Some poor countries understood these basic, unpleasant, facts of life.

They extracted an "education fee" from those emigrating. This fee was

supposed to, at least partially, recapture the costs of educating and

training the immigrants. Romania and the USSR imposed such levies on

Jews immigrating to Israel in the 1970s. Others despairingly regard the

brain drain as a natural catastrophe. Very few countries are trying to

tackle the fundamental, structural and philosophical flaws of the

system, the roots of the disenchantment of those who leave.

The Brain Drain is so serious that some countries lost up to a third of

their total young and educated population to it (Macedonia in

South-eastern Europe, some less developed countries in South East Asia

and in Africa). Others were drained of almost one half of the growth in

their educated workforce (for instance, Israel during the 1980s).

Brains are an ideal natural resource: they can be cultivated, directed,

controlled, manipulated, regulated. They are renewable and replicable.

Brains tend to grow exponentially through interaction and they have an

unparalleled economic value added. The profit margin in knowledge and

information related industries far exceeds anything common to more

traditional, second wave, industries (not to mention first wave

agriculture and agribusiness).

What is even more important:

Poor countries are uniquely positioned to take advantage of this third

revolution. With cheap, educated workforce - they can monopolize basic

data processing and telecommunications functions worldwide. True, this

calls for massive initial investments in physical infrastructure. But

the important input is the wetware, the brains. To constrain them, to

disappoint them, to make them run away, to more merit-orientated places

- is to sentence oneself to a permanent disadvantage and deprivation.

This is what the countries in the Balkans are doing. Driving away the

best part of their population by encouraging the worst part. Abandoning

their future by dwelling on their past. Caught in a fatal spider web of

family connections and political cronyism of their own design. Their

factories and universities and offices and government filled to the

brim with third-rate relatives of third-rate professors and

bureaucrats. Turning themselves into third-rate countries in a

self-perpetuating, self-feeding process of decline. And all the while

eyeing the new and the foreign with the paranoia that is the result of

true guilt.

(Article written on September 8, 1999 and published September 27, 1999

in "Central Europe Review" volume 1, issue 14)

Return

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?

(Who is Guarding the Guards?)

Izetbegovic, the nominal president of the nominal Bosnian state, the

darling of the gullible western media, denies that he and his cronies

and his cronies' cronies stole 40% of all civilian aid targeted at

Bosnia - a minor matter of 1 billion US dollars and change, in less

than 4 years. The tribes of the Balkans stop bleeding each other to

death only when they gang up to bleed another. In this, there are no

races and no traces - everyone is equal under the sign of the dollar.

Serbs, Bosnians and Croats divided the loot with the loftiest of

egalitarian instincts. Honour among thieves transformed into honour

among victims and their murderers. Mammon is the only real authority in

this god forsaken, writhing rump of a country.

And not only there.

In Russia, billions (3 to 5) were transferred to secret off shore bank

accounts to be "portfolio managed" by mysterious fly-by-night entities.

Many paid with their jobs when the trail led to the incestuous Yeltsin

clan and their Byzantine court.

Convoys snake across the mountainous Kosovo, bringing smuggled goods at

exorbitant prices to the inhabitants of this parched territory - all

under the avuncular gaze of multinational peacekeepers.

In Romania, Hungary and Greece, UN forces have been known to take

bribes to allow goods into besieged Serbia. Oil, weapons and strategic

materials, all slid across this greasy channel of the international

brotherhood of cash.

A lot of the aid, ostensibly intended to ameliorate the state of

refugedom imposed upon the unsuspecting, harried population of Kosovo -

resurfaced in markets, white and black, across the region. Food,

blankets, tents, electrical equipment, even toys - were on offer in

bazaars from Skopje to Podgorica and from Sofia to Thessalonica,

replete with the stamps of the unwitting donors. Aid workers scurried

back and forth in expensive utility vehicles, buzzing mobile phones in

hand and latest model, officially purchased, infrared laptops humming

in the air conditioned coolness of their five star hotel rooms (or

fancy apartments). In their back pockets they safeguarded their first

class tickets (the food is better and the stewardesses...). The

scavengers of every carnage, they descended upon this tortured land in

redundant hordes, feeding off the misery, the autoimmune deficiency of

the syndrome of humanism.

