The Mountain Barrier: Part Two
By the middle of November both the Americans and the Japanese realized
that the struggle for the island of Leyte was going to be long and
costly--far longer and costlier than either had anticipated.
On 9 and 10 November, Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, the senior
officer of the Japanese forces in the Philippines, held a series
of conferences on the progress of the campaign. General Yamashita,
commanding general of the 14th Area Army, strongly urged that
the Leyte operation be discontinued and offered reasons for this
stand: There was little likelihood that additional reinforcements
would reach the Philippines, and the vital manpower needed for the
defense of Luzon would be drained off uselessly at Leyte. The naval
battle of Leyte Gulf, he also thought, had been "unsatisfactory"
and there was reason to believe that the air battle off Formosa
had been equally disappointing. The shortage of shipping and
escort strength greatly aggravated the already difficult problem
of troop transportation. Finally, the land operations were not
proceeding favorably. [712] But Yamashita's superior, Field Marshal
Terauchi, commanding general of the Southern Army, insisted that the
reinforcement program be continued and that the battle for Leyte be
brought to a successful conclusion. General Yamashita is said to have
replied, "I fully understand your intention. I will carry it out to
a successful end." [713]
Reinforcements
At the same time General Krueger was anxious to complete the third
phase of the American campaign, the two-pronged drive toward the
port of Ormoc. He felt, however, that there were insufficient troops
to both protect the mountain passes into Leyte Valley and make the
drives toward Ormoc.
In preparing for the Leyte Campaign, General Krueger had asked
that the units which were to participate be embarked with a 10
percent overstrength. This request was disapproved. Just before the
embarkation, however, he received 5,000 untrained replacements. [714]
He had also requested that during the course of the operation 18,800
replacements be delivered to the combat zone, the first 10,000 to
arrive by A plus 10. During the first thirty days of the operation
he would need the following replacements: 14,300 Infantry, 1,300
Field Artillery, 1,130 Corps of Engineers, 750 Medical Corps, 375
Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Artillery, 185 Quartermaster Corps,
185 Ordnance, 185 Signal, and all others 375. Approximately 6 percent
of these should be officers. [715]
Table 1--Sixth Army Daily Strength Reports, 12 November-25 December
1944
--------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------
| Authorized strength | Difference Between Effective
Date | | and Authorized Strength
+----------+------------+------------+------------------
| Officers |Enlisted Men| Officers | Enlisted Men
--------------+----------+------------+------------+------------------
12 Nov 1944 | 6,978 | 107,461 | -1,050 | -11,754
19 Nov 1944 | 9,290 | 147,497 | -1,099 | -15,058
26 Nov 1944 | 11,977 | 185,462 | -1,603 | -17,977
2 Dec 1944 | 11,637 | 191,060 | -1,819 | -19,012
9 Dec 1944 | 10,721 | 174,148 | -1,194 | -18,261
16 Dec 1944 | 10,905 | 176,466 | -1,361 | -21,059
25 Dec 1944 | 11,019 | 176,628 | -1,228 | -22,536
--------------+----------+------------+------------+------------------
Source: Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, 20 October-25 December
1944, p. 153.
As the fighting extended into the mountains, the lack of sufficient
replacements began to be greatly felt. At no time did General Krueger
know when replacements would arrive, or whether they would be combat or
service troops, or what their individual specialties would be. During
the course of the operation he received only 336 officers and 4,953
enlisted men as replacements.
To add to these difficulties, General MacArthur's headquarters used
figures for "assigned strength" rather than "effective strength,"
that is, the number actually present with a unit, in computing
the need for replacements. Such figures gave an entirely erroneous
picture, since evacuations were to change rapidly the figures for
medical installations, and dispositions reports were delayed for
long periods. For example, on 12 November the assigned strength of
the Sixth Army was only 289 officers and 1,874 enlisted men short
of its Table of Organization strength, but its effective strength
was 1,050 officers and 11,754 enlisted men short of the Table of
Organization strength. By 20 December this shortage had pyramided to
about 21,000--considerably more than a division. (Table 1) General
Krueger was seriously concerned about the situation, especially since
nearly 79 percent of the casualties occurred in the infantry. [716]
Fortunately, the 32d and 77th Infantry Divisions--the Sixth Army
reserve--were due to come in soon or had already done so, and there
were on the island additional units that were to have used Leyte
as a shipping area for subsequent operations. The availability of
the 11th Airborne Division, under Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, and the
112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, [717] under General Cunningham,
was most timely. They could be used to help guard the mountain passes
into Leyte Valley and also to give support to the drive of X Corps
south down the Ormoc Valley.
At the same time General Krueger proposed that as soon as there were
sufficient troops and supplies available, an amphibious landing be
made near Ormoc to capture the town. This operation would speedily
reduce the Japanese opposition south of Ormoc, cut the enemy's line of
communication at Ormoc, and place the hostile forces in Ormoc Valley
"in a vise which could shortly squeeze them into extermination." [718]
The supporting naval forces, however, could not make available
sufficient assault and resupply shipping to mount and support such
an operation. The Navy also thought that there was insufficient
air support on the island to insure the safe arrival of a convoy
into Ormoc Bay. There was a strong possibility that severe losses
might result from the suicide bombing techniques of the Japanese
pilots. General Krueger therefore set aside his plan until it could
be introduced at a more opportune time. [719] When the 11th Airborne
Division arrived, General Krueger could attach it to the XXIV Corps
in southern Leyte. General Hodge could then relieve some of the troops
that had been guarding the mountain entrances into the valley and also
send additional support to the troops on the shores of Ormoc Bay,
thus enabling the XXIV Corps to launch a strong drive toward Ormoc
from the south.
General Krueger originally had planned to have the 32d Division, under
Maj. Gen. William H. Gill, establish control over southern Samar, but
in view of the limited number of Japanese on that island, he decided
to make use of the division to add momentum to the attack of X Corps
and to give rest to the weary troops of the 24th Division. [720]
On 14 November General Krueger therefore directed General Sibert
to relieve the units of the 24th Division with elements of the 32d
Division. At the same time, the 112th Cavalry was attached to the
1st Cavalry Division in order to give impetus to the attack. [721]
32d Division Assumes the Offensive
General Sibert made arrangements for the introduction of the 32d
Division and the 112th Cavalry into the battle. The 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, which had reached
positions overlooking Highway 2 south of Limon, were to remain in those
locations and temporarily under the operational control of General
Gill. The 112th Cavalry was to operate in the mountains between Ormoc
and Leyte Valleys and assist the 1st Cavalry Division in a drive to
the southwest toward Highway 2. A regimental combat team from the 32d
Division was to relieve the 21st Infantry on Breakneck Ridge. Another
regiment from the division would mop up in the vicinity of Hill 1525
and prepare to assist in the drive south. Elements of the division were
to relieve the units of the 24th Division in the Daro area, from which
the artillery had been shelling Ormoc. The 24th Division artillery
was to support the advance of the 32d Division until relieved. [722]
The flanks of the 32d Division were protected. The 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry, had established a roadblock on Highway 2, about 2,000
yards south of Limon, and the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, was on
the high ground known as Kilay Ridge, which was 700 yards from the
road and west of the roadblock of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry.
