"Beyond Good and Evil"
Double purpose animated Nietzsche in his writing of "Beyond Good and
Evil" _("Jenseits von Gut und Böse")._ It is at once an explanation
and an elucidation of "Thus Spake Zarathustra," and a preparatory book
for his greatest and most important work, "The Will to Power." In it
Nietzsche attempts to define the relative terms of "good" and "evil,"
and to draw a line of distinction between immorality and unmorality.
He saw the inconsistencies evolved in the attempt to harmonise an
ancient moral code with the needs of modern life, and recognised the
compromises which were constantly being made between moral theory and
social practice. His object was to establish a relationship between
morality and necessity, and to formulate a workable basis for human
conduct. Consequently "Beyond Good and Evil" is one of his most
important contributions to a new system of ethics, and touches on many
of the deepest principles of his philosophy. As it stands, it is by
no means a complete expression of Nietzsche's doctrines, but it is
sufficiently profound and suggestive to be of valuable service in an
understanding of his later works. The book was begun in the summer of
1885 and finished the following winter. Again there was difficulty with
publishers, and finally the book was issued at the author's own expense
in the autumn of 1886.
Nietzsche opens "Beyond Good and Evil" with a long chapter headed
"Prejudices of Philosophers," in which he outlines the course to be
taken by his dialectic. The exposition is accomplished by two methods:
first, by an analysis and a refutation of the systems of thinking
made use of by antecedent doctrinaires, and secondly, by defining the
hypotheses on which his own philosophy is built. This chapter is a
most important one, setting forth, as it does, the _rationale_ of his
doctrine of the will to power. It has been impossible to make extracts
of any unified sequence from this chapter because of its intricate and
compact reasoning, and the student would do well to read it in its
entirety. It establishes Nietzsche's philosophic position and presents
a closely knit explanation of the course pursued in the following
chapters. The relativity of all truth--the hypothesis so often assumed
in his previous work--Nietzsche here defends by analogy and argument.
Using other leading forms of philosophy as a ground for exploration, he
questions the absolutism of truth and shows wherein lies the difficulty
of a final definition. Here we become conscious of that plasticity
of mind which was the dominating quality of his thinking. It is not,
however, that form of plasticity which on inspection resolves itself
into amorphic and unstable reasoning, but a logical, almost scientific,
method of valuing. The mercurial habits of the metaphysicians who deny
absolutism are nowhere discernible in Nietzsche's thought. His mind is
definite without being static. The basis of his argumentation is what
one might call floating. It rises and falls with the human tide of
causation; yet the structure built upon it remains at all times upright
and unchanged.
Nietzsche points out that the numerous "logical" conclusions of
philosophers have been for the most part _a priori_ propositions, the
results of prejudices or desires, and that the syllogistic structures
reared to them came as explanations and defences, rather than as
dialectic preambles. In their adopting a hypothetical truth as a
premise, he sees only the advocacy for a point of view, arguing that
in order to erect a system of logic the initial thesis must be proved.
Therefore he questions the fundamental worth of certainty as opposed
to uncertainty, and of truth as opposed to falsity, thus striking at
the very foundations reared by those philosophers who have assumed,
without substantiation, that only certainty and truth are valuable.
Nietzsche calls these absolutists astute defenders of prejudices, and
characterises the verbalistic prestidigitation of Kant as a highly
developed form of prejudice-defending. Spinoza, with his mathematical
system of reasoning, likewise falls in the category of those thinkers
who first assume conclusions and then prepare explanations for them
by a process of inverted reasoning. Nietzsche proceeds to pose the
instinctive functions against conscious thinking. He asserts that the
channels taken by thought are defined by the thinker's nature, and that
even logic is influenced by physiological considerations. The whole
fabric of philosophic thought is held up to the light of immediate
necessity.
