Seizure of Ormoc Valley
General Krueger wished the two corps to attack aggressively through
Ormoc Valley toward Valencia, about six and a half miles north of
Ormoc. The X Corps, pushing south along Highway 2, was to seize the
high ground north of Valencia and the XXIV Corps was to continue
its drive north, capture Valencia, and establish contact with the X
Corps. (Map 22) Driving north along Highway 2, the 77th Division was
to seize Valencia and its airfield and effect a juncture with the X
Corps to separate the enemy forces in the mountains east of its zone
of action from those on the west coast in the Palompon area. General
Bruce was to co-ordinate all artillery fires and air support missions
in the Ormoc-Valencia area. [1090]
After the seizure of Ormoc, although the 35th Army still controlled
Ormoc Valley, the Sixth Army had closed the northern and southern
entrances. There remained available to the Japanese as a principal
port only Palompon. A road from this town through the mountains joined
Highway 2 in the vicinity of Libongao and constituted the only main
route from the west coast of Leyte to Ormoc Valley. The Americans
noticed that the Japanese were moving supplies, men, ammunition,
and artillery to the Valencia area and concluded that the Japanese
would make a defensive stand in Valencia. [1091]
By the end of 15 December the forces of General Bruce had cleared
the Japanese defenders from the Ormoc area and were ready for the
next phase of the drive north up the Ormoc corridor. Reports made the
previous day by the reconnaissance patrols from the 306th and 307th
Infantry Regiments indicated that there was little enemy resistance
to the west of Highway 2. These led General Bruce to decide in favor
of a plan for enveloping the enemy from the west. The 306th and 307th
Infantry were to strike the flanks and rear of the Japanese defending
the highway and thus permit a more rapid advance along this road by
the 305th Infantry. [1092]
General Hodge had informed General Bruce that the commanding general
of the Sixth Army desired to have the attack pushed "with all possible
vigor." The operations of the 77th Division were to depend upon the
situation and conditions then existing. [1093] On 14 December General
Hodge visited General Bruce, who explained his plans. General Hodge
thought they were "sound" [1094] and later told General Bruce to keep
his plans flexible in order to take advantage of every break to speed
the advance north. It was imperative that the XXIV Corps secure control
of the roads north before the Japanese could establish positions.
Drive From the South to the Libongao Area
Seizure of the Road Junction
According to its plan of attack for 16 December the 305th Infantry,
from the vicinity of Cogon, was to continue its assault north
on Highway 2, liquidate the remaining enemy forces in Cogon, and
finally secure a large defensive position centered around the road
junction north of Cogon. All three battalions of the regiment were
to consolidate around the point while the 306th and 307th Infantry
Regiments were to drive toward Valencia.
The Cannon and Antitank Companies and the heavy weapons units of the
other two regiments were attached to the 305th Infantry for movement
only and were to be used solely in case of emergency. These units
were to be sent to the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments upon call
by those regiments.
At 0930 on 16 December the assault units of the 305th Infantry moved
out. The 1st Battalion, on the left of Highway 2, was to attack north,
and the 3d Battalion, on the right of Highway 2, was to attack north
and then northeast to effect a juncture with the 1st and 2d Battalions
at the road junction north of Cogon. The 2d Battalion was to attack
east to flank the enemy positions along the highway. The operation
was to be assisted by artillery.
During the morning the artillery in support of the 1st Battalion
knocked out two antitank guns, a heavy machine gun, and an enemy
dugout position. At 1035 the 1st Battalion had advanced several
hundred yards. As the 3d Battalion came forward, Company L moved in
on the right flank of the 1st Battalion. At 1100 the 2d Battalion
had reached the enemy positions along the highway and by 1215 had
cleared out the enemy pocket and the road in its sector. A light
tank platoon from the 706th Tank Battalion was attached to the 1st
Battalion at 1255 in order to assist the battalion in clearing the
Japanese from their foxholes. Although progress was slow, it was
thorough. The localized envelopments of the enemy's right (west)
flank resulted in the capture of Cogon at the end of the day. The
305th Infantry advanced 400 yards north of the road junction and
established night positions around it. [1095]
Envelopment of Valencia
In the meantime, the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments had been
ordered to make a series of sweeping envelopments on the Japanese right
(west) flank toward Valencia. The 307th Infantry was to move northwest
about six and a quarter miles through the barrios of Jalubon, Liloan,
and Bao to Catayom on the Bao River, then swing northeast to the barrio
of San Jose and continue northeast to the Valencia airstrip. The
306th Infantry was to follow the 307th Infantry northwest and then
drive east and cut Highway 2. [1096]
The 306th Field Artillery Battalion, though in general support, was to
give priority to the 307th Infantry. The 902d and 305th Field Artillery
Battalions were to support elements of the reconnaissance troops
operating on each flank of the division. The artillery battalions
would fire in the regimental zones of action only on call from or
with the approval of the regiments. [1097]
On 16 December the 307th Infantry crossed the line of departure
on time. Since there were no roads and the route was across rice
paddies, through waist-deep rivers, and over terrain impassable
for vehicles, the troops hand-carried their supplies. Arrangements
were also made for Filipinos to carry supplies, and, as the advance
progressed, more and more Filipinos joined the column of the 307th
Infantry for this purpose. [1098] The regiment met only scattered
resistance. Some Japanese troops encountered in the vicinity of Liloan
were dispersed. At 1525 leading elements of the 307th Infantry passed
through Bao and moved on toward San Jose. On the outskirts of that
barrio, the troops met and destroyed two platoons of the enemy. At
1645 the 307th Infantry dug in for the night in San Jose. The regiment
had covered eight miles, a rapid rate of advance considering the
nature of the terrain and the load carried. At 2340 General Bruce
told the 307th Infantry that an incendiary air strike would be made
on Valencia before 0900 the following day and that the regiment was
to hold its present position until further orders. [1099]
At 0900 on 16 December the 306th Infantry moved past the initial point
of departure on the northwestern edge of Ormoc. At 1035 the regiment
was 1,000 yards west of the starting point and close "on the tail"
of the 307th Infantry. The 306th waited until the 307th cleared and
then moved north. Although it did not encounter any Japanese its
progress was very slow because the route of advance ran through deep
rice paddies. At 1730 the regiment established its night perimeter
about 700 yards south-southwest of Tipic. [1100] During the day the
305th Infantry had cleared Cogon and occupied defensive positions
around the road junction north of the town.
