Measure of the Fighting
By the latter part of November, the fighting on the island had entered
a crucial stage. The additional troops received from General MacArthur
had enabled General Krueger to put into effect his squeeze play against
the Japanese. While the X Corps continued to apply unremitting pressure
on the 1st and 102d Divisions in the northern mountains of Ormoc Valley
near Limon, elements of the XXIV Corps would drive north against the
26th Division along the shores of Ormoc Bay toward Ormoc.
General MacArthur had full confidence in the ability of General
Krueger to carry out this plan and thus bring the Leyte Campaign to a
successful conclusion. Once having given the Sixth Army commander the
assignment for the operation, General MacArthur did not interfere with
General Krueger's prosecution of the battle. But from his headquarters
on Leyte, he closely followed the progress of the campaign, frequently
visited the command posts of the Sixth Army units, and made available
to General Krueger additional troops upon request.
Similarly, General Krueger allowed his corps commanders to exercise
their independence of judgment and kept his orders to the minimum. He,
too, made frequent visits to the front lines, observed the progress of
the fighting, inspected the living conditions of the men, and noted
the status of the construction program. General Krueger's concern is
made evident by a critique issued on 25 November in which he analyzed
the performance of the Sixth Army on Leyte. [791]
The Americans had had time to test their experience on Leyte against
past operations, as well as to determine the good and bad features of
their training and tactics and the performance of their weapons and
to contrast them with those employed by the Japanese. An evaluation
of American methods at this point serves to explain in concrete terms
the nature of the fighting that had occurred and of that which would
occur in the critical days ahead.
The American Ground Forces
Tactics
Following the customary procedure, the divisions went ashore with
two regiments abreast. Within the regiments there were variations,
some going ashore with the battalions abreast and others with the
battalions in column. The size of the landing beach and the nature
of the expected opposition determined the type of landing formation
that was employed. Once ashore, the nature of the tactical situation
resulted in numerous independent actions by subordinate units. The
formation most frequently used was the normal one of two units in
the assault and one in reserve.
Frontal assaults were usually employed against enemy positions, and
not enough use was made of envelopments. When envelopments were tried
they were nearly always successful. It was sometimes advantageous to
bypass isolated enemy strong points, leaving them to be mopped up by
the follow-up units.
Although the primary mission of the infantry is to close with
the enemy and destroy or capture him, the natural reluctance of
American infantrymen to engage the enemy in close quarters had to be
overcome. There were several instances in which the American attacking
force felt out the Japanese position and then sat back to wait it
out. In one area no progress was made for four days. On several
occasions strong combat patrols of platoon or company strength were
sent to feel out enemy positions, but as soon as they made contact with
the Japanese the patrols withdrew. They accomplished nothing except
to determine the presence of an unknown number of enemy soldiers.
If more than minor resistance was encountered, the troops frequently
fell back and called for fire from supporting weapons. On one occasion
a company called for artillery fire upon a roadblock and then withdrew
350 yards while the concentration was delivered. After the lifting of
the artillery fire, it was very difficult to reorganize the company
and get it back to the objective. Meanwhile the Japanese had again
covered the roadblock and the whole process had to be repeated.
The American soldiers were too road-bound. Sometimes resistance
along the road stopped the advance of an entire division. This
opposition could have been eliminated quickly by the employment of
simple envelopments and flanking attacks. Although the presence of
swamps, jungle, and rice paddies tended to channelize the attack,
the Japanese had displayed superior adeptness, and willingness to go
into the swamps and stay there until rooted out.
The standard employment of artillery in close support of the infantry
again proved to be very effective and was used extensively. However,
since the artillery fire enabled the infantry to secure many heavily
fortified positions with few casualties, the infantrymen tended to
become too dependent upon the artillerymen and expected them to do
the work of the infantry. General Krueger insisted that the infantry
must be prepared to close in immediately after the cessation of the
artillery fire.
