The Entrances to Ormoc Valley
General Bruce's quick exploitation of the surprise landing of the
77th Division just below Ormoc had resulted in the capture of Ormoc
on 10 December. With each successive advance, he had displaced his
entire division forward. General Bruce, as he phrased it, preferred to
"drag his tail up the beach." [1045]
With the seizure of Ormoc, General Krueger's Sixth Army had driven
the main elements of the Japanese 35th Army into Ormoc Valley. The
Japanese were caught in the jaws of a trap--the 1st Cavalry Division
and the 32d Infantry Division were closing in from the north and the
77th Infantry Division from the south. General Krueger ordered the
X and XXIV Corps to close this trap upon the Japanese.
Southern Entrance to Ormoc Valley
Japanese Plans
When General Suzuki, the commander of the Japanese 35th Army, ordered
the action against the Burauen airfields, his anticipations had been
high. Accompanied by his chief of staff and six other staff officers,
he had gone to the headquarters of the 26th Division, in the mountains
near Lubi, in order to supervise the operation personally. General
Tomochika, the deputy chief of staff, remained at Ormoc because of
the advance of the Americans up the west coast, and took command of
operations in the area.
A mixed battalion, consisting of four companies, reinforced the 12th
Independent Infantry Regiment. This regiment, under Colonel Imahori,
was to be prepared at a moment's notice for action in the Ormoc
sector. [1046] The 16th and 26th Divisions received orders to retreat
westward and establish defensive positions in the Ormoc Valley. The
16th Division, which had less than 200 men, had ceased to exist as a
fighting unit. The Japanese decided that henceforward their operations
would be strictly defensive. The 26th Division started to withdraw
through the mountains, but its orders to retreat were very hard to
carry out. The Americans had blocked the road, and the 11th Airborne
Division units, which had advanced west from Burauen, were attacking
in the vicinity of Lubi. As a result, the staff officers of General
Suzuki's 35th Army "disbanded and scattered." General Suzuki passed
through the American lines and reached the command post at Huaton,
four miles north of Ormoc, on 13 December; his chief of staff arrived
there the following day. As for the 26th Division, "all contact with
the Division was lost by Army Headquarters until the early part of
March." [1047]
In the meantime General Tomochika had prepared new plans. On 6
December he was told by a staff officer of the 1st Division, which
was fighting the 32d Division in the north, that the 1st Division had
"reached the stage of collapse." [1048] The mission of the 1st Division
was then changed to one of defense. Colonel Imahori by the night of
7 December had sent two companies south. [1049] These companies,
known as the Kamijo Battalion, were destroyed at Ipil by the 77th
Division in its march to Ormoc. Colonel Imahori, fearful that the
rest of his detachment would suffer the same fate, ordered his main
force, the Tateishi and Maeda Battalions, to construct positions
north of Ormoc. The remnants of the Kamijo Battalion established a
position northeast of Ormoc. In his plan for the parachute attack on
the Burauen airfields, General Suzuki had decided to use as a part
of his attacking force the 4th Air Raiding Landing Unit. In view
of the unfavorable situation that had developed, the 14th Area Army
commander, General Yamashita, decided that after the 4th Air Raiding
Landing Unit landed at the Valencia airfield it was to be kept in
the Ormoc area. From 8 to 13 December approximately 500 men from
the unit arrived in the Ormoc area, and were attached to the Imahori
Detachment. They had traveled only at dawn or dusk to avoid detection.
At the same time, "in order to ease the difficult Leyte Island
Operation," General Yamashita dispatched from Luzon to assist the
troops in the Ormoc sector the Takahashi Detachment, composed of the
5th Infantry Regiment of the 8th Division, an artillery battalion,
a company of engineers, a transportation company, and a Special Naval
Landing Force of 400 men with four light tanks and sixteen trench
mortars. In order to suppress the guerrillas, who were active in the
Camotes Islands off the west coast of Leyte and who were guarding the
entrance to Ormoc Bay, the area army commander ordered a detachment,
known as the Camotes Detachment, to those islands. This detachment was
composed of one battalion (less two companies) of the 58th Independent
Mixed Brigade, an artillery battery, and an engineering platoon.
The transports carrying the troops to the Ormoc area underwent a
severe aerial bombardment from American aircraft. As a consequence,
only the Special Naval Landing Force arrived at its target. On the
same day the transports carrying the Takahashi and Camotes Detachments
were forced to put in at Palompon on the west coast. The subsequent
advance of these detachments toward Ormoc was greatly delayed.