The Japanese had constructed defensive positions along Highway 2 in
the southern part of Ormoc Valley. At the road junction of Highway 2
with the road to Liloan were many trenches three to four feet deep and
parallel to the highway. Trenches had also been dug along the sides of
a machine gun emplacement that occupied a slight elevation commanding
Highway 2 both to the north and to the south. On both sides of the
road from Cogon to Catayom foxholes lined Highway 2, in the ditches
and under the shacks. Some of these positions were dug on a slant and
were six to seven feet deep. At Tambuco the foxholes extended along
the highway for 400 yards, with machine gun emplacements on the sides
of the foxholes. Other positions along Highway 2 consisted of poorly
integrated foxholes and machine guns that covered the road. The field
artillery pieces between Tambuco and Catayom were placed along the
highway, with the exception of a 75-mm. gun that guarded a bridge
and was well concealed inside a roadside shack. [1101]
The 14th Area Army had planned to reinforce the 35th Army by
dispatching the Takahashi Detachment, which consisted of the 5th
Infantry Regiment, one artillery battalion, and one engineer company
and one transport company each from the 8th Division, together with
the Ito Naval Landing Force of 400 troops from Luzon.
The 77th Infantry Regiment had landed at Palompon on or about 9
December from Cebu and moved to Matagob where, after assembling its
troops, it began to move southeast toward Huaton, the new headquarters
of the 35th Army. Huaton was a small barrio on Highway 2 about three
and a half miles north of Cogon. On 13 December General Suzuki,
the commander of the 35th Army, arrived at Huaton from the Burauen
area. After the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, the 4th Airborne
Raiding Regiment, the Mitsui Shipping Unit, the Ito Naval Landing
Force, and the 77th Infantry Regiment were assembled, General Suzuki
on 15 December ordered an attack, which was to start 17 December,
against the American forces in the Ormoc area. [1102]
The fall of Cogon and the envelopment to the west forced General
Suzuki to change his plans again. The 305th Infantry had captured the
positions of the Tateishi Battalion of the 12th Independent Infantry
Regiment, and the position of the 77th Infantry Regiment was greatly
weakened. As the attack against Ormoc could not be successfully
completed, the 12th and 77th Infantry Regiments were to carry out a
delaying action. [1103]
Since the fall of Valencia might break the organized resistance of the
Japanese in Ormoc Valley, General Bruce decided to push forward rapidly
and take the barrio before the enemy could regroup. [1104] General
Krueger asked General Whitehead for air strikes against Valencia. If
the weather permitted, a strike would be made at 0900 and another would
be delivered on call. In addition, nearly all available artillery of
the division that could arrive within firing distance, as well as the
226th Field Artillery Battalion from positions east of the mountains
near Daro, would shell the town until ordered to lift the fire.
The 305th Infantry was to drive rapidly north on Highway 2 and clear
out the Japanese for a distance of 200 to 300 yards on each side of the
road, even though it might mean bypassing groups of the enemy on the
flanks. A patrol from the regiment was to operate east of its sector
to locate enemy forces. The 306th Infantry was to drive rapidly east
toward Highway 2 and then advance north up the highway, clearing a lane
200 to 300 yards wide. At a point 500 to 600 yards north of Cabulihan,
it was to await further orders. The regiment was to be prepared to
send a battalion south to assist the 305th Infantry in its advance.
General Bruce organized an armored column to carry rations and
ammunition to the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments. This column,
which was to move north on Highway 2, consisted of five light tanks
from the 7th Division, the Cannon and Tank Destroyer Companies of the
306th and 307th Infantry Regiments, part of Company C, 302d Engineer
Battalion, a platoon from the 305th Infantry, and sufficient LVT's to
carry men and supplies. An artillery observer accompanied the column.