General Gill directed the 128th Infantry of the 32d Division, commanded
by Col. John A. Hettinger, to pass through the 21st Infantry and
attack south astride Highway 2, to push through Breakneck Ridge,
and to capture Limon, 1,500 yards to the south. Colonel Hettinger
ordered the regiment to move out on 16 November at 0800 with battalions
abreast--the 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. William A. Duncan,
on the right (west) of Highway 2, and the 1st Battalion, commanded
by Lt. Col. James P. Burns, on the left. [723] (Map 14)
The forward elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions moved out of their
assembly areas on time. They were followed by the remainder of the
troops as fast as rations and ammunition could be distributed. The
battalions assembled immediately in the rear of the 21st Infantry
and at 1200 pushed through that regiment and entered upon their first
battle on Leyte. [724]
Colonel Hettinger ordered Colonel Burns to overcome the enemy
opposition on Corkscrew Ridge. The 1st Battalion made little
progress. Company A was immediately pinned down by machine gun,
mortar, and rifle fire, and Company B went forward only 150 yards. The
3d Battalion encountered no opposition and advanced to a point 350
yards south of its line of departure, from which Company M delivered
machine gun fire and Company L rifle fire at long range on the enemy
in the vicinity of Limon. [725]
On the morning of 17 November the 1st Battalion reached the slopes
of Corkscrew Ridge, where it dug in. At 0737 the 3d Battalion moved
out along Highway 2 with companies abreast--Company K on the right
and Company L on the left. Company K met no resistance, advanced
about 1,000 yards, and reached a ridge about 500 yards north of
Limon. Elements of the 57th Infantry stopped Company L almost
immediately, but a platoon from the company moved fifty yards west
around the pocket of resistance and destroyed it. The company then
continued its advance to the ridge. [726] Companies K and L dug in
on the ridge for the night. [727]
On the following morning Colonel Hettinger ordered the 3d Battalion to
hold its position until the 1st Battalion could come abreast. The 3d
Battalion therefore limited its activities to sending out patrols. The
1st Battalion again attacked Corkscrew Ridge but made very limited
gains.
Elements of the 57th Infantry had dug in on the reverse slope of
the ridge, and heavy jungle prevented complete observation of these
enemy positions. The Japanese regiment had placed automatic weapons
to command the only routes of approach, thus forcing the American
troops to move uphill in the face of hostile fire. The 2d Artillery
Battalion had placed its guns so that they covered Highway 2. [728]
The 1st Battalion continued to besiege Corkscrew Ridge until 20
November, while the 3d Battalion remained on the ridge overlooking
Limon. Late in the afternoon of 21 November, Colonel Hettinger
ordered the 128th Infantry to seize Limon, and then move south to
secure a bridge-crossing over a tributary of the Leyte River. The
1st Battalion was to contain the enemy on Corkscrew Ridge. The two
assault battalions of the regiment got into position on the ridge
north of Limon, the 2d Battalion on the east side of Highway 2 and
the 3d on the west side. [729]
During the night the 120th Field Artillery Battalion delivered
harassing fire along the road between Limon and the Limon
bridge. [730] At 0800 the assault troops moved out. The 3d Battalion
met little opposition, but the 2d met strong resistance from the 57th
Infantry. [731] Company I encountered no resistance as it moved along
a bluff which was just west of the town and which overlooked Limon and
the bridge. Company K and the 2d Battalion pushed through Limon and
at 1400 the leading elements crossed a tributary of the Leyte River
south of the town. A determined Japanese counterattack forced back the
left flank of the 2d Battalion and exposed Company K. A sudden flood
of the stream, caused by heavy rains, cut off the advance elements
of Company K south of the river from the rest of the company. These
troops moved to the right and joined Company I on the bluffs. The
rest of the company and the 2d Battalion established a night perimeter
along a ridge east of the village. The 3d Battalion, less Company K,
established itself for the night around the positions of Company I
that overlooked the bridge and the tributary of the river. [732]
On 23 November the 128th Infantry straightened out its lines and
consolidated its positions. For the next three days activity was
limited to extensive patrols and the placement of harassing fire
on an east-west ridge that overlooked the highway about 1,000 yards
south of Limon. Entrenched on this ridge, elements of the 1st Division
successfully resisted until 10 December all efforts of the 32d Division
to dislodge them. [733]
With the occupation of Limon, the battle of Breakneck Ridge was over,
but a number of bypassed pockets of resistance were not eliminated
until mid-December. The battle cost the 24th and 32d Divisions a
total of 1,498 casualties, killed, wounded, and missing in action, as
compared with an estimated 5,252 Japanese killed and 8 captured. [734]
The Japanese had failed in their attempt to block off Highway 2
at the northern entrance to Ormoc Valley. In no small measure, the
establishment and maintenance of a roadblock south of Limon by the
2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and the defense of Kilay Ridge in the
rear of the Japanese front lines by the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,
had made this achievement possible. (See Map 13.) Under constant fire
and greatly outnumbered, these units had prevented General Suzuki
from sending additional troops into Limon. From 12 to 23 November
the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, had defended the roadblock under
extremely difficult conditions. The operations report of the 24th
Division graphically summarizes the deeds for which the battalion
received a presidential citation:
These bearded, mud caked soldiers came out of the mountains
exhausted and hungry. Their feet were heavy, cheeks hollow, bodies
emaciated, and eyes glazed. They had seen thirty-one comrades
mortally wounded, watched fifty-five others lie suffering in muddy
foxholes without adequate medical attention. Yet their morale had
not changed. It was high when they went in and high when they came
out. They were proud that they had rendered invaluable aid to the
main forces fighting in ORMOC CORRIDOR, by disrupting the Japanese
supply lines and preventing strong reinforcements from passing
up the ORMOC ROAD. They were proud that they had outfought the
Emperor's toughest troops, troops that had been battle trained in
Manchuria. They were certain they had killed at least 606 of the
enemy and felt that their fire had accounted for many more. And
they were proud that this had all been accomplished despite
conditions of extreme hardship. Two hundred and forty-one of the
battalion's officers and enlisted men were hospitalized for skin
disorders, foot ulcers, battle fatigue, and sheer exhaustion. [735]
The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, under Colonel Clifford, operated west
of Highway 2 on Kilay Ridge, behind the Japanese front lines. It "wrote
a brilliant page in the history of the campaign" [736] but, since its
influence on the situation was not appreciated until later and since
it affords an excellent example of a battalion fighting independently,
the operation of "Clifford's Battalion" will be discussed separately.
