In the Transvaal, and indeed in South Africa generally, it behoves us to

welcome all comers from Europe and America, not being adventurers or

wastrels--all and sundry who can contribute to the good of the country

and who are willing to become loyal citizens. It will be madness to

attempt to build up a South African nation from these islands alone.

England is a small country and the English are gradually ceasing--and

this tendency is certain to increase--to rear large families. In the

past, in our own land as well as in our realms beyond the seas, our

chief glory has been in our genius in amalgamating different strains,

bringing them all into the fold as patriotic Britons. The British Empire

is now more than ever a crucible wherein metals, precious and base, may

be wrought into a fine amalgam. Whether as a limb of a great and

regenerated British Empire, and therein my individual hopes lie, or as a

powerful republic on the pattern of the United States, there ought to be

no question as to the future of South Africa. Mr. Chamberlain said again

only the other day that the prosperity of South Africa in the not far

distant future would doubtless exceed the dreams of the most sanguine

visionary. So let it be. Many shrewd Americans are of the same mind. No

doubt the immediate expansion in South Africa's import trade is due to

military requirements, while the shrinkage of its export trade may be

attributed mainly to the war having put a stop to the recovery and

exportation of gold. The cost of living throughout South Africa, at

present extraordinarily high, is certain to be reduced to more

reasonable limits when the railways are permanently relieved from the

control of the military. It must be remembered, too, that while a fair

proportion of favoured individuals among the colonists have reaped huge

harvests by the war, a far greater number have been crippled and ruined

outright by it. It is not for me to deal with the problems of trade; but

I may say that even should some scheme of the favoured-nation kind be

extended to British imports by the South African Realm to be, that in

itself would not serve, nor will the spirit of patriotic preference for

British goods suffice to preserve the trade of South Africa for this

country. The matter rests with our manufacturers, exporters, and their

agents; and no one, not being a self-deceived egoist, can pretend that

the more alert, adaptive, and modern methods of American and German

houses are not certain, unless our countrymen turn over a new leaf, to

prove too much for our LAISSEZ-FAIRE, self-sufficiency, and careless

indifference.

In this matter the best men, be they English, German, or Yankee, will

win. But this is a home rather than a South African question. In any

case, we may expect soon to see a considerable influx of capitalists,

farmers, and traders, and they cannot but give an impetus to South

Africa's reviving fortunes, let political ineptitude do its worst. I

have endeavoured to show wherein lie the chief obstacles to progress in

the new colonies. In the old--Natal would in any case seem to have an

era of immediate prosperity before her--the future is darkened by

considerations all too apparent for the most optimistic or blind to

overlook or ignore. The Africander Bond and the Dutch Reformed Church

have not buried the hatchet. Throughout South Africa it is, of course,

the duty of the loyal South African of British origin or British

sympathies to endeavour to recognise at their best the many sterling

qualities of the Dutch, and to forgive with what charity he may their

besetting sins, condoning them as the resultants of environment and

circumstance. It is also their duty to recognise that the past mistakes

of Downing Street were chiefly due to lack of brain and thought, rather

than to lack of heart, and to determine to work with all true patriots

for the lasting good and welfare of South Africa.

Unhappily there is ample evidence to show that the Dutch Reformed Church

and the Africander Bond are as active for evil as ever. How great is the

terrorism exercised by the COMMISSIE VAN TOEZICHT (the Secret Council of

the Bond) is illustrated to-day by the abject recantation of the Rev.

Mr. Botha, a pastor who, having counselled his countrymen to submit to

the inevitable and accept British rule as far back as September 1901,

now stands in the white sheet of repentance, and abjectly craves to be

forgiven for what he calls his temporary weakness and backsliding!

