Northern Leyte Valley: Part Two
General Krueger had expected stronger Japanese resistance in the
zone of action of the 1st Cavalry Division than in that of the 24th
Division. He had therefore thought it safe to release the 21st Infantry
for the landings at Panaon Strait. When events proved otherwise, a
portion of the strength of the 1st Cavalry Division was shifted into
the zone of the 24th Division to enable the latter to free itself of
responsibility for rear areas and direct its effort to the advance
into Leyte Valley. [535] (Map 11)
Drive up Leyte Valley
The Japanese planned to fall back into the mountains if the Americans
were successful in seizing the Tacloban airfield. They expected to
take with them "munition sufficient for one and one-half units of fire
for one division ... and food for 20,000 men for six month[s]." [536]
The rapid advance of the Americans, however, prevented the execution of
this plan. After 25 October the remaining elements of the 33d Infantry
Regiment withdrew to a position about three and three-fourths miles
northeast of Jaro. [537] When the American forces had taken the hills
dominating the entrance into Leyte Valley and overlooking Highway 2,
Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, the commander of the 35th Army, concentrated
his forces around Jaro on the southern edge of Leyte Valley. The 41st
Regiment of the 30th Division and the 169th Independent Battalion of
the 102d Division, both of which had but recently arrived on Leyte as
reinforcements to the 16th Division, on 26 October were ordered to
proceed from Carigara to Jaro. On the same day the 17th Independent
Battalion, 102d Division, moved toward Jaro. [538]
The 34th Infantry Advances Into the Valley
After the successful capture of Hills B and C, the 24th Division
resumed its attack west. With the 1st Cavalry Division protecting
the 24th Division's northern flank, the 34th Infantry was to proceed
westward into the interior along Highway 2. The 19th Infantry, as the
24th Division's southern prong, was to follow an almost parallel route
to Pastrana. [539] The 1st Cavalry Brigade was to relieve the combat
troops of the 24th Division in the rear areas in order to enable the
division to continue its advance into the interior.
Highway 2 was a one-lane all-weather road, twelve feet wide with
four-foot shoulders. It had a crushed rock and gravel surface. In
general it ran through level ground, with occasional groves of light
timber, bamboo, and abaca. Much of the area was under cultivation. At
Santa Fe a one-lane all-weather branch road ran four miles south to
Pastrana, at which point a seasonal one-lane road ran southward for
about five miles to Dagami and another northwest for about eight and
a half miles to Jaro.
At 1000 on 26 October the 2d Battalion of the 34th Infantry, commanded
by Colonel Pearsall, moved out of its assembly area at Malirong in a
column of companies and pushed westward on Highway 2. The battalion
met slight resistance at the Malirong River bridge, but mortar fire
knocked out the enemy opposition, and the advance continued. Since
the battalion encountered few Japanese, the flank protection, which
had to traverse difficult terrain, was called in, and the advance
then proceeded at a much more rapid pace. The 2d Battalion met,
and killed or routed, small groups of the enemy. It crossed streams
where the bridges had been destroyed. The 3d Engineer Battalion put
temporary structures in for two of these bridges in order that the
first elements might proceed, and it placed a Bailey bridge over a
third stream. The 1st Battalion, which followed the 2d, used Japanese
handcarts to transport supplies between the destroyed bridges and the
forward troops. [540] By 1730 Colonel Pearsall had all of his battalion
in Sante Fe. The following day, Lt. Col. Thomas E. Clifford, Jr.,
who had become the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, pushed
his unit through the 2d Battalion and advanced 7,000 yards without
opposition to the Mudburon River, where the troops established their
night perimeter at 1545. [541]
Mainit River Bridge
On the morning of 28 October Colonel Clifford ordered the 1st Battalion
to move out in a column of companies along Highway 2 toward the town of
Alangalang about a mile and a quarter northwest. At 0900 the battalion
moved out. Company A, the lead company, entered Alangalang without
incident, set up local security, and then fell to the rear of the
battalion, which passed through Alangalang [542] without pausing and
moved toward the Mainit River about one and a half miles farther on.