Battle of Kilay Ridge
When General Krueger told General Sibert to push the X Corps south
with all possible speed down Highway 2 toward Ormoc, the latter had
selected the 24th Division to make the drive. General Irving wished
to protect the sides of the road and prevent the Japanese from sending
reinforcements north up the highway. On 9 November he therefore ordered
the 34th Infantry to send a battalion around the Japanese west flank
to harass the enemy's rear and thus relieve the pressure that was
holding up the frontal attack of the 21st Infantry on Breakneck Ridge.
Nipponese Caught Napping
At 0100 on 10 November Colonel Dahlen, commander of the 34th Infantry,
alerted the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, for an amphibious landing
to take place at 0700. The battalion had been in contact with the
enemy for twenty-one days and was reduced to an effective strength
of 560 men. The 1st Battalion, with an observer's party from the
63d Field Artillery Battalion, was ordered to move from Capoocan
in eighteen LVT's and proceed seven miles northwest up the coast of
Carigara Bay. [737] It was then to move inland and seize Kilay Ridge,
which was west of the Ormoc road some 3,000 yards behind the Japanese
front lines. [738]
At 0700 the battalion, under Colonel Clifford, moved out, taking every
available man on the mission and leaving only a minimum of cooks and
drivers behind. Since the troops had to hand-carry their equipment
the Headquarters Company left the antitank guns behind, and Company
D took only one section of heavy machine guns and one section of
81-mm. mortars. Colonel Clifford used the men thus released to carry
other weapons and ammunition. Because of the scant time allowed by
the orders, the battalion left without sufficient rations.
At 0750 Clifford's battalion went aboard the LVT's and at 0930
arrived at its destination. Debarking without opposition it pushed
rapidly inland and at 1145 reached a hill approximately one mile
from the landing area. At dusk the 1st Battalion reached a ridge in
the vicinity of Belen and about 2,000 yards north of Agahang. There
it set up a night perimeter. Since his maps were inaccurate, Colonel
Clifford relied upon the services of Filipino guides from this time
until the end of the mission. The rugged and muddy hillsides, made
considerably worse by almost constant rain and fog, were similar to
those encountered by other units fighting in the area.
At 0730 on 11 November Colonel Clifford sent out patrols to pick up a
promised airdrop of rations. The battalion had been without food since
the morning before. At 0910 Colonel Dahlen ordered Colonel Clifford not
to move on to Agahang, which was about 3,800 yards northwest of Limon,
until he received rations. The rations were not forthcoming but at
1400 Dahlen told Clifford to obtain the promised rations at Agahang,
to which the battalion then proceeded. No supplies were received,
but Filipinos furnished the unit with bananas, cooked rice, boiled
potatoes, and a few chickens. A night perimeter was set up. [739]
At 0850 on the following day Colonel Clifford's men received their
first airdrop of rations. Ten minutes later the commanding officer of
the 1st Battalion of the guerrilla 96th Infantry made contact with
Colonel Clifford and gave him a résumé of the enemy situation. (The
guerrillas rendered invaluable aid to the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,
throughout the Kilay Ridge episode by furnishing intelligence and
protecting the rear of the unit.) The battalion moved out at 1200
for Consuegra near the Naga River and entered the town at 1240. At
1310 Colonel Clifford outlined to the officers the plan for the next
two days. For the rest of the day, the battalion was to advance to
Cabiranan and bivouac for the night. On the morning of 13 November
it was to split into two columns and make a fast advance by separate
routes to Kilay Ridge, where it would reorganize. As Colonel Clifford
was briefing his officers, LVT's entered Consuegra with rations for
the troops. The LVT's had left Carigara Bay, passed through Biliran
Strait, gone down Leyte Bay and into the Naga River, and then proceeded
up the river to the vicinity of Consuegra.
At 0855 on 13 November a column of Filipino men, women, and children
entered the perimeter and brought approximately thirty-five boxes of
rations from Consuegra. The battalion left the area at 0930 and reached
the ridge without opposition. Trenches and prepared gun positions
without a man in them honeycombed the ridge from one end to the
other. It was evident that elements of the 1st Division had intended
to occupy the area in the latter stages of the battle for Limon. [740]
Kilay Ridge ran from southeast to northwest, with its northern tip
about 2,500 yards directly west of Limon and its southern end about
3,000 yards south and slightly west of the same point. The ridge was
approximately 900 feet high and though narrow in some places in others
it widened to 400 yards. The summit was broken into a series of high
knolls from which the entire Limon area and some parts of the Ormoc
road could be observed. A view of the latter feature was obstructed
to some extent by a ridge, hereafter called Ridge Number 2, between
Kilay and the road. Kilay Ridge was about 3,900 yards southwest of
Breakneck Ridge. It would be necessary to maintain control of Kilay
Ridge and deny its use to the enemy in order to give complete support
to units advancing south from Breakneck Ridge.
Preliminary Attack
On 14 November Colonel Clifford ordered his battalion to entrench
itself along the ridge in positions that would afford the best
tactical advantage. The battalion established strong points and
observation posts on the knolls, placed blocks on the trails leading
through the area, and sent out reconnaissance patrols to locate
enemy positions. Colonel Clifford made arrangements to utilize the
Filipinos as carriers. These men were to use a trail on the north end
of the ridge and bring supplies to the battalion from a supply dump
at Consuegra. The first human pack train arrived in the area at 1010
with twenty-eight cases of rations and a supply of batteries for the
radios. [741]
At 1125 enemy artillery shelled the southern end of the ridge and
twenty minutes later shifted its fire to the Limon area. The battalion
did not succeed in establishing physical contact with the 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry, which was operating east of the road, but it was able
to make radio contact. Throughout the day, patrols of the battalion
were active in searching out enemy positions.
