The Mountain Barrier: Part One
The successful completion of the campaign for the entire Leyte Valley
on 2 November enabled General Krueger to embark on the next phase of
his plan for the liberation of Leyte.
This action was to consist of two drives converging on Ormoc: one
south through Ormoc Valley by X Corps and the other north from Baybay
by XXIV Corps. The remaining Japanese on the island would thus be
forced into the mountains west of Ormoc Valley where they could not
offer effective organized resistance. At first, while some elements
of the XXIV Corps continued to push west to reinforce the troops on
the shores of Ormoc Bay and mopped up in southern Leyte Valley, the X
Corps was to secure control of the coast of Carigara Bay from Carigara
to Pinamopoan. With the completion of this assignment, the northern
elements of the Sixth Army would be in a position to drive south along
Highway 2 which twisted and turned through the northern mountains
and central plains of Ormoc Valley to the port of Ormoc. [640] (Map 13)
General Sibert ordered elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to occupy
Carigara while the 24th Division secured the coastal corridor that
ran from Carigara to Pinamopoan and then drove south along Highway
2 and occupied Ormoc. A battalion from the 24th Division was to move
to the Jaro area and protect the 155-mm. howitzers of the 947th Field
Artillery Battalion which was to assist the advance south by covering
a trail that ran from Jaro to Ormoc. [641]
Since the 21st Infantry had encountered virtually no opposition in
the vicinity of Panaon Strait and since it was desirable that the
regiment rejoin the 24th Division, General Krueger on 30 October had
directed General Hodge to relieve the 21st Infantry with one battalion
of the 32d Infantry. [642] General Irving ordered the 34th Infantry to
continue its attack and secure Capoocan. When the town was captured
the 19th Infantry was to move into it on 4 November while the 34th
Infantry continued the drive west and secured Pinamopoan. [643]
The Coastal Corridor
Capoocan and Pinamopoan
At 0700 on 3 November the 34th Infantry moved west from its perimeter
at Balaud in a column of battalions, with the 1st Battalion, under
Colonel Clifford, in the lead. The 1st Battalion entered Capoocan at
0755 and within ten minutes had secured the town. [644]
At 0830 the battalion moved out and continued west along the coastal
road to Pinamopoan. After an advance of about 1,000 yards, Company B,
the point, encountered an enemy force, estimated at about 100 men,
entrenched on the west bank of a stream. The column halted and placed
mortar fire on the Japanese but failed to dislodge them. The company
then withdrew while the howitzers of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion
pounded the enemy position.
In the meantime a platoon of Company B moved south to secure a ridge
which paralleled the road. When the platoon located some Japanese
dug in on the reverse slope Colonel Clifford sent Company A to its
assistance. The guides took Company A over the wrong trail and the
troops ran into the strong enemy entrenchments well concealed by
underbrush on the western bank of the stream. Company A launched
a frontal assault, but after the first platoon had passed the
hidden positions the Japanese opened fire and forced the company
to withdraw. Colonel Clifford rushed Company C to the assistance of
Company A, ordering it to deploy around the left flank of Company A
and onto the next ridge. The platoon from Company B returned to its
morning position.
Companies A and C then started against the Japanese emplacements on the
opposite bank of the stream. [645] The leader of the advance squad of
Company A was killed and Sgt. Charles E. Mower assumed command. As he
started to lead his men across the stream, Sergeant Mower was severely
wounded. From his exposed position in the middle of the stream he
directed his squad in the destruction of two enemy machine guns and
numerous riflemen, but he was killed when the Japanese turned their
fire against him. Sergeant Mower was posthumously awarded the Medal
of Honor.
At 1530 Colonel Clifford withdrew Company A. After the 63d Field
Artillery Battalion had blasted the ridge parallel to the road,
Company B attacked, while Company C made its envelopment around the
south flank and destroyed the Japanese pocket of resistance. At 1800
the 1st Battalion formed its night perimeter. [646]
Earlier, at 1430, Company K had made a reconnaissance in amphibian
tractors from Capoocan to a point just west of Pinamopoan. Since it
encountered heavy enemy fire, the company withdrew and returned to
Capoocan. [647]
During the night the 11th and 63d Field Artillery Battalions massed
their fires and laid interdiction fire up and down the highway. Under
cover of darkness, the Japanese force opposing the 1st Battalion
withdrew. On the following morning patrols sent out by the 1st
Battalion scouted 1,000 yards to the front but encountered no
enemy. The battalion therefore moved out at 0730 to Colasian where
it set up a defensive position. The 2d and 3d Battalions then passed
through the 1st. The 2d Battalion entered Pinamopoan and dug in, while
the 3d passed through the town and continued west along the highway
1,700 yards. There it set up a defensive position just short of a ridge
of hills that was later to be known as Breakneck Ridge. [648] Between
Capoocan and Pinamopoan the Japanese had abandoned three 75-mm.,
one 40-mm., and five 37-mm. guns, together with ammunition dumps,
signal equipment, and many documents. The 34th Infantry found some land
mines on the road and destroyed them. Since the regiment had quickly
secured the coastal corridor and had started to move down Highway 2,
the X Corps was now in a position from which it could drive south.
