Spring and Summer Fighting
_The Monsoons--The Weather Breaks--Sure Wind 202--Operations Elsewhere
in I Corps--Changing the Watch_
Commanded by Colonel Andre D. Gomez, the strength of the Marine task
element at Da Nang stood at 450 officers and men as 1964 opened.
Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 continued its assignment as the task
element’s helicopter squadron while Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy’s
204-man MABS-16 sub unit retained responsibility for maintaining and
operating the support facilities.
Shortly after New Year’s Day, ComUSMACV advised Colonel Gomez that
the entire Marine task element would be withdrawn from the Republic
of Vietnam during the first half of 1964. This decision was one of
CinCPac’s continuing responses to the Defense Department plans for
reducing the level of direct American military involvement in Vietnam.
Additionally, Gomez was informed that the task element would be called
upon to initiate a training program designed to prepare Vietnamese Air
Force pilots and mechanics to operate and maintain the UH-34Ds. This
program was scheduled to culminate with the takeover of the 24 Marine
helicopters by a new VNAF squadron on 30 June, and the subsequent
departure of the entire task element for Okinawa where it would rejoin
MAG-16, its parent organization.[11-1]
_The Monsoons_
The new year broke with Marine flight operations at Da Nang still
proceeding at a reduced rate due to the heavy monsoon weather. As had
been the case at the close of 1963, medical evacuation and resupply
missions continued to constitute the major source of work for HMM-361’s
crews. The first Marine helicopter loss during 1964 occurred during
one such mission on 3 January when an aircraft was shot down while
attempting to perform a medical evacuation about 30 miles due west
of Da Nang. Hit at least six times on its descent toward the landing
zone, the UH-34D crashed into the jungle. Its crew miraculously escaped
injury and was rescued by another Marine helicopter. The aircraft,
damaged beyond repair, was intentionally destroyed by U.S. Special
Forces personnel. This was only the second Marine helicopter loss
definitely attributed to Communist fire since SHUFLY’s arrival at Soc
Trang nearly two years earlier.
In the second week of January the weather over the mountains west to
Da Nang broke long enough for Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ squadron to
accomplish a critical trooplift. On short notice the Marines were
ordered to remove a 200-man CIDG force from the hills about 30 miles
west-southwest of Da Nang. Accompanied by a U.S. Army advisor, the
South Vietnamese unit had been conducting a reconnaissance in force
about eight miles west of its camp at An Diem.[11-A] Under cover of the
monsoon clouds, which limited effective U.S. or VNAF air support, Viet
Cong elements of undetermined strength had closed in on the government
force, threatening to isolate and destroy it before the weather lifted.
[11-A] See map of outposts in I CTZ, page 81.
The immediate nature of this particular mission left little time for
detailed planning and briefing. I Corps headquarters could only advise
the Marines of such vital information as the unit’s radio call sign,
radio frequency, size, and location. To familiarize himself with
the terrain in the vicinity of the pickup site, Lieutenant Colonel
Ross first made a reconnaissance flight to the area in an O-1B. His
reconnaissance revealed the landing zone to be “a precarious hill top
knob exposed to a 360° field of fire,” Ross later recalled.[11-2]
The reconnaissance accomplished, the squadron commander returned to
Da Nang, exchanged the O-1B for a UH-34D, and led a flight of 14
helicopters to the pickup point. In accordance with the squadron’s
standing operating procedure, Ross, the flight leader, was to land
first, drop off a loadmaster, and lift out the first Vietnamese
heliteam. Upon approaching the hilltop, however, the lead helicopter
was forced away by heavy small arms fire which punctured the aft
section of the aircraft’s fuselage, wounding the loadmaster.
The second aircraft, following at close interval, was also hit.
Lieutenant Colonel Ross then ordered the entire formation into a
holding pattern out of small arms range while he attempted to persuade
the American advisor to move the Vietnamese unit overland a short
distance to a less exposed landing zone beside a stream. This the U.S.
advisor was reluctant to do. “I was convinced,” Ross concluded, “that
his real concern was the shattered morale of his ARVN troops and doubts
about being able to get them moving to the alternate site.”[11-3] After
some delay the Vietnamese unit finally moved to the new landing zone,
whereupon the Marines completed the troop lift. Still, the helicopters
were exposed to unnecessary risks.
Understandably concerned with problems of this nature which tended to
plague all but the larger preplanned operations, Lieutenant Colonel
Ross questioned the “ability of the advisors to make operational
decisions based upon considerations beyond their own tactical
problems.”[11-4] In this particular case the selection of the exposed
hilltop landing zone tended to substantiate the Marine commander’s
complaints.