On 15 November Company A sent a patrol to Ridge Number 2, which was
600 yards east of the battalion's positions and which overlooked
the Ormoc road. The patrol found numerous enemy emplacements and
approximately fifty Japanese, who began firing with mortars. After
killing five of the Japanese the patrol retired. [742] During the day
the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop reported to Colonel Clifford
and was assigned the mission of patrolling the west flank of the
battalion. Although patrols from the 1st Battalion pushed east of
the Ormoc highway south of Limon, they again were unable to make
contact with the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry. On 16 November Colonel
Clifford again sent out patrols which tried, still unsuccessfully,
to establish physical contact with this battalion. [743]
A platoon from Company B, on 17 November, carried on a running
fire fight with the Japanese and forced its way past Ridge Number
2. It crossed the Ormoc road and made contact with the 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry, at its roadblock. A line of communication between the
battalions could not be established because of the strong enemy forces
between them. At the same time parts of Companies B and D engaged
the enemy on Ridge Number 3, six hundred yards south of Ridge Number
2 and slightly lower. Approximately 200 of the enemy with rifles,
machine guns, mortars, and artillery were entrenched on Ridge Number
3. The American fire killed at least fifty Japanese. A patrol from
Company D probed the Japanese defensive position but was forced to
retire with two men missing and one wounded. Then Company B entered
the fray, and the fire fight grew in intensity. The Japanese directed
fire from at least three automatic weapons as well as strong rifle
fire against the Americans.
Colonel Clifford went to investigate and found Company B engaged
in a bitter fight. While he was there the company sustained six
casualties. One of the men had been shot through the thigh and was
unable to walk. Since the heavy underbrush and bad trails made it
impossible for two men to carry him on a litter, Colonel Clifford
carried the wounded soldier on his back for about a mile to the
command post, over a difficult mountain trail which ran for several
hundred yards in the bed of a swift stream. [744] Colonel Clifford
was awarded a Distinguished Service Cross. [745]
At nightfall Company B was separated from the rest of the
battalion. Colonel Clifford decided to pull the company off the ridge
and replace it with Company C. He was determined to hold what he had
"at all costs." [746] During the day General Sibert attached the
battalion to the 32d Division.
Red Badge of Courage
At daylight on 18 November Colonel Clifford brought heavy machine
guns into place on the perimeter of the battalion and began to fire
on the enemy positions on Ridge Number 3, catching a group of about
twenty-five Japanese who were cooking their breakfast. At 0700 a
carrying party with rations and medical supplies moved out toward the
besieged Company B, and at 1100 Company C started forward to relieve
the company. Colonel Clifford decided to displace a platoon at a
time during the day. Under intense rifle fire, Company C succeeded in
relieving Company B. The fire fight continued throughout the day, and
approximately fifty more Japanese were killed. At 1200 the battalion
conducted burial services for Henry Kilay, a Filipino soldier and
guide who had served the battalion well. [747] During the night and
continuing into 19 November, Japanese heavy machine guns fired into
the perimeter on Ridge Number 2.
In the meantime the enemy began to deliver heavy fire against
Company B, which had moved to the south flank of the battalion on
Kilay Ridge. Colonel Clifford estimated the Japanese assault force
to be one reinforced company well equipped with mortars and light
machine guns. By 0905 on 19 November the Japanese had destroyed one
heavy machine gun and had begun a flanking movement to the east of
the southernmost outpost of Company B.
The artillery liaison party moved south and directed artillery fire
on the enemy. By 1150, however, Company B was being surrounded and
its ammunition was very low. Colonel Clifford made a reconnaissance
of the area and ordered the besieged company to fall back 100 yards
to the north and set up a strong point with the assistance of Company
A. The next morning Company A was to attack and retake the knoll from
which Company B had been forced to retire. Because of strong Japanese
resistance, the gradual attrition of the battalion's forces, and the
"extreme scarcity" of ammunition, Colonel Clifford also decided to
have Company C withdraw from Ridge Number 2 to Kilay Ridge on the
following morning. [748]
Rain fell constantly upon the troops and churned the surface of the
ridge into a "slick mass of mud and slime." [749] Men were tired. With
insufficient rations, broken sleep in sodden foxholes, and constant
harassing fire, many had sickened. Fever, dysentery, and foot ulcers
were commonplace.
Early on the morning of 20 November Company C withdrew silently in
the rain without the knowledge of the Japanese, who threw an attack
of company strength against the position thirty minutes after it had
been vacated. Company C established a strong position 200 yards south
of the battalion command post. The artillery fired intermittently on
the enemy to the south until 1200, when it concentrated its fire in
front of Company B. So intense was the rain that although artillery
shells were falling only 150 yards away, the artillery liaison party
had to adjust the fire almost entirely by sound. At 1225 Company B
moved out in an effort to retake the knoll from which the enemy had
launched his attacks the previous day, but it came under intense
rifle and mortar fire which forced it to retire. At this point the
battalion's supply of ammunition became critically low. [750]
The downpour continued through the night and the next day. Patrols,
sent to search for a means of flanking the Japanese, were unsuccessful,
but they brought back information which made it possible to place
artillery and mortar fire on enemy positions. At 1430 Colonel Clifford
received the report that two strong Japanese columns were converging
on the battalion from the southeast and northeast. One of the platoons
from Company C moved to the north end of the ridge to assure that
the supply line to Consuegra would be kept open. A carrying party
from Consuegra brought in rations and at 1705 the battalion received
an airdrop of blankets, ammunition, and litters. [751] There was no
major enemy contact.
The rains persisted during the night and the next day, 22
November. Throughout the morning, patrols probed the area. At 1130
the battalion received an airdrop of ammunition, medical supplies,
and ponchos. The main perimeter lines were comparatively quiet until
1430 when the enemy pinned down Company B with heavy fire and assaulted
Company A. These attacks rapidly grew in intensity. The Japanese with
fixed bayonets charged against the perimeters and almost completely
surrounded both companies.
At 2000, since the enemy completely surrounded Company B, Colonel
Clifford ordered the company to break through and withdraw through
Company A to the rear of the battalion command post. Under cover of
machine gun and artillery fire, the company withdrew. When a litter
train of the wounded was ambushed, one of the bearers was killed by
enemy fire.
Within the new perimeter of Company B, 750 yards north of the battalion
command post, Colonel Clifford established a rear command post and
all communications moved to it. From this new location the mortars
from Company D began to fire in front of Company A, the most advanced
company. The battalion cached all supplies and ammunition in case
the enemy should suddenly break through. The rains continued.
Colonel Clifford made tentative plans to withdraw during the night
but abandoned them when General Gill ordered him to hold the ridge at
all costs. Advance elements of the 32d Division had entered Limon,
and the withdrawal of Clifford's battalion would have left their
western flank completely exposed. [752]
Fortunately the Japanese did not follow up the attacks on 23 November,
but there was scattered automatic weapons and artillery fire. Next day
American artillery and mortar fire repulsed a small enemy attack at
0830. A platoon from the battalion slipped through the enemy lines and
brought information on the situation to General Gill. It returned with
orders that the battalion was to hold fast. Two airdrops of supplies,
although they drew enemy fire, were successfully recovered.