Defense of the Coastal Corridor
Some elements of the 26th Division had arrived on Leyte during the
naval battle, and on 1 November most of the 1st Division and the
12th Independent Infantry Regiment of the 26th Division landed
at Ormoc. The 1st Division, which had been activated in Tokyo,
had served in Manchuria during the "China Incident" and had been
transferred to Shanghai in August 1944. Though it had no combat
experience, this division was considered by General Tomochika to be
the best equipped division of the Japanese Army. Under the command
of Lt. Gen. Tadasu Kataoka, it had been held in reserve by Imperial
General Headquarters for the decisive battle, and it was sent to
Manila with great expectations. [649]
The arrival of these troops was in accord with a plan devised after the
Battle of Leyte Gulf. The 102d Division, coming from Panay, and the 1st
and 26th Divisions, sailing from Luzon, were to land at Ormoc. General
Suzuki planned to have these troops move north along the Ormoc-Limon
road (Highway 2) through Ormoc Valley, from which they were to diverge
in three columns and capture the Carigara-Jaro road. After seizing
the road, the Japanese troops were to advance east and destroy the
American forces in the area between Tacloban and Tanauan. After the
1st Division had secured Carigara, the 68th Brigade was to land in the
north as 35th Army reserve. At the same time the 30th Division was
to land at Albuera on Ormoc Bay and advance over mountainous trails
to Burauen and later neutralize all resistance in the Dulag area. [650]
When General Suzuki received information that the Americans had secured
Carigara, he realized that it would be impossible to drive toward
San Pedro Bay with the Americans on his left flank. He believed,
however, that the reinforced 1st Division could easily wipe out the
American forces in the Carigara area. On 3 November he ordered the
1st Division to speed up its passage through Ormoc Valley and the 102d
Division to consolidate its forces with those of the 1st Division for
an all-out attack to annihilate the American troops near Carigara. The
26th Division was to advance on Jaro. [651] No alternative to this
plan had been prepared in case the projected operations were not
successful. [652] On 3 November, American aircraft struck at the
1st Division as it moved up Ormoc Valley in a ten-mile-long convoy
of trucks, tanks, and artillery. They destroyed about thirty trucks
and left two tanks burning. The aircraft received heavy and accurate
ground antiaircraft fire, and two of the planes were shot down by
the Japanese. [653]
The lack of defense at Carigara had come as a surprise to General
Krueger, since the Americans had observed the Japanese reinforcing
the area. General Suzuki had cleverly concealed from the Americans his
strength and intentions and thus had gained time for a withdrawal by a
"very successful" delaying action. [654] At the same time, the 57th
Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division had been able to move north
through Ormoc Valley and establish itself in the northern mountains
surrounding Highway 2.
The bringing in of reinforcements by the Japanese brought into sharp
focus the lack of American aerial strength on Leyte. Although the Fifth
Air Force had numerous aircraft in the rear areas, these could not be
brought forward because of the very poor condition of the available
airstrips. The few aircraft based on Leyte could not prevent the flow
of additional enemy forces into the island or give direct support to
the ground troops of Sixth Army.
Since the Japanese had been able to send without difficulty about
13,500 troops into the Ormoc area, General Krueger recognized that
they were capable also of landing troops on the shores of Carigara
Bay. This landing, if successful, would isolate the American forces
in the Carigara area. To meet this threat, several courses of action
were open to General Krueger: he could devote the full energy of the
X Corps to preparing a defense against a sea force attack; he could
disregard the threat and have the X Corps push vigorously south and
secure a position on ground south of Limon, which was about two and a
half miles southwest of Pinamopoan, before the Japanese could build
defensive positions; or, finally, he could advance south with some
elements, leaving others to guard the Carigara area.
If the Japanese Navy and amphibious assault forces entered Carigara
Bay, the possibilities for effective countermeasures were not very
promising. The escort carriers of the Seventh Fleet, greatly weakened
by the Battle of Leyte Gulf, could not give support, and it was quite
possible that any assistance that could be furnished by the Third
Fleet might not arrive in time.