[Illustration: _Loadmaster directs a helicopter into a recently cleared
landing zone. (USMC Photo A329576)._]
During the second week of January, General Greene, the newly appointed
Commandant of the Marine Corps, visited the Marine installation at Da
Nang. The Commandant conducted an inspection of the compound and was
briefed on operations by Colonel Gomez and his staff. After presenting
combat decorations to several members of the task element, Greene
departed for Hawaii where he was to visit the FMFPac headquarters.
The Commandant summed up his impressions of the Marine helicopter task
element in testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services
several weeks after his return to Washington. “I was assured by
General Harkins and his officers--and by the officers of the supported
Vietnamese units--that this squadron has performed its supporting
mission in an outstanding manner,” related Greene. “Everything that
I observed,” he added, “certainly attested to the high morale and
effectiveness of this unit.”[11-5][11-A]
[11-A] A more frequent visitor to the Marine helicopter task
element was Colonel Anderson, the MAAG Chief of Staff.
An experienced aviator, Colonel Anderson had commanded a
Marine bomber squadron (VMB-443) in the latter stages of
World War II. While serving as the MAAG Chief of Staff
during 1963 and 1964, Anderson participated in a number
of combat missions as a pilot with the various squadrons
assigned to SHUFLY.
Late January and early February saw the normal rotation of several of
the task element’s key personnel as well as its helicopter squadron.
On 14 January, Colonel Robert A. Merchant, an officer with a diverse
military background, assumed command of SHUFLY. Merchant had commanded
an artillery battalion on Okinawa in World War II, a Marine attack
squadron in Korea, and had served on the joint staff of the Specified
Commander for the Middle East in Beirut during the 1958 Lebanon
Operation. More recently he had graduated from the Industrial College
of the Armed Forces. Having flown with the task element’s squadron
while on temporary duty in Vietnam the previous October and since
his arrival in early January, Merchant was thoroughly familiar with
SHUFLY’s operations.
Command of the MABS-16 sub unit changed hands two weeks later when
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel G. Beal relieved Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy.
Beal, also a veteran of World War II and Korea, came from the 4th
Marines in Hawaii where he had served as that unit’s air liaison
officer.
Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 ended its tour at Da Nang on 1
February. The squadron’s arrival in I Corps unfortunately had coincided
with the arrival of the early monsoon rains. The unit’s flight
statistics had suffered also from the interruption caused by the
political infighting which had deposed President Diem. As a result, its
operations never reached the sustained tempo which had characterized
the records of the Marine helicopter squadrons previously assigned to
SHUFLY. Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ UH-34Ds totalled 4,236 combat flight
hours and just under 7,000 combat sorties--figures which, considering
the conditions surrounding their accumulation, compared favorably with
the number of combat flight hours (7,249) and sorties (11,900) averaged
by the four previous UH-34D squadrons to serve in Vietnam.[11-6]
HMM-364, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John H. La Voy, a pilot who
had flown his first combat helicopter missions during the Korean War,
initiated support operations from Da Nang on 1 February. Under the
existing plans to deactivate the Marine task element, La Voy’s squadron
was scheduled to be the last Marine helicopter unit to operate in
South Vietnam. As such, HMM-364’s pilots and maintenance crews were to
launch the training program that would prepare the Vietnamese Air Force
personnel to take over the Marine helicopters upon the task element’s
departure from Da Nang.
On 4 February the first class of eight Vietnamese pilots began a
50-hour package of flight instruction under the supervision of
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s pilots. Included in the course of
instruction were operational missions, night and instrument flying,
formation work, and landing practice. Each student was already a
qualified copilot with at least 25 flight hours in VNAF UH-34s--a
factor which allowed the training to be conducted concurrently with
normal operations. This was accomplished by having the Vietnamese
trainees fly as copilots with a Marine pilot on operational flights.
In addition to being an effective training method this system had two
other advantages. First, it enabled the Vietnamese students to acquire
a first-hand knowledge of the helicopter tactics most commonly used
in the northern provinces. Secondly, it allowed Lieutenant Colonel
La Voy’s squadron to concentrate on its primary mission of providing
combat support for the ground forces in I Corps.
Another vital aspect of the training program involved preparing
Vietnamese ground personnel to keep the squadron operational. This
demanded extensive training of mechanics, crew chiefs, engineering,
supply, operations, and ordnance personnel. “This additional duty,”
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy explained, “was a tremendous burden on all
departments of my squadron, whose primary job was to keep aircraft in
commission and to conduct combat operations.” The language barrier
understandably threatened the success of the overall training effort.
