Marines Meet the Challenge
_New American Decisions--A Restructured Military Assistance
Command--Changes in Marine Leadership--Redesignation and
Reorganization--The Vietnamese Marine Brigade--Additional Marine
Activities_
_New American Decisions_
Less than three weeks after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, the
U.S. Presidency changed hands. On 22 November President Kennedy was
assassinated in Dallas and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took
the reigns of the American government. By late November, when the
new president assumed office, the process of political and military
disintegration which had begun in South Vietnam following the Diem
coup was already well underway. This process continued into the early
weeks of 1964 when, in late January, General Nguyen Khanh, the newly
appointed commander of I Corps, seized power in a bloodless coup.
This second turnover in the government of South Vietnam in less than
three months had its most serious impact on the nation’s armed forces.
A new series of command changes ensued and again the government’s
operations against the Communists suffered. As had been the case in the
closing months of 1963, the Viet Cong continued to capitalize on the
government’s disarray by expanding its control into previously secure
areas.
By March the rapidly declining effectiveness of the South Vietnamese
military forces led the Johnson Administration to review the earlier
decisions to withdraw American servicemen and to cut back the military
assistance program. In a 16 March memorandum to President Johnson,
Secretary of Defense McNamara warned that “the [military] situation
had unquestionably been growing worse” in South Vietnam.[10-1] To
counteract this threatening trend, McNamara offered a broad set of
recommendations which included a proposal to support a 50,000-man
increase in the size of the Vietnamese military and paramilitary
forces. The memorandum did not address the question of additional
American advisors who might be needed to supervise the proposed
expansion. In any case, President Johnson approved McNamara’s plan the
following day, thus setting the stage for increases in U.S. military
assistance to South Vietnam.[10-2]
Shortly after his most recent decision on Vietnam, President Johnson
ordered changes in his top civilian and military representatives in
Saigon. On 22 June, General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army, who
had been serving since January as Deputy Commander, USMACV, succeeded
General Harkins as ComUSMACV. One day later, on the 23d, President
Johnson announced that General Maxwell D. Taylor would replace Henry
Cabot Lodge as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. Taylor, who
had been serving since 1962 as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, had been closely associated with the Vietnam problem since his
1961 fact-finding mission. Both he and Westmoreland were thoroughly
familiar with U.S. programs and objectives in Vietnam.
Soon after assuming his new responsibilities, General Westmoreland
requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff augment his command with 5,100
additional military personnel. In his opinion, these men were needed
to support and supervise the expansion of the Vietnamese military and
paramilitary forces. Secretary McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs on 20
July to discuss this request for 900 more advisors and 4,200 additional
support personnel. All agreed that the deteriorating situation in
Vietnam demanded the measure and recommended its approval. The proposal
was forwarded to President Johnson who approved it in early August.
Emphasizing the urgency of the military situation, McNamara then
ordered the Joint Chiefs to complete the entire build-up before 30
September. At this juncture, however, General Westmoreland pointed
out that such a rapid influx of personnel would “overload existing
facilities [in South Vietnam]” and stated his desire to see the
build-up accomplished in a more orderly progression over a period of
several months. After considering the general’s latest request, the
Secretary of Defense withdrew his earlier demand for an accelerated
deployment.[10-3]
[Illustration: _The MACV staff, spring 1964. Seated at head of table
are General Paul D. Harkins, USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, and his relief General William C. Westmoreland, USA.
Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, MACV Chief of Staff, is seated to
General Westmoreland’s immediate left, and Brigadier General Carl A.
Youngdale, USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, is seated two positions
to General Weede’s left. (Photo courtesy of Major General Carl A.
Youngdale, USMC (Ret.))._]
While the details of the expanded U S. advisory program were being
hammered out in Washington, the focus of the administration’s concern
swung abruptly from the battlefields of South Vietnam to the Tonkin
Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam. In two separate incidents during
the first week of August, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked U.S.
Navy ships operating in international waters.[10-A] An international
crisis ensued when the United States retaliated with limited air
strikes against North Vietnamese naval facilities. On 6 August, the
U.S. Congress unanimously passed a joint resolution authorizing the
President “to use all measures, including the commitment of armed
forces to assist [South Vietnam] in the defense of its independence
and territorial integrity....”[10-4] President Johnson signed the
so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution five days after it was passed, and in
so doing, reaffirmed his pledge of full support for the Government of
Vietnam.[10-B]
[10-A] A vigorous debate has since developed concerning the
actual origins of the Tonkin Gulf incidents. It has been
claimed that the Americans precipitated the attacks by
supporting aggressive South Vietnamese naval patrols off
the North Vietnamese coast.
[10-B] U.S. Marines figured prominently in the crisis which
followed the North Vietnamese attacks. A Marine
expeditionary brigade, the 9th MEB, was activated from
elements of the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing and deployed on board amphibious shipping
to a position off Da Nang where it was available to
support U.S. contingency plans. Its commander, Brigadier
General Raymond G. Davis, and his staff attended planning
conferences in Da Nang and reconnoitered possible landing
sites near the city, but the MEB was not committed.
Instead, the organization remained in existence
throughout the remainder of 1964 and into early 1965
when, in March, two of its battalions were landed at Da
Nang. The formation and subsequent commitment of the 9th
MEB in the Republic of Vietnam are covered in detail
in the 1965 history of U.S. Marine operations in the
Republic of Vietnam.
