7. Has recurrent suspicions, without justification, regarding

fidelity of spouse or sexual partner.

Schizotypal Personality Disorder

A pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits marked by

acute discomfort with and reduced capacity for close relationships as

well as by cognitive or perceptual distortions and eccentricities of

behaviour beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of

contexts as indicated by five (or more) of the following:

1. Ideas of reference (excluding delusions of reference) - (SV:

the delusional belief that others are looking at him pointing at him,

talking about him, especially in a derogatory manner);

2. Odd beliefs or magical thinking that influences behaviour and

is inconsistent with subcultural norms (e.g., superstitiousness, belief

in clairvoyance, telepathy, or "sixth sense"; in children and

adolescents, bizarre fantasies or preoccupations);

3. Unusual perceptual experiences, including bodily illusions;

4. Odd thinking and speech (e.g., vague, circumstantial,

metaphorical, over-elaborate, or stereotyped);

5. Suspiciousness or paranoid ideation;

6. Inappropriate and constricted affect;

7. Behaviour, or appearance that is odd, eccentric, or peculiar;

8. Lack of close friends or confidants other than first-degree

relatives;

9. Excessive social anxiety that does not diminish with

familiarity and tends to be associated with paranoid fears rather than

negative judgements about self.

(Article written on December 9, 1999 and published December 13, 1999

in "Central Europe Review" volume 1, issue 25)

Return

The Last Family

"One man cannot be a warrior on a battlefield"

(Russian proverb)

There is no word for it in Russian. Platon Karatayev, the typical

"Russian soul" in Tolstoy's "War and Peace", extols, for pages at a

time, the virtues of communality and disparages the individual - this

otherwise useless part of the greater whole. In Macedonia the words

"private" or "privacy" pertain to matters economic. The word "intimacy"

is used instead to designate the state of being free of prying,

intrusive eyes and acts of meddling. Throughout Central and Eastern

Europe, the rise of "individualism" did not give birth to its

corollary: "privacy". After decades (and, in most cases, centuries) of

cramped, multi-generational shared accommodation, it is no wonder.

To the alienated and schizoid ears of Westerners, the survival of

family and community in CEE sounds like an attractive proposition. A

dual-purpose safety net, both emotional and economic, the family in

countries in transition provides its members with unemployment

benefits, accommodation, food and psychological advice to boot.

Divorced daughters, saddled with little (and not so little) ones, the

prodigal sons incapable of finding a job befitting their

qualifications, the sick, the unhappy - all are absorbed by the

compassionate bosom of the family and, by extension the community. The

family, the neighbourhood, the community, the village, the tribe - are

units of subversion as well as useful safety valves, releasing and

regulating the pressures of contemporary life in the modern,

materialistic, crime ridden state. The ancient blood feud laws of the

kanoon were handed over through familial lineages in northern Albania,

in defiance of the paranoiac Enver Hoxha regime. Criminals hide among

their kin in the Balkans, thus effectively evading the long arm of the

law (state). Jobs are granted, contracts signed and tenders won on an

open and strict nepotistic basis and no one finds it odd or wrong.

There is something atavistically heart-warming in all this.

Historically, the rural units of socialization and social organization

were the family and the village. As villagers migrated to the cities,

these structural and functional patterns were imported by them, en

masse. The shortage of urban apartments and the communist invention of

the communal apartment (its tiny rooms allocated one per family with

kitchen and bathroom common to all) only served to perpetuate these

ancient modes of multi-generational huddling. At best, the few

available apartments were shared by three generations: parents, married

offspring and their children. In many cases, the living space was also

shared by sickly or no-good relatives and even by unrelated families.

