Leyte Is Liberated
On 15 December, General MacArthur had directed General Eichelberger's
Eighth Army to be prepared to assume control of nearly all Sixth
Army units in the Leyte area at 0001 on 26 December 1944 in order to
relieve the Sixth Army for future operations. The Eighth Army was
to relieve the Sixth of all duties and missions in the area except
certain ones dealing with logistics and construction. These were
assigned to the USASOS (SWPA). The Allied Naval and Air Forces were
directed to continue, in support of the Eighth Army, the missions
which hitherto had been specified for the Sixth. [1189]
In furtherance of General MacArthur's instructions, General Krueger
issued orders covering the transfer to Eighth Army control of certain
Sixth Army units. On 21 December he named the units over which he
was relinquishing control as of 0001, 26 December, and stated that
the responsibility for continuing assigned duties and missions in
the area would then pass from him to the Commanding General, Eighth
U. S. Army, the Commanding General, USASOS (SWPA), and the Commander,
Allied Naval Forces. [1190]
General Eichelberger, also, prepared orders for the forthcoming
transfer of authority. The supply and evacuation procedures of
the Sixth Army would remain in effect. The X and XXIV Corps would
"continue on their present assigned missions of destroying Japanese
wherever found, and ... be prepared to conduct overland or amphibious
shore to shore operations to seize enemy supply points and bases,
and ports of entry." [1191]
On 25 December, when elements of the 77th Division had seized Palompon,
the last important port on Leyte, General MacArthur declared that
all organized resistance had ended. He said in a message to General
Krueger: "Heartiest congratulations on capture of Palompon. This closes
a campaign that has had few counterparts in the utter destruction
of the enemy's forces with a maximum conservation of our own. It has
been a magnificent performance on the part of all concerned." [1192]
The Eighth Army Assumes Control
On 26 December, General Eichelberger assumed control of all combat
units in the Leyte-Samar area. It was not until the first part of
January 1945 that the American troops secured the west coast of
Leyte. Thereafter only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained.
Assembly of Japanese Forces
On 25 December 1944, General Yamashita, commanding the 14th Area Army,
notified General Suzuki, the 35th Army commander, that he had written
off the Leyte Campaign as a loss; henceforward the 35th Army on Leyte
would be self-sustaining and self-supporting, the units on Leyte
would be transferred to other areas, and, finally, the units on the
island would be assembled at a point from which raiding operations
could be conducted. Since these orders were ambiguous and apparently
contradictory, General Suzuki asked that the message be repeated but he
never received an answer. Accordingly, in the latter part of December,
he sent his chief of staff to Manila for further clarification of
the orders. The chief of staff arrived at Manila, by way of Cebu,
in late January, but he was unable to obtain any further information
for General Suzuki.
The decision of General Yamashita to abandon the Leyte operation
followed a series of rapidly moving events. On the 14th of December,
he canceled an optimistic plan for an amphibious assault through
the shallow waters of Carigara Bay against Carigara, an assault that
had been scheduled for 16 December. This cancellation followed the
sighting of an Allied convoy en route to Mindoro. [1193] The convoy
reached Mindoro and the troops landed successfully on 15 December. On
19 December, two days prior to the junction of the X and XXIV Corps
on Highway 2, General Yamashita told General Suzuki that he could no
longer send any reinforcements and supplies to Leyte and that the
35th Army would have to become self-supporting. On the same day,
General Yamashita assigned to the defense of Luzon three divisions
that Imperial General Headquarters had earmarked for Leyte. Shortly
afterward, at a conference with representatives from the Southern
Army and Imperial General Headquarters, the representative from the
latter told General Yamashita to forget the Leyte operation.
In the meantime, General Suzuki interpreted his orders to mean that
units of the 35th Army would assemble at a common point at which
they could be self-supporting. He had selected the western area of
Matagob-Palompon in the vicinity of the road leading from Highway 2
at Libongao over the mountains to Palompon on the west coast. Palompon
was to have been used as the rear center of the line of communications
and the army headquarters was to have been established at Kompisao,
but the seizure of Palompon on 25 December by the 77th Division
forced Suzuki to change the location of his army headquarters. [1194]
He then selected as a base of operations an area in the vicinity of
Ginabuyan that overlooked Silad Bay and was about three kilometers
north of Villaba.
The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about 1,200 feet,
heavily forested and having rocky eastern and western slopes that made
it "a natural fortress." From it one could command a view of Ormoc
Valley to the east and the Camotes Sea and Cebu to the west. There
were a few Filipino huts, and cultivated fields and coconut groves,
interspersed with salt beds, lay along the beach. The area "was
admirably suited for an extended period of defensive action." [1195]
General Suzuki ordered the units of the 35th Army that were retreating
westward to repair to the vicinity of the new base of operations.
The units continued to straggle westward towards the selected area. By
1 January, most of them had taken up positions in the Balanac sector,
which was about three and a half miles southeast of Villaba and
overlooked the Palompon road. They had been hard pressed. The 68th
Brigade and the 1st Division made contact and successfully concentrated
south of Villaba in early January. The 12th Independent Regiment (the
Imahori Detachment), the Mitsui Shipping Unit, the 4th Airborne Raiding
Regiment and the remaining troops of the 77th Infantry Regiment, which
had been operating northeast of Ormoc, reached the southern Matagob
area about the middle of January. It was not until the beginning of
February that these units made contact with the 35th Army. The few
remaining elements of the 16th Division stayed in the vicinity of
Valencia until the end of February. The 26th Division also remained
in this area until the middle of January, when it moved west and
established contact with the 35th Army. [1196]
The 102d Division presented certain difficulties. There had been
instances of forty to fifty deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on
boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended
were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out
of touch with Lt. Gen. Shimpei Fukue, the commanding general of
the 102d Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one
of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukue was planning to evacuate
to Cebu. General Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt
that Fukue "was violating the military code in taking these steps
without consent." He thereupon sent the following message to Fukue:
"Lt. General Fukue and his headquarters will remain in Leyte and at
the same time I am attaching other units and groups in the Visayan
and Mindanao sectors to your Division. General Fukue and his Chief of
Staff will report to me in person at Army Headquarters." The commander
of the 102d Division did not answer but his chief of staff sent the
following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present
time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander
and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters." [1197]
General Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukue
and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the
situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukue, with his
chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for
Cebu. This fact was communicated to General Suzuki by Tomochika, who
states that "for several days I had a difficult time in consoling the
general." [1198] The sequel to these events was that General Suzuki
relieved General Fukue of his command and ordered him to remain on
Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki
in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukue was sentenced to confinement
for thirty days. General Suzuki asked Imperial General Headquarters
in Tokyo for authority to court-martial General Fukue; no reply was
forthcoming. General Fukue was released and later returned to command
of the 102d Division. [1199]
In the meantime, the leaderless 102d Division, with a strength of
approximately 2,000 men, crossed Highway 2 north of Libongao and
reached the southern area of Matagob about 24 December. The troops
failed to contact the 35th Army and after remaining for a short time
at Matagob moved to the vicinity of Villaba.
The units that arrived on the west coast were much understrength
and very poorly equipped. All artillery had been lost. There were
only five to ten machine guns per regiment in addition to individual
weapons. Each man had an average of sixty rounds of ammunition and
several hand grenades.
On the 30th of December, General Yamashita sent the following message
to General Suzuki:
Sixty days have already elapsed since the American forces invaded
Leyte Island, during which period the Thirty-fifth Army, under
the forceful leadership of its commander, has waged many a heroic
battle against superior enemy forces and in the face of numerous
difficulties. The Army gave a great blow to the enemy. Moreover,
the Thirty-fifth Army by containing the opposing enemy for this
long period of time deprived him of freedom of action for the
coming operation, thereby facilitating the general conduct of
our operations in this battle and rendering great services to our
cause. I am deeply impressed, particularly with the fact that the
Takachiho Unit captured the hostile airfield at BURAUEN after the
Thirty-fifth Army, despite its inferiority in equipment and number
of men, and the stoppage of supply, made a timely and resolute
attack against the enemy with the commander himself leading
them. However, the enemy, who has increased his material power
and war potential, now threatens, solely on the strength of his
material superiority, to bear down on Luzon Island despite the
heroic and desperate efforts of our sea and air forces as well
as of the Thirty-fifth Army. In view of the sudden change in the
situation, we shall seek and destroy our enemy on Luzon Island,
thereby doing our part in the heroic struggle of the Army and
avenging many a valiant warrior who fell before the enemy. As
munitions have not been supplied adequately, I cannot keep back
tears of remorse for tens of thousands of our officers and men
fighting in Leyte Island. Nevertheless, I must impose a still
harder task upon you. Please try to understand my intentions. They
say it is harder to live than to die. You officers and men, be
patient enough to endure the hardships of life, and help guard and
maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne through eternal
resistance to the enemy, and be ready to meet your death calmly
for our beloved country. I sincerely instruct you as above. [1200]
General Suzuki took steps to make the force on Leyte
self-supporting. In January 1945, he established two principles for
his troops. First, the troops were to utilize as much of the local
food and material as possible and plant sweet potatoes and Indian
corn. Second, all provisions in the area outside of the operation
base were to be purchased. The execution of the first part of his
first precept worked reasonably well but the constant American air
raids and mopping-up operations prevented the Japanese from being too
successful in planting and harvesting the corn and potatoes. They were
also not very fortunate in purchasing supplies from outside the area,
although some supplies were obtained each time the men could pass
through the American protective screen.
The Japanese arrived on the western shores of Leyte at the end of
the harvest season. They secured large quantities of provisions
which the Filipinos had stored and also a great number of coconuts
and sweet potatoes. The soldiers used the carabaos of the island as
meat and obtained salt from sea water. For vegetables, the army's
chief reliance was upon wild ferns, tokay grass, and wild spinach.
