Logistics and Civil Affairs
The old saw that for want of a horseshoe nail the kingdom was lost
is applicable in some degree to the story of logistics on the island
of Leyte. Fortunately the outcome in Leyte was less serious than that
recounted in the proverb. But the cumulative effect of many unfavorable
conditions, each capable of being overcome in itself but each entangled
with the others, resulted in a protraction of the campaign and a
slowing of the schedule for future operations in the Pacific.
Despite the forebodings of Sixth Army engineers with regard to
developing major logistical and air bases in Leyte Valley, General
MacArthur had assigned logistical missions to the Sixth Army which,
even under the best of circumstances, would have taxed its facilities
to the utmost. General Krueger thought that in the planning stages
greater emphasis should have been placed on an appreciation of
terrain when selecting landing beaches and their exits, as well as
sites for base development, airdrome construction, and headquarters
installations. Terrain information should have been carefully analyzed
by competent personnel in order that tactical and development plans
could be based on the utilization of suitable terrain. The target
dates and phase lines should have been flexible enough to allow for
unsatisfactory terrain features. "Airdromes cannot be built speedily
across rice paddies and swamps; bivouac areas, depots and dumps cannot
properly be established in swamps and rice paddies." [577]
Logistics
Scarcely had the assault troops landed when the gloomy predictions
of Colonel Ely that conditions of soil and weather on the island
would make it unfit for the establishment of major bases began to
be realized. Nevertheless, the necessity for early establishment of
land-based air forces to support the operation made it imperative
that the engineers start work immediately on rehabilitation of
existing airfields. Before this task could be carried out, however,
it would be necessary to strengthen and widen the roads in order to
move heavy construction equipment to the airfields. A breakdown of
the transportation system for even a few days could affect adversely
all aspects of the Leyte operation. Because of the shortage of
engineer troops, the lack of road metal, and the continuous traffic,
the construction and maintenance of roads presented a critical and
continuing problem.
Road Construction
The troops found their progress greatly hampered by the poor quality
of roads leading to the interior of the island. The type of soil made
it difficult to provide sufficient approach roads and to maintain
all-weather roads. Drivers did not dare come too near the edge of the
pavement in passing, even on the major two-lane roads, since their
vehicles would probably become mired on the shoulder. The edges of
hard-surfaced roads broke down under the constant wear until the
roads were no longer wide enough for two-way traffic. Vehicles would
often sink to their axles on the shoulders of the highway and on the
many access roads, and frequently the roads into camp areas became
unsuitable for traffic of any sort. [578]
In the 24th Division zone the engineers undertook to build an ancillary
road, from the beachhead area to the existing coastal road, over the
deep swamps and flooded rice paddies. After twenty-four hours' labor
they abandoned the project as not feasible and in a few days rebuilt a
trail that skirted the swamp along higher ground. This new thoroughfare
was pronounced an "excellent" three-lane egress road. [579]
By utilizing a narrow road leading inland to Highway 1, egress from
the 1st Cavalry Division beachhead area was accomplished. Since
the road forked near the beach and ran north to Cataisan Point it
became an access road to the Tacloban airfield. All supplies were
routed along Highway 1 into the interior. When this road went to
pieces under the heavy rains of 25 October, no means remained of
getting overland from the area of the 24th Division to that of the 1st
Cavalry Division. The open country back of the Dulag area made the road
problems of the XXIV Corps zone a little more manageable than those in
the X Corps area. Dulag itself offered graveled streets for traffic,
but unfortunately only one very narrow road, with deep ditches on both
sides, led west toward the mountains. With the coming of heavy rains,
this road was chewed to bits by heavy traffic.
In order to preserve the roads as far as possible, the transportation
officer of the Sixth Army decided to allow their use only to
vehicles having the highest priority and to hold the transportation
of civilians to a minimum. He forbade the use of trucks and other
heavy vehicles for carrying personnel when lighter transportation
was available. [580] Throughout the Leyte operation, though the
engineering troops worked unceasingly, the condition of the roads
remained a tremendous unsolved problem. A rainfall of 23.5 inches
during the month of November forced a continuous contest with the mud,
and men and equipment employed on the airstrips had to be diverted to
the roads, some of which were closed for days at a time while under
repair. Traffic censuses were made as a basis for many corrective
measures that were introduced to control, reduce, and equalize the
flow of traffic. Supplies were issued at night to avoid congestion at
peak periods. ASCOM made strong efforts to keep the road construction
equipment in use and in workable condition, and placed stress upon
provision for proper drainage. Filipino pick-and-shovel crews were
used as much as possible. In spite of these measures, at the end of
November the condition of the roads was "a major hindrance to base
development and operations." [581]
Airfields
The condition of the airstrips produced an even more perplexing
problem than the roads. Immediately upon their arrival, engineer
reconnaissance parties followed the assault infantry and examined
the various sites which had been selected during the planning for
airfields. By 22 October they reported that all the proposed airdrome
sites except Tacloban were unfit for use during the rainy season.