Undoubtedly disloyalty to the British Empire throughout South Africa has

its _fons et origo_ not in the Transvaal but at the Cape. For the moment

the Bond lies low. It has gained everything it can hope to gain for the

present. This the most superficial student of Cape politics can see. The

problem of how to reconcile divergent elements at the Cape, and to make

the Cape Dutch as loyal to the Empire as the French Canadians to-day,

not that their loyalty is unimpeachable, is an extremely complicated

one. At the Cape it is by no means merely a question of Dutch _versus_

English or of Town _versus_ Country. Many of the most active enemies of

Great Britain are to be found in the houses of the old Dutch families

inhabiting the suburban districts of Cape Town--Wynburg, Rondebosch, and

so forth. It is also true that among those old Dutch families no more

loyal subjects of the king are to be found. Unhappily English

associations, close intercourse with Government House, intermarriage

with English families, and education at our universities or at the

Temple here, do not always ensure that the Dutch Africander will be

loyal to Great Britain. Even more to be regretted is the fact that many

colonists of pure British descent, birth even, are merely nominally

loyal to the Imperial connection, if as much as that. Their loyalty is

of the opportunist kind. Because of their hatred of the Dutch

propaganda, and because they fear that the Dutch, if left to themselves,

would become "top dog," they tolerate British institutions. We cannot

blame them over much for this attitude, when we remember how miserably

we have deserted our countrymen in the past; how we have left them to

the tender mercies of the Dutch; how we have neglected their warnings

and advice, and brought ruin and misery upon them because of our

short-sightedness and stiff-neckedness.

Even now the British colonist has many substantial excuses for averring

that loyalty does not pay. In view of these facts it behoves Great

Britain to admit frankly her past errors and to resolve, if she means to

retain her hold on South Africa, to order her footsteps differently in

the future. It behoves Great Britain, if she would avoid future risks of

triangular disloyalty and the grave disasters, local and international,

which might supervene on another period of neglect and snubbing, to

trust the men on the spot. It behoves her to govern South Africa firmly,

consistently, and unemotionally; to have done with Majubanimity and all

its works once and for all; all folly, such as paltering with the

language and education questions, whereby the sentiments and interests

of loyal British colonists are flouted and ignored. Great Britain must,

however, do everything that she can consistently do to bring the two

European races--English and Dutch--together. If she is to do this, if

England is to retain a firm grip on South Africa, we must continue

strong, let it be said rather we must renew our strength here in the

centre of the Empire. Within the next half-century it is probable that

the last ounce of gold will have been extracted from the Transvaal's

deepest deep levels. Within half that time the impending struggle of the

world Powers to establish themselves in unassailable positions will have

taken place. Germany is forced by an inexorable law of self-preservation

to find an outlet for her commerce and her people on the seas. Every

thinking German, from the Kaiser downwards, tells us as much frankly. We

can see it for ourselves. She must find employment, food, and raiment

for her highly prolific people, for their own land is by no means rich

in natural wealth. As to Africa, our hold on it depends entirely upon

the strength of our national grip. If our hand is growing flabby and

listless, and, alas! there are too many indications that such is the

case; if France is to gain her ends in the Mediterranean; if sentimental

views in regard to the natives are to prompt us to stand idly by while

such organisations as the so-called Ethiopian Church of the United

States working from the south, and the emissaries of a militant

Mahommedanism from the north, conspire informally to undermine their

loyalty, then our days in Africa are numbered. In the last event, our

hold on that continent in general and South Africa in particular depends

upon character, especially the character of our ruling classes. The

possibilities of this country in Africa are magnificent; but the

problems to be solved, if these possibilities are to be realised, must

appal and finally overcome all but the stoutest of heart. The world, and

South Africa with it, will fall to the nation which breeds and sustains

the best men.

THE FUTURE OF THE MINING INDUSTRY

BY F. T. NORRIS

The future prosperity of South Africa mainly depends upon the

development of her vast and indisputable gold wealth, for, albeit she

possesses other resources in undoubtedly lavish abundance, the means for

the utilisation of these latter are dependent, in a large measure, upon

the effective exploitation of her auriferous reserves. This fact was

explicitly stated by Sir David Barbour, the financial expert appointed

by the Imperial Government to report in 1901 on the resources of the

Transvaal, and that this impartial official opinion is echoed by all

competent observers prior to and since his investigations only confirms

its correctness. As to the magnitude to which the mining industries in

the Transvaal may ultimately attain opinions differ, but, says this

authority, and this view is confirmed by experts, it is certain that the

production of gold will continue to increase largely for some years at

least; that there will be a corresponding growth in the production of

coal, and it is possible, and perhaps probable, that valuable mines of

other minerals, and especially of diamonds, may be opened. He therefore

opines that, from an economic point of view, the prospects of the future

for a considerable period are quite satisfactory, and it is unnecessary

to speculate as to what may ultimately happen.

Public opinion on the Rand is unanimous that absolutely vital questions

for the mines' future are, for the moment, labour and taxation. A

comprehensive and impartial view of the circumstances of the mines must

force the conclusion that such contentions are perfectly sound.

