PART IV

Transcriber’s Notes: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_.

References to same-page footnotes are alphameric, e.g., [1-A].

The number is the Chapter number; the letter is the sequence

within the chapter.

References to endnotes (near the end of the book) are numeric,

e.g., [1-1]. The first number is the Chapter number; the second

number is the sequence within the chapter.

Additional notes will be found near the end of this ebook.

U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAM

THE ADVISORY & COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA

1954–1964

_by_

Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR

[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS]

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1977

Library of Congress Card No. 76-600051

PCN 190 003064 00

For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents,

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402 (Buckram)

Stock Number 008-055-00094-7

Foreword

This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being

prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the

entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This

particular volume covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine

Corps history--the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and

1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a

one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina

War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some

700 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the

series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish

a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the

subsequent histories can be developed.

The author is a Marine Reservist who was a member of the History and

Museums Division from September 1972 until August 1974. Promoted to

major soon after his return to inactive duty, he is now working for the

Kentucky State Government. A native of Kentucky, he holds a Bachelor

of Arts degree from Morehead State College (1965) and a Master of Arts

degree in American History from the University of Kentucky (1972).

Commissioned in 1965, Major Whitlow served as an infantry platoon

commander with the 6th Marines, an aerial observer with the 1st Marine

Division in Vietnam, and later as a platoon commander at Officer

Candidate School, Quantico. For services in the Republic of Vietnam

during 1967 and 1968 he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and

26 awards of the Air Medal.

[Illustration: (Signature of) _E. H. Simmons_]

E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Reviewed and Approved:

15 September 1976

Preface

_U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1964_ is a narrative account of the

initial decade of Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam. The

monograph had two immediate forerunners, both classified studies

prepared in the middle 1960s by the former Historical Branch, G-3

Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Authored by Major James M.

Yingling, Captain Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M. Frank, the

first of these was entitled “United States Marine Corps Activities in

Vietnam, 1954–1963.” The second, entitled “United States Marine Corps

Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, 1964,” was authored by Major

Harvey D. Bradshaw. Although unpublished, these studies served as

important sources for the material contained in this text. Otherwise,

this history has been derived from official Marine Corps records,

the Oral History Collection of the History and Museums Division, the

comment files of the division, and appropriate historical works. Of

particular value in its compilation have been the command diaries of

the various Marine organizations involved.

Unfortunately, few official documents relative to either the early

Marine advisory program or to the early operations of the Vietnamese

Marine Corps still exist. Therefore, that portion of the text which

deals with those areas has been reconstructed from interviews with

various former Marine advisors. Even their generous assistance,

however, has not completely overcome the dearth of documentary sources.

Any reader possessing a knowledge of this period and subject is invited

to submit pertinent comments to the History and Museums Division.

This monograph has not been the product of a single individual’s labor.

A comment draft of the manuscript was reviewed by over 40 persons,

most of whom were directly associated with the described events. (A

list of these contributors appears as Appendix E.) Their remarks have

been of immense value in reconstructing with accuracy the origin,

nature, and scope of the various Marine operations. The manuscript

was prepared under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,

Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division. Final editing and

the preparation of the index was done by Mr. Charles R. Smith of the

Historical Branch. Miss Kay P. Sue, editorial clerk and manuscript

typist for the division, performed valuable services in typing and

proof reading both the comment and final drafts. Staff Sergeant Paul

A. Lloyd and Sergeant Eric A. Clark, also members of the History and

Museums Division, were responsible for preparing all maps and charts.

Unless otherwise credited, photographs are from official Marine Corps

files.

[Illustration: (Signature of) _Robert Whitlow_]

ROBERT H. WHITLOW

Captain, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Table of Contents

_Page_

Foreword iii

Preface v

Table of Contents vii

PART I THE WATERSHED 1

Chapter 1 Background to Military Assistance 3

The Geographic Setting 3

The People 6

Vietnam’s Recent History 9

Post-Geneva South Vietnam 12

The American Response 14

Chapter 2 The Formative Years 15

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam 15

Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance 16

Political Stabilization and Its Effects 18

Reorganization and Progress 20

Summing Up Developments 25

Chapter 3 Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency 26

Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency 26

Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps 31

Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands 39

American Decisions at the Close of 1961 42

Chapter 4 An Expanding War, 1962 44

The War’s New Context 44

Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division 46

The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962 49

Some Conclusions 53

PART II MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR 55

Chapter 5 SHUFLY at Soc Trang 57

The Decision 57

Deployment to Soc Trang 59

Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations 65

Preparations and Redeployment 73

Accomplishments 74

Chapter 6 SHUFLY Moves North 75

Arrival at Da Nang 75

I Corps Tactical Zone 76

Military Situation, September 1962 79

Initial Helicopter Operations 80

Marine People-to-People Program 85

SHUFLY Operations in I Corps 85

Chapter 7 The Laotian Crisis, 1962 86

Genesis of the Problem 86

The American Response 88

The Marine Corps Role 88

Marine Participation: A Summary 94

PART III THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963 97

Chapter 8 The Marine Advisory Effort 99

The Political Climate 99

The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations 100

Accomplishments 110

Chapter 9 SHUFLY Operations 111

Development of the Compound Continues 111

Combat Support Operations 113

The Situation in Vietnam 121

PART IV AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964 125

Chapter 10 Marines Meet the Challenge 127

New American Decisions 127

A Restructured Military Assistance Command 130

Changes in Marine Leadership 130

Redesignation and Reorganization 131

The Vietnamese Marine Brigade 132

Additional Marine Activities 138

Chapter 11 Spring and Summer Fighting 144

The Monsoons 144

The Weather Breaks 148

Sure Wind 202 152

Operations Elsewhere in I Corps 154

Changing the Watch 156

Chapter 12 Fall and Winter Operations 157

Dry Weather Fighting 157

Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations 159

Changes and Improvements 162

Action as the Year Ends 164

Chapter 13 Prelude to Escalation 166

NOTES 169

APPENDICES 175

A. USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964 175

B. Awards and Decorations, RVN, Through 1964 176

C. Glossary of Acronyms 178

D. Chronology 179

E. List of Reviewers 182

INDEX 184

PART I

THE WATERSHED

CHAPTER 1

Background to Military Assistance

_The Geographic Setting--The People--Vietnam’s Recent

History--Post-Geneva South Vietnam--The American Response_

_The Geographic Setting_

Hanging like a bulbous pendant from China’s southern border, the

Southeast Asian land mass projects itself southward to within 100 miles

of the equator. Often referred to as the Indochinese Peninsula, this

land mass is contained by the Andaman Sea on the west, the Gulf of

Siam on the south, and the South China Sea and the Tonkin Gulf on the

east. Along with the extensive Indonesian island chain which lies to

the immediate south, mainland Southeast Asia dominates the key water

routes between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. So positioned, the

Indochinese Peninsula and the offshore islands resemble the Middle East

in that they traditionally have been recognized as a “crossroads of

commerce and history.”[1-1]

Seven sovereign states currently make up the Indochinese Peninsula.

Burma and Thailand occupy what is roughly the western two-thirds of

the entire peninsula. To the south, the Moslem state of Malaysia

occupies the southern third of the rugged, southward-reaching Malaysian

Peninsula. East of Thailand lies Cambodia, which possesses a relatively

abbreviated coastline on the Gulf of Siam, and Laos, a landlocked

country. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), which

borders to the north on China, and the Republic of Vietnam (South

Vietnam) form the eastern rim of the Indochinese Peninsula.

Vietnamese have often described the area currently administered by the

two separate Vietnamese states as resembling “two rice baskets at the

ends of their carrying poles.”[1-2] This description is derived from

the position of extensive rice producing river deltas at the northern

and southern extremities of the long, narrow expanse of coastline

and adjacent mountains. Vietnamese civilization originated in the

northernmost of these so-called “rice baskets,” the Red River Delta,

centuries before the birth of Christ. Pressured at various stages in

their history by the vastly more powerful Chinese and by increasingly

crowded conditions in the Red River Delta, the Vietnamese gradually

pushed southward down the narrow coastal plain in search of new rice

lands. Eventually their migration displaced several rival cultures and

carried them into every arable corner of the Mekong Delta, the more

extensive river delta located at the southern end of the proverbial

“carrying pole.” Although unified since the eighteenth century under

the Vietnamese, the area between the Chinese border and the Gulf of

Siam came to be divided into three more or less different regions:

Tonkin, centered on the Red River Delta; Cochinchina, centered on the

Mekong Delta; and Annam, the intervening coastal region.

[Illustration:

MAINLAND

SOUTHEAST ASIA

]

[Illustration:

FRENCH

INDOCHINA

1954

]

Since mid-1954 the area known collectively as Vietnam has been divided

into northern and southern states. South Vietnam (known after 1956 as

the Republic of Vietnam), where the earliest U.S. military activities

were focused, came to include all of former Cochinchina and the

southern half of Annam. The geography of this small state, described

in general terms, is rugged and difficult. The lengthy country shares

often ill-defined jungle boundaries with Laos and Cambodia in the west

and with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to the north. Its

land borders total almost 1,000 miles--600 with Cambodia, 300 with

Laos, and roughly 40 with North Vietnam. Approximately 1,500 miles

of irregular coastline on the Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea

complete the enclosure of its 66,000-square mile area.

South Vietnam is divided into four relatively distinct physiographic

regions--the Mekong Delta, the coastal plain, the Annamite Mountains,

and the forested plain. The Mekong Delta, an extensive and fertile

lowland centered on the Mekong River, covers roughly the southern

quarter of the country. This region is essentially a marshy flat

land well suited for rice growing and is recognized as one of Asia’s

richest agricultural areas. South Vietnam’s second physiographic

region, the coastal plain, is similar to the Mekong Delta in that it is

predominantly flat and generally well suited for rice growing. Properly

known as the coastal lowland, this region extends from the country’s

northern border to the Mekong Delta. Its width is never constant, being

defined on the west by the rugged Annamite Mountains--the region which

dominates the northern two thirds of South Vietnam. The jungle-covered

mountains, whose highest elevations measure over 8,000 feet, stand in

sharp contrast to the low and flat coastal plain. The eastern slopes of

the mountains normally rise from the lowlands at a distance of five or

10 miles from the sea. At several points along the coast, however, the

emerald mountains crowd to the water’s edge, dividing the coastal plain

into compartments and creating a seascape breathtaking in its beauty.

At other locations the mountain chain recedes from the coast, allowing

the lowlands to extend inland as far as 40 miles. An extensive upland

plateau sprawls over the central portion of South Vietnam’s mountain

region.

This important subregion, known as the Central Highlands, possesses

relatively fertile soil and has great potential for agricultural

development. The highest elevations in the Annamite chain are recorded

south of the Central Highlands. From heights of 6,000 to 7,000 feet,

the mountains dissolve southward into the forested plain, a hilly

transition zone which forms a strip between the Mekong lowlands and the

southernmost mountains.

South Vietnam lies entirely below the Tropic of Cancer. Its climate

is best described as hot and humid. Because the country is situated

within Southeast Asia’s twin tropical monsoon belt, it experiences two

distinct rainy seasons. The southwest (or summer) monsoon settles over

the Mekong Delta and the southern part of the country in mid-May and

lasts until early October. In the northern reaches, the northeast (or

winter) monsoon season begins in November and continues through most of

March. Unlike the rainy season in the south, fog, wind, and noticeably

lower temperatures characterize the wet season in the north. While

the reversed monsoon seasons provide an abundance of water for rice

growing throughout the Mekong Delta and most of the long coastal plain,

rainfall is not distributed uniformly. Parts of the central coast

record only about 28 inches of annual precipitation. In contrast, other

areas along the northern coast receive as much as 126 inches of rain

during the course of a year. Even worse, a percentage of this rainfall

can be expected to occur as a result of typhoons. The tropical storms

usually lash the Annamese coast between July and November. Almost

always they cause extensive flooding along normally sluggish rivers

which dissect the coastal plain.

_The People_

Slightly over 16 million people currently inhabit South Vietnam. Of

these, over 13 million are ethnic Vietnamese. Primarily rice farmers

and fishermen, the Vietnamese have tended to compress themselves into

the country’s most productive agricultural areas--the Mekong Delta and

the coastal plain. Chinese, numbering around one million, form South

Vietnam’s largest ethnic minority. Concentrated for the most part in

the major cities, the Chinese traditionally have played a leading role

in Vietnam’s commerce. About 700,000 Montagnard tribesmen, scattered

across the upland plateau and the rugged northern mountains, constitute

South Vietnam’s second largest minority. Some 400,000 Khmers, closely

akin to the dominant population of Cambodia, inhabit the lowlands

along the Cambodian border. Roughly 35,000 Chams, remnants of a once

powerful kingdom that blocked the southern migration of the Vietnamese

until the late 1400s, form the country’s smallest and least influential

ethnic minority. The Chams, whose ancestors once controlled most of

the central and southern Annamese coast, are confined to a few small

villages on the central coast near Phan Rang.

[Illustration:

TERRAIN FEATURES

SOUTH VIETNAM

]

South Vietnamese adhere to a broad range of religions. Between 70

and 80 percent of the country’s 16 million people are classified as

Buddhist. It is estimated, however, that a much smaller percentage are

actually practitioners. Roman Catholics comprise roughly 10 percent

of the total population. Usually found in and around the country’s

urban centers, the Catholics are products of Vietnam’s contacts with

Europeans. Two so-called politico-religious sects, the Cao Dai and

the Hoa Hao, have attracted large segments of the rural population,

particularly in the Mekong Delta.[1-A] For the most part, the scattered

Montagnard tribes worship animal forms and have no organized religion,

although many have been converted to Christianity.

[1-A] Founded just after World War I, the Cao Dai claims

more than one and a half million faithful in South

Vietnam. The religion incorporates elements of Taoism,

Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, and large doses

of spiritualism. Its clergy, headed by a “pope,” is

organized in a hierarchy modelled on that of the Roman

Catholic Church. The extent of its borrowing is suggested

by the fact that adherents count the French author

Victor Hugo as one of their saints. Politically, the

Cao Dai moved sharply in the direction of nationalism

during the 1940s, organized its own army, and fought

sporadic actions against the French and the subsequent

French-controlled government of Emperor Bao Dai until

suppressed by the Diem government in 1954.

Like the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao is peculiarly Vietnamese. In

the late 1930s, a Buddhist monk named Huynh Pho So began a

“protestant” movement within the worldly, easy-going

Buddhist faith then prevalent. His followers, whose ranks

grew rapidly, called themselves Hoa Hao after the village

where Phu So began his crusade. Like the Cao Dai faithful

and Catholics, they tended to live apart in their own

villages and hamlets concentrated in the very south and

west of Vietnam, primarily along the Cambodian border.

Intensely nationalistic and xenophobic, they were under

constant attack from the French, Japanese, and Viet Minh,

and by the late 1940s had recruited a large militia

which was subsequently disbanded. Today their overall

membership stands at about one million.

Fundamentally, South Vietnamese society is rural and agrarian. Over

the centuries the Vietnamese have tended to cluster in tiny hamlets

strewn down the coastal plain and across the Mekong Delta. Usually

composed of a handful of closely knit families whose ancestors settled

the surrounding land generations earlier, the hamlet is South Vietnam’s

basic community unit. Next larger is the village which resembles the

American township in function in that it encompasses a number of

adjacent hamlets. The Vietnamese people have naturally developed strong

emotional ties with their native villages. “To the Vietnamese,” it has

been said without exaggeration, “the village is his land’s heart,

mind, and soul.”[1-3] Given the rural nature of the country it is

understandable that the inhabitants of the villages and hamlets have

retained a large degree of self-government. “The laws of the emperor,”

states an ancient Vietnamese proverb, “are less than the customs of the

village.”[1-4]

Overlaying this rural mosaic are two intermediate governmental

echelons--the districts and the provinces, The district, the smaller

of these political and geographic subdivisions, first appeared in

Vietnamese history following the earliest annexation of Tonkin by

the Chinese in 111 B.C. It remained in use and was extended down the

Annamese coast and into Cochinchina by the successive Vietnamese

dynasties which came to power in the ensuing centuries. Provinces,

larger geographic subdivisions, eventually were superimposed over

groups of contiguous districts, thus adding another echelon between

the reigning central government and the villages. This structure

remained in existence under the French after they took control of all

Vietnam in the late 19th century. In order to make their administration

more efficient French colonial authorities modernized the cumbersome

administrative machinery and adjusted provincial boundaries. It is

essentially this French-influenced structure that exists in South

Vietnam today. Still, after years of use and modification, the system

seems somewhat superficial as traditional self-rule of the villages

tends to nullify the efforts of provinces and districts to govern rural

areas. Often the central government’s influence is unable to seep lower

than the district headquarters, particularly in more remote areas.

While South Vietnam is predominantly rural, it does possess several

important urban centers. As might be expected, these are found

primarily in the densely populated Mekong Delta and along the coastal

lowland. Saigon, the nation’s capital and largest city, presently has

a population estimated at 3.5 million. Located slightly north of the

Mekong River complex and inland from the coast, the city dominates the

country in both an economic and political sense. Saigon has excellent

port facilities for ocean-going ships, although such traffic must

first negotiate the tangled Saigon River which leads inland from the

South China Sea. Da Nang, located on the Annamese coast 84 miles

below the northern border, is the country’s second largest city.

With a population of roughly 500,000 and a protected harbor, Da Nang

constitutes the principal economic center in northern South Vietnam.

The old imperial capital of Hue (population of roughly 200,000),

situated about 50 miles north of Da Nang, historically has exerted a

strong cultural influence over the Annamese coast.[1-B] Scores of large

towns, such as Quang Tri, Hoi An, Quang Ngai, Can Tho, and Vinh Long,

extend down the coast and across the Mekong Delta. Often these serve as

provincial capitals. A few lesser population centers, notably Pleiku,

Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot, are situated in the Central Highlands.

[1-B] The population of most of South Vietnam’s cities and

towns has been swollen by the influx of refugees which

occurred as the Vietnam War intensified in the middle

1960s. In 1965, for example, refugee population estimates

for the three major cities were as follows: Saigon--1.5

million; Da Nang--144,000; Hue--105,000.

Most of South Vietnam’s major towns and cities are connected by one

highway--Route 1. Constructed by the French during the early 20th

century, Route 1 originally extended from Hanoi, the principal city

of Tonkin in northern Vietnam, down the coast and inland to Saigon.

While Route 1 and a French-built railroad which parallels it helped

unify South Vietnam’s most densely populated areas, the country’s

road network is otherwise underdeveloped. A few tortuous roads do

twist westward from Route 1 into the mountains to reach the remote

towns there. Of these the most noteworthy are Route 19, built to serve

Pleiku in the Central Highlands, and Route 9, which extends westward

into Laos from Dong Ha, South Vietnam’s northernmost town. A number

of roads radiate outward from Saigon to the population centers of

the Mekong Delta. For the most part, however, the Vietnamese people

traditionally have depended on trail networks, inland waterways, and

the sea to satisfy their transportation needs. The location of the bulk

of the population in the watery Mekong Delta and along the seacoast has

encouraged their reliance on waterborne transportation.

_Vietnam’s Recent History_

Prior to July 1954 the expanse of mainland Southeast Asia now occupied

by South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia belonged to

France. Together these possessions constituted French-Indochina

over which the French had exercised political control in one form

or another, with one exception, since the last quarter of the 19th

century. The only interruption occurred following the capitulation of

France in June 1940. Exploiting the disrupted power balance in Europe,

and attracted by the natural resources and strategic value of the

area, Japan moved into northern French-Indochina less than four months

after France had fallen. In 1941 the Vichy French government agreed

to Japanese occupation of southern French-Indochina. Soon Japanese

forces controlled every airfield and major port in Indochina. Under

this arrangement the Japanese permitted French colonial authorities

to maintain their administrative responsibilities. But as the tide of

war began to turn against the Japanese, the French became increasingly

defiant. The Japanese terminated this relationship on 9 March 1945

when, without warning, they arrested colonial officials throughout

Indochina and brutally seized control of all governmental functions.

Six months after the dissolution of the French colonial apparatus in

Indochina, World War II ended. The grip which Japan had held on most

of Southeast Asia for nearly half a decade was broken on 2 September

1945 when her foreign minister signed the instrument of unconditional

surrender on board the battleship USS _Missouri_. Shortly thereafter,

in accordance with a previously reached Allied agreement, Chinese

Nationalist forces moved into Tonkin and northern Annam to accept the

surrender of Japanese forces. South of the 16th parallel, British units

arrived from India to disarm the defeated Japanese. A detachment of 150

men from a small French Expeditionary Corps arrived by air in Saigon

on the 12th to assist the British, who had included them only as a

courtesy since France was not among the powers slated to receive the

surrender of the Japanese in Indochina.

But the end of World War II and the arrival of Allied forces did not

end the struggle for control of French-Indochina. Instead, it signalled

the beginning of a new conflict in which the contestants were, in many

respects, more formidable. One of these, the French, moved quickly to

restore their former presence in Cochinchina and Annam. Reinforced with

additional units, they occupied most major towns between the Mekong

Delta and the 16th parallel by the end of 1945. Two months later

French negotiators secured an agreement with the Chinese Nationalists

whereby French units would replace the Chinese occupation forces north

of the 16th parallel.

[Illustration:

MAJOR CITIES OF

SOUTH VIETNAM

]

Wartime developments in French-Indochina, however, had brought about

profound political changes which eventually would doom the French

effort to re-establish political and economic influence in the region.

During World War II, Ho Chi Minh, an avowed Communist, had transformed

a relatively feeble political party into a sizable guerrilla

organization. Known as the Viet Minh, the Communist guerrillas had been

organized, trained, and led by Vo Nguyen Giap, a former history teacher

from Annam. During the latter stages of the war, the United States had

supplied the Viet Minh with limited quantities of military supplies.

In return, Ho’s guerrillas had assisted downed American pilots and

occasionally had clashed with small Japanese units. But the Viet Minh

had wasted few men on costly major actions against the Japanese.

Conserving their forces, Ho and Giap had concentrated on organization

and had managed to extend their strength into the densely populated Red

River Delta and along the Annamese coast. In Cochinchina, where their

numbers were considerably smaller, the Communists had limited their

activities almost entirely to organization and recruitment. Thus, by

the end of the war Ho’s organization was able to emerge as a definite

military-political force in northern French-Indochina.

Following the Japanese surrender and before the arrival of the Chinese

Nationalist occupation forces, the Viet Minh seized control of Hanoi,

the capital of Tonkin, and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam. At Ho’s direction the Viet Minh promptly shifted from their

anti-Japanese posture and prepared to contest the French return.

Confronted with this situation in northern Indochina, the French were

forced to bargain with the Communists. A preliminary agreement was

reached on 6 March 1946 whereby the French agreed to recognize the

newly founded but relatively weak Democratic Republic of Vietnam as

a “free state within the French Union.” In return, Ho’s government

declared itself “ready to welcome in friendly fashion the French Army,

when in conformance with international agreement, it would relieve

the Chinese forces” which had accepted the Japanese surrender in

Tonkin.[1-5] Shortly after the conclusion of this agreement, French

forces began reoccupying Tonkin and northern Annam. Within six months

they controlled every major strategic position from the Chinese border

to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Cochinchina’s southern tip.

The uneasy peace was broken in December 1946 after Viet Minh and French

negotiators failed to reach a final agreement on actual political

control of Tonkin and Annam. When open warfare erupted, Ho withdrew

the bulk of his military forces into mountainous sanctuaries along

the Chinese border, but left small groups of guerrillas scattered

throughout the heavily populated Red River Delta. Reinforced with

contingents from Europe and Africa, the French Expeditionary Corps

initially managed to hold its own and, in some cases, even extend its

control. But, drawing strength from its natural appeal to Vietnamese

nationalism, the Communist movement began gaining momentum in the late

1940s. Gradually the war intensified and spread into central Annam and

Cochinchina.

In January 1950, the French moved to undercut the Viet Minh’s appeal

to non-Communist nationalists by granting nominal independence to its

Indochina possessions. Under the terms of a formal treaty, all of

Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) was brought together under a

Saigon-based government headed by Emperor Bao Dai. Laos and Cambodia

likewise formed their own governments, whereupon all three countries

became known as the Associated States of Indochina.

This new arrangement, however, had little effect on the ongoing war

with the Viet Minh. In accordance with the treaties, the Associated

States became members of the French Union and agreed to prosecute

the war under French direction. Moreover, French political dominance

in the region continued, virtually undiluted by the existence of the

Associated States.

In related developments, Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist armies seized

control of mainland China in 1949 and Communist North Korean forces

invaded the pro-Western Republic of Korea in 1950. These events added

new meaning to the French struggle in Indochina as American policy

makers came to view the war on the Southeast Asian mainland within the

context of a larger design to bring Asia entirely under Communist

domination. Following the invasion of South Korea, President Truman

immediately announced his intention to step up U.S. military aid to

the French in Indochina. Congress responded quickly by adding four

billion dollars to existing military assistance funds. Of this, $303

million was earmarked for Korea, the Philippines, and “the general area

of China.”[1-6][1-C] Thus, the Truman Administration, now confronted

by the possibility that Communism might engulf all of mainland Asia,

extended its containment policy to Indochina.

[1-C] The following year would see a half billion U.S. dollars

allocated to support French operations in Indochina.

By 1954 that figure would climb to an even one billion

dollars.

Even with rapidly increasing amounts of U.S. material assistance,

the French proved unable to wrest the initiative from Giap’s growing

armies. Although national armies drawn from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

were now fighting alongside the French, the Expeditionary Corps was

over-extended. Moreover, the French cause was extremely vulnerable

to Communist propaganda. On the home front, public support for the

so-called _sale guerre_ (dirty war) eroded steadily during the early

1950s as the Expeditionary Corps’ failures and casualties mounted.

Finally, on 7 May 1954, the besieged 13,000-man French garrison at Dien

Bien Phu surrendered to the Viet Minh, thus shattering what remained

of French determination to prosecute the war in Indochina. In Geneva,

where Communist and Free World diplomats had gathered to consider a

formal peace in Korea along with the Indochina problem, French and Viet

Minh representatives signed a cease-fire agreement on 20 July which

ended the eight-year conflict.

The bilateral cease-fire agreement substantially altered the map of the

Indochinese Peninsula. France agreed to relinquish political control

throughout the area. Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam all gained full

independence. The most controversial provision of the 20 July agreement

divided Vietnam at the Ben Hai River and superimposed a demilitarized

zone over the partition line. This division, intended to facilitate

the disengagement of the opposing forces, was to be temporary pending

a reunification election scheduled for mid-1956. In accordance with

the agreement, France immediately turned over political control of the

northern zone (Tonkin and the northern half of Annam) to the Communist

Viet Minh. Ho promptly re-established the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam (DRV) with its capital in Hanoi.

Other provisions of the Geneva Agreement called for the opposing armies

to regroup in their respective zones within 300 days. Following their

regroupment, the French military forces were to be completely withdrawn

from the North within 300 days and from the South by mid-1956.

Civilians living both north and south of the partition line were to

be allowed to emigrate to the opposite zone in accordance with their

political convictions. It was anticipated that thousands of Catholics

living in Tonkin would seek refuge in the non-Communist South. Other

articles of the agreement dealt with the creation and responsibilities

of an International Control Commission (ICC) to supervise the

cease-fire. Canadian, Indian, and Polish delegations were to comprise

this commission.

On 21 July, the day following the bilateral agreement, Great Britain,

the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, Cambodia, and Laos

joined France and the Viet Minh in endorsing a “Final Declaration”

which sanctioned the previously reached cease-fire agreement. The

United States refused to endorse this declaration, but issued a

statement to the effect that it would not use force to disturb the

cease-fire.

_Post-Geneva South Vietnam_

The execution of the Geneva Agreement thrust that area of Vietnam

south of the partition line into a period of profound confusion and

instability. Even worse, the colonial period had done little to

prepare the Cochinchinese and Annamese for the tremendous problems

at hand. No real apparatus for central government existed. Likewise,

the long colonial period left the area with few experienced political

leaders capable of establishing and managing the required governmental

machinery. Political control passed nominally to the French-sponsored

emperor, Bao Dai, who was living in France at the time. For all

practical purposes, leadership in the South devolved upon Bao Dai’s

recently appointed pro-Western premier, Ngo Dinh Diem. The product of a

prosperous and well-educated Catholic family from Hue, Diem had served

the French briefly as a province chief prior to World War II. Always a

strong nationalist but staunchly anti-Communist, he had been unable to

reconcile his anti-French attitudes with the Viet Minh movement during

the Indochina War. As a result Diem had left his homeland in the early

1950s to live at a Catholic seminary in the United States. There he

remained until his appointment as premier in mid-June of 1954.

The months immediately following the Geneva agreement found Ngo Dinh

Diem struggling to create the necessary governmental machinery in

Saigon, the capital of the southern zone. At best, however, his hold

on the feeble institutions was tenuous. A serious confrontation was

developing between the premier and the absent Bao Dai, still residing

in France. Further complicating the political scene was the presence of

Hoa Hao and Cao Dai armies in the provinces surrounding the capital,

and the existence in Saigon of an underworld organization named the

Binh Xuyen.[1-D] As 1955 opened the leaders of these three politically

oriented factions were pressing demands for concessions from the new

central government. Among these were permission to maintain their

private armies, and the authority to exercise political control over

large, heavily populated areas.

[1-D] The Binh Xuyen originally operated from the swamps south

of the Chinese-dominated Cholon district of Saigon.

Controlling the vice and crime of the city, by 1954 they

had gained control of the police under circumstances that

reeked of bribery. A year later the organization was

brutally crushed by Ngo Dinh Diem.

The outcome of the embryonic power struggle in Saigon hinged largely

on control of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA). Although not

considered an efficient military organization by even the most liberal

estimates, the 210,000-man National Army was the principal source

of organized power available to the quarreling leaders of southern

Vietnam. Originally created by the French in 1950 to supplement their

Expeditionary Corps, the VNA had since suffered from structural

deficiencies. It actually had no organizational echelon between the

French-controlled General Staff and the 160 separate battalions. Tied

to no regiments or divisions, the Vietnamese battalions naturally

were dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps for operational

instructions and logistical support.[1-E]

[1-E] Selected VNA battalions were sometimes task organized

into _groupes mobiles_ (mobile groups) by the French for

specific offensive operations. But these groups, which

were roughly equivalent to a regimental combat team,

were never composed entirely of VNA battalions under a

Vietnamese command group.

A dearth of qualified Vietnamese officers and a degree of inattention

on the part of the French compounded the problems which stemmed from

the army’s structural flaw. Partially as a result of these shortcomings

the morale of the VNA had deteriorated sharply in the waning stages of

the French-Indochina War. At the time of the cease-fire agreement, high

desertion rates were reported in almost every Vietnamese battalion.

Still, it was evident that he who controlled the National Army would

most likely control the government in the area south of the partition

line.

The danger that the pro-Western zone might become the victim of a

sudden Communist attack from the north, as had been the case on the

Korean Peninsula, injected another element of uncertainty into the

overall situation in southern Vietnam. The conditions which settled

over the area in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva settlement

suggested this possibility since they were alarmingly similar to the

conditions which had prevailed in Korea prior to the North Korean

invasion of 1950. Like Korea, Vietnam was divided both geographically

and ideologically: the North clearly within the orbit of the Soviet

Union and Communist China, and the South under the influence of the

Western powers. As in Korea in 1950, there also existed a very real

armed threat to the weaker pro-Western southern state. Immediately

after the Geneva cease-fire, the Viet Minh army regrouped north of the

17th parallel and was redesignated the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN).

American intelligence reported that the PAVN, which numbered roughly

240,000 disciplined veterans, was being reorganized and re-equipped

with Soviet and Chinese weapons in violation of the Geneva Agreement.

At the same time Western intelligence sources estimated that the Viet

Minh had intentionally left between 5,000 and 10,000 men south of the

partition line following their withdrawal. Also done in violation of

the cease-fire agreement, this meant that Communist guerrillas could be

expected to surface throughout the South in the event of an outright

invasion.

A related condition heightened fears that a Korea-type invasion might

occur in Vietnam. In South Korea a military vacuum had been allowed to

form in 1949 when American units withdrew from the area. Apparently

that vacuum, coupled with a statement by the American Secretary of

State to the effect that the U.S. defensive perimeter in the Pacific

did not include South Korea, had encouraged Communist aggression.

Now, with the scheduled evacuation of French armies from Indochina by

mid-1956, there emerged the distinct possibility that such a military

vacuum would recur, this time in southern Vietnam. “Vietnam,” warned

one American scholar familiar with the region, “may very soon become

either a dam against aggression from the north or a bridge serving the

communist block to transform the countries of the Indochinese peninsula

into satellites of China.”[1-7]

_The American Response_

It was in the face of this uncertain situation on the Southeast Asian

mainland that the Eisenhower administration moved to discourage renewed

Communist military activity. First, the United States sought to create

a regional international organization to promote collective military

action under the threat of aggression. This was obtained on 8 September

1954 when eight nations--the United States, Great Britain, France, New

Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand--signed the

Manila Pact. The treaty area encompassed by the pact included Southeast

Asia, the Southwest Pacific below 21°31′ north latitude, and Pakistan.

Two weeks later the pact was transformed into the Southeast Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO). In a separate protocol, the member nations agreed

that Cambodia, Laos, and the “Free Territory under the jurisdiction of

the State of Vietnam” all resided within their defense sphere.[1-8]

Next, after several months of hesitation, the United States settled

on a policy of comprehensive assistance to South Vietnam, as the

area south of the 1954 partition line was already being called. As

conceived, the immediate objective of the new American policy was

to bring political stability to South Vietnam. The longer range

goal was the creation of a bulwark to discourage renewed Communist

expansion down the Indochinese Peninsula. In this scheme, military

assistance was to play a key role. “One of the most efficient means

of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong,” explained

Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, “is to assist it

in reorganizing the National Army and in training that Army.”[1-9]

In short, the State Department’s position was that a stronger, more

responsive Vietnamese National Army would help Premier Diem consolidate

his political power. Later that same force would serve as a shield

behind which South Vietnam would attempt to recover from the ravages of

the French-Indochina War and the after effects of the Geneva Agreement.

So by early 1955 a combination of circumstances--South Vietnam’s

position adjacent to a Communist state, the unsavory memories of

the Korean invasion, and the impending withdrawal of the French

Expeditionary Corps--had influenced the United States to adopt a policy

of military support for Premier Diem’s struggling government.

CHAPTER 2

The Formative Years

_Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam--Origins of U.S. Marine

Assistance--Political Stabilization and Its Effects--Reorganization and

Progress--Summing Up Developments_

_Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam_

When the Geneva cease-fire went into effect in the late summer of 1954,

the machinery for implementing the military phase of the American

assistance program for South Vietnam already existed. President

Truman had ordered the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance

Advisory Group (USMAAG or MAAG) in French Indochina in mid-1950 as

one of several reactions to the North Korean invasion of the Republic

of Korea. Established to provide materiel support to the French

Expeditionary Corps, the MAAG constituted little more than a logistical

funnel through which U.S. military aid had been poured.

Lieutenant General John M. (“Iron Mike”) O’Daniel, U.S. Army, had

been assigned to command the MAAG in the spring of 1954. O’Daniel’s

selection for the Saigon post anticipated a more active U.S. role in

training of the Vietnamese National Army. He had been chosen for the

assignment largely on the basis of his successful role in creating

and supervising the training programs which had transformed the South

Korean Army into an effective fighting force during the Korean War.

Now, in the aftermath of the Geneva settlement, he and his 342-man

group began preparing for the immense task of rebuilding South

Vietnam’s armed forces.

The entire American project to assist the South Vietnamese in the

construction of a viable state was delayed during the fall of 1954

while the necessary diplomatic agreements were negotiated among

American, French, and South Vietnamese officials. President Eisenhower

dispatched General J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army (Retired), to Saigon

in November to complete the details of the triangular arrangements.

Collins carried with him the broad powers which would be required to

expedite the negotiations.

By mid-January 1955, the president’s special envoy had paved the

way for the transfer of responsibility for training, equipping, and

advising the Vietnamese National Army from the French to the USMAAG.

He and General Paul Ely, the officer appointed by the Paris government

to oversee the French withdrawal from Indochina, had initialed a

“Minute of Understanding.” In accordance with this document, the

United States agreed to provide financial assistance to the French

military in Vietnam in exchange for two important concessions. First,

the French pledged to conduct a gradual military withdrawal from South

Vietnam in order to prevent the development of a military vacuum

which might precipitate a North Vietnamese invasion. Secondly, they

accepted an American plan to assist in a transition stage during which

the responsibility for rebuilding the Vietnamese military could be

transferred to the MAAG in an orderly fashion. General Collins, in

addition to engineering the understanding with General Ely, had advised

Premier Diem to reduce his 210,000-man military and naval forces to a

level of 100,000, a figure which the U.S. State Department felt the

United States could realistically support and train.

The American plan to begin assisting South Vietnam encountered further

delay even after the Ely-Collins understanding had been reached. Ely’s

government, arguing that the United States had agreed to provide only

one-third of the amount France had requested to finance its Indochina

forces, refused to ratify the agreement. The deadlock was finally

resolved on 11 February 1955 when French officials accepted the terms

of the Ely-Collins arrangement in a revised form.