Ask yourselves: how could one of every 3 dollars - 50% of GNP - be

stolen in a country the size of a tiny American state - without the

knowledge and collaboration of the international organizations which

ostensibly manage this bedlam? Why did the IMF renew the credit lines

to a Russia, which cheated bold-facedly regarding its foreign exchange

reserves? How was Serbia awash and flush with oil and other goods

prohibited under the terms of the never-ending series of embargoes

imposed upon it?

The answer is that potent cocktail of fear and graft. First came fear -

that Russia will collapse, that the Balkans will spill over, that

Bosnia will disintegrate. Nuclear nightmares intermingled with Armenian

and Jewish flashbacks of genocide. The west shut its eyes tight and

threw money at the bad spirits of irredentism and re-emergent

communism. The long arm of the USA, the "international" financial

institutions, collaborated in constructing the habit forming dole house

that Eastern and Southern Europe has become. This conflict-reticence,

these approach-avoidance cycles led to an inevitable collusion between

the ruling mob families that pass for regimes in these parts of the

planet - and the unilateral institutions that pass for multilateral

ones in the rest of it. An elaborate system of winks and nods, the sign

language of institutional rot and decaying governance, took over.

Greasy palms clapped one another with the eerie silence of conspiracy.

The world looked away as both - international financial institutions

and corrupt regimes - robbed their constituencies blind. This was

perceived to be the inevitable moral cost of stability. Survival of the

majority entailed the filthy enrichment of the minority. And the west

acquiesced.

But this grand design backfired. Like insidious bacteria, corruption

breeds violence and hops from host to host. It does not discriminate,

this plague of black conscience, between east and west. As it infected

the indigenous, it also affected their guardians. They were all

engulfed by raging greed, by a degradation of the inhibitions and by

the intoxicating promiscuity of lawlessness. Inebriated by their newly

found powers, little Caesars - natives and financial colonialists -

claimed their little plots of crime and avarice, a not so secret order

of disintegration of the social fabric. A ghoulish landscape, shrouded

in the opaque mist of the nomenclature, the camaraderie of the

omnipotent.

And corruption bred violence. The Chicago model imported lock, stock

and the barrel of the gun. Former cronies disappeared mysteriously,

bloated corpses in stale hotel rooms - being the only "contracts"

honoured. Territories were carved up in constant, unrelenting warfare.

One billion dollars are worth a lot of blood and it was spilled with

glee, with the enthusiasm of the inevitable, with the elation of

gambling all on a single spin of the Russian roulette.

It is this very violence that the west tried to drown with its credits.

But unbeknownst to it, this very violence thrived on these pecuniary

fertilizers. A plant of horrors, it devoured its soil and its

cultivators alike. And 120,000 people paid with their lives for this

wrong gamble. Counting its losses, the west is poised to spin the wheel

again. More money is amassed, the dies are cast and more people cast to

die.

(Article written on August 23, 1999 and published September 13, 1999

in "Central Europe Review" volume 1, issue 12)

Return

Herzl's Butlers

James Cook misled the British government back home by neglecting to

report about the aborigines he spotted on the beaches of New Holland.

This convenient omission allowed him to claim the territory for the

crown. In the subsequent waves of colonization, the aborigines

perished. Modern Australia stands awash in their blood, constructed on

their graves, thriving on their confiscated lands. The belated efforts

to redress these wrongs meet with hostility and the atavistic fears of

the dispossessor.

In "Altneuland" (translated to Hebrew as "Tel Aviv"), the feverish tome

composed by Theodore Herzl, Judaism's improbable visionary - Herzl

refers to the Arabs as pliant and compliant butlers, replete with

gloves and tarbushes. In the book, a German Jewish family prophetically

lands at Jaffa, the only port in erstwhile Palestine. They are welcomed

and escorted by "Briticized" Arab gentlemen's gentlemen who are only

too happy to assist their future masters and colonizers to disembark.