As Company C reached the Mainit River it made contact with the enemy,
who had dug in on both steeply sloping banks of the river at the
steel bridge crossing. The company suffered five casualties. It was
opposed by the remaining elements of the 33d Infantry, which had been
considerably mauled by the Americans. [543] Company C withdrew 300
yards as Companies B and A pressed forward on the left side of the
road under continuous rifle fire. Colonel Pearsall's 2d Battalion
had followed the 1st Battalion, and both units were to make an
assault against the 41st Infantry Regiment, which had arrived in the
area. Three batteries of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion shelled
the enemy positions for a depth of 300 yards on the eastern side of
the river and 100 yards on the western side.
After the artillery concentration was over, the two battalions
were to move out to the attack--the 1st on the left and the 2d on
the right. The regimental commander ordered the 1st Battalion to
attack, destroy the enemy resistance, and secure the eastern bank
of the river. Five tanks were to follow in the rear of the assault
companies and fire at targets of opportunity. Five hundred yards away,
to the right of the 1st Battalion, Companies E and F of Pearsall's
battalion were to cross the river, destroy enemy resistance on the
western side, and then go south on Highway 2 to contact the enemy at
the bridge. [544]
The 1st Battalion moved to the water's edge, where it was pinned
down by enemy fire. Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion, however,
were able to push north 500 yards through the heavy brush, and amid
a driving rain they managed to ford the river unobserved. Once on
the other side they charged the entrenchments of the 41st Infantry
Regiment on the river, with Company F in the lead. As Company
F neared the bridge it overran three mortar positions without
stopping but was finally halted by heavy machine gun fire. After the
company's 60-mm. mortar had knocked out the machine gun, the unit
continued to advance and passed the bridgehead before it ran out of
ammunition. Company E then relieved Company F, while the latter set up
heavy machine guns to silence enemy machine guns in the woods to the
west. By 1500 the bridge was in American hands. The Japanese had placed
a demolition charge on the bridge, but the American advance had been
so swift that the enemy never had an opportunity to set off the charge.
The 3d Battalion had meanwhile moved up to the rear of the other two
battalions and established contact south of Santa Fe with the 19th
Infantry, which was protecting the southern flank of the division.
Seizure of Pastrana
On 25 October the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, advancing toward
Pastrana, had pushed against slight opposition into Castilla and
established a perimeter there. [545] On the morning of the same day,
Maj. Elmer C. Howard, the battalion commander, told Lt. Col. George
H. Chapman, Jr., of the 19th Infantry that he had learned from the
Filipinos that there was no organized resistance along the three
miles from Castilla to Pastrana. He therefore asked permission to
go to Pastrana and establish a roadblock. Colonel Chapman told Major
Howard to stay out of Pastrana but to send patrols to locate defenses
around the town. [546] Colonel Chapman later rescinded this order,
and at 1300 on 26 October Major Howard moved his battalion out from
Castilla to attack Pastrana, which was 5,000 yards southwest of Santa
Fe. Company I, the lead company, proceeded over a trail that was
too narrow to accommodate vehicles. At 1600 the point of Company
I reached the outskirts of Pastrana but came under heavy enemy
fire. The battalion pulled back and then attacked with Companies I
and K abreast. The companies were stopped by fire that came from an
unusual fortification--a star-shaped fort, with a tin roof, which
looked like three or four native shacks in a cluster. The sides
were banked with earth, over which grass had been allowed to grow--a
feature so exceptional that it aroused suspicion and gave away the
nature of the installation. Pillboxes flanked the fortification,
which was backed by a system of trenches. Colonel Chapman ordered
another attack at 1630, but casualties were so heavy that the troops
dug in after getting within 100 yards of the fortress.
At 1750 Battery C, 11th Field Artillery Battalion, placed fire on
the fortification, but after forty-two rounds of ammunition had
been expended, the battery reported that the muddy ground "caused
[the] guns to go out of action." [547] From 1850 to 1905, Battery
A of the 14th Field Artillery delivered harassing fire on Pastrana,
[548] and from 2200 to 2400 the 13th Field Artillery Battalion took
over the task of placing fire on the sector around the town. [549]
With the coming of daylight, the 4.2-inch and 81-mm. mortars took
up the shelling. The night-long pounding of the Japanese positions
around Pastrana was so effective that on the morning of 27 October
Company K of the 3d Battalion was able to move around the town and
establish a roadblock at a demolished bridge a few hundred yards
southwest. The rest of the day the 3d Battalion, assisted by Colonel
Zierath's 1st Battalion, which had followed the 3d Battalion, mopped
up in the town and sent out patrols to investigate the terrain and
enemy dispositions west and south of the town.