While the tensions generated by the Tonkin Gulf incidents never really
subsided, the immediate crisis soon passed. Thereafter the American
attentions focused once again on South Vietnam where the political and
military situation began to deteriorate at an unprecedented rate after
midyear. Ironically, this process of accelerated decay coincided with
the initiation of a new South Vietnamese pacification strategy designed
to prevent just such an occurrence. One aspect of the strategy was the
Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan. Announced by General Khanh
shortly after his rise to power, this campaign was similar in method
and objective to the defunct Strategic Hamlet Program. Like the earlier
program, the Chien Tang Plan envisioned the restoration of government
influence in selected rural areas through the coordination of military
and paramilitary operations with social and economic development
programs.[10-C] While the Chien Tang campaign was better planned and
far less ambitious than the Strategic Hamlet Program, there were
definite similarities between the two. The instrument for the social,
economic, and political developmental phase of the new effort, for
example, was the New Life Hamlet--a variation of the planned government
community. Begun in some areas around midyear, the New Life Hamlets
were to become the symbol of the new pacification effort in much the
same manner that the fortified hamlets had symbolized the earlier
Strategic Hamlet Program.
[10-C] Motivated at least partially by the requirement to
provide better support for the pacification strategy,
the Vietnamese government restructured its paramilitary
forces in the spring of 1964. The old Self Defense Corps
was expanded dramatically and renamed the Popular Force
(PF). The Civil Guard was reorganized and designated the
Regional Force (RF). More importantly, the RVNAF extended
its control over both paramilitary organizations for the
first time since their creation.
Coincident with the Chien Tang campaign, a similar but locally
concentrated pacification effort was instituted in the rural areas
around Saigon. Designated the Hop Tac Program, this campaign was
conceived in order to link the seven provinces around the capital into
a zone of intensive pacification in which closely coordinated military,
paramilitary, police, and civil activities would systematically reduce
Viet Cong strength. Because of their proximity to the area and their
availability, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the ARVN Airborne
Brigade were assigned primary responsibility for military operations in
support of the Hop Tac campaign. By midyear, the Chien Tang and Hop Tac
plans emerged as the backbone of General Khanh’s strategy to stave off
further Communist advances in critical areas of the country.
The development of the government’s newest pacification strategy,
however, was based on the assumption that the Viet Cong would pursue
a campaign to strengthen their control in South Vietnam’s populated
rural areas. Such was not the case. Instead, at midyear the Communists
began waging a brand of warfare characterized by large-scale mobile
operations against government military forces. Obviously the enemy had
shifted to the “general counter-offensive”--that phase of guerrilla
warfare designed to bring on the complete political and military
collapse of the opposition.
The new Viet Cong strategy revealed itself in two general geographic
areas during the fall months. In Binh Dinh Province on the coast of
northern II Corps, two Viet Cong main force regiments staged a series
of particularly swift and successful attacks which virtually eliminated
the government’s presence except in the province capital, Qui Nhon,
and a few district towns. In a coordinated offensive the Communists
increased pressure throughout that portion of the Central Highlands
west of Binh Dinh Province, thereby threatening to sever South Vietnam
along an axis that extended roughly between Qui Nhon on the coast and
Pleiku in the highlands. Meanwhile, another phase of the new initiative
unfolded in III Corps where the government’s Hop Tac campaign was
just getting underway. There the Communist offensive threatened to
neutralize the government’s concentrated pacification campaign.
Eroded by the political side-effects of the battlefield developments,
South Vietnam’s fragile power structure became increasingly unstable.
The last five months of 1964 brought frequent changes in the Saigon
government although General Khanh was able to maintain a semblance of
control until December. The turmoil then climaxed when Air Vice Marshal
Nguyen Cao Ky, the commander of the Vietnamese Air Force, engineered a
bloodless coup that forced Khanh from the Saigon political scene.
The frequent changes of government coupled with the stepped-up Viet
Cong military pressure throughout Vietnam produced a downward spiral
in the effectiveness of the republic’s armed forces. By the end of the
year it was becoming increasingly doubtful that the government could
stave off total collapse even with the increased volume of military
assistance it was already receiving from the United States. Against
this backdrop of Communist military activities, unprecedented political
instability on the part of the South Vietnamese, and mounting combat
losses, American military involvement in Vietnam deepened.
_A Restructured Military Assistance Command_
In many respects 1964 was a year of transition for the U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam. Not only did the command experience a
change in leadership when General Westmoreland replaced General Harkins
as ComUSMACV, but it was thoroughly reorganized in preparation for the
more vigorous U.S. advisory program which was expected to begin about
midyear.
The major organizational change within MACV took place on 15 May when
the MAAG was abolished and its staff integrated into that of the
senior command. In June MACV itself was restructured under a new table
of distribution. These changes reflected the anticipated influx of
advisors and support personnel, and therefore concerned the Army more
than the other U.S. armed services.
Initially, the number of Marine billets on the restructured Military
Assistance Command staff did not change substantially. Twenty-four
Marines (15 officers and nine enlisted) were included in the new table
of distribution. This represented a net increase of only one over the
number previously assigned to the MAAG and MACV staffs. By the end of
September, however, Marines temporarily assigned to the MACV staff from
FMFPac commands brought the on-board strength to 37. Another increase
occurred in the early fall when eight more permanent Marine billets
(three officers and five enlisted) were approved.
_Changes in Marine Leadership_
Two key links in the Marine command chain that joined government policy
decisions in Washington to Marine Corps operations in Vietnam changed
hands during the first 60 days of 1964. On 1 January, General Wallace
M. Greene, Jr., replaced General Shoup as Commandant of the Marine
Corps. Greene, known in American military circles as a brilliant staff
officer, had been serving since 1960 as Chief of Staff of the Marine
Corps. By 1964 he had become an outspoken supporter of South Vietnam’s
struggle for independence. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
as a Chief of Service, his presence in administration policies would be
felt until his tour as commandant ended on 31 January 1967.