Elements of the Sixth Army had captured both the Dulag and Tacloban
airstrips within twenty-four hours after landing, but the Dulag
airstrip was found to be out of use and unserviceable. [582] Since
the Tacloban field was shorter than had been estimated and was in
need of resurfacing, it was necessary to construct practically a
new airfield. Although Japanese air resistance was moderate for the
first few days and the weather temperate, progress was slow because of
the condition of the roads and congestion of traffic. Trucks bearing
gravel moved at a snail's pace.
On 25 October the 7th and 8th Fighter Squadrons of the 49th Fighter
Group assisted in the work on the Tacloban strip. The 8th Squadron
was dismayed. The entire Cataisan Peninsula, on which the airstrip
was located, was an "unadulterated bog" and the "confusion was awe
inspiring." Labor details were called to work and then dismissed. Upon
returning to their bivouac area, they would be recalled, and the
process repeated. [583] On 25 and 26 October the Japanese air force
came over the airfield in great waves. Many times the men were forced
to drop their tools and sprawl into gullies and slit trenches as the
Japanese "returned for more blood." [584]
With the naval battle of Leyte Gulf under way, activities on the
airfield were further hampered. Construction crews attempted to lay
a base of coral on the airfield for the steel matting at the same
time that Navy planes used the field for emergency landings. About
a hundred aircraft used the field on 25 October, and twenty-five of
these were destroyed in crash landings, one of which set the fuel
dump afire at night. [585] In spite of enemy air raids, the landing
of naval aircraft and the wrecked planes littering the airstrip,
construction continued. By 30 October some aircraft were arriving
and making satisfactory landings on the runway, which at that time
had nearly 4,000 feet of matting. [586]
On 27 October the Fifth Air Force took over the mission of supplying
air support. Because of the poor condition of the airstrips and
the scarcity of available aircraft, however, it was announced on
31 October that only "sporadic bomb support by the heavy bombers"
and strafing could be accomplished. Work on the airstrips had barely
got under way at the end of October. [587]
At the same time General Casey, commanding the Army Service Command,
painted a dark picture of the future. He stated that the construction
of airfields in the Dulag area would require more effort than had
been anticipated during the planning phase, since the Japanese,
contrary to expectations, had placed little or no surfacing material
on the runways and since soil conditions were such that an eight-inch
sand and gravel base covered with steel mat would be required to
support bomber traffic. [588] Furthermore, the labor crews that
were to have been used in airfield construction were being diverted
to road building, still further reducing "the already insufficient
amount of engineer effort available for drome construction." [589]
Aside from labor shortages, the chief causes for the disappointing
delay in airfield construction were poor soil conditions, enemy air
raids, and rain. [590] Under such inauspicious circumstances, the
Allied Air Forces undertook the mission of furnishing air support on
Leyte. Because of the poor condition of the airfields, only a token
force from the Fifth Air Force was able to come in.
Much ingenuity was exercised by the engineers in overcoming
difficulties. In enlarging the Tacloban airstrip, one of the
greatest impediments to progress was the limited supply of coral for
surfacing the runways. The engineers conceived the idea of having
the dredge Raymond, which had been brought forward to dredge the
navigational channel, used to pump coral from the channel bottom
onto the runways. The 2,800-horsepower pumps could transport solid
matter one mile through pipes that extended across the bay and onto
the land, and they could also raise the dredged matter as much as 300
feet above sea level. The engineers found that this pipeline was the
quickest way to transport material to the Tacloban airstrip, though
mechanical difficulties sometimes developed. [591]
Despite constant work on the morasses that constituted the San Pablo
and Buri airfields, these strips continued to be in a generally
unusable condition. Finally, on 25 November, ASCOM dropped all
construction work on them. The Fifth Air Force, however, felt that
it was necessary to continue using the Bayug airfield, and at least
one aviation battalion remained at work on that strip.
When work on the airstrips at Buri and San Pablo was abandoned, the
Sixth Army units thus released began the construction of a new airfield
on the coast at Tanauan, midway between Tacloban and Dulag. This field
became operational on 16 December 1944. [592] The fact that the main
part of the Fifth Air Force was unable to displace forward to Leyte
made it possible for the Japanese to reinforce their Leyte garrison
and thus prolong the campaign.