In conclusion, "although there was not enough food to increase the
fighting power of the Army, no one died of starvation and some units
stored enough supplies for two to three months." [1201]
The Mop-up
By the end of December, most of the enemy troops were in northwest
Leyte, west of Highway 2 and north of Palompon. Another large enemy
concentration was located in the hills south of Palompon. [1202]
The mop-up of any operation is dangerous, difficult, and unglamorous,
but it is highly essential. The activities of the 7th Division on Leyte
during January and February 1945 are typical of the large-scale mop-up
in which many small units are sent out daily in all directions. This
division was assigned all of the west coast area south of a line from
Palompon to Valencia. Its records state that the division "sent out as
many as forty combat patrols daily to hunt down and destroy thousands
of Japanese stragglers wandering throughout the area." [1203]
Eight divisions were engaged in mopping up for varying lengths of time
on Leyte, but only an outline of their activities will be attempted
here. The operation may be divided into three phases: XXIV Corps
activities from 1 January to 15 February 1945; X Corps activities
from 1 January to 24 February 1945; and Eighth Army Area Command
operations from 24 February to 8 May 1945. [1204]
During the XXIV Corps phase, the 11th Airborne Division encountered an
enemy force well dug in on the southern slopes of Mt. Majunag, five
miles northwest of Burauen. After much bitter hand-to-hand fighting
the Japanese were destroyed. The 96th Division engaged in extensive
patrolling, relieved the 11th Airborne Division, and relieved the
X Corps of all tactical responsibility east of the mountains. The
7th Division sent out numerous patrols in the southern part of the
island, and sent out a reinforced battalion that destroyed all enemy
forces in the Camotes Islands. The 77th Division, which operated
in the northwestern part of the island, cleared up many pockets of
enemy resistance.
In the X Corps phase, the island of Samar was cleared of Japanese
troops. The Americal Division, advance elements of which arrived on
24 January, extensively patrolled both the islands of Leyte and Samar.
During the Eighth Army Area Command phase, the constant searching
out of isolated groups of enemy soldiers continued. In addition to
the Americal Division, the 1st Filipino Infantry Regiment patrolled
Leyte. On 8 May, the control of the Eighth Army over the area came
to an end. [1205]
The Japanese Withdrawal
At the time that General Suzuki made his plans for the units of
the 35th Army on Leyte to become self-sufficient, he felt that
there were too many soldiers on the island to make the plan fully
effective. General Suzuki decided therefore to transfer to other
islands those who, because of their good physical condition and morale,
would be able to withstand the rigors of a long fight. Consequently
the sick, weak, and wounded were dropped from the units that were to
be withdrawn. [1206] General Suzuki also considered the selection of
the location of the new headquarters for the 35th Army. Since there
were 15,000 Japanese residents in and around Davao on Mindanao, it
was finally decided to remove the army headquarters to Davao. As a
preliminary step, the 1st Division was to be sent to Cebu. [1207]
General Suzuki had plans drawn up showing the order of precedence
by which the units on Leyte were to be withdrawn and their
destinations. All available landing barges on Leyte and additional
vessels from Cebu and other areas would be used. The order of the
proposed withdrawal and the destinations of the units were as follows:
1st Division northern Cebu and later to
Negros
41st and 77th Infantry Regiments Mindanao
102d Division Visayan area
26th Division Bacolod sector of Negros
Takahashi Detachment northern Cebu
Units of the 68th Independent Mixed
Brigade northern Cebu
General Suzuki and 35th Army Headquarters would leave Leyte about
the same time as the 26th Division. The 16th Division, the 68th
Independent Mixed Brigade, and other small units were to remain on
Leyte and would be under the command of Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, the
16th Division commander. [1208]
When these plans were announced Lt. Gen. Tadasu Kataoka, the
commanding general of the 1st Division, suggested that as the 1st
Division had lost so many men and officers in the Leyte operation
it might be better to use the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade, which
had fresh troops and would be better suited for the assignment to
Cebu. He was overruled. [1209] There were, however, other officers
who were more anxious to leave Leyte. General Tomochika later wrote:
"Many of the troops rushed to join this movement and Staff Officer
Nakamura experienced difficulty in controlling them. However, quite
a number of men succeeded in transferring without the commander's
orders. The commander was displeased because only a small number of
staff officers were willing to stay on Leyte." [1210]
On the morning of 12 January, four launches arrived at Abijao to begin
evacuation of the 1st Division. The Americans attacked and damaged
the vessels, but three were repaired. By 2300, with the embarkation
of the first party, composed of elements of the 49th Infantry and
Division Headquarters, the evacuation got under way. This group left
Abijao at 0130 on 13 January and reached Tabogon, in northern Cebu,
about 0730. At about the same time, the remnants of the 57th Infantry
reached Cebu. The rest of 1st Division Headquarters, the 1st Infantry
Regiment, and part of the 1st Transport Regiment left Leyte on the
18th, and on the 20th the rest of the 49th Infantry Regiment and the
1st Division Transport quitted the island.
Between the 13th and 20th of January the three launches, each carrying
about seventy men, made four round trips. After the second trip,
the Americans spotted the operation. The hiding place of the craft at
Tabogon was frequently strafed by aircraft and shelled by submarines
and motor torpedo boats, which kept the channel waters under sharp
surveillance. On the night of the 20th, American aircraft sank three
launches. Although additional craft were sent up from Liloan on Cebu,
these were also sunk. It was impossible to evacuate any more personnel
until the middle of March. [1211]
The number of men from the 1st Division evacuated to Cebu was estimated
to be as follows: 1st Division Headquarters, 73; 1st Infantry Regiment,
72; 49th Infantry Regiment, 208; 57th Infantry Regiment, 178; and 1st
Transport Regiment, 212; a total of 743 men. The equipment evacuated
included 332 rifles, 4 heavy machine guns, 11 light machine guns, 5
grenade launchers, and a small amount of small arms ammunition. [1212]
In addition several hundred men obtained their own transportation
and left for other islands in the Philippines.
The Road Ends
From 20 January on, the remaining Japanese forces stayed in the Villaba
sector, hoping that succor would come. On 20 January General Tomochika
"waited on the beach" for a boat that never came. The men were "plunged
into the depths of despair." Time passed. On the evening of 17 March,
two Japanese vessels appeared. General Suzuki and part of his staff
boarded the craft and at 0030, 18 March, left the island of Leyte,
For days the vessels sailed from island to island in the Visayas
only to find that they were too late. The Americans were already in
possession. On the evening of 16 April, the vessel bearing General
Suzuki was bombed by American aircraft off the coast of Negros Island
and Suzuki was killed [1213] The Leyte Campaign had ended.
The liberation of Leyte had been accomplished at no slight cost. During
the peak month, January 1945, there were 257,766 American Army,
including Air Forces, troops on Leyte. [1214] The total Army casualties
for the Leyte Campaign were over 15,500, including more than 3,500
killed and nearly 12,000 wounded. (Tables 4 and 5)
It is impossible, with data now available to determine with any degree
of exactitude the number of Japanese who participated in the campaign
or their casualties. The estimates of the Sixth and Eighth Armies
vary greatly, as do those of the various Japanese sources. The Sixth
Army estimated that it had killed 56,263 and captured 389 men. [1215]
and that as of 26 December 1944 when it relinquished control to Eighth
Army about 5,000 of the Japanese remained on the islands of Leyte and
Samar. [1216] The Eighth Army estimated that, for the mop-up period
from 26 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, it killed and found dead 24,294
and captured 439 Japanese. [1217] General Eichelberger stated that
his forces killed "more than twenty-seven thousand Japanese." [1218]
Table 4--U. S. Army Battle Casualties at Leyte, 20 October 1944-8
May 1945
----------------------------+--------+-------+----------+---------
Organization | Total | Killed | Wounded | Missing
----------------------------+--------+--------+---------+---------
Total | 15,584 | 3,504 | 11,991 | 89
+--------+--------+---------+---------
Sixth Army Troops | 961 | 141 | 831 | [1219]7
Eighth Army Troops | 404 | 61 | 340 | 3
X Corps | 7,126 | 1,670 | 5,384 | 72
+--------+--------+---------+---------
Americal Div and 164th RCT | 731 | 162 | 566 | 3
24th Infantry Division | 2,342 | 544 | 1,784 | 14
32d Infantry Division | 1,949 | 450 | 1,491 | 8
38th Infantry Division | 272 | 68 | 171 | 33
1st Cavalry Division | 931 | 203 | 726 | 2
11th Airborne Division | 532 | 168 | 352 | 12
1st Filipino Division | 52 | 14 | 38 | 0
108th RCT | 53 | 14 | 39 | 0
112th RCT | 160 | 32 | 128 | 0
Corps Troops | 104 | 15 | 89 | 0
+--------+--------+---------+---------
XXIV Corps | 7,093 | 1,632 | 5,454 | 7
+--------+--------+---------+---------
7th Infantry Division | 2,764 | 584 | 2,179 | 1
77th Infantry Division | 2,226 | 499 | 1,723 | 4
96th Infantry Division | 1,660 | 469 | 1,189 | 2
Corps Troops | 443 | 80 | 363 | 0
----------------------------+--------+--------+---------+---------
Source: Reports of the Commanding Generals, Eighth U. S. Army,
Inclosure 1, and Sixth U. S. Army, on the Leyte-Samar Operation,
p. 155.
The Japanese historians of the Leyte operation estimate that the total
strength of their army ground troops was 70,000 men. [1220] General
Tomochika, the chief of staff of the 35th Army, was interrogated
several times after the war. On one occasion he estimated that the
total number of Japanese involved in the Leyte operation, including
naval and air personnel and those who lost their lives in transports
sunk en route to Leyte, was 59,400 men, approximately one fifth of all
Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands. [1221] On another occasion
General Tomochika estimated that 61,800 Japanese had been on Leyte,
and that 13,010 were alive and 48,790 had been killed by 17 March
1945. [1222]
In the plan for the defeat of Japan the objective sought in
reconquering the Philippines was not only to liberate the Filipinos
but also to cut off the Japanese from the rich empire that they had
acquired in the Netherlands Indies, and at the same time to establish
a base for the final assault on the enemy's homeland. As early as 1942
Allied submarines had begun to gnaw at the lifeline between Japan and
its new empire, rich in rubber, tin, rice, and, above all, in oil,
without which Japan could not remain in the war. By the fall of 1944
the submarines had virtually cut this lifeline, which ran past the
Philippines. The loss of the Philippines to the Allies would finally
sever it.
