Battle of the Airstrips
Immediately after Pearl Harbor, American submarines began to attack
Japanese shipping to the Netherlands Indies. From the beginning they
were successful. In September 1943 the submarines accelerated the
tempo of their attack. The Japanese lost to the submarines "tremendous
tonnages of shipping ... all over the ocean. No route was secure from
their attack; no ship was safe south of Honshu." [982] By the early
fall of 1944 the Japanese line of communications to the Netherlands
Indies was virtually cut.
With American land-based air strength on Leyte increasing steadily,
a strong possibility existed that the line of communications between
the Japanese homeland and the South Pacific area would be completely
severed, especially if the main American air force should move up from
New Guinea to Leyte. Imperial General Headquarters felt, therefore,
that the Dulag and Tacloban airfields must be neutralized, and the
Burauen airfields in southern Leyte Valley seized before the American
air force could establish itself in strength on the island. Japanese
control of the airfields would also facilitate the movement of Japanese
supplies to the island and greatly assist the ground operations of
the 35th Army. [983]
In the latter part of November, Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, commanding
general of the 14th Area Army, sent a liaison officer from his
headquarters in Manila with orders to Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, the
35th Army commander, at Ormoc. General Yamashita is quoted as saying:
"If the construction of air bases on Leyte is permitted to continue,
the communications between the Southern areas and the homeland will be
cut and this would be a serious situation. Therefore, we must occupy
Burauen airfield as soon as possible and at the same time neutralize
Tacloban and Dulag airfields. Moreover, we must annihilate the enemy's
air power." [984]
Therefore, in a desperate attempt to gain the initiative, the Japanese
embarked on a rash scheme to seize the airfields of Leyte. Their
plan entailed a co-ordinated effort by both the ground and air
forces. Beginning on 23 November and continuing through 27 November,
the army air force was to launch a campaign to eliminate American air
resistance. On the night of 26 November, aircraft carrying specially
trained demolitionists were to crash-land on the Dulag and Tacloban
airstrips and put them out of commission. [985]
Plans were made for the 3d and 4th Airborne Raiding Regiments to
descend from Luzon on the Burauen airfields. The 26th Division,
together with the 16th Division, which had fought the Americans in
Leyte Valley, and the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade of the 35th Army
were to infiltrate through the mountains and attack and capture the
Burauen airfields. The 16th Division was to move from its position
in the mountains west of Dagami toward Buri, the northernmost of the
Burauen airfields. Elements of the 26th Division which were engaging
the 7th Division on the shores of Ormoc Bay were to break off the
fight, move over the mountains, and attack Bayug and San Pablo, the
southernmost of the Burauen fields. (Map 20) If all went well they
were to proceed east and capture the Dulag airfield, on the shores
of Leyte Gulf. The airborne assault was to be made on the night of
5 December. The ground troops were to arrive early on the morning of
6 December and assist in the attack.
Because he felt that he had not made sufficient preparation, General
Suzuki requested that the attack be postponed until 7 December. General
Yamashita disapproved this request, but since bad weather was forecast
for 5 December, he sent a message to General Suzuki changing the date
of attack to the night of 6 December. This information was immediately
transmitted to the 26th Division. At the same time, efforts were
made by General Suzuki's headquarters to relay the information to
the 16th Division, but because of radio difficulties General Makino
never received the message.
General Makino, after receiving the order for the airborne attack on
the night of 5 December to be followed with an attack by his forces
on the following morning, concentrated the remaining strength of the
16th Division into one battalion. General Suzuki personally took
command of the Burauen operation, and on 1 December he and a part
of his staff moved east into the mountains near Burauen. General
Tomochika was left in command of the Ormoc forces. [986]
Unwittingly, the Japanese were flogging a dead horse. General Krueger
had stopped all work on these airfields on 25 November.
The American Dispositions
The Sixth Army planners for the Leyte operation had not envisaged the
employment of the 11th Airborne Division during the campaign. This
division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, was to have staged
on Leyte for subsequent operations. [987]
On 22 November, however, General Hodge ordered the relief of the 7th
Division, minus the 17th Infantry, by the 11th Airborne Division in
order to free the 7th Division for the drive up the eastern shore of
Ormoc Bay. On the same day the 11th Airborne Division, along with
the 17th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, was ordered to seize and
secure all exits from the mountains into Leyte Valley in its area. The
division was then to advance through the central mountain range,
and secure the western exits from the mountains in order to assist
the attack of the 7th Infantry Division in its drive north toward
Ormoc. [988] Upon receipt of this order, General Swing assigned to
the units of the 11th Airborne Division the mission of securing the
mountain exits.