Ranking officers of the Seventh Fleet, however, did not believe it
likely that the Japanese would launch an amphibious assault through
Carigara Bay. The reasons given were as follows: The Japanese had
never made an assault landing against defended beaches in the past;
they were short of equipment to make a sustained amphibious assault;
and they would be landing in the face of the combined fire of the X
Corps artillery which would cover the beachhead area from positions
well behind the beaches. [655]
Although General Krueger realized that the high ground in the
Limon area was the key to operations farther south, he decided that
the threat to the Carigara area could not be ignored. Since he had
insufficient forces to drive south and at the same time to prepare the
Carigara area for defense, on 4 November he directed General Sibert to
protect the Carigara area from a seaborne attack before the advance
to the south was continued. At the same time the X Corps was to send
out units to explore for trails that led from Daro, about three miles
southwest of Jaro, to Ormoc with the view of emplacing an artillery
battalion of 155-mm. guns within effective firing range of Ormoc. [656]
General Sibert immediately told General Irving to defer until
further orders the advance south by the 24th Division. At the
same time he directed Generals Irving and Mudge to have their
divisions prepare defenses to ward off a seaborne attack against the
Barugo-Carigara-Capoocan area. Patrols of the 24th Infantry Division
and the 1st Cavalry Division were to maintain contact at the Carigara
River. [657]
General Mudge thereupon ordered the 1st Cavalry Brigade to patrol the
Carigara-Jaro road and to protect the movement of supplies and troops
along the road. The 2d Cavalry Brigade was to establish two squadrons
in the Carigara-Barugo area to protect the seaward approaches to the
area, guard the bridge between Barugo and Carigara, and maintain the
security of San Juanico Strait. The brigade was to be prepared to
reinforce the 24th Division. [658]
General Irving, also, redisposed his forces. All the field artillery
battalions had been at Carigara but, with the issuance of the order to
protect the coast of Carigara Bay, the 13th and 52d Field Artillery
Battalions moved to Colasion Point on 4 November, while the 63d and
11th took positions east and west of Capoocan. [659]
On 5 November General Sibert returned the 21st Infantry to the 24th
Division and recommended that General Irving send the regiment to
Pinamopoan to relieve the battle-weary 34th Infantry. [660] By the
end of the day the 1st and 3d Battalions, 21st Infantry, had relieved
the 34th Infantry and were on the edge of Breakneck Ridge west of
Pinamopoan. [661]
The American aircraft made two strikes at the convoy of the 1st
Division as it moved north up Highway 2. The first one at about 1430
destroyed about thirty trucks, several tanks, and an ammunition dump
and killed fifty to seventy-five men and thirty to forty horses. The
second strike at about 1745 hit trucks loaded with Japanese soldiers
who scattered when attacked. All the vehicles were camouflaged with
palm leaves. [662]
By 6 November, since the X Corps had disposed its force to protect
the seaward approaches and since the Navy had given assurance that an
amphibious assault was unlikely, General Krueger felt that the attack
south could be continued. He was anxious to have the Sixth Army drive
rapidly down Highway 2 and secure the port of Ormoc, through which the
Japanese had reinforced the Leyte garrison. He also wished to guard
against the possibility that the Japanese, as more and more of their
troops moved up Ormoc Valley, would attempt to debouch into northern
Leyte Valley. He therefore directed General Sibert to expend his main
effort in the drive south but also to send elements of his force
into the mountains east of Ormoc Valley. These units were to seize
the mountain passes and secure positions in the Daro area from which
the artillery could deliver long-range fire upon Ormoc in support of
the advance south. At the same time, elements of the XXIV Corps were
to guard the mountain passages into southern Leyte Valley. [663]
Battle of Breakneck Ridge
The Battle Begins
On 5 November General Sibert instructed the 24th Division to complete
the relief of the 34th Infantry and at the same time to push strong,
aggressive patrols to the south. The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry,
was to protect a battalion of 155-mm. guns, which was to deliver
long-range fire on Ormoc, about fourteen miles to the southwest. The
attack south was to begin on 7 November. [664]
Accordingly, General Irving ordered the 21st Infantry, after
the completion of its relief of the 34th Infantry, to reconnoiter
Breakneck Ridge to its front on 6 November and on the following day
to launch its drive south. A battalion of the 19th Infantry was to
move to Pinamopoan and protect the line of communications of the 21st
Infantry as the attack progressed. The rest of the 19th Infantry was
to move to the mountains in the vicinity of Daro and Jaro to protect
the 226th Field Artillery Battalion and secure the mountain passes
that led into Leyte Valley. [665]
The 21st Infantry relieved the 34th Infantry in the vicinity of
Pinamopoan without difficulty and sent out strong patrols to Breakneck
Ridge. One of these patrols was led by Lt. Col. Frederick R. Weber,
the regimental commander.