On 9 December the 77th Infantry Regiment, the last of the
Japanese reinforcements for Leyte, landed at Palompon and moved to
Matagob. General Suzuki intended to assemble and integrate these
units and to launch a counteroffensive against Ormoc starting on 17
December. [1050]
Cogon Defenses
On 10 December General Bruce devised a new scheme of maneuver:
the 77th Division was to break loose from its base and use Indian
warfare or blockhouse tactics. At night each "fort" was to establish
an all-round defense from any Japanese night attacks. In the daytime,
an armed convoy was to go "from fort to fort." The Filipino guerrillas
were to guard the bridges and furnish intelligence. [1051]
By nightfall of 10 December the 77th Division had cleared Ormoc. (See
Map 19.) The front lines of the 307th Infantry were on the western
outskirts of the town along the bank of the Antilao River, a stream
which flows past the entire western side of Ormoc. At the city's
northern edge the river is crossed by Highway 2, which then proceeds
directly north about 300 yards west of the river and parallel to it
for a distance of about 1,000 yards. The 306th Infantry on the right
of the 307th Infantry had come abreast of that regiment at twilight.
General Bruce's plan for 11 December provided for a limited attack
north to enable the division to straighten out its lines. The 305th
Infantry in the afternoon would come between the 306th Infantry on the
right and the 307th Infantry on the left. The 305th Infantry was to
be prepared to attack on the morning of 12 December with battalions
abreast, one on each side of the highway. [1052]
At 0930 on 11 December the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments jumped
off with the 307th Infantry on the left. The assault battalions of
the 307th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry, attempted to
cross the Antilao River but came under heavy fire and were pinned down.
The fire came from a well-fortified position of the 12th Independent
Infantry Regiment on the north bank of the river at Cogon, a small
barrio on Highway 2 just north of Ormoc. The enemy position was on
a small elevated plateau, adjacent to Highway 2, overlooking the
river to the south and rice paddies to the east and west. Innumerable
spider holes had been constructed throughout the area. The principal
defensive position, slightly east of Cogon, was in the vicinity of a
three-story reinforced concrete building that had been converted into
a blockhouse. The well-camouflaged positions, with the exception of
the fortress, were so situated in the underbrush and the waist-high
cogon grass that it was impossible to detect them at a distance of
more than ten feet. From these positions the Japanese could command
the bridge over the Antilao River and deny the U. S. troops the use
of Highway 2 to the north. An estimated reinforced battalion with
machine guns, antitank guns, and field pieces, together with small
arms, defended the area.
The artillery fired on the enemy front lines, which were only
twenty-five yards in front of the American assault troops, but failed
to dislodge the Japanese. The assault battalions of the 307th Infantry
and the 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry, thereupon delivered point-blank
fire from their tank destroyer guns, amphibian tank guns, light and
medium machine guns, and infantry weapons on the Japanese position
but still could not overcome it. The lack of shipping had prevented
the division from taking its medium tanks with it. Unable to move
forward, the battalions established their front lines and perimeters
for the night along a line just north of Ormoc.
On the division's right, the 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, moved
forward against increasingly strong resistance from the 12th
Independent Infantry Regiment. After advancing about 1,000 yards the
3d Battalion encountered a well-entrenched position. Elements of the
12th Independent Infantry Regiment had dug in on a steep ridge in
front of which was a deep ravine. Eight hundred yards of rice paddies
lay between this position and the one opposing the other battalions,
though both positions were part of the same defensive system. The
artillery placed fire upon the ridge. Although able to utilize only
a company and a half against the enemy position, the 3d Battalion,
under cover of the artillery fire, attacked and succeeded in gaining a
foothold on the ridge. The 12th Independent Infantry Regiment at the
same time directed two unsuccessful counterattacks against the right
flank and rear of the 3d Battalion. Since the forward elements on
the ridge were vulnerable and any further advance would have exposed
both flanks of the 3d Battalion, the commanding officer of the 306th
Infantry at 1600 ordered the 3d Battalion to withdraw the forward
units on the enemy-held ridge and consolidate its position. [1053]
At 1600 the 2d and 3d Battalions, 305th Infantry, moved north of Ormoc
and took up the position held by the 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry,
between the 307th Infantry on the left and the 3d Battalion, 306th
Infantry, on the right. The relieved battalion was ordered to take a
position to reinforce the 2d and 3d Battalions, 306th Infantry. The
1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, remained just south of Camp Downes as
the extreme right flank of the 77th Division. [1054]