Although his engineers, before the opening of the campaign, had
protested vigorously to General Headquarters against the establishment
of a major base upon Leyte, General Krueger felt constrained to take
the responsibility. Said he:
There is no doubt that if I could have made adequate airdromes
available on Leyte as scheduled we would have had ample air forces
on hand to stop all Jap reinforcements from coming in. But this
proved to be impossible, because of terrific rains that flooded
all level areas on the island. In consequence, we lacked the air
support necessary adequately to support the operation. This was
not the fault of the Allied Air Force, however, but mine. [593]
Base Construction
After the assault troops had cleared the beach areas, a perplexing
problem came to the fore. In the plans for the Leyte operation General
Krueger had assigned to the various commands areas for such facilities
as their supply dumps and hospitals. Upon arrival on Leyte, the Army
Service Command discovered that many of the sites were swamps; the
tactical situation delayed reconnaissance for others.
Throughout November the allocation of areas to the units continued to
present difficulties. On 12 November General Krueger formed the Area
Allocation Group, which consisted of representatives from MacArthur's
General Headquarters, the Sixth Army, the Air Forces, the Navy,
and the Army Service Command. The various units submitted requests
for particular areas to this group, which accepted or rejected the
requests, or allocated different sites. Since many of the applicants
wished to be in the Tacloban area, some of the requests could not
be granted because of insufficient space. Many of the sites best
suited for hospitals or storage were occupied by MacArthur's advance
headquarters and other headquarters. The search of ASCOM for suitable
storage areas continued throughout the month. [594] On 28 November
General Krueger moved the Sixth Army command post from Tanauan
to Tolosa so that an airstrip could be constructed in the Tanauan
area. [595]
By 20 November General Krueger's program for hospital construction
was far behind schedule. Of the eight hospitals planned for the
area only one was as much as 34 percent complete, and one was only
5 percent complete. [596] The lack of hospital facilities, which
continued throughout December, was somewhat offset by the rate of
evacuation and the use of hospital ships and LST's operating under
naval medical procedure. Next to airfields and roads the construction
of hospitals was given priority. But "an adequate number of engineer
battalions ... to do justice to the original requirements" was
not available. At the same time General Krueger ordered that the
hospitals be given first priority on structural materials and on
portable buildings. No lumber, including ship dunnage, could be used
in constructing quarters for either officers or enlisted men until the
hospitals were completed. [597] All units that could be spared from
airdrome and road construction were used to build either hospitals
or port and POL (petrol, oil, and lubricants) installations.
As for port facilities, the Japanese failed to destroy two existing
deepwater berths at Tacloban. Despite numerous enemy aerial attacks on
these docks and on shipping, no material damage resulted. By 1 December
ASCOM had constructed an additional dock and several lighterage
wharves. During November the Army Service Command established, in
addition to the main supply base at Tacloban, a subbase at Dulag for
the southern areas and a supply point at Carigara for the troops of
X Corps. [598]
Supplies
Since the assault troops had brought with them only limited supplies
and ammunition and since they were deep inside Japanese territory
and 1,500 miles from their nearest supply base, at Hollandia, the
need for immediate establishment and stocking of supply bases was
especially urgent. [599]
Because some of the LST's offshore in the vicinity of Hill 522 and
Palo were heavily shelled by the Japanese on A Day, the remaining LST's
were directed to the Cataisan Peninsula, where many of them discharged
their loads on the Tacloban airfield, over which the supplies were
scattered. The proposed runway and dispersal areas were strewn with
hundreds of vehicles, together with thousands of tons of ammunition,
rations, and petroleum products. Since there was only one egress road,
the airstrip became tremendously congested. [600]
Another important cause of the congestion was the dictum of General
Headquarters that certain airfields were to be operational by an
early date. The Air Forces had therefore loaded the vessels with a
considerable number of service troops and a quantity of equipment
which could not be used until the airfields were in operation. When
construction of the airfields was delayed, these troops and equipment
were unemployed for many days, thus cluttering the beaches and adding
to the congestion. Ironically, because of limited shipping space,
they had displaced "engineers and other service troops which would
have been of great value." [601]
On 8 November an estimated 120,000 American troops were on
Leyte. The rations of some of these were on board the vessels that
had brought them to the island, and cargo was not being discharged
at a satisfactory rate. Col. William N. Leaf, the supply officer of
the Sixth Army, did not believe that more than sufficient rations,
clothing, and construction equipment to meet minimum requirements
could be unloaded unless the discharge capacity of the ports was
substantially increased. While this condition was not entirely
satisfactory, it was not as bad as appeared, since incoming units
brought and discharged thirty days' supply for themselves. [602]
General Krueger set up a committee to determine the priority
of discharge for the various classes of cargo. On 9 November the
committee gave top priority to the following items, in order of
preference: ammunition, 1,400 tons a day; rations, 1,000 tons a day;
bridge timber, no specified amount; landing field mats, 500 tons a day;
and aviation gasoline, 1,000 drums a day. [603]
On 27 November the priorities committee reviewed the status of
shipping in the harbors and established new priorities for the
unloading of cargo. In order of priority, the following commodities
