[Illustration: William Maxwell.
(Taken in the Mou-tien-ling Pass.)]
FROM THE YALU
TO PORT ARTHUR
A PERSONAL RECORD.
BY
WILLIAM MAXWELL,
Lately Special Correspondent of _The Standard_,
now of _The Daily Mail_.
_WITH 33 ILLUSTRATIONS AND 3 MAPS._
London:
HUTCHINSON & CO.,
Paternoster Row, E.C.
1906
PRINTED BY
A. CHRIS. FOWLER,
MOORFIELDS AND SHOREDITCH,
LONDON, E.C.
_PREFATORY NOTE._
_So many accounts have been written of the War between Russia and
Japan that apology may be demanded for adding another to these records.
My excuse is that a very limited number of European and American
correspondents accompanied the Japanese Army, and that I may claim to
be the only correspondent who was with General Kuroki from the Yalu
to the Sha-ho; and, with my interpreter, Mr. Ito, the only observer,
European, American or Japanese, present at these engagements, and at
the last assaults upon and surrender of Port Arthur._
_To General Kuroki and the Officers of his Staff I am under many
obligations. Especially am I indebted to General Fujii, Chief of the
Staff, who showed me many favours and gave me much valuable information
which now appears for the first time._
_In the opening chapter will be found a short summary of the
events that led to the War. It contains matter that may throw a
little new light upon some phases of the diplomatic struggle. In the
appendix are studies of the Russian and Japanese Armies which were
issued as confidential papers before the War. I commend them to the
close attention of all who have a professional interest in military
science._
_WILLIAM MAXWELL._
Contents of Chapters
CHAPTER I
The Origin of the War--A Glance over Three Centuries--Korea and
Japan--War between China and Japan--Peace--Russian Intrigue--A
Temporary Agreement--Russian “Instructors” at Seoul--Protest and
Exasperating Delay in Negotiations--Korean Emperor Unexpectedly
Firm--Russia Obtains the Use of Port Arthur--Her Traders in
Korea--Japanese Patience Exhausted.
CHAPTER II
Japanese Study of the Russian Army--Remarkable Confidential
Paper--Concise and Accurate Estimate--Incapacity of the
Russian Officer--Lack of Discipline--Kuropatkin “Not to be
Feared”--Necessary to Frighten the Russian Soldiers--Contempt
for the Cossack.
CHAPTER III
The Japanese Soldier and Russian Opinion--His Patience,
Self-restraint, Ingenuity and Courage--Russian Deductions Mainly
Wrong--Theory Falsified by Fact.
CHAPTER IV
The Plan of Campaign and the Japanese Leaders--Russian
Defensive Triangle--Base Formed by the Yalu--First
Point of Attack--Anticipated Early Fall of
Port Arthur--Tardy Development of Japanese
Campaign--Yamagata--Oyama--Kodama--Tanaka--Fukushima--Kuroki--Fujii
--Their Character and Personality.
CHAPTER V
The Landing in Korea--Seoul Entered--Destruction of
the Varyag--Control of the Korean Gulf--Pyng-yang
Occupied--Strategic Position Won--Russian Lack of
Foresight--Michtchenko’s Mysterious Movements--Misled by Korean
Spies--Cossacks Retire North--A Tactical Error.
CHAPTER VI
The Northern Advance--Kuroki at Pyn-gyang--Four Problems to
Solve--Danger of Russian Move Southwards--A Thirty Miles
Line--Terrible Roads--No Opposition--Halt for Supplies--A
Choice of Roads--Both Utilised--Russian Attack on Chonju
repulsed--Landing Place for Heavy Guns Secured--A Path Across
Fifteen Miles of Morass.
CHAPTER VII
En route for the Front--“The Men of Great Patience”--From
Chinampo to Pyng-yang--A Dismal Journey--Dignified Korean
Governor--Pyng-yang, its Smells and Abominations--Demon
Worship--Coin of the Realm--Miles of Transport--Head-quarters at
last.
CHAPTER VIII
The Valley of the Yalu--Wiju, “the Stronghold of the
West”--Japanese Concentration Complete--A Network of
Rivers--Study of the Position--How the River Runs--Tiger
Hill--How and Where shall we Cross--Vague Information--Kuroki’s
Difficulties.