In La Voy’s opinion, however, “the eagerness of the students to learn
and the wealth of practical experience and varied demonstrations”
combined to help reduce problems imposed by the language
difference.[11-7]
The progress of the program proved the concepts sound. The first small
group of student pilots was graduated on 9 March despite numerous
flight cancellations due to bad weather during the training period.
Subsequent classes of VNAF pilots continued to train with the Marine
helicopter task element throughout 1964. Eventually, a more advanced
training program would have the Vietnamese pilots flying sections
of two and four helicopters as integral elements of larger Marine
helicopter operations.
Although heavy monsoon clouds lingered over I Corps throughout most of
the month of March, brief periods of good weather sometimes allowed
heliborne incursions into the mountainous areas. One such period
began on the 5th and lasted long enough for Marine, Army, and VNAF
helicopters to lift a 54-man ARVN patrol from An Diem to a landing
zone near the Laotian border. During the operation one escorting
U.S. Army UH-1B gunship accidentally struck a tree and was forced
to land in a nearby jungle clearing. Two Marine helicopters quickly
rescued the crew and weapons of the downed UH-1B, but drew automatic
weapons fire in the process. That afternoon 15 Marine helicopters and
two armed UH-1Bs returned to the crash site with 64 ARVN troops who
established a perimeter around the damaged helicopter after being
landed. A maintenance team then landed and repaired the aircraft which
subsequently was flown back to Da Nang.
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s crews undertook to correct several problems
which they identified during these initial combat operations. One
was the need for machine gun fire to protect the port (left) side
of the transport helicopters as they approached contested landing
zones. To fill this requirement the squadron’s metalsmiths designed
and fabricated a flexible mount for an additional M-60 machine gun.
This new mount was designed to allow the machine gun to be swung out
a portside window from the cabin. Placed on each of HMM-364’s 24
helicopters, this modification ultimately added a gunner to each crew
and enabled the Marines to deliver fire to either or both sides of the
aircraft during the critical landing phase of helilifts.[11-8]
La Voy personally instituted another change which made the coordination
of trooplifts more effective. Prior to HMM-364’s arrival in Vietnam,
different Marines had served as loadmasters for each heliborne
operation. While this system of rotating the loadmaster assignment had
stood the test of numerous operations since its inception in late 1962,
La Voy believed that it could be improved. Accordingly, he assigned
one pilot and two crew chiefs permanent additional responsibilities
as loadmasters. Thereafter, this three-man team was responsible for
coordinating loading and unloading activities at pickup points and
landing zones for all troop lifts. Thus, through a relatively minor
adjustment, the Marines helped insure the closer coordination of their
helicopter operations with ARVN ground forces.[11-9]
In early March hostile incidents around the Da Nang air base increased
dramatically. The incidents usually took the form of sniper fire from
the village situated just across the perimeter fence from the living
compound. The primary target of the enemy snipers seemed to be the
task element’s electrical generators whose high noise level prevented
sentries from determining the firing position. Tensions heightened on
the night of the 15th when a terrorist hurled a gasoline-filled bottle
into the doorway of the staff noncommissioned officers quarters. The
crude bomb fortunately failed to ignite. Several days later, however,
a Marine in the compound was wounded by sniper fire from beyond the
perimeter wire.
These latest incidents led Colonel Merchant to request that the
security platoon from the 3d Marine Division be redeployed to help
protect the base camp and flight line. This request was approved by
ComUSMACV and CGFMFPac without delay. On 24 March a 53-man platoon from
the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines arrived at Da Nang on a Marine KC-130
and assumed responsibility for security around the Marine compound and
flight line. Attached to the MABS-16 sub unit, the infantry platoon
freed Colonel Merchant’s aviation personnel to devote full time to
their primary mission--providing helicopter support to I Corps. Like
its predecessor which had been withdrawn only three months earlier, the
new infantry unit would assist with rescue operations in insecure areas
and on occasion would be called upon to provide security around TAFDS
bladders during helicopter operations in more remote areas.
[Illustration: _South Vietnamese troops unload ammunition from a
UH-34D while a Marine loadmaster, braced against wheel and wheel
strut, exchanges information with the Leatherneck pilot. (USMC Photo
A329570)._]
The same day that the platoon from the 3d Marine Division arrived
at Da Nang, a task element Marine was involved in an act of heroism
which later earned him the Bronze Star Medal. While escorting Marine
helicopters on a resupply mission about five miles west-northwest of
Tam Ky, a U.S. Army UH-1B gunship from Da Nang was hit by Viet Cong
fire and crashed in flames. Marine Lance Corporal Walter L. Rupp, a
volunteer machine gunner on board the Army gunship, acted rapidly to
help secure the area despite having suffered injuries in the crash.