were given preference: rations, ammunition, landing mats, and aviation
gasoline. [604] Not all the vessels followed the priorities that had
been set up for the discharge of cargo. General Krueger ordered that
"appropriate disciplinary action" be taken against any Army personnel
who were responsible. [605]
Since successive resupply convoys arrived at Leyte before vessels of
the preceding echelon had been unloaded, thus congesting the harbor,
and since the Japanese were bombing the vessels, the assistant G-4
of Sixth Army suggested on 2 December that the number of vessels
to be called forward from the rear area to be kept to an absolute
minimum. [606] The time allocated for the discharge of cargo was
steadily increased: from 20 October to 3 November it was twelve hours
a day, from 4 November to 8 November eighteen hours a day, and from
9 November until Christmas, twenty-four hours a day. [607]
During the first thirty days the supplies in tons, stockpiled
on Leyte or available on board ship for discharge, over and above
current needs, increased as follows: 20 October, 30,313; 21 October
through 30 October, 128,051; 31 October through 9 November, 193,838;
and from 10 November through 19 November, 319,418. [608]
After the supplies were ashore and stored, the problem of getting
them to the divisions and thence to the front-line troops presented
tremendous difficulties. Nearly all types of transportation were
utilized. As the roads disintegrated, more and more dependence was
placed upon water transportation. Naval vessels and amphibian vehicles
were used to carry the supplies as close as possible to the front-line
troops, and motor vehicles transported them for the remaining distance
whenever feasible. At other times the troops and Filipino civilians
often had to hand-carry supplies to the assault forces. In addition
there were many airdrops to troops who were otherwise completely cut
off from the rest of the Sixth Army.
Medical Support
As the assault forces moved across the beaches, medical units
accompanied them. The 110th Portable Surgical Hospital supported the
operations of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion in the islands of
Leyte Gulf. In the northern part of Leyte the 19th and 27th Portable
Surgical Hospitals went ashore with the 1st Cavalry Division in the
Tacloban area, while the 16th Portable Surgical Hospital supported
the 24th Infantry Division in the Palo area. The 38th and 58th
Evacuation Hospitals also landed on A Day in the X Corps zone but
did not establish themselves in positions to receive patients. In
the zone of action of XXIV Corps in the vicinity of Dulag, the 7th
and 96th Infantry Divisions were accompanied by the 51st and 52d
Portable Surgical Hospitals, the 394th Medical Clearing Company, and
the 644th and 645th Medical Collecting Companies. Later in the day a
platoon from the 69th Field Hospital landed and before nightfall was
ready to receive patients. Earlier on the same day the 7th Portable
Surgical Hospital had accompanied the 21st Infantry Regiment to Panaon
Strait. [609]
Evacuation of Casualties
General Bradley attached to each assault battalion a platoon
from one of the collecting companies of the 96th Division Medical
Battalion. These platoons landed with the assault waves, collected
the casualties on the beach, gave them the necessary treatment, and
then evacuated them to designated ships by landing craft. After the
Navy beach parties had established aid stations the medical units
cleared casualties through them. [610]
As the battle moved on beyond the beaches, the remaining medical units
came ashore and hospitals were put into operation. For the first few
days, however, the medical units evacuated all casualties to naval
vessels in the harbor, whereupon the vessels sailed for a rear area
base. It frequently happened that a man with a minor wound or illness,
or a nonbattle injury, would be well and fit for further duty by the
time the vessel reached the rear area. [611]
After the campaign had progressed beyond the beaches, both the
corps evacuated to rear areas only those casualties who required
prolonged hospitalization. The Filipino civilian employees of the
Army and members of the Filipino armed forces received treatment but
were not evacuated from the island without approval from Sixth Army
headquarters. Wounded or sick Japanese prisoners were segregated
in the hospitals but, otherwise, they received the same treatment
as other patients. [612] Within three days after landing, the XXIV
Corps set up a field hospital which was ready to receive patients on
the following day. Consequently, all casualties who had already been
evacuated to the ships but who required hospitalization for less than
fifteen days were brought ashore and held in the shore party medical
section or admitted to the hospital. [613]
Co-operation between the medical services of the Sixth Army and those
of the Seventh Fleet was excellent. Col. William A. Hagins, Sixth Army
Surgeon, praised the medical service of the Seventh Fleet in unstinting
terms: "The LST's equipped to provide surgical service conformed to
the highest professional standards and they, together with the APH's
(transports for wounded) and the small PCE(R)'s (patrol craft, escort
(rescue)) formed a floating hospital reserve that varied between
3,000 and 5,000 beds. Without this service, which relieved the hard
pressed hospitals of many cases, the level of medical and surgical
care on Leyte would certainly have been sub-standard." [614]
After the action had progressed beyond the beaches, the evacuation of
troops became more difficult. Each medical collecting company of the
96th Division was furnished nine 1/4-ton trucks and three other cargo
carriers. The swamps and steep hills precluded the use of trucks,
however, and the number of cargo carriers was insufficient for the
task. The latter were most useful in evacuating casualties across
swamps and rice paddies. It was necessary to use litter bearers in
the mountains, but the narrow trails permitted the use of only two
men to carry each litter. For some unexplained reason, attempts to
use Filipinos as litter bearers were not successful. [615] The 24th
Division, unlike the 96th, found the Filipinos to be excellent litter