Table 5--Sixth Army Battle Casualties by Arm or Service, 20 October-25
December 1944
----------------+------+------+-------------+-------------+-------------
| Killed | Wounded and| Missing | Total
| | Injured | in Action |
Arm or Service +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------
|Number| Per |Number| Per |Number| Per |Number| Per
| | Cent | | Cent | | Cent | | Cent
----------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------
Infantry | 2,380| 82.42| 7,749| 78.61| 85 | 52.80|10,214| 79.14
Engineer | 132| 4.58| 762| 7.73| 46 | 28.57| 940| 7.28
Medical | 100| 3.47| 375| 3.80| 8 | 4.97| 483| 3.74
Field Artillery | 96| 3.33| 328| 3.33| 5 | 3.11| 429| 3.32
Coast Artillery | 47| 1.59| 248| 2.52| 1 | .62| 296| 2.30
Ordnance | 45| 1.56| 100| 1.01| 1 | .62| 146| 1.13
Quartermaster | 41| 1.42| 67| .68| 9 | 5.59| 117| .91
Signal | 12| .42| 76| .77| 0 | .00| 88| .68
Transportation | 7| .24| 73| .74| 1 | .62| 81| .63
Chemical Warfare| 13| .45| 44| .45| 0 | .00| 57| .44
Military Police | 13| .45| 27| .27| 4 | 2.48| 44| .34
Chaplain | 0| .00| 0| .00| 0 | .00| 0| .00
Miscellaneous | 2| .07| 9| .09| 1 | .62| 12| .09
+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------
Total | 2,888|100.00| 9,858|100.00| 161 |100.00|12,907|100.00
----------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------
Source: Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, 20 October-25 December
1944, p. 155.
The object of the Leyte Campaign had been to force an entry into
the Philippines and establish a solid base for their reconquest. It
had accomplished this object, though the base had not been secured
and developed as promptly or as effectively as the planners had
anticipated. The construction program on the island had been
a disappointment. Leyte never became a major air base. But the
campaign had other and more important effects that had not been
foreseen when it was launched. In their determination to make Leyte
the decisive battle of the Philippines, the Japanese had committed
the major portions of their fleet and air force in a vain attempt to
stay the American advance. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf the Japanese
Navy suffered irreparable damage--all of the carriers were lost and
most of the capital ships were sunk or damaged. The air force was now
almost completely dependent upon the suicidal kamikaze pilot. Finally,
the dispatch of reinforcements and supplies to Leyte had seriously
crippled the defenses of Luzon--the strategic heart of the Philippine
Archipelago.
The Americans had established an air base in the midst of the
Japanese-held Philippine Islands--a base within medium bomber range
of Luzon, the principal American target in the archipelago. [1223]
As General Yamashita, commanding officer of all Japanese Army troops
in the Philippines later said: "After the loss of Leyte ... I realized
that decisive battle was impossible...." [1224]
Three years of hard fighting over jungle trails had finally brought
the U. S. forces back to the Philippines. Ahead lay months of weary
struggle but ultimate victory was no longer in doubt.
APPENDIX A
GHQ Operations Instructions Number 70, 21 September 1944
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
A. P. O. 500
21 September 1944.
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 70
1. a. See current Intelligence Summaries and Annex
No. 3--Intelligence.
b. Allied Forces occupy the line:
MARIANAS-ULITHI-PALAU-MOROTAI and control the approaches
to the southern and eastern PHILIPPINES.
c. The THIRD FLEET, Admiral W. F. Halsey commanding, covers
and supports the LEYTE GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT Operations by:
(1) Containing or destroying the Japanese Fleet.
(2) Destruction of hostile air and shipping in
the FORMOSA, LUZON, VISAYAS and MINDANAO areas
during the period A-9 through A-3 and from A
Day through A+30 as necessary to maintain their
continued neutralization.
(3) Destruction of ground defenses and
installations and shipping in the objective and
adjacent enemy supporting areas from A-2 until
the escort carriers assume the mission of direct
support.
(4) Providing direct support of the landing and
subsequent operations by fast carrier aircraft
as required.
d. Coordination of operations of THIRD FLEET and SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC Naval and Air Forces will be published later.
e. I Time (Zone-9) of Z Time will be used during the
operation.
2. a. Forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, covered and supported
by the THIRD FLEET, will continue the offensive to reoccupy
the PHILIPPINES by seizing and occupying objectives in the
LEYTE and western SAMAR areas, and will establish therein
naval, air and logistic facilities for the support of
subsequent operations.
b. Target Date for A Day: 20 October 1944.
c. Forces
(1) SIXTH US ARMY--Lt General Walter Krueger,
US Army. As constituted, less elements assigned
by subsequent orders to EIGHTH US ARMY.
SIXTH US ARMY reserve:
77th US Infantry Division--GUAM
6th US Infantry Division--CAPE SANSAPOR,
DUTCH NEW GUINEA. Forces allocated for
the operation as designated in Annex
No. 1. Tentative Troop List for the
Operation. The exact composition of the
landing force as designated by Commanding
General SIXTH US ARMY.
(2) FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY--Lt General
V. A. H. Sturdee, CBE
As constituted.
(3) EIGHTH US ARMY--Lt General Robert
L. Eichelberger, US Army.
As later specified.
(4) ALLIED NAVAL Forces--Vice Admiral
T. C. Kinkaid, US NAVY.
As reinforced.
(5) ALLIED AIR Forces--Lt General George C. Kenney,
US Army.
As constituted.
(6) USASOS--Maj General J. L. Frink, US Army.
As constituted.
3. a. The SIXTH US ARMY, supported by the ALLIED NAVAL and
AIR Forces, will:
(1) By overwater operations seize and occupy:
(a) Objectives in the TACLOBAN and DULAG
areas in LEYTE and such adjacent areas
as are required to initiate and insure
uninterrupted naval and air operations
therefrom.
(b) Objectives in the HOMONHON and DINAGAT
ISLANDS and such adjacent areas prior to
the main assault in LEYTE as will insure
the uninterrupted access for amphibious
shipping into LEYTE GULF.
(c) Objectives in the PANAON STRAIT area
that will permit passage of naval forces
through the PANAON STRAIT for operations
in the CAMOTES SEA. This objective will be
secured simultaneously with (1) (a) above.
(2) Establish control of SAN JUANICO STRAITS in
order to permit passage of naval forces through
the SAN JUANICO STRAITS for operations in the
SAMAR SEA.
(3) In subsequent operations, establish control
over the remainder of LEYTE ISLAND; occupy and
consolidate the western portion of southern SAMAR
to include the TAFT-WRIGHT Highway and seize
objectives that will permit opening of SURIGAO
STRAITS for naval operations.
(4) Prepare to conduct such operations as may be
later directed by this headquarters to:
(a) Complete the consolidation of SAMAR.
(b) Destroy or contain hostile garrisons
in the VISAYAS.
(5) Occupy and defend sites for radar and air
warning installations as arranged with the
Commanders ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces.
(6) Assume control of and direct the operations
of FILIPINO Forces of the 9th Military District
(LEYTE-SAMAR).
(7) Establish facilities for minor naval operations
at the earliest practicable date in the LEYTE-SAMAR
area as arranged with the Commander ALLIED NAVAL
Forces and initiate the establishment of naval,
air and logistic facilities for the support of
subsequent operations to reoccupy the PHILIPPINES
as directed in Annex No 4, Logistics, and Annex
No 6, Engineer, and as later directed by this
headquarters.
(8) Establish air facilities in the LEYTE area
with objectives as follows:
(a) First Objective: 1 fighter gp (P-38)
Immediately following the 1 fighter gp (P-40)
assault and by A+5 for:
1 night fighter sq
(b) Second Objective: 1 tactical reconnaissance sq
Additional by A+15. 1 photo sq
1 medium bomb gp plus
1 sq P. O. A.
3 PBY sqs (tender-based)
1 VMR sq (Marine)
(c) Third Objective: 2 light bomb gps (A-20)
Additional by A+30. 1 air-sea rescue sq
1 tactical reconnaissance sq
1 fighter gp (P-38)
(d) Fourth Objective: 1 fighter gp (P-47)
Additional by A+45. 1 PB4Y sq (Air Ech)
2 heavy bomb gps
1 LAB sq
(e) Fifth Objective: 1 photo sq (F-5)
Additional by A+60. 1 PB4Y sq (Air-Ech)
2 troop carrier gps
1 combat mapping sq (Air Ech)
(f) As later designated.
b. The Commanding General EIGHTH US ARMY, supported by
the ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces will:
(1) Relieve the SIXTH US ARMY of missions
in NEW GUINEA, the ADMIRALTIES, NEW BRITAIN,
and the MOROTAI area as later directed by this
headquarters.
(2) Prepare to relieve the SIXTH US ARMY in
the VISAYAN area as later directed by this
headquarters.
(3) Assist the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY
by training, staging and mounting units of the
SIXTH US ARMY in the EIGHTH US ARMY area of
responsibility as arranged with the Commanding
General SIXTH US ARMY.
c. The FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY, supported by the ALLIED
NAVAL and AIR Forces, will continue:
(1) The defense of naval and air installations
within assigned areas of combat responsibility.
(2) The neutralization of Japanese forces within
assigned areas, seizing every opportunity for
the destruction of hostile forces.
d. The Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces, while continuing
present missions, will:
(1) Transport and establish landing forces ashore
in the LEYTE GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT area as arranged
with the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY
(2) Support the operations by:
(a) Providing air protection for convoys
and naval task forces and direct air
support for the landing and subsequent
operations, supplemented as arranged
with the Commander THIRD FLEET and the
Commander ALLIED AIR Forces.
(b) Arranging direct air support and cover
with carrier aircraft for minesweeping
and preliminary landings in the LEYTE
GULF area during the period A-2 to the
time escort carriers assume the mission
of direct support on A Day.
(c) Transporting supporting troops and
their supplies as required to the LEYTE
GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT area in naval assault
shipping.
(d) Denying Japanese reinforcement of
the LEYTE area from the SAMAR, western
VISAYAS and northeastern MINDANAO areas.
(e) Clearing the SURIGAO STRAIT area of
hostile naval forces and shipping and
sweeping the SURIGAO STRAIT to open it
for naval operations and shipping in
the CAMOTES SEA and adjacent waters,
in conjunction with operations of the
SIXTH US ARMY.
(3) Provide submarine offensive reconnaissance
along probable routes of hostile naval forces
and of water-borne reinforcements and supplies.
(4) Provide lifeguard services as required.
(5) Transfer to the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces
the mission of direct air support when land-based
fighters and light bombers are established in
the LEYTE area, at a time as arranged with the
Commander ALLIED AIR Forces.