A combined Franco-American training command, designated the Training

Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM), became operational in Saigon

the day following the French ratification of the Ely-Collins

understanding.[2-A] Headed by Lieutenant General O’Daniel but under

the “overall authority” of General Ely, TRIM was structured to prevent

domination by either French or Americans. The training mission was

composed of four divisions, Army, Navy, Air Force, and National

Security, each of which was headed alternately by either an American

or a French officer. The chief of each division had as his deputy an

officer of the opposite nationality. U.S. officers, however, headed the

divisions considered by MAAG officials as the most important--Army and

National Security. Operating through TRIM and assisted by the French

military, the USMAAG was tasked with implementing the U.S. Military

Assistance Program in a manner that would help shape the Vietnamese

national forces into a cohesive defense establishment prior to the

withdrawal of French forces.

[2-A] The combined training mission originally was designated

the Allied Training Operations Mission. This designation

was changed prior to the time the mission became

operational.

_Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance_

Only one U.S. Marine was serving with the USMAAG in Saigon when

TRIM became operational--Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat.[2-B]

Croizat’s assignment to the U.S. advisory group had resulted when

General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps,

nominated him to fill a newly created billet as liaison officer between

the MAAG and the French High Command during the latter stages of the

Indochina War. Largely because of his French language fluency and his

former association with many French officers while attending their war

college in 1949, Croizat was chosen for the assignment.

[2-B] Other Marines, however, were present in Saigon at

the time. They were those assigned to the American

Embassy. One officer was serving as Assistant Naval

Attache/Assistant Naval Attache for Air, and 12 other

Marines were serving as security guards.

Lieutenant Colonel Croizat, however, did not arrive in Vietnam until 2

August 1954. By then the cease-fire agreement had been signed at Geneva

and the need for a liaison officer with the French High Command no

longer existed. General O’Daniel, therefore, assigned the newly arrived

Marine officer to serve on the General Commission for Refugees which

had been created by the South Vietnamese Government immediately after

the cease-fire. In this capacity Croizat became directly involved in

the construction of refugee reception centers and the selection and

development of resettlement areas in the South. When U.S. naval forces

began assisting in the evacuation of North Vietnam, Lieutenant Colonel

Croizat was sent to Haiphong, the principal seaport of Tonkin. There

he headed the MAAG detachment and was responsible for coordinating

U.S. operations in the area with those of the French and Vietnamese.

When the so-called “Passage to Freedom” concluded in May 1955, 807,000

people, 469,000 tons of equipment and supplies, and 23,000 vehicles

had been evacuated from Communist North Vietnam.[2-C] It was not until

February 1955 that the Marine returned to Saigon.

[2-C] The French moved 497,000 people, 400,000 tons of

equipment and supplies, and 15,000 vehicles. The U.S.

Navy moved the balance.

During Lieutenant Colonel Croizat’s absence, Premier Diem had acted on

a long-standing proposal to create a small Vietnamese Marine Corps.

The issue of a separate Marine force composed of Vietnamese national

troops had surfaced frequently since the birth of the Vietnamese Navy

in the early 1950s. Although the proposal had been heartily endorsed

by a number of senior French Navy officers, the downward spiral of the

French war effort had intervened to prevent the subject from being

advanced beyond a conceptual stage. Largely as a result of earlier

discussions with Croizat, Premier Diem acted on the matter on 13

October when he signed a decree which included the following articles:

ARTICLE 1. Effective 1 October 1954 there is created within the

Naval Establishment a corps of infantry specializing in the

surveillance of waterways and amphibious operations on the coast

and rivers, to be designated as:

‘THE MARINE CORPS’

* * * * *

ARTICLE 3. The Marine Corps shall consist of various type units

suited to their functions and either already existing in the Army

or Naval forces or to be created in accordance with the development

plan for the armed forces.[2-1]

In accordance with this decree a miscellaneous collection of

commando-type units was transferred from the Vietnamese National Army

and Navy to the Marine Corps. Except for a naval commando unit, which

had conducted amphibious raids along the coastal plains, these forces

had operated in the Red River Delta with the French and Vietnamese

Navy _dinassauts_ (river assault divisions). First employed in 1946,

the _dinassauts_ had evolved into relatively effective naval commands

capable of landing light infantry companies along Indochina’s tangled

riverbanks. Normally the _dinassaut_ was composed of about a dozen

armored and armed landing craft, patrol boats, and command vessels.

An Army commando unit, consisting of approximately 100 men, would

be attached to such naval commands for specific operations. Thus

organized, the _dinassauts_ could transport light infantry units

into otherwise inaccessible areas and support landings with heavy

caliber automatic weapons and mortar fire. Such operations had been

particularly successful in the sprawling Red River Delta of Tonkin

where navigable estuaries and Viet Minh abounded.[2-D] Later in the

war, as the concept was refined, the French created a number of

Vietnamese National Army commando units for specific service with the

_dinassauts_. Still attached to the Navy commands these units were

sometimes responsible for security around the _dinassaut_ bases when

not involved in preplanned operations. A number of these rather elite

Vietnamese units, variously designated light support companies, river

boat companies, and commandos, were now transferred to the newly

decreed Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).

[2-D] Of the _dinassaut_ Bernard Fall wrote: “[It] may well

have been one of the few worthwhile contributions

of the Indochina war to military knowledge.” (Fall,

_Street Without Joy_, p. 39) A more thorough analysis

of _dinassaut_ operations is included in Croizat, _A

Translation From The French Lessons of the War_, pp.

348–351.

By the time Lieutenant Colonel Croizat returned to Saigon in early

1955 these units, which totalled approximately 2,400 officers and men,

had been evacuated from North Vietnam. Several of the commandos had

been assembled at Nha Trang on South Vietnam’s central coast where

the French still maintained an extensive naval training facility.

There, under the supervision of a junior French commando officer,

several former commandos had been organized into the 1st Marine

Landing Battalion (or 1st Landing Battalion). The balance of the newly

designated Marine units, however, were scattered in small, widely

separated garrisons from Hue to the Mekong Delta. These units included

six river boat companies, five combat support light companies, and

a small training flotilla. Diem had appointed a former Vietnamese

National Army officer, Major Le Quang Trong, as Senior Marine Officer.

But because no formal headquarters had been created and because no real

command structure existed, Major Trong remained relatively isolated

from his far-flung Marine infantry units.

Upon returning to Saigon, Croizat was assigned to the MAAG’s Naval

Section and subsequently to TRIM’S Naval Division as the senior U.S.

advisor to the newly created Vietnamese Marine Corps. In this capacity

the Marine officer quickly determined that the small Vietnamese

amphibious force was faced with several serious problems. First, and

perhaps its most critical, was that despite Premier Diem’s decree,

the Marine Corps continued to exist essentially on an informal basis.

“The Marine Corps itself had no real identity,” its U.S. advisor later

explained. “It was a scattering of dissimilar units extending from Hue

to the Mekong Delta area.”[2-2] The fact that its widespread units

were still dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps for logistical

support underscored the weakness inherent in the VNMC’s initial status.

Other problems arose from the continuation of French officers in

command billets throughout the Vietnamese naval forces. Under the

Franco-American agreement which had created TRIM, a French Navy captain

doubled as chief of the combined training missions’ Naval Division

and as commanding officer of the Vietnamese naval forces. This placed

the French in a position to review any proposals advanced by the U.S.

Marine advisor. Complicating the situation even further, a French

Army captain, Jean Louis Delayen, actually commanded the 1st Landing

Battalion at Nha Trang.[2-E]

[2-E] Delayen, described by Croizat as “an exceptionally

qualified French Commando officer,” later attended the

U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico.

(Croizat, “Notes on The Organization,” p. 3.)

Demobilization presented another potential difficulty for the

Vietnamese Marine Corps in early 1955. Under the U.S.-Vietnamese

force level agreements, the Vietnamese naval forces were limited to

3,000 men. The Marine Corps, which alone totalled a disproportionate

2,400 men, had been instructed to reduce its strength to 1,137 men

and officers. With no effective centralized command structure and

so many widely separated units, even the relatively simple task of

mustering out troops assumed the dimensions of a complex administrative

undertaking.

In short, the very existence of the Vietnamese Marine Corps was

threatened in a number of inter-related situations. The continuation

of a separate and distinct Marine Corps hinged ultimately, of course,

on the overall reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces and their

support structure. Essentially it would be necessary to establish a

requirement for such an organization within South Vietnam’s future

military-naval structure. Croizat personally sensed that this would

be the pivotal issue in determining the VNMC’s future. “There were

numerous representatives of the three military services from each of

the three countries concerned with the fate of the Vietnamese Army,

Navy, and Air Force,” he pointed out. “But, there was no champion

from within the Vietnamese Marine Corps since no Corps existed except

on paper.”[2-3] Thus, it was left initially to a French captain, a

Vietnamese major, and a U.S. Marine lieutenant colonel to keep alive

the idea that South Vietnam’s defense establishment needed a separate

Marine Corps.

_Political Stabilization and Its Effects_

During early 1955 the entire South Vietnamese government was engulfed

by a crisis which threatened to disrupt the American plans to help

build a viable anti-Communist country. The crisis occurred not in the

form of an overt North Vietnamese attack but rather as a result of

the South’s political instability. In February the leaders of the Hoa

Hao, the Cao Dai, and the Binh Xuyen, dissatisfied with Premier Diem’s

refusal to accede to their various demands, formed the United Front of

National Forces.

By mid-March the disaffected leaders of these organizations felt

strong enough to test the premier’s strength. Trouble began late that

month when the Hoa Hao began undertaking guerrilla-type activities

against Diem’s National Army units in the sect’s stronghold southwest

of Saigon. On 28 March Diem ordered a company of paratroops to seize

the Saigon Central Police Headquarters which the French had allowed

the Binh Xuyen to control. Fighting erupted throughout the capital the

next day as Binh Xuyen units clashed with loyal government forces. A

truce was arranged finally in the city on 31 March after three days of

intermittent but fierce fighting. That same day the Cao Dai broke with

the United Front and accepted a government offer to integrate some of

its troops into the National Army.

An uneasy peace prevailed over South Vietnam until 28 April when new

fighting broke out. By the middle of May, government forces had driven

the Binh Xuyen forces from Saigon, fracturing their organization.

Remnants of the bandit group, however, escaped into the extensive

Rung Sat swamps south of the capital where they continued fighting

individually and in small groups. In the countryside south of Saigon,

30 of Diem’s battalions, including the 1st Landing Battalion, took the

offensive against the Hoa Hao regular and guerrilla forces.

The national crisis, for all practical purposes, ended in the last

week of June when a Hoa Hao leader surrendered 8,000 regulars and

ordered his followers to cease all anti-government activities. Sporadic

fighting continued, however, as Diem’s forces sought to mop-up Hoa Hao

splinter groups fighting in the western Mekong Delta and Binh Xuyen

elements still resisting in the rugged mangrove swamps south of the

capital. In August the Marine Landing Battalion fought a decisive

action against the remaining Hoa Hao in Kien Giang Province about 120

miles southwest of Saigon, destroying the rebel headquarters. Later

in the year the 1st Landing Battalion, joined by several river boat

companies, reduced one of the last pockets of Binh Xuyen resistance

in the Rung Sat. As a result of these and similar actions being fought

simultaneously by loyal Army units, organized resistance to Premier

Diem gradually collapsed.[2-F]

[2-F] Some sources contend that remnants of the Hoa Hao and Cao

Dai armies survived to operate alongside the Viet Cong

guerrillas who began threatening the Diem government in

the late 1950s. (Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. in Vietnam_,

p. 111.)

The sect crisis of 1955 proved to be the turning point in Diem’s

political fortunes. At the height of the crisis, Emperor Bao Dai

attempted to remove Diem as premier by ordering him to France for

“consultations.” Electing to remain in Saigon and direct his government

efforts to quell the rebellion, the premier declined Bao Dai’s summons.

The Vietnamese military forces proved loyal to the premier, having

faithfully executed Diem’s commands throughout the emergency. Having

successfully met the armed challenge of the sects and the Binh Xuyen

and having openly repudiated Bao Dai’s authority, Premier Diem had

imposed at least a measure of political stability on South Vietnam.

An epilogue to the sect crisis was written on 23 October when a

nationwide referendum was held in South Vietnam to settle the issue of

national leadership. In the balloting, since criticized as having been

rigged, Premier Diem received 98.2 percent of the total vote against

Bao Dai. Three days later, on 26 October, South Vietnam’s new president

proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

The Vietnamese Marine Corps benefited greatly from Premier Diem’s

successful confrontation with his political rivals. On 1 May, in

preparation for the 1st Landing Battalion’s deployment to combat, Major

Trong had established a small Marine Corps headquarters in Saigon.

Shortly thereafter, Diem had appointed a Vietnamese officer, Captain

Bui Pho Chi, to replace Captain Delayen as commander of the landing

battalion. The French commando officer, who was a member of TRIM,

remained at Nha Trang as an advisor to the VNMC. Then, on the last

day of June, Diem removed the remaining French officers from command

positions throughout South Vietnam’s naval forces. The combined effect

of these actions was to reduce French influence throughout the nation’s

naval establishment while making the Vietnamese Marine Corps more

responsive to the central government.

The burdens of demobilization also were lightened somewhat as a result

of the sect crisis when a new force level was approved by the United

States in mid-summer of 1955. The new agreement, dictated in part by

the requirement to integrate portions of the sects’ armies into the

national forces, raised the force level to 150,000 men and placed the

personnel ceiling of the Vietnamese naval forces at 4,000 men. This

revision enhanced the prospects for a corresponding increase in the

authorized strength of the VNMC.

The 1st Landing Battalion’s performance against the sect forces in the

Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat, moreover, tempered much of the previous

opposition to a separate VNMC. Heretofore, U.S. and Vietnamese Army

officers had opposed the existence of a Vietnamese amphibious force

apart from the National Army. Until the sect uprising, Lieutenant

Colonel Croizat had used the influence afforded by his position as

naval advisor to the general staff to advocate the continuation of the

VNMC. But during the sect battles the Vietnamese Marines had firmly

established their value to the new government. By displaying loyalty,

discipline, and efficiency in combat, they had spoken out in their own

behalf at a critical juncture in their corp’s existence.

Shortly before the 1st Landing Battalion deployed to fight the

rebellious sect forces, two additional U.S. Marine advisors--an officer

and a noncommissioned officer--arrived in South Vietnam for duty with

the MAAG. Both Marines were assigned to TRIM. Croizat dispatched the

officer, Captain James T. Breckinridge, to Nha Trang where he soon

replaced Captain Delayen as advisor to the 1st Landing Battalion.

As State Department policy prohibited U.S. military personnel from

participating in combat activities with indigenous forces, Breckinridge

was forced to await the battalion’s return from the field. During

its absence he divided his time between Nha Trang and Saigon where

he assisted Colonel Croizat with planning and logistics matters. The

noncommissioned officer, Technical Sergeant Jackson E. Tracy, initially

remained in Saigon but later moved to Nha Trang. There, serving

principally as a small unit tactics instructor to the Vietnamese

Marines, Tracy impressed Breckinridge as a “first-rate Marine

‘NCO’--one who could carry out the most complex assignment with little

or no supervision.”[2-4]

[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat, first U.S. Marine

Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, translates during discussions

between Lieutenant General John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, USA, Chief,

USMAAG, Vietnam, and Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. (Photo courtesy of Colonel

Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.))._]

Soon after 1956 opened, President Diem appointed a new officer to head

the Vietnamese Marine Corps. On 18 January Major Phan Van Lieu assumed

command of the VNMC, and thereby became the second Senior Marine

Officer.

_Reorganization and Progress_

The 1st Landing Battalion remained in action against the Binh Xuyen

remnants until February 1956. During this period Lieutenant Colonel

Croizat reviewed the entire organizational structure of the Vietnamese

Marine Corps. By now the size of the service had been reduced to

roughly 1,800 officers and men although it retained its original

organization of six river boat companies, five light support companies,

a landing battalion, a training flotilla, and a small headquarters.

This organization, with so many dissimilar units existing on one

echelon, influenced Croizat to suggest that Major Lieu restructure

the service. Assisted by Croizat, Captain Breckinridge, and Technical

Sergeant Tracy, Lieu and his small staff spent several months

developing and refining plans for the comprehensive reorganization

of the Marine Corps. Lieu submitted this package to the Vietnamese

Joint General Staff (JGS) on 21 December 1955. The salient feature

of the plan was to create an additional landing battalion without

increasing the 1,837-man ceiling which then governed the size of

the VNMC. Significantly, the plan contained a clause proposing that

the Vietnamese Marine Corps be expanded to regimental size in the

future.[2-5]

[Illustration: VNMC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY 1956

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, 1,837]

[Illustration: LANDING BATTALION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18

FEBRUARY 1956

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 728]

The Vietnamese Joint General Staff approved the new structure, and

reorganization of the VNMC was begun when the 1st Landing Battalion

finally returned to Nha Trang in February. The old river boat and

light support companies were disbanded and three new units--a 4.2-inch

mortar company, a headquarters and service company, and a new landing

battalion--were formed. Designated the 2d Landing Battalion, this new

unit formed about 25 miles south of Nha Trang at Cam Ranh Bay where the

French had trained amphibious forces during the latter stages of the

Indochina War.

As a result of the 1956 reorganization effort, the tables of

organization and tables of equipment for the Vietnamese Marine

battalions were completely revised. Three infantry companies, a heavy

weapons company, and a headquarters and service company now comprised

a landing battalion.[2-G] Each infantry company was organized into

three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. In turn, the rifle platoons

each consisted of three 10-man squads (three 3-man fire teams and a

squad leader). The individual Vietnamese Marine rifleman was armed

with the .30 caliber M-1 carbine, a weapon formerly carried by many

French and Vietnamese commandos. It had been retained for use within

the VNMC because it was substantially shorter and lighter than the

standard U.S. infantry weapon, the M-1 rifle, and was therefore better

suited to the small Vietnamese fighting man. The automatic rifleman in

each Vietnamese Marine fire team carried the Browning automatic rifle

(BAR), a heavier .30 caliber automatic weapon. The weapons platoon

of the rifle company was built around six .30 caliber light machine

guns. Within the heavy weapons company of the landing battalions was a

mortar platoon, equipped with four 81mm mortars, and a recoilless rifle

platoon.

[2-G] Whereas U.S. Marine infantry companies were designated

by letters (A, B, C, D, etc.), the Vietnamese Marine

infantry companies were given number designations.

While this reorganization was underway, Lieutenant Colonel Croizat

initiated a search for acceptable means of expanding the Vietnamese

Marine Corps to regimental size. A staff study produced by the Senior

Marine Advisor a month before the first phase of the reorganization

effort had begun included several important recommendations. Croizat

proposed to General O’Daniel that authorization be granted to raise the

ceiling on the VNMC from 1,837 to 2,435 officers and men. This, the

Marine advisor pointed out, could be accomplished without affecting

the overall ceiling on all South Vietnamese military and naval forces.

By reassigning to the Vietnamese Marine Corps an amphibious battalion

still organized within the National Army, the 150,000-man force level

would not be altered. This would transform the Vietnamese Marine Corps

into a three battalion regiment and would unify all South Vietnamese

amphibious forces under a single command. Croizat’s study further

recommended that the Vietnamese Marine Corps be designated part of the

general reserve of the nation’s armed forces and that it be controlled

directly by the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Although no immediate

action was taken on these recommendations, they were to serve as a

blueprint for the future expansion of the VNMC. Equally important, they

bore the seed that would eventually make the Vietnamese Marine Corps a

fully integrated component of South Vietnam’s defense establishment.

During the ensuing three years, several apparently unrelated

occurrences impacted either directly or indirectly on the U.S. Marine

advisory effort in South Vietnam. The French completed their military

withdrawal from South Vietnam and dissolved their High Command in April

1956, slightly ahead of schedule.[2-H] In conjunction with this final

phase of the French withdrawal, the Training Relations Instructions

Mission was abolished. Thus, it was no longer necessary for the MAAG

programs to be executed through the combined training mission.

[2-H] A few French naval officers and noncommissioned officers

remained at Nha Trang as instructors until late May 1957.

Shortly after the departure of the last French troops, Lieutenant

Colonel Croizat ended his assignment as Senior Marine Advisor. He was

replaced by Lieutenant Colonel William N. Wilkes, Jr., in June 1956.

A veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign, Wilkes came to Vietnam from

Washington, D.C. where he had recently completed a French language

course. Like his predecessor, the new Senior Marine Advisor was

scheduled to serve in Vietnam for two years.

In August, less than two months after Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes’

arrival, President Diem appointed a new officer to head his Marine

Corps. This time Bui Pho Chi, the captain who had commanded the 1st

Landing Battalion during the sect uprising, was selected for the

assignment. Chi’s appointment was only temporary, however, for in

October Diem ordered Major Le Nhu Hung to assume command of the Marine

Corps. Major Hung, who became the VNMC’s fourth Senior Officer, was to

hold the position for four years.

An attempt to abolish the Vietnamese Marine Corps coincided with the

series of changes in its leadership and the departure of Lieutenant

Colonel Croizat. During the summer months, the Vietnamese Minister of

Defense proposed that the VNMC be made a branch of South Vietnam’s

Army. Fortunately, the recent combat record of the 1st Landing

Battalion outweighed the minister’s influence and the effort to

disestablish the Vietnamese Marine Corps was thwarted.

Another noteworthy incident in the record of the early relations

between the U.S. and Vietnamese Marines occurred when the Marine

noncommissioned officer billet within the MAAG was upgraded to an

officer position. This adjustment, which anticipated the creation

of the 2d Landing Battalion, had the effect of making a U.S. Marine

officer available to advise individual VNMC battalions on a permanent

basis. Thus originated a plan whereby a U.S. Marine officer would

advise each Vietnamese Marine battalion--a concept abandoned only

temporarily between 1959 and 1962.

The Vietnamese Marine Corps continued as a two-battalion regiment

under the command of Major Le Nhu Hung from mid-1956 through 1959.

During this period Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes and his successor,

Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., a Marine who had served

as an aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, instituted a variety

of programs intended to provide the Vietnamese Marines with a common

base of experience and training.[2-I] Perhaps the most important of

these was one implemented in 1958 whereby Vietnamese Marine officers

began attending basic and intermediate level schools at Marine Corps

Schools, Quantico. Other formal schools for noncommissioned officers

were established by the Vietnamese Marine Corps in South Vietnam. In

an effort to build _esprit de corps_ among the lower ranking Vietnamese

Marines, the U.S. advisors encouraged voluntary enlistments. They

also persuaded their Vietnamese counterparts to adopt a corps-wide

marksmanship training program similar to the one then in use by the

U.S. Marine Corps.

[2-I] See Appendix A for complete listings of VNMC Commandants

and Senior Marine Advisors to the VNMC during the

1954–1964 period.

In conjunction with the reorganization of the VNMC and the stress

being placed upon small unit and individual training, much of the

U.S. advisory effort during this period was devoted to logistics. The

Marine advisors soon discovered that the Vietnamese officers, who had

not been directly concerned with supply matters under the French,

tended to ignore this important area. “The real problem,” explained

Captain Breckinridge, “was the newness of it all. The Vietnamese

officers simply possessed no base of experience or training in logistic

matters.”[2-6] This shortcoming dictated that the American advisors

not only design a workable logistics system but closely supervise its

operation as well. Wilkes and Wilkinson instituted intensive schooling

of supply and maintenance personnel and emphasized the value of command

supervision to the Vietnamese leaders. The Marine advisors, for

example, taught their counterparts that equipment shortages could often

be prevented if command attention were given to requisitions. Still,

even with constant supervision and formal schooling, the Vietnamese

Marine Corps continued to experience problems in this area throughout

the 1950s and well into the next decade. Breckinridge, who returned to

serve with the Vietnamese Marines again as a lieutenant colonel in the

late 1960s, recalled shortages of such vital and common items as small

arms ammunition even then.

The years between 1955 and 1959 also saw the Marine advisors working

to overcome a potentially more serious problem, one that also dated

from the French-Indochina War. From the outset of their experience

with the Vietnamese Marine Corps, the Marine advisors perceived that

a strong defensive orientation seemed to pervade every echelon of the

small service. Most Americans, including U.S. Army advisors who were

encountering similar difficulties with the Vietnamese Army, agreed that

this “defensive psychology” was a by-product of the long subordination

of the Vietnamese National forces to the French High Command. Indeed,

a criticism frequently voiced by USMAAG officials during the Indochina

War had been that the French tended to frustrate the development of

the Vietnamese military forces by assigning them static security tasks

rather than offensive missions. Even though the forerunners of the

Vietnamese Marine battalions had operated as commando units, they too

had seen extensive duty protecting _dinassaut_ bases and other French

installations. Now this defensive thinking was affecting the attitude

of the Vietnamese Marine toward training. Moreover, it was threatening

the American effort to transform the service into an aggressive

amphibious strike force.

[Illustration: _First group of Vietnamese Marine officers to attend

U.S. Marine Officers Basic School, Quantico, Virginia, pose with

Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (second from right), and

Captain Michael Gott (extreme right). At the extreme left is Captain Le

Nguyen Khang, a future Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. To

his immediate left is Major Le Nhu Hung, a senior officer of the VNMC.

(Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael Gott, USMC)._]

By nature this particular problem defied quick, simple solutions. The

Marine advisors, therefore, undertook to adjust the orientation of

the entire Vietnamese Marine Corps over a prolonged period through

continuous emphasis on offensive training. The advisors consistently

encouraged their Vietnamese counterparts to develop training schedules

which stressed patrolling, ambushing, fire and maneuver, and night

movement. In this same connection the Marine advisors translated U.S.

Marine small unit tactics manuals into French, whereupon the same

manuals were further translated by Vietnamese Marines into Vietnamese.

This process assured that adequate training literature was made

available to the individual Marine and his small unit leaders. The

offensively oriented training programs and the translation project

complemented one another, and combined with continuous supervision by

the U.S. advisors and the return of young Vietnamese officers from

Quantico, gradually helped impart a more aggressive offensive spirit

to the entire Marine Corps.

_Summing Up Developments_

The years between 1955 and 1959 constitute perhaps the most critical

and challenging span in the chronicle of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

Born out of the confusion which dominated South Vietnam in the

aftermath of the Geneva Agreement, the embryonic Marine Corps had

survived against heavy odds. Even before its scattered components

could be drawn together under a centralized command, the Corps had

been hurled into combat against the rebellious sects. Over the course

of their commitment the Vietnamese Marines had strengthened their own

cause through demonstrations of their fighting capability and loyalty.

In terms of the VNMC’s continued existence, equally critical battles

were being waged in Saigon where the Senior U.S. Marine Advisor and

the Vietnamese Senior Marine Officer struggled to gain support for

the infant service. It was there, ironically, that the destiny of the

Vietnamese Marine Corps ultimately had been decided.

On balance, the interval between 1955 and 1959 was characterized by

uncertainty, transition, and problem solving. Never sure of the Marine

Corps’ future, the Senior Vietnamese Marine Officer and a handful of

U.S. Marine advisors had carried forward their efforts to transform

scattered French-inspired river commando units into a coherent and

responsive American-style amphibious force. While this transformation

was only partially realized, definite progress was apparent. Vietnamese

officers had replaced French commanders, and with American guidance,

had given their service a strong interim structure. Many of the more

serious problems which had plagued the struggling organization since

its inception had been identified. With American assistance, solutions

to those problems were being developed and tested. So, despite a stormy

beginning and a threatened early childhood, the Vietnamese Marine Corps

lived.

CHAPTER 3

Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency

_Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency--Insurgency and the Vietnamese

Marine Corps--Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands--American

Decisions at the Close of 1961_

_Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency_

South Vietnam gave every outward indication that it had achieved a

measure of overall stability in the two-year period following President

Diem’s election in the fall of 1955. In early 1956 Diem felt strong

enough politically to announce his government’s refusal to participate

in the reunification elections scheduled for midyear. He based this

position upon the argument that free elections were impossible in

Communist North Vietnam. The proposed July election deadline passed

without a serious reaction by North Vietnam. Equally encouraging was

the fact that there had been no noticeable resurgence in the armed

power of either the politico-religious sects or the Binh Xuyen. At the

same time the American-backed South Vietnamese economy appeared to be

gaining considerable strength.

[Illustration: _Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, USA, Commander,

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. (USA Photo SC494954)._]

The threat of invasion from the North had also been tempered somewhat

by 1958. The MAAG, now headed by Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams,

U.S. Army, a commander respected as a tough disciplinarian, was

beginning to reshape the former Vietnamese national forces.[3-A]

Renamed the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the army now

consisted of four field divisions (8,500 men each), six light divisions

(5,000 men each), 13 territorial regiments (whose strength varied), and

a parachute regiment. Although General Williams viewed this as merely

an interim organization, it had provided the South Vietnamese army with

a unified command structure based on sound organizational principles.

The arrival of a 350-man U.S. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission

(TERM) in 1956, moreover, had freed U.S. Army advisors for assignment

to each ARVN regiment. American officers were likewise reorganizing

and helping train the small Vietnamese Navy (2,160 officers and

men) and Air Force (4,000 officers and men). The Vietnamese Marine

Corps continued to exist as a two-battalion amphibious force within

the nation’s naval establishment. General Williams felt confident

that by 1958 South Vietnam’s regular military establishment had been

strengthened enough to discourage North Vietnamese leaders from

seriously considering an outright invasion.[3-1]

[3-A] General Williams would head the MAAG until his retirement

in 1960.

Backing these developing regular forces, at least on paper, were two

generally feeble paramilitary organizations--the Civil Guard (CG)

and the Village Self Defense Corps (SDC). The larger of these, the

Civil Guard, existed within the Ministry of Interior and was funded

and advised by the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM). Its 48,000 men,

therefore, were not charged against the 150,000-man force level ceiling

that regulated the size of Diem’s regular forces. Nor were the 47,000

members of the Self Defense Corps, even though this organization

received limited amounts of U.S. military assistance funds for payroll

purposes. In any case, serious shortcomings were evident in both the CG

and the SDC. Organized into provincial companies directly responsible

to the various province chiefs, the Civil Guard was entirely separate

from the ARVN chain of command. Furthermore, American civilians under

government contract had armed and trained the CG for police-type as

opposed to military missions. The SDC, essentially a scattering of

local militia units, was even weaker, having been organized at the

village level into squads and an occasional platoon. Although the SDC

units were subordinate to the respective village chief, the ARVN bore

the responsibility for providing them with arms and training. More

often than not the Vietnamese Army units gave their obsolete weapons

to the SDC and showed little genuine interest in training the small

units.[3-2]

Although a measure of stability was obviously returning to South

Vietnam by 1958, one of the country’s more serious problems remained

unsolved--the threat of subversion by Communist Viet Minh agents

who had remained south of the 17th parallel following the Geneva

cease-fire. Following the resolution of the sect crisis in 1955,

Diem turned to neutralize this potential threat. Initially his army

experienced some success with pacification operations conducted in

former Viet Minh strongholds. While they did help extend government

control into the rural areas of several provinces, such operations were

discontinued in 1956.

Another policy initiated that same year seems to have nullified the

moderate gains produced by the pacification campaigns. Acting both

to eliminate Viet Minh sympathizers from positions of leadership at

the local level and to extend his own grip downward to the rural

population, Diem replaced elected village officials with appointed

chiefs. The new policy, which threatened the traditional autonomy of

the individual Vietnamese village, was immediately unpopular.

So was another government program which Diem implemented to undercut

Communist strength throughout the country--the Anti-Communist

Denunciation Campaign. Initiated in mid-1955 to discredit former Viet

Minh, the denunciation campaign evolved into something of a witch

hunt. By the late 1950s large numbers of Vietnamese with only minimal

Communist connections were allegedly being confined in political

re-education camps. Like the appointment of village leaders, the

denunciation campaign served to alienate Vietnamese who might otherwise

have supported the central government in its struggle for control of

the rural regions.

Forced underground by the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, Viet

Minh agents concentrated on strengthening their political posture for

the proposed general election in the period immediately following the

Geneva Agreement. When the hope of reunification by plebiscite passed

in mid-1956, the so-called “stay behinds” began rebuilding clandestine

political cells in their former strongholds. Having retained their

aptitude for the adroit manipulation of local grievances, the

Communists gradually won support from rural Vietnamese who saw

themselves threatened by the new government policies. In mid-1957,

the Communists, who were now being labelled “Viet Cong” by the Diem

government (a derogatory but accurate term which, literally translated,

meant “Vietnamese Communist”) began assassinating government officials

in several of the country’s rural provinces. Aimed at unpopular village

chiefs, rural police, district officials, and school teachers, the Viet

Cong’s assassination campaign was undertaken to erode the government’s

contacts with the local populace and thereby enhance their own

organizational efforts.

Still faced with the possibility of a conventional attack across

the demilitarized zone, President Diem was reluctant to commit his

regular military units to a problem which seemed to demand police-type

operations. Seeing no clear-cut threat, he relied on the Village Self

Defense Corps and the Civil Guard to maintain order in the provinces.

Poorly led and equipped, and trained primarily in urban police methods,

the paramilitary forces proved unable to prevent the diffuse terrorist

attacks. In the 12-month period between July 1957 and July 1958, for

example, some 700 more South Vietnamese officials reportedly died at

the hands of Communist terrorists.[3-3]

The Viet Cong terror-propaganda campaigns continued apace throughout

1958. The occurrence of the first attacks on U.S. facilities in Saigon

and the initiation of an anti-American propaganda campaign near the end

of that year, moreover, indicated that the Communists were broadening

the scope of their activities. By this time, the internal disturbances

were beginning to assume the dimensions of a concerted guerrilla

movement in several of the country’s more heavily populated regions,

including parts of the important Mekong Delta. Near the close of 1958

President Diem finally began ordering regular military units into the

provinces with instructions to eliminate the Viet Cong and restore

government control.

The very nature of the enemy, however, tended to render such government

operations ineffective. Essentially, the Viet Cong derived their

strength from the clandestine political structure which agents had

established in portions of the countryside. Interwoven into the social

fabric of the hamlets and villages, this political infrastructure, as

it later came to be called, served a dual purpose. It was both the

machinery by which the Communists exercised control over the population

and a vital base of support for the growing guerrilla forces, providing

the Viet Cong with men, food, intelligence information, and refuge.

As the Viet Cong guerrillas were recruited from and lived among the

local populace, outsiders found it virtually impossible to identify

them. Their familiarity with the local terrain, their methods of

operating in small groups, and massing for attacks mostly at night made

locating them equally difficult. Even their patience seemed to enhance

their ability to survive. Unwilling to engage a stronger military force

and realizing that a specific government operation could not continue

indefinitely, the Viet Cong normally would melt into their environment

with the arrival of regular units. When the operation terminated

and the regular government forces withdrew, the Communists would

re-emerge, often stronger than before. In many cases the guerrillas

could give real meaning to their anti-government propaganda once the

local population had felt the weight of military operations in their

particular community. Operating in this manner, the Viet Cong were

able to husband their strength while simultaneously expanding their

influence.

There was ample indication that the Communist movement was not wholly

indigenous to South Vietnam. Indeed, evidence of increasing North

Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong was becoming apparent near the

end of the decade. In May 1959, the Central Committee of the North

Vietnamese Communist Party publicly announced its intention “to smash”

the government of Ngo Dinh Diem.[3-4] By the summer of that year

the Viet Cong were being reinforced with men and limited quantities

of equipment infiltrated from North Vietnam. Many of the Communist

infiltrators, who at this early stage were entering Diem’s country

across the DMZ and by sea, were southerners who had gone North with the

Viet Minh in late 1954. Trained in political and military operations,

these returnees added substantially to the Viet Cong’s discipline and

technical capabilities.[3-B]

[3-B] A State Department publication released in 1965 placed

the number of confirmed North Vietnamese infiltrators

for the years 1959 and 1960 at 1,800. It also noted that

an additional 2,700 North Vietnamese were estimated to

have been infiltrated during this two-year period. The

vast majority of these were thought to have been former

residents of southern Vietnam. (Department of State,

_Aggression from the North_, p. 33.)

So strengthened, the Communist guerrillas reportedly were operating

in battalion strength (300– to 400-man battalions) in some areas by

mid-1959. Throughout the country they had expanded their activities

to include hit-and-run attacks on paramilitary posts, district

headquarters, hospitals, schools, and agricultural stations. Like the

assassination campaign which was underway concurrently in areas still

controlled by the GVN, these attacks were conceived with political

considerations in mind. By successfully raiding remote, poorly defended

facilities, the Viet Cong was able to embarrass the central government

while demonstrating their own strength to the local population. The

raids, furthermore, produced weapons which enabled the guerrillas to

operate without total dependence on the North.

By mid-1959 the security situation in the Republic of Vietnam had

deteriorated to the point that much of the optimism formerly voiced

by American and South Vietnamese officials had begun to disappear.

The National Intelligence Estimate released in Washington during

August accurately described the conditions which were settling over

South Vietnam. This paper disclosed that the nation’s economy was

beginning to falter noticeably and that President Diem’s government was

growing increasingly unpopular. Furthermore, the estimate warned that

harassment by the Viet Cong could be expected to intensify.[3-5]

As predicted, security conditions in South Vietnam did grow worse

in the period following the August intelligence estimate. In the

last four months of 1959 almost 200 assassinations were reported. In

January 1960 another 96 civilians were killed by the Communists and

in the following month the total reached 122. By the fall of 1960 the

Viet Cong were strong enough to begin ambushing regular ARVN units

in several provinces. Like their raids on fixed installations, their

ambush tactics were resulting in frequent and demoralizing defeats for

the government. Like the raids, they were also providing weapons and

ammunition for the growing guerrilla forces.

By 1960 the government’s inability to contain the disturbing malaise

was beginning to produce political tensions in Saigon. On 26 April a

group of 18 distinguished Vietnamese political figures, including a

number of former cabinet members, issued a public demand for President

Diem’s resignation. Diem refused, eventually ordering the arrest of all

who signed the manifesto.