bearers and recommended their use whenever possible, since they were
willing workers who conserved the efficiency of a combat unit by
replacing the combat soldiers. [616]
Medical Treatment
With very few exceptions, all casualties were treated within one
hour after the wound had been inflicted. At the forward aid stations
the wounded soldier received only initial treatment necessary before
evacuation to the collecting station. When the casualty arrived at
that point, he was bathed and prepared for further evacuation to a
clearing station. There the necessary surgery was performed to make
the patient safe for further evacuation, and he was then taken to a
rear area. Because of the swamps and steep hills in the 96th Division
sector, the time lag in evacuation from the forward aid station to
the clearing station varied from one hour to thirty hours. [617] In
the 24th Division zone, the clearing stations remained mobile. Only
in rare instances, where it was impossible to remove patients because
of heavy fighting, was a casualty more than four hours in reaching
the clearing station. [618]
Initial measures at the aid stations consisted of treatment for
shock, stopping hemorrhage, administering plasma, applying splints,
and dressing wounds. At the clearing stations and portable surgical
hospitals, the initial surgical care consisted mainly of débridements,
emergency laparotomies, and amputations. The medical officer performed
surgical operations in these forward medical facilities only when
it was thought that the wounded soldier could not stand the arduous
trip to the rear or when his condition would not permit the delay
necessary for evacuation. [619]
A great many chest wounds and compound fractures were treated. The
fractures were cleansed, injured tissue was removed, and a splint or
cast applied. The biggest problem in fractures was the immobilization
of the humerus. If the nerves could be readily found they were
anchored. Plasma was extensively used, and whole blood, considered
indispensable by the surgeons, was generally available. [620]
In the first days of the Leyte Campaign, because of the prelanding
bombardment, more civilians than soldiers required treatment by
medical units. In the 7th Division sector for the first two days,
75 percent of the medical facilities of the only clearing company in
operation were used in caring for civilian casualties. On 24 October
the Army established a separate hospital on Leyte for civilians. [621]
The Sixth Army made a survey of 519 patients who died from injuries
suffered in battle. Of these 1 died of bayonet wounds, 2 of blast
concussion, 249 of gunshot wounds, 170 of fragment wounds, and
97 of unclassified injuries, many of which were believed to have
been inflicted by bomb or shell fragments. The location of the
gunshot wounds was as follows: 66 in the abdomen, 21 in the back,
7 in the buttocks, 67 in the chest, 49 in the head, 18 in the lower
extremities, 9 in the upper extremities, 3 of multiple character,
and 9 of unclassified location. Of the fragment wounds 25 were in
the abdomen, 7 in the back, 6 in the buttocks, 30 in the chest, 33 in
the head, 37 in the lower extremities, 11 in the upper extremities,
12 multiple, and 9 unclassified. [622]
Medical Supply
The Sixth Army plan called for the assault troops to go in with five
days' medical supplies. The other units would go in with thirty days'
supply. The original plan provided for 300,000 troops over a sixty-day
period only. Thereafter, it was expected that Sixth Army would depend
upon resupply shipping and the diversion to Leyte of shipments intended
to fill theater requirements of the Southwest Pacific area. The
resupply shipping consisted of medical maintenance units. Since the
average medical maintenance unit contained less than 700 items as
compared to the 3,000 to 3,500 items eventually needed for a balanced
supply, the medical plan of the X Corps called for loading three days'
supply on their organic transports and on their personnel. The rest
of the supplies were bulk loaded. The X Corps also had an emergency
resupply of two medical maintenance units, one of which was never
unloaded because of damage to the ship on which it was carried. [623]
When the XXIV Corps was ordered to prepare for the Yap operation,
the 7th Division began to make its medical plans. After receiving
permission to take a thirty-day supply for 22,000 men on its
assault shipping, the division separated the stock into two sections,
consisting of a ten-day supply and a twenty-day supply. The former was
packed in ten identical units with one unit to a pallet, each weighing
1,840 pounds and having a volume of seventy-two cubic feet. One of
these units was allotted to each battalion of the division and one
to the division headquarters. The twenty days' supply was packed in
three identical units, each weighing about 21,648 pounds and having
a volume of about 864 cubic feet. [624]
The 24th Division drew approximately thirty tons of medical supplies
from the base medical supply. The division then mobile-loaded
twenty of these tons on five 2 1/2-ton trucks and assigned a truck
to each collecting company. The remaining medical supplies were bulk
loaded. Each medical unit also carried a five-day supply for immediate
use upon commitment. [625]
When put into practice, however, this system of the 24th Division
was not entirely satisfactory. Because of the rapid advance of the
assault troops and the lack of transportation, the system of supply
became an acute problem. Resupply became co-ordinated with the chain
of evacuation. Forward units would submit informal requisitions to the
clearing companies at the second echelon of evacuation, whereupon the
supplies would be issued and brought forward by ambulances on their
return to the front. The clearing companies would submit requisitions
to the main dump. The difficulty of resupply can be appreciated when
considerations of time and distance are understood. For instance,
the round trip from Carigara to Tacloban, where the main dump was
located, amounted to about seventy miles. [626] As greater and greater
dependence was placed upon human carriers to bring out the wounded
and bring in supplies, it proved indeed fortunate that the Sixth Army
had established amicable relations with the Filipino civilians.