Naturally, however, the dimensions of the latter factor have less weight

since the reduction of the customs tariff and the previous abolition of

monopolies, and, with the pending solution of the question of dynamite,

the mining industry is now not only in a vastly superior economic

condition than it ever was, but has been placed in a position to

sustain, not without some difficulty maybe at the outset, all the

prospective burdens of projected Imperial taxation. In saying "not

without difficulty," the crux of the present economic situation, as

looked at by the leading and responsible section of the mining industry

and competent individuals at large, is touched. For the judiciousness or

otherwise of the immediately heavy incidence of the share of the cost

of the war, which it may be contemplated to place on the Transvaal, is

what causes the present misgivings; and, with the operative capacity of

1898 still some ten to fifteen months ahead, the immediate call for

heavy contributions can only act as a drag upon progress. It is with

this consideration in view that the Chamber of Mines, in a recent letter

to Lord Milner, asked for a delay of five years before making a first

payment, in order to allow time for the industry to recover its former

level, and that other authorities have also entered their protests.

[Illustration: PROSPECTING FOR GOLD: PANNING A SAMPLE]

The inference that an immediate and heavy increase of taxation is to be

made to meet the war debt obligations may possibly be gratuitous, and

probabilities confirm this supposition, for it is at issue with the

Government expert's special recommendations. From this point of view,

Sir David Barbour's observations are worth reciting for their direct

bearing. He says: "The sound policy for the Transvaal is to so frame its

system of taxation as not to increase unnecessarily the initial capital

expenditure, or enhance the cost of working. I shall take it for granted

that it is not intended to impose excessive or crushing taxation on

either of the Colonies, or to exact such a share of their revenue as

would cripple or starve the Administration. Subject to these

considerations, I shall assume that any surplus of revenue over

expenditure, or any special assets that the Colonies may possess, can

fairly be taken towards meeting a portion of the cost of the war."

Further: "If the additional taxation which I recommend ... be imposed

... it may be anticipated that after two years from the conclusion of

peace that Colony will be in a position to set aside a portion of its

ordinary revenue towards meeting the cost of the war. I am unable at

present to form an estimate of the amount which it may be possible to

set aside in this way.... On the assumption that the contribution of the

Orange River Colony and the Transvaal towards the cost of the war is to

be limited to the amount which they can pay without imposing excessive

taxation or starving the Administration, it will be obvious from what is

said in the preceding portion of this report, and especially in

paragraph 62, that it is impossible at the present time to specify any

definite sum as that which ought to be paid. I suggest that the Imperial

Government should fix the maximum sum which, under any circumstances,

they would require to be paid. Such portions of the total amount of

contribution, so fixed as it may be found from time to time that the

Colonies can bear, should be made a charge against them. If, in the

course of time, it is found that the Colonies are unable to pay the

whole sum, under the conditions as to taxation and cost of

administration which I have already specified, the balance should be

written off." So far as the immediate incidence of war taxation is

concerned, it is therefore highly probable that the Government, who have

adopted their financial expert's views almost _in toto_ with regard to

fiscal reform, will do the same with regard to the levy of the war

contribution.

[Illustration: WASHING PLANT OF DE BEERS DIAMOND MINES AT KIMBERLEY

Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen]

But another phase of the same subject is revealed in the extent of the

contribution which the Transvaal should be called to bear compared with

that of the other South African Colonies. In the thoughts of some,

tinctured still perhaps with a touch of the recent bitterness of the

war, the Transvaal should bear the heaviest share; but it is to be

observed that this is not the opinion of the responsible heads of the

mining industry, who, while admitting the justness of assuming their

proper proportion of the proposed burdens, appropriately point out that

both the Orange River Colony and the Cape Colony (for a part of the

latter's population) were fellow-sharers in the beginnings and the

conduct of the war, and should bear a due portion of the resultant

financial burdens, while Natal, it is contended, cannot fairly be

allowed to escape contribution to the extent at least of the valuable

Transvaal territory which has been allotted to her. Pending formal

announcements of the Government's intentions--and it is to be observed a

contribution from the Orange River Colony is contemplated in Sir David

Barbour's report--many huge lump sums have been mentioned, which it is

proposed to levy on the Transvaal alone. Such reports naturally have not

only alarmed the mining industry, but disturbed the confidence of

international capitalists, upon whom the future development of the

wealth of the goldfields in the first place rests. The extent of the

alarm which is felt is shown by the Johannesburg Chamber of Mines as a

body pleading in their recent communication to Lord Milner for a

"reasonable sum" to be fixed, and by the rough estimates of this sum

propounded by others, as, for instance, Mr. Freeman Cohen, chairman of

the Potchefstroom Exploration and Gold Mining Company, who indicates

£30,000,000 as the specific figure, while Mr. Bleloch adventures the sum

of £35,000,000. This last gentleman's summing up of the situation is

that the mines can pay, and are willing and forward to pay, provided the

incidence at the first be made light, and that the burden of the

£55,000,000 estimate of the Government's financial expert be shared by

the other Colonies in the proportion, say, of £5,000,000 from each, to

lessen the burden on the mining industry as much as possible, especially

the low-grade section, and also as a matter of equity, and he advocates

in addition--to augment the disposable revenue--the levy of a 5 per

cent. tax on the profits of other industries (banks, &c.), the creation

of death dues and of a land tax; also the beneficial reservation to the

Government of portions of each new mining field to be opened.