In his plan for the drive of the XXIV Corps up Ormoc Valley, General
Hodge ordered the 7th Division to "continue the attack as directed
and coordinated" by General Bruce. [1055] To strengthen the Ormoc
defenses, elements of the 7th Division were scheduled to be brought
forward. General Bruce planned to attack daily towards Valencia, which
was about six and a half miles north of Ormoc. The 77th Division would
eventually cut loose from the Ormoc defenses and take up each night
an all-round defense. The supply convoy, protected by strong guards,
would move along Highway 2 and measure its advance by that of the
assault units. The 305th Infantry was to proceed along Highway 2
and the 306th Infantry, while protecting the division right flank,
was to be prepared to proceed 2,000 to 3,000 yards east of Highway 2,
move north through the hills to a point due east of Valencia, and then
turn west across Highway 2 and capture that town. The 307th Infantry,
while protecting the division left flank, was to be prepared to relieve
the 305th Infantry. The artillery of the division at the outset was
to support the advance from Ormoc and eventually move with the forward
element of the 77th Division when the latter cut loose from the Ormoc
sector. [1056]
Enemy Night Landings
At 2330 on 11 December the 77th Division beach defense units observed
a Japanese convoy, which was transporting the Special Naval Landing
Force, steaming into Ormoc Bay with the apparent intention of landing
at Ormoc. The Japanese evidently thought that Ormoc was still in their
hands. The first craft noticed by the U.S. forces was a landing barge
with about fifty men, heading directly for the Ormoc pier. By the time
the barge came within range of the shore weapons, all shore units were
alert and waited with guns trained upon it. They withheld their fire
until the barge was within fifty yards of the pier and then all weapons
converged their fires upon the craft. The first rounds squarely hit
the barge, which immediately burst into flames. The Japanese clambered
atop the gunwales and are reported to have screamed, "Don't shoot,"
under the mistaken notion that their forces still occupied Ormoc.
The harbor was lit up by the burning barge and 60-mm. illuminating
shells. During the night the Americans discovered that another enemy
vessel, about the size of an LST, had pulled into shore northwest of
the town under cover of darkness and was busily engaged in discharging
troops and equipment. The tank destroyer guns of the 307th Infantry,
emplaced along the beach within 1,000 yards of the vessel, opened fire
on it while forward observers from the 902d Field Artillery Battalion
directed artillery fire upon the landing area and inland. The enemy
vessel attempted to pull out to sea, but after proceeding less than
fifty yards it burst into flames and sank. About 150 men, two tanks,
a number of rifles, mortars, and machine guns, and a quantity of
ammunition had been unloaded before the vessel sank, but most of the
supplies, including four ammunition trucks, had been destroyed by
American fire while the vessel was unloading.
The early dawn of 12 December revealed another ship of the same type
farther west near Linao. The artillery, mortars, and tank destroyer
guns opened up against this vessel as it fled along the shores of
Ormoc Bay, and their fire followed until it was out of range. Before
the fire ceased, heavy clouds of smoke billowed from the vessel as
it moved at a snail's pace. During the night the American fire had to
be closely co-ordinated, since American vessels, including a resupply
convoy, were in the bay. Not a single U. S. craft was damaged.
Troops of the Special Naval Landing Force who had disembarked got
in touch with Colonel Imahori, who immediately ordered them to go
to Highway 2 as the reserve unit of the 12th Independent Infantry
Regiment. It was impossible for them to carry out the order, since the
77th Division had advanced north from Ormoc. They thereupon decided
to join a naval airfield construction unit at Valencia, but again
they failed. In the latter part of December, the men of the Special
Naval Landing Force were in the eastern part of the Palompon area
without having taken part in the battle for the Ormoc corridor. [1057]
Battle of the Blockhouse
Because the fighting on the previous day had been extremely intense,
General Bruce on 12 December consolidated his positions and brought
forward supplies and supporting artillery. The front-line units sent
out strong combat and reconnaissance patrols to the front and flanks
to secure information on the dispositions of the Japanese. [1058]
Throughout the day and night the artillery battalions of the division
placed harassing and interdiction fires on the enemy positions across
the Antilao River. [1059]
The 902d and 305th Field Artillery Battalions, two batteries of the
304th Field Artillery Battalion, and one battery of 155-mm. howitzers
from the 306th Field Artillery Battalion fired continuously for five
minutes on the morning of 13 December at the enemy position in front
of the 305th Infantry. So intense was the fire that the enemy soldiers
were bewildered and streamed toward the front lines of the division
where they were cut down in great numbers by machine gun and small
arms fire. The Japanese in and around the concrete building, however,
lay low and weathered the barrage.