Breakneck Ridge, over which Highway 2 corkscrewed its way between
Pinamopoan and Limon for about 7,200 yards, was actually a hill mass
with many spurs branching off from an irregularly shaped crest line
toward the shores of Carigara Bay to the north and the Leyte River
valley to the south. Shoulder-high cogon grass was thick on the low
ground, and the pockets between the hills were heavily forested. The
valleys were deep, with precipitous sides. The 1st Division had heavily
fortified the area, taking advantage of the innumerable thickly wooded
pockets that served as natural forts. The Japanese had also built an
elaborate system of trenches and other defensive positions and had
honeycombed the area with spider holes. Many of the latter were on
reverse slopes some distance below the crests and were protected from
direct fire. In front of each spider hole the enemy had cut fire lanes
through the cogon grass, which was left so short that even a crawling
soldier would be exposed to fire. The constant rainfall made the hills
slippery and treacherous, and, more important, provided a protective
curtain in the day and covered movements of the enemy at night. [666]
On 5 November, before the relief of the 34th Infantry, Maj. Kemuel
K. Blacker, leading an artillery forward observer's party from the 52d
Field Artillery Battalion and a patrol from the 34th Infantry, had
reconnoitered far forward on Breakneck Ridge to the top of a knoll,
later called OP Hill, which was some 2,500 yards west of Pinamopoan,
and was directing fire from that point. [667] The party was attacked
by a group of about platoon strength from the 57th Infantry Regiment
and took refuge in an abandoned position. At 1230 Colonel Weber
ordered the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, to move out to the party's
assistance. Company K, on the right side of the highway, was able to
secure the northern approaches to the hill and rescue the observation
party, though it ran into heavy machine gun and rifle fire. In the
meantime Company I moved to the left and against stiff resistance
secured a ridge later known as Corkscrew Ridge, which was about 1,200
yards southeast of OP Hill and which formed the southeastern spur of
Breakneck Ridge. Since both companies needed more ammunition, vehicles
with the required supply were sent up along the road. After hidden
Japanese riflemen had punctured the tires, the vehicles withdrew and
the ammunition was carried up by hand. A platoon of riflemen from
Company I cleared out the enemy position but received mortar fire
from an unknown source. [668]
Both companies were so far in advance of the rest of the 21st
Infantry that only limited supplies of ammunition and rations could
reach them. As the afternoon hours wore on, the pressure from the
57th Infantry increased but the companies dug in and held their
positions. During the night they repulsed three counterattacks of about
fifty men each. [669] On the following morning the 57th Infantry placed
mortar fire upon the companies, [670] augmented at first by fire from
one artillery piece and later by fire from a four-gun battery. [671]
The intensity of this fire forced the companies to withdraw from
their position and rejoin the rest of the 3d Battalion on the beach
near Colasion. [672]
During the day the 1st Battalion tried unsuccessfully to secure
positions to support the attack through Breakneck Ridge. At the
close of 6 November the 57th Infantry of the 1st Division securely
occupied Breakneck Ridge and its northern approaches. For the assault
the following day, General Irving attached the 3d Battalion, 19th
Infantry, to the 21st Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, had
reorganized about 2,000 yards east of Pinamopoan. The 1st Battalion was
on the regiment's right, the 2d Battalion was in the center astride
the highway, and the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was on the 21st
Infantry's left. [673]
The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, was the object of a night attack that
started at 2000 and lasted for two hours. The enemy used mortars
and grenades against the battalion but was unable to penetrate
its perimeter. [674] Colonel Weber ordered the 21st Infantry to be
prepared to move out at 0800 on 7 November. The assault was to be
made in column of battalions, the 2d Battalion in the lead, with
a spur of Breakneck Ridge as the initial objective. This spur or
branch ridge extended east and west across the road 400 yards south
of the front line. General Irving ordered the 52d Field Artillery
Battalion to mass its fire immediately in front of the troops for
fifteen minutes just before they jumped off and then to shift its
fire to the ridge. Attached to the 2d Battalion for support were a
platoon from the 44th Tank Company, a company from the 85th Chemical
Battalion, and a company from the 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion. [675]
At 0940 the 308th Bombardment Wing bombed the headquarters of General
Suzuki at Ormoc and strafed the highway near by. Ormoc had also been
under constant fire from the battalion of 155-mm. guns in Jaro, at
a range of 25,000 yards. Only a few houses were left standing after
the bombardment was completed. [676]
The troops moved out as scheduled. Company E, on the west of the
road, reached the branch ridge at 0915 and came under fire from