An equally important change occurred in early March when General
Greene named Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak to replace General
Roberts as Commanding General, FMFPac. A 1934 graduate of the U.S.
Naval Academy, Krulak had won the Navy Cross during ground action in
World War II. He arrived in the Pacific from Washington where he had
served both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as special assistant for
counterinsurgency matters. Having made numerous fact-finding trips to
Vietnam in this capacity, he was intimately familiar with the unique
political-military struggle being waged there. He also had a reputation
of being one of Washington’s most vocal advocates of resisting
Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. A dynamic leader and a man of
strong convictions, Krulak was to exert a pervasive influence over all
Marine operations in the Pacific for nearly half a decade.
Less obvious but of immense importance to both the Marine Corps and
to the future of U.S. military operations in Vietnam was a change
instituted within MACV by General Westmoreland during the early part
of the year. The command’s modified table of organization called for
the establishment of a Deputy ComUSMACV billet to be filled by an Army
general officer. The joint table of distribution for the reorganized
command specified that an Army general would also fill the chief
of staff billet--a position which had been held by General Weede
since MACV’s creation in early 1962. Thus, when Weede’s assignment
ended in May, Major General Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army, became
Westmoreland’s chief of staff while Lieutenant General John L.
Throckmorton, U.S. Army, became Deputy ComUSMACV.[10-D] The Marine
Corps, however, did not lose its entire senior presence on the MACV
staff. Brigadier General Carl A. Youngdale, an officer whose 30-year
career included distinguished combat tours in both World War II and
Korea, arrived 15 January for assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff,
J-2 (Intelligence). His presence on the MACV staff would insure a
Marine voice in U.S. military planning at the Saigon level. Still, many
Marines saw their relative strength on Westmoreland’s staff seriously
reduced--a change which seemed to mark somewhat of a turning point in
the overall management of the military assistance effort.
[10-D] For his service as MACV chief of staff, General Weede was
awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.
_Redesignation and Reorganization_
The reorganization of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
had little initial effect on the Marine advisory program. With the
dissolution of the MAAG, the old Naval Section, under which the Marine
advisors had operated since 1955, was redesignated the Naval Advisory
Group, MACV. Lieutenant Colonel Noren’s Marine Advisory Division,
whose authorized strength remained at 11 officers and nine enlisted
men through the first half of the year, was also renamed in mid-May.
Known thereafter as the Marine Advisory Unit, Vietnam, the organization
continued to function in much the same manner as it had under the
previous arrangements.
The last five months of the year, however, saw some substantial changes
in the composition of the Marine Advisory Unit as the advisor build-up
recently approved by the Secretary of Defense began. Colonel William P.
Nesbit, a recent graduate of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode
Island, relieved Colonel Noren (promoted from lieutenant colonel on
1 July) as the Senior Marine Advisor on 4 September. Colonel Nesbit
arrived in time to supervise the implementation of a new table of
organization which added eight first lieutenants and a captain to the
advisory unit in November.[10-E] The captain and one of the lieutenants
were assigned as advisor and assistant advisor respectively to a new
Vietnamese Marine infantry battalion which was in the process of
being formed. Four other first lieutenants joined Colonel Nesbit’s
command as assistant advisors to existing infantry battalions and one
became the assistant artillery advisor. The two remaining lieutenants
were assigned as advisors to the brigade’s motor transport and
communications companies, replacing noncommissioned advisors. Two
billets were downgraded in rank: the engineer advisor from captain to
first lieutenant, and the artillery advisor from major to captain.
[10-E] A number of the Marines scheduled to fill the newly
created billets did not arrive until early 1965.
In addition to phasing out three enlisted advisor billets, these
changes relieved the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor of his artillery
responsibilities. Colonel Earl E. Anderson, who had been serving since
mid-1963 as the MAAG Chief of Staff, was instrumental in bringing
about this particular modification. Under the old arrangement, the
Senior Marine Advisor’s presence frequently had been required at
the MAAG headquarters in Saigon while the Vietnamese Marine Brigade
headquarters was deployed to combat. As the Assistant Senior Marine
Advisor was likewise torn between two jobs, Anderson had directed that
he be relieved of artillery advisory duties. Thus, Major Raymond C.
Damm, an officer who had served as Assistant Naval Attache in Saigon
between 1959 and 1961, became the first full-time Assistant Senior
Marine Advisor after he joined Colonel Nesbit’s command in May. When
the changes were finally completed, the restructured and redesignated
Marine Advisory Unit included permanent billets for 24 officers and
men (18 officers and six enlisted men).
Another important aspect of the overall Marine advisory program was
altered in the closing months of 1964. Since Lieutenant Colonel
Croizat’s tour with the Vietnamese Marines in the immediate post-Geneva
period, most Marine advisors had attended French language courses
prior to departing for service in Vietnam. As French influence in
Vietnam faded during the late 1950s, however, the requirement for
the language had gradually diminished, particularly as French maps
were replaced by American ones. By the early 1960s this situation had
prompted several Marine advisors to recommend that instruction in
French be replaced by Vietnamese language training. Primarily through
the persistence of Colonels Moody and Noren, the policy was revised in
1964. The arrival of the new advisors in the fall marked the first time
that Marine officers had received formal Vietnamese language training
before beginning their tours. Colonel Nesbit, who had the advantage of
commanding advisors trained in both languages, saw the change as “a
marked step forward,” in improving the advisory effort.[10-5]
_The Vietnamese Marine Brigade_
At the beginning of 1964, the 6,109-man Vietnamese Marine Brigade,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, experienced a crisis
of morale. The recent command changes that had occurred at almost
every echelon and a soaring desertion rate combined to undermine
the brigade’s combat readiness. In February the Khanh government
recalled Colonel Le Nguyen Khang from the Philippines, promoted him to
brigadier general, and reinstated him as commandant in an attempt to
restore the unit’s spirit. A veteran Marine who had been instrumental
in the development of the VNMC since its inception, Khang commanded
confidence throughout the corps. Following his return, increased
attention was given to the welfare of the individual Marine and his
dependents in order to reduce the climbing desertion rate. Under the
close supervision of the senior Vietnamese officers and their American
advisors, the morale problem was gradually overcome.