General Bruce attached Col. Paul L. Freeman, an observer from the War
Department General Staff, to the 305th Infantry. Colonel Freeman was
made the commander of a special attack force, consisting of Companies
E and L, which was to storm the blockhouse. The 305th Infantry, which
was to make the main effort, had the 3d Battalion on the right of
Highway 2 and the 2d and 1st Battalions on the left of the road. The
3d Battalion in a column of companies moved out at 0830. In support of
the 305th Infantry, the 2d Platoon, Company A, 88th Chemical Battalion,
fired on and silenced two enemy machine guns. The Japanese held their
fire until the infantrymen were upon them, making it necessary for
the artillery to fire at very close range. The fire from the 305th
Field Artillery Battalion came to within fifty yards of the American
front lines.
After Company I, the lead company, reached the ridge at 0925, K
Company moved up and attempted to consolidate the 3d Battalion's
position by making an oblique turn to the right flank of Company
I. It was hit at 1155 by the first of five counterattacks by the 12th
Independent Infantry Regiment. The enemy preceded the infantry assault
by artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire. The 3d Battalion
estimated the enemy force to be a reinforced battalion. All of the
counterattacks were driven off with heavy casualties on both sides.
The 2d Battalion, 305th Infantry, on the left of the highway, jumped
off at 0830 in a column of companies, Company F leading. At 0845 the
troops ran into concentrated automatic weapons fire, which pinned them
down. Company G moved around the left flank of Company F and also
came under heavy fire. A Japanese force estimated as two reinforced
companies opposed Companies F and G. With the right flank of Company
F on the blockhouse, the 2d Battalion pivoted on this point until
the line ran in a generally northern direction from the blockhouse
and faced toward the east. The 1st Battalion faced north and tied in
with the 307th Infantry on its left. Colonel Freeman's special attack
force was unable to move forward. The 3d Battalion held the commanding
ground east of Highway 2. The battalions of the 305th Infantry arranged
co-ordinating fires that covered all open spaces. [1060]
The 307th Infantry moved westward along the Ormoc-Linao road to
forestall any enemy reinforcements and counterattacks from that
direction. The troops encountered few Japanese. The 307th Infantry
in its advance of 1,000 yards took the barrio of Linao and captured
three artillery pieces and two antiaircraft guns, as well as ammunition
for those weapons. [1061]
The 306th Infantry, protecting the right flank of the 305th, received
no opposition during the day but assisted the attack of the 305th
Infantry by fire. Patrols of the 306th Infantry explored the area in
the vicinity of Donghol, about two miles northeast of Ormoc, but made
no contact with the enemy. [1062]
Although the 77th Division had extended its western boundary during
the day by about 1,000 yards, the front lines in the center remained
generally where they had been in the morning. The 1st and 2d Platoons
of Company A, 88th Chemical Battalion, laid a continuous smoke
screen in front of the troops from 0930 to 1630, enabling the aid
men to remove the wounded from the front lines and carry them to the
rear. [1063]
During the night of 13-14 December the artillery of the 77th Division
delivered harassing and interdiction fires to the front, the principal
target being the concrete house that had withstood the onslaught of
the previous two days. The 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, received
enemy mortar fire during the night, and both it and the 2d Battalion
received light machine gun fire in the early morning hours. The 2d
Battalion destroyed one machine gun with mortar fire.
At 0930 on 14 December Colonel Freeman prepared his special assault
force to renew the attack. Before the jump-off, artillery and
mortars laid their fire on the blockhouse and beyond. Under cover of
artillery fire the troops cautiously moved out at 1030 with Company
L on the right and by 1105 they had advanced 100 yards. Company L
knocked out two pillboxes with flame throwers and a tank destroyer
gun. Company E found every step of the way contested. The troops used
hand grenades and bayonets and literally forced the enemy out of the
foxholes in tough hand-to-hand fighting. [1064] Capt. Robert B. Nett,
the commanding officer of Company E, although seriously wounded,
refused to relinquish his command. He led his company forward and
killed seven Japanese with his rifle and bayonet. Captain Nett was
awarded the Medal of Honor.