The Americans had developed a strong tendency to telegraph their
punches. In the morning, before an assault by the infantry, the
artillery pounded the Japanese positions, after which the mortars
opened up. The mortar fire nearly always lasted for a half hour, and
then the infantry moved out. Upon occasion, the infantry did not attack
immediately after the preparation by the supporting weapons. This
delay gave the Japanese time and opportunity to regroup and consolidate
their forces, and thus nullified the effects of the preparatory fires.
Parenthetically, it may be remarked that although the actual
casualties per artillery shell were few, the cumulative effect of
the heavy and prolonged fire of the artillery and mortars was very
great. Col. Junkichi Okabayashi, chief of staff of the Japanese
1st Division, estimated that the losses sustained by the division
were distributed as follows: by artillery, 60 percent; by mortars,
25 percent; by infantry fire, 14 percent; and by aircraft, 1
percent. [792]
The employment of tanks singly, or in small groups, materially
aided the infantrymen, since the tanks could be used effectively to
reduce enemy pillboxes and to flush out bamboo thickets. Although
light tanks were more mobile it was found that the mediums were more
efficient in reducing pillboxes. For successful employment, it was
necessary that the tanks have close infantry and engineer support. In
some instances the tanks secured objectives when no infantrymen were
present to consolidate and hold the positions. For example, a regiment
supported by a tank battalion received orders to attack and secure an
objective. The tanks quickly moved out and secured the objective with
little resistance. Since the infantrymen did not arrive during the
day, the tanks withdrew at nightfall. During the night the Japanese
mined the area and four of the tanks were lost when they returned
next morning.
Likewise, tanks were often disabled because the engineers had failed
to remove mines and give support in the crossing of streams. In one
case, the engineers failed to repair a bridge, which collapsed after
three tanks had crossed over it. The Japanese completely destroyed
one of the tanks and disabled the other two. It was necessary for
the Americans to destroy the disabled tanks with their own gunfire
in order to prevent their use as stationary pillboxes by the enemy.
It was found advantageous to establish a night perimeter before
dusk. An early establishment of the perimeter enabled the troops
to take effective countermeasures against Japanese infiltrations
and night assaults. [793] The soldiers also had an opportunity to
become familiar with their surroundings and were less likely to fire
indiscriminately during the night. In spite of this precaution,
there was considerable promiscuous firing during the night and at
dawn. One corps commander effectively stopped this practice in his
command post area by the adoption of two simple measures. First,
he employed a reserve battalion to cover an area extending outward
for one mile and when no Japanese were found the fact was announced
over the loudspeaker. Second, any man caught firing before dawn was
immediately court-martialed and fined fifty dollars. "There was very
little promiscuous firing thereafter." [794]
Although there were three war-dog platoons available for the Leyte
operation, their combat value was practically nil. The unit commanders
to whom they were attached knew little of their capabilities or
limitations. Some expected the dogs to spot a Japanese position
exactly at a distance of 200 or more yards. One unit took the dogs
on a four-day patrol without sufficient dog rations. Another unit
attempted to use dogs in a populated area; the presence of so many
civilians thoroughly confused the dogs.
In general, the troops found that their training had been sound and
that the methods which in the past had been employed in overcoming the
Japanese were also useful on Leyte. It was felt, however, that greater
emphasis in training should be placed on night patrols and night
movements near the enemy lines, as well as on closer co-ordination
between the infantry and the supporting weapons. Finally, it was
believed that the service troops should be given training in basic
infantry tactics and prepared to maintain their own defenses. [795]
All units were in agreement that there could be "no substitute for
aggressive leadership." [796] An infantry unit could be no better
than its leaders. General Krueger said in this connection:
Infantry is the arm of close combat. It is the arm of final
combat. The Jap is usually most tenacious particularly when in
entrenched and concealed positions. Individual enemy soldiers will
remain in their holes until eliminated. Although the supporting
arms are of great assistance, it ultimately becomes the task of
the small infantry units to dig them out. The American soldier
has demonstrated on many battlefields that he can and will do it,
but he must be aggressively led. There can be no hesitating on
the part of his leaders. [797]
Welfare of the Men
At the same time, in order to obtain the best results from the troops,
the unit commanders must concern themselves with the well-being
and comfort of their men. Many commanders were indifferent to such
matters. One corps, for example, had sufficient rations of all
types available, but the meals served the men were poorly prepared
and monotonous. Another corps, at the time it landed, was prepared
to live indefinitely on field rations. As late as ten days after the
landing, no unit--not even any of the fixed installations, including
higher headquarters--operated a mess or served hot meals. Some units
did serve hot coffee after the first few days.