Elements of the 302d Engineer Battalion were to repair immediately
the highway between Ormoc and Valencia and at night retire within
the nearest infantry defensive perimeter. The order was summed up as
follows: "The action will be pressed with the utmost vigor by careful
planning but every effort will be made to save casualties." [1105]
At 0830 on 17 December the 305th Infantry moved out along Highway 2. At
1000 the 1st Battalion reported that it was advancing at the rate of
100 yards every ten minutes against light opposition. By 1145 the 305th
Infantry was fighting through Tambuco. At a road junction just north
of Tambuco, it eliminated some enemy resistance and the advance slowed
down. The regiment moved forward to a point about 300 yards north of
the road junction and established its night perimeter, which extended
300 yards to the northeast along the Tambuco-Dolores road in order
to forestall any Japanese counterattacks from that direction. [1106]
On the same day the 306th Infantry pushed its attack northeast at
0800. The advancing troops almost immediately encountered Japanese
who, apparently taken by surprise, were unable to offer organized
resistance. At 1040, when the forward elements were 1,000 yards
southwest of Cabulihan, the opposition stiffened and the regimental
commander therefore committed the 3d Battalion on the left of the 2d
Battalion. The advance continued. As the regiment neared Highway 2,
resistance became more intense. The 306th Infantry encountered the
Japanese who were fleeing northwest from the assault of the 305th
Infantry and the heavy artillery that accompanied it. (Unknown
to the Americans, General Suzuki and his staff were among the
retreating Japanese. Suzuki succeeded in escaping to Libongao, where
he established a new headquarters for the 35th Army.) At 1440 the 306th
Infantry reached Highway 2 between Catayom and Cabulihan and proceeded
north toward Cabulihan, its objective. Advance elements of the 3d
Battalion reached the outskirts of the town but withdrew three or
four hundred yards to take advantage of more commanding terrain. After
combat patrols had cleared the area, the 306th Infantry established its
night perimeter five hundred yards south of Cabulihan at 1600. [1107]
General Bruce had ordered the 307th Infantry to remain in San Jose
until further notice. Since the guerrilla forces had reported a large
number of Japanese in the area, General Bruce had made arrangements
to soften the sector with an aerial bombardment and artillery fire
before the infantry attack. In response to Bruce's request, fifteen
P-40's from the V Fighter Command had been made available by General
Whitehead for an air strike against the Valencia area.
The 155-mm. guns of the 226th Field Artillery Battalion at Daro began
firing on Valencia and the airstrip on the morning of 17 December
and hit a Japanese ammunition dump. At 1245 the artillery fire
was halted for the air strike, and for fifty minutes the area was
bombed and strafed. With the conclusion of the air attack, at 1335,
the artillery began anew to pound the area. "The medium artillery
... reached out from Ormoc and the 'Long Toms' ... from Daro joined
in the fighting." [1108] In the meantime the 902d Field Artillery
Battalion moved forward to a point from which it could support the
advance of the 307th Infantry. At 1415 the artillery fire stopped
and the 307th Infantry moved out astride the San Jose-Valencia road
toward Valencia. Though the artillery fire and aerial bombardment had
driven some of the Japanese from the area, a strong well-equipped
force, including a number of paratroopers, remained to oppose the
307th Infantry. The regiment pushed forward, however, and at 1640
its leading elements were on the southwestern edge of the airstrip
and within 1,000 yards of Valencia. The 307th Infantry formed its
night perimeter on the edge of the airfield and made preparations to
continue the attack on 18 December. [1109]
During 17 December, despite the disorganization of the Japanese forces,
Colonel Imahori of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment tried to
reach Ormoc, but he was unsuccessful. [1110] A few enemy artillery
shells landed in the Ormoc area but that was all. General Bruce wrote
later: "The men got a laugh because the General's latrine, unoccupied,
was struck. He wished about that time that he had remained up front
which he had reached by landing in a cub plane on an unimproved jungle
road." [1111]
On the morning of 18 December, since supplies and ammunition for the
306th and 307th Infantry Regiments were becoming dangerously low,
General Bruce pushed the armored column vigorously forward through
the 305th Infantry. The column swept past enemy strong points and
succeeded in bringing supplies to both regiments.
The attack of the 305th Infantry was consequently delayed. The 3d
Battalion of the regiment, however, jumped off in a northeast direction
on the Dolores road in order to cut off any Japanese reinforcements
from that area. At 0945 the rest of the 305th Infantry started
out along Highway 2 and encountered little resistance. By 1400 the
battalions had passed through the barrios of Dayhagan and Huaton (the
former and short-lived headquarters of General Suzuki), and knocked
out fifteen enemy trucks and three tanks. The 3d Battalion proceeded
northeast from the road junction along the road to Dolores, and crushed
all resistance. The battalion then moved west toward Highway 2, leaving
a platoon behind to seal off the Dolores road from Highway 2. [1112]
At 0830 on 18 December the 306th Infantry renewed its attack. At first
the 2d Battalion moved south astride Highway 2 in order to make contact
with the 305th Infantry, which was pushing north along the highway,
but since there was little resistance the battalion withdrew and
rejoined the regiment. As the rest of the regiment continued north
it met moderate opposition but pushed ahead steadily. The troops
encountered many strong points along the road but no organized main
line of resistance.
The 306th Infantry proceeded astride the highway against moderate to
strong opposition. An enemy force estimated as two battalions had dug
in under the houses and in foxholes along the sides of the road. The
Japanese tried to halt the advance with heavy machine guns and a
few mortars, but without avail. Patrols from the 306th Infantry made
contact with the 305th Infantry at 1500. The 306th Infantry reached
the southern edge of Valencia at 1630 and tied in with the 307th
Infantry. Night perimeters were established. [1113]
At 0830 on 18 December the 307th Infantry from the southwestern edge
of the Valencia airstrip renewed the attack. There was no opposition
and at 0905 the airfield and the town of Valencia were in the hands
of the regiment. General Bruce considered the heavy artillery and
aerial assaults of the previous day "most effective." The airfield
was in "fair" condition; it was safe for light aircraft and with
minor repairs could be made suitable for other aircraft. The 307th
Infantry spent the rest of 18 December consolidating its positions
and conducting extensive patrols to the north and east. At 1630 it
established physical contact with the 306th Infantry. [1114]
In three days of relatively fast fighting and maneuvering the 77th
Division had shaken the Japanese forces badly and disrupted the plans
of General Suzuki. The 307th Infantry, by making a wide envelopment
of the west flank, had captured Valencia and its airfield, and the
306th Infantry, making a smaller envelopment, had bisected Highway
2 at Cabulihan while the 305th Infantry moved up the highway from
Cogon. All of southern Ormoc Valley from Ormoc to Valencia, a distance
of about six and a half miles as the crow flies, was securely in
American hands. All units were in contact and ready for the next
phase of their mission.