Going further, he inquires into the "impulse to knowledge." He finds
that a specific purpose has always been the actuating force of any
philosophy, and that consequently philosophy, even in its most abstract
form, has had a residuum of autobiography in it. In fine, that
philosophy, far from being a search, has been an aim toward a definite
preconceived result. The moral or ethical impulse, being always
imperious, has not infrequently resulted in philosophising, and in all
such cases knowledge has been used as an instrument. Thus knowledge
which led to a philosophical conclusion has been the outgrowth of
a personal instinct. In those cases where an impersonal "impulse
to knowledge" may have existed, it has led, not into philosophical
channels, but into practical and often commercial activities. The
scholar has ever remained personal in his quest for philosophical
formulas. In Kant's "Table of Categories," wherein that philosopher
claimed to have found the faculty of synthetic judgment _a priori,_
Nietzsche finds only a circle of reasoning which begins and ends in
personal instinct. And in Kant's discovery of a new moral faculty,
Nietzsche sees only sophistical invention, and accounts for its
widespread acceptance by the moral state of the Germans at that period.
Ignoring the _possibility_ of synthetic judgments _a priori,_ Nietzsche
advances the query as to their _necessity,_ and lays stress on the
impracticability of truth without _belief._ The inherent falsity or
truth of a proposition has no bearing on philosophical doctrines so
long as a contrary belief is present, a belief such as we exert toward
the illusions of the world of reality when we make practical use of
that world's perspective.
The schemes of personal philosophy, such, for instance, as we find in
Schopenhauer, are dealt with by Nietzsche in a single paragraph: "When
I analyse the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I
find a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of
which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is
I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks,
that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who
is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally, that
it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking--that I
_know_ what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself
what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is
just happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the
assertion 'I think,' assumes that I _compare_ my state at the present
moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine
what it is: on account of this retrospective connection with further
'knowledge,' it has at any rate no immediate certainty for me." Thus
the smug materialistic philosopher finds himself necessitated to fall
back on purely metaphysical explanations for answers to the questions
arising out of his definition of truth.
Locke falls under a critical survey in this chapter. In answer to
this thinker's theory regarding the origin of ideas, Nietzsche names
the great cycles of philosophical systems and calls attention to the
similarity of processes in such cycles. Furthermore, he shows that the
foundations of all previous philosophies are discoverable in the new
styles of contemporaneous thought. And in those national schools of
philosophy conceived in languages which stem from the same origin, he
finds an undeniable resemblance. All of which leads to a conclusion
incompatible with Locke's theory. Nietzsche attacks the conclusions
of the physicists, denying them any place in philosophy because
their research consists solely in interpretations of natural laws in
accordance with their own prejudices and beliefs. The theories which
might be deduced from natural phenomena are not discoverable in their
doctrines; their activities have consisted in twisting natural events
to suit preconceived valuations.
Finally Nietzsche inquires into the habits and practices of
psychologists. Not even among these workers does he find a basis for
philosophy. Psychology, he argues, has been guided, not by a detached
and lofty desire to ascertain truth in its relation to the human
mind, but by prejudices and fears grounded in moral considerations.
He finds a constant desire on the part of experimenters to account
for "good" impulses as distinguished from "bad" ones. And in this
desire lies the superimposing of moral prejudices on a science which,
more than all others, deals with problems farthest removed from
moral influences. These prejudices in psychology, as well as in all
branches of philosophy, are the obstacles which stand in the way of any
deep penetration into the motives beneath human conduct. Nietzsche,
in his analyses and criticisms, is not solely destructive: he is
subterraneously constructing his own philosophical system founded
on the will to power. This phrase is used many times in the careful
research of the first chapter. As the book proceeds, this doctrine
develops.
Nietzsche's best definition of what he calls the "free spirit," namely:
the thinking man, the intellectual aristocrat, the philosopher and
ruler, is contained in the twenty-six pages of the second chapter of
"Beyond Good and Evil." In a series of paragraphs--longer than is
Nietzsche's wont--the leading characteristics of this superior man
are described. The "free spirit," however, must not be confused with
the superman. The former is the "bridge" which the present-day man
must cross in the process of surpassing himself. In the delineation
and analysis of him, as presented to us here, we can glimpse his most
salient mental features. Heretofore, as in "Thus Spake Zarathustra,"
he has been but partially and provisionally defined. Now his instincts
and desires, his habits and activities are outlined. Furthermore, we
are given an explanation of his relation to the inferior man and to
the organisms of his environment. The chapter is an important one,
for at many points it is a subtle elucidation of many of Nietzsche's
dominant philosophic principles. By inference, the differences of class
distinction are strictly drawn. The slave-morality _(sklavmoral)_ and
the master-morality (_herrenmoral_), though as yet undefined, are
balanced against each other; and the deportmental standards of the
masters and slaves are defined by way of differentiating between these
two opposing human factions. While the serving class is constantly
manifesting its need of a guiding dogma, the ruling class is constantly
approaching the state wherein the arbitrary moral mandates are denied.