A more serious effort to bring down the central government occurred in

November when a group of military officers led by Colonel Nguyen Chanh

Thi, the commander of a newly formed (1959) ARVN airborne brigade,

staged an abortive coup d’etat in Saigon. Two companies of Vietnamese

Marines joined Thi’s rebellious paratroops.[3-C] But the power

struggle, which began in the early morning hours of 11 November, ended

when units loyal to President Diem converged on the capital. Realizing

that the balance had been tipped against them, the coup leaders fled

the country and the incident was closed. While it had failed to

bring down the Diem government, Thi’s attempted coup had revived the

possibility of efforts by military leaders to seize control of the

government and had injected a new element of uncertainty into South

Vietnam’s already unstable internal situation.

[3-C] Vietnamese Marine participation in the abortive coup of

10 November 1960 is covered in greater detail elsewhere

in this chapter.

Two other danger signals flashed across Southeast Asia shortly after

the abortive coup. In January 1961, Communist leaders in Hanoi

announced that the National Liberation Front (NLF) had been founded

in the South on 20 December 1960 with the stated purpose of closely

uniting the “various classes of the South Vietnamese patriotic

population in the struggle against the Americans and Diem....”[3-6]

In truth, the NLF emerged as a fully developed Communist political

organization imported from North Vietnam for the purpose of

controlling, directing, and coordinating the insurgency south of the

17th parallel. For American officials, the announced establishment

of the NLF signified that Ho Chi Minh’s government had opted for the

forceful reunification of North and South.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, another event led to further speculation

that the war in Vietnam was about to enter a new phase. Backed by the

North Vietnamese Army, Communist Pathet Lao forces seized control

of the southeastern portion of the Laotian panhandle. Thus, the

North Vietnamese obtained a protected corridor along South Vietnam’s

northwestern border through which men and materiel could be infiltrated

to the South.

The establishment of the NLF and the Communist takeover in southern

Laos coincided roughly with approval in Washington of a comprehensive

plan designed to help President Diem restore internal order. Designated

the Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP), this study had been ordered by

President Eisenhower in early 1960. Developed by Lieutenant General

Lionel C. McGarr, U.S. Army, the officer who had relieved General

Williams as MAAG Chief, the completed CIP reached the White House

shortly after President John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in January 1961.

Significantly, its arrival came at a time when the Soviet Premier,

Nikita Khrushchev, was publicly pledging his country’s support for

“wars of national liberation.”

The plan presented for the new president’s consideration drew clear

connections between the military and political aspects of the war

in Vietnam. It included a conditional offer of U.S. support for a

20,000-man increase in the regular South Vietnamese military forces and

a 32,000-man increase in the size of the Civil Guard. These military

and paramilitary increases were to be dependent upon President Diem’s

agreement to effect major reforms in his military and political

apparatus--measures which American officials in Saigon considered

necessary for the success of any counterinsurgency effort.

President Kennedy approved the main provisions of the

Counter-Insurgency Plan on 28 January 1961 and negotiations on the

package opened with Diem two weeks later. But the talks soon deadlocked

on the issue of political and military reforms. Meanwhile, with the

discussions in Saigon dragging on inconclusively, the situation in

the provinces continued to worsen. A National Intelligence Estimate

released in March estimated that Viet Cong military strength had

reached 10,000 men. Furthermore, the number of violent incidents

reported in the country had risen to 650 per month. Even worse, it was

estimated that 58 percent of South Vietnam was under some degree of

Communist control.[3-7]

Convinced that the situation was becoming critical and fearing that it

might soon become hopeless, President Kennedy approved a new program

of military assistance to the Diem government on 29 April. Inspired in

part by Kennedy’s desire to increase Diem’s confidence in the new U.S.

administration, the 29 April program did not require concrete pledges

of reform from the South Vietnamese. In its specifics, however, the new

package was similar to the CIP. It contained provisions for supporting

a 20,000 man increase in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

(RVNAF)--a move which would raise the ceiling on the South Vietnamese

regular forces from 150,000 to 170,000. Another provision approved

the use of Military Assistance Program appropriations for the Civil

Guard and Self Defense Corps and expanded the MAAG’s responsibility to

include training and equipping these forces. Under the 29 April plan,

the paramilitary forces were to be transferred from Diem’s Ministry of

the Interior to his Ministry of Defense. In order to meet its increased

advisory responsibilities, authorization was given to increase the size

of the MAAG by 100 men to a strength of 785. This provision allowed the

first enlargement of the group since the introduction of the Temporary

Equipment Recovery Mission in 1956.[3-D]

[3-D] With the dissolution of TERM in the late 1950s, the

International Control Commission had granted permission

for the MAAG to maintain a strength of 685 men. When the

logistics personnel departed Vietnam, new advisor billets

were created within the MAAG’s table of organization.

General McGarr’s advisory group began implementing President Kennedy’s

29 April program during the summer of 1961. But the increases in the

government’s regular and paramilitary establishments and in the size

of the MAAG failed to arrest the trend of warfare on South Vietnam’s

battlefields. The remainder of 1961 was characterized by increasingly

aggressive guerrilla operations and the steady growth of Viet Cong

military forces. In August, for example, the ARVN reported 41 major

armed attacks on its units. The following month brought 450 Viet

Cong-initiated incidents, including several involving multi-battalion

forces of over 1,000 guerrillas. In mid-September, for example, an

estimated 1,500 Viet Cong overran Phuoc Vin, the capital of Phuoc

Thuan Province, and held the town for an entire day before escaping

unmolested into the countryside.[3-8]

Equally alarming was the rapid rise in the Viet Cong’s overall

strength. Increasing numbers of Communist troops were now being

infiltrated over recently opened trails through Laos. Curving

southwestward out of the North Vietnamese panhandle, these infiltration

routes enabled the Communists to bypass the demilitarized zone which

separated the two Vietnamese states and continue their southward

movement down the length of Laos and into Cambodia. From sanctuaries

within these countries the North Vietnamese could easily infiltrate

into South Vietnam by using trails through the rugged mountains.

Relying primarily on these routes, over 3,750 North Vietnamese

infiltrators reportedly entered South Vietnam during 1961. Successful

recruiting in the South served as another source of manpower for

the Viet Cong. Well propagandized, the steady cadence of victories

greatly enhanced the Viet Cong’s prestige and thereby made recruitment

less difficult. By the end of 1961 infiltration from the North and

recruitment in the South had swollen the Viet Cong regular military

forces to an estimated 25,000 men.

_Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps_

At the end of 1958, when President Diem began ordering his regular

military forces into action against the Viet Cong, the Vietnamese

Marine Corps was a two-battalion infantry force organized within South

Vietnam’s naval establishment. The 1,837-man corps was still commanded

by Major Le Nhu Hung. Hung maintained his headquarters at the Cuu Long

Navy Yard, an installation situated on an estuary near the Saigon-Gia

Dinh boundary. Although they continued to maintain barracks at Nha

Trang and Cam Ranh Bay respectively, the 1st and 2d Landing Battalions

were now being rotated to crude little camps near Bien Hoa, a town

located about 20 miles northeast of the capital. Lieutenant Colonel

Wilkinson, who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes as Senior

Marine Advisor in mid-1958, operated out of the MAAG headquarters in

Saigon but maintained an office in the VNMC headquarters at Cuu Long.

Wilkinson’s two assistants, Captains Gary Wilder and Dale N. Davis,

lived with their battalions.

Elements of Hung’s Marine Corps were among the first regular government

units committed to the counterguerrilla effort. The 1st Landing

Battalion was ordered into action by the Joint General Staff in the

closing weeks of 1958. After deploying from Bien Hoa, the battalion

spent nearly two months searching for Viet Cong in a mosquito-infested

region of An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province. Primarily,

the Vietnamese Marines conducted company and platoon-sized patrols

through rugged mangrove swamps in search of guerrillas. When the

operation ended in late January 1959, the Vietnamese commanders

reported that their units had killed and captured several Communist

guerrillas and political leaders. Their troops had also reported

finding a suspected guerrilla training camp which contained small

quantities of food and some weapons. The Vietnamese Marines suffered

no casualties during their deployment. Adhering to prevailing USMAAG

policy, the U.S. Marine advisors did not accompany the unit into

combat. Unable to observe the operation, the American advisors could

not accurately assess the battalion’s tactical proficiency.

[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC,

Senior Marine Advisor. (USMC Photo A229373)._]

A few months after this initial operation, both VNMC battalions were

deployed against the Viet Cong--the 1st again to An Xuyen Province

and the 2d to Vinh Binh Province south of Saigon on the seacoast.

So deployed, both units came under the operational control of the

respective province chiefs. In widely-scattered actions fought during

May, the 1st Battalion and a Civil Guard unit claimed to have inflicted

over 200 casualties on the Viet Cong. In Vinh Binh Province, one

company of the 2d Landing Battalion reported killing 18 guerrillas and

capturing over 100 more. Again, U.S. Marine advisors were not present

and therefore could not assess the accuracy of these reports. In any

case, these were the final combat operations for the Vietnamese Marine

Corps as a two-battalion force.

Obviously, U.S. and Vietnamese authorities in Saigon were giving

increased attention to the growing internal threat. Still, they

had yet to initiate any sweeping changes in the orientation of the

RVNAF. Indeed, in early 1959, the entire ARVN was in the final phase

of a reorganization program which would culminate by midyear in the

formation of seven divisions of uniform size (10,500 men each), five

territorial regiments, and an airborne brigade (formed from the old

Army parachute regiment). Under the new organization the seven standard

divisions were to be deployed in or near population centers throughout

the country and were to be organized under two corps headquarters,

one (I Corps) located at Da Nang, and the other (II Corps) located at

Pleiku in the Central Highlands. A third provisional corps headquarters

had also been formed in Saigon for activation in the event of a

national emergency.[3-E]

[3-E] By 1961 the third corps headquarters would be activated

and geographic boundaries of all three corps would

be delineated to facilitate the coordination of the

government’s military efforts against the Viet Cong.

These military-geographic subdivisions were termed corps

tactical zones (CTZ).

One of the MAAG’s reactions to the emerging guerrilla threat was to

urge that President Diem transfer the Civil Guard to his Ministry of

Defense. This adjustment, General Williams pointed out, would permit

the MAAG to train and equip the CG for a mobile counterguerrilla

mission. But it also entailed raising the 150,000-man force level

ceiling. When both the Diem government and the U.S. Embassy objected

to the proposed transfer, the MAAG turned to another alternative:

the strengthening and use of the regular units whose assignment to

counterguerrilla operations would not seriously disturb the country’s

counterinvasion potential. The Vietnamese Marine Corps, whose infantry

battalions had already participated in several operations against the

Viet Cong, fell into this category of units to be bolstered for the

counterguerrilla role.

It was against this background that the VNMC was enlarged again

in mid-1959. This latest expansion was generally accomplished in

accordance with the staff study prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Croizat

some three years earlier. On 1 June, after both Marine battalions

had returned from their combat assignments in the Mekong Delta, a 3d

Landing Battalion was formed at a camp just outside the Cuu Long

Navy Yard. This new unit, manned primarily by troops transferred from

amphibious elements then being phased out of the reorganized ARVN,

was built around a small nucleus of seasoned Marine officers and

noncommissioned officers. Transferred from the 1st and 2d Battalions,

most of these Marines had seen combat against the Viet Minh, the sects,

and the Viet Cong.

Another development saw a fourth rifle company added to each Marine

infantry battalion. In turn, the old heavy weapons companies were

abolished. The 81mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles were reorganized

into platoons within the battalions’ headquarters and service

companies. New weapons, two 60mm mortars, and personnel to man them

were added to each Marine rifle company. These adjustments raised the

strength of the infantry battalions to around 900 officers and men

and provided the Vietnamese Marine Corps with a basic organizational

structure which its infantry battalions would retain throughout the

coming decade.[3-F]

[3-F] A side-effect of this reorganization was the modification

of the VNMC’s table of equipment. The most important

change saw the Vietnamese Marine riflemen exchange their

M-1 carbines for the heavier M-1 rifle, the weapon with

which the ARVN infantry forces were equipped.

Concurrent with the formation of the 3d Battalion and the modification

of the organizational tables, the VNMC was formally designated the

“Marine Corps Group.” Now numbering 2,276 officers and men, the

Vietnamese Marines were formed into a group headquarters, a group

headquarters and service company, a 4.2-inch mortar battery, and the

three infantry battalions.[3-G]

[3-G] The Vietnamese Marine Group continued to be known as the

Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) in spite of its formal

redesignation.

As important as the VNMC’s expansion, reorganization, and redesignation

was the dramatic change in its role within the Vietnamese armed forces.

On 1 June the Joint General Staff directed the Vietnamese Marine Corps

and the newly formed ARVN airborne brigade to assume the mission of the

general reserve force for the entire RVNAF. So assigned, the Vietnamese

Marine Corps became a “force in readiness”--a service directly

responsible to the Joint General Staff for any assigned ground warfare

mission.[3-9]

[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JUNE

1959

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 2,276]

The Vietnamese Marine battalions and elements of the ARVN airborne

brigade (also garrisoned near Saigon) were ordered into action against

the Viet Cong with increasing frequency after being designated the

RVNAF general reserve. Usually, the Marine battalions, like their

airborne counterparts, were assigned to operate in a particular

province for a specified time period. In such assignments the battalion

commander was directly responsible to the province chief who, in most

cases, was a military officer. The province chiefs sometimes utilized

the Marines in conjunction with their Civil Guard units. It was not

uncommon for the Vietnamese Marines to find themselves conducting

operations in the most rugged and inaccessible regions of the province

to which they were assigned. In such deployments the Marine battalions

often bore the brunt of hostile action or suffered the physical

hardships associated with living and fighting in the most adverse

swamps and jungles.

[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marine riflemen traverse mosquito-infested

swamps of the Ca Mau Peninsula on August 1961 operation. (Photo

courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC.)_]

In connection with their continuing campaign to transform the

Vietnamese Marine Corps into a truly elite fighting organization, the

U.S. Marine Advisors encouraged the Vietnamese Leathernecks to take

pride in the difficult and dangerous missions now being assigned. In a

related effort intended to generate _esprit de corps_ throughout the

service, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson proposed that the Marine Corps

adopt an official emblem and a distinctive uniform. These suggestions

produced results when a board of Vietnamese officers selected an emblem

design similar to that of the U.S. Marines. Shortly thereafter the VNMC

adopted a light weight, black and green “tiger stripe” camouflaged

utility uniform similar to that formerly worn in Indochina by French

commando units. Although designed and procured primarily for use in

steamy tropical jungles, the colorful uniform came to be worn in

garrison with a dark green beret. Along with the newly adopted emblem,

which was worn as a patch over the left breast pocket, this uniform

became the distinguishing mark of the Vietnamese Marine and his U.S.

Marine advisor. Together, the uniform and emblem did much to set the

VNMC apart from the other South Vietnamese armed services.[3-10]

Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson instigated another change during this

same period which did much to improve the effectiveness of the Marine

advisory program. Since the sect rebellion of 1955 American policy had

prohibited all U.S. military personnel from participating in combat

with South Vietnamese forces. Because the prevailing restrictions

prevented his assistants from accurately assessing the combat

capabilities of the Vietnamese Marine battalions, Wilkinson requested

that they be allowed to accompany their units into action. After some

study, General Williams, still the MAAG Chief, approved this request

with the stipulation that the U.S. Marines were to act strictly as

non-participating observers.[3-11] This privilege was not extended to

other MAAG personnel. Wilkinson and his assistants, therefore, became

the first American servicemen to witness actual combat operations

against the Viet Cong. So through an informal and relatively unknown

arrangement, a handful of Marine advisors were able to insure that

principles being stressed in training were being applied in combat.

Now operating alongside the Vietnamese Marines in action, the advisors

were also able to obtain a better appreciation of the terrain and enemy

and a more thorough understanding of the frustrating problems being

encountered by the VNMC units.

The first half of 1960 brought changes in both the leadership of the

Vietnamese Marine Corps and the U.S. Marine advisory program. In May

President Diem relieved Major Hung as Senior Marine Officer. His

replacement was Major Le Nguyen Khang, an officer who spoke fluent

English and who had been the first Vietnamese Marine graduated from

the U.S. Marine Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico. A capable and

inspiring officer who had formerly commanded a landing battalion

in combat against the Viet Cong, Khang was to head the VNMC for

over three years. The following month Lieutenant Colonel Clifford

J. Robichaud relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson as Senior Marine

Advisor. Like Khang, Robichaud had seen combat previously. A former

master sergeant, he had been commissioned during World War II and had

fought as an infantry unit leader on Guadalcanal and later in Korea.

Like all U.S. Marines assigned as advisors to the VNMC after 1960,

Robichaud was scheduled to serve only a one year tour in South Vietnam.

[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marine Corps Emblem._]

Combat assignments against the Viet Cong continued to dominate the

VNMC’s activities during the remainder of 1960. With Communist forces

now capable of battalion-sized operations in some areas, the Joint

General Staff began deploying government forces to the provinces

in multi-battalion strength. By late 1960 the Vietnamese Marines

were conducting two-battalion operations controlled by a task force

headquarters. Khang, now a lieutenant colonel, normally commanded these

Marine task forces.

[Illustration: _Colonel Clifford J. Robichaud, USMC, Senior Marine

Advisor. (USMC Photo A25342)._]

It was during one such operation, in which the 1st and 2d VNMC

Battalions were operating together in the provinces south of Saigon,

that elements of the 3d Battalion became involved in the abortive

coup of November 1960. The power struggle began in the early morning

hours of the 11th while the U.S. Marine advisors were attending an

informal celebration of the Marine Corps birthday at Lieutenant Colonel

Robichaud’s quarters in Saigon. At the appointed hour Colonel Thi’s

rebellious paratroops, accompanied by the 3d VNMC battalion commander

and two Marine companies from Cuu Long, moved into the capital on

trucks and seized the Joint General Staff Headquarters. The remainder

of the 3d battalion, led by the battalion executive officer, who was

unaware of his superior’s intentions, moved to the presidential palace

and established protection for Diem. Word of the coup, meanwhile,

had reached Khang at his field headquarters in the Mekong Delta. Led

by the Senior Marine Officer, the 1st and 2d Battalions returned to

Saigon by truck convoy and immediately joined the two Marine companies

already around the palace. For several hours the possibility existed

that Khang’s Marines might clash with Thi’s paratroops or even with

the two rebellious Marine companies of the 3d Battalion. But pro-Diem

units soon began converging on Saigon in such numbers that the coup

collapsed. Thi and his associates fled the country, whereupon Diem

appointed new officers to command the insubordinate units. With

loyalists in charge throughout South Vietnam’s military and naval

services, the incident was closed. Both the airborne brigade and the

VNMC resumed their functions as the RVNAF general reserve.[3-12]

By the summer of 1961 the USMAAG, now headed by General McGarr, was

ready to implement the 20,000-man expansion of the RVNAF as authorized

in the package approved by President Kennedy the previous spring.

Included in this U.S. program were plans to increase the size of the

Vietnamese Marine Corps by over 1,000 men. This expansion got underway

in July when the initial steps were taken to form a fourth infantry

battalion and a 75mm pack-howitzer battery--additions which were to

raise the authorized strength of the VNMC to 3,321 officers and men.

The transfer of ARVN artillerymen provided the personnel necessary to

man the pack-howitzer unit, which formed near Thu Duc, a small town

about 13 miles north of the capital. Officers and noncommissioned

officers were drawn from the three existing VNMC battalions to form

a nucleus for the new infantry battalion while its ranks were filled

gradually by recruitment. This 4th Battalion was organized at Vung

Tau, a coastal resort town situated on Cape St. Jacques about 40 miles

southeast of Saigon. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Brown, a World War II

veteran who replaced Robichaud as Senior Marine Advisor in August, was

on hand to assist with this latest reorganization of the VNMC.

While the new Marine units were forming the JGS ordered the Vietnamese

Navy and Marine Corps to conduct an amphibious assault against a

suspected Communist stronghold near South Vietnam’s southern tip.

The objective area was a portion of the U Minh Forest, an extensive

inundated region located along the western coast of the Ca Mau

Peninsula. Because it was inaccessible by land, the forest had served

as Communist base area since the French Indochina War. The concept

of operation called for the Marines to land at daybreak, move inland

through the mangrove swamps, and hopefully push Viet Cong elements into

ARVN units which would have established a blocking force inland from

the beach. Captains Michael J. Gott and James S. G. Turner, two U.S.

Marine advisors, embarked on board two World War II vintage Vietnamese

Navy LCIs (landing craft, infantry) at Saigon with the 1st and 3d

Battalions respectively.

[Illustration: _Captain Michael J. Gott, infantry advisor to the

Vietnamese Marine Corps, discusses tactical plans with Vietnamese

officers. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,

USMC)._]

A series of problems arose on the morning of the operation to delay the

landing for several hours. When the Marines finally came ashore late

in the morning they failed to locate any enemy forces. Captain Gott,

who accompanied the 1st Battalion for the duration of the operations

ashore, later recounted the difficulties. He noted, for instance, that

no U.S. Navy advisors were embarked on board the Vietnamese ships. As

a result, the relatively inexperienced Vietnamese sailors encountered

technical difficulties with their navigational aids, and the ships

arrived at the objective area late. Inexperience on the part of the

Vietnamese Marines and sailors in debarkation techniques compounded

the delay. Once ashore, outdated French maps and dense mangrove jungle

combined to retard the Marines’ progress inland, thus allowing the

Viet Cong ample time to melt away. Gott concluded that some of the

difficulties encountered after the landing phase of the operation might

have been offset by the presence of observation aircraft. As it was,

the Marines’ visibility was restricted throughout the operation by

thick mangrove vegetation. Thus a combination of unforeseen factors had

rendered this particular operation ineffective.[3-13]

[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 AUGUST

1961

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 3,321]

A similar landing was repeated in the same area the following month.

Again the participating Marine units failed to engage Viet Cong forces.

Vietnamese Navy and Marine officers complained that there were no

enemy troops in the area and that the government’s intelligence was

inaccurate. Whatever the reason, the results of these two unsuccessful

offensives typified the problems which plagued most South Vietnamese

ground forces throughout the country during the 1960–1961 period. The

Communist guerrillas, aided by difficult terrain, a well-developed

intelligence network, and sometimes by the local population, could

usually evade government units whenever escape was desirable. Because

the Marines normally operated in unfamiliar areas where the Viet

Cong political apparatus was strong, their units were particularly

frustrated. In regions such as the U Minh Forest intelligence

information simply did not flow upward from the people. Instead, in

such Communist-controlled environments, the local Vietnamese served

the Viet Cong, warning them of strengths, locations, and movements of

Marine units.

While combat deployments such as the Ca Mau landings highlighted

the remainder of 1961, the Marine battalions nevertheless spent the

majority of their time in non-combat assignments. During such periods

the battalions occupied their respective base camps around Saigon and

Vung Tau, awaiting orders from the Joint General Staff. Even though

held in reserve, they frequently were called upon to provide security

detachments for vital points such as bridges, naval facilities,

and communications installations. Most U.S. Marine advisors tended

to oppose such assignments, contending that they detracted from

the overall readiness of the battalions and disrupted much needed

training. The utilization of the VNMC units in static security roles

also conflicted with the advisor’s continuing efforts to convince the

Vietnamese Marine that he belonged to an elite, offensively oriented

strike force. Still, despite the protestations of the American

advisors, the JGS persisted in dispersing VNMC detachments in and

around the capital.

Although its battalions were sometimes being frustrated, both in

their attempts to accomplish unit training and in their attempts to

fix Communist troop formations, the VNMC’s involvement in the war

effort was forcing improvement of the service in other areas. Frequent

inspections by U.S. advisors revealed that the Vietnamese were placing

more emphasis on the care of individual equipment and weapons.

Replacement items were being requisitioned with more promptness and

unit commanders were beginning to show increasing concern about the

slow receipt of requested supply items. The replacement of worn-out

World War II trucks with new vehicles removed a long-standing source

of trouble in that it greatly reduced the time consumed in performing

major mechanical repairs on the older vehicles. Even the frequent

deployments of the VNMC battalions were helping to improve the overall

combat readiness of the service by preparing a solid core of small unit

leaders and troops for operations against the Viet Cong.

_Ancillary Effects of Marine Pacific Commands_

At the same time the intensified conflict in South Vietnam was

forcing improvement on the VNMC, it was having a similar but less

direct effect on U.S. Marine commands in the Pacific. In early 1961

Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific (FMFPac), approved a plan to assign individual Marines

from his scattered commands to temporary duty in Vietnam. The purpose

of this program, which became known as On-The-Job Training (OJT),

was to allow Marine officers and noncommissioned officers to obtain

first-hand knowledge of the complex nature of the conflict being waged

in South Vietnam. Beginning in May 1961 small groups of officers and

noncommissioned officers from various FMFPac commands were sent each

month to observe the counterguerrilla techniques being developed and

employed in Vietnam. Although the OJTs were normally “in country” for

only a two-week period, the program was gradually producing a pool

of small unit leaders somewhat acquainted with the situation in the

Republic of Vietnam by the end of 1961.[3-H]

[3-H] The OJT program would be suspended briefly near the end

of 1962 but would be reinstituted in the first months of

1963.

[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines wade ashore from a Vietnamese

Navy Landing Ship, initiating a search for Viet Cong on the Ca Mau

Peninsula. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,

USMC)._]

The major Marine command to feel the impact of the war in Southeast

Asia during the early 1960s was the 3d Marine Division, a 20,000-man

combat-ready force headquartered on Okinawa. In addition to its

participation in the OJT program, the 3d Marine Division began altering

its conventional amphibious orientation. Major General Donald M.

Weller, the division commander, provided the initial impetus for this

shift away from a purely conventional posture. Weller, who in early

1961 had commanded a task force headquarters formed in response to

the deteriorating military situation in Laos, anticipated that his

command might be committed to combat somewhere on the Southeast Asian

mainland. He therefore instructed his staff to begin studying possible

counterinsurgency training programs which would help “turn the entire

orientation of the division toward the type of intervention [which] we

would be faced with in Southeast Asia.”[3-14]

[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines advance from concealment during

search operations on the Ca Mau Peninsula. (Photo courtesy of

Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC)._]

Major General Robert E. Cushman, holder of a Navy Cross and a future

Commandant of the Marine Corps, assumed command of the 3d Marine

Division in September 1961 before General Weller’s objectives could

be fully realized. The new commanding general immediately convened a

Counterguerrilla Warfare Study Group to consider the problem. This

study group framed a set of recommendations for Cushman in late 1961.

His approval of their proposals led to the creation of an Infantry Unit

Training Course and a Command and Staff Training Course early the next

year.

Conducted in Okinawa’s rugged Northern Training Area, the infantry

course prepared rifle companies from the various infantry battalions

for participation in counterguerrilla warfare. The instructors,

graduates of either the Jungle Warfare School in Johore, Malaya, or the

new Army Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, placed

much emphasis on the origins and nature of guerrilla movements, small

units tactics, and night operations. The training syllabus for this

course included several live firing exercises designed for individual

Marines and fire teams. Some of these exercises required the Marines to

negotiate “jungle lanes” equipped with pop-up targets. The week-long

infantry course culminated with a two and one-half day field operation

for the individual infantry platoons.

The Command and Staff Training course was somewhat less rigorous,

being designed primarily to prepare battalion staffs to support their

companies in a counterinsurgency environment. Less than 10 hours in

length, this course was based primarily on lectures and map exercises.

At General Cushman’s direction, the division G-3 (Operations Section)

began stressing the significance of counterinsurgency training at all

echelons of the division. Unconventional warfare training soon became

an integral part of the training schedules at every echelon. Under this

program the various infantry battalions were required to conduct an

extended battalion-sized counterguerrilla operation, and to report to

the G-3 on the progress of their efforts.[3-15]

The FMFPac On-The-Job Training program and the 3d Marine Division’s

new approach to training complemented each other in several ways.

Whereas the OJT program helped create an awareness of counterguerrilla

operations among individual Marine officers and noncommissioned

officers, the division’s training programs achieved the same results at

the staff and battalion level. At points the two programs overlapped

to the further benefit of the 3d Marine Division. Attuned to the

nature of guerrilla warfare and the problems involved in countering

the guerrilla, the officers and noncommissioned officers who returned

from OJT assignments in Vietnam provided assistance in planning and

supervising the division’s counterinsurgency training programs. Short

of actual commitment to combat in a guerrilla-type environment, it

is doubtful that any other combination of training could have better

prepared the 3d Marine Division for a future assignment in Vietnam.

_American Decisions at the Close of 1961_

The progressive erosion of the government’s strength and the steady

growth of the Viet Cong during 1961 prompted President Kennedy to

dispatch his special military advisor, General Maxwell D. Taylor, to

Vietnam in mid-October. Taylor, who had retired in the late 1950s after

having served as Chief of Staff of the Army, carried the following

instructions from the president:

I should like you to proceed to Saigon for the purpose of

appraising the situation in South Vietnam, particularly as it

concerns the threat to the internal security and defense of

that country and adjacent areas. After you have conferred with

the appropriate United States and South Vietnamese authorities,

including the Commander in Chief, Pacific, I would like your views

on the courses of action which our Government might take at this

juncture to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South

Vietnam; and eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its

independence.[3-16]

Like other American officials who had visited Diem’s republic during

the course of the year, General Taylor returned to Washington convinced

that South Vietnam was in grave danger. In a report delivered to

President Kennedy in November, the general outlined his formula for

salvaging the situation. This included the broad recommendation that

the United States abandon its existing policy of strict military

advice and begin cooperating with the Vietnamese in a form of “limited

partnership.” The American role in such a partnership, Taylor

explained, would be to provide “working” advisors and “working”

military units to aid South Vietnam’s military forces.

General Taylor’s report offered several specific proposals for

implementing such a program. Among these were recommendations that

three U.S. Army helicopter companies and approximately 6,000–8,000

American ground troops be deployed quickly to the Republic of Vietnam.

The helicopter units would support the government’s ground operations

but the American ground forces were to be used only in a defensive

posture. Taylor believed that their presence would underscore the

United States’ determination to stand by South Vietnam. A side-effect

of this display of determination would be to stimulate the morale of

the republic’s armed forces. He added that in order to support such a

build-up, it would be necessary to restructure and increase the size of

the USMAAG.

President Kennedy’s consideration of Taylor’s proposals resulted in a

compromise decision which cleared the way for more intense American

involvement in the Vietnam conflict. After securing Diem’s approval in

early December, Kennedy authorized the Department of Defense to expand

its advisory and assistance programs. To enhance the effectiveness of

the advisory program, he removed some of the official restrictions

under which most U.S. military advisors had operated since 1955. One

important change would allow all advisors to accompany their Vietnamese

units into combat. At the same time President Kennedy decided against

ordering U.S. ground forces into the war zone; however, he instructed

the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, to prepare plans for such

a contingency. He also approved General Taylor’s recommendation that

American helicopter units be sent to support the RVNAF. The arrival of

the first of these reinforcements just before 1961 ended, signalled

the beginning of a new and more dynamic phase of American military

participation in the struggle to preserve the independence of South

Vietnam.

CHAPTER 4

An Expanding War, 1962

_The War’s New Context--Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory

Division--The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962--Some Conclusions_

_The War’s New Context_

More than any previous year, 1962 was to be a period of deepened

commitment for all participants in the continuing struggle for control

of South Vietnam. On the American side plans already set in motion by

President Kennedy’s recent decisions promised to loosen the flow of

dollars, equipment, advisors, and combat support personnel to South

Vietnam. Administration officials envisioned that this sharp influx of

assistance would stimulate a redoubled war effort on the part of the

Diem government.

Viet Cong strength and operational capabilities likewise were on the

upswing as 1962 opened. U.S. and South Vietnamese sources were placing

total Viet Cong military strength at roughly 25,000 men. Backing these

military forces was a far greater number of sympathizers. American

agencies tended to divide the Communist military forces into three

rough categories according to function and composition--main forces,

local forces, and village activists. Thought to total around 9,000 men

at the beginning of the year, the main forces constituted the pillar

of Communist military strength in the South. They were organized into

approximately 20 small (200– to 400-man) and highly mobile battalions

and a number of independent companies. Main force units as a rule

were cadred by North Vietnamese (or returnees trained in the North)

and were capable of conducting operations on an interprovincial

scale. (They often were referred to as interprovincial battalions and

companies. Later in the war Americans came to call the main forces

“hard core” units.) Next in terms of operational capabilities were the

Viet Cong local forces whose aggregate strength stood at around 8,000

part-time but well-trained soldiers. The local forces were organized

into platoons and companies which operated independently within

their respective districts. Finally, there were some 8,000 village

activists. Part-time guerrillas in the truest sense of the term, the

activists commonly worked in the paddies by day and engaged in military

pursuits at night. For the most part their ranks were filled with men

considered either too young or too old for service with organized Viet

Cong military units. Nevertheless, they played an important role in the

struggle for South Vietnam’s rural areas by providing various forms

of support for larger Viet Cong formations. Living and working within

the rural hamlets and villages as they did, the activists were a ready

source of intelligence information for the Viet Cong. Often they served

as porters and guides for main force units which had been assigned to

operate within their locale. Otherwise, the activists were responsible

for defending their particular villages against the government’s

military and police forces--a defense which normally took the form of

harassment with mines and sniper fire.[4-A]

[4-A] The three-way division was the most commonly used method

of categorizing the Communist forces. (See U.S. Army,

_The Viet Cong_, p. I:52.) A USMAAG document published

during this period, however, divided the Viet Cong

into two somewhat broader categories--main forces and

guerrillas. Both local force units and village activists

were classified as guerrillas under this system. (USMAAG,

Vietnam, _Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgent

Operations_, p. II-5.) Other sources tended to make more

elaborate divisions. (See Pike, _Viet Cong_.)

After early 1962 the activities of these Viet Cong military and

paramilitary forces were carefully coordinated with Communist political

activities on the national level by a Central Office for South Vietnam

(COSVN).[4-B] From its headquarters, believed to have been located

northeast of Saigon in Binh Duong Province, COSVN exercised direct

control over six military regions (MRs). Designated MR-5 through MR-9

(arranged in a north to south pattern) with an additional Saigon-Gia

Dinh Special Zone, the Communist military regions served essentially

the same purpose as the government’s corps tactical zones. Within

these six regions COSVN utilized a province and district structure

only slightly different from that of the Diem government to exercise

administrative and military control. At each level within this

organization a small, disciplined Communist political committee

orchestrated the activities of its subordinate military units with the

actions of its political apparatus.

[4-B] COSVN apparently was established in March. Prior to this

the NLF had functioned through two separate geographic

headquarters--Interzone V, responsible for roughly the

northern three-quarters of South Vietnam, and the NAMBO

Interzone, responsible for the area roughly described by

the forested hills and Mekong Delta physiographic regions.

To counter the strengthened NLF organization and to satisfy American

demands that he adopt some form of national strategy, President Diem

launched one of the most controversial large-scale undertakings of the

war--the Strategic Hamlet Program. Instituted on an informal basis

in the closing stages of 1961, the program became fully operative in

mid-1962. Although heralded as a new concept, the campaign actually

grew out of an existing program whose broad objective had been to bring

improved economic and social conditions to South Vietnam’s rural areas.

Named the Agroville Program, this effort had been in effect since late

1959 under the direction of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s brother and

principal advisor. Since its institution, however, the program had

achieved little aside from the resettlement of many rural families

into government constructed communities. Few meaningful reforms,

either social or economic, had been realized. During the early 1960s,

moreover, many of the Agrovilles had been victimized by the Viet Cong,

who saw the developments as symbols of the government’s presence in

contested areas. By mid-1961, in an effort to protect the more remote

Agrovilles, authorities in several provinces had begun fortifying the

otherwise helpless population centers.

Concurrent with this evolution of the Agrovilles into fortified

communities, Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, the head of a newly formed

British Advisory Mission in Saigon, suggested that President Diem

consider adopting a similar scheme with broader strategic objectives.

Thompson, who had helped implement such an effort in Malaya in

the 1950s during the struggle there against Communist insurgents,

specifically proposed that the South Vietnamese integrate various

economic and social programs into an effective campaign to reestablish

its influence in the heavily populated Mekong Delta. This campaign,

Thompson advised, “should lead by stages to a reorganization of the

government machinery for directing and coordinating all action against

the communists and the production of an overall strategic operational

plan for the country as a whole....”[4-1]

Under pressure from the U.S. Embassy to develop some sort of national

strategy for countering the insurgency, President Diem accepted the

concept of Thompson’s proposal. Shortly thereafter, Diem named Ngo

Dinh Nhu to head a campaign formally designated the Strategic Hamlet

Program. Nhu was instructed to plan the program and to create a

combined agency that would insure its coordination within the various

government ministries. These instructions resulted in the creation (in

February) of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets. A

counterpart American organization, the U.S. Interagency Committee for

Province Rehabilitation, was formed in April to provide assistance to

Nhu’s agency.

With advice from Thompson and the U.S. Embassy, the Vietnamese

formulated a program which in theory was to evolve in several rather

distinct phases. First it would be necessary to select specific

geographic areas wherein the Strategic Hamlet Program would be

implemented. Once specific objective areas had been established,

regular military units would initiate operations to clear those areas

of Viet Cong formations. Following the completion of these operations

RVNAF units would resettle the inhabitants of the area in fortified

hamlets. Initially these hamlets were to be defended by Civil Guard

units while regular forces continued screening operations in the

surrounding countryside. In the final phase, Self Defense Corps units

would assume responsibility for local security while regular units

continued to screen Viet Cong forces from the developments. During this

phase district civil authorities would initiate economic and social

programs within the newly formed communities in an effort to recapture

the allegiance of the local populace. Thus, in this final phase, it was

expected that the Communist political infrastructure would be broken.