Drive to Palompon Road Junction
Since elements of the XXIV Corps had been able to make more rapid
progress through Ormoc Valley than the X Corps units, General Krueger
on 19 December enlarged the zone of action of the XXIV Corps to
include Libongao, the barrio just below the juncture of Highway 2
with the Palompon road. [1115] General Hodge thereupon ordered the
77th Division to continue north and seize Libongao and then to secure
the Palompon road and establish contact with the X Corps. [1116]
General Bruce ordered the 305th Infantry to assume responsibility for
the defense of Valencia and its airfield, and thus free the 306th
and 307th Infantry Regiments for new assignments. The 307th was to
move north astride Highway 2 to Libongao and then continue to the
junction with the Palompon road. The 306th was to move across country
and strike northwest toward the Palompon road. Although its advance
would parallel that of the 307th, the 306th was to be about 2,300
yards west of the other regiment. After reaching the Palompon road
in the vicinity of the Togbong River the 306th Infantry would strike
west for the crossing and then move east to the road junction. The
304th, 305th, and 902d Field Artillery Battalions were to remain in
the Valencia area while the 306th Field Artillery Battalion was to
be prepared to move forward on call. [1117]
At Libongao, General Suzuki prepared his defense. In the area he had
his headquarters guard and a part of the 4th Airborne Raiding Regiment,
in addition to a field artillery battalion, an engineering company,
and a transportation company. An advance battalion of the Takahashi
Detachment arrived in the sector from Palompon on the night of 17
December. General Suzuki ordered it to proceed south from Libongao
and destroy the American forces in the Valencia area. [1118]
As the 307th Infantry advanced north at 0900 on 19 December, it
became apparent that General Suzuki had organized a defense of the
highway. Many machine gun and light artillery emplacements were dug
in along the road, and the enemy resistance became more determined
as the troops moved north. A force estimated to be of battalion
strength was dug in in depth along streams and ridges. With the use
of grenades the 307th routed the defenders, the battalion from the
Takahashi Detachment. The 307th Infantry pushed steadily north and
at 1800 established a night perimeter; it had advanced nearly three
miles and captured much enemy equipment during the day. [1119]
The 306th Infantry moved out at 1100 and proceeded rapidly, without
meeting resistance, to a point about 500 yards south of the Palompon
road where it encountered elements of the 5th Infantry Regiment. At
1530 a battery of artillery and infantry mortars and machine guns
fired upon the Japanese. In co-ordination with fire from these
weapons, the 306th Infantry was then able to push forward. At 1800,
though patrols from the regiment had reached the Palompon road, the
regiment itself dug in for the night at a point 300 yards south of
the Palompon road. [1120]
On 20 December, after a five-minute artillery preparation to its
front, the 307th Infantry moved out at 0830 and encountered the
"strongest fortified positions" since it had left Camp Downes. The
Japanese 5th Infantry Regiment and other elements of the 1st Division
resisted any forward advance. By 1000 the 307th Infantry had "mowed
down" and annihilated two suicide counterattacks of fifty men each
on its right flank. An additional force, estimated at 2,000 men,
well equipped with machine guns, mortars, and a limited amount
of artillery, opposed the 307th Infantry from hastily constructed
defensive positions. The attack of the enemy forces was not well
co-ordinated; consequently the regiment, though slowed down, was
able to continue forward. At 1549 the leading elements of the 307th
Infantry were at Libongao. The enemy defensive fire increased in
intensity on the northern outskirts of the village. At 1710, about
200 yards north of Libongao, the regiment repulsed a force estimated
to consist of 200 Japanese armed with machine guns and mortars. The
307th Infantry established its night perimeter about 1,000 yards south
of the road junction. During the day the regiment had captured many
tons of ammunition and matériel in supply dumps, together with more
than thirty enemy trucks. The 307th Infantry put many of the latter
into serviceable condition and made immediate use of them. [1121]
For the same day, 20 December, the 306th Infantry, on the left of
the 307th, was assigned the mission of advancing to the Palompon
road. Upon reaching the road, the 1st Battalion on the left would
turn west along it to seize a bridge crossing the Togbong River and
the 3d Battalion would turn east to seize the junction of the road
and Highway 2. [1122] During the night the enemy artillery heavily
shelled the sector of the regiment. After a ten-minute artillery
preparation the assault battalions moved out at 0830, and by 0925
they had reached the Palompon road. Each of the battalions thereupon
started to execute its part of the mission.
The 1st Battalion pushed steadily forward and reached the eastern
banks of the Togbong River at the bridge crossing, the bridge itself
having been destroyed by the enemy. From a commanding ridge upon
the western banks of the river, just north of the bridge site, a
Japanese force estimated to be a battalion in strength opposed any
further advance. The company on the left forced a passage across the
river south of the bridge site, but the company on the right, despite
repeated attempts, was unable to cross the river. At 1630 the 1st
Battalion received orders to take up a night defensive position on the
eastern banks of the river. During the night the enemy unsuccessfully
launched three counterattacks against the 1st Battalion. In the morning
the battalion counted more than 400 Japanese dead around its position.