(6) Escort and protect shipping on the lines of
communication into the LEYTE and SAMAR areas.
(7) Establish in VISAYAN waters, naval forces
required to support current and future operations.
e. The Commander ALLIED AIR Forces, while continuing
present missions, will:
(1) Support the operation by:
(a) Providing aerial reconnaissance and
photography as required.
(b) Neutralizing, in coordination
with carrier and land-based aircraft
of the THIRD FLEET, hostile naval and
air forces in areas within range in the
PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO, intensifying the
neutralization in the western VISAYAS
and MINDANAO areas from D-9 to cover the
movement of naval forces, the landing and
subsequent operations. (Cooperation of
air operations of the THIRD FLEET and
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Air Forces will be
published later.)
(c) Providing protection of convoys and
naval forces and direct support of the
landing and subsequent operations within
capabilities and as requested by Commander
ALLIED NAVAL Forces.
(d) Assuming the mission of direct support
of the operations in the LEYTE-SAMAR area
at the earliest practicable date after
the establishment of fighters and light
bombers in the LEYTE area, as arranged
with the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces.
(2) Continuing the destruction of hostile naval
and air forces and shipping in the ARAFURA and
CELEBES SEA areas and by initiating strikes on
northeastern BORNEO and the SULU ARCHIPELAGO at
the earliest practicable date; denying use of naval
facilities in the SULU ARCHIPELAGO to the Japanese
and protecting the western flank of the operation.
(3) Destroying hostile installations and sources of
war materials in Eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.
(4) Establishing and operating radar and air
warning facilities as required in the LEYTE-SAMAR
area, as arranged with the Commanding General
SIXTH US ARMY.
(5) Establishing air forces in the LEYTE area in
the priority as listed in paragraph 3a (8).
x. (1) For the coordination of planning the Commander
ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces will cause their
respective close support commanders to report
to the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY, who is
charged with the coordination of plans.
(2) A brief of the coordinated plan of operations
will be furnished this headquarters by the
Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY by 5 October 1944.
(3) Commanders ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces,
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, will submit to this
headquarters by 1 October 1944 their respective
plans for general support to be afforded by their
forces during the period of operations.
(4) During the amphibious movement and landing,
the Commander Naval Attack Forces is in command of
the amphibious operations; his command continues
until the landing forces are established
ashore. Command of the forces ashore is then
passed to the Landing Force Commanders. The exact
time of transfer of command from the Commanders
Landing Forces will be announced by radio. The
controlling considerations for fixing the time
when the landing forces are established ashore
will be as agreed by the Commander ALLIED NAVAL
Forces and the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY,
and will be announced by them to this headquarters
and appropriate subordinates.
(5) For coordination of land-based and naval
aircraft in support of the operation, see Standing
Operating Procedure Instructions Number 16/1,
this headquarters, dated 10 August 1944.
(6) To coordinate the attack of THIRD FLEET
carrier aircraft, the Commander ALLIED NAVAL
Forces, in concert with the Commander ALLIED AIR
Forces and Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY,
will furnish the Commander THIRD FLEET at the
earliest practicable date the following:
(a) Schedule and tracks of echelons.
(b) Target maps of air and surface bombardment.
(c) Communication plans.
(d) Naval gunfire plans.
(e) Other plans and data necessary for the
support of the operation by the
fastcarrier forces.
(7) Areas of responsibility for naval and air
operations of the THIRD FLEET and SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC Forces will be designated later.
(8) Instructions for long range reconnaissance,
and bombing and attack restrictions will be issued
in subsequent Operations Instructions.
(9) Annex No. 1 indicates the tentative troop
list for the Operation, and Annex 2 indicates
the troop movements for the concentration.
4. See Annex No. 4--Logistics. (to be issued later)
5. a. See Annex No. 5--Communications.
b. Command Posts.
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS--HAWAII
THIRD FLEET--AFLOAT
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
AREA--HOLLANDIA
Rear Echelon--BRISBANE
Advanced Echelon--LEYTE (date and hour
of opening to be announced later)
SIXTH US ARMY--LEYTE (as announced by Commanding
General SIXTH US ARMY)
Rear Echelon--HOLLANDIA
FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY--LAE
EIGHTH US ARMY--HOLLANDIA
ALLIED NAVAL FORCES--HOLLANDIA
Rear Echelon--BRISBANE
ALLIED AIR FORCES--HOLLANDIA
Rear Echelon--BRISBANE
UNITED STATES ARMY SERVICES OF SUPPLY--HOLLANDIA
Rear Echelon--BRISBANE
By command of General MacARTHUR:
R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
/s/ S. J. Chamberlin,
S. J. CHAMBERLIN,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.
ANNEXES: (Omitted)
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AA Antiaircraft
AAF Army Air Forces
Admin O Administrative Order
AFPAC U.S. Army Forces, Pacific
AGO Adjutant General's Office
AGS SWPA Allied Geographic Section, Southwest Pacific Area
AGWAR Adjutant General, War Department
AIB GHQ SWPA Allied Intelligence Bureau, General Headquarters
Southwest Pacific Area
AKA Cargo Ship, attack
Amph Amphibious, amphibian
APA Transport, attack
APH Transport for wounded
Arty Artillery
ASCOM Army Service Command
ATIS Allied Translator and Interpreter Section
BAR Browning automatic rifle
Bn Battalion
Br Branch
Bull Bulletin
Cav Cavalry
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff
CG Commanding General
CINC Commander in Chief
CINCPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCPOA Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area
CINCSWPA Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area
CM-IN Classified Message, incoming
CM-OUT Classified Message, outgoing
CO Commanding Officer
CofS Chief of Staff
Com3dFlt Commander, Third Fleet
COMINCH Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
CTF Commander, task force
CTG Commander, task group
CTU Commander, task unit
CVE Aircraft carrier, escort
Div Division
DNI Division of Naval Intelligence
DUKW Amphibian, 2 1/2-ton, 6 × 6 truck, used for short runs
from ship to shore
Engr Engineer
ESB Engineer Special Brigade
FA Field Artillery
FE Far East
FEAF Far East Air Forces
FEC Far East Command
Flt Fleet
FM Field Manual
FO Field Order
G-2 Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff
G-3 Operations section of divisional or higher staff
G-4 Supply section of divisional or higher staff
GHQ SWPA General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area
Gp Group
GS General Staff
Hist History, historical
Hq Headquarters
HRS DRB AGO Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch,
Adjutant General's Office
Inf Infantry
I&HS Information and Historical Service
Instns Instructions
Intel Intelligence
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jnl Journal
LCI Landing craft, infantry
LCI (R) Landing craft, infantry (rocket)
LCM Landing craft, mechanized
LCM (R) Landing craft, mechanized (rocket)
Log Logistics
LSD Landing ship, dock
LSM Landing ship, medium
LST Landing ship, tank
Ltr Letter
LVT Landing vehicle, tracked
M29 Weasel
MC Medical Corps
MI Military Intelligence
Mil Military
Msg Message
Mtg Meeting
OCMH Office of the Chief of Military History
OCNO Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Off Officer
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
OP Observation post
OPD Operations Division, War Department General Staff
Opns Operations
PCE (R) Patrol craft, escort (rescue)
POL Petrol oil and lubricants
Prcht Parachute
QM Quartermaster
Rad Radiogram
Rcds Records
Regt Regiment
Rpt Report
S-2 Intelligence section of regimental or lower staff
S-3 Operations section of regimental or lower staff
Sec Section
Ser Series
Sq Squadron
SSUSA Special Staff, U.S. Army
Stf Staff
SWPA Southwest Pacific Area
Tel Conf Teletype Conference
USA U.S. Army
USASOS U.S. Army Services of Supply
USMC U.S. Marine Corps
USN U.S. Navy
USNR U.S. Naval Reserve
USSBS U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey
WD War Department
WDGS War Department General Staff
Wkly Weekly
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Records and studies on the Leyte operation fall into eleven general
classes: Joint Chiefs of Staff records, U.S. Army Air Forces records,
U.S. Army records, U.S. Marine Corps records, U.S. Navy records,
guerrilla records, Japanese studies, interviews, manuscript histories,
special studies, and published works.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Records
The official records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as those of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, are now in the custody of the Research
Analysis Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff. They consist primarily of
the formal papers and minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An almost
complete file of these JCS and CCS papers and minutes was kept for
the Army during the wartime period by the Operations Division of the
War Department General Staff and is now in the possession of the G-3
Division, the successor to the Operations Division. This Army file
contains plans for projected operations, the working papers of the Army
planning personnel, and correspondence with officers in the Pacific
theaters, as well as the copies of the JCS and CCS minutes and papers.
Army Air Forces Records
The archives of the United States Army Air Forces contain manuscript
histories of the various units and commands, written during or shortly
after the war. The quality of these varies considerably. The following
histories are of especial value for a study of the Leyte Campaign:
those of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Fighter Squadrons of the 49th Fighter
Group, 86th Fighter Wing, V Fighter Command, Fifth Air Force; V Fighter
Command; V Bomber Command; XIII Bomber Command; Fifth Air Force;
Thirteenth Air Force; and Far East Air Forces. Two studies are also
useful: Far East Air Forces Staff Study Operation KING II, 12 July
44; and Fifth Air Force Fighter Cover Plan for Ormoc Bay Operation,
file 731.326.
Army Records
The voluminous Army records on the Leyte Campaign vary considerably
in quality and content. The documents range from messages between
the Chief of Staff and theater commanders to company journals.
The Chief of Staff's Log, 1944, which is in the Staff Communications
Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, contains the daily high level
radiograms and telephonic communications between Washington and
the theaters. These give a concise daily summary of the strategic
situation throughout the world, shed considerable light on joint and
combined command, and summarize important plans and decisions.
Most of the records of General MacArthur's headquarters are in
Japan. Available in the Historical Records Section of the Adjutant
General's Office is a nearly complete file of the G-3 journals
for the entire war period. The "Top Secret" messages are not
included. In addition there is a nearly complete file of Allied
Translator Interpreter Section, GHQ SWPA, "Current Translations" and
"Enemy Publications." The Allied Geographical Section, GHQ SWPA,
made terrain studies of the geographical regions in the Southwest
Pacific Area. Although they contain errors three of these were of
value--Special Report 55, Airfields, Landing Beaches and Roads,
Samar, Leyte and Dinagat Group, 10 July 1944; Terrain Study 84,
Leyte Province, 17 August 1944; and Terrain Handbook 34, Tacloban,
25 September 1944. The Military Intelligence Section prepared
information bulletins on the guerrillas that were of some use. These
are: The Resistance Movement on Leyte Island, 7 October 1944, and
The Resistance Movement on Samar Island, 10 October 1944.