Civil Affairs
Although the United States Government had interested itself in
the civil affairs of the Philippines as early as 13 January 1944,
it was not until 10 November, after the Leyte Campaign had been
launched, that General MacArthur received his first directive on
civil affairs. Between the two dates strong disagreements developed
between the War and Interior Departments as to who should administer
civil affairs in the Islands. The Interior Department insisted that
a civil representative of the High Commissioner of the Philippines
should accompany the assault troops, and General MacArthur was equally
insistent that he should not. The President finally resolved the
question in favor of MacArthur. [627] Lacking a directive from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur devised his own policy for
civil affairs during the reoccupation of the Philippines.
The formulation of this policy may be said to have started on 22 July
1944 with a memorandum from Brig. Gen. Bonner F. Fellers, personnel
officer of General Headquarters, to General MacArthur. He stated that
although President Manuel Quezon had established a Division of Civil
Affairs in the Philippine Army, the actual work would have to be done
by the United States Army. General Fellers, therefore, recommended
that General Headquarters immediately assume full responsibility
for civil administration during the reoccupation. Administration
in the occupied areas should be done, however, in the name of the
Philippine Commonwealth and in complete co-operation with its official
representatives. [628]
On 30 August General MacArthur issued a directive creating a civil
affairs unit in his headquarters and outlining the broad policies
that were to be followed in the Philippines. [629] This directive
was subsequently expanded on 28 September [630] but it was not until
9 October, eleven days before the landing on Leyte, that MacArthur
issued detailed instructions on the procedures to be followed. [631]
During the combat stage General Krueger, the senior tactical commander,
was to be responsible for such civil administration and relief as
would be possible under the existing tactical situation. General
MacArthur would delegate the administration of civil affairs and
relief in the liberated areas as promptly as possible to the authorized
representatives of the Commonwealth Government. The only restrictions
placed upon the Filipino people were to be those required by military
necessity. By arrangement with General MacArthur the Philippine
Commonwealth was, in general, to determine the guilt or innocence of
suspected collaborationists, though the U. S. Army commanders were
to retain complete authority to deal with the suspects if necessary.
General MacArthur also established the financial policies to be
followed. A new series of Philippine Treasury certificates called
"Victory Pesos" would be introduced in the liberated areas. The
exchange rate would be two for an American dollar. All prewar currency
and all emergency currency officially determined to be bona fide would
be accepted at face value. All other Philippine or enemy currency would
be worthless. Wage rates to be paid Filipino labor were established
and ceiling prices consistent with the approved wage scale were set.
General Krueger delegated authority for civil administration and relief
to Generals Hodge and Sibert for their respective corps areas. The
commanding general of the Army Service Command was responsible for
the recruitment and maintenance of civilian labor. General MacArthur
attached to the Sixth Army eight Philippine civil affairs units,
which were to assist the field commanders in the administration of
civil affairs and relief. Two of these were retained by Sixth Army,
two were attached to each of the corps, and two to the Army Service
Command. [632]
As soon as the conflict had passed by an area, a civil affairs
unit of the Sixth Army stepped in and started to restore the normal
community life. Temporary appointments of Filipino officials were made,
such appointments going to men who had been screened by the Counter
Intelligence Corps or who were sponsored by Filipinos whose loyalty
was unquestioned. In nearly every case the Philippine Commonwealth
ratified these appointments. In every area reached by the Sixth Army,
civil officials were appointed as soon as the tide of battle passed,
and without exception cordial relations were established. The civil
affairs officers of the Sixth Army did not attempt to interfere with
civil operations unless requested to do so, or unless the military
situation made it necessary.