enemy automatic weapons on the right. Company G ran into about 200
men from the 3d Battalion, 57th Infantry Regiment. They were well
entrenched at a bend of the road on the forward slope of the high
ground, and Colonel Weber had the self-propelled guns of the tank
destroyer battalion brought forward. These fired into the pocket, and
although they killed the commander of the 3d Battalion the unit held
fast. [677] Weber then called two tanks forward, but as they moved
along the road a Japanese soldier jumped out of the high cogon grass
and disabled one of the tanks by planting a magnetic mine against
it. The other tank then withdrew. [678]
General Sibert was dissatisfied with the progress of the 21st
Infantry and felt that Colonel Weber was not sufficiently
aggressive. Accompanied by his G-2, Col. William J. Verbeck, he
visited the command post of Colonel Weber at noon. Dispensing with
the usual command channels and in the presence of General Irving,
he relieved Colonel Weber and made Colonel Verbeck the commanding
officer of the 21st Infantry. Colonel Weber was retained in the
regiment as its executive officer. [679]
Colonel Verbeck ordered Company L, in support of the 2d Battalion,
to make a wide flanking movement to the east and secure the ridge
which had been denied to Company G. The company moved out at 1630
but was unsuccessful. As it withdrew it made contact with Company F
which had successfully pushed forward but because of an unexplained
misunderstanding of orders had withdrawn. [680] Night perimeters were
established on the edge of Breakneck Ridge.
On the same day Colonel Chapman, commander of the 19th Infantry,
ordered his 2d Battalion to send a reinforced rifle company to Hill
1525 about 2,600 yards southeast of Limon, seize this ground, and,
in support of the advance south by the 21st Infantry, direct artillery
fire on Highway 2. Company G, 19th Infantry, moved out on this mission
with only two thirds of a ration per man, since its kitchens were
still in the Jaro area. The guides with Company G lost their way,
and the company set up a night perimeter after a patrol had located
a strong enemy position on a ridge west of its course. The company
position was thought to be in the vicinity of Hill 1525, but it was
actually far east of the hill. [681]
As the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, had failed to secure the ridge 400
yards to its front, Colonel Verbeck that night ordered the battalion,
with Company L attached, to continue the attack toward the ridge after
an artillery barrage on the following morning. The 1st Battalion
was to secure Hill 1525, establish contact with the 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry, and from the hill envelop the southern flank of the
1st Division. [682]
On the morning of 8 November a typhoon, moving in from the west, swept
over the entire island. Jan Valtin, a member of the 24th Division,
graphically describes it: "From the angry immensity of the heavens
floods raced in almost horizontal sheets. Palms bent low under the
storm, their fronds flattened like streamers of wet silk. Trees
crashed to earth. In the expanse of ... [cogon] grass the howling of
the wind was like a thousand-fold plaint of the unburied dead. The
trickle of supplies was at a standstill. On Carigara Bay the obscured
headlands moaned under the onslaught of the ... seas. Planes were
grounded and ships became haunted things looking for refuge. Massed
artillery ... barrages to the summit of Breakneck Ridge sounded dim
and hollow in the tempest. Trails were obliterated by the rain. The
sky was black." [683] In the midst of the storm, the infantry attacked.
The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, effectively used flame throwers
to drive the enemy troops out of spider holes and caves. [684]
Although shelled by sporadic artillery fire, the battalion continued
to advance. Strong elements of the 57th Infantry hotly contested the
American assault. Meanwhile Company E pushed farther along the road
until it was halted at the site of a bridge which had been destroyed
by the enemy. The Japanese had flanked the site with emplacements
from which rifle, automatic weapons, and mortar fire resisted the
frontal attack of the company. [685] At nightfall Company E fell
back to its morning position. The 57th Infantry continued to make a
determined stand against the 2d Battalion. Concealed Japanese riflemen
fired continuously on the front, flanks, and rear of all positions and
small enemy detachments infiltrated through the lines. In concert with
the attack of the 2d Battalion, the 1st Battalion had moved out that
morning toward Hill 1525. Since the maps were grossly inaccurate, the
precise location of the hill was unknown, but the battalion reported
that it had reached the southern slope of the hill at 1600 and was
digging in under automatic weapons fire. At 0700 the 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry, under Colonel Spragins, moved out through a driving rain
and over precipitous trails to join the battalion's Company G. During
the day Company G drove the enemy off the ridge where the company's
advance had been halted the previous afternoon. In their flight the
Japanese abandoned much equipment, most of which was new. Of more
importance, a significant field order of the 1st Division was found
on the body of a Japanese officer.