General Swing immediately started to relieve elements of the 7th
Division and by 28 November the relief was completed. For several days
the 11th Airborne Division sent patrols to the west and maintained
small security guards at the Buri and Bayug airfields.
There were three airstrips--San Pablo, Bayug, and Buri--north of the
Dulag-Burauen road in the area between San Pablo and Burauen. Both
the Bayug and San Pablo airfields were on the Dulag-Burauen road. The
Buri airstrip was almost directly north of the Bayug airstrip. The
land between the Bayug and Buri airstrips was flat for a distance
of about 800 yards. The northern half of this flat land was a swamp,
sometimes five feet in depth. At the northern end of the swamp was a
narrow stream, about fifteen feet wide, which ran along the base of a
plateau. This plateau, which was directly north of the Buri airfield,
was forested with palm trees and jungle growth. Buri airfield lay
between the swamp and the plateau. [989]
By 27 November information from captured documents and prisoners
interrogated by units of the Sixth Army indicated that the enemy
was planning a co-ordinated ground and airborne attack to seize the
airfields in the Burauen area. The intelligence officers of the XXIV
Corps, however, thought that the Japanese were not capable of putting
this assault plan into effect. The American patrols operating west
of Burauen had found no new trails being constructed nor any old
ones being extensively used. Furthermore, the American forces had
blocked all known trails leading east over the mountains into the
area. Although the enemy might be able to make an airborne attack,
"he is not at this time capable of launching a co-ordinated ground
airborne attack of major proportions in the Burauen area." [990]
Despite the trail blocks, however, elements of the 16th Division were
able to descend upon the Buri airstrip from the mountains southwest
of Dagami. Only one battalion of the 26th Division, which was to
have attacked the airfields in the Burauen area on 7 December, ever
reached the area. The movement over the mountains was difficult, and
it was not until the night of 10-11 December that the unit arrived
west of Burauen. It made a half-hearted attack, which was repulsed
by elements of the 11th Airborne Division. [991]
Although the intelligence officers of the XXIV Corps believed there
was no possibility of a co-ordinated ground and aerial assault,
General Hodge alerted the XXIV Corps to a possible enemy paratroop
landing. All units were directed to strengthen local defenses and
establish in each sector a twenty-four-hour watching post. All men
were to be armed and wear helmets, or to have arms and helmets within
reach at all times. In the event of any unusual enemy activity, the
headquarters of the XXIV Corps was to be notified immediately. [992]
In order to protect the airfields more adequately, a company of the
77th Division was furnished to the 11th Airborne Division to defend the
Dulag airfield, while the latter division held one battalion alerted
at Burauen in readiness to move against hostile forces at any of the
three airfields in the area. [993] One battalion of the 306th Infantry
Regiment and a platoon each from Companies A and B of the 767th Tank
Battalion were stationed north of Burauen; the regiment was to be
prepared to assemble two companies near the headquarters of the Fifth
Air Force for motor movement in defense against airborne attack, and
to maintain security detachments at the Bayug and Buri airstrips. [994]
First Japanese Effort
In the meantime the first phase of the Japanese plan to regain
the initiative had begun. At 0245 on 27 November, three enemy air
transports with lights on flew over Leyte Gulf at an altitude of about
fifty feet. Ten minutes later one of these aircraft crash-landed in
the water about twenty-five yards offshore in the area of the 728th
Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which was about two miles south of Rizal
and about three miles north of Tarragona.