CHAPTER IX
Bridging the Yalu--A Memorable Feat--Daring
Reconnaissance--Energy of the Engineers--The Island of
Kontonto--Suitable for the Howitzers--Safely Landed and
Screened--The Field Guns next--Russians Bombard the Bridge--Work
Uninterrupted--Field Guns Over the Main Stream--Pontoons
Struck--Another Bridge Facing Tiger Hill--Ploughshares as
Anchors--Ten Bridges Put Together Under Cover.
CHAPTER X
Preparing for Battle--Description of the Scene--Like Painted
Canvas--View of the Russian Position--Reminiscent of the
Tugela--Should be Impregnable--The Russians Reconnoitre--And
Retire--Japanese Preparations Completed--The Islands Cleared--A
Fight for Tiger Hill--Important Flanking Movement--General Plan
of Attack.
CHAPTER XI
The First Encounter--Japanese Confidence--Five Thousand
Wounded Expected--The Russian Dispositions--Ignorance of the
Direction of the Attack--A Front of Eighteen Miles--Primitive
Trenches--Kuroki Risks a Divided Command--An Anxious Night.
CHAPTER XII
The Passage of the Yalu--The Guns Begin to Speak--Japanese
Batteries Unmasked--Two Hours’ Artillery Duel--Russian
Retirement--Japanese Right Advance--Crossing the River at
Night--The First of May--A General Attack--No Faith in Boer
Tactics--Plunging through the River--Desperate Struggle--The
Position Taken--Banzai!
CHAPTER XIII
The Pursuit and the Lessons--Supports and Reserves in Play--A
Detached Russian Force--Fierce Rearguard Fight--Priest as
Leader--Capture of Guns--Russian Casualties--The Enemy’s
Misplaced Confidence--Effect of Japanese Fire--Common Shell and
Shrapnel--Not a Frontal Attack--Why no Counter Attack?
CHAPTER XIV
After the Battle--A Moving Picture--Kuroki at Ease--Wounded and
Dying--“Unser Vater”--The Realism of War--An Appreciation of
the Japanese Task--Saving of the Living--Return to Camp--Close
Shave--Nearly Shot for a Cossack.
CHAPTER XV
“The Peace of the East”--Antung City--The Godmothers of Japan,
Korea and China--Manchurians as Men--Japanese March through
Antung--A Dutch Kitchen--Native Houses--The Privilege of
Conquerors--My Quarters in a Temple--A Feast Day.
CHAPTER XVI
The March into Manchuria--Feng-Hoang-Cheng--“The Merciful Man
has no Enemies”--The Governors of the Province--The Manchu as
Soldier--A Beautiful Country--March to Kao-li-men--Russians
Fall Back upon Liao-Yang--The Intendent of the Eastern
Marshes--Informing Interview--“Twenty years since I spoke with
an Englishman”--Nearly like a Cardinal.
CHAPTER XVII
The Soldier and his War Songs--Temple Bell and Rifle Shot--The
War Song of Nippon--Political rather than Martial--Sir Ian
Hamilton’s Translation.
CHAPTER XVIII
In Memory of the Dead--A Shinto Service--Memories of Omdurman,
Khartoum and Ladysmith--The Lost Origin of a Ritual--A Genuine
Product of Japanese Soil--A Religion only in Name--The Essence
of the Creed--The High Priest’s Allocution--General Nishi’s
Eulogy--Tribute to the Fallen.
CHAPTER XIX
A Buddhist Ceremony--Japan’s Foreign Civilization but Indigenous
Religion--“The sins of Russia have offended Buddha”--A Sermon
instinct with Patriotism--The Offering of Incense.
CHAPTER XX
Why the Japanese lingered at Feng-hoang-cheng--Many Reasons for
Hesitation--Kuroki’s Caution--A New Factor--What the Russians
ought to have done--An Interval of Forty-five Days but no Waste
of Time--Our Right Flank Cleared.
CHAPTER XXI
Advance toward Liao-yang--Enemy Abandon Mou-tien-ling
Pass--Evidences of Confused Retreat--Heaven-reaching Pass--Rain
for Three Nights and Days--Splendid Defences Deserted--Effect of
a Flanking Movement--The Northern Road Open--A Surprise--Russian
Assault on our Outposts--A Hand-to-hand Encounter--An Attack
Badly Planned and Badly Executed.
CHAPTER XXII
Attack on Mou-tien-ling--The Japanese “Mother” us--“You
must wait”--To-wan--Engagements at Dawn--The Guns
Speak--Reinforcements Hurried Up--Inexplicable Retirement of
the Enemy--Vigorous Pursuit--A Deadlock--The Need for Horse
Artillery--Sharp Fighting on our Right--Why these repeated
efforts to capture positions already abandoned?