The 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, upon reaching the Palompon road
turned east and encountered steadily increasing enemy opposition. By
1500, however, Company K reached the road junction. At the same
time the 3d Battalion received orders to withdraw west 300 yards
so that the 307th Infantry could register unrestricted fire to its
front. This withdrawal was carried out and the 3d and 2d Battalions
of the 306th Infantry established night positions 300 yards west of
the road junction.
At 1900 General Bruce ordered the 306th Infantry to deliver harassing
fire on the enemy forces to the west during the night of 20-21 December
and the 307th Infantry to fire 500 yards to its front up Highway 2
and east of the highway. [1123]
The Japanese 5th Infantry Regiment had assembled in the Libongao
sector with orders to proceed to the Valencia sector, but the 77th
Division had advanced so rapidly that it was attacking the 35th Army
Headquarters. The Takahashi Detachment suffered heavy casualties
and withdrew to Matagob, on the Palompon road between Palompon and
Libongao. The field artillery battalion and the engineering and
transportation companies that had been left at Matagob were absorbed
by the Takahashi Detachment. On 21 December General Suzuki ordered
the regiment to make a defensive stand, so that the main force of
the 35th Army could withdraw to the Palompon sector on the shore of
the Camotes Sea. [1124]
During the night of 20-21 December the 77th Division artillery expended
half a unit of fire, intermittently bombarding enemy positions west
of the 77th Division and to the east of Highway 2. The bombardment was
the most intensive made by the 77th Division during the campaign. Just
before renewal of the attack on 21 December, the artillery delivered
a concentrated thirty-minute preparation. General Bruce ordered the
306th Infantry to move out at 0630. Since the 1st Battalion was short
of ammunition, it was to await the arrival of Company E, which had
been attached to the battalion, with additional ammunition. At 1250,
having received the ammunition, the battalion moved out and at 1330
secured the ridge (overlooking the bridge site), which had blocked
its advance the previous day.
Immediately afterward General Bruce ordered the battalion to proceed
west along the Palompon road and secure the bridge over the Pagsangahan
River. The ridge was thereupon outposted as the 1st Battalion withdrew
to prepare for continuation of the assault, but elements of the 5th
Infantry Regiment drove the outposts off the ridge and immediately
occupied it. At 1500 the 1st Battalion attacked unsuccessfully in
an effort to retake the position. It formed a night perimeter at the
river crossing at 1600, and at 0750 concentrated a ten-minute artillery
preparation on the enemy positions on the ridge. The 1st Battalion
then moved out toward the high ground and secured the ridge within
twenty minutes, the Japanese offering only slight resistance. [1125]
The 77th Division had reached the Palompon road. In its drive north
the division had destroyed the major elements of the 5th and 77th
Infantry Regiments and the 4th Airborne Regiment.
The 32d Division Resumes the Offensive
Elements of the X Corps were slowly moving south in an attempt to
effect a juncture with the XXIV Corps. On 14 December the 126th and
127th Infantry Regiments of the 32d Division had pushed south down
Highway 2 against very determined resistance and through mountainous
terrain to the main defense line of the 1st Division. The Japanese
were well entrenched on a series of ridges overlooking Highway
2. A heavy rain forest covered the ridges and the deep ravines in
between. The enemy had carefully selected his defensive positions
and camouflaged his machine guns, which were flanked by hidden
riflemen. Targets could not be spotted beyond a range of about
seventy-five feet. The employment of mortars was very limited because
of the lack of visibility, and the hazards of tree burst were equally
dangerous to both the Japanese and the Americans. The troops had to
"approach within spitting distance of the [Japanese machine] guns"
before they could locate the weapons. [1126]
For the next few days the regiments of the 32d Division fought
valiantly against a foe that limited the division's advance to a few
score yards a day. Of the many acts of individual bravery, those of
Pfc. Dick J. Vlug and Sgt. Leroy Johnson were outstanding. Private
Vlug single-handedly destroyed five enemy tanks that were moving
north along the highway. Sergeant Johnson threw himself upon an enemy
grenade that killed him but did not hurt those comrades near him. Both
men were awarded the Medal of Honor.
On the morning of 17 December advance elements of the 126th Infantry
were about 4,000 yards south of Limon. After a preparation of heavy
mortar fire the 1st Battalion moved out at 0730, encountering about a
platoon of the enemy on a knoll 300 yards east of the road. A bitter
fire fight broke out and continued throughout the day. The battalion
was unable to advance farther and set up a night perimeter. During
the fight the 1st Battalion captured four enemy machine guns.
In the zone of the 2d Battalion, east of the highway, all the
battalion's mortars, machine guns, and 37-mm. guns, together with four
medium tanks, massed their combined fires on the enemy positions to
the front. These positions consisted of numerous foxholes, pillboxes
of coconut logs, and L-shaped fortifications dug into the mountain
sides. A rain of steel descended upon the Japanese on the high
ground directly east of the battalion. This preparatory fire had
excellent results and the 2d Battalion, after moving out at 1100,
quickly secured the ridge and consolidated its position. It captured
three 47-mm. antitank guns, three 75-mm. mountain guns, and two
70-mm. battalion guns. About 150 of the enemy were killed by the
preparatory fire and the battalion attack.