A guard from the battalion, assuming the plane to be friendly,
approached it and climbed on the wing to offer assistance. The Japanese
emerged from the plane and threw grenades at the guard. The men of
the tractor battalion, hearing the noise, came on and killed two
Japanese with small arms fire. Three others, however, escaped and
reached a swamp west of the landing point. Ten or twelve more of the
enemy moved south along the beach in the surf and also disappeared
into the swamp. [995]
One of the other two planes crash-landed on the Buri airstrip and all
its occupants were killed. The remaining plane crashed on the beach
near the Bito River, north of Abuyog. Opposite, across the river,
elements of the 11th Airborne Division were encamped. [996] With the
exception of one soldier, who was killed at dawn, all of the Japanese
in this plane escaped. The 728th Amphibian Tractor Battalion found many
demolition charges abandoned in the plane. In view of this discovery,
and the fact that the enemy made no attempt to follow up the landing
by an airborne attack in force, the Americans concluded that the
Japanese were on a suicide mission of demolition and destruction in
the Dulag and Burauen airfield areas. Although the operation caused
no damage, Radio Tokyo informed the Japanese people that it was
"most successful." If the enemy believed that his attempt had been
successful, however, the possibility existed that other airborne
troops would be landed, either as raiding parties or in force. [997]
By 5 December the XXIV Corps was lulled into a sense of false
security. The 2d Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry, which had been
in the Burauen area, had rejoined its regiment, which was fighting
for the mountain passes on the trail to Albuera. The 3d Battalion,
306th Infantry, on the northwestern approaches to the airfields,
reverted on 5 December to the control of the 77th Infantry Division,
which was embarking for the Ormoc operation. The only infantry unit
in the Burauen area at the time of the Japanese attack was the 1st
Battalion, 187th Glider Infantry (less one company), which was on San
Pablo airfield. The G-2 periodic report on 5 December at 2000 stated
with regard to the general situation in the Burauen-Dagami-Mount Alto
area: "An examination of reports of action in this area since 1 Nov
may well warrant the assumption that organized resistance has about
ceased." [998] But before morning, the remnants of the Japanese 16th
Division hit the Buri airfield.
Battle of Buri Airstrip
On or about 2 December General Makino, commanding general of the
16th Division, had assembled from the hills southwest of Dagami the
remaining elements of the division. The total strength thus massed
was only about 500 men. The men rested, and then marched on toward
the Buri airstrip. On the way, American artillery and tank fire
killed approximately 200 of them. The remaining force moved to a new
location--a deep gorge about 6,500 yards southwest of Dagami. On
5 December, this force was to move out of the gorge, join the
paratroopers, and launch a combined assault against the Buri airstrip.
The Americans later learned from interrogated prisoners that the morale
of the men of the 16th Division was very low at that time. They were
living on coconuts and bananas, since the officers had taken the few
remaining rations. Wounded men in the force had been abandoned. [999]
The 16th Division was still unaware that the target date for the
Burauen operation had been postponed to the night of 6 December, and
consequently proceeded with its plans to attack the Buri airstrip on
6 December at 0630--over fourteen hours before the paratroopers were
scheduled to land. On the night of 5-6 December, approximately 150
Japanese made their way quietly toward the Buri airstrip.
At 0600, the 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, northwest
of Burauen, saw elements of the Japanese 16th Division crossing the
main road south of the battalion's position and heading east toward
the Buri field. The battalion immediately relayed this information
to the XXIV Corps headquarters. [1000] After crossing the road, the
enemy moved into the swamp near the airfield. One Japanese unit of
about 15 men, armed with a machine gun, stationed itself at a Filipino
shack 300 yards west of the highway in order to cover the road. [1001]
At the Buri strip were about 47 men from the 287th Field Artillery
Observation Battalion and 157 miscellaneous troops. [1002] Small
units of engineering troops and a signal company were at the foot of
the bluff, on the northern edge of the strip.
At 0630, the 16th Division launched its surprise attack. Led by a
Filipino, [1003] the Japanese broke into the American bivouac area
while the men were still asleep. Some were bayoneted while in their
blankets, or before they could seize their weapons. Others held the
Japanese off until they could retreat, shoeless and in their shorts
and undershirts, either up the bluff to the headquarters of the V
Bomber Command, or to the road, where an infantry company had come up
in support. [1004] The service troops were "firing at everything that
moves and ... probably inflicting casualties among our troops." [1005]
The Japanese from the 16th Division entrenched themselves in the
woods north of the airstrip.
Meanwhile, General Hodge ordered that the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry,
be released from the 96th Division and placed under the operational
control of General Swing of the 11th Airborne Division. The battalion
was to proceed immediately to the aid of the two companies of the 11th
Airborne Division in the Buri airfield area. General Hodge emphasized
that the area was "critical" and "must be kept closed." It would be
"dangerous" to let the enemy "get into the service troops along the
road and around airfields." [1006] One reinforced company of the 1st
Battalion was already in the area and the rest of the battalion made
ready to follow. [1007]
Small patrols of combat troops held the enemy forces in check. At
1030 one patrol killed seventeen Japanese north of the Buri airfield,
and another killed three of the enemy west of the airstrip. The
1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Infantry was moved from the San
Pablo airfield to the Buri area and went into position near the
airfield. [1008] By 1800 on 6 December, the enemy had been driven
off the Buri airfield, though pockets of resistance still remained
on the edges of the airstrip. The battalion encountered a portion of
the 16th Division east of the strip and destroyed it. [1009] Forty
of the enemy were known to be dead, and it was believed that as many
more had also been killed.