In between these extremes - of annihilation and assimilation - modern

Europe has come up with a plethora of models and solutions to the

question of minorities, which plagued it and still does. Two schools of

thought emerged: the nationalistic-ethnic versus the cultural.

Europe has always been torn between centrifugal and centripetal forces.

Multi-ethnic empires alternated with swarms of mini-states with

dizzying speed. European Unionism clashed with brown-turning-black

nationalism and irredentism. Universalistic philosophies such as

socialism fought racism tooth and nail. European history became a

blood-dripping pendulum, swung by the twin yet conflicting energies of

separation and integration. The present is no different. The dream of

the European Union confronted the nightmare of a dismembered Yugoslavia

throughout the last decade. And ethnic tensions are seething all across

the continent. Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia,

Bulgarians in Moldova, Albanians in Macedonia, Russians in the Baltic

countries, even Padans in Italy and the list is long.

The cultural school of co-existence envisaged multi-ethnic states with

shared philosophies and value systems, which do not infringe upon the

maintenance and preservation of the ethnic identities of their

components. The first socialists adopted this model enthusiastically.

They foresaw a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural socialist mega-state. The

socialist values, they believed, will serve as the glue binding

together the most disparate of ethnic elements. In the event, it took a

lot more than common convictions. It took suppression on an

unprecedented scale and it took concentration camps and the morbid

application of the arts and sciences of death. And even then both the

Nazi Reich and the Stalinist USSR fell to ethnic pieces.

The national(istic) school supports the formation of ethnically

homogenous states, if necessary, by humane and gradual (or inhuman and

abrupt) ethnic cleansing. Homogeneity is empirically linked to

stability and, therefore, to peace, economic prosperity and oftentimes

to democracy. Heterogeneity breeds friction, hatred, violence,

instability, poverty and authoritarianism. The conclusion is simple:

ethnicities cannot co-exist. Ethnic groups (a.k.a. nations) must be

left to their own devices, put differently: they must be allocated a

piece of land and allowed to lead their lives as they see fit. The land

thus allocated should correspond, as closely as possible, with the

birthplace of the nation, the scenery of its past and the cradle of its

culture.

The nationalist school depended on denial and repression of the

existence of heterogeneity and of national minorities. This was done by:

a. Ethnic Cleansing

Greece and Turkey exchanged population after the First World War.

Czechoslovakia expelled the Sudeten Germans after the Second World War

and the Nazis rendered big parts of Europe Judenrein. Bulgarians forced

Turks to flee. The Yugoslav succession wars were not wars in the

Clausewitz sense - rather they were protracted guerrilla operations

intended to ethnically purge swathes of the "motherland".

b. Ethnic Denial

In 1984, the Bulgarian communist regime forced the indigenous Turkish

population to "Bulgarize" their names. The Slav minorities in the

Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were forced to

"Magyarize" following the 1867 Compromise. Franco's Spain repressed

demands for regional autonomy. Other, more democratic states fostered a

sense of national unity by mass media and school indoctrination. Every

facet of life was subjected to and incorporated in this relentless and

unforgiving pursuit of national identity: sports, chess, national

holidays, heroes, humour. The particularisms of each group gained

meaning and legitimacy only through and by their incorporation in the

bigger picture of the nation. Thus, Greece denies to this very day that

there are Turks or Macedonians on its soil. There are only Muslim

Greeks, it insists (often brutally and in violation of human and civil

rights). The separate identities of Brittany and Provence were

submerged within the French collective one and so was the identity of

the Confederate South in the current USA. Some call it "cultural

genocide".

The nationalist experiment failed miserably. It was pulverized by a

million bombs, slaughtered in battlefields and concentration camps, set

ablaze by fanatics and sadists. The pendulum swung. In 1996, Hungarians

were included in the Romanian government and in 1998 they made it to

the Slovakian one. In Macedonia, Albanian parties took part in all the

governments since independence. The cultural school, on the ascendance,

was able to offer three variants:

1. The Local Autonomy

Ethnic minorities are allowed to use their respective languages in

certain municipalities where they constitute more than a given

percentage (usually twenty) of the total population. Official

documents, street signs, traffic tickets and education all are

translated to the minority language as well as to the majority's. This

rather meaningless placebo has a surprisingly tranquillizing effect on

restless youth and nationalistic zealots. In 1997, police fought local

residents in a few Albanian municipalities precisely on this issue.

