JAPANESE STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.
The issues of war are not determined by numbers and bank balances. If
victory depended on these factors the British Empire would never have
been created. Our forefathers happily knew not the law of military
science that judges the strength of an army by its size. They were
conscious of another factor that cannot be expressed in figures, in
differences of armament or even in the genius of commanders. This
factor is the spirit of the army. Intangible as the law of gravitation,
it cannot be stated in terms of any known value, yet it gives momentum
to the mass, and without it discipline is but blind obedience, and
courage the mere absence of fear. The duty of military science should
be to determine this factor not less than to ascertain the numerical
strength and armament of an enemy.
Mindful of this duty the Japanese studied the character of the
Russian soldier and found him lacking in qualities that make an army
invincible. The best testimony I can offer on this subject is a
confidential paper written by General Fujii, Chief of the Staff of
General Kuroki’s Army and Commandant of the Staff College. It is a
concise and modest document, yet it contains psychological truths of
greater value than columns of facts and figures.
It is clear from this official survey that the Japanese did not accept
the European estimate of the fighting capacity of their enemy. A
military _attaché_ who was in a large measure responsible for
British official opinion of the Russian army exclaimed after the battle
of Liao-yang: “My reputation is gone! For years I have been urging that
Russian troops are invincible and here am I running away with them
every day!”
The Staff in Tokyo were under no delusion. After careful study and
observation they discovered the weak places in the Muscovite armour and
were never for a moment doubtful of the issue. They knew the capacity
of the Russian officer, his want of initiative, his proneness to
jealousy and divided counsel, his readiness to put personal interest
and comfort before every other consideration.
Among the multitude of things left behind by the Russians in their
retreat from Liao-yang not the least interesting and valuable were the
general orders issued from day to day by their Commander-in-Chief.
They disclose the gravest defects in the discipline of the army, and
more especially of the Cossacks. It appears from them that the Colonel
of one Cossack regiment was removed from his command for deserting a
post of great importance at the mere rumour of the approach of the
enemy and without writing to inform the force to his immediate front--a
defection that endangered the whole movement. Two Colonels of the 23rd
East Siberian Regiment were cashiered for reasons not stated, and the
Commanding Officer of the 3rd Ural Cossacks was dismissed the service
for conduct unworthy of an officer and for habitual drunkenness.
These are only a few examples of the looseness of discipline in the
higher commissioned ranks. Numbers of Russian officers, according to
the testimony of British and French Missionaries in Liao-yang, were
drinking with courtesans while their regiments were fighting at the
front. Many also were censured by General Kuropatkin for discussing in
public the conduct of the war and the character of their seniors in
rank.
The state of affairs disclosed in these documents confirmed the
Japanese in their opinion that the Russians were inferior to themselves
in discipline and training, and will strengthen the conviction of all
who have mingled with Russian military and naval officers that the army
officer is often a person of inferior character and social position. So
marked, indeed, is the distinction, that Russian naval officers rarely
accept on a footing of social equality their comrades in the army.
Of General Kuropatkin as Commander-in-Chief the Japanese staff never
entertained a very high opinion. They were inclined to the opinion of
Skobeleff under whom Kuropatkin laid the foundation of his reputation.
“You are an ambitious man and will have a fine career, but do not
forget my advice. Never accept an independent post in which you will
have to direct affairs.” The truth is that after the battle of the
Yalu, the Japanese refused to accept the European opinion that General
Kuropatkin was a great strategist and skilful in manœuvre.
“He lost his opportunity after the Yalu,” said General Fujii, than
whom there is no more competent critic. “Kuropatkin may be a great
organiser, but in the field he is not to be feared.”
Neither did the Japanese understand the chorus of praise over
Kuropatkin’s “masterly retreats.” They have not reached the decadent
stage which accepts even successful retreat as a proof of military
capacity. The Japanese estimate of the Russian General may be given
in one sentence from the lips of a distinguished soldier: “He never
attempts any great movement, but is always content with nibbling and
retiring.”
While not under-rating the courage of the Russian soldier, the Japanese
looked upon him as an ignorant and stupid peasant, who is easily
depressed by failure.
“They are an imperfectly educated, strongly religious and _naïve_
sort of people. If there is a great hero to lead and set them an
example they are not men to fear death, as was seen at Plevna,
where they piled up corpses for earthworks and dashed into the
enemy’s trenches. Yet if they meet any little reverse they are at
once terrified and panic-stricken, and run away in confusion. It is
therefore necessary to frighten them in the beginning.”
I am quoting from the confidential study of the Russian army, to which
I would add the practical comment of an officer who fought from the
Yalu to the Sha-ho: “We always win in the last ten minutes, because the
Russians will not stay long enough.”
Their infantry often charge with the bayonet, but they have little
skill in its use, and none at all in individual encounter.”
And what of the Cossack, about whom tradition has woven a dazzling and
invincible fame? The Japanese dismiss him with mild contempt, which
events have justified.
“The Cossack in the war of 1877 made no heroic movement. His reputation
is built entirely on his own reports, which are always exaggerated. He
invariably retires when met by a stronger force. If our infantry is a
little careful we need have no fear of the Cossack.”
In this estimate of the Russian army I have abstained from expressing
any personal opinion, knowing that it would be valueless. Those who
have any curiosity to study the Japanese view will be rewarded by
consulting General Fujii’s paper, which will be found in the appendix.
I would add only this tribute to the bravery of the Russian soldiers.
If they do not know how to fight they know at least how to die. Never
except over the ruins of Fort Shishishan in the last days of Port
Arthur have I seen the white flag.