Following the pacification of a few contiguous hamlets, the same

process was to be repeated over and over, in an expanding pattern.

In this manner Diem hoped to expand the GVN’s control progressively

outward from the initial secure hamlets over large areas of the

countryside. Ultimately the GVN intended to construct nearly 11,000

such protected communities in several of the country’s most critical

rural areas.

A principal shortcoming of this method of pacification was that the

success of the entire program within a specific area depended on the

successful completion of virtually every developmental phase in every

strategic hamlet. Should the Communist infrastructure remain intact

in even one hamlet, that hamlet could precipitate the collapse of the

entire campaign by contaminating the surrounding communities in a

geometric progression.

Given this critical requirement that all phases be accomplished in a

deliberate and orderly manner, it was unfortunate that Nhu initiated

the program in an uncoordinated fashion. By the first of the year,

months before the appropriate American and South Vietnamese agencies

had been formed to guide the program, the construction of hamlets

had begun on a scale which already suggested a nationwide campaign.

Furthermore, the government failed to test the plan in a pilot project

such as Thompson (as well as U.S. advisors) had recommended. Instead,

it launched rather extensive campaigns simultaneously in several

traditional Communist strongholds during the spring of 1962.

Nevertheless, once formally initiated, the Strategic Hamlet Program

constituted the government’s first real effort to implement a concerted

counterinsurgency strategy on a national scale. Regardless of its

weaknesses and its somewhat abortive start, the program would serve

as the context within which the Diem government would wage its battle

with the Viet Cong during 1962 and most of 1963. From this military

standpoint, moreover, Diem’s adoption of the Strategic Hamlet Program

marked somewhat of a watershed in the evolution of ground strategy in

the Vietnam war. Inherent in its selection was the decision to opt for

a “clear-and-hold” as opposed to a “search-and-destroy” strategy. In

accordance with the dictates of the pacification campaign, RVNAF ground

forces would focus primarily during the next two years on operations

to clear Communist military formations from the more densely populated

rural areas.

_The Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division_

The American military build-up called for by the Washington decisions

of December 1961 was well underway as the new year opened. Several

U.S. units introduced in the closing weeks of 1961 had already

begun operations by January. These included two U.S. Army transport

helicopter companies and a composite U.S. Air Force detachment.

Designated FARM GATE and composed initially of 151 officers and

men, the Air Force detachment had a dual mission of training VNAF

elements and conducting attack sorties in support of President Diem’s

forces. The arrival of another U.S. Air Force unit, a C-123 transport

squadron, another Army helicopter company, and an Army communications

organization, the 3d Radio Research Unit, just after the first of

the year raised the number of American military personnel serving on

permanent assignment in Vietnam to over 3,000. Assigned to the Army’s

radio unit, which immediately began operations from Pleiku in II

Corps Tactical Zone, were 42 Marines from the 1st Radio Company, FMF.

Designated Detachment A, 1st Radio Company, these were the first U.S.

Marines to participate in the ongoing build-up.

Thus far, however, the U.S. troops arriving in Vietnam were for combat

support rather than advisory type duty. At a meeting held in Honolulu

in mid-January, Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the ranking

American military officials concerned with Vietnam to make substantial

increases in the number of advisors serving with the Vietnamese armed

forces.

Less than a month after the Honolulu conference, a new U.S. command was

created in Saigon to manage the expected influx of advisors and the

intensified military assistance effort more efficiently. On 8 February,

the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV or MACV)

supplanted the MAAG as the senior American command in the Republic

of Vietnam. Its commander, Army General Paul D. Harkins (ComUSMACV),

assumed direct responsibility for all U.S. military policy, operations,

and assistance to President Diem’s government. Harkins was directly

subordinate to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt,

whose headquarters was in Hawaii.

The number of U.S. Marines assigned to MACV’s staff indicated that

they would play an important role in its operations. In all, 21 staff

billets in the new command were allocated to the Marine Corps. The

most important of these was the chief of staff billet. This assignment

went to Major General Richard G. Weede, a veteran who had commanded

an artillery battalion during the campaigns for Saipan and Okinawa

during World War II. Later, in Korea, he had distinguished himself

as the commander of the 5th Marines. Weede arrived in Saigon from

Hawaii where he had commanded the 1st Marine Brigade since 1959. Other

Marines joined General Harkins’ command as Deputy Chief of Staff, J-2

and as branch chiefs for the J-3 through J-6 divisions. Two other

positions assigned to Marine officers were the project officer for

a Joint Operations Evaluation Group and a research and development

project officer for a Department of Defense agency. Both of these were

operationally controlled by the newly organized Military Assistance

Command.

[Illustration: _Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, Chief of Staff,

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (USMC Photo A150562)._]

Under the new U.S. command arrangement, the old Military Assistance

Advisory Group became subordinate to General Harkins’ command.

Headed by Major General Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army, the MAAG was

now responsible primarily for the advisory aspect of the assistance

program. To accommodate the impending increases in the number of

advisors, the MAAG’s staff was restructured. Under its new table of

organization, Marine officers were to serve as deputy chief of staff

and head of the plans branch of the J-3 division. Later, in 1963, the

MAAG’s table of distribution would be modified with the effect that

the chief of staff billet would be held by a Marine colonel. The first

Marine to serve as General Timmes’ chief of staff would be Colonel Earl

E. Anderson, a much-decorated aviator who eventually would become the

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The reorganization of the MAAG brought about a dramatic change in

the size and scope of the U.S. Marine advisory effort. The new table

of organization included a provision for an 18-man Marine Advisory

Division within the MAAG’s Naval Section. The organizational charts

for this division included advisor billets for a lieutenant colonel,

a major, six captains, a gunnery sergeant, and four staff sergeants.

Administrative positions were to make up the balance of the new

organization.

As had been the case previous to this expansion, the lieutenant colonel

was to serve as the Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine

Corps. The inclusion of the major’s billet was expected to enhance the

overall effectiveness of the advisory division as he was to double as

Assistant Senior Advisor and as senior artillery advisor. The gunnery

sergeant was to assist in the artillery advisory duties. Of the six

captains, four were to be assigned as advisors to VNMC infantry

battalions while the two others were slated to advise on engineer and

supply matters. The four logistics-trained staff sergeants were to be

assigned as assistant infantry battalion advisors and were expected to

free the officer advisors from direct involvement in time-consuming

supply matters.

Marines required to man this enlarged advisory unit began arriving in

Vietnam as early as February. All of the new officer advisors were

graduates of either Junior School at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico or

the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Following their assignments, but before departing for Vietnam, many

advisors received schooling in military assistance operations. This

normally included a five-month course of instruction in the French

language, a requirement which more and more Marine advisors were

beginning to question as a result of the Vietnamese desire to converse

in their own language rather than French. Upon arrival in Saigon,

the Marines were given two days of orientation briefings at MACV

headquarters before assuming their jobs in the Marine Advisory Division.

Lieutenant Colonel Brown continued to serve as the Senior Marine

Advisor and headed the new advisory division throughout the summer of

1962. In October he was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G.

Moody, Jr., a veteran who held the Navy Cross for heroism as a company

commander during the Korean War. Having served with the British Royal

Marines following Korea, Moody was somewhat familiar with the problems

involved in dealing with foreign military services.

[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC, Senior

Marine Advisor. (USMC Photo A412981)._]

Encouraged by both Brown and Moody, the U.S. Marine advisors

participated in every combat operation undertaken by the VNMC during

1962. Prior to planned operations they helped their Vietnamese

counterparts coordinate the more sophisticated means of support which

became available as the American military build-up took hold. During

planning phases, for example, they assisted with the development of

detailed orders and helped plan for employing artillery fire and air

support. If the impending operation was to be amphibious in nature, the

Marine officers coordinated with the U.S. Navy advisors assigned to

the supporting Vietnamese Navy units, thereby insuring that planning

for embarkation had been accomplished. On occasion the advisors were

required to coordinate helicopter support for the VNMC units--a task

sometimes complicated by the Vietnamese Marines’ lack of experience

in heliborne operations. Unfortunately, the almost constant combat

assignments being drawn by the handful of U.S. and VNAF helicopter

units available in Vietnam made training in such operations impossible.

Even more difficult were the advisor’s responsibilities after their

units deployed to combat. The U.S. Marines were experiencing the often

frustrating task of actually searching out the elusive Viet Cong on a

continuing daily basis. Additionally, the Americans found themselves

faced with the unenviable task of advising Vietnamese officers, who,

in some cases, had been fighting Communist guerrillas since the

French-Indochina War. These circumstances presented a unique set of

challenges for the advisors. For American officers with relatively

little actual experience in this brand of warfare to offer tactical

advice in a form acceptable to their Vietnamese counterparts demanded a

combination of tact, patience, and subtle persuasive powers.

The U.S. Marine advisors quickly learned that success in this peculiar

assignment depended largely on the degree of respect they commanded

among the Vietnamese Marines. To help build this intangible yet vital

foundation of mutual understanding and confidence, the Marine advisors

stayed with their units in combat, sharing with the Vietnamese Marine

the same foods, the same dangers, the same discomforts, and the same

routines. The Marine advisors lived in U.S. bachelor quarters in Saigon

when their respective battalions were in garrison. Nevertheless, they

spent much of this time at the Marine base camps, inspecting troops

and equipment and making preparations for the battalion’s next combat

assignment. Among others, Lieutenant Colonels Brown and Moody viewed

this continuous association with the Vietnamese Marines as the single

most essential ingredient to a successful advisory program.

_The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962_

For the Vietnamese Marine Corps 1962 was characterized by expansion,

redesignation, and continued combat operations against the Viet Cong.

On 1 January the former Vietnamese Marine Group was redesignated the

Vietnamese Marine Brigade and was enlarged to 5,483 officers and men.

Under its new table of organization, the number of infantry battalions

remained at four but two new battalions were added. One battery of

eight 105mm howitzers, two batteries of eight 75mm pack howitzers, and

a headquarters and service battery comprised an artillery battalion

which was created to provide artillery fire support to the infantry

units. An amphibious support battalion of 1,038 officers and men was

also formed. This unit contained the personnel necessary to provide

the entire Marine brigade with reconnaissance, communications, motor

transport, medical, engineer, and training support. Lieutenant Colonel

Khang continued in his position as Commandant of the expanded and

restructured Vietnamese Marine Corps.

The infantry battalions of the Vietnamese Marine Brigade performed

a variety of combat missions ranging from security duty around key

government installations to helicopter landings in suspected Viet Cong

redoubts during 1962. The four infantry battalions (the 4th Battalion

became available for combat assignment at midyear) participated in

23 combat operations which involved 404 days in the field. These

operations included 12 amphibious landings and eight heliborne

assaults. With the exception of two howitzer batteries which saw

some combat, the artillery battalion devoted the year to training.

Supervised by Major Alfred J. Croft and Gunnery Sergeant William A.

Loyko, their new Marine advisors, the Vietnamese artillerymen learned

their skills in a number of field firing exercises conducted on ARVN

artillery ranges.

In terms of casualties the VNMC battalions fought no major engagements

with the Communists during the year. A typical operation was one

conducted in An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province, early in

the year. The 2d Battalion, which was assigned to the An Xuyen province

chief for the period between 18 February and 26 April, conducted one

helicopter landing, provided troop escorts for numerous truck convoys,

and fought several minor engagements with the Viet Cong. Although the

Vietnamese commander reported 112 enemy killed and another 40 wounded

during the two-month assignment, the figures contradicted those of

Captain Evan L. Parker, the Marine advisor, which placed the Viet Cong

casualties at about 40 dead and 20 wounded. This difference, which was

not uncommon, stemmed largely from the fact that the Marine advisors

limited their reports to enemy dead and wounded actually sighted.

Still, the conflicting reports sometimes led to tensions between the

Vietnamese commander and the Marine advisor.

In other instances the Vietnamese Marine battalions were ordered to

serve as the reserve force for one of the three corps tactical zones.

The 1st Battalion, for example, accompanied by Captain Bradley S.

Snell, assumed the mission as II Corps reserve on 16 May and remained

in that role until mid-September. Based at Ban Me Thuot deep in the

Central Highlands, the battalion provided security for government

installations while remaining ready to react to enemy threats. As

the corps reserve it conducted one heliborne operation and several

search-type missions. In one of these searches the Vietnamese Marines

uncovered and destroyed a Viet Cong small arms factory. During its

assignment in II Corps, the 1st Battalion accounted for only four Viet

Cong dead and one wounded while suffering 16 dead and 28 wounded. These

statistics attested both to the grim effectiveness of enemy sniper fire

and mines and to the enemy’s elusiveness.

[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1

JANUARY 1962

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 5,483]

The newly activated 4th Battalion, advised by Captain Don R.

Christensen, entered combat for the first time during an operation in

Binh Thuan Province in the first week in August. Supported by Battery

A (a 75mm howitzer unit) of the artillery battalion, it joined the 43d

ARVN Infantry Regiment in an attempt to locate and destroy Viet Cong

forces operating around Phan Thiet, the provincial capital, located on

the coast 95 miles east of Saigon. Following the conclusion of this

operation on 22 August, the Marine units reverted to the control of the

Binh Thuan province chief. In this capacity they assisted in clearing

and resettlement operations being conducted in conjunction with the

Strategic Hamlet Program. Between 4 August and 15 October, when its

assignment in the province ended, the 4th Battalion reported 12 Viet

Cong killed and seven captured. Vietnamese Marine casualties were one

killed and five wounded. During the assignment the Marines resettled

some 600 civilians in fortified hamlets.[4-2][4-C]

[4-C] Major Croft, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor during

this period, later recalled that province chiefs tended

to misuse the Marine units by assigning them unproductive

missions such as static security. (Col Alfred J. Croft,

Comments on 2d Draft MS, Whitlow, “Marine Activities in

Vietnam, 1954–1964,” hereafter _Croft Comments_.)

[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines search dense jungle for Viet Cong

base areas. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,

USMC)._]

In the last week of September General David M. Shoup, Commandant of

the U.S. Marine Corps, arrived in Saigon to begin a four-day tour of

South Vietnam. Shoup, who held the Medal of Honor for his actions as

a regimental commander on Tarawa in World War II, was recognized as

one of President Kennedy’s most trusted military advisors. Acting in

his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant was

scheduled to visit a number of U.S. and South Vietnamese installations,

including several strategic hamlets.

[Illustration:

CORPS TACTICAL ZONES

1962

]

After a series of briefings at MACV and MAAG headquarters in Saigon,

the Commandant and his party journeyed by automobile to the base camp

of the 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion at Thu Duc on the outskirts

of the capital. There, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonels Brown and

Khang, Shoup reviewed a Vietnamese Marine honor guard and inspected

the 3d Battalion. Impressed with the units he had seen, General Shoup

commended President Diem on the status of his Marine Brigade. “From my

observation,” he wrote from Washington, “the Vietnamese Marine Corps

is in an excellent state of readiness from the standpoint of equipment

as well as the degree of training of its members.” “Indeed,” he added,

“your Corps of Marines seemed to be a splendid and competent fighting

organization.”[4-3]

The Commandant was less complimentary of the Strategic Hamlet Program.

After visiting several of the developments, he concluded that the

government’s effort to concentrate the Vietnamese civilians into

defended communities was counter-productive to the program’s stated

objective of winning the allegiance of the rural population. As Shoup

reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon his return to Washington,

the forced resettlement of the peasants from their native hamlets and

villages into what amounted to fortified camps seemed to be generating

antagonism rather than good will.[4-4]

At the close of 1962 Vietnamese Marine commanders reported a total of

192 Viet Cong killed, 77 wounded, and another 158 taken prisoner. U.S.

Marine advisors felt that even these moderate figures were inflated.

They estimated that only about 98 enemy soldiers had been killed, 27

wounded, and roughly half as many actual Viet Cong captured as had

been reported by their Vietnamese Marine counterparts. The Vietnamese

Marines also had failed to inflict any serious damage on the enemy’s

logistic system, capturing only 16,000 rounds of small arms ammunition,

45 grenades, 31 mines, and 50 individual weapons, a printing press, two

typewriters, several motors, and an assortment of medical supplies.[4-5]

_Some Conclusions_

In retrospect, 1962 bears assessment as an important watershed in the

chronicle of U.S. Marine activities in Vietnam. As the year began only

three Marine advisors and a handful of embassy guards were serving

in the Republic. The initial months, however, brought a dramatic

expansion of that role, both in terms of numbers and responsibilities.

By March Marines were functioning on MAAG and MACV staffs in Saigon,

in U.S. Army communications facilities in the Central Highlands, and

throughout the provinces where Vietnamese Marine units operated.

Their contributions to the war effort, therefore, were broad and

varied, ranging from high level planning to infantry advisory duties.

The Marine role had expanded in rough proportion to the broad-based

expansion of the overall U.S. military assistance program. In this

connection, Marine contributions tended to be concealed within the

context of the American assistance effort. Still, by mid-1962 it could

be said that the Marines in Vietnam were leaving the impact of their

service on virtually every stage of the ground war.

PART II

MARINE HELICOPTERS

GO TO WAR

CHAPTER 5

SHUFLY at Soc Trang

_The Decision--Deployment to Soc Trang--Mekong Delta Combat Support

Operations--Preparations and Redeployment--Accomplishments_

One of the most important developments in the chronicle of U.S.

Marine activities in South Vietnam during the early 1960s occurred

shortly after the creation of MACV. In mid-April 1962, a Marine medium

helicopter squadron was deployed to the Mekong Delta to provide support

for the Government of Vietnam forces in their battle with the Communist

guerrillas. The significance of the squadron’s arrival went beyond the

added mobility that it afforded those Vietnamese units attempting to

hold the rice producing delta region. Coinciding as it did with the

increases in the number of Marines serving on the MACV staff and under

the MAAG, its arrival indicated that the Marine role would expand in

direct proportion to the widening U.S. effort to defend the Republic of

Vietnam.

_The Decision_

The decision to deploy the Marine aviation unit to the combat zone

originated in the immediate aftermath of General Taylor’s report to

President Kennedy. On 17 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac), Admiral Harry

D. Felt, to prepare for increased operations in South Vietnam. This

order implied that the Pacific command should stand ready to deploy

additional helicopter units to Diem’s republic in the event that it

became necessary to augment the Army companies already operating there.

(By now the number of Army helicopter companies in South Vietnam stood

at three.) CinCPac was also instructed to explore South Vietnam’s

requirements for additional helicopter units beyond the Army companies

already present.[5-1]

Shortly afterward, Admiral Felt advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that

a valid requirement for additional helicopter support did exist in the

Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. He recommended that a fourth U.S.

Army light helicopter company be deployed to the area. Included in the

admiral’s recommendation was a proposal to support the aviation unit

with a composite maintenance, avionics, and medical group.[5-2]

Admiral Felt’s recommendations were approved by the Secretary of

Defense on 6 March. The Joint Chiefs immediately assigned the

responsibility for providing the support package and helicopter unit

to the Army. In turn, Army authorities alerted the 33d Transportation

Light Helicopter Company at Fort Ord, California for the move. Its

departure date was set for 18 April.[5-3]

Unknown to the officers and men of the alerted unit, the plans for its

deployment to combat were being reconsidered at the time the orders

were received. Two days before Admiral Felt’s recommendation reached

the joint Chiefs, a proposal to augment Army helicopter units with

Marine pilots had been advanced by General Timmes, the MAAG chief. This

proposal triggered a brief but eventful debate within U.S. military

circles. With General Harkins’ concurrence, Timmes recommended that

nine Marine helicopter pilots be assigned to the Army aviation units in

Vietnam for periods of 60 to 90 days. This arrangement, he pointed out,

would enable the Marine pilots to become familiar with the nature of

the combat support operations in South Vietnam and would provide them

with transitional training in the Army’s Piasecki-built tandem-rotored

H-21 helicopter (nicknamed the “Flying Banana”).[5-4]

Admiral Felt turned to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,

Pacific (FMFPac), Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, for his comments

on the MAAG chief’s plan. Shapley in turn instructed Major General

Carson A. Roberts, the Commanding General, Aircraft, FMFPac to study

the proposal and to frame a set of recommendations. Roberts, who had

been selected for promotion to lieutenant general and was scheduled to

relieve Shapley as Commanding General, FMFPac, found the prospect of

Marine aviators participating in combat support operations in Vietnam

appealing but felt that the proposal under review had some definite

disadvantages. He pointed out that under Timmes’ plan the Marine pilots

would be flying a type of helicopter unfamiliar to them instead of the

ones they would operate if the Marine squadrons were later deployed

to Vietnam. Furthermore, General Roberts warned that the piecemeal

assignment of his pilots would reduce the combat readiness of the unit

from which they would be drawn.[5-5]

At Roberts’ suggestion, General Shapley offered CinCPac a

counterproposal which he believed would benefit both the South

Vietnamese government and the Marine Corps. He suggested that a

complete Marine medium helicopter squadron from Marine Aircraft Group

16 (MAG-16), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) and supporting elements

be moved from Okinawa to the war zone. The Marine squadron, operating

24 HUS-1s (a single-rotor, Sikorsky-built transport helicopter later

known as the UH-34D) would replace the Army helicopter company at Da

Nang in the northernmost corps tactical zone, I Corps. The Army unit

would then be freed for redeployment southward into either II or III

Corps Tactical Zones.

General Shapley emphasized several advantages which he saw in this

plan. First, it would provide additional helicopter support for the

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces while concurrently providing an entire

Marine helicopter squadron with an opportunity to gain first-hand

experience in a counterguerrilla environment. It would also provide

Marine Corps units with operational experience in I Corps, the area

to which they would be committed if standing contingency plans were

later executed. Finally, Shapley explained that his proposal offered an

almost entirely self-sufficient aviation unit which could be supported

administratively and logistically by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The

unit would require only minimal support from the Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam.[5-6]

On the same day that he had heard the Marine commander’s proposal,

Admiral Felt received a message from Admiral John H. Sides, Commander

in Chief, Pacific Fleet, which strongly advised that Roberts’ plan

be implemented.[5-7] Admiral Felt then solicited General Harkins’

opinion on the matter. He reminded the MACV commander that the proposed

deployment would provide the Marines with operational experience in

an area where they might some day be committed. The admiral further

pointed out that the location of a Marine helicopter unit at Da Nang

would enable the Army aviation companies to move south into one of the

other corps tactical zones--a move that would facilitate the logistical

support of those units by shortening their supply lines.[5-8]

Harkins generally concurred with Admiral Felt’s viewpoint. He noted

that the more powerful Marine HUS helicopter (Sea Horse) could be

expected to out perform the Army’s H-21 in the higher elevations around

Da Nang. He also felt that the Marines, with their seaborne supply

network, were better equipped to cope with the logistics problems in

the more isolated northern reaches of South Vietnam. But he objected

to the deployment of the Marine unit to Da Nang on the basis that

the relocation of the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company from I Corps

in the immediate future would disrupt a series of operations which

were already underway in I Corps. As an alternative, General Harkins

proposed that the Marine helicopters be located initially at Soc

Trang in the Mekong Delta. Later, when the tempo of operations in the

northern corps tactical zone permitted, it could exchange places with

the Army unit at Da Nang.[5-9]

One Army general raised a specific objection to the proposal that the

Marine squadron be deployed from Okinawa. General James F. Collins, the

Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CinCUSArPac) argued that the

presence of the Marine helicopters at Soc Trang would introduce yet

“another supply and maintenance feature into the III Corps area.”[5-10]

This argument was followed by the recommendation that the Army’s 81st

Light Helicopter Company, then based in Hawaii, be ordered to the

Mekong Delta. The 81st, General Collins contended, was already trained

in troop transportation operations in jungle terrain.

General David M. Shoup, the Marine Corps Commandant, who approved the

FMFPac plan in concept, harbored one reservation regarding General

Roberts’ proposals. His concern stemmed from the possibility that the

Marine Corps might be required to replace the squadron from Okinawa

with another in order to maintain the level of operational forces

available to CinCPac--an eventuality which would upset long-range

Marine Corps deployment schedules. General Shoup indicated that he,

too, would oppose the deployment of a Marine helicopter squadron to

South Vietnam if this proved to be the case.[5-11]

At this juncture in the debate, Admiral Felt journeyed to Saigon to

discuss the matter more thoroughly with General Harkins. Following

consultations, the two commanders jointly communicated their

recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 March. They advised

that it would be more desirable to deploy one of the Marine helicopter

squadrons from Okinawa than either the Army unit already on alert

in California or the one in Hawaii. This decision, Felt and Harkins

informed the Joint Chiefs, was influenced heavily by the readiness

posture of the various units under consideration. A Marine squadron,

they pointed out, could be on station and ready for combat operations

by 15 April--three days before the company already alerted by the Army

could depart California.[5-12]

Admiral Felt and General Harkins then dealt with the CinCUSARPac

contention that additional supply problems would be created by the

deployment of a Marine unit to the Mekong Delta. The Pacific commanders

advised that, in their opinion, the logistical support “can be handled

relatively easily by [the] Marines.”[5-13] They added that should

requirements for a fifth helicopter unit arise in South Vietnam, the

Army’s 81st Helicopter Company would be selected for the assignment. It

would be replaced in Hawaii by the 33d Transportation Light Helicopter

Company from Fort Ord. Finally, Admiral Felt and General Harkins

recommended that the Marine squadron be deployed initially to the

Mekong Delta area of III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Later, when

operational conditions in I Corps were more favorable, the Marines

could replace the Army helicopter unit there.

After meeting to discuss the matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved

the entire package of recommendations on 16 March. Admiral Felt

immediately ordered the Pacific Fleet to deploy a Marine helicopter

squadron to South Vietnam and authorized direct liaison between the

1st Marine Aircraft Wing and ComUSMACV. In turn, Admiral Sides, the

Commander of the Pacific Fleet, notified the Commander, Seventh Fleet,

Vice Admiral William A. Schoech, of the decision and directed him to

take appropriate action.[5-14]

_Deployment to Soc Trang_

The Commanding General of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Major General

John P. Condon, a Michigan native who had earned a Distinguished Flying

Cross and three Legions of Merit for service during World War II and

Korea, was informed of the impending deployment on 22 March. At the

time, Condon, his staff, and elements of his command were participating

in SEATO exercise TULUNGAN in the Philippines. The arrival of the

orders proved timely for most of the affected units were in close

proximity to the wing commander. As the Marine helicopter squadron and

its supporting elements were scheduled to arrive in Vietnam just two

weeks after the SEATO exercise ended, preparations for the move were

begun immediately. General Condon quickly dispatched several officers

to Saigon to establish liaison with USMACV.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing fortunately possessed a background which

facilitated the rapid preparations for the movement. Since August of

the previous year General Condon’s command regularly had deployed a

medium helicopter squadron (HMM) and its supporting elements with the

Special Landing Force (SLF), a Marine air-ground team embarked on board

the Seventh Fleet’s Amphibious Ready Group. Since 1961 this naval

task force had cruised Southeast Asian waters ready to implement U.S.

contingency plans. These deployments had given the Marines of the wing

a reservoir of experience which enabled them to make maximum use of the

short period of time available for planning.

By 30 March, the wing’s planning had progressed to the stage that

General Condon could provide the Commander of the Seventh Fleet with

specific recommendations for the entire operation. The general concept

of the plan was that Task Unit 79.3.5, under the command of a Marine

colonel, was to be built around a Marine medium helicopter squadron

which was participating in Operation TULUNGAN. This task unit, code

named SHUFLY, was to occupy an old Japanese-built landing strip near

Soc Trang, a small town located about 85 miles southwest of Saigon in

Ba Xuyen Province. Situated only 20 miles from the coast, Soc Trang

possessed one of the few hard surfaced runways in the area. Condon

informed the Seventh Fleet commander of the arrangements which his

liaison officers had made during their trip to Saigon. An ARVN infantry

battalion and two 4.2-inch mortar companies were to assume the defense

of the air strip at Soc Trang the same day that the Marines began

landing.

[Illustration: _Major General John P. Condon, USMC, Commanding General,

1st Marine Aircraft Wing. (USMC Photo A420792)._]

The Marine general then proceeded to outline the chain of command and

method of support which he considered best for the Marine task unit.

SHUFLY, he suggested, should be under the operational control of

ComUSMACV but should remain under the administrative control of the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing. Most of its logistic support, the wing commander

thought, could come through normal Marine and Navy channels with fuels,

lubricant oils, rations, and ammunition, being the exceptions. Rations

and ammunition were to be provided by MACV, while fuels would be

supplied by private Vietnamese distributers operating under contracts

with the U.S. government.

Next, General Condon explained to Admiral Schoech his desires for the

organization of the task unit. He felt that SHUFLY would function best

if organized into three distinct task elements. First, he proposed

that a headquarters be formed under the command of Colonel John F.

Carey, a veteran Marine aviator who had been awarded the Navy Cross

for heroism during the battle for Midway. Carey was currently serving

as Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. This headquarters,

General Condon advised, should consist of eight officers and six

enlisted men. The second element of the task unit, the wing commander

continued, would be Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362),

reinforced, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp.

The squadron, whose normal complement was 63 officers and 196 enlisted

Marines, was to be augmented by 50 additional maintenance personnel.

Its equipment would include 24 HUS helicopters (which under normal

operating conditions could lift eight to 12 combat-loaded Vietnamese

troops), three Cessna single-engine OE-1 observation aircraft, one

R4D transport aircraft, and supplemental maintenance equipment.

Prior to its deployment, HMM-362 would exchange its helicopters for

recently overhauled aircraft in order to reduce maintenance problems

once operations in Vietnam began. SHUFLY’s third element would be a

sub unit of Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16). Designated Task

Element 79.3.5.2, it would be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William

W. Eldridge. Navy medical, dental, and chaplain personnel would be

included in the sub unit’s 193 enlisted men and 18 officers.

The wing commander intended to provide the MABS-16 sub unit with

a Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System (TAFDS) and a Marine

Airfield Traffic Control Unit (MATCU). The traffic control unit would

be equipped with Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) and Ground Control

Approach (GCA) systems which would enable the helicopter squadron to

conduct landings during periods of reduced visibility.[5-15]

Colonel Carey, the task unit commander, was to be assigned

responsibility for liaison with MACV and military authorities in

III Corps, the tactical zone which encompassed the entire Mekong

Delta and the transition zone between the delta and the highlands.

All operational planning, security, external communications, and

administrative matters also were to fall under his cognizance. This

arrangement would allow Lieutenant Colonel Clapp and his squadron

to concentrate on daily flight operations and aircraft maintenance.

Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 sub unit would be responsible for

all normal base support and airfield operations.[5-16]

General Condon’s report to Admiral Schoech concluded with a rough

outline of the schedule for the task unit’s deployment. On 9

April--only eight days after the termination of the SEATO exercise in

the Philippines--Marine transport aircraft from the 1st MAW, augmented

by three transports from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), would

begin airlifting the task unit headquarters and the MABS-16 detachment

from Okinawa. The Marine general anticipated that all “housekeeping”

facilities would be in position at Soc Trang within five days.

Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s HMM-362 would fly into Soc Trang from the

amphibious assault ship (helicopter carrier) USS _Princeton_ (LPH-5)

on the morning of 15 April. The proposal that the helicopters be flown

ashore satisfied a Department of Defense requirement that conspicuous

unloading activities were to be avoided in the Saigon area.

Admiral Schoech approved the 1st MAW’s proposed plan on 3 April and

ordered Task Unit 79.3.5 to be transferred to General Harkins’ command

on 15 April. He then instructed the Commander, Task Group 76.5 (the

Amphibious Ready Group) to provide SHUFLY with whatever supply and

administrative support it might require for the movement. At the same

time the fleet commander ordered appropriate subordinate commanders

to provide an escort of destroyers for the USS _Princeton_ and an

inconspicuous air cover when the LPH arrived and began unloading

HMM-362. Accordingly, the covering aircraft were instructed not to

approach within 20 miles of South Vietnam unless the situation around

Soc Trang endangered the Marine helicopters.[5-17]

The day following Schoech’s approval of the Marine plan, the carrier

task unit was formed to transport HMM-362 to South Vietnam. SHUFLY was

activated simultaneously and given orders which reflected General

Condon’s planning. Colonel Carey was instructed to establish his

headquarters at the Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, in order

to prepare for the deployment. The task unit commander was advised that

he would receive more detailed instructions relative to administration

and logistics at a later date.

Colonel Carey’s task group headquarters in Japan had only one week in

which to complete preparations for the move to the Republic of Vietnam.

His staff’s responsibility for coordinating between units located at

Atsugi, Japan, and Futema, Okinawa, made this task even more difficult.

Carey’s officers worked out the details of the airlift with the staff

of Marine Aerial Refueler-Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152), the

GV-1[5-A] unit assigned to carry the MABS-16 sub unit and the task unit

headquarters to Soc Trang.

[5-A] The GV-1 (later KC-130), a four-engine, turbo-prop

refueler-transport built by Lockheed, is the Marine

refueling version of the Air Force C-130.

The airlift portion of the movement began as scheduled on 9 April with

the MABS-16 detachment being transported from Futema directly to Soc

Trang. At 0800 Colonel Carey and part of his staff landed at Soc Trang

in a twin-engine Douglas R4D Skytrain. As planned, the 400-man ARVN

battalion had already established a perimeter around the airfield.

Using the R4D’s radio, the crew provided landing instructions for the

GV-1s of VMGR-152 and VMGR-352 which began landing and unloading their

cargoes at half hour intervals. Several key American and Vietnamese

military officers were on hand to watch the lead elements of SHUFLY

arrive. Major General Condon, the 1st MAW commander, flew the first

GV-1 into Soc Trang but departed after the aircraft had been unloaded.

General Harkins and Brigadier General Le Van Nghiem, the Vietnamese

commander of III Corps, also made appearances at the airstrip to

welcome Colonel Carey and his Marines.

Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 detachment began readying the

airfield for HMM-362’s arrival shortly after the first transport

aircraft had unloaded. To serve as living spaces the Marines raised

75 strongback tents, all with plywood decks. They set up a water

purification system and began trucking water from the town of Soc

Trang, about two and a half miles away. Within two days, 9,000 gallons

of water had been purified. Other conveniences improved the camp’s

living conditions. A field laundry and a mess hall were set up and by

12 April, hot meals were being served to the Marines. A post office

began operations and telephones were installed to connect living and

working areas.

By 14 April, the day before HMM-362 was scheduled to arrive at Soc

Trang, most of the airfield facilities were ready to support flight

operations. An old hangar, which had been constructed by the Japanese

during their World War II occupation of Indochina, had been repaired

to house some of the squadron’s aircraft and equipment. The MABS-16

communications section was operational and had established radio and

teletype links with MACV in Saigon and MAG-16 on Okinawa. The TAFDS

had been assembled and filled with aviation fuel and MATCU-68, the air

traffic control unit assigned to SHUFLY, was prepared to control flight

operations.

The Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5) steamed from Okinawa on 10 April

with HMM-362, its reinforcements, and HMM-261 embarked on the USS

_Princeton_. The task group arrived off the coast of South Vietnam

in the early morning hours of 15 April. At dawn Lieutenant Colonel

Clapp, who had seen action as a fighter pilot during the Iwo Jima and

Okinawa campaigns in World War II, led the first flight of helicopters

from the deck of the _Princeton_. The operation proceeded smoothly

with aircraft from both squadrons ferrying HMM-362’s equipment inland

to the Soc Trang airstrip. Far out at sea, jets of the Seventh Fleet

orbited, ready to provide protection to the Marine helicopters. They

were not needed, however, as the Viet Cong made no effort to oppose

the movement. By mid-afternoon the airlift of HMM-362’s personnel

and equipment to the Soc Trang airfield had been completed. HMM-261

returned to the _Princeton_ where it continued to function as the

helicopter element of the Special Landing Force.

The day after arriving at Soc Trang, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s

squadron, nicknamed “Archie’s Angels,” was prepared to support the

ARVN. Since the squadron’s combat support was not required immediately,

the pilots and crews began flying missions to familiarize themselves

with their new surroundings. They learned that their operations were to

be conducted over the vast expanse of South Vietnam which stretched

from just north and east of Saigon to the nation’s southernmost tip,

the Ca Mau Peninsula, and from the South China Sea westward to the

Cambodian border. Their initial flights over the Mekong Delta revealed

a predominantly flat and monotonous landscape. Parched by the long dry

season, the dusty brown rice paddies stood in sharp contrast with the

verdant mangrove swamps which abounded near major streams and along

the coast. Numerous hamlets, most enclosed by dense hedgerows and

treelines, were scattered across the countryside. Thousands of canals

and trails and a few crude roads completed the rural landscape in which

the Viet Cong guerrilla thrived. Larger towns, such as Soc Trang, Can

Tho (located about 80 miles southwest of Saigon), and My Tho (located

about half way between the capital and Can Tho) were under the control

of the Government of Vietnam.

While the pilots and crews of HMM-362 were acquainting themselves

with the geography of the Mekong Delta, Colonel Carey and his staff

met in Saigon with U.S. and Vietnamese officers from the MACV and

III Corps headquarters. There, they established liaison with the

three ARVN divisions subordinate to General Nhgiem’s III Corps--the

21st, the 7th, and the 5th--and discussed operational matters. After

several conferences, the final details of the command arrangements

were completed. It was agreed that all Marine missions would require

the approval of MACV, III Corps, and the task unit commander. This

arrangement would enable General Harkins’ command to retain actual

operational control of the Marine helicopters even though they would

be supporting III Corps exclusively. Final approval of all mission

requests for Marine support would rest with the Joint Operations Center

(JOC) at JGS headquarters in Saigon. Manned by U.S. Army, U.S. Air

Force, ARVN, and VNAF officers, this agency was part of a recently

instituted Tactical Air Support System, the purpose of which was to

provide positive control over all military aircraft in South Vietnam.

