Logistics
The conquest of Leyte was taking longer than had been anticipated. The
decision of the Japanese to make Leyte the decisive battleground
of the Philippines had forced the Americans to commit not only the
reserve 32d and 77th Infantry Divisions but also the 112th Cavalry
Regimental Combat Team, the 11th Airborne Division, and elements of
the 38th Infantry Division. The inability of the Americans to establish
considerable land-based air forces on Leyte, as well as the unexpected
Japanese reinforcement program, had retarded the campaign. Not only
was the timetable of future operations in the Pacific upset, but a
strong possibility existed that it would not be feasible to establish
a major logistical and air base on the island--the primary purpose
of the operation.
The construction program on Leyte was hampered by conflicting
priorities and, as had been foreseen, very poor terrain, bad weather
conditions, and a shortage of service personnel.
Construction
Retelling the disagreements and describing the conflicts that arose
over the everchanging needs of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces would
be involved, tedious, and unprofitable. But the progress of the
construction program must be recounted, since it had direct bearing
not only on the Leyte Campaign but also on the Mindoro and Luzon
operations.
Airfields
The importance of the development of the airfields cannot be
overemphasized. The inability of the Sixth Army to meet its
construction dates on the airstrips, because of poor soil conditions
and heavy rains, prevented the U. S. forces from stopping the flow
of Japanese reinforcements and made it impossible for the Allied
Air Forces to give sufficient land-based air support to the ground
troops. It also forced a postponement of the Mindoro operation. It
is well, therefore, to summarize just what had been accomplished in
airfield construction.
Work on the Tacloban airstrip had been handicapped at first by the
heavy concentration of troops, supplies, and equipment in the area
during the early stages of the operation. Thereafter, work was further
hampered by the insufficient supply of coral for surfacing the runway
and by the very heavy traffic concentrated on the haul road because of
the necessity for unloading cargo over White Beach. By 25 December,
1 runway, 50 dispersal areas, 536,000 square feet of alert apron,
1 diagonal taxiway, 1 parallel dispersal taxiway, and 8,943 feet of
additional dispersal taxiways had been constructed.
The Dulag airfield was located on the flat flood plain of the Marabang
River. The difficulties encountered were numerous: time lost because
of excessive rains that amounted to thirty-five inches in forty days;
air alerts; very poor drainage, which required the construction of
a system of drag-line trenches to the river; and very poor access
roads. The access roads required an excessive expenditure of time,
labor, and material in order to maintain traffic to the airfield. One
runway, 2 alert areas with gravel surface and 2 with mat surface,
1 matted transport parking area, 133 dispersal areas, and 24,200 feet
of dispersal taxiways were constructed by 25 December.
In the latter part of November all construction work was stopped on the
three airfields in the Burauen area, but not before considerable time
and effort had been expended in futile attempts to make the airfields
usable. [1029] Since these airfields could not be made serviceable,
General Krueger received permission from General MacArthur to construct
an airfield in the Tanauan area, and moved his headquarters from
Tanauan to Tologosa on 28 November in order that construction might
be started. The new site had a good sandy surface, its drainage
was satisfactory, and it proved to be an excellent location for an
airfield. By 16 December the field became operational, and by the
25th there had been completed 1 runway with mat surfacing, 1 overrun,
90,000 square feet of warm-up area, 120,000 square feet of alert apron,
1 parallel taxiway, and 26 large dispersal areas. [1030]
Roads
The rehabilitation of roads presented problems as vexatious as those
in airfield construction. In southern Leyte Valley, the road that
ran from Dulag through Burauen to Dagami soon became impassable
for about two miles on each side of Burauen. This section of the
road was completely rebuilt by dumping approximately three feet of
gravel over it. The remainder of the road was kept open most of the
time by permitting only one-way traffic. The other roads were just as
bad. After heavy rains the road in the Army Service Command area was
frequently under at least two feet of water. The streets in Tacloban
disintegrated so rapidly that much engineer effort was required to
keep them open. Such maintenance was necessary to assure continued
operation of the many supply and administrative facilities located
in the city. [1031] The roads on the west coast were, if possible,
even worse. Upkeep of the roads in general required a "profligate
expenditure of engineer troops." It was found that a battalion could
accomplish no more in a month than a platoon could have carried out
in a week under good weather conditions. The roads required a rock or
gravel foundation one to three feet thick, whereas a road-metal surface
of three to four inches on an earth base was normally adequate. Since
priority was given to work on the principal roads and airfields, the
construction of access roads, as well as hardstands for hospitals,
depots, and other needed installations was greatly delayed. In this
connection General Krueger stated: "This, in turn, greatly affected the
supply situation, including construction materials, by lack of access
to the depots, lack of storage space into which to discharge ships,
and lack of facilities and spare parts to permit repair and servicing
of engineer heavy equipment as well as other critical transportation
and combat vehicles." [1032]
On 21 December General Krueger estimated that after the elimination
of certain projects on which informal agreements had been reached,
the extent of completion by 5 January of the other projects would be
as follows: main supply roads, 50 percent; access roads, 20 percent;
Air Forces installations (exclusive of air depot and assembly plants),
44 percent; hospitals, 40 percent; base supply and services, 25
percent; oil and aviation gasoline storage (exclusive of naval oil
storage which had not been started), 50 percent; Navy installations, 20
percent; and headquarters construction, 40 percent. [1033] The gloomy
prognostications of Sixth Army engineers had proven all too true.