The records of the Sixth Army for the campaign are very complete and
in excellent condition. In addition to a fine operations report, there
are complete G-2, G-3, and G-4 journals. These journals contain the
daily messages, reports, and memoranda exchanged between Sixth Army,
General Headquarters, responsible naval commanders, and subordinate
units of the Sixth Army, as well as planning papers, periodic reports
of Sixth Army and subordinate units, field and administrative orders,
interrogations, and estimates of the enemy situation. For the period
after 26 December 1944 the operations report of the Eighth Army
is useful.
The operations report of the X Corps is helpful but too brief. The
journals (G-2, G-3, and G-4) of the corps, however, are good. The XXIV
Corps prepared an inadequate and incomplete operations report and its
journals as a whole are inferior to those of the X Corps. The sections
and sub-sections of the headquarters of the XXIV Corps completed
"histories." These consist mainly of photographs of individuals and
notations of changes in personnel. The "history" of the Sixth Army
Service Command is poor and there are few records of ASCOM in the
Historical Records Section, Adjutant General's Office.
The records of the 1st Cavalry Division and subordinate units are
generally adequate, although those of the two brigades are inferior
to those of the division and of the regiments. The narrative of the
operations report of the 7th Division is inferior but the appendixes
are excellent and very complete; the journals of the division are
good. In general the operations reports and journals of the infantry
regiments are very helpful. The operations report of the 32d Infantry
is excellent and a model for a perfect regimental operations report. In
contrast, the operations reports and journals of the 11th Airborne
Division and subordinate units are very poor and incomplete. The 24th
Infantry Division prepared a superb operations report and kept good
journals. The records of the regiments of the division are sparse
and incomplete and their operations reports are either inadequate or
nonexistent. The records and operations reports of the 32d Division
and its regiments are extremely sketchy and inexact. The 38th Division
used Leyte as a staging area; when the Japanese parachuted into the
Burauen airfields, its 149th Infantry was committed. The operations
report of that regiment for the resultant action is far too brief. The
77th Infantry Division and its regiments have very good operations
reports but their journals are inadequate. The operations reports and
journals of the 96th Division are good. The journals and operations
reports of the Americal Division are only fairly good. There are
"histories" and operations reports of small independent or attached
units, but these are frequently one to three pages in length and very
incomplete. Finally, it should be noted that the operations reports
of the various artillery units are in the main poor and incomplete
and the journals are highly technical.
Marine Records
Special Action Report of Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps, 28
December 1944.
Navy Records
The naval records that were consulted include the operation plans and
reports by naval commanders. Copies of most of these are among the
records of the Historical Records Section, Adjutant General's Office,
Department of the Army. All of the documents are in the files of the
Office of the Naval Records and Library, Department of the Navy.
Guerrilla Records
There is in the Office of the Chief of Military History a large,
completely disorganized collection of heterogeneous materials by and
about the guerrillas in the Philippine Islands. These are incomplete,
inadequate, and controversial. Some of the guerrilla bands had no
records and all that is known of others is from violently prejudiced
sources. Some of the American guerrillas published books on their
experiences. These are impressionistic, generally replete with
derring-do, and consequently possess scant value as sources. The
Combat History Division, G-1 Section, AFWESPAC, prepared a four-volume
work--"Triumph in the Philippines," the third volume of which, entitled
"Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," is colorful, but poor history.
Japanese Studies
At the cessation of hostilities, General MacArthur ordered the former
Japanese War and Navy Ministries to prepare studies on Japanese plans
and operations in World War II. The resulting studies, translations and
originals, of which those mentioned below deal with the Leyte Campaign,
are on file with the Office of the Chief of Military History. Although
there are errors in dates, designations of units, and frequently in
facts, these are the best sources for information on Japanese plans
and operations. An exception is the independent study by General
Tomochika, which despite its garish title is very good and contains
much human interest. Tomochika, evidently a man of strong prejudices,
at times was unduly critical of some of his fellow officers. Japanese
Studies used in this volume are:
Tomochika, Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu, The True Facts of the Leyte Operation,
typescript of translation, 10th I&HS, Eighth Army, 3 December 1946
Japanese Studies in World War II, 5, 4th Air Army Operations, 1914-45
----, 7, 14th Army Operations on Leyte
----, 11, 35th Army Operations, 1944-45
----, 14, Naval Operations in the Philippine Area, 1942-45
----, 21, History of the Southern Army, 1941-45
----, 72, History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters,
1941-45
----, 102, Philippine Area Naval Operations, October 1944-December
1944, Part II, The Battle of Leyte Gulf
Interviews
The following U.S. Army officers furnished the author valuable
information on the Leyte Campaign: Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger,
Maj. Gen. George H. Decker, Col. W. J. Verbeck, Col. Fred Weber,
Col. Sidney F. Mashbir, Col. John M. Finn, Capt. Francis Cronin,
Capt. Robert Ross Smith, and 1st Lt. James J. Frangie. Fleet Admiral
William D. Leahy, Lt. Comdr. Henry M. Dater, Lt. Comdr. Russell
L. Harris, Lt. Comdr. Philip A. Crowl and Lt. Roger Pineau of the
U.S. Navy were very co-operative, helping to clear up moot points
that arose. Capt. Samuel E. Morison furnished information on the
Pearl Harbor Conference of July 1944.
Manuscript Histories
There are in the files of the Office, Chief of Military History,
the following manuscript histories of certain phases of the campaign:
Dean, Captain Tucker--The Liberation of Leyte. A preliminary work
based principally upon the earlier study by Capt. Russell A. Gugeler.
Gugeler, Captain Russell A.--The 7th Division on Leyte. A good study
although poorly documented.
History of the Engineer Corps in the Southwest Pacific, Chapter VI,
Philippine Campaign.
Special Studies
There are available in the Office, Chief of Military History, copies
of special studies that bear upon the Leyte Campaign. As a group they
are capably done, although, of course, some are better than others.
Air Evaluation Board, POA, Leyte Campaign, 1944. Highly critical of
Army close air support.
Committee 16, Officers Advanced Course, The Armored School, Fort Knox,
Kentucky, Armor on Leyte, May 1949.
Division of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, O. N. I. No. 93, Field Monograph of the Philippines,
3 parts, III, Visayan Islands, January 1944.
Grigg, Maj. Martin C., The Operations of the 1st Battalion, 149th
Infantry ... in the Battle for the Buri Airstrip ... Advanced Infantry
Officers Class, 1948-1949, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.
MacLaughlin, Maj. Charles V., Operation of the XXIV Corps in the
Invasion of Leyte Island, Advanced Infantry Officers Class, 1947-1948,
The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.
Military Intelligence Division, War Department, "Leyte Field
Fortifications," Tactical and Technical Trends, April 1945.
Military Intelligence Service, General Staff, War Department, Survey
of the Philippines, 3 volumes, 15 February 1943.
National War College, Analytical Study, Japanese Opposition at Leyte
and Okinawa, 1948.
Fellers, Col. Bonner F., Psychological Warfare in the Southwest
Pacific Area, 1944-45, 15 March 1946.
Staff Study of Operations of the Japanese 35th Army on Leyte,
typescript of translation, 10th I&HS, Eighth Army (not dated),
4 parts.
Staff Study of Operations of the Japanese 102d Division on Leyte and
Cebu, typescript of translation, 10th I&HS, Eighth Army (not dated).
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Employment of Forces Under
the Southwest Pacific Command, February 1947.
Williams, Maj. E., Intelligence Activities During the Japanese
Occupation (not dated).
Publications
Arnold, General Henry H., Global Mission (New York, Harper and
Brothers, 1949).
Cronin, Capt. Francis D., Under the Southern Cross, The Saga of the
Americal Division (Washington, Combat Forces Press, 1951).
Davidson, Orlando R., Williams, J. Carl, and Kahl, Joseph A.,
The Deadeyes: The Story of the 96th Infantry Division (Washington,
Infantry Journal Press (now Combat Forces Press), 1947). A divisional
history definitely above the average.
Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces
in World War II: V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1953).
Eichelberger, Robert L., Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New York, The
Viking Press, 1950).
Field, James A., Jr., The Japanese at Leyte Gulf, The Sho Operation
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947). An excellent study
based upon Japanese documents and interrogations. There are many
superb photographs, maps, and charts.
Flanagan, Maj. Edward M., Jr., The Angels: A History of the 11th
Airborne Division, 1943-1946 (Washington, Infantry Journal Press,
1948). A popular history written for the men of the division.
Halsey, Fleet Admiral William F., and Bryan, Lt. Comdr. J., Admiral
Halsey's Story (New York, Whittlesey House, 1947). An interesting and
popular account, of value in showing Halsey's strong interest in an
early return to the Philippines.
Johansen, Maj. Herbert O., "Banzai at Burauen," Air Force, XXVIII,
3 (March, 1945). A popular account based entirely on American sources.
Kenney, George C., General Kenney Reports (New York, Duell, Sloan
and Pearce, 1949).
Karig, Capt. Walter, USNR, Harris, Lt. Comdr. Russell L., and Manson,
Lt. Comdr. Frank A., Battle Report, Victory in the Pacific (New York
and Toronto, Rhinehart and Co., Inc., 1949) (5 vols.), V. A highly
readable journalistic salty account based upon documentary sources
and interviews. There are many excellent photographs.
Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D., I Was There (New York, Whittlesey
House, 1950). Excellent. Based entirely on his diary and notes written
at the time.
Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July
1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War (Washington, 1945).
The Medal of Honor (Washington, 1948). A history of the Congressional
Medal of Honor and the official citations of the men who had been
awarded the medal.
Morton, Louis, "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East,"
Military Review, XXIX, 12 (December, 1949). An excellent analysis of
prewar strategy up to the summer of 1941.
Reel, A. Frank, The Case of General Yamashita (Chicago, The University
of Chicago Press, 1949). An able pleading for General Yamashita by
one of his defense counsel at his trial as a war criminal.
Sturgis, Brig. Gen. S. D., Jr., "Engineer Operations in the Leyte
Campaign," reprint from The Military Engineer, November, December 1947,
and January 1948.