These living arrangements - more adapted to rustic open spaces than to

high rises - led to severe social and psychological dysfunctions. To

this very day, Balkan males are spoiled by the subservience and

servitude of their in-house parents and incessantly and compulsively

catered to by their submissive wives. Occupying someone else's home,

they are not well acquainted with adult responsibilities. Stunted

growth and stagnant immaturity are the hallmarks of an entire

generation, stifled by the ominous proximity of suffocating, invasive

love. Unable to lead a healthy sex life behind paper thin walls, unable

to raise their children and as many children as they see fit, unable to

develop emotionally under the anxiously watchful eye of their parents -

this greenhouse generation is doomed to a zombie-like existence in the

twilight nether land of their parents' caves. Many ever more eagerly

await the demise of their caring captors and the promised land of their

inherited apartments, free of their parents' presence.

The daily pressures and exigencies of co-existence are enormous. The

prying, the gossip, the criticism, the chastising, the small agitating

mannerisms, the smells, the incompatible personal habits and

preferences, the pusillanimous bookkeeping - all serve to erode the

individual and to reduce him or her to the most primitive mode of

survival. This is further exacerbated by the need to share expenses, to

allocate labour and tasks, to plan ahead for contingencies, to see off

threats, to hide information, to pretend and to fend off emotionally

injurious behaviour. It is a sweltering tropic of affective cancer.

Newly found materialism brought these territories a malignant form of

capitalism coupled with a sub-culture of drugs and crime. The

eventuating disintegration of all polities in the ensuing moral vacuum

was complete. From the more complex federations or states and their

governments, through intermediate municipalities and down to the most

primitive of political cells - the family - they all crumbled in a

storm of discontent and blood. The mutant frontier-"independence" or

pioneer-"individualism" imported from Western B movies led to a

functional upheaval unmatched by a structural one. People want privacy

and intimacy more than ever - but they still inhabit the same shoddily

constructed, congested accommodation and they still earn poorly or are

unemployed. This tension between aspiration and perspiration is

potentially revolutionary. It is this unaccomplished, uneasy

metamorphosis that tore the social fabric of CEE apart, rendering it

poisoned and dysfunctional. This is nothing new - it is what brought

socialism and its more vicious variants down.

But what is new is inequality. Ever the pathologically envious, the

citizens of CEE bathed in common misery. The equal distribution of

poverty and hardship guaranteed their peace of mind. A Jewish proverb

says: "The trouble of the many is half a consolation." It is this

breakdown of symmetry of wretchedness that really shook the social

order. The privacy and intimacy and freedom gained by the few are bound

to incite the many into acts of desperation. After all, what can be

more individualistic, more private, more mind requiting, more

tranquillizing than being part of a riotous mob intent of implementing

a platform of hate and devastation?

(Article written on January 9, 2000 and published January 24, 2000

in "Central Europe Review" volume 2, issue 3)

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Rasputin in Transition

The mad glint in his eyes is likely to be nothing more ominous than

maladjusted contact lenses. If not clean-shaven, he is likely to sport

nothing wilder than a goatee. More likely an atheist than a priest,

this mutation of the ageless confidence artist is nonetheless the

direct spiritual descendent of Rasputin, the raving maniac who governed

Russia until his own execution by Russian noblemen and patriots.

They are to be found in all countries in transition. Wild and insidious

weeds, the outcome of wayward pollination by mutated capitalism. They

prey on their victims, at first acquiring their confidence and love,

then penetrating their political, social and financial structures

almost as a virus would: stealthily and treacherously. By the time

their quarry wakes up to its infection and subjugation - it is already

too late. By then, the invader will have become part of the invaded or

its master, either through blackmail or via tempting subornation.

This region of the CEE and the Balkans provides for fertile grounds. It

is a Petrie dish upon which cultures of corruption and scandalous

conduct are fermented. The typical exploiter of these vulnerabilities

is a foreigner. Things foreign are held in awe and adulation by a

populace so down trodden and made to feel inferior in every way, not

least by foreign tutors and advisors. The craving to be loved, this

gnawing urge to be accepted, to be a member of the club, to be

distinguished from one's former neighbours - are irresistible. The

modern Rasputin doles out this unconditional acceptance, this

all-encompassing affinity, the echoes of avuncularity. In doing so, he

evokes in the recipients such warmth, such relief, such fervour and

reciprocity - that he becomes an idol, a symbol of a paradise long

lost, a golden braid. Having thus completed the first phase of his

meticulous attack - he moves on to the second chapter in this book of

body snatching.