2. The Territorial Autonomy

Ethnic minorities often constitute a majority in a given region. Some

"host" countries allow them to manage funds, collect taxes and engage

in limited self-governance. This is the regional or territorial

autonomy that Israel offered to the Palestinians (too late) and that

Kosovo and Vojvodina enjoyed under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution

(which Milosevic shredded to very small pieces). This solution was

sometimes adopted by the nationalist competition itself. The Nazis

dreamt up at least two such territorial "final solutions" for the Jews

(one in Madagascar and one in Poland). Stalin gave the Jews a decrepit

wasteland, Birobidjan, to be their "homeland". And, of course, there

were the South African "homelands".

3. The Personal Autonomy

Karl Renner and Otto Bauer advanced the idea of the individual as the

source of political authority - regardless of his or her domicile.

Between the two world wars, Estonia gave personal autonomy to its Jews

and Russians. Wherever they were, they were entitled to vote and elect

representatives to bodies of self-government. These had symbolic

taxation powers but exerted more tangible authority over matters

educational and cultural. This idea, however benign sounding,

encountered grave opposition from right and left alike. The right wing

"exclusive" nationalists rejected it because they regarded minorities

the way a sick person regards his germs. And the left wing,

"inclusive", nationalists saw in it the seeds of discrimination, an

anathema.

How and why did we find ourselves embroiled in such a mess?

It is all the result of the wrong terminology, an example of the power

of words. The Jews (and Germans) came up with the "objective",

"genetic", "racial" and "organic" nation. Membership was determined by

external factors over which the member-individual had no control. The

French "civil" model - an 18th century innovation - regarded the nation

and the state as voluntary collectives, bound by codes and values,

which are subject to social contracts. Benedict Anderson called the

latter "imagined communities".

Naturally, it was a Frenchman (Ernest Renan) who wrote:

"Nations are not eternal. They had a beginning and they will have an

end. And they will probably be replaced by a European confederation."

He was referring to the fact that nation STATES were nothing but (at

the time) a century old invention of dubious philosophical pedigree.

The modern state was indeed invented by intellectuals (historians and

philologists) and then solidified by ethnic cleansing and the horrors

of warfare. Jacob Grimm virtually created the chimeral Serbo-Croat

"language". Claude Fauriel dreamt up the reincarnation of ancient

Greece in its eponymous successor. The French sociologist and

anthropologist Marcel Mauss remarked angrily that "it is almost comical

to see little-known, poorly investigated items of folklore invoked at

the Peace Conference as proof that the territory of this or that nation

should extend over a particular area because a certain shape of

dwelling or bizarre custom is still in evidence". Archaeology,

anthropology, philology, history and a host of other sciences and arts

were invoked in an effort to substantiate a land claim. And no land

claim was subjected to a statute of limitations, no subsequent conquest

or invasion or settlement legitimised. Witness the "Dacian wars"

between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania (are the Romanians latter

day Dacians or did they invade Transylvania long after it was populated

by the Hungarians?). Witness the Israelis and the Palestinians. And,

needless to add, witness the Serbs and the Albanians, the Greeks and

the Macedonians and the Macedonians and the Bulgarians.

Thus, the modern nation-state was a reflection of something more

primordial, of human nature itself as it resonated in the national

founding myths (most of them fictitious or contrived). The

supra-national dream is to many a nightmare. Europe is fragmenting into

micro-nations while unifying its economies. These two trends are not

mutually exclusive as is widely and erroneously believed. Actually,

they are mutually reinforcing. As the modern state loses its major

economic roles and functions to a larger, supranational framework - it

loses its legitimacy and its raison d'etre.

The one enduring achievement of the state was the replacement of

allegiance to a monarch, to a social class, to a region, or to a

religion by an allegiance to a "nation". This subversive idea comes

back to haunt itself. It is this allegiance to the nation that is the

undoing of the tolerant, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, abstract modern

state. To be a nationalist is to belong to ever smaller and more

homogenous groups and to dismantle the bigger, all-inclusive polity,

which is the modern state.

