Westward to the Sea
The co-ordinated pressure exerted from the north and south on the
Japanese forces in the Ormoc area had compelled the commander of the
35th Army to make successive changes in his plans. General Suzuki had
abandoned the aerial and ground assault against the Burauen airfields,
transferred the field base of the 35th Army from Ormoc to Palompon
and, finally, had found it necessary to order the remaining Japanese
units on Leyte to retreat to the hills behind Ormoc Valley. General
Tomochika said afterward, "The best that the 35th Army could do from
then on was to hold out as long as possible." [1143]
The northwestern mountains of Leyte west of Ormoc Bay provided a
difficult barrier to any movement toward the northwest coast. The
area was the last one available to the Japanese either for escaping
from Leyte or for staging defensive actions. In general, the terrain
was rough, increasing in altitude from broken ground and low hills
in the north to steep rocky ridges and high hills in the south. The
northern part was either under cultivation or covered with cogon
grass. Toward the south, the cultivated fields and grasslands were
gradually supplanted by dense forests.
Palompon had been extensively used by the Japanese as an auxiliary
port of entry to Leyte. The town was the western terminus of the
road that ran north and eastward across the northwestern hills to
join Highway 2 near Libongao. (Map 23) It was this road junction that
the X and XXIV Corps had seized. The Palompon road, as it was called,
followed the lower slopes of the hills until the flat interior valley
floor was reached. The confining hills were steep-sided with many
knife-edged crests. [1144] Such was the area into which the forces
of the Sixth Army had driven remnants of the Japanese 35th Army.
When the 77th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division joined
forces on 21 December just south of Kananga, Highway 2 between Ormoc
and Pinamopoan was opened to the Americans. The Sixth Army, anxious to
deliver the coup de grâce, arranged its troops for a four-division
thrust to the west coast on a long front. In the south the 77th
Division was to drive west along the Palompon road. To its right
(north) there would be, from left to right, the 1st Cavalry Division
and the 32d and 24th Infantry Divisions. The Sixth Army had started the
Leyte Campaign with two corps on a four-division front and was ending
its part in the campaign with two corps on a four-division front.
The 77th Division Goes West
Overwater to Palompon [1145]
Guerrillas had informed General Bruce that the bridges on the road
that wound through the mountains from the vicinity of Libongao to
Palompon either were intact or could be quickly repaired. General
Bruce decided to verify this by having an engineer patrol work with
the guerrillas and by having a reconnaissance made over the area in
a cub plane. On 19 December General Bruce directed that a fast-moving
force be organized to operate along the road to Palompon. The engineers
later informed him that because of the condition of many of the bridges
it would be impossible to send an advance column along the road. [1146]
On 21 December General Hodge, anticipating the juncture of the X and
XXIV Corps, ordered the 77th Division to be prepared after that event
to move rapidly west and seize the Palompon area. [1147] On 22 December
General Krueger, acting on a recommendation that had been made by
General Bruce through General Hodge, [1148] informed Admiral Kinkaid
that it might be possible to expedite the capture of Palompon by
having an infantry battalion, utilizing amphibian vehicles and LCM's,
make an amphibious movement from Ormoc to the vicinity of Palompon. He
therefore asked Admiral Kinkaid if naval support to escort and guide
this movement could be furnished for either the night of 23-24 or
that of 24-25 December. If possible, the amphibious force should
have a destroyer escort. [1149] Admiral Kinkaid stated, in reply,
that because of preparations for other operations it would be "most
difficult" to provide a destroyer escort but that he could furnish a
PT escort which he believed would be sufficient protection. [1150]
This was satisfactory to General Krueger and he ordered the XXIV
Corps to make plans for the amphibious movement. [1151] In turn
General Hodge told General Bruce to prepare for the operation.