Company I, 3d Battalion, quickly secured and destroyed a roadblock
that the enemy had constructed the previous day. Accompanied by the
four tanks, the company then advanced down the highway just behind
the 2d Battalion without encountering opposition. For the rest of
the day the 3d Battalion protected the road and patrolled five or six
hundred yards to the rear. The 127th Infantry to the south remained
in position awaiting the 126th Infantry. [1127]
By the following morning, 18 December, the 126th Infantry was on a
line that extended east of Highway 2. To the front of the regiment,
elements of the 1st Division occupied three positions on an east-west
line approximately 800 yards in length and extending across Highway
2. There were actually three ridges along this line. The first ran
north and south beside the road, and on it was located the western
position of the enemy. From this site the Japanese were able to
roll hand grenades down on the road. About 200 yards to the east
was another strongly fortified north-south ridge, east of which was
a small valley with a banana grove. Still farther east was a small
knoll upon which was located a strong enemy defensive position. An
estimated two reinforced enemy companies, well supported by automatic
weapons and well dug in, occupied this position. The whole area was
covered with a dense rain forest, and it was impossible to spot any
Japanese fortified position more than thirty yards away.
Before the troops moved out, the mortars and tanks placed heavy fire
on the Japanese positions for twenty minutes. At 1010 on 18 December
the 126th Infantry attacked with the 1st Battalion on the right and
the 2d Battalion on the left. In advancing to the ridge nearest the
road, the American troops received considerable small arms fire just
east of the road. The 1st Battalion moved ahead up the ridge east
of the road and by 1230 it had advanced 200 yards to the top of the
ridge. The Japanese resisted strongly and heavy fighting occurred
in which both sides used machine guns, grenades, and bayonets. By
1800 the 1st Battalion was in firm possession of the ridge. The 2d
Battalion, supported by machine guns and mortars, was able to creep
up through the forested ravine to within thirty yards of the enemy
position on the knoll before it was fired upon. A bitter engagement
then ensued. After five hours of intense fighting the battalion drove
the Japanese defenders off the knoll. The 1st and 2d Battalions formed
their night perimeters within fifty yards of the enemy front lines. The
3d Battalion of the 126th Infantry moved south along the road and
closed the gap between the 126th and 127th Infantry Regiments. [1128]
The artillery fired upon several buildings about 800 to 1,500 yards
southwest of the forward elements of the 32d Division. Lucrative
artillery targets were practically nonexistent. [1129]
On the morning of 19 December the 126th Infantry followed the same
procedure that had been used the previous day. A heavy machine gun
and mortar concentration was placed upon the Japanese positions on
the crest of a ridge fifty yards to the front. At 1100 the 126th
Infantry moved out with battalions abreast, the 1st Battalion on
the right and the 2d on the left. Six heavy machine guns immediately
fired on the left flank of the 1st Battalion. The battalion withdrew
and placed a concentration of more than 200 rounds of mortar fire
on the position while its machine guns raked the Japanese force
"fore and aft." The troops then renewed the assault but the Japanese
continued to resist. Elements of the 1st Division had dug in on the
top and both sides of a ridge and had utilized caves to construct
a defensive position in which there were more than 100 foxholes
with communicating trenches. Heavy fighting continued throughout the
day. The 1st Battalion used mortars, flame throwers, white phosphorus
grenades, hand grenades, rifles, and supporting flanking fire from its
heavy and light machine guns, but was able to advance only seventy-five
yards. Although the battalion overran many emplacements, a determined
Japanese force remained to be overcome when the battalion established
its night perimeter on the eastern slope of the ridge.
The 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, encountered only scattered rifle
fire that came principally from the enemy position on its right
flank. During its advance the battalion delivered flanking machine
gun and rifle fire in support of the 1st Battalion on its right. By
1200 the 2d Battalion had advanced 200 yards and secured the area in
its zone of action. At 1530 the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, which
had been protecting the eastern flank of the 32d Division, relieved
the 2d Battalion, which withdrew to an assembly area in the rear.
During the night of 19-20 December, the commanding officer of
Company B, 126th Infantry, which had borne the brunt of the enemy
resistance, placed one platoon of the company along the eastern side
of the ridge and another platoon on the western side. At the same
time he continued the pressure from the south. Throughout the night
the company kept firing at known enemy positions and the sector in
general. The company commander also required each of his men to throw
hand grenades periodically. At first light and without any breakfast
the troops rushed the enemy position. The Japanese had lost the power
to resist and by 1000 the company had taken the last of the three
enemy positions. Two hundred Japanese dead were counted in the area.
At 1245 on 20 December the 127th Infantry took over the conquered
sector and the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, withdrew to an assembly
area in the rear. [1130]
Debouchment From the Mountains
Since the 32d Division had borne the brunt of the assault, General
Sibert ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to make the main attack
south. It was to assist the advance of the 32d Division to a bridge
1,000 yards north of Lonoy and then move south and make contact
with the 77th Division. [1131] The 1st Cavalry Division had been
operating in the central mountain chain on the eastern flank of the
32d Division and had been opposed by the 102d Division. The latter,
after its arrival at Ormoc, had gone directly into the mountains in
the vicinity of Mt. Pina. [1132] The 102d Division did not play a
significant role in the Leyte campaign.
The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team had moved south on the eastern
flank of the 32d Division. The 1st Squadron of the 112th Cavalry had
been able to keep pace with the 32d Division, but the 2d Squadron
had encountered a very strong enemy force on a ridge overlooking the
Leyte River south of Limon. The Japanese resisted all the squadron's
efforts to dislodge them. The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, relieved the
2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry, and on 14 December it had succeeded in
overcoming the Japanese and had seized the ridge.