CHAPTER XXIII
Assault on Chaotoa--Important Strategic Position--Its Strength
and Entrenchments--A Day of Desultory Fighting--Under Cover
of Darkness--Attack at Dawn--Weak Point in the Russian
Position--The Signal--A Timely Arrival--Rush into the
River--Brilliant Capture of Chaotoa.
CHAPTER XXIV
The Advance on Liao-yang--A General Action--We Leave
Mou-tien-lien--Axioms of War put to the Test--Kuroki and
Kuropatkin Face to Face--The Ramparts of Manchuria--We Hold
the Enemy’s Front--A Race for a Pass--Check on our Left
Flank--Prolonged Artillery Duel--A Torrid Afternoon--Drinking
amid a Hail of Bullets--Shrapnel fails again--The Centre
Relieves the Left--All the Objectives in our Hands--Kuropatkin’s
Failure to Deliver Counter Attack.
CHAPTER XXV
Attack on Yu-shu-ling--A Dramatic Encounter--An Isolated
Engagement essential to the General Movement--Four o’Clock
in the Morning--“The Enemy is upon us”--Russian Headlong
Flight--Makura-yama--Diversion on the Enemy’s Right--A Gauntlet
of Fire--Russian Retreat on Am-ping.
CHAPTER XXVI
The Battle of Liao-yang--Preparing the Way--Increased Russian
Activity--How Kuroki Drove Kuropatkin to his Last Defences
about Liao-yang--Two Hundred Thousand Men and Three Defensive
Lines--Detailed Action and Skilled Co-operation--A Wedge of
Steel in the Heart of the Enemy.
CHAPTER XXVII
The Russian Army Retires on Liao-yang--“To-day the Russians
are very Obstinate”--A Dense Fog--Russians Retire on their
Second Line--Five Months in the Mountains--The Freedom of the
Plains--Leisurely Russian Retirement--The Moral of Long Range
Artillery--Startling Flight on the Last Defences--Within Fifteen
Hundred Yards of the Enemy’s Trenches--Deficiency of Japanese
Field Signalling--In Prosperous Am-ping.
CHAPTER XXVIII
The Assault on Liao-yang--The Sedan of Manchuria?--First
Evidence of Permanent Russian Occupation--Kuroki’s Reasons for
Retirement--Shou-shan--Hundreds of Guns Engaged--Our Infantry
unable to Advance--Nozu Checked--Stale-mate at Nightfall--Battle
begins again at Dawn--Weary, Inconclusive Day.
CHAPTER XXIX
Capture of Liao-yang--The Supreme Moment at Hand--Truce of the
Night--An Apparently Impregnable Position--Reckless Courage of
the Japanese--Three Attacks and Three Repulses--An Irresistible
Onrush--Liao-yang Won--Unflinching Rearguard at the Railway
Station--Kuropatkin’s Main Army on its way to Mukden--Orderly
Retirement--No Sedan after all.
CHAPTER XXX
Kuroki Crosses the Tai-tsu--A Great Achievement--Kuropatkin’s
Strategy Frustrated--Kuroki’s New Task--Absence
of Favourable Conditions--River Crossed without
Opposition--Manjuyama--Kuropatkin’s Eye--Fierce Artillery
Struggle--Passing through an Inferno--Fighting all
Night--Capture of Manjuyama--Terrible Sacrifice--Unavailing Move
against Ponchiho--“Bitter in the mouth.”
CHAPTER XXXI
Retreat of the Russians--We are too Exhausted to Pursue--Failure
of the Field Wire--A Triple Line of Dead--Horrors of a Soldier’s
Grave--Fog again--Twelve Days’ Casualties--Why Kuropatkin
Escaped.
CHAPTER XXXII
Battle of Sha-ho--Kuropatkin’s Address to his Army--Reason of
the Retreat--Now strong enough to abandon the Defensive and
ensure Victory--Stringent Orders from St. Petersburgh--The
Move South Begins--Our Right Wing Falls Back--A Gigantic
Struggle--Half-a-Million Men Engaged--Russian Plan of
Attack--Critical Situation on our Right--Spectacular Cossacks.