For the next two days there was comparative quiet in the sector
except for patrol activity and intermittent fire. At 1000 on 25
November, General Gill sent Colonel Clifford the following message:
"You and your men are doing a superb job. Hang on and keep killing
the Japs...." [753]
At nightfall on 25 November, however, the semiquiet was shattered when
an enemy force armed with automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery
began a heavy assault against the perimeter of Company A. The company
beat off the attack with losses to both forces. On the following
morning, Colonel Clifford had Company C relieve Company A. At 1630
Colonel Dahlen informed him that he, Clifford, was "in a tight spot,"
since the 32d Division could give "no immediate help," and advised
him to "use artillery and hang on." [754] It became apparent that
the Japanese were so disposed that they could launch attacks from
different directions. Further evidence to this effect was supplied
on 27 November, when a Japanese patrol of almost platoon strength
got astride the supply line to Consuegra on the northern front of
Kilay Ridge. A patrol from Company B dispersed the unit and killed
three of the enemy. Colonel Clifford estimated that elements of the
1st Regiment were disposed as follows: a minimum of one reinforced
company was south of him, at least two reinforced companies were on
the ridge about 1,000 yards to the east, and a strong but unknown
number of the enemy opposed him on the west. If this last force pushed
northward Clifford's supply line to Consuegra would be severed. From
1725 to 2020 on 27 November, Company C came under a strong long-range
attack from enemy positions on the ridge to the east. A patrol from
the 128th Infantry, 32d Division, brought Colonel Clifford the welcome
information that reinforcements were en route.
The Main Effort
At 1000 on 28 November the battalion repulsed a small party of the
enemy that attacked from the south. There was a lull until 1930 when
the Japanese unleashed a strong effort to drive the defenders from
Kilay Ridge and recapture it. The opening was marked by 90-mm. mortar
fire upon the outposts of the battalion. Heavy weapons from the ridge
on the east then began firing as at least two machine guns and many
small arms began to rain lead from the west. The enemy fire rose to a
crescendo as the mortars joined in and directed their heaviest fire
at a platoon of Company C on the southwestern end of the ridge. The
Japanese began to deploy troops, apparently in an attempt to reach a
gulch to the west of the battalion's positions. A heavy assault was
launched from the south against Company C.
By 1955 the mortars of the battalion were brought to bear against
the advancing Japanese as the crews worked in feverish haste to break
up the assault. At 2015, although Company C now had mortar support,
the enemy charged with bayonets and grenades. Fighting was at close
quarters and the Japanese began to infiltrate the forward positions. An
hour later the advance platoon of Company C pulled back to join the
company, which had been cut off from the rest of the battalion. The
fire fight continued throughout the night with constant rifle fire,
numerous attempts at infiltration by the Japanese, and intermittent
mortar fire. [755]
At dawn on 29 November the Japanese forces were still on the ridge in
strength and their automatic weapons began to fire anew. All forward
elements of the battalion were under attack and Company C was still
separated from the rest of the battalion. A reinforced platoon from
Company B, at 0730, was able to break through to Company C, kill six
of the enemy, and seize two machine guns en route. As Company C's
ammunition was practically exhausted, Colonel Clifford immediately
sent a carrying party forward. Since the Japanese had blocked off the
trail immediately after the passage of the platoon from Company B,
the carrying party was pinned down.
In the meantime two carrying parties from Consuegra entered the
perimeter of the battalion with food and ammunition. One carried the
"Thanksgiving ration of roast turkey and ... fresh eggs." The battalion
therefore hoped for "a good meal" if the situation permitted. [756]
Colonel Clifford urgently requested General Gill to send
reinforcements. At 1325 Gill told Clifford that he had ordered the 2d
Battalion, 128th Infantry, 32d Division, to proceed to Kilay Ridge
immediately and come under Clifford's control. Colonel Clifford
forcibly reopened the trail to Company C and had food and ammunition
brought into the forward position. A short time later, Company G,
128th Infantry, arrived and Clifford immediately committed it to
reinforce Company C. The remainder of the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry,
arrived at 1835 and was held in reserve. (See Map 14.)
The action for 1 December began at 0800 when a patrol from Company
B proceeded down a draw to the west of Kilay Ridge. The patrol was
to swing wide and approach the right rear almost directly south
of the enemy-held knolls on Kilay Ridge. These were thought to be
the Japanese strong points and were the objectives for the day. A
preparatory concentration from supporting artillery and from mortars
of both battalions was first laid. The heavy machine gun section of
the 128th Infantry moved into the draw to the west and set up its guns
on the right flank of the ridge in order to be in a position to fire
across the face of the ridge when the main assault began. Company E
of the 128th Infantry then passed through Company C and launched an
attack against the Japanese-held knolls on the southeastern end of
the ridge. Heavy and light machine gun fire from Company C protected
the flanks of Company E.
The company took the first knoll easily, but heavy fire from behind
a huge log on the second knoll halted Company E. Company A sent a
bazooka team forward to knock out the position and Company C sent all
of its grenades forward, but by 1320 the Japanese soldiers were still
resisting all attempts to dislodge them. The patrol from Company B
returned at 1345 with the report that it had been to the rear of its
objective and had seen no enemy activity. No unit made any further
progress that day. At 1720 General Gill ordered Colonel Clifford to
withdraw the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry. [757]
At 0925 on 2 December, Company E, 128th Infantry, attacked the knolls
at the south tip of Kilay Ridge, while Company F moved down the ridge
and swung to the right to attack the ridge to the south--the objective
of the two-battalion assault. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,
withdrew one unit, but at 1245 Colonel Clifford received orders to halt
all further withdrawals pending orders from the commanding officer,
128th Infantry. By then Company E had taken its objective but Company F
had encountered determined resistance fifty yards from the top of the
ridge. It doggedly advanced and by 1625 reached the crest and dug in,
though still receiving hostile mortar fire.
The next day examination of the battlefield where the two battalions
had been fighting revealed numerous enemy dead and the following
abandoned equipment: three 70-mm. mountain guns, four heavy machine
guns, seventeen light machine guns, one 90-mm. mortar, and many
rifles, pistols, sabers, and field glasses. Documents containing
valuable intelligence were also found. On 4 December the 1st
Battalion, 34th Infantry, started to withdraw. During the next two
days elements of the battalion moved through Consuegra and Calubian
to Pinamopoan. The battalion had lost 26 men killed, 2 missing, and
101 wounded, but it estimated that it had killed 900 men of the 1st
Infantry Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, had acquitted
itself well. It had prevented the Japanese from reinforcing the Limon
forces and imperiling the 32d Division. For its work the battalion
received the presidential unit citation.