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Pacific, Naval Analysis
Division, prepared two studies on the Pacific campaigns which are
valuable for the student of the Leyte operation. The Campaigns of
the Pacific War (Washington, 1946) is excellent for a study of the
Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (2
vols., n. d.) contains much highly important material but it should
be remembered that the interrogated Japanese officers were naturally
desirous of making a good case for themselves and at the same time
were anxious to give an answer which would please the interrogator.
Valtin, Jan [Richard J. Krebs], Children of Yesterday (New York, The
Reader's Press, 1946). An excellent popular account of the activities
of the 24th Division.
Verbeck, Col. W. J., A Regiment in Action, (n. p., n. d., privately
printed, copy in OCMH). The story of the 21st Infantry Regiment which
consists mainly of excerpts from the operations reports and journals
of higher echelons.
Woodward, C. Vann, The Battle for Leyte Gulf (New York, The Macmillan
Co., 1947). An extremely readable popular account based upon
American and Japanese sources and interviews with which Dr. Woodward
became acquainted while an officer on duty with the Office of Naval
Intelligence during the war. The book is valuable in spite of a few
minor errors of fact.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The multivolume series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, consists
of a number of subseries which are tentatively planned as follows:
The War Department, The Army Air Forces, The Army Ground Forces,
The Army Service Forces, The Defense of the Western Hemisphere, The
War in the Pacific, The European Theater of Operations, The War in
the Mediterranean, The Middle East Theater, The China-Burma-India
Theater, Civil Affairs, The Technical Services, Special Studies,
and Pictorial Record.
The following volumes have been published or are in press: [1226]
The War Department
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942
The Army Ground Forces
The Organization of Ground Combat Troops
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
The Army Service Forces
The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces
The War in the Pacific
Okinawa: The Last Battle
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
The Approach to the Philippines
The Fall of the Philippines
Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
The European Theater of Operations
The Lorraine Campaign
Cross-Channel Attack
Logistical Support of the Armies (Volume I)
The Supreme Command
The Middle East Theater
The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
The China-Burma-India Theater
Stilwell's Mission to China
The Technical Services
The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and
Operations
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I
The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War
Special Studies
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
The Women's Army Corps
Pictorial Record
The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Japan
NOTES
[1] Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward was succeeded by General Smith on 1
February 1953.
[2] Philippine Municipal Government Reports, Folder 2, App. DD,
Guerrilla File 6910.23 (B), Military Intelligence (MI) Library.
[3] Louis Morton, "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East,"
Military Review, XXIX (December, 1949), 38.
[4] The Joint Chiefs of Staff were General George C. Marshall, Chief of
Staff, United States Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief,
U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations; General Henry H. Arnold,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief--the President of the United
States. The Joint Chiefs were responsible for the conduct of the war
in the Pacific, subject to the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. The latter were representatives of the United States and the
United Kingdom. The Joint Chiefs represented the United States.
[5] Memo, Gen Marshall and Admiral King for President, 30 Mar 42,
no sub, and two incls, "Directive to the Commander in Chief of
the Pacific Ocean Area" and "Directive to Supreme Commander in the
Southwest Pacific," OPD ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 1-B.
[6] JCS 287/1, Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 8 May 43;
CCS 417, Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 2 Dec 43.
[7] United States Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS], Military Analysis
Division, Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command
(Washington, 1947), p. 32.
[8] JCS to CINCSWPA, CM-IN 5137, 12 Mar 44. CM-IN and CM-OUT numbers
used in the footnotes of this volume refer to numbers on copies of
those messages in General Marshall's Message Log, on file in the
Staff Communications Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
[9] GHQ SWPA, RENO V, 15 Jun 44.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, CM-OUT 50007, 13 Jun 44.
[12] Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, CM-IN 15058, 18 Jun 44.
[13] Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, CM-IN 2926, 4 Jul 44.
[14] Rad cited n. 11.
[15] Rad cited n. 12.
[16] Rad cited n. 11.
[17] Rad, CofS to CINCSWPA, CM-OUT 55718, 24 Jun 44.
[18] William F. Halsey, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York, 1947),
pp. 194-99.
[19] Ibid., p. 195.
[20] Information was furnished by Capt. Samuel Eliot Morison, USNR,
22 January 1951, who stated that Roosevelt had related the incident
to him. Lt. Gen. Robert G. Richardson, who was not present, states
that MacArthur told him that the President pointed to Mindanao when
he made his remark. Ltr, Gen Richardson to Gen Marshall, 1 Aug 44,
Book 21, OPD Exec 9.
[21] Interv with Admiral Leahy, 5 Oct 50, OCMH.
[22] Memo, COMINCH for CofS, 9 Aug 44, OPD ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43).
[23] Interv with Admiral Leahy, 5 Oct 50, OCMH. See also, Fleet Admiral
William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York, 1950), pp. 247-52. In answer
to an inquiry about the conference made to the director of the Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library, the author was informed that "a careful search of
the papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt in this Library has not revealed
any materials that would be pertinent to the subject...." Ltr, Herman
Kahn to author, 20 Oct 50, OCMH.
[24] GHQ SWPA, MUSKETEER Plan, 10 Jul 44.
[25] Rad, JPS to Staff Planners of CINCPOA and CINCSWPA, CM-OUT 71483,
27 Jul 44.
[26] Tel conf, Washington and Brisbane, 7 Aug 44, WD-TC 797.
[27] Tel conf, Washington and Brisbane, 10 Aug 44, WD-TC 809.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, CM-IN 24770, 27 Aug 44.
[30] Min, JCS 171st Mtg, 1 Sep 44.
[31] Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, CM-OUT 27648, 8 Sep 44.
[32] Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CM-IN 13120, 14 Sep 44.
[33] Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CINCSWPA, and COMINCH, CM-IN 12893,
13 Sep 44.
[34] Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CM-IN 12893, 14 Sep 44.
[35] Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army,
July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War (Washington,
1945), p. 71.
[36] Rad, CINCSWPA to JCS, CINCPOA, and Com3dFlt, CM-IN 12636, 14
Sep 44.
[37] Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA, CINCPOA, and Com3dFlt, 15 Sep 44, OCTAGON
31-A, CofS CM-OUT Log, 15 Sep 44; Biennial Report, p. 71, cited n. 34;
General of the Air Force Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York,
1949), pp. 529-30.
[38] Rad, CINCSWPA to JCS, CM-IN 17744, 15 Sep 44.
[39] Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA et al., CM-OUT 40792, 3 Oct 44.
[40] MI Sec, WDGS, Survey of the Philippines, 3 vols., 15 Feb 43;
Div of Naval Intel, Office, Chief of Naval Opns, ONI 93, Field
Monograph of the Philippines, Jan 44; Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ
SWPA, Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44; ASF Manual M365-1,
Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, 25 Apr 44.
[41] Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. Unless otherwise stated the
material on terrain is based upon this report, pages 5-7.
[42] S. D. Sturgis, Jr., Brigadier General, U.S. Army Air Engineer,
USAF, Engineer Operations in the Leyte Campaign, reprinted from The
Military Engineer, November and December, 1947, and January, 1948,
p. 4.
[43] Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA, Terrain Study 84, Leyte
Province, 17 Aug 44, p. 43.
[44] Unless otherwise stated, material on the guerrillas is based
upon the Guerrilla Papers, a collection of disorganized, miscellaneous
records by and about the guerrillas in the Philippine Islands. It is
located in the Documents Files Section, G-2, Department of the Army.
The records of the Leyte guerrillas are incomplete, inadequate, and
controversial. Some of the guerrilla bands had no records, and all that
is known of others is from violently prejudiced sources. Consequently,
the full story of the guerrillas can probably never be told.
[45] 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 22 Oct 44.
[46] Miranda's rank is obscure. At various times he is referred to
as lieutenant, major, colonel, and brigadier general.
[47] MI Sec, GHQ AFPAC, Intelligence Series, Vol. II, Intelligence
Activities in the Philippines. During the Japanese Occupation
(hereafter cited as Intelligence Activities in the Philippines),
App. 7.
[48] Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 56.
[49] Ibid., pp. 16-18.
[50] Memo, Col Kangleon for K-50-OCTOPUS (probably for MacArthur),
23 May 43, Guerrilla Papers.
[51] The estimates on the number of deaths vary considerably. In a
letter to President Manuel Quezon by Senator Carlos Garcia, dated 16
October 1943, the deaths are mentioned as "several"; a manuscript by
Mrs. Charlotte Martin, who was on Leyte, says "many lives were lost";
and 1st Lt. Jack Hawkins, USMC, a guerrilla, stated in December 1943
that "over three hundred casualties were suffered by the contesting
sides." Guerrilla Papers.
[52] GHQ FEC, MI Sec, GS, Messages in the Guerrilla Resistance Movement
in the Philippines, Kangleon 201 File, DRB AGO.
[53] Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Br, Rpt,
Guerrilla Resistance in the Philippines, 21 Jul 44, Guerrilla Papers.
[54] ATIS, GHQ SWPA, Current Translations, 148, 6 Feb 45.
[55] ATIS, SWPA, Enemy Publications 359, Guerrilla Activities in the
Philippines, 2 parts, 28 Apr 45, passim, DRB AGO. Any resemblance
between the Japanese figures and those in Kangleon's reports is
purely coincidental.
[56] MI Sec, GHQ SWPA, G-2 Info Bull, The Resistance Movement on
Leyte Island, 7 Oct 44, Doc Files Sec, G-2, Dept of Army.
[57] Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 5.
[58] Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton considered Villamor "the most daring
of the Filipino pilots." Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries
(New York, 1946), p. 58.
[59] Interv with Maj Villamor, 12 Oct 50.
[60] The party consisted of Major Villamor, 1st Lt. R. C. Ignacio,
2d Lt. D. C. Yuhico, 2d Lt. E. F. Quinto, Sgt. P. Jorge, and
Sgt. D. Malie.
[61] AIB, GHQ SWPA, Instructions to Maj Villamor, 27 Dec 42,
Guerrilla Papers.
[62] Villamor Rpt on Intel Net in Philippines, Guerrilla Papers.
[63] Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 77.
[64] Ibid., App. 2. The number of men and the amount and kinds of
supplies are not given.
[65] Ibid., App. 1.
[66] Ibid., passim.
[67] GHQ FEC, MI Sec, GS, A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ SWPA,
and Affiliated Units, Plate 10, facing p. 32, copy in OCMH.