While Company E was so engaged, Company L on its right advanced
through dense foliage and burnt the Japanese out of their foxholes
and the bamboo thicket with flame throwers. The company was assisted
by armored bulldozers from the 302d Engineers. For a hundred yards on
all sides of the blockhouse, the enemy had dug many deep foxholes only
a few yards apart. All the foxholes were covered, some with coconut
logs and earth, and others with improvised lids of metal and earth. One
was protected by an upturned bathtub. The armored bulldozer drove over
the positions, its blades cutting off the tops of the foxholes, after
which small arms fire into the holes killed the occupants. The crews of
the tank destroyers not only fired point-blank at targets but opened
the escape hatches and dropped grenades into the foxholes. [1065]
At 1240 the blockhouse, or what remained of it, was secured.
In the meantime the 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, flanked the
blockhouse at 1225 and wheeled 1,000 yards to the east, cutting off
the enemy line of communications on Highway 2. The 3d Battalion,
305th Infantry, remained on the high ground. By 1510 the crossroad
north of Ormoc was taken. At the end of the day, the front lines of
the 305th Infantry ran south to north along Highway 2 with Company L
in the blockhouse sector. A large pocket of the enemy, which had been
bypassed by the 1st Battalion, was centered generally in front of the
2d Battalion. The 307th Infantry was on the left flank of the 305th,
while the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, which had relieved the 306th
Infantry, was on the right flank in Ormoc. [1066]
During the day the 307th Infantry continued its mission of protecting
the left flank of the 77th Division in its northward advance and sent
patrols and a strong reconnaissance force, consisting of two reinforced
rifle companies, one dismounted cannon platoon, and four tanks, west
to the banks of an unnamed river near Jalubon. The reconnaissance
force killed twenty-one of the enemy, also capturing and destroying
great quantities of Japanese matériel and supplies. By the time the
perimeter of the 307th Infantry was established in the late afternoon
of 14 December, as reported by General Bruce, "the coast line from
Ormoc to Jalubon was dotted with fires and the explosions of burning
Japanese ammunition dumps." [1067]
Two other patrols, composed of volunteers from the 306th and
307th Infantry Regiments, reconnoitered approximately 3,000 yards
to the west of the 307th Infantry for possible trails for a wide
envelopment. [1068] These patrols met only scattered groups of the
enemy and advanced within 2,000 yards of Valencia, returning with
the information that an envelopment was feasible. [1069] During the
day the 184th Infantry relieved the 306th Infantry of its mission of
holding the coastal defenses, freeing the latter unit for an enveloping
movement to the north.
On 15 December the 77th Division consolidated its lines and sent out
small patrols. The enemy continued to be very active in the sector
of the 305th Infantry. During the night the artillery operating in
the 1st Battalion sector knocked out four 2 1/2-ton trucks and killed
seventeen of the enemy, while the 2d Battalion beat off two Japanese
counterattacks. In the 3d Battalion sector all was quiet.
By 15 December the port of Ormoc had been sealed off. It was through
this port that the Japanese had sent in a profusion of men, supplies,
and equipment, thus prolonging the battle for the island beyond the
time anticipated in the original American plans for the operation. The
77th Division estimated that for the period from 11 through 15 December
it had taken 9 prisoners and killed 3,046 of the enemy. [1070] Its own
casualties were 2 officers and 101 enlisted men killed, 22 officers and
296 enlisted men wounded, and 26 enlisted men missing in action. [1071]
The Mountain Passage
As a result of General Suzuki's abortive attempt to seize the Burauen
airfields, a number of Japanese soldiers remained in the mountains
west of Burauen. Most of these were from the 26th Division and
they were trying to rejoin the main part of the 35th Army in Ormoc
Valley. Earlier, the 11th Airborne Division had started out over
the mountains from Burauen in order to relieve enemy pressure on the
eastern flank of the XXIV Corps in its drive toward Ormoc. (Map 21)
Mahonag
Just west of Burauen the central mountain range rises abruptly from
Leyte Valley to peaks that are 4,000 feet or more in height. Many of
the deep, precipitous gorges were impassable even for foot soldiers. No
roads went through the mountains but there were short footpaths from
one locality to another. Some of these trails led over boulder-strewn,
swiftly running streams and frequently bridged deep gorges with a
single log where a slip meant a drop of thirty to forty feet. The paths
were often so steep that footholds had to be cut into the hillsides,
and soldiers were forced to use their hands to avoid falling as much
as forty to a hundred feet. [1072]
On 25 November the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment moved west from
Burauen for Mahonag, ten miles away. The almost impassable terrain,
heavy rainfall, and pockets of lurking Japanese made passage very
difficult. It was impossible for the regiment to move as a unit. In
small parties, sometimes even less than a squad, the 511th moved
forward. "The journey to Mahonag defies description. Sucking mud,
jungle vines, and vertical inclines exhausted men before they had
marched an hour. Though it rained often during any one trip, still
there was no drinking water available throughout the journey." [1073]
The 3d Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, after considerable
hardship entered Mahonag on 6 December. [1074]
On 9 December the 2d Battalion, though encountering heavy fire
from enemy machine guns, mortars, and rifles, pushed steadily
forward and established contact with the other units of the 511th
Parachute Infantry Regiment at Mahonag. For several days thereafter,
this regiment was busily engaged in sending out patrols. Company G,
patrolling in force for two miles to the front, was cut off from the
rest of the regiment, which was held down because of strong enemy
action. On 13 December the 32d Infantry pushed northeast from Ormoc
Bay in an effort to make juncture with the 11th Airborne Division
and assist it in moving out of the mountains.