Armed with his new-fangled popularity, the crook moves on and leverages

it to the hilt. He does so by feigning charity, by faking interest, by

false "constructive criticism". To his slow forming army, he recruits

the media, the flower children, the bleeding hearts, reformers,

dissidents and the occasional freak. By holding old authority in

disdain, by declaring his contempt for the methods of the "tried and

true", by appearing to make war upon all rot and immorality - this

creature of expediency emerges as a folk hero. It is the more cynical

and world weary and "sophisticated" members of society that lead the

way, succumbing to his ardour and conviction, to his child-like

innocence, to his unwavering agenda. He cleverly thrusts at them the

double edge of their own disillusionment and disappointment. Thus

mirrored, they are transformed and converted into his camp of renewal

and clean promises by this epiphany. They hand him the keys to every

medium, the very codes and secrets that make him so powerful. They

pledge their alliance and allegiance and render to him the access they

possess to the nerve centres of society. The castle gates thus opened

from inside, his victory assured, the rogue moves on to consummate this

unholy marriage between himself and the deceived.

Always in fear of light, he surreptitiously and cunningly begins to

interact with the foci of power and money in the land. However

loathsome he is to them, however repulsive the experience, however

undesirable the effects of their surrender - they are made to recognize

him as their equal. With the might of the media and a large part of the

people behind him, he can no longer be ignored. Their conspiracy-prone

mind, awash with superstitions and its attaching phobias, tries to

comprehend his meteoric rise, the forcefulness with which he treads,

his unmitigated, inane, self-confidence. Is he a spy? A member of a

secret order? The latent agent of a hyperpower? The heart of a world

conspiracy? Has he no fear of retribution and no remorse? Before this

great unknown, they kneel and yield, an atavistic reaction to atavistic

fears. Now all doors are thrown open, all deals are made available, all

secrets are revealed. The more he learns, the mightier he becomes - the

more his might, the more he learns. To him, a virtuous cycle, to his

hosts - a vicious one.

In all this tumult, he does not lose sight of his original goals -

power, money, fame, all three. It is a relentless pursuit, an obsessive

hunt, a ruthless and unscrupulous chase. In his war, no prisoners are

taken, no price too dear, no human in his orbit left untouched. He will

manipulate and threat and beg and promise and plead and blackmail and

extort to accomplish that which he set out to achieve: decision making

powers, wealth, clout, exposure and resultant fame. It is at this stage

that the latter day Rasputin emerges from the shadows and joins

officialdom or concludes lucrative transactions based on favourably

deflated prices and insider dealing. By now, his shady past is no

longer a hindrance. His prowess far exceeds his invidious biography.

Well installed, he ignores both media and the people. He brushes aside

contemptuously all criticism and enquiry. His true, narcissistic, face

is exposed and it is hideous to behold. But there is nothing to be done

and all resistance is futile. The con man now is in a haste to maximize

his hard earned profits and exit the scene, on his way to another realm

of guile and naiveté.

(Article written on January 25, 2000 and published February 14, 2000

in "Central Europe Review" volume 2, issue 6)

Return

The Honorary Academic

Mira Markovic is an "Honorary Academic" of the Russian Academy of

Science. It cost a lot of money to obtain this title and the Serb

multi-billionaire Karic was only too glad to cough it up. Whatever else

you say about Balkan cronies, they rarely bite the hand that feeds them

(unless and until it is expedient to do so). And whatever else you say

about Russia, it adapted remarkably to capitalism. Everything has a

price and a market. Israel had to learn this fact the hard way when

Russian practical-nurse-level medical doctors and

construction-worker-level civil engineers flooded its shores.