Supplies
Inland Movement of Supplies
As the roads on Leyte became more and more unserviceable, greater
reliance was placed on the use of naval vessels to transport supplies
and personnel to various parts of the island. The Transportation
Section, Sixth Army, maintained a small-boat pool that was used
extensively to transport light cargo and personnel between Tacloban,
San Ricardo, Palo, Tanauan, Tolosa, Dulag, and Catmon Hill. [1034]
LCM's were widely employed on the northern and eastern coasts of the
island and LSM's operated on the west coast. [1035] (Table 2)
Table 2--Shipping Tonnage Discharged in Leyte-Samar Area, 28 October-25
December 1944
------------------------------------------------------------------
| Tonnage |Average Daily| Lighterage on Hand
Period | Discharge|Rate of |--------------------------
| |Discharge |LCT's|LCM's|DUKW's| Barges
--------------+----------+-------------+-----+-----+------+-------
Total | 571,350 | | | | |
|----------+-------------+-----+-----+------+-------
28 Oct-3 Nov | 33,901 | 4,843 | 11 | 54 | 107 | 18
4 Nov-10 Nov | 32,421 | 4,632 | 35 | 63 | 315 | 33
11 Nov-17 Nov | 141,238 | 20,177 | 26 | 69 | 219 | 33
18 Nov-24 Nov | 110,494 | 15,785 | 18 | 59 | 253 | 39
25 Nov-1 Dec | 47,744 | 6,821 | 28 | 71 | 289 | 38
2 Dec-8 Dec | 56,786 | 8,112 | 24 | 53 | 297 | 43
9 Dec-15 Dec | 53,387 | 7,627 | 21 | 53 | 294 | 42
16 Dec-22 Dec | 68,677 | 9,811 | 39 | 68 | 300 | 49
23 Dec-25 Dec | 26,702 | 8,900 | 39 | 69 | 287 | 49
------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: G-4 Report, Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, p. 218.
The troops that were fighting in the mountains were frequently supplied
by airdrops by the 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron from supplies that
were available in the Leyte area. From about the middle of November
until the latter part of December, 1,167,818 pounds of supplies
were either dropped or delivered by air. (Table 3) Two hundred and
eighty-two plane loads of supplies were dropped, a total of 2,776
parachutes being used. Because of the nature of the terrain and the
proximity of the Japanese, the proportion of airdropped supplies
that could be recovered varied from 65 to 90 percent. Approximately
60 percent of the parachutes were recovered and returned to the 11th
Air Cargo Resupply Squadron. [1036]
Supplying the West Coast
The landing of the 77th Division on the west coast of Leyte brought
into sharper focus the difficult job of giving adequate logistical
support to the tactical units. The Sixth Army supply lines were
tenuous. There was a shortage of shipping, and furnishing supplies
to the troops fighting in the mountains was especially difficult.