On 22 December, General Bruce put his plan into operation. The 1st
Battalion, 305th Infantry, was to make the amphibious landing in the
vicinity of Palompon while the 2d and 3d Battalions were to proceed
west along the Palompon road, after moving in trucks from Valencia to
the Palompon road near the Togbong River. Previously, on 21 December,
Battery A of the 531st Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. gun) was
brought with a great deal of effort to a position near San Jose from
which it could fire on Palompon, which the guerrillas and civilians
had received instructions to evacuate. [1152]
The 1st Battalion was to commence loading at 1400 on 23 December
at Ormoc. The convoy was to be protected en route by patrol torpedo
boats and close air support. Upon arriving at Palompon at 0500 on 25
December, the mortar-firing LCM's were to bombard the shore before
the assault forces moved in. Beginning 23 December, the artillery of
the 77th Division was to bombard Palompon and to continue as long as
Lt. Col. James E. Landrum, the task force commander, desired it. [1153]
The 1st Battalion was to move ashore on the beach about 1,500 yards
north of Palompon with Companies C and B in assault, Company C on the
left. Its mission was to destroy the enemy force in Palompon and then
turn north. [1154]
In support of the proposed landing, aircraft from the Fifth Air
Force bombed Palompon on 23 December. The results were "hot stuff,"
an overenthusiastic observer reported, claiming that "only half of
two houses were left standing in the whole town." [1155]
On 23 December, the reinforced 1st Battalion moved to Ormoc to prepare
for the amphibious landing and at 1930 on 24 December the troops
embarked. [1156] The convoy departed at 2000. The vessels included,
in addition to the mechanized landing craft, the LVT's of the 718th
and 536th Amphibian Tractor Battalions. They made the tedious ten-hour
trip without incident as far as enemy action was concerned, although
three of the LVT's "sank owing to mechanical failure."
The vessels took position off the landing beaches on the morning
of 25 December. After the 155-mm. guns of the 531st Field Artillery
Battalion had fired from positions near San Jose, twelve and a half
miles east of Palompon, the mortar boats of the 2d Engineer Special
Brigade softened up the beaches. The landing waves then started for the
shore, the first wave landing at 0720 and the last one at 0755. They
received no hostile fire.
"Meanwhile," wrote General Bruce, "the Division Commander could stand
it no longer and called for a plane, flew soon after daylight across
the mountains and seaward, located the amphibious forces still at
sea, ... witnessed the preparatory fires by the 155-mm. guns and that
from the mortar boats ... saw them going in ... and advance to the
beach. (He obeyed a rather boyish impulse and flew from 25 to 50 feet
above the heads of the troops in the assault boats and leaned out,
giving a boxer's victory sign with both hands.)" [1157]
The troops quickly organized on the beach. A light fast armored
column moved north to clear the road and to forestall any Japanese
counterattack from that direction as the rest of the task force went
rapidly south through the barrio of Look to Palompon, which fell at
1206. This closed the last main port of entrance on the island to the
Japanese. Within four hours after hitting the beaches the battalion
had secured the barrios of Buaya and Look as well as Palompon, and had
strong patrols operating to the northeast and south. The troops met no
opposition at any point. It was doubtless with great satisfaction that
General Bruce sent the following message to the Commanding General,
XXIV Corps: "The 77th Infantry Division's Christmas contribution to
the Leyte Campaign is the capture of Palompon, the last main port of
the enemy. We are all grateful to the Almighty on this birthday of the
Son and on the Season of the Feast of Lights." [1158] The 1st Battalion
received "warm congratulations and thanks" from General Krueger. [1159]
The 1st Battalion occupied a defensive position in the vicinity of Look
on 25 December, and rested on 26 December, which was Christmas Day back
home. It spent the next five days sending out patrols and awaiting the
arrival through the mountains of the rest of the 305th Infantry. On 30
December, Company C made a reconnaissance in force and an amphibious
landing at Abijao, about seven miles north of Palompon. The company
overcame some Japanese resistance and burned down the town to prevent
its reoccupation. It then pushed 1,300 yards north and established
radio contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, which had
pushed through the mountains to the vicinity of Villaba. [1160]
The Palompon Road
The Palompon road wound through the mountains and crossed many rivers,
over which some forty bridges would have to be built or repaired. It
ran northwest two and a half miles from the Togbong River to the
barrio of Humaybunay and then cut sharply to the southwest for about
four miles to Matagob, at which point it went into the hills almost
directly south for about 2,000 yards, and then turned south-southwest
for 1,000 yards. At this point it turned and twisted to the southwest
for approximately five and a half miles to the vicinity of San Miguel,
from where it arched 3,500 yards to Look, on the Camotes Sea.