Throughout the year the Vietnamese Marine Brigade continued to share
the role of South Vietnam’s general reserve force with an ARVN airborne
brigade. Normally at least one Marine battalion was held in the
vicinity of Saigon, ready to respond to tactical emergencies while
others operated nearby in support of the Hop Tac campaign. Still, the
brigade’s infantry battalions managed to see action in every corps
tactical zone except I Corps, which was the farthest removed from
the capital.[10-F] Although sometimes combined into regimental-sized
task forces for specific operations, the individual Marine battalions
normally were attached to either a corps, a province, or an ARVN
division for combat operations. When so attached, the Vietnamese
Marines often were assigned to clear particularly hazardous or
difficult terrain. At times they served as a reserve force, responding
to crucial situations to either recoup or exploit actions initiated by
other government units.
[10-F] South Vietnam’s corps boundaries were adjusted again in
late 1964. The southern boundary of I Corps was moved
south to include Quang Ngai Province. The southern border
of II Corps was also moved southward to include eight
provinces formerly encompassed by III Corps. Under the
new arrangement, III CTZ formed a narrow strip across
the nation which centered roughly on Saigon. The Capital
Military District, the boundaries of which coincided with
those of Gia Dinh Province, formed an enclave within
III Corps. The southernmost tactical zone, IV Corps,
encompassed the entire Mekong Delta.
In early January, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff assigned a Marine
task force to a pacification mission in Go Cong and Long An Provinces,
located just southeast of Saigon. Two VNMC battalions, controlled by
a task force headquarters, moved into the operations area later in
the month and remained until mid-September when the operation was
terminated. The object of the Marine unit’s presence was to reestablish
government control over the region through systematic small unit
operations designed to deny the enemy his usual freedom of movement.
[Illustration:
CORPS TACTICAL ZONES
AT THE END OF 1964
]
Despite the length of this particular deployment, the Vietnamese
Marines fought no major engagements. Furthermore, they had not
translated their improved morale into an effective pacification
operation. While desertions and unauthorized absences remained low
considering the duration of this particular assignment, Colonel Noren
later recalled several flaws in the campaign. These operations, he
remarked “were characterized by inadequate coordination of military
operations and intelligence reporting ... too little operational
activity ... and a seeming lack of appreciation of the objectives of
pacification.”[10-6] Colonel Nesbit, who became the Senior Marine
Advisor as the operation entered its final stages, tended to confirm
this assessment. “The capacity of the task force headquarters in staff
functioning,” he reported, “was marginal.”[10-7]
[Illustration: _General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the
Marine Corps, inspects an honor guard of Vietnamese Marines. With him
are Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese
Marine Corps, and Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff,
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (Official USMC Photo)._]
While the drive to pacify the Go Cong-Long An areas was in progress,
other Vietnamese Marine task forces were organized to undertake
different combat assignments elsewhere in the southern portion of
Vietnam. One, composed of two battalions, an artillery detachment, and
a headquarters element, launched a brief clearing operation northwest
of Saigon in heavily populated Tay Ninh Province in January. A similar
operation involving another task force was conducted the next month in
the difficult mangrove swamps of An Xuyen Province at the southern tip
of the nation. In both cases the government offensives enjoyed local
success, but failed to reduce significantly the enemy’s capabilities
and influence in the area.
Midyear 1964 found the Vietnamese Marine commanders and their American
advisors engaged in renewed efforts to restructure and expand the
Vietnamese Marine Brigade. Accomplished for the most part in July, the
salient feature of this latest reorganization was the creation of a new
infantry battalion. With its nucleus garrisoned at a small base about
12 miles northwest of Saigon, the newly organized 5th Battalion devoted
the remainder of the year and the first six months of 1965 to forming
and training its companies. It finally became combat ready in June
1965.
[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JULY
1964
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 6,555]
Aside from the addition of the new infantry battalion, the mid-1964
reorganization produced other noteworthy changes in the structure
of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. In the artillery battalion, the two
75mm pack howitzer batteries were combined into one battery of eight
weapons, while the one 105mm howitzer battery was divided to form two
new batteries of six howitzers each. The tables of equipment were
revised to reflect these adjustments. Another significant change
occurred in the area of training. The Training Company was deleted from
the Amphibious Support Battalion and a separate recruit training center
was created at Thu Duc near Saigon. Tactical planning and control was
also improved when the Brigade Headquarters was reduced in size and two
smaller Task Force Headquarters (Task Force A and Task Force B) were
formed.
Following the mid-1964 reorganization, the Vietnamese Marines performed
combat missions not unlike those they had been assigned prior to
July. One exception was that the brigade no longer found itself
tasked with actual pacification phases of operations. Instead, the
Marine battalions concentrated on clearing operations around Saigon
in conjunction with the Hop Tac campaign. Additionally, the various
battalions were called upon occasionally during this period to provide
security for key government installations located in Saigon and Vung
Tau--assignments which gave the infantry units much needed respites
from field duty.