Drive of 32d Infantry
The 32d Infantry also encountered very precipitous hills and its
advance was bitterly contested by the Japanese. By the evening of 14
December the regiment had considerably reduced the distance between
itself and the 511th Parachute Infantry.
At 0700 on 15 December, as the 3d Battalion was moving out, a patrol
of six men from Company G, 511th Parachute Infantry, entered the
battalion's lines. The rest of Company G was only 700 yards east of
the ridge. The patrol reported that Company G had been cut off from
the rest of the regiment for four days and was without food.
The 3d Battalion encountered only slight resistance and at 0950 was
on top of the ridge. A platoon moved out to make contact with Company
G of the 511th Parachute Infantry. The platoon reached the company,
and at 1855 Company G entered the lines of the 3d Battalion, which
fed and sheltered its men for the night.
In the meantime the 1st Battalion had moved out at 0800 and encountered
scattered resistance. To the east and south of the 32d Infantry was an
impassable canyon, several hundred feet deep. In order to reach the
511th Parachute Infantry, it would be necessary for the regiment to
go either north for an undetermined distance or down the ridge toward
the coast and then up again. A third possibility involved crossing
the Talisayan River in the foothills several miles to the west. With
these facts in mind Colonel Finn asked his executive officer, "Are
we to actually contact the 511th personally[?] What is the purpose
of the contact and are we to lead them out by hand[?]" [1075]
At the same time, General Arnold advised the 511th Parachute Infantry
of the situation and that "present orders" from General Hodge required
the displacement of the 32d Infantry from its positions in order
to wipe out pockets of resistance that remained near Ormoc. The
511th Parachute Infantry was to make every effort to drive toward
the position of the 32d Infantry, since the latter would soon be
withdrawn. The 511th would then have to fight it out alone. General
Arnold finally decided that the 1st and 3d Battalions, 32d Infantry,
would be withdrawn and that the 2d Battalion, which was fresher, would
move up and attempt to establish contact with the 511th Parachute
Infantry. [1076]
At 0700 on 16 December the 2d Battalion started eastward along
the south bank of the Talisayan River. For the next few days the
battalion made slow progress, meeting and destroying small groups of
the enemy pushing west. As the troops advanced they were confronted
with steep and heavily wooded ridges which were separated by gorges
several hundred feet deep. The Japanese, well concealed by the heavy
foliage and entrenched in caves, were most difficult to dislodge,
but the distance between the 2d Battalion and the 511th Parachute
Infantry daily diminished. On 20 December the 2d Battalion was held
up by the terrain and strong enemy opposition on two ridges to its
front. For the next two days the battalion pounded at the Japanese
force in attempts to dislodge it. At this time the distance between the
2d Battalion and the 511th Parachute Infantry had narrowed down. Enemy
resistance was overcome on the morning of 22 December. In the meantime
the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment passed through the 511th Parachute
Infantry Regiment and continued the attack. At 1330 on 22 December the
2d Battalion of the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment passed through the
2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, and pushed on to the coast. The difficult
mountain passes had been overcome. [1077]
The Drive South
Regrouping of Japanese Forces
When the Americans took Limon, the key point of entrance on Highway
2 into Ormoc Valley from the north, the Japanese forces were thrown
into confusion. The Americans, unknown to themselves, had successfully
divided the Japanese 1st and 102d Divisions that had been charged
with the defense of northern Leyte. The Japanese were forced to
regroup their various units in an attempt to correct the rapidly
deteriorating situation along their front lines. The strong American
infantry assaults, which had been co-ordinated with heavy mortar and
artillery fire, induced General Kataoka, the commanding general of
the 1st Division, to redistribute his forces along Highway 2. [1078]
The onslaught of the X Corps had forced General Suzuki to abandon
the earlier plan of advancing the 35th Army north along three widely
separated routes. Instead he had to concentrate the main strength of
the 1st Division along the highway to check the American advance. The
plan to use the 1st Division as a strong offensive force had to be
discarded in favor of using it in a strictly defensive role.