Although there was considerable rain and mud, few units made a genuine
effort to get their men under shelter even when the tactical situation
permitted. Night after night, officers and men slept in wet foxholes
even when no enemy troops were within shooting distance. "It must never
be forgotten," said General Krueger, "that the individual soldier
is the most important single factor in this war.... He is expected
to do a lot including risking his life. But to get the most out of
him he must have the feeling that everything possible under existing
circumstances is being done for his well being and comfort. This is
a prime responsibility of command...." [798]
Weapons and Vehicles
The basic weapons--the U.S. .30-caliber rifle Model 1903, the
U.S. .30-caliber rifle M1, the BAR, bayonets, and grenades--with which
the rifle squads and the individual soldiers of the heavy weapons
company were equipped were generally satisfactory and notably superior
to comparable weapons of the Japanese.
The troops used a variety of hand grenades. The white smoke grenade
was considered to be defective and was frequently discarded. The white
phosphorus grenade was extensively used, mainly as an antipersonnel
weapon. It was thrown with telling effect into foxholes, caves,
and heavy underbrush. An Australian grenade was introduced, but
because the troops were unfamiliar with its use, it was not too
successful. Incendiary hand grenades were effectively used against
enemy weapons, ammunition dumps, and supplies. Colored grenades were
employed to mark strips for the air dropping of supplies. [799] The
fragmentation grenade was most favored by the troops, and after that
the phosphorus grenade. [800]
The Browning automatic rifle was very popular, the best results being
obtained when two were allotted to a squad. The increased fire power
thus obtained was very effective in night defense.
The 81-mm. mortar continued to be highly esteemed as a close support
infantry weapon. The 4.2-inch chemical mortars of the attached chemical
mortar battalions were extensively employed, affording excellent
results when emplaced on firm ground. On marshy or swampy ground,
however, their base plates would sink and cause inaccurate firing
or put the weapons out of commission. The most popular mortar was
the 60-mm., which was very mobile and especially suitable for use in
close terrain. This mortar fired an illuminating shell which was used
constantly for night defense, but its base plate also tended to sink
into the ground.
Flame throwers were employed with very good effect in reducing strongly
fortified positions. The M2-2 flame thrower was an excellent incendiary
weapon against bamboo thickets and shacks. The cartridge type was
considered to be more satisfactory, since the spark-ignited flame
thrower was not dependable in rainy weather. The flame thrower was
considered "a very important factor in overcoming the enemy's inherent
'will to resist.'" [801]
The .50-caliber machine gun again proved its value in defense,
being highly effective not only against ground targets but also
against aircraft. The 96th Division found the Thompson submachine gun
excellent for use by patrolling units but "some difficulty ... has
been encountered with the M3 machine gun in its failure to feed
properly." [802]
The 7th Division found the 75-mm. self-propelled howitzer, because of
its superior mobility, to be the most effective infantry weapon for
reduction of Japanese pillboxes. The 105-mm. howitzers of the field
artillery battalions again proved their worth by the speed, accuracy,
and effectiveness of their fire. The greater striking range of the
155-mm. howitzer had special value for general support missions.