Spearhead of the Assault
While the 112th and 7th Cavalry Regiments were busily engaged in
defending the east flank of the 32d Division in its push south along
Highway 2, the 12th Cavalry was mopping up enemy groups entrenched in
the mountains farther to the east. Particularly strong enemy resistance
had been encountered in the Mt. Badian and Hill 2348 sector, which was
about five miles northeast of Kananga, a barrio on Highway 2. [1133]
In the process of reducing the Japanese-held area, it was estimated
that an enemy force of 500 to 600 men had been wiped out. From 28
November to 9 December, the 12th Cavalry remained in the Mt. Badian and
Hill 2348 sector, sent out westward patrols, and slowly moved westward.
On 10 December, General Sibert decided to have elements of the 1st
Cavalry Division debouch from the mountains onto Highway 2 south of
the 32d Division and in the Lonoy area. This move was to be concurrent
with the expected advance of the 32d Division down the highway. [1134]
The 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, was in the vicinity of Mt. Cabungaan,
and the 2d Squadron, on Hill 2348, was 2,000 yards northeast of
the 1st Squadron. An enemy strong point existed to the north of the
perimeter of the 1st Squadron. The 12th Cavalry spent 10 December
in making preparations for a two-squadron assault against this enemy
force. The plan was for the 1st Squadron to attack at 0830 while the
2d Squadron from Hill 2348 supported the attack by enveloping the
left flank of the enemy. In furtherance of this plan Troop E of the
2d Squadron moved off Hill 2348 at 0800 toward the southwest and dug
in for the night just north of Mt. Cabungaan. [1135]
On the morning of 11 December, an intense mortar and artillery
concentration was placed upon the enemy position in front of the 1st
Squadron. The fire was so close that fragments frequently fell on the
waiting assault troops. After this fire, the 1st Squadron with Troop A
in the lead moved out at 0715. At the same time Troop E attacked from
the northeast. The enemy defenses consisted of seven or eight pillboxes
and many caves dug into the very rugged terrain. The men of Troop A,
closely followed by Troop B, charged up the hill "throwing grenades
and firing from the hip." [1136] The hill fell to the 1st Squadron at
1003 after very heavy hand-to-hand fighting. Troop E had been held
up by the terrain and was unable to assist the 1st Squadron. After
the capture of the Japanese position, patrols established contact
with Troop E at 1200. The regimental reconnaissance platoon returned
from the vicinity of Lonoy with the information that the Japanese
had prepared strong defensive positions in that area. The platoon
had gained a good observation point 900 yards east of Lonoy. [1137]
The next several days were spent in sending out patrols and moving
the 2d Squadron to the position of the 1st Squadron.
On 14 December, the 12th Cavalry was ordered to continue west to
Highway 2 and assist the advance of the 32d Division, to establish a
roadblock on the highway, and to attack the hostile forces to the north
between it and the 32d Division. [1138] In furtherance of this order,
the 1st Squadron, less A and C Troops, moved west on 15 December toward
a previously reconnoitered area that was about 1,800 yards east of the
barrio of Lonoy. This site, a banana plantation, was chosen for its
observation facilities to the west and as an excellent dropping ground
for supplies. The 1st Squadron, having encountered little opposition,
closed on the area before dusk. Thereupon the rest of the regiment
was ordered to close in on the area before nightfall on 17 December.
Lonoy
The 12th Cavalry on 18 December sent out patrols to Lonoy, Kananga, and
to the northwest to make contact with the nearest friendly troops. The
patrols to Lonoy and Kananga, although they ran into scattered groups
of the enemy, were able to locate suitable approaches to Lonoy for
their squadrons. [1139]
At 2235, on 18 December, the 12th Cavalry received orders to move
out the following morning, seize Lonoy, and be prepared to seize
Kananga. The commanding officer of the regiment decided to have the
1st and 2d Squadrons move out abreast with the 2d Squadron on the
left. During the entire night the artillery was to deliver harassing
fire on the highway north of Lonoy and on the area between the routes
of approach of the two squadrons.
After a preparation on 19 December, the 1st and 2d Squadrons moved
out at 0800. The 1st Squadron met only light, sporadic resistance. The
troops observed many Japanese proceeding north along the highway and
had mortar and artillery fires placed upon them. At 1200, the 1st
Squadron seized Lonoy, captured much enemy equipment, and destroyed
many supply dumps. The 1st Squadron moved to assist the 2d Squadron
in the capture of a knoll southeast of the barrio. The 1st Squadron
closed on the knoll about 1400, and aided the assault of the 2d
Squadron by fire and by sending a troop east to assist it.
The 2d Squadron jumped off on schedule but at 0930, when it was 800
yards short of its objective, the squadron came under heavy rifle
and machine gun fire from the thick woods. The 271st Field Artillery
Battalion placed fire on the area and a great many of the enemy were
killed, the remainder fleeing south. The squadron received additional
machine gun fire from the north but a patrol quickly silenced it. In
the meantime the mortar platoon from Troop D, in support of the 1st
Squadron, fired upon Lonoy. The Japanese immediately responded with
fire from a 105-mm. gun, which they had cleverly concealed in the gap
between the two squadrons and about 600 yards from the regimental
observation post at which the gun directed its fire. The enemy
gun killed one man and wounded fifteen others of the command-post
group. The heavy machine guns from the Weapons troop and the artillery
from the 271st Field Artillery Battalion began concentrating their
fires upon the enemy gun. The Antitank Platoon was sent out to destroy
the gun and its crew. Following the machine gun and artillery fire,
the enemy gun was silent for about half an hour. It then suddenly
opened up against the 2d Squadron at a range of about 300 yards. The
enemy fire resulted in tree bursts which killed five men and wounded
fifteen others. Troop G, which suffered the most casualties, and
the Antitank Platoon immediately turned and attacked to the north to
destroy the gun. The 2d Squadron, less Troop G, renewed the attack
towards Lonoy, receiving scattered rifle fire. At 1730 it reached
Lonoy and was in contact with the 1st Squadron.