Manning an M-60 machine gun, Rupp delivered fire on the approaching
enemy while the pilot, copilot, and three other passengers were pulled
from the wreckage. All six American personnel, including the injured
Marine, were evacuated safely to Da Nang, and then flown to the U.S.
Army Field Hospital at Nha Trang for more extensive medical attention.
_The Weather Breaks_
Much of I Corps began experiencing improved weather conditions during
the first days of April. Relying on helicopter support, the ARVN
resumed its offensives into the rugged mountainous regions. On the 6th
a combined Allied helicopter flight lifted 42 ARVN soldiers from Tam Ky
to a landing zone about 18 miles directly west of Quang Ngai. An Army
UH-1B was shot down by Communist fire during the operation. Shortly
after the crash, one of HMM-364’s helicopters landed to rescue the crew
and strip the weapons from the downed aircraft. Marine mechanics then
helped Army aviation technicians disassemble the UH-1B whereupon it was
suspended beneath an Army UH-37 (a twin-engine, piston-powered, heavy
helicopter manufactured by Sikorsky) in a specially designed sling and
helilifted back to Da Nang for repairs.
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s squadron suffered its first combat aircraft
loss on 14 April. The incident occurred after one of HMM-364’s
helicopters was hit in the engine by Viet Cong fire while attempting
to evacuate wounded Vietnamese infantrymen from a hillside landing
zone about 40 miles west of Da Nang near the Laotian border. Struck
while taking off, the UH-34D plunged 150 feet down the steep hillside
and crashed through the jungle into a stream bed. One Marine manning
an M-60 machine gun suffered a broken leg in the crash. The other crew
members and passengers, however, were able to carry him up the hill to
the ARVN landing zone. Heavy thunder showers prevented rescue for two
hours, but the weather finally broke and the men were helilifted to Da
Nang. The aircraft was destroyed the next day.
Four days after this incident, HMM-364 committed all available aircraft
to a battalion-size heliborne assault into rugged northwestern Thua
Thien Province. The ARVN’s objective was a mountainous area on the
northern rim of the A Shau Valley, a 30-mile-long, two-mile-wide
trough whose location adjacent to the Laotian border invited Communist
infiltration. Although enemy activity would eventually force the
government to abandon its string of outposts in the valley, the issue
of control of the area was still unresolved in early 1964.
Colonel Merchant, as commander of the Aviation Headquarters Operations
Center for I Corps, assigned 20 Marine UH-34Ds, four VNAF UH-34s, five
U.S. Army UH-1B gunships, and three Marine O-1Bs to the operation
which the ARVN code named LAM SON 115. Additionally, 14 VNAF T-28s,
four A-1H Skyraiders, and two observation aircraft were assigned by
the Joint General Staff to provide support for the helicopter assault.
The operation was to be controlled by Colonel Merchant as the Tactical
Air Commander Airborne (TACA) from a U.S. Air Force U-10, whose radios
would permit the commander and his staff to communicate with every
aircraft participating in the effort. (The Marine helicopters had UHF
and VHF communications, while the Marine observation aircraft used UHF
and FM. The Army UH-1Bs had UHF; the VNAF transport helicopters also
relied upon UHF radios.)
In addition to Merchant, the airborne control staff from the ASOC
included Lieutenant Colonel William Montgomery, USAF, and a Vietnamese
officer. The Vietnamese representative was to assist in clearing close
air strikes with ARVN ground forces and also was to help resolve any
language problems which developed.
The one-day operation began early on 18 April with Marine and VNAF
transport helicopters lifting 200 South Vietnamese soldiers from an
outpost in the northwestern portion of the A Shau Valley into a rugged
landing zone approximately six miles further north. Later the same
morning 300 more Vietnamese troops were helilifted from a government
outpost in the central portion of the valley to a second landing zone
situated six miles north of the 200-man unit which had been flown in
earlier. HMM-364’s helicopters averaged almost 8 hours per aircraft
while flying 160 total hours in support of LAM SON 115. Only one Marine
UH-34D and one VNAF helicopter were hit by enemy fire during the
execution of the well-planned and efficiently coordinated operation. No
aircraft were lost.