The Japanese had pockmarked Matagob and the area surrounding it
with foxholes and emplacements and had dug spider holes under the
houses. South of Matagob, where the road climbed into the hills, the
enemy had utilized natural caves, gullies, and ridges on both sides
of the road and dug many deep defensive positions. Some of these were
eight feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and widened to six
feet at the bottom. The Japanese had emplaced machine guns in culverts
and had constructed several well-camouflaged coconut log pillboxes
on the forward slopes of the ridges. An excellent, almost invisible
installation, which served as an observation post, was dug in on the
forward slope of a ridge about three miles north of San Miguel. It
had a concealed entrance on the reverse slope. From this post eight
miles of the road to the north and east could be observed.
The Japanese 5th Infantry Regiment was the principal enemy unit in the
sector, although remnants of other units retreating west from Highway
2 were in the area. The following Japanese units were identified: 1st,
3d, and 6th Batteries of the 8th Field Artillery Regiment; elements
of the 8th Division Signal Unit; the 8th Transport Regiment; and the
8th Engineer Regiment. Although intelligence officers estimated that
there were between 2,000 and 3,000 enemy troops in the sector, only
a force of about battalion strength opposed the 305th Infantry. The
rest had scattered into the hills to the northwest.
At 0700, on 22 December, the 2d Battalion, 305th Infantry, left
Valencia followed at 1035 by the 3d Battalion. The 2d Battalion crossed
the Togbong River, moved through the 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry,
and at 1030 attacked along the Palompon road. The battalion had
advanced 1,600 yards northwest by 1230 and secured the Pagsangahan
River crossing. The assault continued with the 3d Battalion coming
up on the right flank of the 2d. The battalions moved through rice
paddies and through Humaybunay and established a night perimeter
about one mile southwest of the barrio.
The 302d Engineer Battalion, which followed behind the assault
battalions, fought the "battle of bridges." [1161] The engineers
worked around the clock, frequently without any infantry protection,
to restore the bridges as soon as possible. The bridges were to
be sufficiently strengthened initially to support 2 1/2-ton truck
traffic for infantry supply, then they were to be reinforced to carry
20 tons in order to bring M8's forward, and eventually to 36-ton
capacity to carry the M10's. General Bruce had hoped that sufficient
Bailey bridges could be made available for important crossings to
carry traffic while engineers built wooden bridges under the Bailey
bridges. Only a limited number of Bailey bridges were furnished,
however, and engineer progress to the west was slowed down. [1162]
The assault battalions of the 305th Infantry that were astride the
Palompon road spent a quiet night. They had before them the enemy's
strongly fortified positions at Matagob. At 0830 on 23 December, the
2d Battalion moved out, followed at 1130 by the 3d Battalion. The 2d
Battalion moved forward west of the road while the 3d advanced east
of the road. Intermittent enemy rifle fire fell upon the 2d Battalion
but it pushed ahead steadily. At 1500, the 2d Battalion was 500 yards
beyond Matagob and the 3d was 300 yards behind the 2d. The troops
came under heavy fire from two enemy 75-mm. guns on the hills west of
Matagob and suffered several casualties. The mortars and artillery
with the 305th Infantry silenced the Japanese guns. The regimental
commander issued orders for the battalions to move out for the assault
at 1000 on the following day against the regimental objective, a road
bend that was 2,000 yards to its front. The 2d Battalion set up its
night perimeter in place while the 3d Battalion withdrew to a point
1,000 yards east of Matagob. The regimental command post moved from