[68] Office, Chief of Naval Opns, Guerrilla Activities in the
Philippines, 14 Sep 44, file OP-16 FE.
[69] Unless otherwise stated this section is based upon a report by
Col H. V. White, G-2 Sixth Army, sub: G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, 20 Sep 44,
Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 167-70.
[70] GHQ SWPA Philippine Monthly Combined Sitrep, 15 Jun 44, GHQ G-3
Jnl, 15 Jun 44.
[71] GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 4, 11-17 Jun
44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 17 Jun 44; GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of
Enemy Sit 5, 18-24 Jun 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 24 Jun 44; AAF SWPA Intel
Sum, Ser 216, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 13 Jun 44; GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands,
G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 6, 25 Jun-1 Jul 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 1 Jul 44; GHQ
SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 7, 2-8 Jul 44, GHQ G-3
Jnl, 8 Jul 44; AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 225, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 14 Jul 44.
[72] AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 228, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 25 Jul 44.
[73] Notes, WIDEAWAKE Conference, 20 Jul 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 24 Jul 44.
[74] Sixth Army G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, 20 Sep 44, Sixth Army Opns Rpt
Leyte, p. 170.
[75] GHQ SWPA Warning Instns 5, 31 Aug 44.
[76] GHQ SWPA Warning Instns 5/1, 15 Sep 44.
[77] GHQ SWPA Stf Study, King II, 4th ed., 20 Sep 44. This study was
not a directive but a basis for planning the operation.
[78] CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 8-44, quoted in Annex A, CINCPAC-CINCPOA
Opns in POA, Oct 44, pp. 56-57, A-16-3/FF12, Ser 00397, 31 May 45.
[79] Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44, Annexes 6a-6f.
[80] Hist Div, Dept of the Army, Combat Chronicle, An Outline History
of U.S. Army Divisions, passim, OCMH.
[81] CTF 77 Opns Plan, Ser 00022A, 26 Sep 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 6 Oct 44;
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 8-44, cited n. 10, above.
[82] GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, 21 Sep 44.
[83] Ibid.
[84] AAF SWPA Opns Instns 71, 24 Sep 44.
[85] FEAF, History of Far East Air Forces, I, 117, AAF Hist Archives.
[86] CANF SWPA Opns Plan 13-44, 26 Sep 44.
[87] Ibid., Apps. 1 and 2 to Annex C.
[88] Ibid., App. 3 to Annex E.
[89] Ibid., App. 1 to Annex E.
[90] CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 8-44, cited n. 10, above.
[91] GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, 21 Sep 44.
[92] CANF SWPA Opns Plan 13-44, 26 Sep 44.
[93] Memo, Rear Adm Forrest P. Sherman, Plans Off POA, and Maj Gen
Stephen J. Chamberlin, ACofS G-3 SWPA, for CINCSWPA and CINCPOA,
21 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 21 Sep 44.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44.
[96] Ibid.; Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 23.
[97] X Corps FO 1, 30 Sep 44; 1st Cav Div FO 1, 2 Oct 44; 24th Inf
Div FO 1, 1 Oct 44.
[98] XXIV Corps FO 3, 28 Sep 44; 96th Div FO 2, 10 Oct 44; 7th Div
FO 9,1 Oct 44.
[99] Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44.
[100] Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 23.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid., p. 20.
[104] Ibid., p. 24.
[105] Ibid., p. 19.
[106] Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44.
[107] Memo, Col Ely, Exec Off, Sixth Army Engineer, for Col Samuel
D. Sturgis, Jr., Sixth Army Engineer; Air Evaluation Board SWPA,
The Leyte Campaign, pp. 400-403.
[108] Interv with Maj Gen George H. Decker, formerly CofS Sixth Army,
7 Sep 51.
[109] MI, GS, GHQ FEC, History of the United States Army Forces in
the Far East 1943-1945, p. 69.
[110] Sixth Army Admin O 14, 30 Sep 44.
[111] Sixth Army Admin O 14, Annex 4, 30 Sep 44.
[112] Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 24.
[113] XXIV Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 35.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Sixth Army Admin O 14, 30 Sep 44.
[116] GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, Annex 4, 21 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl,
21 Sep 44.
[117] Ibid., p. 18.
[118] Rad, CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, 16119, 19 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl,
19 Sep 44; Info Rad, CINCSWPA to CINCPOA, CX 18072, 20 Sep 44, Sixth
Army G-3 Jnl, 21 Sep 44.
[119] Memo, Adm Sherman, Plans Off POA, and Gen Chamberlin, ACofS
G-3 SWPA, for CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, 21 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl,
22 Sep 44.
[120] Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 19.
[121] GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, Annex 4, 21 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl,
21 Sep 44.
[122] Ltr, GHQ SWPA to Comdr Allied Naval Forces, 23 Sep 44, Sixth
Army G-3 Jnl, 26 Sep 44.
[123] Ltr, Lt Col James W. Hill, Asst AG Sixth Army to CINCSWPA and
CG USASOS, 25 Sep 44, sub: Heavy Shipping Requirements for King II
Operation, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 25 Sep 44.
[124] Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, Rpt of Transportation Off, p. 270.
[125] CTF 77 Attack Plan A304-44, 2 Oct 44.
[126] Rads, CG Sixth Army to CG X Corps, CG XXIV Corps, CG ASCOM, CO
21st Inf Regt, and CO 6th Ranger Inf Bn, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 8 Oct 44.
[127] Rad, CG Sixth Army to GHQ SWPA, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 10 Oct 44.
[128] Opns Rpt CTF 78 to COMINCH, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44.
[129] Rpt, Capt Ray Tarbuck, USN, 3 Nov 44, GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Oct
44. (Hereafter cited as Tarbuck Rpt.)
[130] Opns Rpt CTF 78 to COMINCH, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44.
[131] 96th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 20.
[132] 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2.
[133] XXIV Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4.
[134] 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 25.
[135] XXIV Corps Hist Rpt for 1944, Sec Histories, History of the
Adjutant Generals Section from 8 April to 31 December 1944, pp. 10-11.
[136] Tarbuck Rpt.
[137] Ibid.
[138] CTF 77 Opns Rpt, Ser 00302-C, 31 Jan 45.
[139] CINCPAC and CINCPOA Rpt Opns in POA in Oct 44, Ser 002397,
31 May 45.
[140] USSBS, Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command,
p. 40.
[141] Japanese Studies in World War II, 14, Naval Air Operations in
the Philippine Area, 1942-45, p. 18. (Monograph numbers cited in this
volume are file designations used by OCMH.)
[142] GHQ SWPA Sum of Enemy Sit 894, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 2 Sep 44.
[143] Ibid.
[144] GHQ SWPA, Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 16, 3-9 Sep
44; 905, 13-14 Sep 44; 914, 22-23 Sep 44; 916, 24-25 Sep 44; and 907,
15-16 Sep 44; GHQ G-3 Jnl, 9-25 Sep 44.
[145] CINCPAC and CINCPOA Rpt on Opns in POA in Oct 44, Ser 002397,
31 May 45.
[146] Japanese Studies in WW II, 102, Philippine Area Naval Operations,
Oct-Dec 44, Part II, The Battle of Leyte Gulf, pp. 4-11. (Hereafter
cited as Philippine Naval Opns.)
[147] USSBS, Naval Analysis Div, The Campaigns of the Pacific War
(Washington, 1946), p. 283.
[148] Philippine Naval Opns, pp. 5, 85-86.
[149] AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 247, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 29 Oct 44.
[150] AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 246, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 22 Oct 44.
[151] Rad, Com3rdFlt to CINCPAC-CINCSWPA, 170352 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl,
17 Oct 44.
[152] Rad, Com3rdFlt to CINCPAC and var., H 2692, 0321,15 Oct 44,
AAF Hist Archives.
[153] Air Evaluation Bd SWPA Rpt, Leyte Campaign--Philippines, 1944,
p. 16.
[154] Hist of FEAF, pp. 261-63, AAF Hist Archives.
[155] Air Evaluation Bd SWPA Rpt, p. 16.
[156] Rad, Com3rd Flt to CTG 38.1, 160216, 16 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl,
17 Oct 44.
[157] Tarbuck Rpt.
[158] CTG 77.4 Opns Rpt, Ser 00120, 15 Nov 44.
[159] Japanese Studies in WW II, 72, Hist of Army Section, Imperial
General Headquarters, 1941-45, p. 131. (Hereafter cited as Hist of
Army Sec, Imperial GHQ.)
[160] Ibid., pp. 131-32.
[161] Japanese Studies in WW II, 6, 14th Area Army Plans,
1944. (Hereafter cited as 14th Area Army Plans.)
[162] The organization of Japanese forces is discussed in detail in
Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ.
[163] Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 140-41.
[164] Interv, 2d Lt Stanley L. Falk with General Kuroda, at Sugamo
Prison, Tokyo, 13 Jun 47, copy in OCMH.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 132-33, 135, 140, and errata
sheet to above.
[167] Maj Gen Yoshiharu Tomochika, The True Facts of the Leyte
Operation, p. 8, typescript of translation in OCMH.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid., p. 9.
[170] Ibid., p. 8.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Statement of Lt Col Seiichi Yoshie, Circumstances Leading to
the Relief of General Kuroda, 1 Oct 51, copy in OCMH.
[173] United States vs Tomoyuki Yamashita, Testimony of Yamashita,
XXVIII, 3518-19, DRB AGO.
[174] Ibid., XXVIII, 3519-20.
[175] Ibid., Testimony of Muto, XXII, 2998.
[176] A. Frank Reel, The Case of General Yamashita (Chicago, 1949),
pp. 18-19.
[177] USSBS Interrog 418, Interrog of Maj Gen Toshio Nishimura,
19-22 Nov 45, MS, OCMH.
[178] Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 6.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Japanese Studies in WW II, 11, 35th Army Operations 1944-45,
pp. 14-20. (Hereafter cited as 35th Army Opns.)
[182] Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 6.
[183] 16th Division Order 821, Tacloban, 17 October 1944, translation
in App. C to Annex Y, 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, DRB AGO.
[184] Japanese Studies in WW II, 7, 14th Area Army Operations on Leyte,
p. 4 (Hereafter cited as 14th Area Army Opns Leyte.)
[185] USSBS Interrog 506, Interrog of Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu Tomochika,
Oct-Dec 44, p. 2, typescript copy in OCMH.