Central Mountain Range
1st Cavalry Division
As elements of the X Corps were pushing south on Highway 2 through
Breakneck Ridge, other units from the corps were engaged in securing
the central mountain range that divided Leyte and Ormoc Valleys
in order to prevent any Japanese forces from debouching into Leyte
Valley. General Suzuki had ordered the 1st Division commander to place
the 57th Infantry in the Limon area while the 1st and 49th Infantry
Regiments were to go to the central mountain range. The two regiments
last mentioned were to prevent any American attempts to infiltrate into
Ormoc Valley and to exploit any favorable opportunity to break through
into Leyte Valley. About 8 November the 102d Division, including its
signal, artillery, and engineer units, arrived at Ormoc and General
Suzuki immediately sent them into the mountains of central Leyte. [758]
General Krueger had already anticipated this movement and had stationed
elements of the X and XXIV Corps at the principal entrances into
Leyte Valley. On 10 November General Mudge sent elements of the 1st
Cavalry Division to patrol the area extensively. [759]
The northern mountains between Ormoc and Leyte Valleys were high
and rugged, with precipitous sides. The area was heavily forested,
and there were many ground pockets which constituted natural, heavily
wooded fortresses for the Japanese. The very few trails in the sector
were scarcely better than pig trails. The area had not been properly
mapped and at all times the troops were seriously handicapped by
insufficient knowledge of the terrain. The nearly constant rainfall
bogged down supply and made the sides of the hills slippery and
treacherous. From 5 November through 2 December, elements of the 1st
Cavalry Division extensively patrolled the central mountain area and
had many encounters with small forces of the enemy. At all times the
supply situation was precarious.
The 1st Cavalry Division utilized motor transport, LVT's, tractors
and trailers, native carriers, and airdrops to get supplies to
forward troops. Motor transport hauled supplies from the warehouses
in Tacloban to Carigara, a distance of thirty miles. At this point
LVT's of the 826th Amphibian Tractor Battalion hauled the supplies,
through rice paddies churned into waist-deep morasses, to Sugud,
three miles south of Carigara. The supplies were manhandled from the
LVT's into one-ton two-wheeled cargo and ammunition trailers, which
were towed by the tractors of the artillery battalions that fired in
support of the division. The tractors wound their way laboriously
into the foothills through boulder-strewn streams and up steep
inclines that made it necessary for the tractors to be arranged in
tandem. There was always mud, which made traction difficult, and the
LVT's were better able than the tractors to navigate through slick,
soft mud which had little body texture.
The 12th Cavalry established high in the foothills, at the entrance to
the passes through the mountains, a supply base that was also a native
camp, a hospital, and a rest camp. About 300 Filipino carriers were
kept here under the protection of the guerrillas. The carriers had been
hired for six days at a time and were not allowed to leave without
a pass from their Filipino leader. This precaution was necessary,
since the ration-carrying assignment was extremely arduous.
Under armed escort, the long train of carriers, two men to each
fifty-pound load of rations, ammunition, and other types of supply,
began immediately to struggle forward from the supply camp over
narrow, slippery trails, across waist-deep rivers and streams, and
through heavy undergrowth. In the never-ending climb to gain altitude,
it took five hours to traverse a track that measured less than three
miles. At the base of a vertical descent of more than 500 feet, there
was a second supply base, the relay station. From this station it
was another day's forced march to the forward troops. An additional
300 Filipinos were stationed at the relay station in the mountain
wilderness, surrounded by elements of the enemy. These carriers made
the last half of the tortuous journey, while the others returned to
the base camp for resupply. It took four days to get supplies from
the warehouses to the front-line troops. [760]
The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, under General Cunningham, had
arrived at Leyte on 14 November. [761] At this time the 21st Infantry
was advancing very slowly along Breakneck Ridge, against strong
resistance, and the units of the 1st Cavalry Division were spread
thinly over the central mountain area. [762] In order to strengthen
the defense line, the 112th Cavalry was committed upon its arrival and
passed to the control of X Corps. [763] On 15 November General Sibert
attached the 112th Cavalry to the 1st Cavalry Division and ordered
it to operate in the Carigara area. [764] General Mudge directed the
112th Cavalry to assume, on 16 November, the responsibility for beach
defenses in the Capoocan-Carigara-Barugo area and to mop up in the
Mt. Minoro area about 3,000 yards south of Capoocan. [765]
The 112th Cavalry patrolled the Mt. Minoro area until 22 November. In
accord with General Krueger's desire to relieve some of the pressure
that was being exerted against the 32d Division in its drive south down
Highway 2, General Mudge on 23 November ordered the 112th Cavalry to
move southwest from Mt. Minoro toward the highway. The combat team
encountered sporadic resistance and on the morning of 30 November
reached a ridge about 2,500 yards east of Highway 2 and about 5,000
yards southeast of Limon. [766] A strongly entrenched enemy force on
the ridge resisted all attempts of the 112th Cavalry to dislodge it.
The ridge was covered with a dense rain forest, and the lower slopes
were thickly spotted with bamboo thickets and other extremely dense
vegetation. Clouds covered the tops of the peak and rain fell almost
continuously, churning the ground into ankle-deep mud. Visibility
was limited to only a few yards. The enemy defensive field works
consisted of foxholes, prone shelters, communication trenches,
and palm-log bunkers. These positions presented no logical avenue
of approach. They were complete perimeters and employed all-round
mutually supporting automatic weapons fire. Although the fields of
fire were limited, the weapons were so effectively placed that they
covered all approaches. [767]
The strong resistance made further progress impossible and the 112th
Cavalry established its perimeter. During the night the Japanese
subjected the 1st and 2d Squadrons, 112th Cavalry, to heavy artillery
fire and launched several patrol attacks against the perimeter of
the 2d Squadron. The night assaults were beaten off. [768]
The next two days were spent by the 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry,
in trying unsuccessfully to dislodge the Japanese from the
ridge. At 1310 on 2 December the 112th Cavalry received orders
to move north-northwest toward the Leyte River, from which point
they were to send out patrols to make contact with units of the 32d
Division. [769] At this time, however, the 112th Cavalry was still
opposed by a strong enemy force. Troop A nevertheless moved out to
make contact with the 32d Division and to reconnoiter to the west
for further enemy concentrations and for routes by which the 112th
Cavalry could advance to Highway 2.