Humaybunay to the 3d Battalion perimeter. [1163]
During the night the Japanese made several attempts to penetrate the
American lines. The 3d Battalion destroyed a demolition squad that
entered its position, while the 2d Battalion beat back one attack
at 0245 and another one, which was accompanied by mortar fire, at
0630. The 305th Infantry killed an estimated 100 Japanese with no
casualties to the regiment. [1164]
At 1000 on 24 December the assault troops jumped off. The Japanese
resistance was light and intermittent, but American progress was
slow because of the rough, irregular hills in which the enemy had
established positions in foxholes, spider holes, and caves. Since it
was not possible to bypass these positions, the regiment had to clear
each one before the advance could continue. The force received some
artillery fire but a mortar platoon from Company A, 88th Chemical
Weapons Battalion, silenced the enemy guns. At 1500 the battalions
set up their night perimeter 500 yards short of the road bend. During
the night a Japanese force of twenty men, which tried to penetrate
the defenses of the 3d Battalion, was killed. [1165]
At 0800 on 25 December the attack was renewed, but made very slow
progress. The enemy, dug in in small pockets along the road, resisted
stubbornly. The 3d Battalion advanced 200 yards and was pinned
down by machine gun, mountain gun, and rifle fire. The 2d Battalion
attempted to envelop the enemy strong point on the Japanese right
(south) flank but was repulsed. [1166]
On 26 December the regiment limited its activity to patrolling. Since
it was Christmas Day in the States, "All guns of the Division Artillery
fired ... at ... 1200 as a salute to the nation on Christmas Day. This
was followed by one minute of silent prayer for the dead and wounded of
the 77th Division." [1167] That night General Bruce ordered the troops
to build bonfires and sing, and employ other ruses in the hope that the
Japanese might believe that the troops were celebrating Christmas and
might therefore try to enter the defensive perimeters. These ruses were
unsuccessful in the sectors of the assault battalions, but a similar
one employed in the area of the regimental command post attracted
some Japanese patrols, which were either destroyed or driven off.
At dawn on 27 December the 3d Battalion moved around the Japanese
left flank toward the high ground six hundred yards from the line
of departure. Despite enemy artillery and machine gun fire and the
difficult terrain, the battalion reached the objective, killing 160
Japanese. The remainder fled to the hills.
When it became apparent that the Japanese resistance was strong and
determined and might unduly delay the progress of the 305th Infantry,
General Bruce decided to move the 2d Battalion of the regiment
overwater to the vicinity of Palompon at the western terminus of the
road. The 2d Battalion could then attack east along the road while the
3d Battalion continued the attack west. The Japanese defenders would
thus be under fire on their front and rear. This eastern attack force,
which was called the Provisional Mountain Force, moved to Ormoc and
thence, after arrangements had been made with the naval representatives
of Krueger's staff, overwater by LCM's to Palompon. It arrived at
the latter without incident at 1500 on 28 December. On the same day
the 3d Battalion, reinforced, continued the attack westward. The
Japanese resisted strongly with small arms fire from pillboxes and
with artillery. The 3d Battalion advanced approximately 1,000 yards
during the day. [1168]
At 0800 on 29 December, the 3d Battalion moved out. The battalion
had advanced 650 yards at 1000 when it encountered very determined
resistance from an enemy force in very well camouflaged, dug-in
positions. The troops were pinned down for the rest of the day. The
Provisional Mountain Force moved out of Look at 1200 to a position
from which it could launch its assault eastward along the road.