CHAPTER XXXIII
A Gallant Fight--The Weakness of Ponchiho--Umizawa
Forced Back--Both Sides Reinforced--Desperate Measures
Required--Oyama Orders a General Attack--Inferiority of Japanese
Artillery--A Terrible Day of Battle--“Order, Counter-order,
Disorder”--Russian Failure all along the Line.
CHAPTER XXXIV
A Hard-won Victory--The Moment to Strike--An Inspiring
Spectacle--How the Japanese Advanced--Assault on Temple
Hill--Its Capture--Russians Prepare to Retreat--Ponchiho
Surrounded--Prince Kun-in to the Rescue--First Instance of
Cavalry Usefulness--We Manage to Hold On.
CHAPTER XXXV
The Last Struggle--The General Advance--Very Slow Progress--The
Famous Okasaki Brigade--Its Exploits--An Assault that
Failed--Enemy Withdraw in the Night--We Follow Them Up--Pursuit
and Slaughter--Fifty Guns Captured--Ten Thousand Dead Russians.
CHAPTER XXXVI
A Forlorn Hope--Stirring Episode of the Battle--A Night
Attack--Difficult Operation--Elaborate Preparations--A Horror
of Great Darkness--Slowly Pressing Onward--Zone of Death--The
Russian Imperial Regiment--Fearless and Resolute Men--Stronghold
Swept by Fire and Bayonet--Step by Step--Not Died in Vain.
CHAPTER XXXVII
Valley of the Shadow--Dead and Dying--Plucked from the Grave--A
Shattered Victim--Strangely Pathetic Group--A Soldier on his
Knees--“Kick him up”--A Slain Drummer.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
Mukden in Sight--Storming a Hill--Four Roads Open to the
Retreat--Our Failure to Envelop the Enemy--Its Reason--Caution
Justified--A Feature of the War--Breakdown of the Russian
Intelligence Branch--Bombardment of a Mountain--At Close
Quarters Again--Courageous and Audacious Defence--Flight.
CHAPTER XXXIX
The Story of a Famous Brigade--General Okasaki’s 4,000
Fighting Men--Their 3,889 Casualties--Unshaken Morale of the
Brigade--Okasaki’s Career--What the Brigade Did--A Crowded and
Stirring Chronicle--Typical of the Japanese Infantry.
CHAPTER XL
To Port Arthur--A Change of Scene--Miscalculations as to
Port Arthur--Permission to Join Nogi--Appreciation of
Privilege--Hurrying South.
CHAPTER XLI
The Surrender--New Year’s Day--Flag of Truce--A Land of
Silence--Incredible News--“Port Arthur has Fallen”--Stoessel’s
Message--Fateful Council of War--Orders to Destroy the
Ships--Nogi Agrees to Negotiate--His Delegates--“The Road to
Peace”--Plum Tree Cottage--Terms of Capitulation--Russian
Requests--The Answer--Fire in Port Arthur--Stoessel’s Enquiries
after Kuropatkin and the Baltic Fleet--Kondrachenko, the Heart
and Soul of the Defence--Stoessel’s View of the Cause of the
War--His Wish to Retire.
CHAPTER XLII
The Two Leaders--Sketch of Nogi--The Meeting--Stoessel’s Honour
Preserved--Nogi’s Bereavement--A Courteous Gift--Stoessel on
his Way to Dalny--Inside the War-scarred City--The Broken
Battleships--Nogi’s Triumphant Entry--The Japanese Good Soldiers
but Bad on Parade--Russian Officers on the Defence--Technical
Criticisms.
CHAPTER XLIII
Why did General Stoessel Surrender?--Port Arthur Capable of
Further Resistance--Four Justifications for Capitulation
Examined--Facts and Figures--The Last Days Less Glorious than
the First--The General, and not the Garrison, Surrendered.
CHAPTER XLIV
Japanese Guns and Horses--The One Advantage of their Guns--Their
Predilection for Common Shell--Good Results--Tactical
Deficiencies--The Cavalry--Difficulty of Forming Correct
Judgment--The Conservative Cavalry Officer--Spirited Defence of
his Branch--The Korean Stock to Blame--Lack of Opportunity to
Test Capacity--The Lance must be Relegated to Museums.
CHAPTER XLV
Children and the War--True Hero Worshippers--A Missive to Lord
Roberts--Kuroki’s Letter Bag--Blood-curdling Sentiments--His
Punctiliousness in Replying--Girls Better Letter Writers than
Boys--Some Juvenile Examples.