When the consolidation of the battalion was made, Colonel Spragins
determined that he was east of Hill 1525 as shown on the maps. Although
the battalion was in a position to observe Leyte Valley, it would
have to move westward in order to get a view of Ormoc Valley. At 1530
Colonel Spragins therefore sent Company E to occupy a ridge 1,000
yards to the west. The battalion then dug in for the night. [686]
On the following morning General Irving placed the battalion under
the operational control of the 21st Infantry.
Immediately in front of the 21st Infantry was a Japanese force
estimated to be of battalion strength. To the east was an undetermined
number of enemy machine guns. In front of Company E a bridge was out
and tanks could not pass. On the steep sides of the gulch around this
bridge site, elements of the 57th Infantry with rifles, automatic
weapons, and mortars stopped all attempts of Company E to move
forward. [687]
Through the night torrential rains fell. At dawn of 9 November two
begrimed, soaked, and weary battalions of the 21st Infantry jumped off
to the attack, the 2d Battalion, less Company F, on the west side of
the road and the 3d Battalion on the east. Heavy artillery preparations
had already pounded the Japanese front lines. As the attack progressed,
mortars and artillery placed fires on targets of opportunity. In
destroying pockets of resistance in the gulch, grenades, rifles,
and flame throwers were used, together with heavy machine guns.
At 0930 Company I, 21st Infantry, reached the crest of the intermediate
ridge on the east side of the road which ran southward toward the
center of Breakneck Ridge. An hour later Company E, 21st Infantry,
moved out from the perimeter it had held for two days. Its mission
was to cut west of the road and secure the commanding high ground in
the rear of the emplaced Japanese at the bridge site where the advance
of the company had been stopped on the previous day. At the same time
Company L, 21st Infantry, passed through Company I and attacked the
center of Breakneck Ridge as Company G started a wide envelopment
to the west from Company E's position to assault OP Hill from the
west. Artillery forward observer parties went with the companies and
called artillery fires on targets of opportunity.
At 1150 Company L encountered determined opposition from enemy
rifle and mortar fire but doggedly pushed ahead for several hours and
secured the top of the ridge. Company G reached its objective, but upon
receiving intense enemy fire was forced to retire to the eastern slopes
of a ridge 300 yards to the north, where it reorganized. Company E also
reached its objective and then formed its night perimeter. At 1815 the
Japanese launched a counterattack against the perimeter of Company G
but the attack was repulsed. For the night a platoon of heavy machine
guns was attached to each rifle company to protect its perimeter.
Since the position of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, had by this
time become clear, Colonel Verbeck ordered the battalion to move
from the east and to relieve the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, on
Hill 1525. One company was to be established on a ridge overlooking
Highway 2 while the remainder of the battalion was to block the trail
that passed Hill 1525. [688] The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was to
push westward from its position on Hill 1525 and cut the Ormoc road
some 1,800 yards south of Limon in order to forestall the escape of
Japanese troops from Breakneck Ridge. Company A was to remain on the
hill and hold it until the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, arrived.
The 1st Battalion, less Company A, jumped off at 0730. After it had
advanced about one and a half miles and was within sight of Highway 2,
the battalion was halted by heavy enemy fire from the front and both
flanks. It renewed the attack and informed Colonel Verbeck that it was
moving slowly northwest and was less than a mile from Limon. In the
meantime the enemy attacked Company A on Hill 1525, and the company
was able to maintain its position with difficulty. Because of this
fight and the fact that no contact had been established with the 2d
Battalion, 19th Infantry, Colonel Verbeck ordered the battalion to
rejoin Company A. The troops therefore returned and took part in the
fight to repel the Japanese. The 1st Battalion withstood the enemy
force until 1400, when an estimated battalion of fresh troops from
the 57th Infantry was thrown into the fight. [689] The Americans then
broke off the engagement, and the battalion, covered by Company A,
withdrew from Hill 1525 to the vicinity of Pinamopoan. [690]
Information that the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was being attacked
on Hill 1525 reached the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, shortly after
noon as it was on its way to relieve the 1st Battalion. Colonel
Spragins pushed forward immediately with two companies, hoping to
reach the 1st Battalion by 1500, but progress was slowed by steep,
slippery slopes that were often blocked by huge fallen trees. At 1630,
without having heard any sounds of battle, which they had hoped would
guide them to the 1st Battalion's position, the troops reached what
they believed to be the western slopes of Hill 1525. Patrols reported
no contact either with friendly or enemy units and the 2d Battalion
set up its night perimeter.