By the end of the year the Vietnamese Marine Corps had been improved in
several areas. In the motor transport field two new pieces of equipment
were put into full-time operation--a high pressure steam cleaner and
an M-108 wrecker. Progress also was made in upgrading the entire
communications capability of the brigade when the table of equipment
was revised in accordance with the modified table of organization. The
new tables provided for modern test and repair equipment and eliminated
obsolete and impractical items. Other unrealized improvements were
still in their formative stages as the year closed. In the field of
supply, for example, the brigade supply officer, with assistance
from his American advisor, was drawing up plans which would give the
Vietnamese Marines a more responsive and more manageable system.
While the technically oriented programs were being developed and
implemented, intensified training programs were preparing more
and better trained Vietnamese Marines for their responsibilities.
Established in July, the Marine Training Center at Thu Duc had
graduated 1,464 recruits before the end of the year. These recruits,
moreover, were trained by Vietnamese noncommissioned officers who had
recently completed the drill instructor course at Marine Corps Recruit
Depot, San Diego. For the first time since its inception, the VNMC was
benefiting from a flow of recruits trained by Vietnamese Marines at a
separate Marine training facility.
Other programs likewise were helping prepare Vietnamese officers
and noncommissioned officers to command and manage their growing
service. A total of 718 officers and noncommissioned officers attended
various training courses in South Vietnam during the year while 42
more officers attended formal schools in the United States during the
same period. Another 52 small unit leaders participated in on-the-job
training programs with U.S. Marine units on Okinawa between January and
December.[10-8]
Unfortunately, these developments were overshadowed by a military
disaster which befell the 4th VNMC Battalion on the last day of the
year. The Marine unit had been serving since early December as the
reserve force for III Corps Tactical Zone. On the 27th an estimated
Viet Cong battalion overran the small pro-government town of Binh
Gia located in Phuoc Thy Province roughly 35 miles east of Saigon.
III Corps officials reacted by dispatching the 4th Battalion and an
ARVN Ranger battalion to the area. The 4th Battalion, accompanied by
two U.S. Marine advisors and three OJT observers from the 3d Marine
Division, was ordered to recapture the town. It proceeded to do so on
the 30th, encountering no enemy opposition. Later in the day, while the
Marines were developing defensive positions around the town, a spotter
aircraft sighted a large Viet Cong force approximately two miles to the
west and called for air strikes. A U.S. Army helicopter gunship was
shot down and its crew killed while attacking the target.
Against the advice of his senior U.S. Marine Advisor, Captain Franklin
P. Eller, the 4th Battalion commander ordered one of his companies
to secure the crash site and recover the bodies of the dead crewmen.
Accompanied by Eller, First Lieutenant James P. Kelliher, and Staff
Sergeant Clifford J. Beaver, two of the 3d Division OJTs, the company
moved west from Binh Gia on the morning of the 31st to carry out the
mission. After reaching the crash site, the Marine unit was ambushed
by a large Viet Cong force using 82mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles,
and .50 caliber machine guns. Unable to maneuver because of the intense
fire, the company radioed for assistance and began withdrawing from the
ambush site in small groups.
[Illustration: _Marine Captain Franklin P. Eller, advisor to the 4th
Vietnamese Marine Battalion, coordinates with other American-advised
units operating nearby. (USMC Photo A183570)._]
The battalion commander, accompanied by the assistant Marine advisor,
First Lieutenant Philip O. Brady and the other OJTs, responded to the
call for assistance by leading the remaining three companies from
their positions at Binh Gia. Just outside the town they met Captain
Eller, who had been wounded in the face, along with Lieutenant Kelliher
and the remnants of the hard-hit company. Eller and the survivors of
the morning ambush returned to Binh Gia while the remainder of the
battalion pushed westward in an attempt to locate the enemy force.
Later in the morning, the Marine column was surprised while moving
through an abandoned rubber plantation by a Communist force of between
1,200 and 1,800 men.
No artillery was available to support the beleaguered battalion.
Vietnamese Air Force A-1 Skyraiders, however, were able to deliver
close air strikes for about 45 minutes. U.S. Army helicopter gunships
replaced the Skyraiders on station, but their rocket and machine gun
fire proved too light to dislodge the enemy from his positions under
the dense vegetation. By late afternoon, 29 of the 4th Battalion’s 35
officers, including the battalion commander, were dead. In desperation,
the Americans organized the surviving Vietnamese Marines into small
groups some of which managed to slip past the Viet Cong and find their
way back to Binh Gia.
The Vietnamese Marines had suffered their most decisive defeat of the
war. Their losses were extremely high: 112 killed, 71 wounded, and
13 missing out of a 326-man battalion. Equipment losses included 142
weapons and over a dozen radios. Additionally, all four of the U.S.
Marines who had participated in the disastrous action had been wounded.
Both Captain Eller and Lieutenant Brady were later awarded the Silver
Star Medal for their roles in the battle.[10-G] Captain Donald G. Cook,
one of the OJT observers from the 3d Marine Division, was missing in
action at the close of the battle.[10-H]
[10-G] Personal decorations for heroism were awarded more
frequently to Marine advisors through 1964. Earlier
in the year (16 February), a Marine captain, Donald
E. Koelper, an advisor to the 4th Vietnamese Marine
Battalion earned a Navy Cross, the nation’s second
highest award for heroism. Koelper was decorated for
warning the occupants of a crowded American theater in
Saigon to take cover just prior to the detonation of a
Viet Cong terrorist bomb. The Marine was killed by a Viet
Cong satchel charge. But his sacrifice limited the number
of casualties to three killed and 51 wounded.