That the whole weight of the taxation of the Transvaal should not be

made to fall upon one industry is, of course, consonant with reason,

policy, and equity. Pending the pronouncement of its actual intentions,

and in view of the alarmist rumours which are spread about, it behoves

the Government, to allay the very natural apprehensions entertained, to

give an early and explicit outline of its proposals, and in this

connection the projected visit of the Right Hon. J. Chamberlain to the

Colonies is of the best augury. From his place in Parliament that

statesman has already disclaimed, on several occasions, proposals anent

the immediate imposition of heavy taxes attributed to the Imperial

Government, and the probabilities are that those recently published in

London are as baseless as they are vague.

The dependence, to a large extent, of the development of the mining

industry on the fostering and assistance, or otherwise, accorded by the

existing Government is a point too painfully brought home to the Rand

mining industry by past experience to need demonstration; wherefore the

sound common-sense statesmanship of those now responsible for the

prosperity of the Empire is a valuable guarantee that the various

problems now absorbing the attention of the industry will be treated in

a fair, just, and liberal manner.

The Rand mining industry, at the moment, is undoubtedly in the throes of

one of those periodic waves of depression incident to all great

gold-mining fields, though to the Rand in a less degree than to the

others, on account of the certain results which may be reckoned upon

from the stable nature of its geological formation. Capital required for

its development is in many cases being withheld, investors looking

askance at its demands with obvious misgivings. This attitude is

undoubtedly due to impatience, and disappointment that progress has not

been more rapid since peace has been declared.

[Illustration: THE INFANCY OF A GOLD-MINE: WINDING QUARTZ WITH A WHIM]

Apparently it was assumed that only a cessation of hostilities was

needed for the mines to hurry up and resume their old-time rate of

production and prosperity. Such an assumption ignores the real

difficulties of reconstituting a country and its industries, devastated

and disorganised for three years by war, and setting up an entirely new

order of things. As a matter of fact, the progress actually achieved has

been marvellous, and as much, or even more, than could have been

expected in like cases. It has apparently been forgotten that civil

government has only within a few weeks replaced the military in the main

administrative channels. The railway network of the sub-continent has

only been thrown open to the free transport of merchants' goods within

the past month, and the limitation of transit to the Rand, and the

interior generally, is a most serious matter, by reason of the fact that

the trunk railways from the coast are only single lines. For the

clearance at the ports of the accumulations of mining machinery, mining

stores, building materials, foodstuffs, and general merchandise, months

are required, and this clearance must take place ere the railway traffic

can fall back into its normal grooves. Abundance of labour, too--always

a crucial question with mining operations, whether they be on the Rand,

in Rhodesia, or elsewhere in the sub-continent--is, for a variety of

causes, not yet available, although measures have been taken by the

Government and the mining industry, acting in concert, which have placed

this subject on a more satisfactory footing than it ever enjoyed. Other

advances have been made in the improvement of the status of the

industry, such, for instance, as the reduction of the customs duties,

which enormously improve the industry's chances of future remunerative

working. Some desiderata are certainly unfulfilled, such as reduced

railway rates; but the instalment of reforms made affords a fair basis

on which working can be resumed with admirable chances of remuneration

and profit. This being so, the unreasonableness of the show of

impatience that progress has not been more rapid, and the undeservedness

of the distrust with which the industry is professed to be regarded in

some quarters, are obvious. A sober view of the situation of the

Transvaal at the present moment must undoubtedly force the confession

that the amount of solid work done in solving the many problems

simultaneously surging up for solution in a new colony besides

mining,--repatriation, resettlement, &c.--and in rebuilding generally

the body politic, is of substantial volume, and that the progress

hitherto made, in removing the difficulties which beset the mining

industry, are sufficient augury that whatever remains unalleviated will

receive its due and satisfactory attention in the near future.

South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 8 (of 8) South Africa and Its Future · 第 9 / 20 段