CHAPTER XLVI
Comrades at Last--An Incident of Battle--Told by an Officer of
Kuroki’s Staff--Wounded Japanese and Russian Fraternise--A Story
of Devotion.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
_Facing
page_
_Frontispiece_ 1
Japanese Marching Order: Front View }
Japanese Marching Order: Back View } 18
In comfortable Quarters }
My Interpreter and Staff } 44
General View of the Russian Positions on the North Bank of
the Yalu 52
Japanese Infantry fording the Yalu 56
A Close View of the Yalu 84
A Cavalry Regiment crossing the River 88
A Gun Team in the Water 92
On the Line of Retreat 96
The Day after the Retreat 98
Abandoned Russian Field Kitchen 100
City Wall, Feng-Hoang-Cheng }
A Street Scene, Feng-Hoang-Cheng } 114
Japanese Ambulance Party, Chaotoa 176
Captured Russian Guns 186
Japanese Funeral Service }
The Tower at To-wan } 194
After the Fight }
The Red Cross at Work } 200
A Buddhist Shrine }
Figure of Buddha } 268
Temple Hill: Ruins of Temple and Gods }
A Manchurian Scavenger } 286
Foreign Attachés and Correspondents 314
Russian Warship on Fire, Port Arthur 340
What we found in Port Arthur 354
General Nogi enters Port Arthur }
Breech of Japanese Siege Gun } 356
Japanese marching into Port Arthur }
Snapshot of Madame Stoessel } 358
Horse-shoeing Extraordinary 368
MAPS
Battle of Yalu 64
Liao-yang 214
Battle of Liao-yang 228
From the Yalu to Port Arthur
Chapter I
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
For the origin of the war between Russia and Japan we must glance
back over three centuries. After the famous expedition of 1592–8,
Korea was bound to Japan by the closest ties. It was an independent
Kingdom in “political intercourse” with the Japanese as distinguished
from countries like Holland and China, whose relations were purely
commercial. For this reason the Government at Seoul was notified in
1869 of the overthrow of the Shagunate and the restoration of the
Imperial Authority. Ignorant of events beyond her own borders, and
animated by a spirit of aggressive conservatism, Korea refused to
acknowledge the new Government and returned a defiant and insulting
answer to the representations of the Mikado.
Upon this issue the newly organised Government in Japan was divided.
One party was for vindicating the national honour by appeal to arms;
the other party was for peace at any price. The peace party prevailed
and Field Marshal Saigo, who more than any other man was responsible
for the new order of things and for the restoration of the Imperial
power, withdrew from public life. Trusted and beloved by the people, he
was followed into retirement by several hundred soldiers and civilians
who held office under the new Government. When Saigo emerged from
privacy it was as leader of the rebellion of 1877, which was quelled
after a sanguinary struggle that lasted eight months.
Meanwhile the Koreans were encouraged to acts of aggression, and a
Japanese gunboat, taking soundings near Chemulpo, was fired upon. The
fort was attacked and the garrison dispersed. Recognising the Chinese
claim of suzerainty over Korea, the Japanese entered into negotiations
in Pekin. But the Government of China declined to be responsible for
the acts of this tributary kingdom, and declared that the Koreans had
complete liberty to do whatever they liked in all matters of State,
whether internal or external. Upon this repudiation of her suzerain
power, the Japanese despatched a mission to Korea and a treaty was
made between the two countries. The preamble to that document contains
a precise declaration that Korea is “an independent country, equal to
Japan.”
As soon as the danger was past, China, after her wont, sought to
reassert her claim to suzerain power. By stealthy and underhand means
she strove to regain her authority over Korea. Chinese interference
in the foreign affairs of the Hermit Kingdom became acute in 1882 and
was the cause of the riots at Seoul. These disturbances were directed
against the Japanese colony and legation, and, being met by intrigues
on the part of the Japanese residents, were responsible for the war
between China and Japan in 1894–5.
No sooner had peace been concluded than Russian intrigue took the place
of Chinese, and Japan found herself threatened by a more persistent
and formidable rival for control over her neighbour Korea. Having
just been deprived of the fruits of victory by a coalition of Russia,
France and Germany, the Japanese were not prepared to enter immediately
upon a struggle with the Czar. They accordingly came to terms with
Russia, and on May 14th, 1896, an agreement was entered into at Seoul
between Baron Komura, _chargé d’affaires_--now Minister of Foreign
Affairs and chief negotiator of the treaty of peace at Portsmouth--and
M. J. Waeber, the representative of Russia. In the same year another
agreement was made at Moscow between the Marquis Yamagata--now chief of
staff at Imperial Head-Quarters--and Prince Lobanoff.