Often the daily support flights proved more hazardous then the large
assault operations whose details were planned in advance. An incident
that occurred on 21 April while a UH-34D was evacuating a wounded South
Vietnamese soldier from the mountains 15 miles west of Tam Ky confirmed
the dangers inherent in such daily operations. In an effort to lure the
evacuation helicopter within range of their weapons, the Communists
ignited a yellow smoke grenade in a clearing close by the actual
landing zone. The pilot alertly identified the correct landing zone,
thereby foiling the enemy ruse.
[Illustration:
MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER
OPERATIONS FIRST HALF 1964
]
[Illustration: _HMM-364 loadmaster directs loaded UH-34D into a hilltop
landing zone during operations in I Corps. (USMC Photo A329571)._]
Several days later, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s Marines encountered an
equally clever Viet Cong tactic while performing another evacuation
mission, this time in support of a U.S. Special Forces patrol 20
miles west of Thuong Duc. Army UH-1B gunships made several low-level
reconnaissance passes over the pickup site while the UH-34D pilot
prepared to hoist the casualties through the dense jungle. When the
gunship crews reported no enemy activity, the Marine pilot maneuvered
his aircraft into a hovering position above the invisible patrol. At
this juncture, well-concealed Viet Cong began firing automatic weapons
at the hovering helicopter and forced it to seek safety away from
the pickup area. The escorting gunships then wheeled in from above,
returning the Viet Cong’s fire with rockets and machine guns. The
enemy promptly ceased firing, whereupon the Marine helicopter again
maneuvered into position above the patrol. Again the enemy challenged
the aircraft with fire, this time striking it in the rear portion of
the fuselage. Although no serious damage was done, the evacuation
helicopter was again forced away from the patrol’s position.
The UH-1Bs once more placed suppressive fire on the enemy position,
finally allowing a second Marine helicopter to hoist the wounded man
through the trees. A new burst of enemy fire, however, interrupted a
subsequent effort to retrieve the body of a dead patrol member. An
HMM-364 helicopter returned to the area the following day and completed
the evacuation.
Although neither resulted in U.S. or VNAF aircraft losses, the
incidents of 21 and 24 April confirmed that the Viet Cong was devising
new methods with which to counter the Allies’ helicopters. His use
of false smoke signals and his persistent refusal to compromise his
position by firing on the faster, more heavily armed U.S. gunships
represented crude but effective additions to his expanding repertoire
of counter-helicopter tactics. Although unappreciated by the
Leatherneck crews, the enemy’s most recent flurry of actions had no
lasting effect on the overall pattern of helicopter operations.
_Sure Wind 202_
In late April Colonel Merchant’s Marines joined with VNAF and U.S.
Army elements to launch what would be the costliest and most viciously
opposed heliborne assault attempted in South Vietnam during the
1962–1965 period. On the 26th, Merchant, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, and
Lieutenant Colonel George Brigham, the task element operations officer,
flew to Quang Ngai and Pleiku to participate in the final stages of
planning for a multi-battalion heliborne offensive into the Do Xa area,
the mountainous Viet Cong stronghold located along the northern border
of II Corps. At Quang Ngai officials from the II Corps headquarters
had already completed the general plans for Operation SURE WIND 202
(Vietnamese code name: QUYET THANG 202), the size of which demanded
the use of all transport helicopters available in both I and II Corps.
The Marine representatives learned that HMM-364’s role in the upcoming
operation would be to helilift a 420-man South Vietnamese battalion
from the Quang Ngai airfield to Landing Zone BRAVO, an objective
located about 30 miles due west of the pickup point. Simultaneous
with this assault, a U.S. Army helicopter company based at Pleiku was
scheduled to transport two ARVN battalions (960 troops) from Gi Lang,
an outpost located 24 miles west-southwest of Quang Ngai, to a second
landing zone about eight miles west-southwest of Landing Zone BRAVO.
The operation was to begin on the morning of 27 April, with the first
assault waves scheduled to land at 0930.
Due to the distance between the mountainous landing zones and because
two different helicopter units would be conducting the respective
trooplifts, the operation plan treated the two assaults as separate
operations. A U.S. Air Force U-10 aircraft had been assigned to carry
Colonel Merchant, the TACA, and other ASOC representatives who would
coordinate the helilift into Landing Zone BRAVO. Twenty Vietnamese A-1H
Skyraiders had been assigned to provide tactical air support for the
Marine portion of the operation. Twelve of these attack aircraft were
scheduled to conduct preparatory strikes on and around the landing
zones, four were to orbit above the area after the helicopter landing
began, and the remaining four were to be positioned on airstrip alert
at Da Nang. Five Army UH-1B gunships were assigned to escort the Marine
UH-34Ds to and from the landing zone.