Meanwhile, Troop G sideslipped to the west and with the Antitank
Platoon attacked and destroyed the enemy gun and four of its crew. A
patrol located another enemy 105-mm. gun but, because of darkness and
point-blank fire from the weapon at a range of about twenty-five feet,
it was unable to knock out the gun. At 2200 Troops G and H, the medical
group, and the Antitank Platoon formed a joint night perimeter. [1140]
Late that night the regimental commander ordered the 2d and 1st
Squadrons of the 12th Cavalry to move south on the morning of 20
December along Highway 2 in a column of squadrons, with the 2d
Squadron in the lead. During the night, in preparation for this
advance, the 271st Field Artillery Battalion fired 1,096 rounds on
Kananga, on the road north of Lonoy, and on sectors occupied by the
enemy artillery. This fire destroyed the enemy 105-mm. gun.
At 0715 on the morning of 20 December the 2d Squadron, less Troop G,
moved out and immediately came under heavy fire from enemy forces that
had dug in underneath houses and behind small pieces of cover along the
road. The squadron eliminated these pockets of resistance by direct
fire and by flanking movements on both sides of the highway. At 1200
the 2d Squadron forced the Japanese off a ridge which was just east
of the highway and about 500 yards north of Kananga. The squadron
then encountered heavy rifle and machine gun fire that came from a
coconut grove and some houses about 200 yards south of the ridge.
In the meantime, the 1st Squadron, at 0830, moved south to support
the attack of the 2d Squadron. At about 1230, the 1st Squadron arrived
behind the ridge occupied by the 2d Squadron and then continued south,
at 1500, seizing and completely dominating a ridge about fifty yards
east of Kananga. The 2d Squadron and a platoon from the 1st Squadron
attacked north, parallel to the highway, and by nightfall cleaned
out the coconut grove and set up a night perimeter.
General Mudge, commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, said
of the 12th Cavalry:
As a result of the stout-hearted efforts of the 12th Cavalry
Regiment, elements of the Division are within 2,500 yards of making
contact with forward elements of the 77th Division. Considering
the fact that the regiment has been reduced to 50% strength by the
rigors and deprivations of 40 days in the mountains, the display
of courage, stamina, and drive on the part of the 12th Cavalry is a
credit to the best traditions of the United States Cavalry. [1141]
During the night General Mudge ordered the 12th Cavalry to move out
at 0800 21 December, seize Kananga, and then make physical contact
with the 77th Division, which was pushing north from Libongao. He
attached the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, to the 12th Cavalry.
Juncture of Forces
On the morning of 21 December the 1st and 2d Squadrons of the 12th
Cavalry, supported by the 271st Field Artillery Battalion, moved out
in a co-ordinated assault against Kananga. The 1st Squadron attacked
from the north while the 2d Squadron drove in from the ridge on the
east. The first elements of the regiment reached Kananga at 1157 and
by 1425 the 12th Cavalry was in the town. The regiment methodically
cleared out every hut, ferreted out each Japanese, and destroyed every
installation. While the mopping up was going on, patrols from the 12th
Cavalry pushed to the south to make contact with the 77th Division.
The regimental commander ordered the commander of the 3d Battalion,
306th Infantry, to push east at 0730 on 21 December along the
Palompon road to the juncture of the road with Highway 2 and then
turn north for 1,000 yards and attempt to establish contact with the
1st Cavalry Division. The 3d Battalion moved out on time, and within
fifteen minutes reached the road junction and turned north. The
battalion had gone only 200 yards north when its left-flank company
came under intense fire from a ridge overlooking the road. The 2d
Battalion complied with orders from the regimental commander to
"put out something" on the 3d Battalion's left flank and sent out
one rifle company to envelop the enemy position. This move relieved
the pressure to some extent but the advance was still slow and costly.
In the meantime, the 307th Infantry reached the road junction at 0800,
having advanced without incident. With the slowing up of the 306th
Infantry, General Bruce ordered the commander of the 307th Infantry
Regiment to send forward additional troops. The 2d Battalion, 307th
Infantry, and the Cannon and Antitank Companies of the regiment were
sent to the front to reinforce the 306th Infantry. This maneuver was
successful and the attacking forces pushed forward.
At 1645, the 306th Infantry and Troop A of the 12th Cavalry made
physical contact. At 1115 on 22 December, Col. John H. Stadler, the
commanding officer of the 12th Cavalry, representing General Mudge,
met General Bruce at a bridge south of Kananga. The X and XXIV Corps
had joined hands. Highway 2 was at long last open for its entire
distance from Ormoc to Pinamopoan. [1142]
The Ormoc Valley, in which the Japanese had so tenaciously resisted the
American advance, was now securely in the hands of the Sixth Army. The
northern and southern prongs of the trap had closed. There remained
only Palompon as an exit for the Japanese forces. To the securing of
that port, the X and XXIV Corps, acting in concert, could concentrate
their main efforts. Plans had been readied. The Sixth Army was poised
in a position from which it could drive westward to the sea and bring
the Leyte campaign to a successful conclusion.