Attack From the Sky
San Pablo Airstrip
The Japanese air transports were scheduled to be over the airfields
at 1840 on 6 December, with an escort of fighter aircraft. Fighters
were to neutralize the airstrips and, just before the paratroopers
jumped, medium bombers were to strafe the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug
airstrips. At the same time light bombers were to hit antiaircraft
positions between San Pablo and Dulag and points west. Fifty-one
aircraft in all (transports, bombers, and fighters) were assigned to
the operation. The transports were allotted as follows: twenty to the
Buri airstrip, nine to San Pablo airstrip, six to Bayug airstrip,
and two each to the Tacloban and Dulag airstrips. Each transport
carried fifteen to twenty men. [1010]
The Japanese parachutists were well drilled as to their mission. The
operation was to be divided into five phases. The first phase was to
begin with the jump-off. The men, immediately after landing, were to
attack and destroy aircraft on the ground, and one element was to
attack the barracks and communications. This phase was to end when
the moon rose. In the second phase, ending about 2230, the troops
would destroy matériel, ammunition dumps, bridges, and remaining
barracks. During the third phase, from 2330 to 0300, the paratroopers
were to destroy the remaining aircraft and installations. In the
fourth phase, lasting from 0300 to 0600, they were to build defensive
positions. In the fifth phase, from 0600 on, preparations were to be
made for future operations.
There were to be three assault waves. The first wave would consist
of the headquarters unit with approximately 25 men; the signal
unit with 7; the 1st Company with 100; the 2d Company with 86; the
construction company with 97; and a platoon with 50 men. The second
would be composed of 9 men from the headquarters unit; the 3d Company;
the Heavy Weapons Company; and the signal unit. The final wave would
consist of the remaining troops--about 80 men. [1011]
Just before dark, thirty-nine Japanese transports with supporting
bombers and fighters roared over the Burauen airfields. Several
incendiary bombs fell on the San Pablo strip, setting a gasoline
dump afire and burning a liaison plane. Approximately eighteen enemy
aircraft were shot down. Parachutists began to descend from the
transports. The commander of the 3d Regiment with about 60 of his
men dropped on the Buri strip, while between 250 and 300 parachutists
landed near the San Pablo strip. [1012]
The parachutists, immediately after landing, ran up the north and south
sides of the San Pablo strip. They talked in loud tones and allegedly
called out in English, "Hello--where are your machine guns?" Most of
the enemy forces assembled on the north side of the airstrip. They
burned three or four more liaison planes, a jeep, several tents,
and another gasoline dump, throwing ammunition on the latter.
The only American troops in the area, a small detachment of the 11th
Airborne Division, consisted of elements of the 127th Airborne Engineer
Battalion, the signal company, Headquarters Battery of the division
artillery, special troops as well as Air Corps service troops. During
the night of 6-7 December, confusion reigned on the airstrip. There
was uncontrolled and disorganized firing and much difficulty arose
in establishing a co-ordinated command. [1013]
At dawn, after most of the paratroopers had assembled on the San Pablo
airfield, they moved north and west to the northern edge of the Buri
airstrip and joined elements of the 16th Division.
At the San Pablo airstrip, Lt. Col. Douglas C. Davis, the commanding
officer of the 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion, organized the
miscellaneous service troops into an infantry unit to protect the
San Pablo airstrip. The 674th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion,
which was at the mouth of the Bito River, north of Abuyog, was to
leave its guns at that place and come to the assistance of Colonel
Davis' force. At daylight, the troops of the 127th Airborne Engineer
Battalion moved out toward the airstrip and met the 674th Field
Artillery Battalion, under Col. Lukas E. Hoska. The artillery battalion
swung into line and the two units moved out as a provisional infantry
regiment under Colonel Davis--the airborne engineers on the left and
the artillery battalion on the right.