On 3 December, after an artillery concentration, Troop G, 2d Squadron,
112th Cavalry, started out toward the enemy-held ridge. The slope
was so precipitous that the troops could not climb and shoot at the
same time. The Japanese were able to throw grenades upon Troop G
without exposing themselves, and the troop retired to the bottom of
the hill. An artillery concentration was called for and delivered
on the ridge, after which the troop again started up the hill. The
Japanese, however, quickly regained their former positions after
the artillery fire ceased and again repulsed Troop G with grenades
and small arms fire. The troop withdrew to its former position at
the bottom of the hill. For the remainder of the day, the artillery
placed harassing fire on the enemy strong point while patrols probed
to the south and west around the flanks of the Japanese position,
seeking better avenues of approach. [770]
Troop A journeyed without incident toward Highway 2, at 1415 on 3
December made contact with the left rear of the 126th Infantry west
of Hill 1525, and at the end of the day was moving southwest to make
contact with the leading elements of the 126th Infantry. No contact
had been made with the enemy and there was little sign of enemy
forces. The 1st Squadron received orders to proceed to the Leyte
River and locate a dropping ground. [771]
Henceforward, until 10 December, the 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry,
was stalemated by the strongly entrenched Japanese force. Each day
repeated attacks were made against the enemy position, but to no avail,
and patrols that probed the flanks of the enemy to discover a means
of enveloping the hostile force had no success. On 8 and 9 December
the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, attempted to locate and cut off the
supply line of the Japanese force that was holding up the advance of
the 2d Squadron. [772]
On 10 December the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, which had been in
the Barugo-Capoocan area, relieved the 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry,
which passed to the control of Sixth Army. In the meantime the 1st
Squadron, 112th Cavalry, less Troop A had moved west toward the Leyte
River. Troop A reached the left flank of the 126th Infantry. The
progress of the 1st Squadron was slow because of the hilly terrain,
but on the morning of 7 December it arrived at the Leyte River and
established physical contact with Troop A and the 126th Infantry. [773]
At the end of 10 December, the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, was on
the Leyte River.
The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, after relieving the 2d Squadron, 112th
Cavalry, sent out patrols to study the terrain and attempt to find
avenues of approach to the flanks and rear of the enemy strong point
which had long held up the 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry. An aerial
reconnaissance was made of the area. The aerial observer reported
that the Japanese position was "definitely as bad" as the 2d Squadron,
112th Cavalry, had reported it to be, and that the approach from the
rear was even worse than the one from the front. [774]
The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, spent 11 December in sending out
patrols on both sides of the enemy-held ridge. The Japanese let the
patrols through and then fired, wounding two of the men. The patrols
then returned. An artillery concentration was placed upon the enemy
position, and at 1245 the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, moved out behind
a barrage which lifted twenty-five yards at a time. One platoon
attacked frontally while the other platoons attempted to flank the
Japanese. The platoon on the right flank suffered three casualties and
was immediately pinned down. After the other platoons got to within
fifty yards of a Japanese machine gun position, they also were pinned
down. At 1600 they dug in for the night at the base of the hill.
During the engagement fifteen to twenty enemy bunkers were observed on
each side of the ridge and four machine guns were definitely spotted. A
night infiltration party armed with hand grenades, rifles, and knives
was sent to knock out these bunkers. It destroyed two machine guns
and killed four Japanese.
At 0730 on the morning of 13 December, the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry,
moved out and came under fire from two Japanese machine guns well
emplaced on a cliff. The ridge narrowed to ten feet with sixty-degree
slopes, making forward passage almost impossible. The troops were
pinned down. In the meantime, Troop F of the squadron worked south
in an attempt to envelop the rear of the enemy force but was unable
to do so and returned. The 2d Squadron established night perimeters
near the same positions it had held the previous night.
On the following morning the 75-mm. and 105-mm. artillery and the
4.2-inch and 60-mm. mortars began to register heavy fire on the
Japanese strong point. At 1200 Troop G of the 2d Squadron jumped off,
attacking the enemy position frontally while Troop F moved in from
the rear. Employing flame throwers, Troop G steadily pushed forward
and by 1445 had knocked out four enemy bunkers and destroyed several
machine guns. Of more importance, it was fifty yards beyond the
enemy front lines. Troop F also continued to advance. By the end of
the day the enemy force had been rooted off the high ground, and the
2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was in firm possession of the ridge. The
unit captured a quantity of enemy ordnance, including 12 light and 3
heavy machine guns, 9 grenade launchers, and 73 rifles, together with
considerable quantities of grenades and ammunition. Before the ridge
was secured, "over 5000 rounds of artillery fire had been placed on
[the] ... position without appreciably affecting it." [775]
The 96th Division
By the end of October the XXIV Corps, having secured the southern
part of Leyte Valley, the Dulag-Burauen-Dagami-Tanauan road net,
and all airfields in the area, was ready for the next phase of its
mission. General Hodge thereupon immediately initiated operations
whereby the XXIV Corps was to liberate southern Leyte concurrently with
the drive of the X Corps in the north. General Hodge's plan called
for the 96th Division to make a holding attack east of the mountains
while the 7th Division drove north from Baybay up the coast of Ormoc
Bay. [776] (See Map 2.) He therefore ordered the 96th Division to
defend the Tanauan-Dagami-Burauen-Dulag area and to relieve as rapidly
as possible all elements of the 7th Division in the area. Finally it
was to mop up all enemy forces in its zone and to furnish security for
all the principal roads and installations in the area. [777] General
Bradley on 2 November ordered Colonel Dill's 382d Infantry to relieve
the 17th Infantry of the 7th Division in the vicinity of Dagami, to
send strong reconnaissance and combat patrols into the hills to the
west and northwest, and to destroy all enemy forces encountered. [778]
General Suzuki was desirous of pushing through to Leyte Valley,
one of the best entrances to which was through the Dagami sector. At
the foot of the central mountain range, Dagami was the center of a
network of roads that led to all parts of Leyte Valley and to the
airfields. Since it was one of the key positions for control of
the valley, its recapture would be of great advantage to the 35th
Army. Just west of Dagami, the central mountain range served as a
natural fortification. The mountains consisted of a series of ridges
separated by deep gorges which were usually covered with a dense
tropical growth. At key points in the area, the 16th Division had
built coconut-log and concrete pillboxes.
There were substantial parts of the 9th, 20th, and 33d Infantry
Regiments of the 16th Division in the mountains west of Dagami. In
the latter part of October the 16th Division became short of food
and General Makino asked that it be supplied by air. The 4th Air Army
therefore attempted with six light bombers to supply the division, but
for some unexplained reason it failed. The 16th Division henceforward
was forced to supply itself and forage off the land. [779]
On 2 November the 382d Infantry started to relieve the 17th
Infantry. The 2d Battalion at 1500 relieved the 3d Battalion,
17th Infantry, just north of Dagami and at 1430, the 1st Battalion
relieved the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, about 1,000 yards west of
Dagami. [780]
Elements of the 16th Division were entrenched on "Bloody Ridge,"
a small promontory on the left side of the road west of Dagami just
short of Hitomnog in front of the 382d Infantry. A waist-deep swampy
rice paddy was between the ridge and the road. The 1st Battalion,
382d Infantry, after moving into this area engaged the enemy, but at
nightfall it broke off the fight and established its night perimeter.