To insure maximum coordination at lower echelons, Marine liaison

officers were assigned to the corps headquarters and to the 21st ARVN

Division. It was anticipated that this division, headquartered at Can

Tho, only 35 miles northwest of Soc Trang, would require more Marine

helicopter support than the other divisions that were operating within

the corps tactical zone.[5-B]

[5-B] I and II Corps had their own agencies within the corps

headquarters for control of air assets whereas III CTZ

relied directly on the JOC. Under this arrangement, I

Corps and II Corps were required to pass mission requests

for air support on to the JOC.

[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Archie Clapp (second from left),

HMM-362 squadron commander, Major General John Condon (fourth from

left), Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Colonel John

Carey (extreme right), task unit commander, confer briefly after

arriving at Soc Trang. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P.

Kizer, USMC)._]

While operational planning was underway, the MABS-16 Marines set about

to improve the newly occupied compound. Two diesel-powered generators

were put into operation and began furnishing electrical power for the

camp. The utilities section, which maintained the generators, then

began installing electrical wiring throughout the compound. Toilet and

shower facilities were constructed to accommodate the Marines.

Measures were also taken during this interlude to strengthen the

airfield’s defenses. Expecting that the Viet Cong might attempt

to infiltrate the Marine position, Colonel Carey created a 40-man

security unit to protect the inner camp and flight lines. This unit,

composed of men from MABS-16 and HMM-362 and responsible to a permanent

sergeant-of-the-guard, maintained roving patrols and security posts

during hours of darkness. A network of concertina wire, trip flares,

and machine gun emplacements provided additional protection around the

helicopters and living area. Attack alerts were conducted periodically

to coordinate the ARVN’s outer defenses and the Marine guard within the

perimeter.

[Illustration:

III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1962

]

Within less than two weeks after the first Marines had arrived at Soc

Trang, the camp had been adequately prepared to support sustained

combat helicopter operations. In addition, defenses had been

established and the lines of logistical support from MACV had been

opened. Food and water were readily available. All necessary liaison

with the Vietnamese units to be supported had been accomplished. Pilots

and crews had gained a rudimentary knowledge of the area in which they

would fly and SHUFLY’s entire command structure had undergone a one

week “shake down” in which it had proven sound.

_Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations_

Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron began combat operations on Easter

Sunday, 22 April, exactly one week after arriving in the Republic of

Vietnam. The unit’s first combat assignment was to assist the Army’s

Saigon-based 57th Helicopter Company in an operation code named

LOCKJAW. The American helicopters were to support the ARVN 7th Division

which was headquartered at My Tho, 53 miles northeast of Soc Trang. The

Marine helicopters, which departed Soc Trang at 0900, flew 29 sorties

and lifted 400 Vietnamese soldiers without incident during the course

of their first operation.

Unlike the U.S. Army helicopters already operating in other parts

of South Vietnam, the Marine HUS-1s were not armed with machine

guns during their initial operations from Soc Trang. Prior to their

deployment, the Marine commanders had reasoned that weapons mounted

in the cargo hatch would hinder loading and unloading during critical

periods while the helicopters were in landing zones. Additionally,

armed aircraft would tend to present a more hostile appearance to

Vietnamese civilians, thereby providing the Viet Cong ready-made

material for their anti-American propaganda themes. The only weapons

on board the helicopters, therefore, were the individual side arms and

two M3A1 .45 caliber submachine guns carried by the crew members. The

automatic weapons enabled Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s men to return fire

at short ranges and would also enhance their survival capabilities in

the event an aircraft was forced down in unsecure territory.[5-C]

[5-C] By the summer the new light weight AR-15, the forerunner

of the M-16, would replace the M3A1 “greaseguns.” Near

the end of the year, however, the Leatherneck crews were

carrying M-14 rifles, the standard U.S. 7.62mm infantry

weapon of this period.

Once HMM-362 began combat flight operations the tempo of activities

at Soc Trang quickened. The same day that SHUFLY helicopters

participated in the coordinated helilift from My Tho, an HUS was

called upon to evacuate an American advisor from Vinh Long, 46 miles

north of Soc Trang. The following day the first combined operation

involving Vietnamese Marine ground forces and U.S. Marine helicopters

was conducted. A company of Vietnamese Marines was helilifted into a

threatened government outpost south of the town of Ca Mau, located near

the southern tip of South Vietnam, to provide security while HMM-362’s

helicopters evacuated the 57-man garrison.

On 24 April, 16 Marine helicopters supported the 21st ARVN Division in

Operation NIGHTINGALE conducted near Can Tho. In this operation 591

ARVN troops were lifted into eight landing zones along two canals where

a large group of Viet Cong had been reported. Shortly after the first

wave of the assault force landed, a vicious small arms fight erupted.

HMM-362 suffered its first combat damage when a helicopter was forced

down after its oil line was punctured by enemy fire. An accompanying

HUS quickly landed and retrieved the crew. Four other helicopters

proceeded to the forward loading site, picked up a Marine repair

team and enough ARVN troops to protect the team while it worked, and

returned to the downed aircraft. The mechanics completed their repairs

in two hours after which the crew returned the helicopter to Soc Trang.

The security force was then lifted out of the area.

Despite the damage suffered by the Marine aircraft, the Can Tho

operation apparently achieved some success. The Viet Cong reportedly

suffered 70 dead and lost three prisoners to the South Vietnamese while

the ARVN units lost only three killed and six wounded. The Marines of

HMM-362, moreover, had responded to a new challenge by demonstrating

that they could recover helicopters which had been forced to land in

insecure territory. Although the principle of providing security while

accomplishing field repairs had been employed previously by the Army

helicopter companies, the Can Tho operation of 24 April marked the

first time the Marines had been required to use the technique.

[Illustration: _Aerial view of Soc Trang airstrip. (Photo courtesy of

Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC)._]

HMM-362 again joined the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company for a

coordinated troop lift on 25 April. This time the objective was the

small town of Chau Doc on the Bassac River near the Cambodian

border which had been raided and burned by a force whose identity was

undetermined. Fourteen Marine helicopters transported 168 troops from

the 21st ARVN Division to the scene of the incident while two other

squadron aircraft lifted the Deputy Commander of III Corps, the 21st

Division Commander, and the Senior U.S. Advisor in III Corps, Colonel

Daniel B. Potter, Jr., U.S. Army, to the village. The landing was

uncontested as the marauding band had fled across the international

border into Cambodia.

The conditions which confronted HMM-362 in the Mekong Delta during its

first weeks of combat operations encouraged the squadron’s pilots to

experiment with new tactics. One such instance occurred in the first

week of May in Ba Xuyen Province when the province chief requested

that the Marine helicopters support his Civil Guard company in a

raid on a fortified Viet Cong village about 12 miles southwest of

Soc Trang. Because the objective was located so near the Soc Trang

airfield, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp ordered an unusual technique used

for approaching the landing zone. The flight would rendezvous over Soc

Trang at tree-top level and proceed to the objective with the flight

leader slightly to the rear and above the formation. From this vantage

point the flight leader could keep the other aircraft in sight and

exercise better control over each element of the flight. The success of

the new procedure led Lieutenant Colonel Clapp to remark later that the

technique was similar to “calling the plays from the grandstand.”[5-18]

It became another tactic available for the squadron’s future use.

In terms of lessons learned, HMM-362’s most significant operation

during its initial month of combat support came on 9 May. Twenty-three

helicopters and two OE-1 observation aircraft launched from Ca Mau at

1100 for an assault on Cai Ngai, a Viet Cong-controlled village 21

miles to the south. At 1200 the helicopters began landing the ARVN

troops in six landing zones which had been attacked only five minutes

earlier by Vietnamese Air Force fighter bombers. Firing broke out even

before the Vietnamese troops could jump from the helicopters. During

this clash eight of the Marine aircraft were hit by small arms fire

and two Vietnamese troops were wounded while still on board. One HUS,

struck in the oil return line, was forced to land a few miles from

the objective. Troops were flown in quickly to establish a perimeter

around the downed aircraft while repairs were made. After the temporary

repairs had been completed, its crew flew the helicopter to Ca Mau,

where it remained until more extensive work could be accomplished. The

other aircraft, including an OE-1, suffered only superficial damage and

continued to support the ARVN operation.

From this encounter with the Viet Cong, the Marine pilots learned that

air strikes conducted just prior to a helicopter landing in the heavily

populated delta country tended to disclose the location of the landing

zone to the enemy. In this instance the Communists had been able to

reach the landing zone in the few minutes which elapsed between the

last air strike and the arrival of the Marine helicopters. Following

this experience, the Marines would no longer allow VNAF air strikes on

landing zones prior to operations in the flat delta region.[5-D]

[5-D] The development of helicopter tactics and techniques in

Vietnam will be covered in detail in a separate monograph

being prepared for publication by the History and Museums

Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

The Americans and Vietnamese, however, soon learned to use fixed-wing

aircraft to support helicopter operations in another manner. By

mid-June, FARM GATE T-28 Trojans (a single-engine two-seat trainer

built by North American) modified to carry bombs, rockets, and machine

guns were flying escort missions for the Marine helicopter squadron.

This particular aircraft could fly slowly enough to cruise with the HUS

yet fast enough to deliver an air strike en route to the objective and

then catch up with the helicopter formation. Normally an element of two

T-28s accompanied the helicopters and were used primarily to attack

targets near the landing zone after the ARVN troops were on the ground.

The placement of an American pilot-instructor and a Vietnamese student

in the T-28, a requirement imposed by MACV, helped avert language

problems which invariably developed when coordinating ARVN ground

operations and U.S. air operations. The effectiveness of the escort

tactic increased as the Marine and Air Force pilots became accustomed

to planning, coordinating, and executing the missions.

The Marines quickly learned the value of utilizing the OE-1 in

conjunction with their helicopter operations. Three single-engine,

two-man aircraft, a detachment from Marine Observation Squadron 2

(VMO-2), proved remarkably versatile in day-to-day operations over the

delta. Primarily, they were used in daylight visual reconnaissance,

usually to study objective areas and the approach routes which the

helicopters would later use. Sometimes their crews were called upon

to photograph proposed landing zones for briefing purposes. Often the

aircraft’s radios were used to relay messages between various ARVN

ground units which were operating beyond the range of their radios.

Equipped with two frequency-modulated (FM) radios for work with ground

stations and one ultra high-frequency (UHF) radio for communicating

with other aircraft, the OE-1 was perfectly suited for controlling

helicopter landings. The Marine aviators also found that, unlike

their helicopters, the observation aircraft did not arouse suspicion

in the area over which it flew. This advantage was due probably to

several factors. First, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) routinely

operated similar aircraft over the entire region; secondly, the enemy

could not readily determine whether the OE-1 was on a reconnaissance

mission or merely flying from one point to another; and finally, the

small aircraft made little noise. Given these characteristics it was

no accident that the helicopter squadron relied on the observation

aircraft more and more as the pattern of operations unfolded.

[Illustration: _Vietnamese infantrymen disembark from HMM-362

helicopters and move toward treeline in one of the first helicopter

assault operations attempted by a Marine unit in the Mekong Delta.

(Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC)._]

Shortly after their arrival in Vietnam, the Marines of HMM-362 began

experimenting with one of the more imaginative techniques developed in

the early stages of the intensified U.S.-GVN counterinsurgency effort.

Marine air crews had noticed that the enemy often managed to elude the

larger ARVN units by fleeing the operations area in small groups. Even

the smallest breach between ARVN units seemed to allow large numbers

of guerrillas to escape into covered or heavily populated areas where

they became impossible to find. Colonel Carey and Lieutenant Colonel

Clapp devised a plan to prevent escapes of this nature. Their idea was

to have a flight of four Marine helicopters loaded with about 50 ARVN

soldiers circle above the contested area. This so-called “Eagle Flight”

would be on the alert for any Viet Cong attempting to evade the ground

forces. Once the enemy was located, often by the OE-1 observation

aircraft, the helicopters would land the Vietnamese soldiers at a

position where they could block his escape. The Marine commanders felt

that the adoption of such a tactic would increase the effectiveness of

the ARVN’s helicopter assault operations.

After several weeks of planning by HMM-362 and the affected III Corps

commands, the concept was put into practice. The Eagle Flight was first

tested in a large operation on 18 June when HMM-362 helilifted ARVN

troops into 16 different landing zones. Heavy monsoon rains made the

enemy particularly difficult to pin down, but the Marine pilots managed

to sight 10 Viet Cong near the main landing zone. After landing near

the enemy, the ARVN troops captured 10 Communist soldiers and wounded

one other. Shortly after this incident another Eagle Flight made two

eventful contacts with the enemy. The Marine helicopters landed their

small force and the ARVN promptly killed four Viet Cong and captured

another. Twenty minutes later, after reboarding the helicopters, the

South Vietnamese swept down upon a new prey, this time capturing four

prisoners.

The novel concept was employed successfully again on 10 July. While

HMM-362 aircraft lifted 968 ARVN troops into the Ca Mau area, an Eagle

Flight spotted a sampan moving northward from the operations area. The

flight leader landed the troops nearby and the ARVN intercepted the

craft. Later that day the Marines and ARVN of the Eagle Flight clashed

twice with an estimated platoon of Viet Cong. In the first encounter

seven enemy were killed and several weapons were captured. In the

second skirmish, the enemy suffered six dead and lost more weapons. All

four Marine helicopters, however, were hit by small arms fire during

the two brief fights.

By the middle of July, the Eagle Flight had become a proven combat

tactic. By reducing the enemy’s opportunity to escape when the

government forces possessed the advantage on the battlefield, it had

favorably influenced the tactical situation when used in the Mekong

Delta. Equally important, SHUFLY’s commanders had demonstrated their

ability to adapt their technological resources to the Viet Cong’s

methods of operations. Variants of the Eagle Flight tactic, under

different names such as Tiger Flight, Sparrow Hawk, Pacifier, and Quick

Reaction Force, would be used by the Marines throughout the Vietnam war.

The Marines were quick to apply their technological knowhow to other

problems which were to confront them during their early operations in

the III Corps Tactical Zone. One example was their adaptation of the

TAFDS to the problem which arose when the helicopters were called upon

to operate far beyond their normal fuel range. HMM-362 helicopters

would airlift a TAFDS unit, complete with a 10,000 gallon fuel bladder,

pumps, and MABS-16 personnel, to the site where the ARVN troops were

to be loaded. The fuel bladders were filled by gasoline trucks which

travelled from the nearest source of fuel. The Marine helicopters could

then use the TAFDS as a temporary base of operations, refueling between

troop pick-ups when necessary. Thus employed, the TAFDS allowed the

operating radius of the helicopters to be extended to support even the

most distant South Vietnamese operation.

While the Marines were learning to adapt their technology to the

guerrilla war environment, the enemy was applying his ingenuity in

attempts to frustrate the American and South Vietnamese helicopter

operations. The Viet Cong quickly learned to capitalize on the presence

of large crowds of civilians who sometimes gathered near helicopter

landing zones to watch the strange aircraft. One such incident occurred

in June when Communist soldiers mingled with a crowd and delivered

fire on helicopters which were lifting elements of the 21st ARVN

Division. Two aircraft were hit by enemy fire although the damage was

not extensive enough to force them to land. The Marines, who refused

to return fire with their individual weapons unless the Viet Cong

could be separated from the civilian populace, found no effective

method of countering this tactic. Later in June, the Marines of HMM-362

encountered another tactic when they found that hundreds of upright

bamboo stakes had been prepositioned in the intended landing zone. The

perpendicular spikes, each four or five feet high, not only prevented

the helicopters from landing but also made it impossible to disembark

the ARVN troops while hovering. Fortunately, the abundance of landing

zones in the delta region tended to make this particular tactic

ineffective.[5-E]

[5-E] The German army had used a similar technique (upright

poles) to obstruct landing zones against U.S. paratroops

at Normandy during World War II. (Taylor, _Swords and

Plowshares_, p. 80.)

On 20 July, HMM-362 added a new dimension to the counterguerrilla

capabilities of the South Vietnamese forces when it executed the first

night helicopter assault of the war. The mission, which began at 0415

at Soc Trang, involved lifting three waves of ARVN troops into an

objective on the Plain of Reeds, about 40 miles southwest of Ben Tre.

The ARVN force intended to encircle a suspected Viet Cong village

before dawn and then attack it at daybreak. The Marine portion of the

airlift was completed 10 minutes before daylight after which the Army’s

57th Helicopter Company joined the operation. Although the night troop

lift was executed without incident, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp attributed

its success at least partially to the near perfect conditions. The

moonlight, reflected from the flat, flooded rice paddies, had aided the

Marine pilots in the tricky operation.[5-19]

Prior to SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang, General Roberts’ staff at

FMFPac had developed a policy for the periodic rotation of the task

unit’s Marines for which the Commandant’s approval had been gained.

The helicopter squadron would be replaced by a similar unit after

approximately four months of operations in the combat zone. But

rather than being drawn from the 1st MAW on Okinawa, the replacement

squadron was to be provided by the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in

California. Officers and men serving with the supporting headquarters

and MABS-16 elements, however, were to be replaced by Marines from

MAG-16 at approximately four-month intervals. So as not to disrupt the

operational efficiency of the task unit, individual replacements would

be made in increments.

In accordance with this rotation policy, HMM-163, the HUS unit

scheduled to relieve HMM-362, began arriving at Soc Trang on 23 July.

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Rathbun, a veteran fighter

pilot of World War II and Korea, the squadron continued to arrive

during the last week of July. Airlifted by GV-1s from the Marine Corps

Air Facility, Santa Ana, California, the new squadron brought neither

helicopters nor maintenance equipment. The squadron commander had

orders to continue operations with HMM-362’s aircraft and equipment.

Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron maintained a steady operational

pace even after the new unit’s appearance. On 27 July, 18 of HMM-362’s

helicopters participated in an operation about 30 miles northeast

of Soc Trang. The next day the task unit commander committed 21

helicopters and OE-1s to a 21st ARVN Division operation near Ca Mau.

The Eagle Flight was committed on four different occasions during this

operation.

Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s “Ridge Runners” officially relieved

“Archie’s Angels” on 1 August after a week of orientation flying with

HMM-362’s crews. The men of the departing squadron could reflect

on their tour in South Vietnam with a sense of satisfaction and

accomplishment. Since their arrival in mid-April, they had executed

50 combat helicopter assaults, had flown 4,439 sorties, and had

amassed 5,262 hours of combat flight time, all in unarmed aircraft.

During the course of these missions they had made approximately 130

different landings against Viet Cong opposition. Seventeen of their

24 helicopters and two of the three OE-1 aircraft had received battle

damage. To the credit of the squadron’s maintenance personnel and

aircrews, HMM-362 had not lost a single aircraft during its operations

in the Republic of Vietnam. Miraculously the squadron had suffered no

casualties while testing the Marine Corps’ vertical envelopment concept

in the guerrilla war situation.[5-20]

During their three and a half months at Soc Trang, Lieutenant Colonel

Clapp’s men had contributed significantly to another facet of the war

effort--one usually considered unrelated to normal combat operations.

Sensing the unique links between the political and military aspects

of the struggle in South Vietnam, Colonel Carey had initiated a

“People-to-People-Program,” the objective of which was to assist the

Government of Vietnam in winning the allegiance of the Vietnamese

people. Within a few days after occupying the Soc Trang airfield,

Colonel Carey had ordered the task unit’s medical facilities made

available to Vietnamese civilians requiring emergency medical

treatment. U.S. Navy doctors and corpsmen began visiting nearby

villages to hold “sick call” for the local inhabitants. On an average

visit these medical teams would examine around 60 Vietnamese of all

ages. They would then dispense soap, vitamins, and aspirin--commodities

which some rural Vietnamese had never seen. Gradually, the medical

teams expanded their operations until by mid-June they were being flown

by helicopter as far away as Ca Mau.

HMM-362’s departure from Vietnam coincided roughly with the departure

of most of the Marine task unit’s senior officers--the men who had

directed the efforts to win the “other war” for the allegiance of the

Vietnamese people. On 30 July, Colonel Julius W. Ireland, another

Marine aviator who had seen combat in two previous wars, relieved

Colonel Carey as the task unit commander. The new commander was one of

few Marines who had been in Vietnam previously. In April 1954 he had

landed at Da Nang (then known by its French name, Tourane) as squadron

commander of Marine Attack Squadron 324 (VMA-324) and delivered 25

F4U/FG Corsair fighter bombers to the French who were in desperate

need of attack aircraft to support Dien Bien Phu. Five days after

Ireland assumed command of Task Unit 79.3.5, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph

R. Davis replaced Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge as commanding officer of

the MABS-16 sub unit. On 13 August another change occurred when the

executive officer of the Marine task unit, Lieutenant Colonel Harry C.

Dees, was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Alton W. McCully. Except that

it left few original members of the task unit, the departure of these

Marines for new duty stations in Okinawa, Japan, and the United States

did not affect the operations at Soc Trang. Thoroughly briefed on their

responsibilities, the new officers would continue to direct Marine

support of the Vietnamese government on both the battlefield and the

psychological front.

HMM-163 participated in its first combat mission as a squadron on

1 August when it joined the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company in a

coordinated troop lift. Like their predecessors, “Rathbun’s Ridge

Runners” maintained a brisk pace of operations during the weeks

following their initial assignment. Shortly after its first troop

lift, the squadron participated in a 2,000-man South Vietnamese

spoiling operation in An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province.

Anticipating a major Viet Cong offensive in the four southern

provinces, III Corps authorities moved their headquarters to Soc Trang

and established a forward command post at Ca Mau. The Vietnamese Air

Force then positioned a composite detachment of four AD-6 Skyraiders

(single-engine, propeller-driven attack bombers built by Douglas), two

T-28s, and a number of H-34 helicopters (the U.S. Army, Air Force, and

VNAF version of the HUS) at Soc Trang to support the operation. Joined

by the VNAF H-34s, the Marine squadron conducted numerous troop lifts

during the week-long operation. At the end of the action the ARVN

reported 84 Viet Cong killed, another 30 captured, and the confiscation

of nearly 15,000 pounds of arms, ammunition, and explosives. The first

Marine helicopter loss in Vietnam occurred during the operation when

a VNAF fighter careened off the runway and damaged a parked HUS to

the extent that it could not be repaired. Marine mechanics stripped

undamaged parts from the helicopter for use as replacements.[5-F]

[5-F] Marine helicopters lost in Vietnam during the 1962–1964

period were replaced by new ones airlifted from Okinawa

by U.S. Air Force C-124 Globemaster transports. By

replacing aircraft losses on a one-to-one basis the task

unit was able to maintain a level of 24 helicopters

except for brief periods.

HMM-163 suffered its first aircraft damage as a result of combat a few

day’s later on 18 August during a mission led by Lieutenant Colonel

Rathbun. Fourteen HUSs arrived at a prearranged pickup point to

rendezvous with an ARVN infantry force but the Marine pilots discovered

that the unit had not appeared. One crewman then reported having seen

some ARVN troops about a half mile away from the landing zone. At this

juncture, a white smoke signal appeared at approximately the same

location that the Marine had observed the South Vietnamese troops.

Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun and his wingmate, assuming that the smoke

marked the actual pickup point, took off to investigate the area. While

making a low pass over the smoke signal, the squadron commander’s

helicopter was hit several times by small arms fire which severed the

rudder control cable and punctured the main rotor transmission. The

loss of oil required Rathbun to make a forced landing on a nearby road.

After mechanics had been flown in and repairs had been accomplished,

the helicopter was flown to a secure area.

[Illustration: _Marine officers visit Father Phuoc’s village. Left

to right: Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp; Colonel John F. Carey;

Father Phuoc; Colonel Julius W. Ireland; Colonel Gordon Gale; Major

General Richard G. Weede; French Interpreter Gilles H. Rocheleau; and

three unidentified Marine officers. (USMC Photo A420824)._]

An investigation of the incident later revealed that the confusion had

begun when the ARVN unit scheduled to be helilifted became involved in

a skirmish with guerrillas less than a mile from the pick up point. A

VNAF Forward Air Controller (FAC) in an observation aircraft had then

marked the Viet Cong position for an air strike with a white smoke

grenade rather than red smoke, as was normally used. This was the smoke

which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun had attempted to identify when his

aircraft was hit.

From this incident the pilots of HMM-163 learned several valuable

lessons about helicopter support in conjunction with ARVN ground

operations. First, helilifts of government forces from the field at

prearranged times required thorough last minute coordination. Secondly,

helicopters could not be used safely on low-level reconnaissance or

identification passes. Finally, prearranged colored smoke signals were

easily confused and when used routinely were subject to enemy attempts

at deception. Such signalling methods were most effective when used in

conjunction with radio communications between air and ground units.

A somewhat humorous sequel to this incident took place later in the

day when Rathbun learned that he had been selected for promotion to

colonel. The timing of the notification prompted one squadron wit to

quip: “Lost a bird, gained a bird.”[5-21]

“Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” continued intensive support operations in

III Corps Tactical Zone throughout the month of August. Their daily

missions normally included both scheduled troop lifts and unscheduled

medical evacuations. During the week of 19–25 August HMM-163

helicopters logged slightly over 800 combat flying hours. A squadron

record for a single day was established on 24 August when 197.6

helicopter hours were flown. Flight time for the helicopters during

the entire month totalled 2,543 hours--a new Marine Corps record for

an HUS squadron. The OE-1 aircraft added 63 missions and 212 hours to

this total. Another statistic revealed that 21 of the squadron’s pilots

logged over 100 hours of combat flying time during August.[5-22] This

record was even more impressive considering that flight operations were

hampered by the monsoon season which reached its peak during August in

the Mekong Delta.

In August Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s men made a significant

modification to their helicopters when they began mounting M-60

machine guns inside the cargo hatch. So as not to obstruct the hatch

during loading and unloading phases, the squadron’s metalsmiths

designed a flexible mount which allowed the crew chiefs to swing the

belt-fed, 7.62mm automatic weapon back into the cabin when necessary.

The addition of the machine gun enabled the crew chief to protect

the otherwise defenseless helicopter during critical landing and

take off phases. Still, the Marine gunners were restricted in their

action by MACV’s “rules of engagement” which at this time stipulated

that American servicemen could fire only after being fired upon and

then only at clearly identified enemy. Intended to prevent offensive

combat action by U.S. military personnel operating in Vietnam, these

regulations prevented Americans from returning fire except when

the enemy was clearly identified.[5-G] Primarily because of these

restrictions the Marines seldom employed their M-60s in the heavily

populated Mekong Delta.

[5-G] The rules of engagement applied to U.S. advisors as

well as aviation crews. Although they underwent several

modifications during the course of the war, the above

definition was virtually unaltered during the period

between 1962 and 1964.

_Preparations and Redeployment_

In early September General Harkins directed that Colonel Ireland begin

planning for the redeployment of his helicopter task unit northward

to Da Nang. The shift to I Corps, which had been the subject of

much debate prior to SHUFLY’s assignment at Soc Trang, came as no

surprise. Shortly after the task unit’s arrival in the Mekong Delta,

Colonel Carey accompanied General Condon on a visit to the Army’s 93d

Helicopter Company at Da Nang. There they discussed details of the

relocation with Army officers. In early July General Harkins set 1

August as the date on which the Marine task unit and the 93d Helicopter

Company would switch locations. But personal appeals by General Nghiem,

the III Corps commander and his senior U.S. advisor, Colonel Porter,

that the Marine helicopters be retained at Soc Trang caused Harkins to

postpone the date for the exchange until 15 September.

In that the airlift was executed in phases, the Marines’ movement to

Da Nang was accomplished in much the same manner as had been the task

unit’s initial move into Soc Trang. On 4 September Colonel Ireland

dispatched the task unit’s assistant communications officer and an

advance party to Da Nang to assess the communications requirements

there and to prepare for the arrival of the remainder of the Marines

and their equipment. Four days later Marine wiremen, message center

personnel, and radio operators began preparing a communications center

at their new home. The next day the advance party established radio

contact with SHUFLY headquarters in order to help coordinate the move.

By 9 September MABS-16 technicians had assembled a TAFDS at the Da Nang

airfield. This facility would enable the GV-1 transports participating

in the airlift to refuel for the 460-mile return flight to Soc Trang

after unloading their cargoes at Da Nang.

While the advance party readied the facilities at Da Nang for its

unit’s arrival, combat support operations and preparations for the move

northward continued simultaneously at Soc Trang. During an operation on

5 September, three of HMM-163’s helicopters were hit by several rounds

of enemy small arms fire. Although all three aircraft returned safely

to base, the Marines suffered their first casualty to Viet Cong fire

when Corporal Billy S. Watson, a crew chief, was slightly wounded.

Troop lifts from Soc Trang continued until 1740 on 13 September when

helicopter support operations were ended and the final preparations for

the move to Da Nang began.

On the evening of 14 September, the first of the Marine GV-1s slated

to transport the task unit arrived at Soc Trang from Okinawa. At dawn

the next morning, the refueler-transports began shuttling Marines and

their equipment to Da Nang and the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company to Soc

Trang. By the end of the day much of the airlift had been completed.

The crews and helicopters of Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s squadron,

however, did not begin displacing northward until the 16th when 12 HUSs

made the seven-hour flight to Da Nang with three en route refueling

stops. The 12 remaining helicopters arrived at SHUFLY’s new base of

operations the next day. The move was completed on 20 September when

the last cargo carrying GV-1 landed at Da Nang.

_Accomplishments_

As SHUFLY’s Marines began preparing for their impending operations

in the northern provinces they could look with pride on their

accomplishments at Soc Trang. Since their arrival in the Mekong Delta

in April the Leathernecks had clearly demonstrated their ability to

conduct sustained and effective helicopter operations in support of

non-English-speaking ground forces. While it could not be said that

their presence had completely transformed the complexion of the GVN’s

struggle to control the critical Mekong Delta region, the Marine

helicopters had provided the ARVN units operating there with a degree

of mobility they had not previously possessed. This new-found mobility

in turn had helped generate a new offensive spirit within government

units assigned to southern III Corps. In his letter to ComUSMACV

requesting the retention of the task unit at Soc Trang, Colonel Porter,

the Senior U.S. Advisor to the corps tactical zone, reported: “Now

they [ARVN forces] have a taste of victory and for the first time are

beginning to believe there is a possibility of defeating the Viet

Cong.”[5-23]

During the course of their operations throughout South Vietnam’s

southern provinces, the SHUFLY Marines displayed an instinct for

recognizing and coping with the challenges of unconventional warfare.

Confronted by a war without front lines in which an elusive, highly

mobile enemy blended readily with the local populace, the task unit’s

leaders devised new and successful helicopter tactics. Likewise,

SHUFLY’s Marine and Navy personnel moved to prevent a possible

conflict of cultures and to discredit Communist propaganda through the

initiation of the People-to-People Program. Although only an informal

beginning, this program would serve as a foundation upon which the U.S.

Marine Corps would later build a doctrine defining the relationship

between Marines on duty in Vietnam and the Vietnamese people.

Beyond the innovative thinking of its leaders, much of SHUFLY’s success

in III Corps was produced by hard work on a sustained basis. For this

the individual Marines, particularly the maintenance crews which

often worked around the clock in primitive surroundings to keep the

helicopters airworthy, deserved heavy credit. Although unglamorous,

their daily contributions underwrote the success of the combat support

operations. So, functioning as a team, the task unit’s members blended

innovation, hard work, and technical expertise with perseverance and

courage to carve out a reputation for themselves in the faraway rice

lands of the Mekong Delta.

CHAPTER 6

SHUFLY Moves North

_Arrival at Da Nang--I Corps Tactical Zone--Military Situation,

September 1962--Initial Helicopter Operations--Marine People-to-People

Program--SHUFLY Operations in I Corps_

_Arrival at Da Nang_

Da Nang retained many characteristics of an old French colonial port

city when the Marines arrived there in mid-September 1962. With its

thriving market place, its throngs of bicycles, and a noticeable dearth

of automobile traffic, the city was certainly more Asian than European

in appearance. Still, the former French presence was evident in the

architecture of public buildings, electric and telephone lines, paved

streets, built-up waterfront, and an airfield. Although the French

influence seemed not to have disturbed the traditional Vietnamese

culture, it had imparted a picturesque charm to South Vietnam’s second

largest city.

Virtually surrounded by the city itself, Da Nang’s airfield was to

serve as SHUFLY’s new base of operations. Having been rebuilt as

a military base by the French following World War II, the Da Nang

facility was relatively modern. Understandably, it differed in many

ways from the crude little airfield the Marines had left behind in the

steamy Mekong Delta. The runway, for example, was considerably longer,

having 8,000 feet of paved surface. The Da Nang base was also busier,

having already been occupied by Vietnamese and U.S. Air Force units.

Furthermore, it served the city as a commercial airport.

Scattered around the long north-south runway were numerous clusters of

French-built masonry structures. A group of 50 of these yellow-walled

buildings, located about one half mile west of the runway, had been

designated as living quarters for the newly arrived Marines. Although

the actual living spaces were somewhat crowded and in need of much

repair, the indoor toilets, showers, ceiling fans, and fluorescent

lights (none of which functioned properly) were welcomed by the men

who had experienced the discomforts of life in Soc Trang’s “tent

city.” Once the Marines had moved in, their compound would include a

chapel, medical and dental facilities, service clubs, a movie, a barber

shop, a laundry, and a mess hall.

While many of the problems encountered initially by the Marines at

Da Nang were similar to those that had greeted their predecessors at

Soc Trang, there were also some new ones to be resolved. The two most

imposing of these stemmed from the distance between the living compound

and working areas. Located along the southeast side of the airstrip,

the flight line and hangar were nearly three miles from the Marine

quarters by road. Located still farther away, about a quarter mile

south of the hangar, were the motor pool and communications facility.

In addition to creating a new requirement for transportation, the

distances between the various areas necessitated adjustments in the

security arrangements which had been used at Soc Trang.

Fortunately SHUFLY’s first commander, Colonel Carey, had foreseen

the requirement for transportation between the living area and the

flight line during his visit to the Da Nang installation in April. The

problem was solved by the purchase of three used American school buses

which were already on hand when the Marines arrived from Soc Trang.

The security situation proved somewhat more perplexing. Initially

Colonel Ireland handled the problem in much the same manner as it had

been at Soc Trang. A permanent sergeant-of-the-guard was detailed to

supervise a security force composed of men from the MABS-16 sub unit

and HMM-163. Guard posts were established around the helicopter flight

line, the hangar, the TAFDS, the motor pool-communications area, and

the billeting compound. But this arrangement, while serving the

intended purpose, was not ideal. Frequently the Marines who served

on security watch at night were called upon to perform long hours

of work the following day. This prompted Colonel Ireland to request

that a permanent security force be assigned to his command in order

that the overworked mechanics, cooks, carpenters, electricians, and

communicators could concentrate on their particular jobs. The request

was placed under consideration by ComUSMACV and FMFPac authorities but

was not approved immediately.[6-A]

[6-A] General Weede explained that, because such increases

could not be made without the approval of the Department

of Defense, such requests were forwarded first to MACV

Headquarters for approval. (_Weede Interview._)

[Illustration: _A portion of the Marine Compound at Da Nang. (Official

USMC Photo)._]

At Da Nang Colonel Ireland’s task unit was not responsible for every

facet of airfield operations as had been the case previously at Soc

Trang. The U.S. Air Force provided radar, ground control approach,

tactical air navigation, and meteorological services at the new

installation while the Vietnamese operated the control tower. These

conveniences allowed Ireland to make a small reduction in the overall

size of the Marine task unit. Those MABS-16 specialists who had

operated these systems at Soc Trang were returned to their parent

organizations on Okinawa.

_I Corps Tactical Zone_

At the time the Marine task unit arrived in Da Nang, I Corps Tactical

Zone encompassed South Vietnam’s five northern provinces. Quang Tri

Province, located immediately south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ)

topped this tier of political subdivisions. Below Quang Tri Province

lay Thua Thien, followed by Quang Nam, Quang Tin (recently created),

and Quang Ngai Provinces. All are coastal provinces and, with the

exception of Quang Ngai, extend inland from the seacoast to the Laotian

border, a distance which varies between 30 and 70 miles. Together, they

occupy the central portion of the region formerly known as Annam and

extend 225 miles to the south of the DMZ.

[Illustration:

I CORPS 1962

]

The climatic pattern in the northern provinces is the exact reverse

of that which affects the southern portion of the nation. In I Corps

the dry season occurs in the summer months while the monsoons, which

blow from the northeast, dominate the winter. Heavy monsoon rains

accompanied by wind and fog normally begin in October. After reaching

their peak usually in November, the monsoon rains tend to diminish

gradually until their disappearance around mid-March.

The differences between the physical structure of the northern

provinces and the Mekong Delta is even more striking than their

reversed climatic patterns. White beaches stretch almost unbroken along

the entire length of I Corps. Just inland and roughly parallel to the

coast south of Da Nang lies a lightly populated strip of sand dunes and

generally unproductive soil. This strip varies in width from one half

to two miles. In the west it dissolves into the flat, densely populated

coastal plain. Any similarity between the Mekong Delta and the northern

provinces is found in this expanse of fertile rice-producing land where

tiny rural hamlets and slightly larger villages, each enclosed by thick

hedgerows and treelines, abound. North of Da Nang the semi-barren

coastal sands tend to extend farther inland, and thereby reduce the

productive portion of the coastal plains.

The most distinct geographic feature of I Corps, and one easily visible

to the Marines at Da Nang, is the chain of towering mountains which

protrude from the flat coastal plain several miles west of the city.