The 1st Division had suffered much: as of 2 December, 3,000 of
its men had been killed or wounded. Furthermore, one third of the
infantry weapons of the 1st Infantry Regiment and two thirds of
those belonging to the 57th Infantry Regiment had been rendered
inoperable. The infantry was short of grenades and ammunition for
the 50-mm. grenade dischargers. "The men were suffering from the
effect of continuous fighting, from lack of provisions, overwork,
and especially from the lack of vitamins." [1079]
By this time communications between the 1st Division and other units
had broken down. Telephonic and telegraphic communications between
the division and 35th Army headquarters were out for long periods of
time, and liaison between the division headquarters and front-line
units was carried out by messengers moving on foot. The supply lines
had also broken down. The 1st Division Transport Regiment found it
virtually impossible to supply food and ammunition to the 1st and
57th Infantry Regiments and the 1st Artillery Regiment.
General Kataoka grouped his forces along Highway 2 in the
Limon-Pinamopoan area in order to concentrate the maximum strength
along Highway 2. The 1st Reconnaissance Regiment was to attack the
left flank of the 32d Division, [1080] which was already opposed by
the 57th Infantry in the Limon sector; the 1st Battalion, less Company
3 and the 2d Battalion, plus Company 11, of the 49th Infantry were to
occupy the 1,900-yard sector two miles southeast of Limon in order to
hold back American forces in that area; and the 1st Artillery Regiment
was to defend its prepared positions south of Limon. The troops of
the 1st Engineer Regiment and other noncombat units were issued small
arms and ordered to take part in the defense of Highway 2. [1081]
Drive of the 32d Division
In order to support the amphibious landing of the 77th Division at
Deposito and its subsequent movement northward, General Krueger had
ordered the X Corps to make its main effort, beginning on 5 December,
by advancing vigorously south astride Highway 2 from the vicinity
of Limon. [1082] Acting on Corps orders, General Gill prepared to
move out with two regiments abreast. The 32d Division consolidated
its positions on 5 December, and readied itself for a strong assault
south down Highway 2. [1083] (See Map 14.)
The 127th Infantry had pushed past the 3d Battalion, 128th Infantry,
which was south of the Leyte River and west of Limon. The 127th
encountered very determined resistance from the Japanese entrenched
on the high ground 1,000 yards south of the Leyte River bridge. The
well-camouflaged enemy defenses consisted of numerous foxholes and
ten-foot-deep spider holes, many of which were connected by interlacing
communication trenches.
The terrain that the troops traversed was adapted to defensive
fighting, and the 1st Division took full advantage of this fact. There
were deep ravines and steep hills where the enemy had dug in on both
the forward and reverse slopes. The entire area was covered by heavy
rain forest with dense underbrush. The nearly constant rainfall made
observation difficult and the maps for the area were very inaccurate.
By 12 December the 32d Division had "detoured" around the 1st and
57th Infantry Regiments of the 1st Division and was assaulting
the Japanese artillery positions south of Limon. On this date the
division straightened out its lines, established physical contact
between the assault battalions, resupplied the assault units,
and sent out patrols. The sector in which the greatest Japanese
resistance was encountered continued to be that of the 2d Battalion,
126th Infantry. Employing mortars and four tanks, this battalion was
able to make only limited gains. [1084]
During the night of 12-13 December the artillery battalions of the
32d Division fired harassing missions near the perimeters of the
126th and 127th Infantry Regiments and southward on Highway 2 as far
as the vicinity of Lonoy.
The 14th Area Army had planned to land the 39th Infantry Regiment
and an artillery company from the 10th Division near Carigara on
16 December, but in view of the American 77th Division's advance to
Ormoc the plan was canceled on 11 December. On 13 December General
Suzuki attached an infantry company of about 100 men from the 102d
Division to the 1st Division in order to strengthen the latter's lines.