The preparatory air strikes around Landing Zone BRAVO began as the
first ARVN heliteams boarded the 19 Marine and two VNAF helicopters
at Quang Ngai. Following the VNAF’s air strikes, the escorting Army
gunships swept in for a prelanding reconnaissance of the zone. They
were met by fire from Viet Cong .50 and .30 caliber machine guns.
The gunships countered with repeated rocket and machine gun attacks
on those enemy positions that could be located but were unable to
silence the Communist weapons. Meanwhile, the loaded Marine and VNAF
helicopters cleared Quang Ngai and were closing on the objective. After
the UH-1Bs expended their entire ordnance load and most of their fuel
in attempts to neutralize enemy fire, Colonel Merchant ordered all
helicopters, transports and gunships alike, back to Quang Ngai to rearm
and refuel.
With the transports and gunships enroute to Quang Ngai, the ASOC
summoned the on-call VNAF A-1Hs to attack the Viet Cong positions.
During ensuing strikes one Skyraider was damaged severely by .50
caliber machine gun fire. The Vietnamese pilot turned his smoking
aircraft eastward in an unsuccessful effort to nurse it to the Quang
Ngai airstrip. The attack bomber crashed less than one mile from the
west end of the small airstrip.
The A-1H air strikes on and around Landing Zone BRAVO continued until
1225. Shortly after the strikes ceased Colonel Merchant ordered the
first wave of transport helicopters to land the ARVN assault force.
Escorting UH-1Bs were still drawing fire as the first flight of three
UH-34Ds approached the contested landing zone. This time, however,
the Marine and VNAF pilots were not deterred. The first UH-34Ds
touched down at 1230 with their machine gunners pouring streams of
orange tracers into the surrounding jungle. Despite the high volume
of suppressive fire, several helicopters in the first wave sustained
hits from Viet Cong automatic weapons. One, damaged critically, crashed
in the landing zone. Its crew members, all of whom escaped injury,
were picked up by another Marine helicopter, piloted by Major John R.
Braddon, which had been designated as the search and rescue aircraft
for the operation. Another UH-34D with battle damage proceeded to the
outpost from which the Army helicopter missions were originating and
made an emergency landing.
[Illustration: _A formation of Marine UH-34Ds lift South Vietnamese
troops into mountains southwest of Da Nang. (USMC Photo A329574)._]
The second assault wave was delayed while VNAF Skyraiders renewed their
efforts to dislodge the enemy from his positions around the embattled
landing zone. The helilift resumed at 1355 in the face of reduced but
stubborn Communist resistance. During this phase of the troop lift,
one VNAF and several Marine helicopters were hit by enemy .50 caliber
fire. The Vietnamese aircraft, which lost its tail rotor controls,
spun sharply while trying to take off and crashed near the center of
the zone. Its crew members escaped injury and were picked up by Major
Braddon’s rescue helicopter.[11-B]
[11-B] For his role in the two successful rescue attempts,
Braddon was awarded the Silver Star Medal.
After this incident, as the South Vietnamese soldiers began fanning out
from the landing zone and forcing the Communist gunners to withdraw
deeper into the jungle, the landing proceeded somewhat faster. The
fourth and final assault lift of the day was executed at 1730, after
which 357 of the 420 ARVN troops had been transported into Landing
Zone BRAVO. During the first day of the operation, 15 of the 19
participating Marine UH-34Ds were hit. Only 11 Marine and VNAF
helicopters originally assigned to support the operation remained
airworthy.
[Illustration: _At the loadmaster’s direction, a Marine UH-34D waits in
a crude landing zone as an unidentified U.S. advisor and two Vietnamese
soldiers unload supplies. Other ARVN troops provide security. (USMC
Photo A329572)._]
The heliborne assault portion of SURE WIND 202 was completed the next
morning. Fourteen UH-34Ds from HMM-364, several of which had been
repaired during the night, and four Army UH-1Bs lifted the remainder
of the South Vietnamese battalion into the landing zone. By then the
intensity of the enemy action in the surrounding hills had diminished
greatly. Only one Marine helicopter was hit and it suffered only minor
damage. Upon finishing their tasks, HMM-364’s aircraft proceeded to Gi
Lang, the outpost from which the Army helicopter company was operating,
to help it complete its portion of the assault lift.
Aircraft losses for the operation continued to accumulate on the second
day when a Marine UH-34D was caught in the rotor wash of other landing
helicopters and crashed while approaching the runway at Quang Ngai. The
aircraft plummeted into an irrigation canal adjacent to the airstrip,
rolled over onto its side, and completely submerged. The crewmen
managed to climb to safety but the helicopter was a total loss.