There is a conspicuous absence of foothills leading to the mountains

which seem to surround Da Nang on the north and west. North of the Hai

Van Peninsula, a rugged promonotory which juts into the South China

Sea about 10 miles north of the Marines’ new home, a zone of foothills

eases the transition from the wide coastal plain to the rugged

jungle-covered mountains.

The coastal plains of the five northern provinces are broken by several

significant streams along which most of the region’s principal

population centers are located. Roughly 10 miles south of the 1954

partition line the Cua Viet empties into the southern portion of the

Tonkin Gulf. Both Quang Tri City, the capital of Quang Tri Province,

and Dong Ha, South Vietnam’s northernmost population center of any

significance, are situated on the Cua Viet and its major tributary, the

Song Cam Lo. The Song Huong (often referred to as the Perfume River),

which flows past the old imperial capital of Hue, enters the sea at a

point approximately half way between Da Nang and the nation’s northern

boundary.[6-B] At Da Nang the Song Han (also called the Da Nang River)

flows into Da Nang Harbor after its main tributary, the Song Cau Do,

curves through the coastal plains immediately south and west of the

city. Eighteen miles south of the Marines’ new base of operations,

the Song Cau Dai empties into the South China Sea near Hoi An, the

capital of Quang Nam Province. The Song Cau Dai originates about 18

miles inland at the confluence of the Song Thu Bon and the Song Vu Gia

which twist seaward from the south and west respectively. Together

these three estuaries constitute the most important geographic feature

of the sprawling coastal plain south of Da Nang. Another major stream,

the Song Tra Bong, flows on an eastward course about 32 miles south of

the Song Cau Dai. Still further south is the Song Tra Khuc, a river

which dominates the wide coastal plain of Quang Ngai Province in much

the same fashion as does the Song Cau Dai and its tributaries in the

area south of Da Nang. The provincial capital, Quang Ngai, once a major

railroad center for South Vietnam, is situated several miles inland on

the south bank of the Song Tra Khuc. The southernmost stream of any

significance in I Corps is the Song Ve, which angles northeastward

through central Quang Ngai Province. While none of these waterways is

navigable far beyond its mouth by ocean-going vessels, each serves the

local population as convenient local routes of communication as well as

vital sources of irrigation water during the long dry seasons.

[6-B] In the Vietnamese language the word “song” means stream

and normally precedes the name of rivers.

The two and a half million people who inhabited I Corps in 1962 had

developed along social and economic lines dictated largely by the

geography and climate of their region. Rice growing, centered on

the coastal plains, dominated the economic activities of the area.

Combined, the provinces of I Corps produced nearly half a million

tons of rice annually. Fishing, concentrated along the coast and the

major rivers, ranked as the second most important economic pursuit.

Unlike most of South Vietnam, I Corps did possess some potential for

industrial development. A small but productive surface coal mine was

located about 25 miles southwest of Da Nang at Nong Son along the

western bank of the Song Thu Bon. Although the mine was operating in

1962, it had made little discernable impact on the overall economic

picture of the region.

[Illustration: _Aerial view of Marine helicopter flight line at Da

Nang shortly after SHUFLY’s relocation to I Corps in September 1962.

(Official USMC Photo)._]

_Military Situation, September 1962_

From its new base at Da Nang, Colonel Ireland’s task unit was

responsible for directly supporting the forces under Major General

Tran Van Don’s I Corps headquarters. The 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions,

headquartered respectively at Hue and Da Nang, were the major tactical

units at General Don’s disposal. Occasionally elements of the 25th ARVN

Division, headquartered at Kontum in northwestern II Corps, joined I

Corps forces for offensive operations along the southern fringe of

Quang Ngai Province. Several ARVN Ranger battalions served as mobile

reaction forces for the corps tactical zone.[6-C] Also scattered over

the northern corps tactical zone were numerous paramilitary units of

assorted sizes. These, too, were garrisoned primarily along the heavily

populated coastal plain.

[6-C] The ranger battalions had been organized in late 1960

from existing ARVN forces. They were conceived as highly

mobile infantry units and were under the direct control

of the CTZ commander.

Opposing these government forces in the early fall of 1962 were Viet

Cong forces of formidable strength. Four interprovincial battalions

(main force), four interprovincial companies, five provincial

companies, 18 district companies, and three district platoons were

known to be operating within the boundaries of I Corps. Together, these

units totalled an estimated 4,750 men.[6-1] Added to the presence

of these known Viet Cong units was the threat posed to I Corps by

its proximity to North Vietnam and to the so-called “Ho Chi Minh

Trails” located across the Laotian border. The relative position of

the northern provinces naturally invited Communist infiltration. In

June, for example, the _4th Viet Cong Battalion_, a main force unit,

was infiltrated into Quang Nam Province from sanctuaries in Laos. By

September MACV intelligence estimates reported one North Vietnamese

(PAVN) infantry division, two independent PAVN infantry regiments, and

an artillery regiment poised in areas of Laos adjacent to the I Corps

border. “These units,” the U.S. report warned, “... could be committed

anywhere in I Corps or [the] northern part of II Corps 20 days after

starting movement.”[6-2]

While the government’s nationwide strategy focused on clearing and

holding the populated areas, the physiographic configuration of I

Corps (as well as II Corps to the south) demanded that offensive

operations be conducted in the mountains adjacent to the coastal plains

against Viet Cong base areas. Since the arrival of the U.S. Army

helicopter company at Da Nang early in the year, General Don had shown

an increasing tendency to mount battalion and regimental heliborne

assaults deep into the western mountains. Capitalizing on the mobility

which the American helicopters afforded, the ARVN command had hoped to

disrupt remote Communist base areas inside the international border.

Still, heliborne offensives into western I Corps were often hampered by

bad weather, particularly during the monsoon season.

Another facet of the government effort to deny the enemy unrestricted

access to the mountains was a system characterized by a network of

small, relatively isolated outposts. In late 1961, at the urging

of U.S. officials in Saigon, the Diem government had launched a

program whose ultimate objective was similar to that of the Strategic

Hamlet Program. First, U.S. Army Special Forces teams entered

remote Montagnard villages located in the Annamite Chain and built

small fortified camps. This accomplished, the Americans initiated

pacification activities with the hope of securing the allegiance of the

traditionally independent Montagnard tribesmen.

By mid-1962 the Special Forces effort appeared on its way to success.

Already Montagnard tribesmen had been organized into a number of

Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs) throughout the mountains of

I and II Corps. Advised by Special Forces teams, the CIDG units were

monitoring infiltration routes and harassing the Communists as they

attempted to move through the mountains. By the summer of 1962 the

distinctive little barbed wire enclosed camps were scattered over the

length of western I Corps.

Although it played an important role in the government’s strategy for

controlling the insurgency in the northern provinces, the outpost

system had obvious shortcomings. Roads between the distant camps and

the towns along the coastal plain were almost nonexistent. Those that

did exist, such as Route 9, the road which extended from Route 1

westward across Quang Tri Province and into Laos, were vulnerable to

ambush or interdiction by guerrilla forces. Truck convoys, furthermore,

consumed time and required protection by security forces. As a result

of their relative isolation, the CIDG camps had come to depend heavily

on aircraft as a means of resupply. While crude runways had been

constructed at many of the outposts, they were often better suited for

helicopter operations than for fixed-wing transport landings. The newly

arrived Marine commanders anticipated that their squadron, like the

Army helicopter company it had replaced, would be required to devote a

sizable percentage of sorties to resupplying the far-flung outposts.

_Initial Helicopter Operations_

The system of helicopter coordination in I Corps promised to be

somewhat different from that which had governed Marine operations in

the Mekong Delta. At Da Nang, an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)

was organized within the corps headquarters to process all requests

for aviation support. Manned by ARVN, VNAF, U.S. Air Force, and U.S.

Marine officers, the ASOC processed mission requests from the various

field commands, passing them on to the Joint Operations Center at JGS

headquarters for final approval. Once approved, the ASOC assigned

specific missions to the American and Vietnamese units which supported

I CTZ. This arrangement enabled the corps headquarters to plan and

coordinate all combat support missions flown within the five northern

provinces.

[Illustration:

MAJOR OUTPOSTS I CORPS 1962

]

The Vietnamese commanders in I Corps, who had learned to value

helicopter support as a result of the Army aviation company’s

eight-month presence at Da Nang, lost no time in employing the newly

arrived Marine squadron. HMM-163 flew its first combat operation from

Da Nang on 18 September, the day after the last flight of helicopters

arrived from Soc Trang. Fourteen HUSs lifted troops of the 2d ARVN

Division into two landing zones in the rugged hills about 35 miles

south of Da Nang and 25 miles inland from the coast. The scarcity of

suitable landing zones in the steep hill country and the fact that

the enemy could deliver fire on those that did exist from nearby

high ground and the surrounding jungle prompted the Marine pilots

to adjust their tactics in preparation for this mission. After VNAF

fighters bombed and strafed the objective area, the helicopters made an

unopposed landing.

The tactic of preparing helicopter landing zones with air strikes

was continued and refined in the ensuing weeks. The Marines began

using artillery fire in conjunction with air strikes to neutralize

enemy troops in the vicinity of the objective. The OE-1 was well

suited for assisting in the employment of the artillery fire support.

Having familiarized themselves with the landing site during a prior

reconnaissance mission, the pilot and observer of the OE-1 would arrive

over the designated area prior to the operation and adjust artillery

fire until the helicopters appeared. During the landing the crew of the

observation aircraft often coordinated between the helicopters and the

escorting aircraft and were available to assist the ground units with

artillery fire missions.

The task unit’s staff borrowed another idea from their experience

in the Mekong Delta which allowed HMM-163 to provide more efficient

helicopter support in the northern provinces. In this case the concept

of temporarily positioning the TAFDS to support specific operations

was refined somewhat by placing the portable refueling bladders at

secure, permanent locations throughout I Corps. Several days after

arriving in I Corps, the Marines emplaced a 10,000-gallon section of

the TAFDS at Quang Ngai, about 65 miles south of Da Nang, to serve as a

permanent refueling point for aircraft operating in southern I Corps.

Within the month, another fuel bladder was positioned at Hue and a

third was emplaced at Tam Ky, the capital of Quang Tin Province, which

was situated on Route 1 about half way between Da Nang and Quang Ngai.

These well-chosen refueling points greatly enhanced the squadron’s

operational potential. Used to support daily operations, they enabled

the helicopters to operate deep into the adjacent mountain areas on

resupply and medical evacuation missions.

On 19 September, the day after their initial combat support assignment

in I Corps, the Marine helicopter crews were called upon to conduct an

operation which they would repeat often in the coming months. They were

ordered to evacuate a threatened government outpost from the mountains

18 miles west of Da Nang. That day the HMM-163 pilots lifted an odd

cargo of troops, dependents, personal belongings and an assortment of

pigs, cows, chickens, and ducks to a secure area on the coastal plain.

Unfortunately, helicopter evacuations of encircled or endangered South

Vietnamese outposts would become almost routine for Marine helicopter

squadrons assigned to Vietnam during the period between 1962 and 1965.

As the North Vietnamese stepped up their support for the Viet Cong,

the isolated government outposts along the infiltration routes became

particularly vulnerable. The increased number of helicopter evacuation

missions during the next three years would be grim testimony of the

trend of warfare which was unfolding in the South. Reinforced with more

and more North Vietnamese and growing amounts of Communist bloc and

captured U.S. equipment, the Viet Cong would press the initiative even

in South Vietnam’s most isolated areas.

The Communists operating in I Corps lost little time in challenging the

newly arrived Marine unit. HMM-163 suffered its first battle damage

while lifting elements of the 2d ARVN Division into a landing zone

southwest of Tam Ky on 26 September. One of 22 helicopters involved

in the mission was struck in the fuselage by small arms fire despite

the use of preparatory air and artillery strikes on the landing zone.

The day after this incident another of the squadron’s helicopters was

hit by enemy fire while attempting to evacuate wounded ARVN soldiers

from the battlefield. On the 29th two more aircraft were damaged by

ground fire while participating in another troop lift. One round passed

through the windshield and exited at the rear of the cockpit, missing

the copilot’s head by inches. During the first week of October another

HUS was struck while landing at Tien Phuoc, a government outpost about

15 miles southwest of Tam Ky. In this incident two ARVN troops were

killed and the Marine crew chief, Lance Corporal James I. Mansfield,

was wounded before the pilot could fly the aircraft out of the danger

area. In each of the instances the helicopters were able to return to

Da Nang where necessary repairs were made.

The most serious incident recorded during the early operations in I

Corps ironically resulted from mechanical failure rather than Viet Cong

fire. It occurred on 6 October when a search and rescue helicopter

crashed and burned on a hillside 15 miles southeast of Tam Ky while

covering a 20-plane helilift of 2d ARVN Division elements.[6-D] Unable

to land near the downed aircraft because of the thick jungle, other

helicopters landed troops at the base of the hill with instructions to

proceed to the crash site on foot. When the Vietnamese soldiers reached

the downed aircraft after cutting their way through dense vegetation,

they found the copilot, crew chief, and five other members of the task

unit dead. The pilot, First Lieutenant William T. Sinnott, who was

injured seriously, was hoisted through the trees and evacuated by an

HUS which came to the rescue. The five Marines killed in the crash

were First Lieutenant Michael J. Tunney, Sergeant Richard E. Hamilton,

Sergeant Jerald W. Pendell, Corporal Thomas E. Anderson, and Lance

Corporal Miguel A. Valentin. Two Navy personnel, Lieutenant Gerald

Griffin, a doctor, and Hospitalman G. O. Norton were also dead. These

were the first deaths suffered by Marine Task Unit 79.5 since deploying

to Vietnam.[6-3]

[6-D] For larger operations the task unit commander usually

designated one HUS as a search and rescue aircraft. This

helicopter normally carried several mechanics and Navy

medical personnel and was equipped with a hoist.

An administrative measure which eventually resulted in the extension of

the length of tours for the Marine helicopter squadron as well as all

other personnel assigned to SHUFLY was initiated in the first week of

October. Colonel Ireland dispatched a recommendation to the Commanding

General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing proposing that the tours for both

the squadron and the individual Marines serving with the sub unit and

the task unit headquarters be set at six months. Pointing out that the

U.S. Army helicopter company which had occupied Da Nang previously had

operated from January to September without rotating personnel, the task

unit commander outlined the positive features of such an adjustment.

It would, he contended, provide more continuity for administration

and operations, thereby resulting in a more effective utilization of

manpower. To underscore his argument, Ireland emphasized the number of

man hours involved in the rotation of a helicopter squadron. Adding his

opinion that the two-month extension of all tours would not measurably

affect the morale of the Marines at Da Nang, he recommended that the

next rotation of helicopter squadrons be postponed until January.

After being forwarded to FMFPac for consideration, Colonel Ireland’s

proposals were approved later in the fall and instructions were passed

to all involved commands to implement the new policy.[6-4]

Another adjustment--this one in the area of tactics--had been made

during the task unit’s first two months at Da Nang. By November

the Eagle Flight concept had been tailored to complement reaction

force plans which already existed in I Corps at the time of SHUFLY’s

relocation. ARVN authorities in the northern corps tactical zone had

developed a system whereby their various infantry units were placed on

alert for use as heliborne reaction forces. Designated the Tiger Force,

the alert unit was staged at its base, ready to react to any tactical

emergency.

HMM-163 Marines executed one of their earliest Tiger Flights on 7

November in response to a train ambush sprung by the Viet Cong several

miles northwest of the Hai Van Peninsula. Four Marine helicopters

launched from Da Nang, made an airborne rendezvous with two other

HUSs, and proceeded to Hoa My, four miles away, to pick up a 52-man

ARVN Tiger Force. The Marines then helilifted the South Vietnamese

into a suitable landing zone near the ambush site. The relatively

short amount of time consumed in the reaction did not prevent the

Communist attackers from vanishing into the surrounding jungle.

Generally, however, the tactic was more successful, particularly when

the reaction force was used to reinforce a threatened static position

or to establish hasty blocking positions in support of ground offensive

operations that were already underway.

While the task unit encountered few major problems during the early

operations from Da Nang, minor difficulties were commonplace. Most

often these developed during the execution phase of combat support

missions. One that particularly concerned the Marine commanders was

the tendency of South Vietnamese units not to prepare properly for

scheduled helilifts. To the dismay of the Leatherneck helicopter crews,

ARVN activities at the pickup points were usually characterized by

confusion. More often than not the Vietnamese unit scheduled to be

helilifted had not been organized into heliteams prior to the arrival

of the transport aircraft. Given the fact that heliborne operations

were still somewhat of a novelty to most ARVN small unit leaders (and

to many U.S. advisors) at this stage of the war, these circumstances

were perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, lack of prior preparation

at pickup points on the part of the ground units often threatened to

disrupt the timing of preplanned operations.

To help remedy this situation and to insure that their helicopters

were not overloaded, the U.S. Marines began designating one of the

squadron’s noncommissioned officers as “loadmaster.” Equipped with

a radio, the loadmaster would arrive at the assembly area on board

the first helicopter, whereupon he would disembark and supervise the

entire loading process. This technique was particularly valuable during

operations in which ARVN units were being helilifted from the field.

In such cases the loadmaster performed the same function as did those

who supervised the loading process at secure assembly areas. This, of

course, required that the Leatherneck remain in the landing zone until

the last Vietnamese troops had boarded the final helicopter. Although

dangerous, this technique enabled the Marines to eliminate many

problems which might otherwise have occurred.

By early November the monsoon season had begun to settle over the

northern portions of South Vietnam. Unlike the summer rains in the

Mekong Delta in which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s crews had managed to

set new helicopter flight records, the winter monsoons that struck the

northern provinces seriously restricted flight operations. Heavy fog

and low clouds frequently made it impossible to conduct air operations

in the mountainous areas; therefore, the squadron was forced to

concentrate most of its operations in the coastal plains. In an effort

to maintain his support at a maximum level, Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun

began dispatching an OE-1 to the objective area prior to scheduled

missions in order to obtain a current report on the local weather

conditions. Despite these efforts, the monsoon rains, which often moved

in quickly from the South China Sea, still disrupted flight operations.

A typical weather-related incident occurred on 13 November when a

scheduled troop lift was cancelled because of heavy fog after 200

Vietnamese Special Forces troops had loaded onto 20 Marine helicopters

for an early morning operation.

Several unrelated changes in official designations occurred at

approximately the same time that the monsoons began affecting

operations in the northern provinces. In November all Marine aircraft

were redesignated in accordance with a Department of Defense order

which standardized aircraft designations throughout the U.S. armed

services. Thereafter, SHUFLY’s HUS helicopters would be known as

UH-34Ds, its OE-1s as O-1Bs, and its R4D as a C-117. In another

adjustment, the Joint General Staff in Saigon ordered the realignment

of South Vietnam’s tactical zones. A fourth corps tactical zone (IV

CTZ), which encompassed the entire Mekong Delta, and a Capital Military

District, which included Saigon and its environs, were created. The

composition of I Corps was affected by the adjustments as the new

alignment shifted Quang Ngai Province into II Corps. The Marines,

however, continued to provide helicopter support to the province, which

was relatively isolated from the remainder of II Corps.

More important than either the new aircraft designations or the

realignment of the tactical zones were several internal changes within

the Marine task unit. On 6 November the task unit was redesignated

Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. That same day Lieutenant Colonel Alton

W. McCully, who had been functioning as Colonel Ireland’s executive

officer, assumed command of the task element. Ireland returned to

Okinawa where he took command of Marine Aircraft Group 16, which, under

the new arrangement, became responsible for both the administrative and

logistical support of SHUFLY.

_Marine People-to-People Program_

The concept of the People-to-People Program, which had been initiated

with a degree of success in the Mekong Delta, was brought to Da Nang

by Colonel Ireland and his Marines. During the fall and early winter

of 1962, as weather caused flight operations to subside, the Marines

were able to increase the tempo of the program. SHUFLY’s men actively

supported an orphanage in Da Nang which was maintained by an American

missionary family. On Christmas day the Marines participated in a

“Father-For-A-Day” program which had been arranged by the task element

chaplain, Lieutenant Richard P. Vinson, U.S. Navy. Each orphan spent

the day with a Marine who had volunteered to serve as his “father.”

The Vietnamese children were treated to dinner in the mess hall,

presented with Christmas gifts, and then joined in singing carols with

the Marines. At the conclusion of the festivities, Chaplain Vinson

presented the director of the orphanage with a gift in Vietnamese

currency equivalent to over 800 dollars--money which the men of the

task element had donated.

In addition to their activities associated with the orphanage, the

Marine officers taught English to a number of Vietnamese civilians.

Held three nights weekly, the classes were received enthusiastically.

Beyond the foundations of good will which it helped shape, the

People-to-People Program enabled the Marines to acquire a better

understanding of the Vietnamese people, their culture, and their

problems.

_SHUFLY Operations in I Corps_

SHUFLY’s initial helicopter support operations in I Corps represented

the beginnings of what would become a long association of U.S. Marines

with South Vietnam’s rugged northern provinces. Essentially these early

operations were characterized by continuity and adjustment. Since their

arrival at Da Nang in September the Marines had extended the standard

of consistent and effective combat support operations set earlier in

the flat Mekong Delta. Necessarily, SHUFLY’s commanders had modified

the previously developed tactics and techniques to fit the mountainous

terrain and the nature of warfare being waged in I Corps. For the most

part these adjustments had proven successful by allowing the Marines to

continue the pace of helicopter support with a reduction of the risks

involved. That SHUFLY had suffered its first fatalities during these

initial months in I Corps dampened but did not detract from its overall

achievements. As 1962 closed, the Marines had begun establishing a

reputation in the northern provinces as courageous, professional

fighting men and generous allies. It was this reputation upon which a

generation of Marines would build in the ensuing decade.

CHAPTER 7

The Laotian Crisis, 1962

_Genesis of the Problem--The American Response--The Marine Corps

Role--Marine Participation: A Summary_

_Genesis of the Problem_

Almost simultaneous with SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang in April

1962, U.S. Marine combat forces were ordered to Thailand in response

to the growing crisis in Laos. Inhabited for the most part by peaceful

hill tribes, the small, landlocked Kingdom of Laos seemed an unlikely

setting for any significant military confrontation. Even more

improbable was the possibility that a serious international crisis

could stem from what had begun as a political rivalry among relatively

obscure princes.

To be certain, the context of what should have been a rather

meaningless political feud had been altered substantively by North

Vietnam’s drive to extend its control over the Republic of Vietnam.

Recognizing Laos as a strategic stepping stone for their southward

thrust, the North Vietnamese, joined by the Soviet Union, had

begun providing military aid to the Pathet Lao army of the leftist

prince, Souphanauvong, in the late 1950s. To counter these Communist

activities, the United States had extended military assistance to

the anti-Communist government of Prince Boun Oum. In the resultant

struggle, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who previously had proclaimed

neutrality, sided with the Pathet Lao. With the lines drawn and the

contenders now reinforced by powerful allies, the conflict naturally

escalated. Laos, like South Vietnam, had become a pawn in the Cold War.

Administered through a small USMAAG, the American military assistance

to Boun Oum, however, did little to slow the advances of the Pathet

Lao. Early in 1960, they had joined forces with North Vietnamese

units to seize control of the eastern portion of the country’s long,

southward extending panhandle. In early 1961, again backed by North

Vietnamese forces, the Pathet Lao had opened an offensive on the Plain

of Jars in central Laos. Boun Oum’s units, commanded by General Phoumi

Nosavan, proved unable to contain this push into central Laos.

By March 1961 the situation had become critical enough for President

Kennedy to direct that CinCPac alert U.S. military units for possible

deployment. In response, Admiral Felt activated a task force

headquarters and assigned Major General Donald M. Weller, who was then

serving as Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, as its commander.

Designated Joint Task Force 116 in accordance with existing CinCPac

contingency plans, Weller’s command was to consist predominantly of

Marine air and ground forces with Army and Air Force units making up

the balance. Simultaneous with the activation of Weller’s headquarters

on Okinawa, CinCPac alerted the scattered forces earmarked for

assignment to the joint task force.

Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration managed to defuse the situation

somewhat by securing Soviet assistance in arranging a cease-fire in

Laos. The crisis cooled further when 14 governments, including the

Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Vietnam, agreed to reconvene

the Geneva Conference to consider neutralization of the Kingdom of

Laos. This conference convened on 16 May 1961, and together with

the shaky cease-fire, brought a modicum of stability to Laos. With

international tensions eased, the alert of U.S. forces in the Pacific

ended. Subsequently, General Weller’s JTF 116 headquarters was

deactivated.

[Illustration:

MAINLAND

SOUTHEAST ASIA

]

The negotiations in Geneva proved to be long and tedious. In Laos,

frequent fighting, usually of a localized nature, punctuated the

cease-fire almost from the day it was effected. Finally, in the first

weeks of 1962 heavy fighting broke out anew, this time on a general

scale, and precipitated a new and more intense crisis. For U.S.

observers the situation seemed to reach its critical point in early May

when Pathet Lao forces, backed by North Vietnamese formations, routed

a major element of Phouma’s army from Nam Tha, a town located east of

the Mekong River in extreme northwestern Laos. Following this action,

Phoumi’s forces retreated southwestward across the Mekong into northern

Thailand. Now in full control of the east bank of the Mekong, the

Communists appeared poised for a drive into Thailand, a full-fledged

member of SEATO. The collapse of Phoumi’s military forces, moreover,

seriously threatened the U.S. bargaining position at the ongoing Geneva

talks.

_The American Response_

In the face of the situation along the Laotian-Thai border, the U.S.

Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed CinCPac to upgrade the readiness

of Joint Task Force 116 for possible deployment. Accordingly, on 10

May Admiral Felt directed Major General John Condon, the Commanding

General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, to activate the joint task force

headquarters, assemble its staff, and refine its deployment plans.

The Amphibious Ready Group of the Seventh Fleet, carrying the Special

Landing Force, promptly sailed into the Gulf of Siam.

Both to reassure Thailand of the U.S. commitment to its defense and

to discourage further Communist advances on the Southeast Asian

Peninsula, President Kennedy ordered U.S. forces deployed to Thailand

on 15 May. Admiral Felt moved immediately to execute this decision.

In simultaneous actions CinCPac designated Army Lieutenant General

John L. Richardson, then serving as Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S.

Army, Pacific, to replace Major General Condon as Commander, JTF 116

and instructed Richardson to execute CinCPac Operations Plan 32-59,

Phase II (Laos). Felt’s instructions to the new Commander, JTF 116 were

explicit. General Richardson’s command was to act in such a way that

would leave no doubt as to American intentions to defend Thailand.

Through these same actions JTF 116 was to exert a “precautionary

impact” on the situation in Laos. Furthermore, the Commander, JTF 116

was directed to position his forces in a manner so that they could

respond to any armed Communist threat to Thailand.[7-1]

Concurrently with the order to deploy JTF 116, CinCPac instructed the

Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Harkins,

to establish and assume command of a U.S. Military Assistance Command,

Thailand (USMACThai). Thus Harkins, in a dual role as ComUSMACV and

ComUSMACThai, was to be responsible to CinCPac for all U.S. military

activities and operations in both Thailand and South Vietnam. Once it

became operational in Thailand, JTF 116 plus the already existing Joint

U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAAG), were to

come under Harkins’ purview. Until USMACThai and the JTF staffs could

become operational, however, the various task force components were to

report to the Chief JUSMAAG, Thailand, Major General J. F. Conway, U.S.

Army.

One element of the joint task force was already in Thailand when

President Kennedy issued the order to commit U.S. forces--the Army’s

1st Brigade, 27th Infantry. At the time this infantry brigade was

participating in a SEATO exercise near Korat, a town located about 130

miles northeast of Bangkok in the central portion of the country. In

response to CinCPac orders it promptly moved into bivouac at a position

40 miles west of Korat.

_The Marine Corps Role_

Operations Plan 32-59, Phase II (Laos), called for a U.S. Marine

expeditionary brigade composed of a regimental landing team (three

reinforced infantry battalions), a jet attack squadron, a helicopter

transport squadron, and supporting units, to operate from Udorn, a

provincial capital located nearly 350 miles northeast of Bangkok.

Strategically situated only 35 miles south of Vientiane, the political

capital of Laos, Udorn was the site of a 7,000-foot concrete runway. A

300-man Marine aviation support unit, Marine Air Base Squadron 16, had

actually been positioned at this airstrip for over six months during

1961. While at Udorn the MABS-16 Marines had provided maintenance

support for helicopters which were assisting General Phoumi’s forces in

Laos. A Royal Thai regiment had provided security for the base during

this unit’s deployment and was still in the area in 1962 when the

decision was made to commit JTF 116 to Thailand.

[Illustration: _Aerial view of Udorn airstrip. (USMC Photo A182977)._]

Lieutenant Colonel Harvey M. Patton’s VMA-332, an A-4C (Skyhawk) jet

attack squadron, claimed the distinction of being the first Marine

unit to arrive in Thailand in response to the 1962 Laotian crisis. The

20 single-placed Skyhawks departed the Cubi Point Naval Air Station

in the Philippines on the morning of 18 May, were refueled in flight

by aircraft from VMA-211, another Marine A-4 squadron, and landed at

Udorn around noon. The bulk of the Marine units began arriving in

Thailand the following day. At Bangkok the Special Landing Force,

composed of Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Adams’ 1,500-man Battalion

Landing Team 3/9 and Lieutenant Colonel Fred A. Steele’s HMM-261, an

HUS-1 helicopter squadron, disembarked from the ships of the Amphibious

Ready Group.[7-A] That same day Marine GV-1 refueler-transports began

airlifting additional aviation support detachments from Okinawa to

Udorn. These included detachments of Marine Air Control Squadrons 2

and 4 (MACS-2 and -4), Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12), and a

Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (ProvMAG) headquarters. Upon landing

Colonel Ross S. Mickey, the commander of the ProvMAG, established his

headquarters at the airfield and assumed operational control of all

USMC aviation elements at Udorn. On the 18th, HMM-261’s helicopters

began arriving at the now busy airfield, having flown from the

Amphibious Ready Group with a refueling stop at Korat. Lieutenant

Colonel Steele reported to the newly activated ProvMAG.

[7-A] A Marine battalion landing team derives its designation

from the infantry battalion around which it is built,

in this case the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. In 1962,

the BLT included a howitzer battery, a tank platoon, an

amphibious tractor platoon, a pioneer platoon, a motor

transport platoon, an anti-tank platoon, and air and

naval gunfire liaison teams.

Following the commitment of the SLF on 19 May, another BLT

and helicopter squadron from Okinawa reconstituted the

Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force.

On 19 May Brigadier General Ormand B. Simpson arrived at Udorn with

the staff and communications personnel of the 3d Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (3d MEB) headquarters. Simpson, a Texan who had been serving

as Assistant Division Commander, 3d Marine Division, had assembled

and activated this headquarters on Okinawa shortly after CinCPac’s

activation of JTF 116. As Commanding General, 3d MEB, Simpson was to

assume command of all Marine elements, air and ground, deployed to

Udorn. In addition to being the CG 3d MEB, General Simpson carried

the designation, Naval Component Commander, a title which gave him

responsibility for all Navy as well as Marine forces operating at Udorn

under JTF 116.

Concurrent with General Simpson’s arrival, U.S. Air Force C-130 and

C-123 transports were ferrying Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ Battalion

Landing Team from Bangkok to Udorn. The BLT had placed its supplies

and trucks, along with HMM-261’s heavier equipment, on rail cars

for transport to Udorn. Because the Thai flat cars were too small

to accommodate such massive vehicles, Adams ordered his tank and

amphibious tractor platoons to re-embark on board the USS _Point

Defiance_ (LSD-31). Once on the ground at Udorn the battalion and its

remaining reinforcements assembled alongside the airstrip. From there

the Leathernecks were transported by Thai Army trucks some eight miles

south to Nong Ta Kai, a small town situated astride the main service

road. Adams’ battalion established a temporary camp on some high ground

just beyond the town. With the BLT’s arrival, the initial Marine combat

forces assigned to JTF 116 were in position. The next day, 20 May,

General Simpson assumed command of all U.S. Marine and Navy units at

Udorn and the 3d MEB, a complete air-ground team, was in being.

Elsewhere in Thailand the U.S. military build-up was continuing apace.

A squadron of 20 U.S. Air Force F-100 Super Sabre tactical fighter

bombers and a detachment of three refueler aircraft had deployed to

Takhli airfield from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Two USAF

transport squadrons had also begun operations from this base. At

Korat, the 1st Brigade, 27th Infantry was being reinforced with Army

units from Hawaii. Another Army unit, a logistics support command, was

being activated near Bangkok.

To command this growing assortment of military units, General

Richardson established the JTF 116 headquarters at Korat. Major

General Donald M. Weller, who had been serving as Deputy Commanding

General, FMFPac, since leaving the 3d Marine Division in 1961, joined

Richardson’s headquarters as chief of staff. General Weller’s offices

were located at Korat initially. Later he relocated at Bangkok where he

headed a rear echelon responsible for coordination with the JUSMAAG,

ComUSMACThai, and the American representatives to SEATO. While in the

capital Weller was also responsible for implementing a logistic plan,

the objective of which was to upgrade lines of communication being used

by JTF-116 elements.

It is of interest to note that Colonel Croizat, who had been the first

U.S. Marine advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, was serving at

this time as the senior U.S. military representative on the SEATO

planning staff in Bangkok. Both Weller, who had commanded JTF 116 for

a period during early 1961, and Croizat who had served as its chief

of staff during that interval, were intimately familiar with the

JTF’s structure, capabilities, and functions. In fact, the operations

plan being executed had been developed in large part under their

guidance.[7-2]

[Illustration: _Marines disembark from attack transports at Bangkok,

Thailand. (USMC Photo A182785)._]

Another facet of this particular situation was that portions of

Operations Plan 32-59 Phase II, (Laos) were to exert a profound

influence on later U.S. Marine operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

A key provision of this particular document outlined the command

relationships which would govern Marine and Air Force tactical air

support in the event JTF 116 actually became involved in combat.

This provision designated the Commander JTF 116 as the “coordinating

authority” responsible for synchronizing all JTF tactical air support.

But at the same time it assigned the CG, 3d MEB, operational control

of all Marine tactical aircraft, thereby insuring that the Marine

air-ground team would not be fractured. Later, in the mid-1960s when

American tactical jet squadrons would be called upon to support U.S.

and RVNAF ground forces in South Vietnam, the CinCPac staff would

borrow heavily from this arrangement to define the relationships of

Marine and Air Force tactical aviation assets.

[Illustration: _Major General Donald M. Weller, Chief of Staff, Joint

Task Force-116. (USMC Photo A407463)._]

Training began almost immediately after the Marine units were in

position at Udorn and Nong Ta Kai. Generally the MEB adhered to a

training program designed to help fulfill three requirements: to

make its presence known and thereby enhance its credibility as a

“show of force”; to acclimatize the individual Marines to the hot,

humid, tropical climate; and finally, to familiarize the operational

elements and their commanders with the surrounding terrain. The primary

objective of this program, of course, was to prepare the brigade for

combat should that contingency arise out of the troubled situation

in Laos. Coordinated air-ground exercises conducted around Udorn

enabled General Simpson’s command to publicize its presence in the

area while concurrently refining its heliborne and close air support

capabilities.[7-B] In addition to air-ground exercises, Lieutenant

Colonel Adams’ infantry companies sharpened their skills in patrolling

of all types and made frequent use of nearby Thai Army firing ranges to

maintain their weapons proficiency. All field training was conducted in

an unpopulated area defined by the Thai government and every precaution

was taken so as not to disturb the local population. The Marine units

utilized blank ammunition exclusively in training except for the

closely supervised live fire exercises.

[7-B] The MEB’s after action report pointed out one flaw in

the composition of the Provisional MAG. There had been

no provision made to include light observation aircraft

in its organization. As a result, aerial reconnaissance

had to be accomplished from either A-4Cs or HUS-1s,

neither of which was configured for such a mission. The

A-4C, which could carry only the pilot, and the HUS-1

proved equally unsuited for reconnaissance missions.

The 3d MEB report specifically recommended that future

composite aviation packages of this nature should include

a detachment of OEs with pilots and trained aerial

observers.

[Illustration: _Brigadier General Ormond R. Simpson and Brigadier

General John F. Dobbin confer at Udorn, Thailand. (USMC Photo

A182779)._]

Realizing that the ultimate success or failure of the American

commitment in Thailand might hinge on the relationships U.S. military

men established with the Thai populace, General Simpson ordered his

command to initiate a civic action program. The day after his arrival

at Udorn, Simpson met with local civilian officials and established the

basis for a people-to-people program similar to the one instituted by

SHUFLY Marines at Soc Trang. Thereafter, the MEB’s goal in this area

was to foster among the Thai a favorable impression of the individual

Marine, his commanders, and his unit. The people-to-people program

which followed was, in all respects, a concerted and integrated

effort. Officers taught conversational English classes to interested

civilians both at Udorn and at Nong Ta Kai, while Leatherneck

engineers and Navy Seabees (who arrived near the end of May) helped

repair public buildings. Navy medical and dental personnel attached

to Colonel Mickey’s ProvMAG and Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT joined

the effort by administering almost daily to the physical ailments of

the local populace and occasionally visiting the more remote villages

by helicopter. In an action intended to help prevent friction between

Marines and Thai townspeople, General Simpson directed that MEB units

disembark from trucks as they approached towns, march through the

population centers at sling arms, and re-embark aboard their trucks at

the opposite end of the town. Relying on this broad array of simple but

effective programs, the 3d MEB was able to impress upon the civilian

population that its mission was one of assistance and good will rather

than occupation.