Indeed, the state is losing in the battlefield of ideas to the other

two options: micro-nationalism (homogeneous and geographically

confined) and reactionary affiliation. Micro-nationalism gave birth to

Palestine and to Kosovo, to the Basque land and to Quebec, to

regionalism and to local patriotism. It is a fragmenting force. Modern

technology makes many political units economically viable despite their

minuscule size - and so they declare their autonomy and often aspire to

independence.

Reactionary Affiliation is cosmopolitan. Think about the businessman,

the scholar, the scientist, the pop star, the movie star, the

entrepreneur, the arbitrageur and the Internet. People feel affiliated

to a profession, a social class, a region, or a religion more than they

do to their state. Hence the phenomena of ex-pats, mass immigration,

international managers. This is a throwback to an earlier age when the

modern state was not yet invented. Indeed, the predicament of the

nation-state is such that going back may be the only benign way of

going forward.

(Article written on September 5, 1999 and published September 20, 1999

in "Central Europe Review" volume 1, issue 13)

Return

The Phlegm and the Anima

An Impressionistic Canvass

The Calamity

It often rains in Skopje nowadays. Sudden, thunderous outpourings of

acidulous and gluey fluid. People say it is the pollution from 12,000

tonnes of bombs dropped 20 km from here. The unions warn of a hot

autumn. The omens are ominous. It looks like an economic crash rather

than a soft landing. Tony Blair was here a while ago. He photo

opportunities with photogenic refugees and promised the soft spoken and

dreamy eyed Prime Minister of Macedonia 20 million British Pounds. The

money never came. Blair's promise went the way of thousands of other

promises made by the good and the mighty throughout the history of this

melancholy part of the globe.

Emir Kusturice compared the Balkans to an island, drifting listlessly,

receding wedding music in the background. It is heart rending and often

provokes in me a tsunamic pity, an earthquake of goodwill. The locals

are adept at using this resonance, at taking advantage of foreigners

vulnerable to their music, to their costumes, to their rustic

shrewdness.

In 1963, upon the occasion of a particularly malicious earthquake,

which levelled Skopje - they rebuilt it from generous foreign

donations. The message sank in: foreigners love disasters, natural and

manmade. Foreigners are willing to shell hard currency for this

indulgence. The harder the catastrophe - the harder the currency. Thus,

calamities became an export industry, a major earner of foreign

exchange, the opportunity of a lifetime for a few in exchange for the

misery of the many.

The Aftermath

Music drifts in with the fragrances of decaying blossoms and with

corpulent mosquitoes. The fragmented echoes of animated discussions.

People here talk with their whole bodies. They lean forward and touch

their conversants. When they meet or depart they kiss each other on the

cheeks and hug passionately. It was, therefore strange to see the body

language of the octogenarian president of Macedonia with his much

younger Albanian counterpart. They stood apart and made diametrically

opposed declarations about the future of Kosovo. Watching the old

communist apparatchik Gligorov, I was reminded or Milosevic when he

announced the Serb victory in operation Allied Force. He stood so

rigid, as though about to break and leaned towards the camera, creating

an eerie fish lens effect. Balkanians are not proud people, they are

adaptable. But, in an effort to compensate for a deep-set inferiority

complex, they react with vanity and narcissism. Co-existence here has

never been an easy proposition and the Americans forced strange

bedfellows upon each other. Accustomed to the imposing ways of

superpowers, the Balkan bowed its head. But it is a contemptuous

gesture. Balkanians aim to win through their surrender. They always

harbour hidden agendas. Knowing this, they are also paranoid but, as

distinct from the classic pathology, they do have enemies. The Balkan

will wait until America joins Rome and Turkey. The only commodity it

has aplenty is time. So now Gligorov and Mejdani shake hands but they

both know the long knives are drawn. They both will wait for the

intruders to depart, which will them go on with that traditional

pastime of Balkan rulers: slaughtering each other.

The War Chests

After the Rain : how the West lost the East · 第 4 / 22 段