[10-H] It was later learned that Captain Cook had been wounded
and captured by the Viet Cong. Cook reportedly died in
captivity in 1967.
The ranger battalion operating nearby suffered a similar fate,
incurring nearly 400 casualties in another violent ambush. Thus, within
a 24-hour period two elite government battalions had been shattered.
Only later was it learned that the Marines and rangers had clashed with
two main force regiments of the _9th Viet Cong Division_--the first
Communist division to become operational in South Vietnam.
As a result of the disastrous engagement at Binh Gia, the 4th
Vietnamese Marine Battalion was rendered ineffective as a fighting
force for a period of three months. This loss created two immediate
problems for General Khang and his American advisors. It reduced the
brigade’s available infantry strength by approximately 25 percent and
placed an added burden on the recruit training center which was already
laboring to provide enough new troops to fill the 5th Battalion. For
the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1964 ended on a discouraging note.
[Illustration: _Marine Captain Donald E. Koelper, advisor to the 4th
Vietnamese Marine Battalion, was posthumously awarded the first Navy
Cross for action in Vietnam. (USMC Photo A411741)._]
_Additional Marine Activities_
U.S. Marine participation in the Vietnam War during 1964 was not
limited to the activities of the advisory division and the helicopter
task element. Various other Marine units and detachments made
significant, although less publicized, contributions to the war effort
throughout the year. One of these was the Marine security detachment
which continued to protect the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Twice during
the year the growing political unrest and the increasing threat of
Communist terrorist attacks prompted the expansion of the security
detachment, first in April and again in October. By the end of the year
the detachment’s strength stood at 30 Marines--a figure which made it
the second largest such unit in the world. Only the Marine detachment
in Paris, with 37 officers and men, was larger. And nowhere was an
embassy guard assignment more dangerous than in Vietnam where terrorist
attacks were apt to occur at anytime.
Other groups of Marines performed an assortment of missions in
support of the Government of Vietnam during the course of the year.
The Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, for example, continued
its duties at the U.S. Army Communications installation in Pleiku.
A handful of these Marines also served at a newly opened U.S. Army
communications station at Phu Bai some eight miles southeast of Hue.
The strength of the Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, however,
was reduced from 42 officers and men to only 16 by the end of December.
The spring of 1964 saw a new, substantially larger Marine
communications detachment introduced into the northern provinces of
South Vietnam. Unlike its predecessors at Pleiku and Phu Bai, this unit
was composed exclusively of Marines and included an infantry element
for security purposes. Designated the Signal Engineering Survey Unit,
the radio detachment consisted of three officers and 27 enlisted men
drawn from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, and from Headquarters Marine
Corps. This element, commanded by Major Alfred M. Gray, Jr. arrived
at Da Nang on 20 May along with a 76-man infantry detachment from
Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. The infantry element, reinforced
with an 81mm mortar section (two mortars), was commanded by First
Lieutenant Raymond J. Otlowski. Major Gray assumed overall command of
the composite force which was designated Marine Detachment, Advisory
Team One. Advisory Team One became the first actual Marine ground unit
to conduct independent operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted the bulk of the newly formed
unit to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at Khe Sanh
in northwestern Quang Tri Province in the closing days of May. Two
officers and five enlisted communicators remained behind at Da Nang
and a four-man team positioned itself in the U.S. Army compound at Phu
Bai to provide radio support for the main body. At Khe Sanh, Advisory
Team One initially concentrated on building a solid supply base prior
to undertaking actual communications operations. ARVN truck convoys
brought the preponderance of its supplies from Quang Tri over Route 9,
the old colonial road that snaked through the Annamite Mountains into
Laos. While Major Gray and his men proceeded with this task, Marine
UH-34Ds from Da Nang helilifted an ARVN infantry company onto Tiger
Tooth Mountain (Dong Voi Mep), a jungle-covered mountain located eight
miles north of the CIDG Camp. With an elevation of 5,500 feet, Tiger
Tooth Mountain is the highest terrain feature in northern I Corps. On
13 June U.S. Army UH-1B helicopters lifted Major Gray, nine enlisted
men, and several thousand pounds of equipment into a tiny landing
zone which the South Vietnamese troops had hacked out near the top of
the rugged mountain. The ARVN soldiers, who had established a rough
perimeter around a peak slightly below the mountain’s highest point,
were on hand to greet the small group of Americans. After the initial
helilift, however, bad weather in the form of dense clouds intervened
to delay the remainder of the movement for an entire week. SHUFLY
helicopters finally completed the mission on 21 June. When the helilift
concluded 73 Marines and roughly 100 Vietnamese troops were strung
around and across a 5,000-foot peak just south of Tiger Tooth’s highest
elevation. Another 81 Leathernecks remained at Khe Sanh to provide a
pool from which fresh security forces and radiomen could be drawn when
needed.
MACV orders explicitly prohibited the Marines on Tiger Tooth Mountain
from patrolling or engaging in any other activity which could have been
construed as offensive in nature. As a result of this restriction,
Major Gray’s men were confined to defensive positions around the crude
little landing zone and the tents which housed the radio equipment.
Even so, life on the mountain was extremely rigorous. The clouds
which frequently enshrouded the mountain top left the Marines, their
clothing, weapons, and equipment constantly damp. High winds heightened
their discomfort. The local weather conditions also made food and water
deliveries to the position hazardous and irregular. Marine UH-34Ds
prepositioned at Khe Sanh brought C rations and water cans whenever the
clouds revealed Tiger Tooth’s higher elevations. Often, however, the
weather did not break for days. Normally the men were limited to two
canteens of water daily--a restriction which made bathing and shaving
impossible. Because of the harsh living conditions on the mountain,
fresh security forces and radio men were rotated from Khe Sanh at two
week intervals, weather permitting.