At 0930 on 30 December the 305th Infantry struck along the Palompon
road, the 3d Battalion driving west, and the Provisional Mountain
Force attacking east. The Mountain Force encountered only scattered
resistance until 0930, when the Japanese, from well-entrenched
positions in the precipitous sides of the road at a point about
four miles east of Palompon, directed strong machine gun fire along
the road. The Mountain Force dug in for the night on high ground
overlooking the point at which its advance had been halted. The 3d
Battalion succeeded in overcoming the opposition which had halted
it the previous day, and pushed forward to a point about 1,000
yards southwest of Tipolo. The Japanese had emplaced artillery on
curves in the road and could fire directly on the advancing American
troops. Although the 305th Infantry lost one tank to enemy artillery
fire, it was able to destroy three 75-mm. guns and capture two others
intact. [1169]
During the night, the Japanese force withdrew; only scattered troops
were left to delay the advance. At 0800 on 31 December, the assault
forces of the 305th Infantry resumed the attack, and encountered only
sporadic rifle fire. At 1225 at a point two miles northeast of San
Miguel the 3d Battalion and the Provisional Mountain Force met. This
ended all organized resistance along the Palompon road and secured an
overland route from Highway 2 in the Ormoc Valley to Palompon on the
west coast. [1170] The 77th Division made the astounding estimate that
for the period from 21 through 31 December 1944, it had killed 5,779
Japanese, taken 29 prisoners, and had lost 17 men killed, 116 wounded,
and 6 missing in action. [1171]
X Corps Goes West
Meanwhile, to the north of the 77th Division, elements of the 1st
Cavalry Division and the 32d Infantry Division had turned off Highway
2 and were pushing over the mountains to the west coast. [1172]
The 1st Cavalry Division
With the clearing of Highway 2 and the junction of the X and XXIV
Corps at a point just south of Kananga, the 1st Cavalry Division
was in readiness to push toward the west coast in conjunction with
assaults by the 77th Division on its left and the 32d Division on its
right. The troops were on a 2,500-yard front along Highway 2 between
Kananga and Lonoy.
On the morning of 23 December the assault units of the 1st Cavalry
Division moved out from the highway and started west. None encountered
any resistance. The 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, established a
night perimeter on a ridge about 1,400 yards slightly northwest of
Kananga. The 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, set up a night perimeter
1,000 yards north of that of the 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, while
the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, dug in for the night on a line with
the other two squadrons.
This first day's march set the pattern for the next several
days. The regiments pushed steadily forward, meeting only scattered
resistance. The chief obstacles were waist-deep swamps in the zone
of the 12th Cavalry. These were waded on 24 December. The tangled
vegetation and sharp, precipitous ridges that were henceforward
encountered also made the passage slow and difficult.
On 28 December, the foremost elements of the 5th and 12th Cavalry
Regiments broke out of the mountains and reached the barrio of
Tibur on the west coast, about 2,800 yards north of Abijao. (See Map
2.) By nightfall on the following day, the 7th Cavalry was also on
the west coast but farther north. In its advance it had encountered
and destroyed many small, scattered groups of the enemy, most of
whom showed little desire to fight. The regiment arrived at Villaba,
two and one-half miles north of Tibur, at dusk, and in securing the
town killed thirty-five Japanese.
During the early morning hours of 31 December, the Japanese launched
four counterattacks against the forces at Villaba. Each started with
a bugle call, the first attack beginning at 0230 and the final one at
dawn. An estimated 500 of the enemy, armed with mortars, machine guns,
and rifles, participated in the assaults, but the American artillery
stopped the Japanese and their forces scattered. On 31 December,
the 77th Division began to relieve the elements of the 1st Cavalry
Division, which moved back to Kananga.
On the morning of the 30th of December, the 7th Cavalry had made
physical contact northeast of Villaba with the 127th Infantry, 32d
Division, which had been driving to the west coast north of the 1st
Cavalry Division.