[186] Japanese Studies in WW II, 5, 4th Air Army Operations, 1944-45,
pp. 1-50. (Hereafter cited as 4th Air Army Opns.)
[187] USSBS, Interrogations, I, 160.
[188] James A. Field, Jr., The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The SHO
Operation (Princeton, N. J., 1947), p. 8.
[189] USSBS, Interrogations, I, 219; II, 500-504.
[190] Unless otherwise noted the account of the activities of the
6th Ranger Infantry Battalion is taken from the 6th Ranger Infantry
Battalion Operations Report Leyte.
[191] Rad, CTG 77.2 to CTF 78, 17 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 17 Oct 44.
[192] Co D, 6th Ranger Inf Bn, Opns Rpt Leyte.
[193] Msg, CTG 78.4 to Tancier, 18 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl,
18 Oct 44.
[194] Rad, GHQ to CofS, 17 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 18 Oct 44.
[195] Co B, 6th Ranger Inf Bn, Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Rad, CTG 78.5 to CTF 77, 19 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl,
19 Oct 44.
[198] Rad, Parsons to CTF 77, 78, and 79, 14 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3
Wasatch Jnl, 14 Oct 44.
[199] CTF 77 to COMINCH, Opns Rpt Leyte, Ser 00302-C, 31 Jan 45, p. 8.
[200] Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 31.
[201] Rad, CTG 77.5 to CTF 77, 19 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl,
19 Oct 44.
[202] Rpt, COMINCH, Amph Opns--Invasion of the Philippines, COMINCH
P-008, pp. 1-3.
[203] CTG 77.2 to CTF 77, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 19 Oct 44.
[204] Rpt, CTF 77 to COMINCH, Amph Opn P-008, pp. 1-3.
[205] CTG 79.1 Movement Order, A173-44, 9 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 16
Oct 44.
[206] Opns Rpt CTG 79.1 to CTF 79, Ser 00454, 26 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl,
15 Nov 44.
[207] Msg, CTF 77 to CINCSWPA, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 18 Oct 44.
[208] Msg, CINCSWPA to CTF 77, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 18 Oct 44.
[209] Tarbuck Rpt.
[210] Opns Rpt CTF 79 to Com7thFlt, Ser 00323, 13 Nov 44, p. 71.
[211] Japanese Studies 11, 35th Army Opns, p. 24.
[212] CTF 79 Opns Rpt, Ser 00323, 13 Nov 44. (All naval records cited
are in the Office of Naval Records and Library.)
[213] COMBATDIV4 Opns Rpt, Ser 0322, 28 Dec 44.
[214] Tarbuck Rpt.
[215] COMBATDIV 4 Opns Rpt, Ser 0322, 28 Dec 44.
[216] COMINCH P-008, pp. 2-8.
[217] Com3dAmph Force Opns Rpt, Ser 00317, 11 Nov 44.
[218] CTG 77.4 (Com Escort Carrier Group), Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008,
30 Apr 45, Part 2, pp. 9, 10.
[219] CTF 78 Opns Rpt, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44.
[220] 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. Unless otherwise stated all
records of tactical units are in DRB AGO.
[221] Tarbuck Rpt.
[222] 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4.
[223] GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, 21 Sep 44.
[224] Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44.
[225] CTF 77 Opns Rpt, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44.
[226] CTF 78 Opns Plan 101-44, 3 Oct 44.
[227] 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 17.
[228] 1st Cav Div FO 1, 2 Oct 44.
[229] Unless otherwise stated the material on the 1st Cavalry Division
is taken from 1st Cav Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Oct 44, and 1st Cav Div Opns
Rpt Leyte, pp. 2-4.
[230] 7th Cav Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 2-4.
[231] Ibid.
[232] 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 17.
[233] 1st Cav Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2.
[234] 12th Cav Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1-2.
[235] 5th Cav S-3 Periodic Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44.
[236] 8th Cav Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5.
[237] 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 19.
[238] 1st Cav Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3, 1st Cav Div Arty Unit Jnl,
20 Oct 44.
[239] 1st Cav Div Msgs to X Corps, 20 Oct 44.
[240] Unless otherwise stated information in this subsection is
taken from 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 2-10, and 24th Div G-3 Jnl,
20 Oct 44.
[241] X Corps FO 1, 30 Sep 44.
[242] Ibid.
[243] Ibid.
[244] 19th Inf Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1.
[245] 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7.
[246] 34th Inf Unit Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44.
[247] Private Robinson was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.
[248] 19th Inf Unit Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44.
[249] 35th Army Opns, p. 27.
[250] CTF 79 Opns Rpt, Ser 00323, Encl A, 13 Nov 44.
[251] 383d Inf Regt FO 6A, App. A, 30 Sep 44.
[252] CTG 79.2 Opns Rpt, Ser 0032, 4 Nov 44.
[253] 383d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1.
[254] Ibid.
[255] 382d Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44.
[256] 382d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2.
[257] 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 33-37.
[258] Unless otherwise stated, the part of this subsection dealing
with the 7th Infantry Division is taken from the following: 7th Inf
Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3-5; 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Oct 44; and 7th
Inf Div FO 9, 1 Oct 44.
[259] 776th Amph Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4.
[260] 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44.
[261] 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4.
[262] 184th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2.
[263] 184th Inf Jnl, 20 Oct 44.
[264] Rad, GHQ SWPA to CG Sixth Army, Sixth Army G-3 Rear Jnl, 21
Oct 44.
[265] Extracted Report of Landing on Leyte in the Philippine Islands by
an Australian Officer Attached to the Northern Assault Force Landing
at Red Beach. Copy in OCMH.
[266] 2d ESB Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1.
[267] Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, Engr Rpt, p. 232.
[268] Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt, p. 218.
[269] Ltr, CG 2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44, 2d ESB Jnl and
Jnl File.
[270] CTU 78.1.7 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 2.
[271] Ltr, CG 2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44, 2d ESB Jnl and
Jnl File.
[272] CTU 78.2.1 and 78.2.3 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 3.
[273] Lts, CG 2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44, 2d ESB Jnl and
Jnl File.
[274] Maj F. W. Doyle to Brig Gen L. J. Whitlock, Rpt of Observations,
KING II Opn, 4 Nov 44, GHQ G-4 Jnl, AGO KCRC.
[275] 2d ESB Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6.
[276] Maj Doyle to Gen Whitlock, Rpt of Observations, KING II Opn,
4 Nov 44, GHQ G-4 Jnl.
[277] 7th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, Supplementary Annex, p. 3.
[278] 96th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 73.
[279] Rpt of Sup Off to CO Funston, 23 Oct 44, in CO USS Frederick
Funston Opns Rpt, Ser 0101, 31 Oct 44. The boat crews and beach parties
had been fortified with a lunch consisting of turkey salad, ham and
cheese, hot steak sandwiches, ice cream, and cold fruit juices. The
Army assault troops carried K rations.
[280] Com3dAmph Force Opns Rpt, Ser 00317, 11 Nov 44.
[281] 96th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 73-75.
[282] CTG 79.1 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 15.
[283] 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt.
[284] CTG 71.1 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part 5, p. 15.
[285] 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt.
[286] 1140th Engr Const Gp Shore Party Opns Rpt Leyte.
[287] The New York Times, October 20, 1944.
[288] Japanese Studies in WW II, 21, Hist of Southern Army, 1941-45,
OCMH.
[289] Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, p. 139.
[290] 4th Air Army Opns, pp. 38-43.
[291] Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 24 Oct 44.
[292] Sixth Army G-2 Jnl, 24 Oct 44.
[293] Hist of V Bomber Command, Ch. 4, Jul-Dec 44, p. 73, AAF Hist
Archives.
[294] Ibid., pp. 73-75.
[295] Hist of 7th Fighter Sq, 49th Fighter Gp, 86th Fighter Wing,
V Fighter Comd, Fifth Air Force, Nov 44, p. 1, AAF Hist Archives.
[296] USBSS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 285.
[297] Ibid.
[298] Ibid.
[299] Ibid., App. 87, p. 292.
[300] Ibid., App. 88, p. 294.
[301] USSBS, Interrogations, II, 317.
[302] USBSS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 281.
[303] Ibid., p. 284.
[304] It is not within the scope of this history to deal with the
ensuing battle between the Japanese and American Navies. A full
discussion of the "greatest naval battle of the Second World War
and the largest engagement ever fought on the high seas" would
require a volume. Such a study is being prepared by Samuel Eliot
Morison in his series of studies on the U.S. Navy's part in the
war. Two excellent accounts--James Field's The Japanese at Leyte
Gulf, and C. Vann Woodward's The Battle for Leyte Gulf (New York,
1947)--have already appeared. The present volume attempts to present
only those facts needed to understand the effect of the battle on land
operations. (Quotation is from Woodward, Battle for Leyte Gulf, p. 1.)
[305] USSBS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 284.
[306] Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, Combat Command: The American
Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War (New York, 1950), p. 286.
[307] Field, Japanese at Leyte Gulf, pp, 81-82.
[308] USBSS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 285.
[309] Ibid.
[310] Ibid.
[311] Ibid.
[312] Ltr, Gen Krueger to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, 12 Sep 51, OCMH.
[313] Ibid.
[314] USBSS, Interrogations, I, 44.
[315] CTU 77.4.3 Opns Rpt, Ser 00100, 29 Oct 44, Incl B, p. 2.
[316] Woodward, Battle for Leyte Gulf, p. 229.
[317] Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 43.
[318] Ltr, Adm Halsey to Gen Ward, 6 Jul 51, OCMH.
[319] Hist of V Fighter Comd, Ch. 4, Jul-Dec 44, p. 73, AAF Hist
Archives.
[320] Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 21 Oct 44.
[321] Opns Rpt, CSA Seventh Flt to Comdr Seventh Flt, no ser, 2 Nov 44.
[322] AAF Evaluation Bd POA Rpt 3, The Occupation of Leyte, Philippine
Islands, pp. 27 and 15. This report was prepared by Brig. Gen. Martin
F. Scanlon, who accompanied the XXIV Corps to Leyte as an air observer
for the Army Air Forces in the Central Pacific. By close support is
meant operating to the immediate front of the first-line troops.
[323] AAF Bd POA Rpt 3, p. 15.
[324] Opns Rpt, CSA Seventh Flt to Comdr Seventh Flt, no serial,
2 Nov 44.