[Illustration:
MARINE DETACHMENT
ADVISORY TEAM ONE
OPERATIONS IN I CTZ
MAY-AUGUST 1964
]
Advisory Team One operated in the extreme northwestern corner of the
republic without incident until the second week of July. Then a severe
storm struck its mountaintop base, blowing away tents and antennae,
collapsing fighting positions, and generally disrupting operations.
Several nights later, on the 17th, a Viet Cong force of undetermined
size probed the Marine sector of the perimeter. An intense exchange
of small arms and automatic weapons fire ensued for nearly two hours.
Although the Marines suffered no casualties and could find no dead or
wounded Viet Cong the next day, it was apparent that their location had
been compromised.
Amid reports of increasing Communist activity throughout the area, MACV
authorities in Saigon promptly ordered Major Gray to withdraw his force
from Tiger Tooth Mountain. Fortunately good weather permitted Marine
helicopters from Da Nang to helilift the men and their equipment from
the mountain to Khe Sanh the day after the firefight. On the 22d, Air
Force C-123 transports airlifted the entire Marine detachment to Da
Nang. There Gray and his Marines crowded into the old French compound
occupied by the helicopter task element. Although cramped, the SHUFLY
facilities provided welcome relief for the men who had endured the
rigors of Tiger Tooth Mountain and Khe Sanh for nearly two months.
While at Da Nang, Major Gray detached a small group of radiomen to
Monkey Mountain, a rocky, jungle-covered peninsula that jutted into the
South China Sea just northeast of the city. There in relative comfort
and safety, the technicians conducted equipment tests for two weeks.
Several changes in the leadership and composition of the advisory
team took place during this interval. Captain Raymond A. Becker, a
communications officer from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, relieved
Major Gray as the commander of the unit on 13 August. Soon thereafter
a reinforced infantry company, Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines,
commanded by Captain William R. Irwin, replaced Lieutenant Otlowski and
the Company G Marines as the advisory team’s security element.
Under Captain Becker’s command, Advisory Team One redeployed, this
time to Dong Bach Ma, a 3,500-foot mountain located roughly 25 miles
west-northwest of Da Nang. An abandoned French resort, still untouched
by the war, sprawled across the higher elevations of Bach Ma and a hard
surface road curved up its steep northern face from Route 1. Using this
road ARVN trucks moved Captain Irwin and the infantry element to the
newly selected site in advance of the radio personnel. Once atop the
mountain, Irwin had his men establish a perimeter around an abandoned
monastery. This accomplished, Marines cleared a small helicopter
landing zone near the old but well-preserved religious building
which was to serve as their base of operations. On 19 August Marine
helicopters lifted Captain Becker, his communicators, and some 4,000
pounds of equipment to the site from Da Nang.
Advisory Team One, relying heavily on Marine helicopters for logistical
support, operated without incident from the quaint old monastery
until the second week of September. The composite unit completed its
operations at Bach Ma on the 10th whereupon it returned to Da Nang.
Within days the detachment was disbanded without fanfare. The radio
experts returned to their parent commands in Hawaii and Washington
while Company K was airlifted to Okinawa where it rejoined the 3d
Battalion, 3d Marines. The quiet dissolution of the Marine Detachment,
Advisory Team One, ended the first brief and little publicized chapter
of Marine ground unit operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
In October an element of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 3d Marine
Division, operating from ships of the Seventh Fleet, conducted an
extensive survey of Cam Ranh Bay in southern II Corps. The purpose
of its survey was to determine the feasibility of establishing a
naval facility. Marine counterintelligence teams from FMFPac also
were temporarily assigned to MACV for 30-day periods throughout the
year. These officers and noncommissioned officers normally augmented
the U.S. Army 704th Counterintelligence Unit during their stay in
Vietnam. Another group of Marines to employ their skills in the
counterinsurgency environment was a small Special Operations Group of
six officers and 21 enlisted men. These Marines conducted operations
under the auspices of MACV.
A more permanent influx of Marines into the war-torn republic occurred
in the last quarter of the year. In response to the intensified
advisory effort ordered by Secretary McNamara in July, General Greene,
the new Marine Commandant, assured the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that the Marines could be expected to carry their share of the
increased burden. Shortly thereafter, the Marine Corps was directed to
provide 60 officers and noncommissioned officers to serve as advisors
with ARVN units in I Corps Tactical Zone. These orders, later described
by Major Damm, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor to the VNMC as
“very short fused ones,” were executed without delay.[10-9] The 3d
Marine Division was given short notice to select suitable personnel
and to transfer them immediately to ComUSMACV. In response to these
instructions, the Okinawa-based command quickly formed four advisory
teams, each composed of four men--a captain, a first lieutenant, a
gunnery sergeant, and a corporal (who was to serve as the team’s radio
operator). Accompanied by Major John W. Walker, the first increment of
Marine advisors was airlifted to Da Nang by KC-130 in mid-September.
Upon reporting to the I Corps Senior U.S. Advisor, Colonel Howard B.
St. Clair, U.S. Army, the four teams were broken up, the Marines being
assigned individually to battalions of the 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions.
Major Walker joined the I Corps advisory staff in Da Nang as assistant
operations officer. The balance of the 60 new Marine advisors were
formed into teams on Okinawa and airlifted to Da Nang in the ensuing
weeks. By December the advisors, who had initially been drawn from
the 3d Marine Division, were being replaced gradually by officers and
noncommissioned officers just beginning their normal 12-month overseas
tours.