The vital part of that agreement is in the clause which states that
“with the object of relieving Korea from financial embarrassment,
Russia and Japan counsel the Government to suppress all useless charges
and to establish equilibrium between expenditure and revenue.
“If after the introduction of reforms recognised to be indispensable,
it becomes necessary to have recourse to external loans, the two
Governments (Russia and Japan) will in common accord lend their
support to Korea. The Governments of Japan and Russia will endeavour,
as far as the financial and economic situation of the countries will
admit, to leave to Korea the creation and maintenance of an armed
force of native police sufficiently large to preserve internal order
without foreign assistance. In the event of the contracting parties
desiring more precise or detailed definition, or in the event of other
points arising on which it may be necessary to act in concert, the
representatives of the two Powers shall be charged with the duty of
arriving at a friendly understanding.”
This treaty is the basis of the report that the Marquis Ito was
desirous of forming an alliance, not with Great Britain, but with
Russia. The ink was hardly dry before the Russian Government began to
display that bad faith which has characterised her policy in the East.
M. Alexieff, an official in the Treasury at St. Petersburgh, who is
not to be confused with the Admiral of the same name who figured so
prominently later on, was despatched as a sort of financial agent;
and several Russian military agents under the familiar guise of
“instructors” were imposed upon the King at Seoul, who was informed
that the number would be increased to twenty-six.
The Japanese Government was not made cognisant of these acts of
“pacific penetration,” nor was its opinion invited. As soon as the
Government in Tokyo became aware of the presence of these Russian
agents at Seoul, its representative at St. Petersburg was instructed
to enter a protest, and to point out that the action of the Russian
Government was in violation of the spirit of the agreement between
the Marquis Yamagata and Prince Lobanoff. Count Muravieff was at
that time Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Lobanoff having died
in the interval. The new Minister declared that the appointment of
these advisers and instructors was the act of Prince Lobanoff. While
disclaiming responsibility, Count Muravieff urged that the Emperor
of Korea was an independent Sovereign and that Russia could not well
refuse his request for agents and advisers. He promised, however, that
no more “military instructors” should be sent to Seoul, though it was
impossible to recall those already there.
This discussion was protracted with exasperating delays until news
reached Tokyo of the occupation of Kiao-chiao by Germany. Remembering
the part played by Germany after the war with China, the Japanese not
unnaturally suspected another act of collusion with Russia, and their
representative in St. Petersburg was instructed to invite an expression
of opinion on the subject. Count Muravieff treated the occupation as of
no consequence. The Russian Government, he remarked, did not look upon
the matter very seriously. The action of Germany was instigated by the
desire of the Emperor to stimulate enthusiasm for the expansion of the
navy and not by any motive of aggression in the Far East. Accordingly,
the Russian Government could take no step and could enter no protest
against the German occupation of a Chinese port.
That Kiao-chiao was the first card laid upon the table in this game of
diplomatic “bluff” was quickly apparent. Russia had already made up her
mind to acquire Port Arthur, and, with it, command of the Eastern Seas.
On the last day of the year 1897 Count Muravieff dined with the Czar
and the Empress Dowager, and on the first day of the New Year he had
an interview with the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg. The Count
declared that the Czar was desirous of arriving at an understanding
about Korea on the basis of recognising the preponderant interest of
Japan in that country; Russia having there no interest other than
political and that of no great importance. The Empress Dowager, added
Count Muravieff, had expressed similar opinions, and they were anxious
to learn the views of the Japanese.
The Minister replied that nothing would be more welcome to the Japanese
Government, for ever since the Chinese war they had been very desirous
of coming to such an understanding about Korea. He himself, as the
Count well knew, had, throughout a whole year, endeavoured to bring
about an agreement of that kind, but had not succeeded. Invited to name
a day for beginning the negotiations, Count Muravieff displayed no
convincing alacrity. He had authority to do no more than communicate
the desire of the Czar and to ask in a general way the views of the
Japanese Minister. Further consideration was necessary and at an early
and convenient day he would make another communication.
The next step was taken in Tokyo, in January, 1898, when the Russian
Minister informed the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs that Russia
would support the “commercial and industrial interests” of Japan in
Korea, and was prepared to come to an understanding on that basis.