Demolition charges were used effectively by patrols for the destruction
of enemy ammunition dumps in inaccessible locations and not salvageable
because of the tactical situation. Except for this purpose, demolitions
were not extensively used. [803]
The 37-mm. gun was an antitank weapon only occasionally employed by the
7th Division because there were few Japanese armored vehicles against
which to use it. The excessive difficulty of manhandling it into a
position from which fire could be delivered against Japanese pillboxes
and machine guns rendered it ineffective for that purpose. The
90-mm. guns of the antiaircraft artillery had a considerable number
of erratic bursts because of corroded fuzes and worn fuze setting lugs.
The tanks and tank destroyers could have been used more frequently
and with greater versatility. Situations often arose in which an
infantry platoon was held up by enemy machine gun and mortar fire,
but "the use of indirect artillery fire was impracticable either
because of overhead cover for the enemy weapons or because of undue
risk to our enveloping infantry." General Krueger recommended that the
infantry employ direct fire by the tanks or tank destroyers. He felt
that "the tank destroyer commanders lacked aggressiveness and skilled
direction." [804] The tank destroyer commanders admitted that they were
idle but added that the infantry had not called for them. The tanks and
tank destroyers were ideal weapons for the destruction of machine guns,
mortars, and other heavy infantry weapons, but the infantry commanders
seemed to be unaware of their capabilities. Many commanders employed
their armored vehicles down the middle of the road when they could
have used them more effectively on the flanks and for envelopments.
The 96th Division found the Cannon Company's self-propelled
105-mm. howitzer extremely mobile in swamps and mountainous
terrain. It was able to go several miles farther up the mountains
than any other vehicle and gave excellent support in covering the
mountain passes. [805]
The cargo carrier M29 (weasel) proved to be a most useful supply
vehicle. The commanders used it for reconnaissance and visits to
units in isolated areas and over roads that were impassable to
wheeled vehicles. It also was employed to carry supplies and to
evacuate the wounded from inaccessible areas. The weasel was much
less destructive of roads than any of the other tracked vehicles,
but the tendency to use it on dry roads resulted in worn-out tracks
and excessive maintenance requirements.
The 96th Division found the DUKW to be an excellent vehicle when
waterborne but on land, regardless of the condition of the roads and
terrain, it was not half as effective as the 2 1/2-ton cargo truck. On
roads the DUKW was a traffic hazard and an obstacle to other cargo
traffic. [806]
The 7th Division landed with seventeen one-ton trailers. They were
found to be of little value and the division recommended that they
should not be used in any future operation unless a hard-surfaced,
all-weather road net existed at the anticipated target. [807]
Intelligence
General Krueger pointed out that prompt, aggressive reconnaissance
should have been instituted immediately upon the landing of the
troops. The fact that knowledge of the terrain was very limited
before the assault--inaccuracies in the distances on existing maps
were as high as 50 percent--gave urgency to the need for immediate
reconnaissance.
The sources of information on the Japanese were as follows:
ground and aerial reconnaissance, Filipino civilians, guerrillas,
captured documents, and prisoners. Air observation was of limited
value because of the Japanese ability at camouflage and because the
inclement weather prevented aerial observation of many areas. The
tendency of the Filipinos to say "yes" to everything was also a
handicap. In general, the guerrilla reports were more accurate than
those of civilians. Considerable information was obtained from patrols,
which were especially valuable for on-the-spot intelligence.
In interrogating prisoners the best results were obtained by
employing Nisei, who obtained more information from prisoners when
the latter were not subjected to questioning by an officer through
an interpreter. Since most of the prisoners had been separated from
their units for a considerable time and were seriously wounded,
their information was sparse and generally out of date.
Captured documents were the most fruitful source of
intelligence. Although the Japanese made a few attempts to destroy
dog tags and other means of identification before going into battle,
they were not too successful. The fact that General Krueger obtained
information on the proposed ground offensive of the Japanese for
the middle of November from papers found on the body of a Japanese
officer was not an isolated incident. Many officers carried on their
persons sets of orders and maps.