They encountered strong resistance to the west of the San Pablo
airstrip. After advancing north of the strip, the engineers ran
out of ammunition. The field artillery battalion went forward to a
coconut grove, also to the north of the airstrip. The gap between
the two units was closed by a strong patrol. Since the food and
ammunition situation remained uncertain, the composite force went
into a perimeter in defense of San Pablo strip, where it remained
for the next few days. [1014]
Buri Airstrip
On the night of 6-7 December, the Air Corps service personnel had
abruptly quitted the Buri airfield, leaving behind carbines, rifles,
grenades, small arms ammunition, and machine guns. 2d Lt. Rudolph
Mamula of the 767th Tank Battalion had been ordered to take charge
of the situation, co-ordinate the action of forces on the airstrip,
and recover abandoned armament and ammunition. Apparently he was
unsuccessful, because later in the day the Japanese made "the best
use" of the same arms and ammunition. By the middle of the morning,
on 7 December, the enemy had completely occupied the Buri airstrip.
In anticipation of the landing of Japanese paratroopers, General
Krueger had requested General MacArthur to release elements of the 38th
Division for employment against the enemy airborne troops. The 38th
Division had arrived on Leyte to stage for future operations. General
Headquarters assigned the 149th Infantry to the control of the
commanding general of the Sixth Army; two battalions of the 149th
Infantry were in turn released on 6 December to the control of General
Hodge, the commanding general of XXIV Corps, who put them under the
operational control of the 11th Airborne Division for employment
against parachutists in the Burauen area. The remaining battalion of
the 149th Infantry was alerted for the movement in the Burauen area
on twenty-four hours' notice. [1015]
The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 149th Infantry, 38th Division,
were alerted at 0200 on 7 December for movement to the San Pablo
airstrip. The advance elements of the 1st Battalion were greeted at
the San Pablo airstrip by General Swing, who is reported to have
said: "Glad to see you. I am General Swing of the 11th Airborne
Division. We've been having a hell of a time here. Last night
approximately seventy-five Jap paratroopers dropped on us of which
we have accounted for about fifty. Fifteen hundred yards from here
on an azimuth of 273° is another airstrip just like this one. Between
here and there are about twenty-five Jap troopers. It is now 1400. I
want that strip secure by nightfall." [1016]
The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion decided to attack with
Companies A and C abreast, Company A on the right, with approximately
a 200-yard frontage for each company. A section of heavy machine guns
was attached to each unit, and a platoon of 81-mm. mortars from Company
D was to support the attack from positions on the San Pablo airstrip.
Moving out at 1430, the troops covered the first 400 yards without
incident but were stopped by a rain-swollen swamp. Since attempts to
bypass the swamp were fruitless, the men were forced to go through
it. The water was shoulder-high in places, and the companies lost
contact during the crossing. Company A proceeded to the Buri
airstrip, arriving there about 1630. Company C, which had been
delayed by a slight skirmish with the enemy, did not arrive until
about 1800. Because of the lateness of the hour and the fact that
observation had shown there were "many more Japanese" on the north of
the airstrip than had been estimated by General Swing, it was decided
to establish perimeters for the night. [1017]
By the end of 7 December the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry,
had established a toe hold on the southwestern fringe of the Buri
strip. During the day the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, northwest of
the Bayug airstrip, had received machine gun fire from an estimated
enemy platoon just west of the Burauen-Dagami road. This enemy force
was contained throughout the day as advances were made southeast toward
the Buri airstrip. At 1630 the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, and the
1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, established contact at the western end
of the Buri airstrip. The 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, 96th Division,
had been placed under the control of the 11th Airborne Division. At
dusk of 7 December, it took a position near the 1st Battalion,
149th Infantry. [1018] At 2000 the sector was reported quiet. It
was impossible to estimate the total number of American and Japanese
casualties for the day, but it was believed to be large. [1019]
During the night of 7-8 December, the Japanese brought forward two
machine guns and emplaced them directly in front of Company A of the
1st Battalion, 382d Infantry. At dawn the machine guns opened up. Their
low, grazing fire pinned down the company, but Pfc. Warren G. Perkins,
in the face of enemy bullets, located the guns and called mortar fire
upon the site. The mortar concentration, falling within fifty yards of
Perkins, silenced the machine guns and startled the Japanese. Pvt. Ova
A. Kelley took advantage of the confusion and charged with his M1 rifle
and a carbine. Kelley killed eight of the enemy before he himself was
slain. [1020] The rest of Company A followed Kelley and secured the
edge of the airstrip where it set up a perimeter. During 8 December
the Americans consolidated their positions.