Relations With Filipino Refugees
While the American assault forces were hitting the shores of Leyte,
a delegation of Filipinos boarded the Blue Ridge and gave General
Irving of the 24th Division information regarding conditions on the
island. They received a cordial welcome, the Filipino steward's mates
giving them much of their spare clothing. [633]
Many refugees who had been driven from their homes by the naval
bombardment came into the American lines on the beaches seeking
comfort and aid. These Filipinos had been without food or water for a
considerable time, some of them for as long as twenty-four hours. Many
of those who had remained in foxholes during the naval shelling were
badly shaken up.
Palo Sector
In the area around Palo [634] fifty to seventy-five civilians had
arrived by nightfall on A Day, 20 October. The Army gave them food
and drink and then quartered them in two houses on the beach. By
the following morning the influx of Filipinos had become very great
and the arrival of many more was expected. The civil affairs officers
therefore secured two more dwellings, had latrines dug, and maintained
constant policing of the area, which was finally encircled by wire
enclosures. The Army set up an evacuation hospital unit in the bivouac
area to take care of the wounded and sick. A baby was delivered in
an emergency obstetrical tent, "both mother and child faring well."
Wells were dug to provide water for washing. During 21 October
between 1,500 and 2,000 refugees crowded into the area. By 22
October the congestion had become so great that a larger site was
imperative. General Sibert decided to move the civilians to Palo,
even though the town had not yet been cleared of Japanese. After
an Army chaplain had said Mass, the refugees proceeded on foot,
in single file, to Palo. The Army adopted this mode of advance in
order to minimize interference with troops, supplies, and equipment
and also to protect the refugees from mines and booby traps which
the Japanese had placed on the shoulders of the road. Many of the
civilians carried all of their effects with them; children, as young
as three or four years, were impressed into carrying their share of
the family's meager possessions.
Because of the inpouring of refugees from surrounding districts,
Palo suddenly grew from a normal population of about 6,000 to one
estimated at 12,000 to 15,000. Nearly 5,000 people with their animals
crowded into a church and its adjacent compound. Sanitary conditions
were very bad.
The Army fed these refugees from captured stocks of rice and
appointed a force of civilian police. After a survey of the area,
the Army instituted sanitary measures for cleaning up the church and
its compound, with removal and burial of the dead animals. Civilian
laborers who had been checked for their loyalty undertook the burial
of American and Japanese dead and the unloading of ships in the
harbor. The Army disarmed all Filipinos except guerrillas and enforced
security regulations, which prohibited civilians from appearing on
the streets after dark. As more military units entered the town,
5,000 of the refugees were moved to its outskirts. The Army set up
a hospital in the compound and surgeries in the schoolhouses, with
separate wards for men and women. Teachers and other qualified women
assisted as practical nurses. Within one week the Army had organized
the town and begun work toward rehabilitation.
Dulag Sector
On the beaches of XXIV Corps a naval civil affairs unit controlled
the Philippine civilians. [635] This unit arrived ashore at 0700 on 21
October. The area which had been previously allocated for a civilian
compound was found to be a swamp. Approximately 1,500 refugees were
scattered around the landing beaches. The Army assembled these and
moved them to a new site in the town of Dulag, but the location
had undergone a three-day naval bombardment which had reduced it to
smoldering rubble. The Army recruited laborers to clean the area.
The military police assisted in control of the civilian population
and procured and distributed food and water. A medical officer and
several enlisted men from the 7th Division gave medical aid to large
numbers of civilians who were treated for minor wounds, injuries,
tropical ulcers, and other ailments. By 22 October the medical officer
had referred at least 100 of the more serious cases to an Army field
hospital near by. Fifteen unclaimed and unidentified civilian dead
were buried in the Filipino cemetery.
By the morning of 22 October, since the civilian population of Dulag
had grown to approximately 10,000, General Hodge issued orders to move
the refugees to a new location. By 23 October, when a suitable place
had been found, the number of refugees had risen to approximately
30,000. The mass migration to the new location, which was two miles
from Dulag, was most difficult, and not until the civil affairs
officers had sent food and water to the new site could civilians
be persuaded to move. The selected area measured about 1,000 by 600
yards and consisted of a coconut grove and a beach. Except for its
inadequate size and its infringement upon military installations,
it was completely satisfactory. After 24 October the civilians were
removed from camp and sent back to their home villages as soon as
the latter were declared secure.
Issuing of Supplies
By the morning of 24 October the Sixth Army was taking care of
some 45,000 people, most of the population of about fifty-six
communities. Although at first there was a shortage of food and water,
by 24 October there was an adequate supply. Before that time the
Army supplied the civilians with C and K rations, since it could not
locate an appreciable quantity of the civilian food supplies. Seventy
percent of these supplies, consisting of fish, rice, and meat, were
later found and distributed by the civil affairs officers.