The 32d Division
On 22 December the 127th Infantry had reached Lonoy and made contact
with the 7th Cavalry. On the following day the troops rested. [1173]
The 128th Infantry had been engaged in sending out patrols throughout
the Limon area from 11 to 18 December. These patrols were successful
in wiping out pockets of resistance that had been bypassed by the
advance forces of the 32d Division in the division's drive along
Highway 2 to the south. On 20 December, the 128th received orders
from General Gill to prepare for a move to the west coast. [1174]
Both the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments sent out patrols on
23 December to reconnoiter the terrain. At 0800 on 24 December the
two regiments started for the west coast. Throughout the march to
the sea, they encountered only small parties of the enemy, who
put up no effective resistance, but heavy rains, dense, almost
impassable forests, and steep craggy hills slowed the advance.
The commanding officer of the 127th Infantry said of the hills
encountered on 24 December:
The morning was spent in climbing to the top of a mountain
ridge. The climbing was difficult but as we later found out, the
descent was much worse. The trail led almost perpendicular down the
side. After reaching the bottom, another ridge was encountered,
this almost straight up, everyone had to use hand holds to pull
themselves up. All in all there were seven ridges from the bottom
of the first descent to the first possible bivouac area. [1175]
The hills were less rugged from then on. On the morning of 25 December,
the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, encountered and dispersed 300 to
400 Japanese. Throughout the march both regiments received supplies
by airdrop, which was not completely satisfactory since none of the
drops was made at the requested time and frequently there was a wide
scattering of supplies.
On the afternoon of 29 December the two regiments were on their
objectives: the 128th Infantry on the high ground overlooking Tabango
and Campopo Bays and the 127th Infantry on the high ground overlooking
Antipolo Point, approximately three miles to the south. Patrols were
sent out to scout the terrain and establish contact with the 1st
Cavalry Division on the south and with the 24th Infantry Division on
the north. [1176]
The 24th Infantry Division [1177]
The 24th Division, after having been relieved by the 32d Division on
Breakneck Ridge, had protected the rear areas on a trail leading from
Jaro to Ormoc. Two weeks before the march to the west coast a large
Japanese convoy had been attacked by U. S. aircraft and forced into
San Isidro Bay on the northern part of the west coast. Although the
vessels were destroyed, some of the troops were able to get ashore. On
9 December they headed toward Calubian, on Leyte Bay about six miles
northeast of San Isidro. General Woodruff, who had replaced General
Irving on 18 November, ordered Colonel Clifford's 1st Battalion,
34th Infantry, which had been defending Kilay Ridge, to wipe out
the part of the enemy force that had landed at San Isidro and fled
northeastward to the vicinity of Calubian.
At 2300 on 21 December, Colonel Clifford notified Colonel Dahlen,
the commanding officer of the 34th Infantry, that a Japanese force of
about 160 men was at Tuktuk, about four miles south of Calubian. He
added that at 0800 on the following morning the 1st Battalion would
move out and destroy the force.
At 0300 a force consisting of a platoon from Company C and a platoon
from Company A moved toward the high ground northwest of Tuktuk in
preparation for the assault, but because of very poor trails the
force was delayed. In the meantime four LVT's with a platoon of
mortars moved overwater to Tuktuk. At 0830 the attack started, with
machine guns mounted on the LVT's and mortars furnishing supporting
fire. The Japanese resistance was sporadic, although some mortar fire
was received. As the troops of the 34th Infantry neared the barrio,
the enemy defenders broke and fled, and the town was deserted as the
soldiers entered. Approximately thirty enemy dead were counted in the
barrio and vicinity. The fleeing enemy force was later destroyed by
patrols that worked over the sector. The Japanese had obviously been
looting because linens, silverware, and women's clothing were found
in their packs. One soldier had a baby's high chair tied on the top
of his pack.
On 23 December, Col William W. Jenna, former commanding officer of
the 34th Infantry, returned from sick leave in the States and assumed
command of the 34th Infantry. With his arrival plans were expedited
to clean up the northwestern end of the Leyte peninsula in conjunction
with the assaults of other units of the Sixth Army.