The Japanese received much of their information on the American order
of battle from broadcasts emanating from San Francisco. At first,
the Japanese on the island were unable to find out the American order
of battle for Leyte but within a few days the Americans gratuitously
furnished them the information. Said General Tomochika:
At the time of the landing, 35th Army Headquarters did not know
the number or name of the American units which had landed ... but
within a day headquarters learned.... We found out ... by tuning
in on the San Francisco broadcasts; Japanese troops in the combat
area were unable to determine their identity. From the same
source, we later obtained information which was of considerable
help in planning. In fact, that was the only way we could get
information.... Information was always received through the San
Francisco broadcast before reports from our front line units
reached headquarters.... Since the information came much sooner
from the American broadcast than from the Japanese communications,
the Army Headquarters depended on the American broadcasts for
much intelligence. [808]
Japanese Warfare
The 24th Division found the Japanese troops on Leyte to be better
trained in combat and more skillful than those the division had
encountered during the Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay operation. [809] In
general the Japanese fought a delaying action, and when forced to yield
ground they would fall back to previously prepared positions. During
a bombardment by American heavy weapons, the enemy troops would
withdraw but when the fire lifted they would quickly reoccupy the
vacated positions. [810]
The 21st Infantry was impressed with the Japanese "excellence in
battle" on Breakneck Ridge. There were few instances of "reckless
charges, needless sacrifices or failure to observe known tactical
principles." The most notable characteristics exhibited were
the excellent fire discipline and the effective control of all
arms. Without exception individual soldiers withheld their fire until
it would have the greatest possible effect. The heaviest firing would
generally start about 1530 and increase in intensity until about dark,
the fire being accompanied by counterattacks from the front and on
the flanks. These assaults usually came when the Americans' energy
and ammunition were at their lowest point during the day and when
they would prevent proper consolidation of the front lines before
dark. [811]
The Japanese employed reverse slope defense tactics with much
skill and were successful in utilizing terrain for their defensive
positions. Caves and other natural formations were exploited to the
limit and positions were dug in deeply and expertly camouflaged. The
Japanese frequently sacrificed fields of fire for cover and
concealment, a fact which made it very difficult for the Americans
to locate hostile positions.
Captured documents indicated that the Japanese attacks were generally
well conceived but that there were not enough troops at the time of
the assault. The documents also gave repeated indications that units
either did not receive their orders or did not reach the appointed
place on time. The Japanese employed two main types of attack. The
first, which was similar to that employed by the Americans, utilized
a base of fire from supporting weapons, followed by infantry fire and
movement. This type of attack was not usually accompanied by artillery
or mortar support. The other method consisted of a localized charge
in which the Japanese by sheer force of numbers tried to crack the
American lines. The heavy weapons fire of the Americans was nearly
always able to break up both types of attack. Enemy forces, generally
in small numbers, tried repeatedly to infiltrate through the American
lines. The objectives were artillery pieces, supply dumps, and key
installations. Rarely did they accomplish even minor damage.
Artillery weapons were seldom used by the Japanese to maximum
effect. The gunnery techniques were "remarkably undeveloped"
and inefficient, the pieces being used singly or in pairs and only
rarely as batteries. Their fire was never massed. The gun positions
generally were well constructed but they were frequently selected
with such high regard for concealment that the fields of fire were
limited. The use of mines and demolition charges was poor, the mine
fields being hastily and obviously laid.
The troops were well trained and led by officers imbued with a sense
of duty. Consequently, "as long as any officers remain alive, the
remnants of a ... force are capable of determined action." [812]
The Japanese view of American methods was summed up by General
Tomochika as follows: "The strong points of the American strategy
in the Leyte Operation were numerous but the two outstanding points
were (1) the overwhelming striking power of the American Army, and
(2) the American operations were planned in minute detail and on the
whole were carried out scrupulously." [813]