The Army originally distributed food to individuals but later made
distribution through leaders in the barrios until it could establish
a general store. The civil affairs officers distributed 28,700 full
rations, fifty cases of condensed milk for infant use, and five tons
of captured Japanese rice. About 5,000 full rations were stolen or
not accounted for. An Army purification unit set up a 3,000-gallon
canvas water tank and furnished water to the area.
A general store was in operation by 26 October for the sale of
necessities. Clothing, rice, biscuits, salmon, and candles were the
items most in demand. Some articles were ill adapted to the use or
customs of the Filipinos. "The people would not buy or use the 4,000
rat traps or the rolls of toilet paper furnished nor would they buy or
use canned or powdered milk." [636] Prices were fixed at prewar levels.
The civil affairs units of the Sixth Army opened about 500 schools in
the principal barrios, those in Tacloban being the first to open. Many
school buildings were either rebuilt or repaired under the direction of
civil affairs officers and with funds furnished by them. Since there
were no primary textbooks, in one instance the civil affairs units
mimeographed a series of three schoolbooks which were illustrated
by an Army artist. The teachers of Leyte not only provided excellent
service in school work but also acted as relief workers, sanitarians,
and assistants in the dispensaries and hospitals.
At first, a number of improvised hospitals were opened up. When the
civilian hospital supplies arrived, however, modern hospitals were
established at Tacloban, Baybay, and Carigara. These were staffed
by local doctors and nurses, but the civil affairs unit continued to
furnish food and supervision. Twenty-seven permanent dispensaries were
also established. These were greatly needed, since the Japanese had not
given the people any medical aid and had stopped all preventive medical
measures. Dental treatment was given to more than 2,000 Filipinos,
and smallpox inoculations were administered to more than 8,000. Also,
when they seemed to be required, inoculations were given for typhoid,
typhus, and cholera.
The prescribed amount of civilian medical supplies proved to be
inadequate, a situation which placed an undue burden upon the medical
units and facilities of all echelons of the Sixth Army. The food
supplies, however, were more than adequate. The sizes of clothing and
shoes were often too large and there was not a sufficient supply of
women's and children's garments. On the island 10,000 tons of civilian
supplies were landed, of which 6,830 tons were distributed. About
1,102 tons of rice were sold or given away, a figure which does not
include captured Japanese stocks of rice. More than 400,000 refugees
were fed and 287,000 relief clients were cared for. [637] By 25
December the relief rolls included only the aged, sick, and infirm,
and members of families without a breadwinner.
Recruitment of Filipinos
"Hundreds of self appointed guerrillas whose only claim to
participation in the guerrilla organization was a recently realized
ambition to be of service to their country and to their allies"
confronted the assault forces on the beachheads. These individuals
caused endless confusion, since it was practically impossible for
the Americans to distinguish between the genuine guerrilla and
his opportunistic counterfeit. After the first few days, however,
the Army made contact with guerrilla headquarters and established
liaison with the bona fide guerrillas. [638]
General Krueger made the guerrillas a part of his armed forces, and
they became a source of additional strength to the Sixth Army. These
men frequently operated and patrolled in enemy-held territory and
brought the Americans valuable information on Japanese movements and
dispositions; the unit commanders of Sixth Army, however, tended to
discount reports from such sources with regard to the size of Japanese
forces. The guerrillas also guarded supply dumps and depots, bridges,
and other installations in the rear areas.
The generosity of the American soldier in giving away supplies
made it difficult to recruit civilian labor. Since gifts of food to
prospective laborers diminished their incentive to work, the Sixth
Army issued an order prohibiting such gifts. As early as 21 October
the Army got in touch with political and labor leaders to serve as
advisers and assistants, telling them from day to day how many laborers
would be needed. The Filipino leaders were very co-operative and made
arrangements to secure the necessary labor. Good results were obtained
by enlisting the support of local leaders, especially the parish
priests. General Krueger declared: "In all reported instances, the
priests lent willing assistance and their information on individuals
and conditions was found reliable and outstandingly impartial." [639]
As the fighting reached past Carigara and Dagami and into the central
mountain range the Filipinos acted as supply carriers for the troops
and worked on the roads and trails. At one time there were as many as
8,000 Filipinos engaged in this labor. Army furnished transportation
to the site of the work and paid wages according to the Commonwealth
Government wage scales.
Throughout November the logistical situation on Leyte remained
bad. Work on roads, together with that on airfields and other
installations, consisted largely of temporary expedients. The
difficult problem of getting supplies ashore and to the troops had
not been completely solved, a situation which hampered the progress
of the tactical troops. The lag in construction of airdromes made
it impossible for land-based air forces to give adequate close air
support to the ground forces. This lack of support was another handicap
to General Krueger's men as they fought their way into the mountains.