At 0805, the 1st Battalion renewed the attack and met increased heavy
resistance as it advanced through the rice paddy. The companies came
under mortar and automatic weapons fire at 1445 as they came into
the open.
The Japanese took full advantage of the exposed troops and from
machine guns and mortars delivered heavy fire which immobilized
the 1st Battalion. The unit was unable to move in any direction
until nightfall, when, with the aid of some artillery smoke, the
troops began to withdraw. "Men threw away their packs, machine guns,
radios and even rifles. Their sole aim was to crawl back through the
muck and get on solid ground once more. Some of the wounded gave up
the struggle to keep their heads above the water and drowned in the
grasping swamp." [781] After every officer in Companies B and C had
been killed or wounded, 1st Sgt. Francis H. Thompson took charge and
organized the evacuation. He silenced an enemy machine gun and also
assisted in removal of the wounded. As a result of his leadership
both companies successfully withdrew and reorganized. [782]
At 1745 five enemy planes strafed the battalion. The advance units
of the 1st Battalion withdrew some 300 yards in order to consolidate
their defensive positions for the night. During the day Company E of
the 2d Battalion reached Patok, and Company G moved out at 2100 to
reinforce the 1st Battalion. [783]
During the night of 3-4 November the 16th Division launched a strong
counterattack of an estimated two-company strength against the
perimeter of the 1st Battalion. Mortar and artillery fires repulsed
the assault. There was no further enemy activity during the night. On
the morning of 4 November the 1st Battalion moved out against light
resistance, advancing about 800 yards and past the scene of the bitter
fighting of the previous day. Colonel Dill ordered the 2d Battalion
(minus Company E) and one platoon from Company G to move west from
Dagami and join the 1st Battalion. The 2d Battalion joined close behind
the 1st Battalion in a column. At 1430 the 1st Battalion encountered
increased enemy resistance and committed its reserve company on the
left flank. The 2d Battalion received orders from Colonel Dill to move
up to the left flank of the 1st, but the 2d arrived too late for the
two battalions to launch a co-ordinated assault before nightfall. They
therefore consolidated their positions for the night, having advanced
about 1,000 yards. [784]
The night of 4-5 November was not quiet. The Japanese delivered
harassing fire on the 1st Battalion, and at 2205 elements of the 16th
Division launched a heavy assault against the perimeter of the 2d
Battalion. An artillery concentration immediately stopped the attack,
and the Japanese fled, leaving 254 dead and wounded behind them.
The following morning, after the artillery had fired a preparation
in front of the 1st and 2d Battalions, the two battalions renewed the
attack at 0900 and two companies from the 3d Battalion protected the
regimental left (south) flank. The battalions advanced about 1,000
yards before they encountered any strong resistance. The defenses of
the 16th Division consisted of a great many concrete emplacements,
concealed spider holes, and connecting trenches. By nightfall,
at 1700, the two battalions, assisted by the tanks from Company A,
763d Tank Battalion, successfully reduced the enemy to their front
and captured the ridge. Each battalion formed its own perimeter and
made plans to renew the attack on 6 November. [785]
At 0830 the 1st Battalion, with light tanks in support, moved
out in the attack westward against a strong enemy force that was
well entrenched in foxholes and pillboxes. Each of these defensive
positions had to be reduced before the advance could continue. At 1300
the 2d Battalion moved to the high ground on the right flank of the
1st. The 1st Battalion encountered a strong concrete enemy pillbox
which was believed to be a command post, since there were no firing
apertures. As grenades had no effect it became necessary finally
to neutralize the pillbox by pouring gasoline down the ventilation
pipes and setting it afire. Two officers and nineteen enlisted men
of the enemy were killed in the pillbox. The Japanese continued to
fight tenaciously. There was no withdrawal, but by the end of the
day only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained. [786]
The Japanese 16th Division was taking a bad beating. Its supply of
provisions had run out. All the battalion commanders, most of the
company commanders, and half the artillery battalion and battery
commanders had been killed. On the night of 6 November the 16th
Division contracted its battle lines and on the following day took
up a new position in the Dagami area. The new position ranged from
a hill about four and a half miles northwest of Dagami to a point
about three and three-fourths miles northwest of Burauen. [787]
On 7 November all three battalions of the 382d Infantry engaged the
enemy and maintained constant pressure against his positions. The
1st and 3d Battalions advanced west, while the 2d Battalion drove
north and west. The 3d Battalion encountered the more determined
resistance. Advancing, preceded by tanks, it met heavy enemy machine
gun and rifle fire. A large enemy force assaulted the troops at
close quarters and tried to destroy the tanks, but when the 382d
Infantry introduced flame throwers and supporting machine guns, the
attackers fell back in disorder. The regiment overran the Japanese
defensive positions and killed an estimated 474 of the enemy. [788]
Company E of the 2d Battalion had remained in the Patok area, engaged
in patrolling and wiping out isolated pockets of enemy resistance.
On 8 November strong patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalions probed
west into the hills. They encountered the left flank of the enemy
supporting position at a point about 2,600 yards west of Patok. A very
heavy rainfall on the night of 8-9 November made an assault against
the position impossible on 9 November. After all-night artillery fire,
the 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 0900 on 10 November. They met
no resistance, but progress was slow because of the swamps. By 1225
the two battalions, supported by a platoon of light tanks, occupied
the ridge formerly held by elements of the 16th Division. The 1st
Battalion had advanced 2,500 yards. [789] The 382d Infantry had
destroyed all organized enemy resistance in its sector and removed
the threat to Dagami.
By this time General Krueger was devoting the main effort of the
Sixth Army toward preventing the 35th Army from debouching into Leyte
Valley. The 96th Division received orders from General Hodge to halt
the relief of the 7th Division and to move north to the Jaro-Palo road
and secure the mountain entrances in that sector. The 7th Division was
to relieve the 96th Division on the Dagami-Burauen road. A regiment
was also to be made available for immediate motor movement to the
north and another for a proposed operation on northern Mindanao. [790]
The 96th Division moved to the mountains northwest of Dagami and sent
extensive patrols into the central mountain range along a ten-mile
line that extended from Dagami to Jaro. Constant small contacts with
the enemy continued until the end of the campaign. The 7th Division
patrolled the Burauen area.
The Sixth Army had prevented the Japanese from debouching into Leyte
Valley. The X Corps had secured Limon, the entrance to Ormoc Valley,
and was in a position to drive south down the valley to the port of
Ormoc. Although General Krueger's troops had performed well, they
had made mistakes which gave their commander serious concern.