"At this time," states the 24th Infantry Division operations report on
Leyte, "it began to dawn on all concerned that Hill 1525, as shown on
the map, was not a single hill mass, but a long ridge of many knolls
and hilltops." [691]
Breakneck Ridge: Second Phase
On 9 November the Japanese 26th Division arrived at Ormoc in three
large transports with a destroyer escort. The troops landed without
their equipment and ammunition, since aircraft from the Fifth Air Force
bombed the convoy and forced it to depart before the unloading was
completed. During the convoy's return, some of the Japanese vessels
were destroyed by the American aircraft. [692]
The arrival of these troops was in accord with a plan embodied in
the order which had been taken from the dead Japanese officer on
the previous day. This plan envisaged a grand offensive which was to
start in the middle of November. The 41st Infantry Regiment of the
30th Division and the 169th and 171st Independent Infantry Battalions
of the 102d Division were to secure a line that ran from a hill 3,500
yards northwest of Jaro to a point just south of Pinamopoan and protect
the movement of the 1st Division to this line. With the arrival of
the 1st Division on this defensive line, a coordinated attack was to
be launched--the 1st Division seizing the Carigara area and the 41st
Infantry Regiment and the 26th Division attacking the Mt. Mamban area
about ten miles southeast of Limon. (See Map 2.) The way would then
be open for a drive into Leyte Valley. [693]
General Krueger was quick to realize the significance of this
order. Since General Suzuki apparently wished to make the mountains
of northern Leyte the battleground for the island, Krueger disposed
his forces to meet the enemy threat. The X Corps was to continue
its drive south down Highway 2 but at the same time was to dispose
units in the central mountain range to protect the exits from Ormoc
Valley into Leyte Valley. The XXIV Corps was to send a reinforced
regiment into the hills northwest of Dagami to prevent any Japanese
from infiltrating into Leyte Valley, and the corps was also to be
prepared to assist elements of the X Corps that guarded the trail
running from Daro to Dolores, a village about six miles northeast of
Ormoc. A regiment of the XXIV Corps was to be placed in Sixth Army
Reserve at Dagami, where the central mountain range began. [694]
General Sibert then ordered the 24th Division to continue its
attack south. The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, under
Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham, which was expected to arrive on 14
November, was to relieve elements of the 1st Cavalry Division that
guarded the beaches in the Carigara-Barugo area. The 1st Cavalry
Division was then to drive southwest from the central mountains and
relieve some of the pressure against the 24th Division. [695]
General Hodge at the same time ordered the 96th Division to seize the
high ground between Jaro and Dagami, secure all routes of exit from
the west coast through the central mountain range, and send patrols
through the passes to the west coast of Leyte. The division was also
ordered to maintain in the vicinity of Dagami one infantry regiment
in Sixth Army Reserve. At the same time elements of the 7th Division
had reached the shores of Ormoc Bay in the vicinity of Baybay and
were ordered to send patrols toward Ormoc and to prepare the route
for a future advance in strength. [696]
If the attention of the Japanese could be fastened upon the X Corps in
the north and northeast, it might be possible for General Krueger to
put into effect his plan to send a strong force from the XXIV Corps
over the mountains far to the south along the Abuyog--Baybay road
to the eastern shores of Ormoc Bay in order to reinforce elements of
the 7th Division already there. This force was to drive north toward
Ormoc while elements of the X Corps pushed south toward the town along
Highway 2. It might even be possible later to land an amphibious force,
perhaps as large as a division, at a point just below Ormoc. But first
it was all-important that the Japanese be contained in Ormoc Valley
and that their attention continue to be directed to the north. [697]
On 9 November General Irving ordered the 24th Division to launch a
co-ordinated assault on the following day to drive the 1st Division
from Breakneck Ridge and also deny it commanding ground from which the
Japanese could conduct delaying actions just south of the barrio of
Limon. (See Map 13.) The 21st Infantry was to drive south along Highway
2 and the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was to proceed west from its
position on the east flank of the enemy and establish a roadblock
on Highway 2 about 2,000 yards south of Limon. The 1st Battalion,
34th Infantry, was to make a wide enveloping movement around the
west flank of the 57th Infantry and seize the high ground known as
Kilay Ridge which was about 700 yards from Highway 2 and west of the
proposed roadblock of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry. General Irving
announced: "Success of the Leyte Campaign depends upon quickly and
completely destroying hostile forces on our front." [698]
By the morning of 10 November the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, had
reorganized and re-equipped itself. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the
regiment were disposed along a ridge southwest of Pinamopoan. The
companies of the two battalions were intermingled. [699]
The rains continued to pour down upon the troops, and the thick
mud was slippery and treacherous underfoot. After the artillery had
fired a ten-minute concentration on Breakneck Ridge, the 21st Infantry
attacked at 0945. Company A, the lead company, passed through Company
E and pushed south. At 0955 Company G seized OP Hill. Simultaneously,
Company I moved to the site of the destroyed bridge 300 yards east of
OP Hill. Company L moved toward the high ground 300 yards southeast
of its position and at 1120 secured this ground.