Everything is for sale in this region of opportunities, instant

education inclusive.

It seems that academe suffered the most during the numerous shock

therapies and transition periods showered upon the impoverished

inhabitants of Eastern and Central Europe. The resident of decrepit

communist-era buildings, it had to cope with a flood of eager students

and a deluge of anachronistic "scholars". But in Russia, the CIS and

the Balkans the scenery is nothing short of Dantesque. Unschooled in

any major European language, lazily content with their tenured

positions, stagnant and formal - the academics and academicians of the

Balkans are both failures and a resounding indictment of the rigor

mortis that was socialism. Economics textbooks stop short of mentioning

Friedman or Phelps. History textbooks should better be relegated to the

science fiction shelves. A brave facade of self-sufficiency covers up a

vast hinterland of inferiority complex fully supported by real

inferiority. In antiquated libraries, shattered labs, crooked buildings

and inadequate facilities, students pursue redundant careers with the

wrong teachers.

Corruption seethes under this repellent surface. Teachers sell exams,

take bribes, and trade incestuous sex with their students. They refuse

to contribute to their communities. In all my years in the Balkans, I

have yet to come across a voluntary act - a single voluntary act - by

an academic. And I have come across numerous refusals to help and to

contribute. Materialism incarnate.

This sorry state of affairs has a twofold outcome. On the one hand,

herds of victims of rigidly dictated lectures and the suppression of

free thought. These academic products suffer from the twin afflictions

of irrelevance of skills and the inability to acquire relevant ones,

the latter being the result of decades of brainwashing and industrial

educational methods. Unable to match their anyhow outdated knowledge

with anything a modern marketplace can offer - they default on to

menial jobs, rebel or pull levers to advance in life. Which leads us to

the death of meritocracy and why this region's future is behind it.

In the wake of the downfall of all the major ideologies of the 20th

century - Fascism, Communism, etc. the New Order, heralded by President

Bush, emerged as a battle of Open Club versus Closed Club societies, at

least from the economic point of view.

All modern states and societies must choose whether to be governed by

merit (meritocracy) or by the privileged few (oligarchy). It is

inevitable that the social and economic structures be controlled by

elites. It is a complex world and only a few can master the knowledge

it takes to govern effectively. What sets meritocracy apart is not the

number of members of its ruling (or leading) class, usually no larger

than an oligarchy. No, it is distinguished by its membership criteria

and by the mode of their application.

The meritocratic elite is an open club because it satisfies three

conditions:

1. The process and rules of joining up (i.e., the criteria) are

transparent and widely known;

2. The application and membership procedures are uniform, equal to

all and open to continuous public scrutiny and criticism;

3. The system alters its membership requirements in direct

response to public feedback and to the changing social and economic

environment.

To belong to a meritocracy one needs to satisfy a series of demands,

whose attainment is entirely up to he individual. And that is all that

one needs to do. The rules of joining and of membership are cast in

iron. The wishes and opinions of those who happen to comprise the club

at any given moment are of no importance and of no consequence.

Meritocracy is a "fair play" by rules of equal chance to derive

benefits. Put differently, is the rule of law.

To join a meritocratic club, one needs to demonstrate that one is in

possession of, or has access to, "inherent" parameters, such as

intelligence, a certain level of education, a potential to contribute

to society. An inherent parameter must correspond to a criterion and

the latter must be applied independent of the views and predilections

of those who sometimes are forced to apply it. The members of a

committee or a board can disdain an applicant, or they might wish not

to approve a candidate. Or they may prefer someone else for the job

because they owe her something, or because they play golf with him.

Yet, they are permitted to consider only the applicant's or the

candidate's "inherent" parameters: does he have the necessary tenure,

qualifications, education, experience? Does he contribute to his

workplace, community, and society at large? In other words: is he

"worthy" or "deserving"? Not WHO he is - but WHAT he is.