At 1045 on 9 December the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, attacked
north with Companies A, B, and C on a line. The companies got across
the airstrip but then came under fire from Japanese weapons emplaced
on high ground to the north. The 1st Battalion therefore withdrew to
the southern edge of the strip. During the day it had killed fifty
of an enemy force estimated to consist of two hundred men. The 2d
Battalion remained in position throughout the day. [1021]
At twilight the assault companies of the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry,
were sent out in various directions to locate enemy patrols said
to be converging upon the airfield. Only a few mortar men and
headquarters personnel were left behind to guard the perimeters. At
midnight approximately 150 Japanese attacked. The headquarters
and service troops with rifle fire, together with the mortar men,
stopped the charge. They killed fifty of the enemy and suffered seven
casualties. [1022]
On 10 December, after a half-hour artillery concentration, the 1st
Battalion, 149th Infantry, attacked with Companies A and C abreast,
and Company B in the rear. After the 1st Battalion had pushed north
300 yards across the airstrip, Companies A and C moved northwest
while Company B went to the northeast. The companies cleared the
airfield area of individual riflemen and destroyed small pockets of
enemy resistance. The 1st Battalion went into perimeter at 1700 on
the Buri airstrip. The 2d Battalion remained in position throughout
the day. [1023]
At 1930 the Japanese launched their final concentrated attack against
the airfields. They began to fire at the administration buildings of
the Fifth Air Force, and some of the bullets went through the plywood
walls of the house of Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead. "The General
ducked a bullet, ordered someone to find out who the blankety-blank
was responsible and that he'd blankety-blank better stop or think up
a blankety-blank good reason." [1024]
A staff officer immediately started to investigate the situation. He
got Lt. Col. Paul V. Kaessner of the 8th Aviation Signal Battalion on
the telephone. The following conversation is reported to have ensued:
"Colonel," he said sternly, "you've got to stop that promiscuous
firing down there immediately!"
"Like to, sir," answered the colonel, "but the Japs...."
"Japs," shouted the staff officer, "that can't be Japs. That fire
is coming from our fifties."
"That's right ... and the Japs are doing the shooting!"
"Where in the hell did the Japs get our machine guns?"
"How in hell should I know, sir?"
"The bullets are coming right through the general's quarters."
"Tell the general to get down on the floor. Incidentally, that
yelling you hear is a Banzai raid on our mess hall." [1025]
The air force personnel were pushed back until they reached the
hospital, where they halted and held. They then counterattacked and
drove the enemy away from the area. The Japanese left thirty of their
dead behind them.
This action was the last major effort of the Japanese against the
Burauen airfields. Only a little more than a battalion of the 26th
Division, which was to have assisted the 16th Division, managed
to reach the airstrips, and it had arrived in a very disorganized
condition. Immediately afterward, General Suzuki, the commanding
general of the 35th Army, learned that the 77th Division had landed
just below Ormoc on the eastern coast of Ormoc Bay. Since Ormoc was the
southern entrance to Ormoc Valley, it was highly important that the
town be defended at all costs. General Suzuki therefore ordered that
the operations against the Burauen airfields be discontinued and that
all troops repair to Ormoc Valley. The return through the mountains
was difficult. Nearly all organization was lost, and the Japanese made
their way back through the mountains as scattered individuals. [1026]
The air transports allotted to Tacloban were destroyed by antiaircraft
fire, while those destined for Dulag crash-landed, killing all their
occupants. [1027]
The Japanese had failed to achieve any major objective. Though
they had destroyed minor fuel and supply dumps and a few American
aircraft, delayed airfield construction, and isolated Fifth Air
Force headquarters for five days, they had not appreciably delayed
the Leyte operation. [1028]
The Japanese attempt to take the initiative away from the Americans
had failed. The Sixth Army was at the northern and southern entrances
to Ormoc Valley. Elements of the X Corps had been battering for a
long time at the northern portal. With the capture of Ormoc, the
XXIV Corps had sprung the lock on the southern doorway and was in a
position to drive north and thus relieve some of the pressure being
exerted against the X Corps.
The arrival of the XXIV Corps at the entrance to Ormoc Valley brought
the critical logistical situation on the island of Leyte to the
fore. The tenuous supply line already had been stretched very thin,
and, with the 77th Division extending its lines, a strong possibility
existed that it might snap altogether.