In planning for the amphibious movement of the 77th Division,
the resupply shipping set up for the division was as follows: on 9
December, two days after the division's landing at Deposito, 12 LSM's
and 4 LCI's would bring in supplies; on 11 December, 12 LSM's and 5
LCI's would bring in additional supplies; and on 13 December 12 LSM's
and 4 LCI's would carry further supplies to the division. Thereafter, 3
LSM's would be assigned the task of supplying the 77th Division. [1037]
Table 3--Airdrops by 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron, 11 November-25
December 1944
--------------+--------------------------+-----------+-----------
Branch | Supplies |Weight in | Percent
| | Pounds | of Total
--------------+--------------------------+-----------+-----------
Total | | 1,167,818 | 100.0
| +-----------+-----------
Quartermaster | Rations | 445,916 | 38.3
| Miscellaneous | 357,061 | 30.4
Ordnance | Ammunition | 337,761 | 28.9
Medical | Supply and Equipment | 21,308 | 1.8
Signal | Supply and Equipment | 4,546 | 0.4
Chemical | Chemical Warfare Supplies| 1,226 | 0.2
--------------+--------------------------+-----------+-----------
Units Supplied | Weight | Percent
| | of Total
-----------------------------------------+-----------+-----------
Total | 1,167,818 | 100.0
+-----------+-----------
11th Airborne Division | 388,570 | 33.3
1st Cavalry Division | 301,058 | 25.8
32d Infantry Division | 167,859 | 14.3
24th Infantry Division | 126,004 | 10.7
Guerrillas | 91,054 | 8.7
96th Infantry Division | 52,973 | 4.2
77th Infantry Division | 14,800 | 1.1
112th Cavalry Regiment | 10,300 | 0.8
7th Infantry Division | 4,200 | 0.3
Others | 11,000 | 0.8
-----------------------------------------+-----------+-----------
Source: Report of Transportation Officer, Sixth Army Operations Report
Leyte, p. 271.
The Japanese had sunk two LSM's near Baybay on 4 December and damaged
several other vessels during the Deposito landing. [1038] Because
of the extreme shortage of shipping that resulted, General Hodge
suggested to General Bruce on 8 December that thirty trucks, which
had been scheduled for delivery on the first two convoys of resupply
shipping, be sent overland along the Abuyog-Baybay mountain road and
used to shuttle supplies of the division between the two towns. These
supplies could be sent forward to the 77th Division when its beachhead
merged with that of the 7th Division. [1039] On the following day
the first resupply for the 77th division left Abuyog in a convoy of
trucks which went over the mountains to Baybay, where LCM's took the
cargo and moved it to the area of the 77th Division. [1040]
At 2100 on 10 December, General Hodge notified General Bruce that
the second echelon of resupply was to arrive at 2359 on the following
day at any beach that General Bruce desired. The supplies consisted
of 40,000 rations, 1,000 gallons of 80-octane gasoline, 500 gallons
of diesel oil, 100 tons of ammunition, and 10 tons of medical
supplies. Certain tactical and service units were also to be sent
forward. The third echelon, which was scheduled to arrive on the west
coast on the night of 14-15 December, was to consist of the remaining
units of the 77th Division and "considerable resupply." [1041]
As the tide of battle swept the 77th Division farther northward, its
line of supply and that of the 7th Division became very thin. About 15
December the supply officer of the XXIV Corps summarized the situation
to the corps chief of staff. Between 19 and 25 December three resupply
echelons, consisting of twenty-four LSM's and five LCI's carrying 3,250
tons of supplies, were to arrive on the west coast. He believed this
amount was insufficient. According to his calculations, the daily
requirements for two divisions in heavy fighting were 500 tons of
supplies. He estimated that the supplies of the 77th Division could
not last beyond 18 December. By 19 December the division would be in
short supply unless 100 truck loads of supplies could be sent over
the mountains before that time. The convoy that was to go forward
on the 19th would carry only two days' supplies and there would be
a three-day interval before the arrival of the next convoy. The XXIV
Corps, therefore, was faced with the problem of moving 200 truck loads
of supplies during those three days merely to keep even. After 25
December, one and a half days' supply would be sent overwater every
three days. Since the supply officer of the XXIV Corps had strong
doubts that the road would stand "a movement involving 300 trucks
every three days" it was believed that the supply situation would
steadily worsen. [1042]
On 15 December General Krueger sent a radio message to Admiral Kinkaid
reviewing the critical supply situation and requesting that sufficient
amphibious shipping be made available immediately to carry supplies
to the forces on the west coast. Admiral Kinkaid acquiesced, and
on 22 December a resupply convoy arrived at Ormoc with "sufficient
supplies and equipment to alleviate the critical situation." [1043]
By 26 December a general level of five to ten days' supply of all
classes had been built up, a level that was maintained throughout
the rest of the operation. The XXIV Corps utilized to the maximum
the available space on the LSM convoys, and units on the west coast
employed all available motor transportation to supplement the tonnage
on the convoys. Finally, the supplies were pooled in dumps at Ipil
and Ormoc and then allotted to the units.
On 25 December General Hodge received a Christmas message from his
supply officer: "Best wishes for Merry Xmas and a New Year filled
with supplies, resupplies, more supplies and no supply worries." [1044]
The serious logistical situation was to affect definitely the progress
of the Sixth Army as it fought its way into Ormoc Valley--the last
important enemy stronghold on the island.