From 23 to 26 December, extensive patrolling was conducted along the
west coast of the Leyte peninsula. On 26 December the 34th Infantry
issued orders for clearing the part of the Leyte peninsula in its
zone. The 1st Battalion was to secure all trails and high ground in
the interior, prevent any enemy movement to the north and to the east,
and, finally, be prepared to assist the 2d Battalion in the capture
of the San Isidro Bay area.
At 2245 on 26 December the LCM's at Villalon (a barrio on Biliran
Strait and about six miles northwest of Calubian) began to load
Companies F and G. By 2300 the embarkation was completed and the
craft moved to Gigantangan Island, arriving there fifteen minutes
after midnight. The troops disembarked and slept. At 0530 they again
embarked and proceeded to Taglawigan, arriving there at 0730. After
strafing the shore the companies landed, meeting no resistance. At
the same time Company F completed its assignment without opposition,
pushing east and south and encircling Taglawigan. Before noon, some
elements of the 2d Battalion were moving overland to Daha, about two
miles to the south, while others had re-embarked and were making an
overwater movement toward it. By noon Taglawigan and Daha had fallen
to the 2d Battalion.
Company G, reinforced, left Company F at Daha, re-embarked on the
landing craft, and headed toward the San Isidro Bay area, 6,000 yards
to the south. As the convoy neared San Isidro, it came under machine
gun fire from the barrio and the hills to the southwest. A frontal
attack on the town was abandoned and the landing craft moved to the
southwest of the jetty to make their landing. The LVT's mired in the
mud about 100 to 150 yards offshore. The rest of the force, which
was in the LCM's, waded ashore. Some of the troops from the LVT's met
with great difficulty in trying to get ashore but the LVT's finally
succeeded in retracting and picked them up. Approximately 150 soldiers
with supplies for the task force returned to Gigantangan Island. The
convoy had only one casualty.
In the meantime, the 1st Battalion had received orders at 1300 to
take San Isidro. The battalion moved overland from Calubian and at
nightfall it dug in on the high ground overlooking San Isidro.
At 0800 on 28 December, the co-ordinated assault was made against
San Isidro, with elements of the 2d Battalion attacking from the
north while the 1st Battalion attacked from the east. The troops
encountered light resistance, the Japanese defenders being only
partially armed. Fifty-five of the enemy were killed and one prisoner
was taken. By 1230, the 1st Battalion was out-posting San Isidro.
With the capture of San Isidro, the last main point on the Leyte
peninsula was safely in the hands of the 34th Infantry. The troops
moved south along the coast and destroyed small, poorly equipped groups
of the enemy. One group of Japanese, whose only weapons were bayonets
attached to bamboo poles, tried hopelessly to break through the lines.
On 1 January 1945, the 77th Division was ordered to relieve the
32d and 24th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division. The
relieved divisions were to move to staging areas and prepare for
future operations.