On 29 April, three UH-34Ds flew a maintenance-inspection team and a
Marine security squad from Da Nang into Landing Zone BRAVO to assess
the damage suffered by the two helicopters which had been shot down on
the first day of SURE WIND 202. The inspection team found that four
bullets had struck the Marine aircraft. The VNAF aircraft, on the
other hand, was riddled by nearly 30 bullets, including a .50 caliber
round that had severed the tail rotor control cable. The inspection
team concluded that both helicopters were damaged beyond repair and
proceeded to destroy them where they had fallen.
Originally, MACV and II Corps planners had anticipated that the
Marine helicopters would not be required to support SURE WIND 202
beyond the initial assault. It soon became apparent, however, that
the daily helicopter requirements for the operation would exceed the
aviation assets available in II Corps. The American command in Saigon,
therefore, directed Colonel Merchant’s task element to continue
providing support for the duration of the offensive. Accordingly,
the task element commander assigned a liaison officer to the 2d ARVN
Division headquarters. This officer was tasked with coordinating daily
aircraft requirements. When SURE WIND 202 finally ended on 25 May,
HMM-364’s crews had contributed 983 sorties and 800 flight hours to the
South Vietnamese effort in northwestern II Corps.[11-10]
_Operations Elsewhere in I Corps_
While some of HMM-364’s crews continued flying support missions from
Quang Ngai, others conducted a critical operation in western I Corps.
The mission, which already had been delayed five days because of the
Marines’ extensive commitment during the early stages of SURE WIND
202, was executed on 30 April. It involved 17 Marine UH-34Ds, four
Army UH-1Bs (two transports and two gunships), two Marine O-1Bs,
two VNAF Skyraiders, and one South Vietnamese observation aircraft.
Their assignment was to evacuate a 78-man ARVN patrol which had
been under frequent enemy fire for six days in the rugged jungle
about 42 miles west of Da Nang. The transport helicopters encountered
almost continuous small arms fire during the landing and subsequent
evacuation. One Marine helicopter carrying a crew of four Marines
and five ARVN passengers was shot down while climbing away from
the contested landing zone. The pilot made a forced landing in a
nearby clearing and the nine men were evacuated under fire by other
UH-34Ds. Despite the hazardous nature of the mission, the entire
South Vietnamese patrol was removed to the safety of Nam Dong, a
well-defended Special Forces camp located in a valley 34 miles west of
Da Nang.
Acts of heroism were commonplace during the 30 April evacuation. One
Marine copilot assumed control of his severely damaged helicopter and
flew it to Nam Dong after the pilot and crew chief had been wounded.
Staff Sergeant John C. Thompson, who served as one of the loadmasters
for the operation, was later awarded the Navy Cross for his role in the
action. Having arrived in the landing zone aboard the first transport
helicopter, the Marine noncommissioned officer exposed himself to Viet
Cong fire almost continuously while supervising the loading of each
aircraft. After the last five South Vietnamese troops had boarded the
final helicopter, Thompson shouted to its pilot that he would remain on
the ground to provide covering fire while the aircraft took off. But
the pilot ordered Staff Sergeant Thompson on board and then succeeded
in maneuvering the heavily loaded UH-34D out of the empty landing zone.
By late May it had become apparent to U.S. military authorities in
South Vietnam that the demand for American transport helicopters in I
Corps would continue beyond the 30 June date which had been set earlier
for SHUFLY’s departure. General Westmoreland, therefore, proposed to
the Commander in Chief, Pacific, that the Marine unit be retained at Da
Nang indefinitely. He further recommended that HMM-364 turn over its
helicopters and maintenance equipment to the Vietnamese Air Force on
30 June as scheduled, and that the unit be replaced by another Marine
UH-34D squadron. These recommendations were forwarded to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff who approved them on 10 June. In response, the Marine
Corps began immediate preparations to deploy a new, fully equipped,
medium helicopter squadron to Da Nang.
HMM-364 began its final month in Vietnam by supporting another
heliborne assault into II Corps. This time the Marines teamed with the
U.S. Army’s 52d Aviation Battalion to lift an ARVN battalion from Dak
To, a town situated in western Kontum Province, to an objective in
the Do Xa base area. To support the operation, which was code named
SURE WIND 303, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s crews positioned a TAFDS
fuel bladder at the Dak To airstrip on 1 June. Two days later, 15
Marine UH-34Ds contributed 180 sorties to the assault phase of the new
government operation. No battle damage was recorded by Marine aircraft
during this latest incursion into northern II Corps.