This crisis in Laos eased somewhat after the U.S. joint task force

established its presence in northeastern Thailand, and Communist

forces halted their advance short of the international border. With

these two developments there was no requirement for additional Marine

infantry battalions. Accordingly, General Simpson redesignated his

force the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU), even though other

reinforcements continued to arrive at Udorn throughout May and most

of June. Near the end of May, a 70-man Seabee detachment from Navy

Mobile Construction Battalion 10 was airlifted to the position. This

detachment, the initial increment of a larger Logistics Support Group

(LSG), moved to Nong Ta Kai where it helped the BLT’s pioneer platoon

complete a more permanent camp designed to withstand the approaching

monsoon season. In mid-June, with no end to the MEU’s assignment in

sight, the remainder of the 500-man LSG deployed from Okinawa to Udorn.

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Hudson, this group included a

motor transport detachment, a medical detachment, a supply unit, and an

engineer detachment.[7-C] These reinforcements brought the number of

Marines, Seabees, and Navy medical and dental personnel under General

Simpson’s command to its highest level--3,426 officers and men. A final

change in the composition of the 3d MEU occurred in the final week of

June when HMM-162, an HUS-1 squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Reinhardt Leu, replaced HMM-261 as the helicopter element.

[7-C] Lieutenant Colonel Hudson was relieved by Lieutenant

Colonel Angus J. Cronin on 22 July.

While General Simpson’s MEU was strengthening its posture in

northeastern Thailand, U.S. officials were reporting definite progress

in the negotiations being held in Geneva and Vientiane. Encouraged by

these signs and hoping to influence the Geneva talks even further,

President Kennedy ordered major elements of the U.S. combat forces

withdrawn from Thailand on 29 June, just four days after HMM-162’s

arrival at Udorn. In response General Richardson directed General

Simpson to prepare for the immediate withdrawal of the ProvMAG and one

infantry company. Two days later, on the morning of 1 July, VMA-332’s

Skyhawks launched for Cubi Point in the Philippines. Subsequently,

HMM-162’s helicopters departed for Bangkok where they re-embarked on

board the USS _Valley Forge_. Okinawa-based GV-1s airlifted one of BLT

3/9’s companies to the Philippines while elements of the Marine air

control squadrons traveled by rail to Bangkok for embarkation on board

ships of the Seventh Fleet. By 6 July General Simpson’s 3d MEU had been

reduced by just over 1,000 men.

At Geneva, the first weeks of July were marked by steady progress

toward a diplomatic solution to the long-standing Laotian problem.

By the 20th it was evident that a formal agreement would soon be

forthcoming. With these encouraging developments, General Richardson

was directed to prepare for the withdrawal of the remainder of his

forces from Thailand. In Laos, the quarreling political factions had

already agreed to participate in a coalition government headed by

Prince Souvanna Phouma which would serve as the basis for a neutral

state. At Geneva on the 23d, the United States, the Soviet Union,

North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Burma, Great Britain, France, Canada,

India, Communist China, Thailand, Poland, the Kingdom of Laos, and

Cambodia finally signed the Declaration of Neutrality of Laos and an

attached protocol. In so doing the 14 signatories agreed to recognize

and respect the sovereignty, independence, and neutrality of the

Kingdom of Laos. Under the terms of this agreement, foreign troops were

prohibited from entering or operating within the borders of Laos. Had

it been adhered to, this provision would have denied North Vietnam the

use of the corridor down the length of eastern Laos, altering the scope

and nature of the conflict in the Republic of Vietnam.

[Illustration: _Marines of BLT 3/9 assemble before being airlifted to

the Philippines. (USMC Photo A182883)._]

Following the signing of this declaration in Geneva, CinCPac directed

General Richardson to effect the withdrawal of the remainder of his

joint task force. General Simpson’s 3d MEU began executing these

instructions on the 28th when Marine GV-1s and Air Force C-130s began

airlifting Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT 3/9 to Okinawa. By the 31st no

Marine combat units were left at Udorn. General Simpson and his staff

departed the airfield a few days later, and shortly thereafter the 3d

Marine Expeditionary Unit was deactivated.

_Marine Participation: A Summary_

The deactivation of the 3d MEU marked the end of the first deployment

of a Marine air-ground combat team to mainland Southeast Asia. Since

the decision to commit American forces to Thailand in mid-May, the

Marine units assigned to General Simpson had demonstrated anew the

value of their service as a force capable of supporting U.S. foreign

policy on short notice. Within the period of a few days, the various

FMFPac commands had assembled a complete air-ground-support team, and,

assisted by the Seventh Fleet, had deployed the affected units to a

position over 1,800 miles from the nearest major Marine base. Located

far inland from the seacoast, a Marine unit’s normal habitat, the 3d

MEU had been sustained solely by air while maintaining its combat

readiness in a difficult tropical environment.

In so doing the Marines had shown that a substantial American combat

force could be brought to bear quickly in the remote areas chosen

by the Communists as targets for their so-called “wars of national

liberation.” Furthermore, the MEU by relying on a vigorous civic action

program, had established that a sizable Marine command could maintain

its combat readiness almost indefinitely without eroding the respect of

the indigenous population. Thus, General Simpson’s Marines had created

a solid foundation of mutual respect and confidence with the Thai

people. This accomplishment alone would prove valuable when American

military forces would be required to return to northern Thailand later

in the decade. Against the backdrop of these accomplishments, the 3d

Marine Expeditionary Unit’s operations in Thailand could be assessed as

having extended the tradition of the U.S. Marine Corps as an effective

instrument of American diplomacy.

PART III

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES,

1963

CHAPTER 8

The Marine Advisory Effort

_The Political Climate--The Advisory Division and VNMC

Operations--Accomplishments_

_The Political Climate_

A sudden rupture occurred in South Vietnam’s internal political

situation during 1963 which largely determined the course of the

war as well as the nation’s future. Following the sect uprising of

1955–1956, the Diem government had experienced a three-year period of

relative political tranquility. Beginning in 1959, however, political

dissent had begun to re-emerge from several influential segments of

South Vietnamese society. The results of the August 1959 national

elections, in which pro-Diem candidates captured every seat in the

National Assembly, served to stimulate political opposition which

had lain dormant for nearly four years. Opposition to the government

mounted steadily in the months following the elections within military

as well as political circles as some South Vietnamese officers began

privately expressing disenchantment with Diem’s management of the war.

Then came the abortive coup in November 1960. The regime’s popularity

diminished in the wake of this crisis as Diem tightened his control on

the war-torn nation.

Another problem--religious unrest--which was to play a key role in

determining South Vietnam’s political direction as the decade unfolded,

also emerged during this period. Buddhist leaders throughout South

Vietnam began protesting against various policies enacted by the

Catholic-controlled government. The tensions gradually mounted, and

by early 1963 the protests were highlighted by spectacular and highly

publicized self-immolations by Buddhist monks. Finally, in May, the

religious problem erupted into violence when the Vietnamese police and

military forces killed 12 Buddhist demonstrators while suppressing a

religious demonstration at Hue. This action triggered a protracted

crisis of public confidence in the Diem government which deepened as

the summer wore on. Then, on 21 August, Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s

closest political advisor, ordered the national police to raid key

Buddhist pagodas throughout the nation. Following the raids, which

uncovered some weapons, Nhu attempted to blame the attacks on several

key South Vietnamese generals. His effort to shift the responsibility

for the police raids served only to alienate some of the nation’s most

powerful military leaders.

On 1 November, a junta of South Vietnamese generals led by Major

General Duong Van Minh reacted to the deepening political crisis by

deposing President Diem and seizing control of the Government of

Vietnam. Both the president and his brother were murdered by an ARVN

officer the following day. The U.S. government, which had advance

knowledge of the coup and was in contact with the plotting generals,

publically declared its intention to remain neutral. General Harkins

ordered USMACV to cease all activities and to withdraw its advisors

from South Vietnamese units pending the outcome of the power struggle.

The overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem stirred fresh hope among many Americans

and South Vietnamese that the new government could attract the solid

public support of the Vietnamese people, and thereby wage a more

effective war against the Communists. South Vietnam’s new leaders

immediately focused their attention upon healing the nation’s deep

political divisions and securing continued U.S. assistance for the

war effort. They pledged to respect religious freedom, to return the

government to civilian control, and to continue the struggle against

the Viet Cong. Appreciating the interrelationship of these assurances,

the United States officially recognized the new government on 7

November, whereupon ComUSMACV lifted the temporary ban on military

assistance.

The American hopes that the new political climate in the Republic of

Vietnam would stimulate a more effective military effort, however,

proved to be shortlived. Confusion reminiscent of the sect uprising

in 1955 spread throughout the government following Diem’s death.

The dismissal of more than 30 high-ranking military officers for

actively supporting the former president during the coup typified the

new regime’s campaign to realign top personnel in all governmental

agencies. Far from enhancing the efficiency of the Vietnamese military,

the power struggle and the chaos which prevailed in its wake dragged

the war effort to its most ineffective level since before the U.S.

stepped-up its military assistance program in early 1962. It was on

this unfortunate note that the year 1963 ended.

_The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations_

At the beginning of 1963, the Marine Advisory Division, still headed

by Lieutenant Colonel Moody, consisted of eight Marine officers and 10

noncommissioned officers. In April, however, the table of organization

was adjusted slightly when the first sergeant and four assistant

infantry advisor (noncommissioned officers) billets were eliminated.

Another small unit training advisor was added to the organization,

changing the strength of Lieutenant Colonel Moody’s command to eight

officers and six noncommissioned officers. Men from the 3d Marine

Division continued to augment the advisory effort and gain combat

experience while serving in Vietnam on temporary assignments.

Like the U.S. organization which advised and assisted it, the

Vietnamese Marine Corps began the new year at the same strength that it

had achieved when it had been expanded to brigade size in early 1962.

Still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, the Vietnamese

Marine Brigade continued to operate as part of the nation’s general

reserve under the direct control of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff.

As the year opened three of the four VNMC infantry battalions were

garrisoned separately in small, crude, self-sustaining camps around Thu

Duc on the northern outskirts of Saigon. The 4th Battalion maintained

its camp at Vung Tau on the coast. The newly formed artillery

battalion, which became fully operational in mid-January when B and C

Batteries passed their final gunnery examinations, was garrisoned near

Thu Duc. While the Marine units spent little time in their base camps,

being deployed almost continuously in combat, the Joint General Staff

normally kept one battalion at Thu Duc to enable it to respond to any

emergency which might develop.

For the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1963 was to be highlighted by

innovations in the important areas of training and operations. Prior

to Lieutenant Colonel Moody’s arrival in Vietnam, all Vietnamese

Marine recruits had received basic training at ARVN installations,

an arrangement tolerated but never appreciated by the U.S. Marine

advisors. Before his departure in the fall of 1963, Moody was able to

convince Khang that he should push for the authority to establish a

separate Marine training center. In late 1963 the JGS approved this

proposal, whereupon the Vietnamese Marine engineers, advised by Captain

Robert C. Jones, began building a small training facility at Thu Duc.

In a related action Moody set in motion plans to have a small number

of specially selected Vietnamese Marine noncommissioned officers

sent to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diego for training as

drill instructors. Although these plans would not come to fruition

during Moody’s assignment, the concept of a separate recruit training

center promised to permit the Vietnamese Marine Corps to establish and

maintain its own standards for basic training.

Another change to occur in 1963, this one in the area of tactical

operations, was the reinstitution of multi-battalion combat operations

under the control of provisional Marine Brigade headquarters.[8-A]

Although the VNMC had performed such operations in 1960, they had been

abandoned in the ensuing years in favor of battalion-sized deployments

to the various provinces and corps tactical zones. Moody, however,

prevailed upon Khang to alter this pattern by seeking assignments that

would enable the brigade headquarters to exercise tactical control of

its battalions.

[8-A] Such task-organized Marine forces were usually called

either provisional brigades or provisional regiments but

on at least one occasion the organization was designated

a Marine Task Force. In each case the composition was

similar--two or three infantry battalions, an artillery

unit, an engineer or reconnaissance company, and a

command element.

[Illustration: _Lieutenant General Carson A. Roberts, Commanding

General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (right center), inspects an

honor guard of Vietnamese Marines in Saigon. With him, from left,

are Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant of the Vietnamese

Marine Corps; Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam; and Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody,

Jr., Senior USMC Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (Official USA

Photo)._]

The first such operation was launched in the first week of the new

year. On 1 January a provisional brigade headquarters, commanded by

Khang and advised by Moody, embarked on board a Vietnamese Navy LST

(landing ship, tank) at Saigon along with the 2d VNMC battalion. The

4th VNMC Battalion, advised by Captain Don R. Christensen, embarked on

board two Vietnamese LSMs (landing ship, medium) at the same time. The

mission of the provisional brigade was to conduct an amphibious landing

near the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula and clear Viet Cong units from a

series of villages in conjunction with the Strategic Hamlet Program.

Subsequent to the clearing operations, VNMC engineers were to construct

a fortified hamlet. The entire operation was to extend until mid-April.

Elaborate precautions were taken not to disclose the location of the

objective area. The small flotilla sailed beyond sight of land and

remained afloat for two days before moving into position off Ca Mau. On

3 January the two LSMs proceeded to the coast, moved up a river lined

with thick mangrove vegetation, and landed the 4th Battalion. The 2d

Battalion, accompanied by Captain Richard B. Taylor, came ashore from

the LST in Dong Nai boats, small styrofoam craft specifically designed

for use in swampy terrain. The provisional brigade headquarters

remained on board the LST as the designated operations area did not

extend far inland.

[Illustration: _U.S. Marine-trained drill instructor with Vietnamese

recruits. (USMC Photo A183561)._]

To their surprise the VNMC assault elements found the first objective,

a large village, completely deserted. As Lieutenant Colonel Moody later

recalled, “They had removed everything, even the cattle and other

livestock.”[8-1] At the second objective, a nearby village, the Marines

found definite evidence of recent Viet Cong activity but no enemy

troops. There they captured a handful of rifles, carbines, and light

mortars along with a printed document that contained detailed excerpts

of the Marine operations plan. Quite obviously the operation had been

compromised in Saigon during the planning stages. In any case, this

discovery explained the evacuation of the initial objective as well as

the relative dearth of action during the remainder of the operation.

The provisional headquarters and the 4th Battalion returned to

Saigon after the initial phases of the operation had been executed,

leaving the 2d Battalion and an engineer platoon to continue security

operations in the area and build the strategic hamlet.[8-B] When the

operation finally ended on 11 April, the Vietnamese Marines had lost a

total of five men killed and 14 wounded. Mines and snipers had produced

most of these casualties. The Marines accounted for 11 Viet Cong killed

and 14 wounded.

[8-B] Lieutenant Colonel Moody noted that the Vietnamese

Marines seldom were involved in the actual construction

of strategic hamlets. This task was normally left to

the civil authorities in the area who more often than

not used the local population as a labor force. (_Moody

Comments._)

In the closing days of April, the JGS ordered Lieutenant Colonel

Khang to form two infantry battalions and an artillery element into a

provisional brigade for immediate assignment to II Corps. There the

Vietnamese Marines were to join elements of the 2d and 25th ARVN

Divisions for a multi-regiment thrust into the rugged mountains just

south of the I Corps-II Corps border. Code named BACH PHOUNG XI, this

offensive was to penetrate the Do Xa, a Viet Cong base area never

before entered by government forces. Centered in that portion of the

Annamite Mountains where the borders of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and

Kontum Provinces converged, the Do Xa had been under Communist control

since the early stages of the French-Indochina War. In this remote,

inaccessible mountainous zone the Viet Cong reportedly had built-up

extensive staging areas and training camps. Prisoner interrogations

obtained throughout the early 1960s revealed that many North Vietnamese

soldiers entering the South’s northern provinces had infiltrated the

Do Xa before moving into the densely populated coastal lowlands of

Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Additionally, the area was thought

to contain the Communist military headquarters for Military Region 5

(MR-5).

After alerting his 2d and 4th Battalions, a pack howitzer battery, a

reconnaissance platoon, and a headquarters element, Khang flew with

Lieutenant Colonel Moody to Pleiku for planning conferences with Major

General Nguyen Khanh and his II Corps staff. The concept of BACH

PHOUNG XI, Khang and Moody learned, called for U.S. Marine and Army

helicopters to lift ARVN infantry and artillery elements into positions

which would form a loose ring around the suspected center of the Do Xa

base area. The ARVN units would then begin contracting this ring in

stages, whereupon the provisional Marine brigade would be helilifted

into its center, the heart of the Do Xa, to search for Communist camps.

To control the entire operation General Khanh would establish a corps

headquarters forward at Plateau Gi, a Montagnard village located on

the southern edge of the operations area, about 25 miles northeast of

Kontum.

On 1 May, U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted Khang and the

2,000-man provisional Marine brigade from the capital to Quang Ngai.

Both Lieutenant Colonel Moody and Major Croft, the Assistant Senior

Marine Advisor and artillery advisor, accompanied the Marine force. The

next day an ARVN truck convoy transported the Marines from Quang Ngai

some 40 miles north to Tam Ky, the roadside town which served as the

capital of Quang Tin Province. The 2d Battalion, advised by Captain

Taylor, dismounted from the trucks and assembled at Tam Ky air strip

while the remainder of the convoy turned west onto a narrow dirt road

which curved through the foothills and deep into the jungle-covered

Annamite Chain. Meanwhile, Army H-21s from Pleiku landed at Tam Ky,

loaded assault elements of the 2d Battalion, and began helilifting

them into a stream-side landing zone some 30 miles southwest of the

provincial capital. The convoy carrying the balance of the Marine

force continued its southwest motor march until it reached the small

ARVN-held town of Tra My. There, some 24 miles southwest of Tam Ky,

Khang established his command post in a school house adjacent to a

crude little dirt airstrip. The 75mm pack howitzer battery, advised by

Major Croft, set up its weapons nearby while the reconnaissance platoon

and elements of the 4th Battalion, advised by Captain Christensen,

established security. When these units were in place U.S. Marine

UH-34Ds from Da Nang lifted a TAFDS fuel bladder and pump to the

airfield. Once the helilift of the 2d Battalion was completed, the

Army H-21s, refueling from the TAFDS bladder, began lifting the 4th

Battalion into the 2d Battalion’s landing zone, which was located

several miles south of Tra My.

With the initial movement into the operations area accomplished and the

brigade command post functioning, the two infantry battalions began

combing a deep valley and the adjacent mountains for Communist base

camps. After several days Khang’s Marines located one rather complete

camp but encountered no resistance upon entering the position. Once

again the occupants, probably forewarned by the initial movement of the

ARVN units into the area, had withdrawn ahead of the Marines. The only

people found in the camp were a North Vietnamese doctor and nurse. A

subsequent search of the bamboo huts and the underlying tunnel complex

did produce a supply cache. The Vietnamese Marines discovered several

rifles, six typewriters, three sewing machines, a radio, 44 maps, a

French artillery computing board, and scores of flashlight batteries.

[Illustration:

LOCATION OF DO XA

BASE AREA

]

ARVN and Marine operations in the area during the next two weeks

failed to locate any large Viet Cong elements. For the most part the

Marines busied themselves by destroying a few abandoned camps and

some cultivated crops. ARVN units operating around the Marines reported

scattered action as they engaged small groups of Viet Cong attempting

to escape from the center of the Do Xa. BACH PHOUNG XI concluded in

mid-May when U.S. Marine UH-34Ds lifted the VNMC battalions back to Tra

My. From there the Marines returned by convoy to Quang Ngai where they

staged for the airlift back to Saigon. The statistics for the Marine

portion of the operation revealed that only two Viet Cong soldiers had

been killed. Khang’s force suffered 36 wounded, most as a result of

encounters with booby traps constructed from sharpened bamboo spikes.

ARVN forces fared only slightly better, having killed barely a score

of Communists. Except for the fact that they had demonstrated their

ability to penetrate the most difficult Viet Cong sanctuary, the two

week offensive into the Do Xa base area had little impact on the war

effort. From the standpoint of training and experience, however, the

operation was beneficial. The Vietnamese Marines and their advisors

learned a great deal about construction of landing zones and about

directing helicopters, fields in which they had received little

previous training.[8-C]

[8-C] An interesting sidelight to this operation was that it

stimulated somewhat of a fad in the offices at MACV and

the JGS. Military officials from Saigon who visited the

brigade command post, including General Weede, took back

large water-smoothed rocks as souvenirs of their trip to

the infamous Viet Cong stronghold. Printed on the side

of these ornate stones were the words “Do Xa, May 1963.”

(_Moody Comments._)

In early September Lieutenant Colonel Wesley C. Noren, recently

transferred from the 2d Marine Division where he had served as

Assistant G-3, arrived in Saigon to replace Lieutenant Colonel Moody

as the Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Already

selected for promotion to colonel, Noren would become the seventh

Senior Marine Advisor when Moody left Vietnam in October.

In mid-October the Vietnamese Marine commanders formed a provisional

regiment for Operation PHI-HOA 5, which was to be conducted in III

Corps Tactical Zone.[8-D] The 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions, supported by

a composite artillery battery and the reconnaissance company, joined

ARVN, VNAF, and Vietnamese Navy units in a major search and clear

campaign in the northwest corner of Gia Dinh Province, only about 20

miles southeast of Saigon. Like many other large government military

operations undertaken in 1963, this one failed to uncover any major

enemy forces. The Communist soldiers again managed to elude government

forces. An extensive tunnel and cave network, which the Marines

systematically destroyed with demolitions, was discovered under the

entire area. Still, the Marines managed to kill only six Viet Cong and

capture 10. Two Vietnamese Marines were killed and 36 others wounded

before the operation terminated on 1 November.

[8-D] After the realignment of the CTZs the previous December,

III Corps included a 200-mile-long section of Vietnam

which encompassed the southern one third of the Central

Highlands and the area south to the boundary of the

Capital Military District near Saigon.

[Illustration: _General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the

Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley G. Noren, Senior Marine

Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, confer with Lieutenant Colonel

Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (USMC Photo

A420917)._]

The coup d’etat which toppled President Diem from power began the same

day that Operation PHI-HOA 5 concluded. Instead of returning to their

base camps, the 1st and 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalions, accompanied

by the composite battery, moved into the capital to participate in the

power struggle. These units actually launched the coup by seizing key

installations in the heart of the city while the 2d VNMC Battalion

blocked the highway to Bien Hoa, thus preventing loyalist intervention.

Sporadic fighting against troops loyal to Diem continued until the

early morning of 2 November when the 4th Battalion finally stormed

and captured the presidental palace. Four Vietnamese Marines were

killed and 12 wounded during the battles in Saigon. No U.S. Marines

were involved in the fighting as Lieutenant Colonel Noren directed his

subordinate advisors to remain in their quarters. When the situation

stabilized, the advisors rejoined their units and resumed their normal

duties.

[Illustration:

CORPS TACTICAL ZONES

1963–1964

]

Combat operations against the Communist guerrillas resumed for the

Vietnamese Marine Brigade in the second week of November. Accompanied

by its U.S. Marine advisor, Captain James P. McWilliams, the 3d

Battalion initiated a search and clear operation in III Corps in

conjunction with the 11th ARVN Regiment on 10 November. The next day

the Vietnamese Marines clashed sharply with a substantial Viet Cong

force west of My Tho and suffered six killed and 21 wounded. Nineteen

enemy bodies were found on the battlefield along with four weapons,

several grenades, and some documents. McWilliams, respected by his

fellow advisors for his candid and forthright assessments, later

recalled that such encounters were the exception rather than the

rule. “While the Vietnamese Marines were individually good fighters

and showed tenacity in most cases against forces that would stand and

fight, this was not the nature of the conflict,” he lamented. More

often than not, McWilliams went on to explain, the highly mobile Viet

Cong could elude the larger, more cumbersome government units.[8-2]

On 14 November, the same day that the combined Marine-ARVN operation

in III Corps terminated, the Vietnamese Marine command formed a

provisional regiment to control operations DAI-PHONG 28 and 29, which

were to be conducted concurrently in the same general area. Composed of

the 1st and 3d Battalions, and a 75mm pack howitzer platoon, the Marine

force searched until 21 November for Viet Cong units thought to be in

Binh Duong Province but with discouraging results. Only one enemy was

killed, two prisoners taken, and three weapons captured at the expense

of five dead and 13 wounded Marines.

A week later the 2d Battalion, now advised by Captain Joseph N. Smith,

fought a more typical action while participating in Operation DAI-PHONG

30. The battalion commander, Captain Nguyen Thanh Yen, received orders

for the operation during the early morning hours of 25 November.

Shortly after daybreak nearly 550 Vietnamese Marines boarded trucks

at their camp near Thu Duc for the trip to Bien Hoa airfield. Upon

arrival, officers from III Corps headquarters informed Captain Yen

that his battalion was to conduct a heliborne assault against Hoi Dong

Sam, a Viet Cong-held village in western Hau Nghia Province just west

of Saigon. The purpose of the operation was to intercept a guerrilla

force which had overrun the nearby Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp the

previous day and had taken several American prisoners. The enemy unit

was believed to be using Hoi Dong Sam as a way station while attempting

to escape across the Cambodian border.[8-3]

The operation began at about 0800 when eight U.S. Army H-21 “Flying

Bananas” from the 145th Aviation Battalion helilifted Captain Smith,

a Vietnamese company commander, and his 90-man assault force from

Bien Hoa. Eight Army UH-1B gunships and a U.S. Air Force O-1B Bird

Dog observation aircraft escorted the transport helicopters on the

20-minute flight to the objective area. The gunships were put to

use almost immediately when Communist .50 caliber machine gun fire

erupted from a treeline at the eastern edge of the village. Under the

suppressive fire of the UH-1Bs, the first wave of H-21s landed the

assault force in some partially flooded rice paddies about 700 meters

east of the Viet Cong positions. The Marine assault force quickly

deployed into a treeline on the western edge of the landing zone.

From this position the company began returning fire with rifles and

.30 caliber machine guns. The Air Force forward air controller (FAC)

overhead in the O-1B and the Army gunships prevented the enemy from

withdrawing across the open rice paddies which surrounded the objective

on the north, south, and west.

The distance between the assembly area at Bien Hoa and the landing

zone combined with the scarcity of transport helicopters to slow the

progress of the helilift. The landings continued at 40-minute intervals

while the UH-1B gunships teamed with the Vietnamese Marine assault

force to suppress the enemy’s fire. The last elements of the battalion

were finally landed about two hours after the initial assault. Largely

because of the effective suppressive fires from the air and ground, no

aircraft were hit during the helilift.

[Illustration:

2d VNMC BATTALION ATTACK ON

HOI DONG SAM 25 NOV 1963

]

Once the entire battalion was on the ground, the assault company,

augmented by a pair of 60mm mortars and two 57mm recoilless rifles,

provided a base of fire to protect the movement of its sister

companies. Captain Yen maneuvered his three remaining rifle companies

and a battalion command group north to a position from which they could

launch an envelopment on the fortified village. Using a treeline which

bordered an irrigation canal as cover, the force hooked westward until

it was directly north of the Viet Cong position. Meanwhile, a FARM

GATE twin-engine B-26 relieved the UH-1B gunships on station. At this

point in the action the Air Force FAC observed a group of 30–40 enemy

attempting to flee from the northwest corner of Hoi Dong Sam. After

clearing the target with the Marine battalion, he directed the B-26 to

attack the target with its 250-pound bombs. The aircraft made several

bombing passes and dispersed the Viet Cong. When the air strike ended

the enveloping force began its assault against the northern edge of the

village with two companies abreast and one following in reserve several

hundred meters to the rear. Once the assault force was in motion the

base of fire displaced forward, firing as they moved, to a small canal

about 120 meters in front of the .50 caliber positions in the treeline.

The two assault companies, followed closely by Yen, Smith, and the

battalion command group, penetrated the northern end of the village and

swept through to its southern periphery. The commander of the company

on the east (or left) flank, deployed elements into the treeline where

the Viet Cong automatic weapons had been active. Following a sharp but

brief exchange of gunfire, the Marines cleared the position. They found

eight enemy dead and three .50 caliber machine guns.

By noon the 2d Battalion had secured the entire village. Captain Yen

ordered his assault companies to establish a perimeter defense and

the reserve company to begin a systematic search of the position. His

Marines uncovered a number of well-camouflaged bunkers and fighting

positions. In a small canal just east of the village the Marines

found the mount for another heavy caliber automatic weapon. They also

discovered eight Viet Cong suspects and detained them for questioning.

One rifle company moved to investigate the area where the B-26 had

attacked the fleeing enemy earlier in the morning but found no evidence

of additional casualties. Following the capture of Hoi Dong Sam, Yen’s

battalion conducted patrols for several days in search of the Viet

Cong force that had attacked the Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp on the

25th. The enemy force, however, eluded the Marines by gaining refuge in

Cambodia. The battalion returned to garrison at Thu Duc on 28 November.

In many ways the results of DAI-PHONG 30 pointed up the problems

which frequently frustrated GVN military forces and their American

advisors. The 2d Battalion had seized its objective and in so doing

had killed a handful of Viet Cong and detained a number of suspects.

The Marines had captured three heavy caliber automatic weapons and

an assortment of small arms--all without suffering a single casualty

of their own. Still, it was difficult to translate the action into

victory. The Marines, along with the other government forces involved

in the operation, had failed to intercept the Viet Cong raiding force

in its flight toward the international boundary. Moreover, most of

the occupants of Hoi Dong Sam had made good their escape despite the

presence of observation and attack aircraft. Like many other government

military operations undertaken during the 1961–1964 period, DAI-PHONG

30 was successful from a statistical standpoint but did little to wrest

the tactical initiative from the guerrillas.

In the first week of December, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff

ordered VNMC units to conduct an extended search in the jungles of

western Tay Ninh Province in III Corps. A special Marine Task Force

composed of the 1st and 3d Battalions was helilifted into the area

on 3 December to begin Operation DAI-PHONG 31. This operation was

punctuated by two major engagements and frequent enemy harassment. In

one particularly vicious clash, the Vietnamese Marines incurred heavy

casualties while attempting to fight out of a skillfully executed Viet

Cong ambush. When the operation concluded on 9 December, the Vietnamese

Marines had suffered 11 men killed, 58 wounded, and 1 captured. Nine

Viet Cong bodies were found and another Communist soldier was captured.

The enemy left four individual weapons on the battlefield.

In mid-December, South Vietnam’s new leaders removed Lieutenant Colonel

Khang from his position as Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

Although he had not participated in the November coup, Khang had been

a political appointee of President Diem and as such was viewed as a

potential threat to the new regime. After being promoted to colonel,

he was assigned to the Philippines as the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed

Forces Attache. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, who had been serving

as Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff of the VNMC, was appointed

as Khang’s successor. He assumed command of the Vietnamese Marine Corps

on 16 December.

Vietnamese Marine Brigade units continued operations against the Viet

Cong following Khang’s relief but fought no major engagements. Near the

end of December, with the nation drifting into political uncertainty

and its own top leadership changed, the morale of the Vietnamese Marine

Corps plummeted. Lieutenant Colonel Noren saw this unfortunate trend as

a by-product of the general political instability which was beginning

to grip the country rather than a reflection of Lien’s leadership.

Indeed, Noren thought the new VNMC commandant to be an extraordinarily

capable officer.[8-4] In any case, as 1963 ended the U.S. Marine

advisors were reporting climbing desertion rates in almost every

battalion.

_Accomplishments_

Even though 1963 closed upon a discouraging note, the Marine Advisory

Division could report positively on its own activities. At the

urging of the Senior Marine Advisor, the Vietnamese Marine Corps had

reinstituted multi-battalion combat operations. Steps had also been

taken to cut the VNMC’s last formal ties to the ARVN by creating a

separate Marine Corps recruit training facility. When activated this

training center was expected to provide VNMC battalions with a stream

of enlisted men who would possess a background of higher quality basic

training.

As for personal achievements, the U.S. Marine advisors had accompanied

their units in every combat operation during 1963 except the November

coup. No advisors had been killed in the 12-month period and only four

(two of whom were on temporary assignment from the 3d Marine Division)

had been wounded. The first combat decorations other than Purple Heart

Medals for wounds were also approved and awarded to the advisors during

the year. On 13 December, Captains Don Christensen and Frank Zimolzak,

former advisors to the 4th and 3d Battalions respectively, were awarded

the Bronze Star Medals with the Combat “V” for meritorious service.

Captain Richard Taylor, an advisor with the 2d Battalion, earned

the first Silver Star Medal during the same period for “conspicuous

gallantry” between November 1962 and October 1963. Captain Joseph N.

Smith, advisor to the 2d and 4th VNMC Battalions, earned the second

Silver Star for gallantry displayed between October 1963 and April

1964.[8-E]

[8-E] Both Silver Star Medals were awarded during 1964.

CHAPTER 9

SHUFLY Operations

_Development of the Compound Continues--Combat Support Operations--The

Situation in Vietnam_

SHUFLY, the only U.S. Marine tactical command assigned to South

Vietnam, continued its combat support operations in the semi-isolated

northern provinces throughout 1963. Although the size of I Corps had

been reduced in late 1962 when the Vietnamese Joint General Staff

shifted Quang Ngai Province to II CTZ, the mission of the Marine

task element remained essentially unchanged. As the new year opened

Lieutenant Colonel McCully’s command was still responsible for

providing direct helicopter support to the forces of the five northern

provinces. Likewise, the government’s order of battle in the northern

provinces had not changed to any great degree. The 1st ARVN Division

still occupied the coastal plains south of the DMZ in Quang Tri and

Thua Thien Provinces. Headquartered at Da Nang, the 2d ARVN Division

continued to carry the main burden of operations against the Viet Cong

in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. Operating in Quang Ngai Province

to the south of the new I Corps-II Corps border were elements of the

25th ARVN Division. Interspersed along the coastal lowlands among

the various regular battalions of these three divisions were small

paramilitary garrisons. In the mountains to the west, the scattered

Special Forces outposts with their Montagnard defenders continued their

struggle for survival while monitoring Communist infiltration.

_Development of the Compound Continues_

The first month of 1963 saw three important changes in the composition

and leadership of Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. On 11 January, HMM-162,

a UH-34D squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu,

replaced Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s HMM-163 as the task element’s

helicopter unit. Five days later, on the 16th, Lieutenant Colonel

George H. Linnemeier, winner of four Distinguished Flying Crosses

during World War II and Korea, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Davis as

the MABS-16 sub unit commander. In the last week of January Lieutenant

Colonel Harold F. Brown, a veteran aviator who had piloted scout-dive

bombers during the Second World War, arrived at Da Nang and assumed

command of the task element from Lieutenant Colonel McCully.

During McCully’s tour as the Commander, Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6,

the Marine compound at Da Nang had begun to assume a quality of

permanency which had never been evident at Soc Trang. The utilities

section of the MABS-16 detachment was responsible for many of the

more noticeable improvements. By the first of the new year they had

constructed several shelters on the west side of the runway to cover

the motor transport section’s working area. They also had replaced the

electrical system and repaired some of the damaged plumbing in the

living areas. The task element’s special services section had begun

to provide the Da Nang Marines with entertainment by showing nightly

movies, arranging fishing trips into Da Nang harbor, and issuing

athletic equipment.

The monsoon season, which was characterized by cold rains, high

winds, and deep mud, proved to be a source of much irritation to the

Marines during the winter of 1962–1963. In addition to slowing flight

operations and creating almost constant discomfort, the weather caused

some unforeseen complications. In October 1962, heavy rainfall had

combined with constant vehicle usage to turn the road between the

living area and the flight line into a quagmire that was virtually

impassable. At the time, Colonel Ireland, then the task unit commander,

had responded by requesting equipment from Okinawa to improve the

Marines’ only road link with their aircraft. Wing authorities promptly

complied and a road grader was flown in by KC-130 (the new designation

for the GV-1 Hercules). Within days a 700-foot section of the road was

opened and a drainage ditch dug along its entire length.

This measure proved to be only temporary, however, for in January the

mud again threatened to cut the Marine vehicles off from the east side

of the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel McCully obtained a bulldozer from

Okinawa to make more permanent repairs. With the help of this piece of

equipment, the Marines constructed a new 400-foot section of road on

an eight-inch rock base. These repairs proved to be satisfactory and

the road caused no further problem during the remainder of the monsoon

season.

Improvements in the compound continued to be made under the task

element’s new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brown. In April action was

taken on an earlier request for the assignment of a security detachment

to guard the Marine area. A reconnaissance platoon of 47 Marines from

the 3d Marine Division joined the task element, thus freeing the men

of the helicopter squadron and the MABS-16 sub unit of the important

secondary responsibility they had held since the task unit’s deployment

to Soc Trang. The assignment of the ground Marines was timely in that

it corresponded with a reduction by the ARVN of its forces guarding the

perimeter of the Da Nang airbase. One Marine general later observed

that with the arrival of the infantry unit, “the air-ground team was in

being in Vietnam.”[9-1]

Other less obvious changes that contributed to the overall efficiency

of the Marine task element also occurred during the early spring. In

April, the task element commander was able to assign a better facility

to medical and dental services. They had been crowded into one of the

small structures along with other offices since the displacement from

Soc Trang, but now were moved into a separate building in the living

compound.

Another problem that plagued the Marines during their entire first

year at Da Nang--inadequate water supply--was finally solved in late

1963. Originally the task unit had depended on a shallow well from

which water was pumped and purified. The Marines nearly exhausted this

source shortly after their arrival at Da Nang late in the dry season

and their commanders were forced to impose strict water discipline. The

monsoon rains eased the water crisis but by January production again

dropped, this time as a result of the accumulation of heavy silt in

the pumps. A Vietnamese contractor was engaged to clean and repair the

pumping system but the problem soon recurred. In the early spring two

new shallow wells were dug, one in the motor transport working area and

the other in the living compound. With the onset of the dry season,

however, the Marines again were forced to conserve water. This time the

shortage became so acute that tank trucks were required to haul some

16,000 gallons of water a day from a nearby Air Force installation.