Granted, these processes of selection, admission, incorporation and

assimilation are administered by mere humans and are, therefore,

subject to human failings. Can qualifications be always judged

"objectively, unambiguously and unequivocally"? Can "the right

personality traits" or "the ability to engage in teamwork" be evaluated

"objectively"? These are vague and ambiguous enough to accommodate bias

and bad will. Still, at least appearances are kept in most cases - and

decisions can be challenged in courts.

What characterizes oligarchy is the extensive, relentless and ruthless

use of "transcendent" (in lieu of "inherent") parameters to decide who

will belong where, who will get which job and, ultimately, who will

enjoy which benefits. The trouble with transcendent parameters is that

there is nothing much an applicant or a candidate can do about them.

Usually, they are accidents, occurrences absolutely beyond the reach or

control of those most affected by them. Race is such a transcendent

parameter and so are gender, familial affiliation or contacts and

influence.

In many corners of the globe, to join a closed, oligarchic club, to get

the right job, to enjoy excessive benefits - one must be white

(racism), male (sexual discrimination), born to the right family

(nepotism), or to have the right political (or other) contacts

(cronyism). And often, belonging to one such club is the prerequisite

for joining another.

In France, for instance, the whole country is politically and

economically run by graduates of the Ecole Normale d'Administration

(ENA). They are known as the ENArques (=the royal dynasty of ENA

graduates).

The privatisation of state enterprises in most East and Central

European countries provided a glaring example of oligarchic

machinations. In most of these countries (the Czech Republic,

Macedonia, Serbia and Russia are notorious examples) - state companies,

the nation's only assets, were "sold" to political cronies, creating in

the process a pernicious amalgam of capitalism and oligarchy, known as

"crony capitalism" or privateering. The national wealth was passed on

to the hands of relatively few, well connected, individuals, at a

ridiculously low price. The nations involved were robbed, their riches

either squandered or smuggled abroad.

In the affairs of humans, not everything falls neatly into place. Take

money, for instance. Is it an inherent parameter or an expressly

transcendent one? Making money indicates the existence of some merit,

some inherent advantageous traits of the moneymaking individual. To

make money consistently, a person needs to be diligent, resilient, hard

working, to prevail and overcome hardships, to be far sighted and to

possess a host of other - universally acclaimed - traits. On the other

hand, is it fair when someone who made his fortune through corruption,

inheritance, or luck - be preferred to a poor genius?

That is a contentious issue. In the USA money talks. Being possessed of

money means being virtuous and meritorious. To preserve a fortune

inherited is as difficult a task as to make it in the first place, the

thinking goes. Thus, the source of the money is secondary.

An oligarchy tends to have long term devastating economic effects.

The reason is that the best and the brightest - when shut out by the

members of the ruling elites - emigrate. In a country where one's job

is determined by his family connections or by influence peddling -

those best fit to do the job are likely to be disappointed, then

disgusted and then to leave the place altogether.

This is the phenomenon known as "Brain Drain". It is one of the biggest

migratory tidal waves in human history. Capable, well-trained,

educated, young people leave their oligarchic, arbitrary, influence

peddling societies and migrate to less arbitrary meritocracies (mostly

to be found in what is collectively known as "The West").

This is colonialism of the worst kind. The mercantilist definition of a

colony is a territory, which exports raw materials only to re-import

them in the form of finished products. The Brain drain is exactly that:

the poorer countries are exporting raw brains and buying back the

finished products masterminded, invented and manufactured by theses

brains.

Yet, while in classical colonialism, the colony at least received some

recompense for its goods - here the poor country is actually the poorer

for its exports. The bright young people who depart (most of them never

to return) carry with them an investment of the scarce resources of

their homeland - and award it to their new, much richer, host

countries. This is an absurd situation, a subsidy granted reluctantly

by the poor to the rich. This is also one of the largest capital

transfers (really capital flight) in history.

After the Rain : how the West lost the East · 第 3 / 22 段