Experience had taught the Japanese to be wary in their dealings
with Russian diplomacy, and Tokyo required a pledge of good faith.
Before _pourparlers_ began, the Czar must recall from Korea his
“financial adviser” and “military instructors.”
Again Russia displayed no unseemly haste. While the Czar was
deliberating, a confidential information from China came to the
Japanese Government to the effect that Russia was demanding a long
lease of Port Arthur. There was the secret of this complacence toward
Germany and of these tentative offers to Japan. It was added that the
Chinese Government “would not reply in haste,” but would take advantage
of its reputation for never doing to-day what could be put off till the
morrow.
In the month of March an unforeseen incident arose in Korea which
solved the problem of “financial and military advisers.” M. Speyer,
formerly Russian Minister in Tokyo, had been transferred to Seoul, with
the promise that he should succeed to the representation in Pekin. M.
Speyer was a conscientious diplomatist, and when the Emperor of Korea
refused to accept certain proposals made by his Russian “financial and
military advisers,” he issued an ultimatum. His Majesty was allowed
twenty-four hours to decide whether he had need of these advisers.
M. Speyer would not have laid such a trap for himself and M. Alexieff
if he had not been convinced that the Emperor would be terrified into
acceptance of every demand. But His Majesty, assured of support from
another quarter and aware of the dispute between Russia and Japan,
showed unexpected firmness. After three days’ delay he informed M.
Speyer that he had no further need of Russian advisers, and, “with many
thanks for past services,” discharged them from their engagements. Here
was an _impasse_ from which there was no escape without betraying
the determination of the Czar not to relax his hold on Korea.
In St. Petersburg it was recognised that their representative had
managed the business badly and had defeated their carefully laid
scheme. M. Speyer accordingly did not go to Pekin, but was sent to
vegetate at Rio Janeiro. This incident removed every obstacle to
agreement on the subject of Korea, and on April 25th, 1898, was signed
the Nissi and Rosen Convention, which solved the problem of Russian
advisers.
Russia was the more ready to make this concession because nearly a
month before--on March 27--a convention had been signed in Pekin,
whereby China ceded to the Czar the use of Port Arthur, Talien and
the adjacent country. Count Muravieff was evidently convinced that
the withdrawal of the Russian advisers from Korea and the formal
recognition of Japan’s interest in that country would be regarded
in Tokyo as ample compensation for the occupation of Port Arthur.
He boldly expressed this opinion in an interview with the Japanese
Minister, who pointed out that, after all, this was a very one-sided
arrangement, inasmuch as, while Japan’s preponderant interests in
Korea were admitted, she was expressly forbidden by the Nissi-Rosen
convention to appoint advisers to the Emperor of Korea.
The occupation of Wei-hai-wei by Great Britain followed soon
afterwards. Russia clearly anticipated this move, for in April Count
Muravieff caused the Japanese Government to understand that, if they
desired it, China would give an assurance that, after the withdrawal of
the Japanese troops, Wei-hai-wei should not be conceded to any other
Power. Russia was prepared to assent to such an assurance, and was
willing to use her efforts to induce the other Powers to accept that
arrangement. From this act of amazing self-denial Russia was saved by
the Japanese and British Governments. Japan declared that she had no
wish to impose such a condition in the terms of evacuation, and Great
Britain, with the connivance of the Government in Tokyo, and in despite
of Russia, calmly stepped into Wei-hai-wei.
These facts, which cannot be disputed, afford abundant evidence of
the extreme moderation of the Japanese demands. They prove that the
Japanese manifested no hostility to the Russian occupation of Port
Arthur, but were prepared to make great concessions in order to secure
the heritage of Korea, to which they were entitled by conquest, by
“pacific penetration,” and by the necessities of geographical position.
But appetite comes with eating. Having absorbed Port Arthur and begun
on Manchuria, Russia saw no reason why she should not have Korea
also. When her Imperial company promoters and traders crossed the
Yalu, Japanese patience was exhausted. Her fleet and army had been
more successful than her diplomatists, and were more ready to accept
the challenge. The Anglo-Japanese alliance--the sequel to the Russian
occupation of Manchuria after the Boxer trouble--ensured for her a fair
fight, and Japan proceeded to demonstrate to an amazed world that the
Muscovite giant, who had long overshadowed the East, has feet of clay
and the hollowness of sounding brass.