The Marine task element’s responsibilities were expanded slightly
in the first week of June when MACV directed Colonel Merchant to
provide search and rescue (SAR) support for U.S. aerial reconnaissance
operations which had begun over Laos and North Vietnam. After 7 June
at least two UH-34Ds (one section) were positioned together either at
Quang Tri or at Khe Sanh, ready to conduct SAR missions for downed
American and VNAF pilots. While based at Khe Sanh the helicopters were
also used to support Advisory Team One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. At
Quang Tri the SAR helicopters operated from a clearing adjacent to a
local soccer field. Years later, Marine pilots who had stood the SAR
duty there would recall the incongruous sight of small Vietnamese boys
playfully pursuing their soccer games alongside parked combat aircraft
and a TAFDS bladder.
In addition to normal support operations, HMM-364’s pilots devoted
much of the second week of June to a search for Privates First Class
Fred T. Schrenkengost and Robert L. Greer, two MABS-16 Marines who had
disappeared from the Da Nang compound on 7 June. Intelligence reports
indicated that both men had been captured by Communist guerrillas about
five miles south of the airfield while sight-seeing on rented motor
bikes. The aerial search produced no signs of the missing enlisted
men but reliable Vietnamese sources reported that the Viet Cong had
displayed them in several villages. The task element commander finally
called off the fruitless search on 15 June, a full week after it had
begun. Ground efforts by the South Vietnamese to locate the men
continued but were also futile. The two Marines were never found.[11-C]
[11-C] The status of PFC Fred T. Schrenkengost was changed
from missing in action to killed in action, body not
recovered, on 23 July 1974. The status of PFC Robert L.
Greer was likewise changed on 14 November 1975.
While the aerial search south of Da Nang was in its final stages,
HMM-364 suffered its last aircraft loss in Vietnam when a helicopter
crashed while carrying supplies from Khe Sanh to Major Gray’s Advisory
Team One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. The accident occurred on 13 June when
a UH-34D was caught in severe down drafts while attempting to land in
the small landing zone near the top of the jagged 5,000-foot-high peak.
The crew and passengers luckily escaped injury and were rescued but the
aircraft was damaged too extensively to be repaired. Marines stripped
the UH-34D of radios and machine guns and then burned the hulk.
_Changing the Watch_
On 16 June, three days after the crash on Tiger Tooth Mountain,
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s unit ceased its operations and began
preparations for turning over its helicopters and equipment to the
Vietnamese Air Force. The Marines spent three days removing the
automatic stabilization equipment (the helicopter’s equivalent of an
automatic pilot) and the USMC identification from the 24 UH-34Ds. While
HMM-364’s men accomplished the necessary last-minute preparations,
pilots from a new Marine medium helicopter squadron, HMM-162, began
flying their UH-34Ds ashore from the LPH-8, USS _Valley Forge_.
Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Curtis, an Oklahoman who
held four Distinguished Flying Crosses for air actions fought during
World War II and Korea, HMM-162 was the first Marine squadron since
Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s to deploy to Vietnam with its complement of
aircraft and maintenance equipment. With HMM-162’s arrival, elements of
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s unit began departing for Okinawa on board
refueler-transport aircraft from VMGR-152. Also on board one of the
KC-130s bound for Okinawa was Lieutenant Colonel Beal, who relinquished
command of the MABS-16 sub unit to Major Marion R. Green on the last
day of June.
The newly commissioned VNAF 217th Squadron informally accepted the
aircraft from HMM-364 on 19 June. Formal acceptance occurred 10 days
later with Major General Paul J. Fontana, the commanding general of
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, attending a ceremony presided over by
the I Corps commanding general. Following the exchange of equipment,
the Vietnamese officials presented various orders of the Cross of
Valor, their nation’s second highest decoration, to Marine pilots who
had distinguished themselves during Operation SURE WIND 202. Vice
Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, commanding general of the Vietnamese Air
Force, then presented Vietnamese pilot wings to Colonel Merchant,
Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, and to each Marine instructor-pilot who
had participated in the helicopter pilot training program. HMM-364’s
tour in South Vietnam ended officially on 30 June when the last of
its members boarded KC-130’s bound for Okinawa. Since initiating
combat flight operations in February, the squadron’s helicopters
had logged 2,665 combat sorties and 2,365 combat hours. Another
statistic underscored the intensity of the actions in which the unit
had participated. Well over half of the squadron’s 24 helicopters
had been damaged by enemy fire during its five-month deployment in
Vietnam.[11-11]