Finally, in November, a detachment from a Navy construction battalion

completed a well 450 feet deep and capped it with a high pressure pump.

This proved to be the permanent solution to the long-standing water

shortage.

Over the course of the year the Marines received several new

vehicles which helped relieve the burden on the rebuilt buses

which were beginning to falter under heavy use. Four 10-passenger,

four-wheel-drive trucks and two M-442 “Mighty Mite” jeeps were flown

in by KC-130s from Okinawa and assigned to the task element’s motor

transport section. By summer, two of the old buses were replaced with

tactical passenger vehicles which were better suited for transporting

personnel between the barracks and work areas. The addition of the new

vehicles also allowed the mess hall to begin transporting hot noon

meals to the men working on the east side of the airstrip. A mess line

set up in the hangar area fed those Marines who previously had lost

time by travelling to the living compound for noon meals.

Two changes were made in the task element’s command structure in

midyear. On 5 July Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Cassidy, a veteran

aviator with 20 years service, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Linnemeier

as commanding officer of the MABS-16 sub unit. Two weeks later, on the

18th, Colonel Andre D. Gomez, a Marine who had distinguished himself

as an artillery officer during World War II before becoming a pilot,

assumed command of Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6.

In summary, the improvements made in the task element’s compound during

the course of 1963 helped insure the successful support of sustained

combat helicopter operations. Although overshadowed by the publicity

which the actual flight operations attracted, the continued improvement

of the Da Nang base was vital to the overall effectiveness of the

Marine combat support effort.

_Combat Support Operations_

Marine helicopter support for government forces in I Corps encountered

a brief interruption shortly after the new year began when HMM-163 was

replaced by a fresh UH-34D squadron. Marine KC-130s shuttled between

Okinawa and Da Nang for several days during the second week of January

bringing the officers and men of HMM-162 to Vietnam and returning

with members of HMM-163. The change-over of units was completed on 11

January when Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun officially transferred his

squadron’s aircraft and maintenance equipment to the newly-arrived unit.

In the five months and ten days since they initiated operations at Soc

Trang, “Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” had amassed an enviable combat record.

The squadron’s crews had flown a total of 10,869 hours, 15,200 sorties,

and had lifted over 25,216 combat assault troops and 59,024 other

passengers. In one month alone (August) they had established a Marine

Corps record for medium helicopter squadrons by flying 2,543 helicopter

hours. These records had not been set without risks, however. During

the course of their operations in the Mekong Delta and in I Corps,

helicopters operated by HMM-163’s crews had been hit on 32 occasions by

Communist small arms fire.[9-2] Moreover, the squadron had become the

first Marine unit to suffer combat casualties in the Vietnam conflict.

HMM-162, led by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, the veteran Marine

aviator who had commanded the squadron during the recent deployment

to Thailand as part of the 3d MEU, began full-fledged combat support

operations the same day that the last of Rathbun’s squadron departed

Da Nang. HMM-162’s crews, many of whom had participated in similar

operations around Udorn the previous summer, limited their early

flights to routine resupply missions and a few medical evacuations.

Such missions enabled the squadron’s personnel to become better

acquainted with the terrain over which they would operate during the

next six months.

The new squadron participated in its first major combat troop lift on

January 19, when a break in the monsoon allowed the 2d ARVN Division

to execute a heliborne operation into the mountains about 15 miles

west of Da Nang. Eighteen Marine UH-34Ds lifted 300 ARVN troops into

three separate landing zones near a suspected Communist base area.

The squadron’s pilots and crews encountered their first Viet Cong

opposition during this troop lift. Upright bamboo stakes obstructed one

of the landing zones while at another the enemy fired at the Marine

aircraft with small arms. Although two UH-34Ds were hit, none were shot

down and the mission was completed successfully.

A month later, on 18 February, the Marine pilots experienced another

of the hazards associated with flight operations in Vietnam while

attempting to land troops from the 1st ARVN Division in a clearing

about 18 miles southwest of Hue. Five helicopters sustained punctures

in the bottoms of their fuselages when they accidentally landed on tree

stumps concealed by high grass in the landing zone. One stump caused

extensive damage to an aircraft when it ripped into its forward fuel

cell. The crew was forced to leave the UH-34D in the field under ARVN

protection overnight. The next morning Marine mechanics were flown in

from Da Nang to repair the helicopter.

Despite several troop lifts involving a dozen or more aircraft,

heliborne assault missions did not dominate HMM-162’s operations during

the unit’s first three months in South Vietnam. Poor weather conditions

over the northern provinces continued to restrict flight operations

generally to resupply and medical evacuation missions. Statistics

for the first quarter of 1963, for example, indicated that Marine

helicopters conducted 6,537 logistics sorties as opposed to 1,181

tactical support sorties.

The single most significant incident during HMM-162’s initial three

months in Vietnam took place in the second week of March when the

squadron suffered its first aircraft losses and casualties. These

were incurred during a salvage-rescue attempt in the mountains of

northern II Corps. The incident began on 10 March as two Marine UH-34Ds

attempted to insert a four-man American-Vietnamese ground rescue team

into the jungle about 30 miles southwest of Quang Ngai. The team’s

assignment was to locate a U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk (a twin-engine,

turboprop, electronic reconnaissance aircraft manufactured by Grumman)

which had crashed, and its pilot, who had parachuted into the jungle.

The exact site of the accident had not been located but the general

area was known to be a steep jungle-covered mountain, the elevation of

which approached 5,000 feet. While attempting to lower search personnel

into the jungle by means of a hoist, one of the helicopters lost power

and crashed. The ARVN ranger who was on the hoist when the accident

occurred was killed but the helicopter’s crew managed to climb from

the wreckage shortly before it erupted in flames. The copilot, Captain

David N. Webster, was severely burned in the explosion.

Other Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang joined in the rescue operation,

refueling from the TAFDS at Quang Ngai for the flight into the

mountains. The situation was complicated further when a second Marine

helicopter experienced a power loss and crashed near the burned-out

UH-34D hulk while attempting to land a rescue team composed of MABS-16

Marines. Fortunately, the aircraft did not burn and the only injury

incurred in the crash was a sprained ankle, but the extremely steep

and densely jungled terrain kept the Marines from reaching the site

of the other downed helicopter. Bad weather and darkness prevented

further efforts to extricate the various American and South Vietnamese

personnel from the jungle that day. During the night Captain Webster

died of injuries.

The next day, the Marines stripped a UH-34D of some 700 pounds of

equipment so as to enable it to operate more efficiently at the

extreme elevations in the vicinity of the crash sites. After carefully

maneuvering the helicopter into a hovering position, the pilot was able

to extract the survivors and the dead copilot from the site where the

first UH-34D had crashed and burned. The survivors were flown to Quang

Ngai. There the wounded were treated and later evacuated by U.S. Air

Force transport to an American hospital at Nha Trang.

While these events were taking place, the Marines from the second

downed helicopter, guided by search aircraft operating over the area,

located and recovered the injured Army Mohawk pilot. This accomplished,

the Marines hacked out a small clearing from which they were evacuated

by another Marine helicopter.

The episode was not yet over, however, as the crashed OV-1 and its

payload of advanced electronics equipment still had not been secured.

Finally, an ARVN ranger company, which had joined the search, reached

the remnants of the Mohawk and established security around the site

while U.S. Army technicians were helilifted in to examine the debris.

The Marine UH-34D, which had crashed nearby without burning and was

damaged beyond repair, was cannibalized for usable parts and then

destroyed.

On 13 March, with the search and rescue tasks completed, Marine

helicopters began shuttling South Vietnamese rangers to Mang Buc,

a nearby government outpost. During this phase of the mission the

helicopters received fire from Viet Cong who had moved into positions

near the rangers’ perimeter. Three UH-34Ds delivered suppressive fire

on the enemy with their door-mounted M-60 machine guns while the

remaining helicopters picked up the troops in the landing zone. This

was the first recorded instance of a Marine helicopter providing close

air support in actual combat.

Other developments occurred in the early months of 1963 which either

directly or indirectly affected the conduct of Marine helicopter

operations. One was the improved coordination of intelligence gathering

and usage among all South Vietnamese and American agencies within

I Corps. This effort, which was essentially a concerted drive to

streamline the collection and flow of intelligence information, was

stimulated by a series of corps-wide intelligence seminars, the first

of which was held in early February. Of special interest to the Marine

aviators was the establishment of closer liaison between the Marine

task element, U.S. Army Special Forces, and South Vietnamese units in

the northern corps tactical zone.

Closely related to the improvement of the overall intelligence

situation was the acquisition of some new equipment by the SHUFLY

Marines. In March the task element received two new model hand-held

aerial cameras for use by the crews of the O-1B observation aircraft.

Later in the month a photo lab was completed to facilitate the rapid

processing of the photographs. By the end of the month the Marines were

also being provided with high altitude photographic coverage of some

objective areas taken by U.S. Air Force reconnaissance jets.

The tempo of Marine helicopter operations began to quicken in early

April with the advent of sustained periods of clear weather. On 13

April, HMM-162 participated in a major heliborne assault in which

435 2d ARVN Division troops were lifted into a suspected Communist

stronghold in the mountains along the Song Thu Bon, about 30 miles

south of Da Nang. As in most troop lift missions, the Marine O-1Bs

provided reconnaissance and radio relay support. For the first time

in the war Marine transport helicopters were escorted by helicopter

gunships, the UH-1B Iroquois (a single-engine, turbine-powered utility

helicopter built by the Bell Helicopter Company). Five UH-1Bs from a

detachment of the Army’s Da Nang-based 68th Aviation Company, armed

with M-60 machine gun clusters and 2.75-inch rockets, joined the VNAF

fighter bombers to conduct preparatory airstrikes on the landing zones.

The initial landing met no enemy resistance but later in the day action

in the operational area intensified. A Marine UH-34D was hit by eight

rounds of enemy small arms fire while attempting to evacuate wounded

South Vietnamese soldiers and U.S. Army advisors from a landing zone

near the point where the ARVN forces had been landed that morning. With

the copilot, First Lieutenant John D. Olmen, wounded, the badly damaged

aircraft force landed in the Vietnamese position.

Two other Marine helicopters were dispatched to the scene to pick up

the Marine crew and complete the evacuation. They managed to evacuate

Lieutenant Olmen, a wounded American advisor, and one dead and four

wounded ARVN soldiers without incident. On a return trip to pick up

more wounded, however, one of the two UH-34Ds suffered heavy damage

from Viet Cong fire. In this incident the crew chief, Corporal Charley

M. Campbell, was wounded in the thigh, chest, and back by small arms

fire, and the aircraft was forced to land near the first downed

helicopter. The accompanying UH-34D landed, picked up Campbell, and

returned him to Da Nang for emergency treatment. Repair teams were

helilifted to the position on the afternoon of the 13th, and began

repairing both helicopters. One was able to return to Da Nang later

that day but the other required extensive repairs and could not be

flown to safety until the 15th.

While HMM-162 repair crews were working feverishly to extricate their

aircraft from the predicament along the banks of the Song Thu Bon,

another of their helicopters was shot down nearby while supporting the

same operation. This aircraft was hit four times while approaching an

ARVN landing zone located in a small valley about three miles south of

the action in which the two helicopters had been lost earlier. After

temporary repairs were made, its crew flew the damaged UH-34D to Da

Nang where more detailed repair work was accomplished.

The number of combat support sorties flown into the mountains by

HMM-162’s crews rose steadily as the weather improved. Near the end

of April, the Marines helilifted three battalions of the 1st ARVN

Division into the mountains of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces near

the Laotian border. These units were to participate in an extended

multi-regiment drive against suspected Communist infiltration routes

there. This operation, for which Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s squadron

provided daily support after the initial landing, taxed the durability

of both the Marine crews and their aircraft. For 90 days task element

helicopters flew into and out of hazardous landing zones located at

elevations as high as 4,500 feet. The majority of these sorties were

resupply and medical evacuation missions with the occasional exception

being the heliborne displacement of infantry and artillery units when

distance or terrain prohibited overland movement. Despite the dangers

inherent in helicopter operations conducted over mountainous terrain,

the squadron incurred no aircraft or personnel losses while supporting

the offensive in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

While his squadron’s support of the 1st ARVN Division’s ongoing drive

near the Laotian border continued, Lieutenant Colonel Leu committed 21

UH-34Ds to support the offensive against the Do Xa base area along the

southern edge of I Corps. On 27 April, Marine crews helilifted over

567 troops of the 2d ARVN Division into the mountainous area roughly

22 miles southwest of Tam Ky to begin Operation BACH PHUONG XI. The

squadron was less fortunate during this operation than it was during

the lengthy Quang Tri effort. One helicopter was shot down by Viet Cong

fire which wounded the pilot, Captain Virgil R. Hughes, in the leg. The

crew and the embarked ARVN soldiers escaped further injury when the

aircraft made a crash landing in which it suffered extensive damage.

After the crew was rescued, a salvage team from Da Nang stripped the

helicopter of all usable parts and burned the hulk so the Viet Cong

could not make use of it. This was the first Marine helicopter loss

definitely attributed to direct enemy action.[9-3]

Following the initial heliborne assaults into the Do Xa area, two

UH-34Ds were rotated to Tra My from Da Nang on a daily basis. Refueling

from the TAFDS bladder, these standby aircraft were used primarily to

perform medical evacuation missions for VNMC and ARVN units involved

in BACH PHOUNG XI. Before the operation ended in mid-May, HMM-162’s

crews had evacuated nearly 100 Marine and ARVN casualties from

hazardous landing zones scattered along the border of I and II Corps.

The task element’s O-1Bs also provided aerial reconnaissance support

for all phases of the operation. On 19 May, the day before BACH PHOUNG

XI terminated, 12 Marine UH-34Ds lifted the two Vietnamese Marine

battalions to the provisional brigade command post at Tra My. This

particular phase of the operation evoked favorable comment from an

anonymous U.S. Marine pilot who noted on an unsigned debriefing form

that the heliborne withdrawal had gone smoothly and that the Vietnamese

Marines appeared “well organized in the landing zones and at Tra

My.”[9-4] BACH PHOUNG XI ended unceremoniously the following day when

HMM-162 helilifted the ARVN battalions from the Do Xa base area.

One trend which became increasingly apparent as the spring of 1963

unfolded was the growing utilization of the Army UH-1B helicopter

gunships as escorts to and from landing zones. The gunships

accompanied all Marine assault helilifts and medical evacuations, and

when available, also escorted resupply flights in order to provide

suppressive fire around government positions while landings were in

progress. Although well suited for the escort missions, the lightly

armed UH-1Bs did not replace the Vietnamese Air Force attack aircraft

as the principal source of preparatory air strikes around landing zones

being used for assault helilifts. The Marines continued to rely on the

more heavily armed VNAF T-28s and A-1Hs to conduct the so-called “prep

strikes.”[9-A]

[9-A] As a result of the joint helicopter operations in I

Corps, a vigorous debate developed within the Marine

Corps concerning the value of armed helicopters. This

debate and the subsequent development, procurement, and

operations of Marine helicopter gunships will be covered

in a separate historical monograph being prepared by the

History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps.

May was the last full month of combat support operations for Lieutenant

Colonel Leu’s squadron. In the first week of June, transports from

VMGR-152 began landing at Da Nang with the Marines of a new UH-34D

squadron. Since assuming responsibility for helicopter support in I

Corps in mid-January, HMM-162 had compiled a solid combat record. While

under the squadron’s operations, the UH-34D helicopters had flown

17,670 sorties for a total of 8,579 flight hours. The O-1Bs added

approximately 400 sorties and another 1,000 hours to these figures. In

the month of May alone HMM-162’s helicopters flew over 2,000 flight

hours--a number which approached the record set by HMM-163 during the

previous summer in the Mekong Delta. Other statistics reflected the

growing intensity of the Vietnam war. Since its deployment to Da Nang,

Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s unit had lost three helicopters--two as a

result of operations at extreme elevations and one to enemy fire. One

member of the unit had been killed and three others wounded since the

squadron entered the combat zone.[9-5]

After a brief change-over period, the outgoing squadron commander

officially turned over his unit’s aircraft and maintenance equipment on

8 June to Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Shook, the commanding officer of

HMM-261. Shook, who had flown Marine helicopters in combat during the

Korean War, committed his crews to their first actual combat missions

that same day.

A significant change took place in the coordinating arrangements that

governed U.S. helicopter units supporting I Corps at approximately

the same time that HMM-261 initiated combat support operations. Since

its relocation at Da Nang, the Marine task element, along with all

other aviation units in I CTZ, had received its missions from the Air

Support Operations Center located within the corps headquarters. As

the number of U.S. and VNAF aviation organizations assigned to I Corps

grew and the total number of missions multiplied, it became necessary

to modify the system of coordination and control. In accordance with

a ComUSMACV directive, I Corps headquarters created an Aviation

Headquarters Operations Center (AHOC) to oversee the employment of

Marine and Army aircraft in the CTZ. The AHOC, which was composed of

a senior Army representative, a senior Marine representative, and an

operations section, was to be directed by the Commander, Task Element

79.3.3.6. Formally stated, its primary mission was to “plan, direct,

and control the employment of all Army and Marine Corps Aviation

Units and aircraft operations in direct support of I Corps.” The

newly organized AHOC was also ordered to “participate in, and provide

assistance to operational planning and the coordination of employment

of USA/USMC Aviation with VNAF/USAF tactical air.”[9-6] The AHOC,

therefore, was formed to supplement rather than replace the older Air

Support Operations Center, which continued to direct and control all

U.S. Air Force and VNAF operations over the northern provinces. It

was under this arrangement that U.S. Marine and Army aviation units

operated after mid-1963.

HMM-261’s Marines began encountering systematic Viet Cong resistance

to their operations shortly after their first combat missions in early

June. A 21-aircraft assault mission into the mountains west of Da

Nang was aborted on 6 July when the Marine pilots discovered that the

Viet Cong had obstructed the two available landing zones with upright

stakes. While inspecting one of the landing zones on a low pass, a

helicopter was hit in the forward fuel cell by Communist small arms

fire. The damage to the aircraft was not serious enough to force a

landing, but the pilot of an escorting U.S. Army UH-1B was mortally

wounded while attempting to suppress the ground fire.

Ten days after the enemy forced the cancellation of the assault mission

west of Da Nang, HMM-261 suffered its first aircraft loss in Vietnam.

The crash, which was later attributed to mechanical failure, occurred

about 37 miles southwest of Da Nang while one of the squadron’s

helicopters was on a routine logistics mission. Six passengers, two

American advisors and four ARVN soldiers, were injured in the accident.

The squadron commander dispatched two other UH-34Ds to the scene of

the crash to evacuate the wounded and insert a salvage team. The badly

damaged aircraft was assessed as beyond repair and was destroyed.

In the second week of August, officers from HMM-261 and the task

element’s staff (under the command of Colonel Gomez) met with American

and Vietnamese officers at I Corps headquarters to plan a large-scale

heliborne retrograde movement. The planned helilift was to mark the

culmination of Operation LAM SON XII, a three-week long offensive

by several battalions of the 2d ARVN Division against Communist

infiltration routes in Quang Nam Province along the Laotian border.

Although not encircled, the ARVN battalions had encountered increasing

Viet Cong pressure since early August. I Corps authorities feared that

unless their units were withdrawn promptly they might be cut off from

the few landing zones that existed in the rugged operations area.

As planned, the retrograde operation involved helilifting some

1,300 troops with their artillery and equipment to Thuong Duc, a

government-held town situated 30 miles southwest of Da Nang along

the Song Vu Gia. The operation plan called for the commitment of 20

Marine helicopters, 18 of which would participate in the actual troop

lifts. The two extra UH-34Ds would be used in the event it became

necessary either to replace helicopters assigned to the troop lift or

to conduct search and rescue operations for downed aircraft. Three VNAF

UH-34s and two U.S. Army unarmed UH-1Bs were designated by the I Corps

headquarters to assist HMM-261 with the helilift.

The Da Nang Air Support Operations Center assigned a variety of other

aircraft to support the operation. These included two VNAF T-28s, one

FARM GATE B-26, and two U.S. Army UH-1B gunships. These aircraft would

share the task of providing close air support for the troop lift. A

Marine O-1B was scheduled to perform weather reconnaissance missions.

The entire air operation was to be coordinated from two aircraft. An

American forward air controller in a VNAF observation plane was to

direct all air strikes while overall control for the multiservice,

bilingual effort was to come from a U.S. Air Force U-10 Super Courier.

This six-man, single engine aircraft, which possessed an eight hour

fuel capacity and carried three radios, would serve as an airborne air

support operations center (Airborne ASOC). It would be flown by an Air

Force pilot and would carry a Marine officer from the task element

along with U.S. and Vietnamese representatives from the Da Nang ASOC.

These officers would be in continuous radio contact with all aircraft

in the operations area, and also with the U.S. Air Force liaison

officer to I Corps who would be positioned with the ground troops.

The concept of the operation called for the ARVN units to be lifted

from two hazardous landing zones over a three-day period. According to

the plan 500 ARVN soldiers were to be removed from Landing Zone HOTEL

on Thursday, 15 August. Landing Zone HOTEL, a small clearing which

could accommodate only three UH-34Ds, was situated along a river and

was crowded between two 1,000-foot-high ridgelines only five miles

from the Laotian border. The steep, jungle-covered ridges generally

paralleled each other less than 400 meters apart on either side of the

landing zone. Slightly west of the small clearing the ridges joined to

form a box canyon. The physical structure of the location dictated that

the transport helicopters use the same approach and retirement routes.

Due largely to the proximity of the high terrain which surrounded

Landing Zone HOTEL, the ARVN adopted a Marine proposal to leave a

125-man security force on the two ridges. This force would provide

cover for the helicopters conducting the final troop lift during this

first phase of the retrograde movement. The 125 South Vietnamese

soldiers would move cross-country to another landing zone to be picked

up by helicopters following the completion of the helilift from Landing

Zone HOTEL.

The second landing zone, codename ZULU, was nearly as treacherous

as the first. ZULU was completely encircled by a rim of hills some

500 feet higher than the floor of the landing site. In addition to

the 125-man security force from HOTEL, the Marine, Army, and VNAF

helicopters were scheduled to lift 200 ARVN troops and two 105mm

howitzers from this landing zone on 16 and 17 August (the second and

third days of the operation).

An unexpected complication developed the morning the operation began

when the Air Force grounded its B-26s after one of the attack bombers

crashed elsewhere in the northern portion of Vietnam as a result of

undetermined causes. Shortly after this crash, HMM-261 was called

upon to divert a flight of helicopters to assist in search and rescue

operations for the downed B-26, thus reducing even further the assets

available to support the heliborne retrograde.

Despite the loss of some of the air power assigned to the operation,

I Corps authorities elected to proceed with the helilift from Landing

Zone HOTEL as planned. After the crew of a Marine O-1B confirmed that

good weather prevailed over the operations area, the first helicopters

departed Da Nang on schedule. Less than half an hour after take off the

Marine and Vietnamese pilots began maneuvering their aircraft between

the two ridges which dominated Landing Zone HOTEL. Twice during the

pickup the armed UH-1B escorts drew fire from the thick jungle on one

side of the approach lanes being used by the transports. Both times

they returned fire in the direction of the unseen enemy and forced him

to silence his weapons. The first phase of the operation was completed

without serious incident four hours after it had begun.

The second phase of the helilift began the next morning with the two

unarmed U.S. Army UH-1Bs making several trips to Landing Zone ZULU to

lift out the disassembled ARVN 105mm howitzers. The Marine and VNAF

transport helicopters followed and continued to shuttle troops out of

the landing zone for three hours without encountering enemy opposition.

Then a departing flight of UH-34Ds drew fire from a nearby ridgeline.

One of the escorting UH-1Bs immediately marked the suspected target for

the VNAF T-28s and the attack aircraft bombed and strafed the position.

The Communist activity ceased.

After an overnight march, the covering force from Landing Zone HOTEL

arrived at Landing Zone ZULU. Although they were not scheduled to be

removed from the field until the next day, the schedule was adjusted

and the 125 weary ARVN soldiers were flown to the secure assembly area

on the afternoon of their arrival. This modification reduced the amount

of work which would be required of the helicopters on the final day of

the operation.

The next phase of the helilift from ZULU on 17 August was characterized

by increasing concern for security around the landing site. The general

scheme for protecting the helicopters during this critical stage of

the exercise was to establish two perimeters, one around the rim of

high ground which surrounded the zone and another around the immediate

landing site. The outer perimeter would be withdrawn first, leaving the

inside ring of troops to deny the enemy direct access to the landing

zone while the force from the outer perimeter boarded the helicopters.

Once the Vietnamese soldiers were withdrawn from the rim of hills, the

area within 300 meters of the close-in defenses would be automatically

cleared for air strikes. Even with these precautions the helicopters

would be extremely vulnerable to any enemy force that might rapidly

occupy the high ground above Landing Zone ZULU following the withdrawal

of the outer perimeter. Accordingly, once the troops from the outer

defenses were staged for the helilift, the transport helicopters would

be directed by the airborne ASOC to tighten the landing interval

between aircraft from the usual five minutes to as short a time span

as possible. By landing in such rapid succession, the dangerous final

stage of the operation could be accomplished more quickly.

Two hours after the helilift began on Saturday morning, the air

liaison officer at ZULU reported that the outer perimeter had been

withdrawn and that all remaining Vietnamese troops were in positions

around the landing zone. At this point the operation, now in its most

critical phase, began to experience agonizing delays. First, a loaded

helicopter arrived at the assembly area with a rough running engine.

Fearing that the fuel in the TAFDS had somehow become contaminated,

Lieutenant Colonel Shook instructed all HMM-261 pilots to check their

aircraft’s fuel strainers while their passengers disembarked at the

assembly point. No evidence was found to indicate that the fuel

contained contaminants, but the operation was slowed at the exact point

where the intensified helilift was to have begun. Another minor delay

occurred after a helicopter flying near the landing zone reported

having drawn enemy ground fire. The approach and departure routes were

adjusted slightly so that the transport helicopters would not fly over

the area and VNAF T-28s were directed to attack the suspected enemy

position. Shortly after the air strike ended the air liaison officer

at the landing zone reported more enemy activity only 500 meters from

his position. This momentary crisis was resolved when the American air

liaison officer personally directed armed UH-1Bs to neutralize the

target area.

Finally, the airborne ASOC passed instructions to proceed with the

operation, whereupon HMM-261 and VNAF helicopters began spiraling down

into the landing zone. The escorting UH-1B gunships provided continuous

protection for the transport helicopters by flying concentric but

opposite patterns around them. One after another the transports landed,

took on troops, climbed out of the landing zone, and turned toward

Thuong Duc. Less than five minutes after the stepped-up helilift began,

the last troops were airborne. The crew chief of the helicopter which

embarked the final ARVN heliteam then dropped a purple smoke grenade

into the empty landing zone to signal all other aircraft that the lift

was complete.

The three-day heliborne retrograde from the Laotian border proved

to be one of the most efficient helicopter operations conducted by

the Marines in the Republic of Vietnam during the early 1960s. Its

success was due largely to detailed planning, particularly the South

Vietnamese plans for the ground defense of both landing zones. These

plans and their subsequent execution led a grateful Colonel Gomez,

the task element commander, to declare: “This was the first time in

our experience that a helicopter-borne withdrawal had been treated as

a retrograde operation rather than an administrative lift. Without a

sound retrograde plan the operation might well have failed.”[9-7]

Although this observation was correct, it should be added that the

close coordination between the airborne ASOC, the operational aircraft,

and the air liaison officer on the ground had contributed to the

successful execution of the plans. These agencies were instrumental in

coordinating the bilingual, multiservice effort, particularly when it

was beset with difficulties in its critical final stage.

HMM-261’s combat support missions continued at a normal rate following

the completion of the mid-August retrograde helilift. A month later,

on 16 September, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s squadron lost its second

UH-34D in a crash 25 miles west-southwest of Hue. The helicopter, which

had developed mechanical problems while carrying troops of a South

Vietnamese assault force, was damaged beyond repair. Its crew members

and passengers fortunately escaped injury. The aircraft was stripped of

usable parts by a salvage team from Da Nang and burned.

Shortly after this incident, the first elements of a new squadron

began arriving at Da Nang and HMM-261 turned to preparations for its

departure. Since early June, when it had become the fourth Marine

helicopter squadron assigned to SHUFLY, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s unit

had accumulated 5,288 combat flying hours and 11,406 sorties in the

UH-34Ds alone. The squadron’s crews had helilifted over 6,000 troops,

nearly 1,900,000 pounds of cargo, and had accomplished over 600 medical

evacuation missions.[9-8]

The new squadron, HMM-361, assumed responsibility for helicopter

support in I Corps on 2 October after a short period of orientation

flying with the crews of the departing unit. HMM-361’s commanding

officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Ross, was well qualified to

direct a tactical aviation unit in a combat situation. Decorated with

five Distinguished Flying Crosses during World War II and Korea, he was

a recent graduate of the Air Force Command and Staff College.

Barely a week after Ross’ squadron initiated combat support operations

at Da Nang, it suffered its first aircraft and personnel losses.

The incident occurred on 8 October when two UH-34Ds crashed almost

simultaneously while on a search and rescue mission 38 miles southwest

of Da Nang. Both helicopters burned, killing 10 men; the pilots,

copilots, the squadron’s flight surgeon, and five crewmen. A search

of the area was initiated immediately for the downed aircraft, but

darkness prevented their discovery until the next morning. By then

the Viet Cong had surrounded both crash sites and were waiting to

ambush the search and rescue helicopters which they knew would arrive.

When the rescue aircraft attempted to land, they met determined enemy

opposition. Colonel Gomez requested ARVN assistance and 254 South

Vietnamese troops were lifted into nearby clearings with instructions

to dislodge the enemy force from the area around the downed aircraft.

While executing the landing, HMM-361 helicopters were hit nine times by

small arms fire, but suffered only superficial damage. One ARVN soldier

was killed.

The following day, as the South Vietnamese forces moved toward the

downed UH-34Ds, three Marine helicopters escorted by three armed UH-1Bs

and two VNAF T-28s lifted an inspection team into the crash site to

recover the bodies and investigate the wreckage. Enemy automatic

weapons fire broke out while the UH-34Ds waited in the landing zone

and forced the pilots to take off while the inspection team found

cover on the ground. After the Communist fire had been suppressed, the

helicopters returned for the stranded Marines. Their investigation of

the aircraft hulks had been fruitful: the evidence of enemy small arms

fire in the wreckage and the relative positions of the two helicopters

led Lieutenant Colonel Ross to conclude that the aircraft had been shot

down by the Viet Cong.[9-9] But this was not a conclusive finding.

There was room for speculation that the two helicopters had actually

collided in midair while attempting to evade ground fire.

Ground action in the hills around the crash sites continued. On 11

October, another Marine helicopter was hit by Viet Cong fire while

resupplying ARVN units in the area. In this incident the UH-34D was

struck twice in the engine and once in the wheel strut while in a

landing zone about two miles from the point where the crashes had

occurred. After assessing the damage, a maintenance team from Da Nang

determined that the helicopter would require a new engine. Marines from

the security platoon were utilized to provide security until 13 October

when an additional 120 ARVN troops were helilifted into the area and

established a perimeter around the aircraft. Other helicopters then

delivered the new engine and a maintenance crew to the landing zone.

After the engines were exchanged, a crew returned the UH-34D to Da Nang.

By the time HMM-361 had removed the last ARVN troops from the hills

around the scene of the tragic accidents, monsoon weather had begun

to restrict flight operations. The remaining two weeks of October

were characterized by a reduced number of missions, most of which

were either resupply or medical evacuations. By the end of October,

despite numerous flight cancellations, Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ crews

had gained the unenviable distinction of having attracted more enemy

fire during a one month period than any previous squadron to serve with

SHUFLY. Their helicopters had been shot at on 46 different occasions

and had been hit 18 times.[9-10]

SHUFLY’s combat support operations came to a halt in the first days of

November as the reverberations from Diem’s overthrow spread to South

Vietnam’s northern provinces. American officials in Washington and

Saigon, aware of the pitfalls that might accompany open support of

either side in the power struggle, ordered all U.S. military forces

to cease advisory and combat support activities. As a result of the

sensitive political situation, no U.S. aircraft left the ground on 2

November. Two days after the new regime seized power in Saigon, the

U.S. Marine helicopters were permitted to perform emergency medical

evacuation and emergency resupply missions. Even these flights were

to be approved beforehand by ARVN military officers in Saigon. Four

days after Diem’s overthrow, the new leaders in Saigon eased the

political restrictions and SHUFLY’s operations returned to near normal.

One remaining limitation stipulated that U.S. helicopters could not

transport ARVN units into population centers even though troops could

be helilifted from the cities into rural areas.

Due to torrential monsoon rains which began striking the Da Nang

area in mid-November, HMM-361’s combat support operations continued

at a relatively low level throughout the remainder of the year. This

trend was confirmed by the flight totals compiled for the final two

months of 1963. In November, the squadron’s UH-34Ds flew only 145

sorties for 233 flight hours. December’s statistics, 230 helicopter

sorties for 338 flight hours, indicated a slight upswing but fell far

short of the monthly figures achieved earlier in the year. With rain

and fog frequently rendering the mountains inaccessible by air, the

preponderance of the squadron’s missions were conducted along the

coastal plains. As 1963 ended SHUFLY’s combat support operations were

continuing at a greatly reduced rate.

_The Situation in Vietnam_

Although not yet desperate, the overall situation in South Vietnam

at the end of 1963 was far from favorable. Mismanaged and poorly

coordinated from the outset, the Strategic Hamlet Program had failed

to fulfill even the most moderate of American and South Vietnamese

expectations. Little discernable headway had been made toward restoring

any large segment of the populated rural areas to government control.

Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had disregarded the Geneva Agreement

of 1962 and had continued to infiltrate troops and material down the

Laotian corridor into the South. Although the 1963 figure of 4,200

confirmed infiltrators was roughly 1,000 men lower than the figure for

the previous year, it was substantial enough to force the government

to deviate more and more from its avowed strategy of clearing Viet

Cong formations from the vital populated areas. To help meet this

continuing influx of Communist regulars, the government had committed

its ground force to operations against base areas located in the remote

hinterlands with increasing frequency. More often than not these

multi-battalion offensives, such as the VNMC-ARVN drive into the Do

Xa base area in May, proved futile, usually resulting in scattered

and inconsequential clashes with small groups of Viet Cong. The

continuation of such actions, of course, worked to the advantage of the

Communists as the government forces expended time, energy, and lives

without exacting a commensurate price from the enemy.

Other disturbing trends had emerged on the South’s battlefields during

the course of the year. Following an action fought in the Mekong

Delta during early January in which the Viet Cong soundly defeated a

multi-battalion ARVN heliborne force, enemy main force units continued

to maintain their integrity and fought back when confronted with

helicopter assaults. This trend was evident even in the northern

provinces where each successive assault by Marine helicopters appeared

to meet more determined resistance. Aside from the Viet Cong’s

new-found confidence in countering heliborne offensives, another source

of concern to U.S. and Vietnamese officials was the appearance in the

South of several Viet Cong regimental headquarters during the year.

The activation of these headquarters, which assumed control of already

operational main force battalions, seemed to presage another phase of

Communist military escalation.

The situation throughout South Vietnam worsened in the aftermath of

the Diem coup. Subsequent to the widespread command changes ordered

by the new government, the morale, and in turn the effectiveness,

of the Vietnamese armed forces declined sharply. The Viet Cong moved

quickly to exploit the prevailing state of confusion by staging a

rash of attacks in the weeks after Diem’s overthrow--attacks which

worked a profound influence on the already faltering Strategic Hamlet

Program. “The fall of the Ngo regime,” wrote one American scholar,

“was accompanied by the complete collapse of the pacification efforts

in many areas, and vast regions that had been under government control

quickly came under the influence of the Viet Cong.”[9-11] The nation’s

new leaders therefore formally terminated the badly damaged Strategic

Hamlet Program. Although it was soon to be replaced with similar

pacification campaigns, most Vietnamese and American officials conceded

that much time and energy would be required to restore momentum to

the government’s efforts at securing the allegiance of the rural

population. So, by the end of 1963 both the tempo and effectiveness

of South Vietnam’s overall war effort was at its lowest ebb since the

intensification of the U.S. military assistance program in early 1962.

[Illustration: _ARVN troops fan out from an HMM-361 helicopter during

an assault into the mountains of I Corps. (USMC Photo A420866)._]

This threatening situation was hardly consistent with American military

plans which were being implemented at year’s end. Drawn up at Secretary

of Defense McNamara’s direction and approved by him in the late summer

of 1963, these plans called for a phased withdrawal of 1,000 U.S.

servicemen from Vietnam by January 1964. The phased withdrawal plan,

whose ultimate objective was to end direct American participation in

the war, envisioned a gradual scaling down of U.S. involvement while

simultaneously turning over more military responsibility to the South

Vietnamese. Included in the initial 1,000-man reduction was the 47-man

security platoon which had guarded the U.S. Marine task element’s

compound at Da Nang since April. For the Marines serving with the task

element, 1963 thus ended on an incongruous note. While the Viet Cong

threat appeared on the rise, their own defenses were being reduced.

Clearly, events in Vietnam had overtaken long-range plans already in

motion.

PART IV

AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964