On the morning of 13 December the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, with
the assistance of its tanks and heavy mortars, pushed past the Japanese
who had held up its advance. In the face of most determined opposition
the battalion moved south, destroying the pockets of resistance which
had been bypassed. At the end of the day the 2d Battalion had advanced
400 yards to a position 200 yards north of a roadblock set up by
the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, less Company L,
which was to remain on the high ground overlooking the road, was to
attack south on the east side of Highway 2 and come abreast of the
1st Battalion, 126th Infantry.
At 1521 the 3d Battalion reported that six enemy tanks were coming
up the highway. After heavy fighting, the Japanese tanks withdrew at
nightfall and returned to the south. The 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry,
the southernmost unit of the division, made plans to dislodge the
enemy force between it and the 3d Battalion. The contested ground
consisted of an open space 600 to 700 yards long and 200 to 300 yards
wide, at the southern end of which were two knolls. The 1st Battalion
had men on both knolls but did not control the northern end of the
sector where the Japanese had dug in and were using machine guns,
mortars, and rifles. The 1st Battalion charged against the Japanese
and rooted them out with grenades and mortar fire. Except for this
action, only slight gains were registered during the day. The men
of the battalion were hungry, having been without food since the
previous afternoon. The commanding officer of the battalion renewed
a request for additional rations and ammunition, since the one-third
ration that had been received the day before was insufficient.
The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 127th Infantry received orders from
the regimental commander to advance south with the 1st Battalion on
the left, pinch out the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry, and link up with
the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry,
moved out in a column of companies and had advanced 400 yards when it
encountered forty to fifty Japanese on a ridge to its front, about 150
yards west of the road. The enemy threw blocks of TNT and grenades
against the battalion, effectively pinning down the troops. A night
perimeter was established.
The 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, moved abreast of the regiment's 1st
Battalion throughout the day. Its advance was bitterly contested by
the Japanese, who employed machine guns, mortars, and rifles against
the battalion, which dug in for the night under fire. [1085] At 1630
the 11th Field Artillery Battalion fired upon fifteen Japanese who were
walking along the road south of Lonoy and killed twelve of them. [1086]
The night of 13-14 December was not quiet. At 2300 an enemy force
from the 1st Infantry Regiment broke into the command post of the
126th Infantry. The Japanese set up a machine gun in the area and
attacked with grenades and rifles. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting ensued
but by 0325 the enemy force was evicted and the area had quieted
down. At 0630, with the coming of dawn, the Headquarters Company got
things in order and everyone was "happy to hear sound of comrade's
voices." Six Japanese were killed and two Americans and two Filipinos
wounded. [1087]
On 14 December nearly all battalions of the 127th and 126th Infantry
Regiments were engaged in moving slowly forward and maintaining
physical contact with each other. At 1045 the air observer of
the 11th Field Artillery Battalion located what appeared to be a
camouflaged four-gun position at a point 300 yards northeast of
Lonoy. The battalion fired upon the site and the Japanese fled from
the position. The 11th Field Artillery Battalion again fired into
the same general area at 1315 and set a supply and ammunition dump
and three buildings on fire. At 1530 the battalion and the corps
artillery massed their fires in order to cover all of Lonoy. [1088]
At 1730, the 127th Infantry destroyed two enemy tanks going north.
The 126th Infantry, on the same day, moved forward in a column of
battalions. The 1st Battalion made a limited advance, since it was
very short of ammunition and completely out of food. It did establish
a roadblock, however, and made contact with the 2d Battalion, 127th
Infantry. The 2d Battalion, the northernmost unit of the 126th
Infantry, moved slowly behind the 3d Battalion of the regiment. An
interval of about 250 yards existed between the two battalions. The
Japanese in front of the 32d Division, especially in the sector of
the 3d Battalion, had strongly entrenched themselves and resisted
the 3d Battalion from both sides of the highway.
Every bend of the road was lined with ... foxholes dug into the
banks of the road and spider holes dug underneath the roots of
trees and under logs on the hillsides. It was bitter, close hand
to hand fighting and because of the steepness of the terrain,
the denseness of the tree growth, the inaccuracy of maps and
nearness of adjoining units, artillery and mortar fire could not
be used to its full advantage in reducing these positions. [1089]
The main Japanese defensive line had been reached. By 14 December the
32d Division had advanced more than two miles south of Limon. The
77th Division had crushed the Cogon defenses and was in a position
to drive north and make juncture with elements of the X Corps. The
northern and southern entrances to Ormoc Valley were denied to the
Japanese. The jaws of the Sixth Army trap were starting to close.