Nietzsche sees a new order of philosophers appearing--men who will
stand beyond good and evil, who will be not only free spirits, "but
something more, higher, greater, and fundamentally different." In
describing these men of the future, of which the present free men are
the heralds and forerunners, Nietzsche establishes an individualistic
ideal which he develops fully in later chapters.
A keen and far-reaching analysis of the various aspects assumed by
religious faith constitutes a third section of "Beyond Good and Evil."
Though touching upon various influences of Christianity, this section
is more general in its religious scope than even "The Antichrist,"
many indications of which are to be found here. This chapter has to
do with the numerous inner experiences of man, which are directly
or indirectly attributable to religious doctrines. The origin of the
instinct for faith itself is sought, and the results of this faith are
balanced against the needs of the individuals and of the race. The
relation between religious ecstasy and sensuality; the attempt on the
part of religious practitioners to arrive at a negation of the will;
the transition from religious gratitude to fear; the psychology at the
bottom of saint-worship;--to problems such as these Nietzsche devotes
his energies in his inquiry of the religious mood. The geographical
considerations which enter into the character and intensity of
religious faith form an important basis for study; and the differences
between Comte's sociology and Sainte-Beuve's anti-Jesuit utterances are
explained from a standpoint of national influences. Nietzsche examines
the many phases of atheism and the principal anti-Christian tendencies
of all philosophy since Descartes. There is an illuminating exposition
of the important stages in religious cruelty and of the motives
underlying the various forms of religious sacrifices. Again we run upon
the doctrine of eternal recurrence, but here, as elsewhere, it may be
regarded, not as a basic element in Nietzsche's philosophical scheme,
but as a by-product of his thought. Nietzsche emphasises the necessity
of idleness in all religious lives, and shows how the adherence to the
religious mood works against the activities, both of mind and of body,
which make for the highest efficiency.
A very important phase of Nietzsche's teaching is contained in this
criticism of the religious life. The detractors of the Nietzschean
doctrine, almost without exception, base their judgments on the
assumption that the universal acceptation of his theories would result
in social chaos. As I have pointed out before, Nietzsche desired
no such general adoption of his beliefs. In his bitterest diatribes
against Christianity, his object was not to shake the faith of the
great majority of mankind in their idols. He sought merely to free
the strong men from the restrictions of a religion which fitted the
needs of only the weaker members of society. He neither hoped nor
desired to wean the mass of humanity from Christianity or any similar
dogmatic comfort. On the contrary, he denounced those superficial
atheists who endeavoured to weaken the foundations of religion. He
saw the positive necessity of such religions as a basis for his slave
morality, and in the present chapter he exhorts the rulers to preserve
the religious faith of the serving classes, and to use it as a means
of government--as an instrument in the work of disciplining and
educating. In paragraph 61 he says: "The selecting and disciplining
influence--destructive as well as creative and fashioning--which can
be exercised by means of religion is manifold and varied, according to
the sort of people placed under its spell and protection." Not only is
this an expression of the utilitarian value of religious formulas, but
a definite voicing of one of the main factors in his philosophy. His
entire system of ethics is built on the complete disseverance of the
dominating class and the serving class; and his doctrine of "beyond
good and evil" should be considered only as it pertains to the superior
man. To apply it to all classes would be to reduce Nietzsche's whole
system of ethics to impracticability, and therefore to an absurdity.
