THE JAPANESE SOLDIER AND RUSSIAN OPINION.
The soldier in the field is always an interesting study. The absence
of those influences that regulate habits and manners in cities: the
communism and openness of his life all tend to make him the natural
man, to bring out his true character and to develop in him the manly
qualities--patience, self-restraint, ingenuity and courage.
In none of these qualities is the Japanese soldier deficient. He has
the patience of Job, and centuries have fixed in him the habit of
self-restraint. His ingenuity is characteristic of an artistic race.
He adapts himself readily to his environment. Whether billetted in the
wretched and filthy hovels of Korea, in the spacious, solid and dirty
houses of China, or on the bleak hillside, he makes himself at home.
In a few hours the place is clean and tidy, and a spray of hawthorn or
wild peach reminds him of the cherry blossom at home. By instinct and
habit the Japanese are a clean people, and there is not in the world
a cleaner army. Their food is simple and wholesome: they rarely drink
anything stronger than boiled water; their regard for sanitary laws is
great, and, as I shall presently show, the mortality in the field from
disease is so small as to be almost incredible.
Of the courage and discipline of the Japanese soldier we have
convincing proof in the Boxer trouble. A trained observer has put
on record: “The admirable spirit shown by all ranks; their reckless
courage and absolute disregard for danger and their perfect discipline
... cannot be too highly praised.” It is a common error to suppose that
the Japanese acquired their skill in war with the adoption of modern
arms and European dress. The truth is that they have been a race of
warriors for ages. Until long after the middle of the last century
they lived under feudal lords exactly as our forefathers lived in the
days of the Black Prince. The habits and instincts formed under feudal
conditions are still strong. The spirit of obedience is paramount,
and there is no danger that the Japanese soldier will not face at the
command of his officer. That allegiance which he paid to his feudal
lord he has given to his Emperor, who is the fountain of all virtues
and the source of every victory.
To many it may seem strange that from a hostile community of military
clans there has sprung in less than half a century a nation instinct
with the most fervid patriotism. Like many other “miracles” in Japan,
this is a natural phenomenon, and was visible in Scotland as far back
as the days of the Stuarts. Whatever its origin there is no gainsaying
the patriotism. It is strong and relentless as the sea, and has
carried the Japanese army over many bloody leagues.
His endurance is not less remarkable than his courage. He can march
far, work hard, and fight like a Trojan on a handful of rice, a few
slices of the root of the lotus and a pickled plum. He never grumbles
at “fatigue” work. The word “grouse” has no place in the soldier’s
vocabulary. He will pull a gun through the mire, make a road over the
swamp, and drag a heavily-laden cart as cheerfully as he will charge a
trench filled with riflemen.
Another advantage the Japanese army can claim. It is well officered.
The men to whom are entrusted not merely brigades but regiments and
companies may be relied upon to show the finest qualities that the
profession of arms can develop. Yet if I was asked to state in one
sentence why the Japanese have been victorious in every battle on sea
and land, I would say: “It is because every Japanese goes into action
determined to die, and it is therefore the other man who dies.”
How did the Russians regard the Japanese? What estimate did they form
of the fighting qualities of their enemy? That the Russians had made
careful study of the Japanese army is manifest from confidential papers
found upon prisoners. These documents, which will be seen in the
appendix to this volume, are the work of an experienced soldier. The
technical parts dealing with the constitution, training, discipline,
and methods of fighting are instructive. But, for the moment, it is
the deductions and generalisations that interest. How inaccurate and
misleading these are may be judged from one or two examples.
[Illustration: Japanese Marching Order: Front View.]
[Illustration: Japanese Marching Order: Back View.]
“The Japanese infantry never attack with the bayonet; they believe that
against the modern rifle bayonet attacks are impracticable, and that
the issue must be decided by powder and shot.... They do not recognise
the necessity of continuing the fight within reach of the bayonet.”
Nothing could be further from the truth, as anyone who reads these
pages may discover for himself. The Japanese love the _arme
blanche_, and never hesitate to use it. With the bayonet they have
proved themselves again and again to be most dangerous foemen, whether
singly or _en masse_. Before Liao-yang a whole division charged
and carried a position at the point of the bayonet and never fired
a shot. At the Sha-ho bayonet charges were almost hourly incidents,
and demonstrated the fallacy, born in South Africa, that entrenched
positions are unassailable save by powder and shot. The Japanese
recognise no “lethal zone swept by a horizontal sheet of lead” within
four hundred yards of an entrenched enemy. They found this the zone of
comparative safety from rifle fire, and went in with the bayonet.
“The Japanese make frontal attacks without attempting turning
movements.”
This certainly has not been characteristic of the operations in
Manchuria. Wide flanking movements have been the distinguishing feature
in Japanese tactics as well as in their strategy. It is true that at
the battle of the Yalu they claimed to have won the victory by direct
frontal attack, yet it cannot be denied that the flanking movement
in the mountains on the east was the immediate cause of the Russian
retirement.
“The Japanese do not like night attacks and night marches.”
Night attacks and night marches are always difficult and hazardous,
and are not “liked” by any army, but the Japanese have never shown any
reluctance to use the cover of night. From the Yalu to the Sha-ho the
campaign has been remarkable for the number of night marches and night
attacks, some of which, according to Japanese staff officers, have been
on a scale never before attempted.
I have given now a general idea of the fighting capacities of the
rival forces as they appeared to one another. Those who are interested
in technical details will do well to study the appendices. Enough,
however, has been said in these chapters to enable the reader to follow
with some insight the narrative of the active campaign.