Colonel Verbeck then ordered the 1st Battalion to attack a ridge 200
yards to its front by maneuvering through the defiles on each side
of the enemy-held spur. The maneuver was unsuccessful and the 1st
Battalion resumed its former position. [700] The Japanese resisted
all efforts of the 2d Battalion to move down the reverse slope of
OP Hill. [701] During the day the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, and
the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, moved out to secure the commanding
positions south of Limon. [702]
The ten guns of the 2d Battalion, 1st Artillery Regiment of the 1st
Division, were moved to a position east of Limon where they could be
used to assist the 57th Infantry Regiment. [703] During the night of
10-11 November the 57th Infantry severed the telephone lines from the
headquarters of the 21st Infantry to all of the regiment's battalions.
That night the American artillery fired heavy interdiction fires, and
before 0900 on 11 November it delivered preparations, including white
phosphorus shells, on enemy pockets and strong points on Breakneck
Ridge. Company C of the 85th Chemical Battalion maintained constant
harassing fires on the reverse slopes of the east ridge and OP Hill,
at the rate of approximately two 4.2-inch mortar rounds every five
minutes. [704] Colonel Verbeck attached Company L to the 2d Battalion.
The 21st Infantry resumed the attack at 0900 with the 1st and 2d
Battalions abreast, the 1st Battalion to the north of OP Hill and
the 2d Battalion south and west of the parts of Breakneck Ridge
previously captured.
Strong elements of the 57th Infantry from the south and from positions
in the wooded ridges east of Corkscrew Ridge immediately fired upon
the 2d Battalion and pinned it down for the rest of the day. The 1st
Battalion encountered little opposition until it reached a point
about 300 yards south of the crest of Breakneck Ridge, where the
Japanese strongly resisted. The troops then moved west of the enemy
left flank about 200 yards to enable the tanks from Company A, 44th
Tank Battalion, to make an attack against the main position of the
57th Infantry on Breakneck Ridge. [705]
The tanks proceeded along Highway 2 up Breakneck Ridge and down its
reverse slope. They destroyed an estimated twenty-five enemy positions
which contained automatic weapons. One tank got stuck when it went off
the edge of the road. As darkness approached, its crew was rescued by
another tank which then put a 75-mm. shell into the stalled vehicle
to prevent its use by the Japanese. [706]
At 1600 the 308th Bombardment Wing dropped twenty-eight 500-pound
bombs on the Valencia airfield in the middle of Ormoc Valley and
twenty-four 500-pound bombs on a Highway 2 bridge in the vicinity of
the airfield. [707]
At nightfall the 1st Battalion had secured its objective, a ridge
300 yards to the southwest of OP Hill, and all positions were
consolidated. During the night the 226th and 465th Field Artillery
Battalions placed harassing fire on the enemy positions. In order
to shake the morale of the Japanese, the artillery fired its rounds
at exact five-minute intervals but scattered the fire throughout the
enemy-held area. [708]
On the morning of 12 November the 3d Battalion, supported by six tanks
and a platoon from the 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion, moved out along
the road skirting the crest of Breakneck Ridge. By 1115 it had passed
over the crest and was moving down the reverse slope. After the 3d
Battalion crossed the hill, the 1st Battalion attacked on the right
of the road with the mission of enveloping the Japanese left (north)
flank. [709] There was little resistance, and soon after 1200 the
crest of Breakneck Ridge was in the hands of the 21st Infantry. But
shortly afterward the 2d Field Artillery Battalion of the 1st Division
shelled the regiment and stopped all forward advance. [710]
On 13 November the 1st and 2d Battalions took up the fight, with
machine guns from the vicinity of OP Hill firing in support. The 1st
and 2d Battalions advanced 600 and 400 yards, respectively. By 14
November it appeared to General Irving that the 21st Infantry had
eliminated nearly all resistance on Breakneck Ridge. The regiment
controlled the ridge proper, but several adjacent spurs, notably
Corkscrew Ridge, were still controlled by the 57th Infantry. On 15
November the 1st Battalion, the most advanced unit, was about 1,500
yards north of Limon. On 16 November the 128th Infantry of the 32d
Division relieved the 21st Infantry. The battle of Breakneck Ridge
had not been an easy one for the 21st Infantry; it had lost 630
men killed, wounded, and missing, together with 135 men from other
causes. By actual count it had killed 1,779 Japanese. [711]