Two additional permanent Marine advisor billets were also approved
in the closing weeks of 1964. These were created within the Naval
Advisory Group to assist the Vietnamese Navy in controlling one of
South Vietnam’s most troublesome areas--the Rung Sat Special Zone
(RSSZ). Located southeast of Saigon on both sides of the Long Tao
River, the main ship channel to the capital, the Rung Sat was a vast,
difficult-to-penetrate, mangrove swamp. Due largely to its relative
inaccessibility, the area had been developed by the Viet Cong into a
key base for supporting their operations in the surrounding provinces.
More significantly, by early 1964 the Communist-held Rung Sat posed a
serious threat to commercial ships bound for Saigon. For this reason
the responsibility for pacifying the area was turned over to the
Vietnamese Navy in April.
Initially one Marine major, Edward J. Bronars, was assigned to assist
and advise the Vietnamese Navy in its attempts to secure the Rung
Sat. In November, however, the RSSZ advisory staff was reorganized to
include one Marine captain and one sergeant. Although they did not
arrive for duty until early the following year, the newly approved
billets created the third distinct group of Marine ground advisors
assigned to the Republic of Vietnam.[10-10]
The OJT program continued in effect for junior Marine officers and
staff noncommissioned officers throughout 1964. Near the end of
the year the program was broadened somewhat to include members of
Hawaii-based Marine commands. Each month 10 Leathernecks arrived at
Da Nang to begin their 30-day assignments. At SHUFLY headquarters the
visitors were briefed as a group before being attached individually
to specific South Vietnamese units for the duration of their stay in
Vietnam. Normally, the officers and staff noncommissioned officers
joined a unit already being advised by a U.S. Marine. When possible,
the OJT was assigned to a unit which could benefit from his particular
military and technical skills. Still, the on-the-job-trainee was not
always considered an asset. “In honesty,” one permanent advisor to the
Vietnamese Marine Corps conceded, “OJTs were a mixed blessing--they
provided some help but they also were an added responsibility for the
VNMC commander who was charged with their safety.” “Some OJTs,” he
added, “received misperceptions of the capability of the Viet Cong
since their knowledge/experience was limited to the events occurring
during their brief 30-day tour.”[10-11] Nevertheless, a significant
number of Marine small unit leaders were able to gain some degree
of first-hand experience in counter guerrilla warfare under the
provisions on the OJT program.[10-I]
[10-I] The 3d Marine Division’s OJT program did not end until
after elements of the division landed at Da Nang in March
1965. The Marine Advisory Unit experimented successfully
with another form of augmentation in the first days of
1965. When the Vietnamese Marines deployed to the Binh
Gia area with a provisional brigade in early January,
Colonel Nesbit, who was still serving as Senior Marine
Advisor, requested additional personnel to assist
and advise at the staff level. FMFPac responded by
temporarily detaching eight officers and 11 enlisted men
to the advisory division. MACV provided two more Marine
officers and seven additional enlisted men, all of whom
remained attached to the Marine Advisory Unit for the
duration of the operation. The temporarily assigned
Marines returned to their parent organizations when the
operation terminated. This is covered in more detail in
the 1965 account of U.S. Marine activities in Vietnam.
A similar but shorter term program for field grade officers and
colonels, the Job Related Orientation (JRO) Program, also took hold
during the early months of 1964. Instituted in the last half of the
previous year, the JRO program provided for a small number of staff
officers from the various FMFPac commands to visit U.S. Headquarters
in Vietnam and Thailand for an eight-day period. Small groups of these
officers arrived at Da Nang from Okinawa and, like the OJTs, were
briefed by the helicopter task element commander and his staff. Later
they were afforded an orientation flight over the northern provinces.
Next, the visiting officers were flown to Saigon where they received
more briefings at MACV headquarters. In the capital, where they were
hosted by the Senior Marine Advisor, they visited Vietnamese Marine
units and discussed tactics and problem areas with the advisors.
After four days in the Republic of Vietnam the Marines travelled on
to Bangkok where they spent the balance of their visit. Upon the
conclusion of these JRO trips, each officer was required to submit a
detailed written report to the Commanding General, FMFPac. In turn,
extracts of these reports were forwarded to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps in Washington.
Generally these reports addressed tactical, operational, logistics,
and intelligence matters. But a number of the Marine officers used
the reporting system to articulate their opinions relative to the
overall direction of the war. Colonel Warren P. Baker, a member of the
3d Marine Division staff who visited Vietnam in March, pointed out
that field advisors and MACV staff members differed sharply in their
personal assessments of progress being made. The field advisors, Baker
observed, demonstrated far less optimism than did the staff members.
Furthermore, he reported that unless the people of South Vietnam
could be won over to the government, the Viet Cong’s success could be
expected to continue.[10-12] Another officer, Lieutenant Colonel Harry
E. Dickinson, summarized his conclusions with an even more emphatic
warning:
The commitment of sizeable U.S. combat units should not be effected
except to protect the seat of government. While local success might
be achieved in certain areas, it is extremely doubtful whether any
lasting degree of success would entail in the northern and western
sections. As combat units were increased, the forces of Vietnam
would do less and less with the inevitable conflict of overall
command. The end result would be the ringing of the country with
combat units but no solution for the internal conflict. I strongly
disagree that any two or three divisions could achieve real victory
as has been stated in the press.[10-13]
Through candid reporting of this nature, Marine commanders from Okinawa
to Washington were kept abreast of the complex and difficult problems
being generated by the war in Southeast Asia.