The Japanese Retreat
Condition of Japanese Forces
The morale and physical condition of the Japanese Army were very
low. With the juncture of the American X and XXIV Corps, the 35th
Army had begun to disintegrate. Desertion became common. The wounded
would not assemble with their units. The problem of the wounded
became serious since there were no proper facilities for medical
treatment. General Tomochika later said: "Commanders employing
persuasive language frequently requested seriously wounded soldiers
at the front to commit suicide; this was particularly common among
personnel of the 1st Division and it was pitiful. However the majority
died willingly. Only Japanese could have done a thing like this and
yet I could not bear to see the sight." [1178]
Those of the slightly wounded that could not march with the able-bodied
soldiers walked by themselves. They became separated from their units
and some, although able to do so, refused to rejoin their outfits,
giving their wounds as an excuse. In addition there were deserters
who fled to the hills. The 35th Army began the policy of sending the
slightly wounded back to the front lines. Many of the service units,
such as the Mitsui Shipping Unit and the air corps ground crews,
refused to fight since they were not trained as combat troops. "Even
the artillery and antiaircraft units retreated without facing the
enemy. Their excuse was that they were not trained to fight as infantry
and were useless without their guns." [1179]
Doubtless, some of the unwillingness of the Japanese service troops to
serve on the front lines was due to their physical condition. When the
1st Division arrived on Leyte on 1 November it brought with it enough
food and ammunition for one month, and by 1 December this supply was
exhausted. On 3 December an additional one-half month's supply was
brought in at Ormoc; but this was destroyed or captured by the 77th
Division in its advance. Consequently after the 1st of December all
Japanese troops on Leyte "were on a starvation diet and had to live
off the land." [1180] The 1st and 57th Infantry Regiments were the
principal sufferers. The men were forced to eat coconuts, various
grasses, bamboo shoots, the heart fibers of coconut tree trunks,
and whatever native fruits or vegetables they could forage. When the
troops received orders to withdraw to the west coast of Leyte, "they
were literally in a starved condition, ... many instances occurred
in which men vomited seven to ten times a day because they could not
digest some of the food due to their weakened stomachs." [1181]
The 1st Division abandoned much equipment, ammunition, and rations
along the highway through the Ormoc Valley. Many of the stragglers and
deserters clothed and fed themselves with the abandoned matériel. The
chief of staff of the 35th Army stated that when the Americans
captured army headquarters, he left the headquarters without any
clothing. However, he picked up "a new uniform and sufficient food
while on the road." [1182]
Withdrawal Plans
On 19 December, General Suzuki, the commander of the 35th Army
on Leyte, had received word from the 14th Area Army in Manila that
henceforth the 35th Army was to subsist on its own resources and what
it could obtain within its operational area. [1183]
On the same day, probably because of the information received from
Manila, General Suzuki ordered a conference of the staff officers of
the 1st and 102d Divisions. At this meeting, General Suzuki ordered
the 1st Division to retreat to the northern sector of the Matagob area
and the 102d Division to the southern part of the same sector. At
Matagob the divisions were to reorganize for a counterattack. The
order did not give any specific time for the withdrawal; each division
was to take action according to the situation in its sector. On 20
December, General Suzuki moved his headquarters farther west to a
point approximately three and a half miles north of Palompon. [1184]
On 21 December, the 102d Division, which had about 2,000 men, began
to withdraw to the vicinity of Matagob. The division, having failed to
get in touch with the 35th Army, moved to the west coast near Villaba,
approximately ten miles north of Palompon. [1185] It made contact
with the 1st Division at the end of December, and also with the 68th
Infantry Brigade and the 5th Infantry Regiment, which were already
in that sector. [1186] The 1st Division also began to withdraw on 21
December, making the withdrawal in two columns. The southern column
consisted of about six hundred men of the 49th Infantry Regiment,
1st Division Transport Regiment, and other units. On its way west,
it was met on 23 December by the 68th Brigade which, unaware of
the loss of the Ormoc road, was proceeding toward the highway. The
brigade joined the southern column, which reached the Bagacay sector
the following day. (The barrio of Bagacay is six miles northeast
of Villaba.) The northern column also had about six hundred men and
consisted of elements of the Division Headquarters, the 1st Infantry
Regiment, the 57th Infantry Regiment, and other units. The detachment
was forced to cut its way through dense jungle. On 25 December it
was attacked by the Americans and further decimated. That night the
northern and southern columns met at Bagacay and on the following day
started towards Matagob. On the 28th, following orders from General
Suzuki, they turned north and established defensive positions on the
eastern slope of Mt. Canguipot, two and a half miles southeast of
Villaba. [1187]
As the Japanese, pursued by the forces of the X and XXIV Corps,
spiritlessly retreated toward the mountains of western Leyte, Imperial
General Headquarters notified the Japanese people: "Our forces are
still holding the Burauen and San Pablo airfields and continue to
attack the enemy positions. Our forces are fighting fiercely on the
eastern mountain slopes near Ormoc and Albuera." [1188]