Passing from a consideration of the religious mood, Nietzsche enters a
broader sphere of ethical research, and endeavours to trace the history
and development of morals. He accuses the philosophers of having
avoided the real problem of morality, namely: the testing of the faith
and motives which lie beneath moral beliefs. This is the task he sets
for himself, and in his chapter, "The Natural History of Morals," he
makes an examination of moral origins--an examination which is extended
into an exhaustive treatise in "The Genealogy of Morals." However, his
dissection here is carried out on a broader and far more general scale
than in his previous books, such as "Human, All-Too-Human" and "The
Dawn of Day." Heretofore he had confined himself to codes and systems,
to _acts_ of morality and immorality, to judgments of conducts. In
"Beyond Good and Evil" he treats of moral prejudices as forces working
hand in hand with human progress. In addition, there is a definite
attitude of constructive thinking here which is absent from his earlier
work. He outlines the course to be taken by the men of the future, and
points to the results which have accrued from the moralities of modern
nations. He offers the will to power in place of the older "will to
belief," and characterises the foundations of acceptance for all moral
codes as "fictions" and "premature hypotheses." He defines the racial
ideals which have grown up out of moral influences, and, applying them
to the needs of the present day, finds them inadequate and dangerous.
The conclusion to which his observations and analyses point is that,
unless the rulers of the race take a stand beyond the outposts of good
and evil and govern on a basis of expediency divorced from all moral
influences, the individual is in constant danger of being lowered to
the level of the gregarious conscience.
In the chapter, "We Scholars," Nietzsche continues his definition
of the philosopher, whom he holds to be the highest type of man.
Besides being a mere description of the intellectual traits of this
"free spirit," the chapter is also an exposition of the shortcomings
of those modern men who pose as philosophers. In the path of these
new thinkers Nietzsche sees many difficulties both from within and
from without, and points out methods whereby these obstacles may be
overcome. Also the man of science and the man of genius are analyzed
and weighed as to their relative importance in the community. In
fact, we have here Nietzsche's most concise and complete definition
of the individuals upon whom rests the burden of progress. These
valuations of the intellectual leaders are important to the student,
for by one's understanding them, along with the reasons for such
valuations, a comprehension of the ensuing volumes is facilitated.
Nietzsche hereby establishes the qualities of those entitled to the
master-morality code; and, by thus drawing the line of demarcation in
humanity, he defines at the same time that class whose constitutions
and predispositions demand the slave-morality. In addition, he affixes,
according to his philosophical formula, a scale of values to such
mental attributes as objectivity, power to will, scepticism, positivity
and constraint.
Important material touching on many of the fundamental points of
Nietzsche's philosophy is embodied in the chapter entitled "Our
Virtues." The more general inquiries into conduct and the research
along the broader lines of ethics are supplanted by inquiries into
specific moral attributes. The current virtues are questioned, and
their historical significance is determined. The value of such virtues
is tested in their relation to different types of men. Sacrifice,
sympathy, brotherly love, service, loyalty, altruism and similar ideals
of conduct are examined, and the results of such virtues are shown
to be incompatible with the demands of modern social intercourse.
Nietzsche poses against these virtues the sterner and more rigid
forms of conduct, pointing out wherein they meet with the present
requirements of human progress. The chapter is a preparation for his
establishment of a new morality and also an explanation of the dual
ethical code which is one of the main pillars in his philosophical
structure. Before presenting his precept of a dual morality, Nietzsche
endeavours to determine woman's place in the political and social
scheme, and points out the necessity, not only of individual feminine
functioning, but of the preservation of a distinct polarity in sexual
relationship.
In the final chapter many of Nietzsche's philosophical ideas take
definite shape. The doctrine of slave-morality and master-morality,
prepared for and partially defined in preceding chapters, is here
directly set forth, and those virtues and attitudes which constitute
the "nobility" of the master class are specifically defined. Nietzsche
designates the duty of his aristocracy, and segregates the human
attributes according to the rank of individuals. The Dionysian ideal,
which underlies all the books that follow "Beyond Good and Evil,"
receives its first direct exposition and application. The hardier
human traits such as egotism, cruelty, arrogance, retaliation and
appropriation are given ascendency over the softer virtues such
as sympathy, charity, forgiveness, loyalty and humility, and are
pronounced necessary constituents in the moral code of a natural
aristocracy. At this point is begun the transvaluation of values which
was to have been completed in "The Will to Power." The student should
read carefully this chapter, for it is an introduction as well as an
explanation for what follows, and was written with that purpose in
view.