The 19th Infantry was to continue to protect the southern flank of the
24th Division, which was driving toward Carigara, by moving toward
Jaro--the proposed assembly point of the 35th Army. On the morning
of 28 October, Colonel Zierath had the 1st Battalion establish a
roadblock north of the Binahaan River in the vicinity of Macalpe. The
2d Battalion pushed forward to Tingib and established a perimeter
there. For the next two days the 19th Infantry sent out patrols in all
directions; they met only scattered resistance from the Japanese. On
29 October Company K left Pastrana and established a roadblock
at Ypad. On the following day it moved south from Ypad to Lapdok,
where it established contact with elements of the XXIV Corps. On
the 30th two platoons from Company C encountered about 100 Japanese
at Rizal. The enemy fought aggressively, but resistance ceased after
artillery fire had been placed on the town. It was estimated that the
majority of the enemy force was killed. As a result of the skirmishes
and patrols, General Makino was unable to establish contact between
elements of the 16th Division at Dagami and those at Jaro. [550]
Fall of Jaro
At the crossing of the Mainit River, a one-lane all-weather branch
road runs southwest for about three and a half miles to Jaro, and
then northwest along the western edge of Leyte Valley for about ten
and a half miles to Carigara on the north coast. At Jaro many dirt
roads and trails branch out in all directions.
The drive of the 24th Division toward Carigara was continued as the
34th Infantry, protected by the 19th Infantry on its flank, moved
toward Jaro. After the seizure of the Mainit River bridge, two tanks
of the 1st Platoon, 603d Tank Company, attached to the 34th Infantry,
scouted north and made contact with forward elements of the 2d Squadron
of the 8th Cavalry, which had arrived in the San Miguel area.
On the evening of 28 October Colonel Newman issued orders to the 34th
Infantry for the following day. The 3d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Edward
M. Postlethwait, was to pass through Colonel Clifford's 1st Battalion
and Colonel Pearsall's 2d Battalion and resume the offensive with
Company L in the lead. From Cavite the battalion would move southwest
along the road to capture Jaro. Company L would be sufficiently in
advance to make reconnaissance of the route before the rest of the
battalion arrived. [551]
At 0900 on 29 October, Company L moved out from Cavite, meeting no
resistance until an hour later when it ran into some of the enemy at
a point about 100 yards from Galotan. [552] The leading scout spied a
man, whom he thought to be a Filipino, dashing into a shack. When he
shouted for the man to come out, the scout was shot in the head. The
company came on and killed the man. It then came under machine gun
fire. Platoons attacked from both flanks against Galotan. Since the
enemy troops had dug in under the shacks, it was slow, bloody work
digging them out with rifles and grenades. The 3d Platoon, which had
been in reserve, closed in when the center of the town was reached and
helped finish the job. In the meantime another unit of the company,
which had been sent to the right on a wide enveloping movement,
came under fire from a wooded knoll. Artillery and mortar fire soon
drove the Japanese off. Unable to retreat westward, the enemy moved
northward down a stream bed and set up a defensive position 500 yards
west of the road and opposite the center of the advancing column of the
3d Battalion. Fortunately, since the Antitank Platoon had displaced
forward by sections, one section was in position at this point and
was able to quickly eliminate the enemy threat. The 3d Battalion
resumed its march and secured Jaro at 1700 without further difficulty.
By this time the 19th Infantry had gained control of the area south
and east of Jaro. Junction between the 34th Infantry and 19th Infantry
was accomplished on 31 October when the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry,
moved into Jaro. Other elements of the 19th Infantry were engaged
in mopping up in the Pastrana sector. The 19th and 34th Infantry
Regiments had been able to advance rapidly in their drives through
Leyte Valley, had maintained contact with the 1st Cavalry Division,
and had arrived within ten miles of Carigara Bay.
By 28 October the XXIV Corps had nearly secured the southern portion of
Leyte Valley. General Sibert was anxious to have the X Corps advance
rapidly to the shore of Carigara Bay and thus bring all of the valley
under control of the Sixth Army. The 24th Division was relieved by
the 1st Cavalry Division of responsibility for protecting the rear
areas from Santa Fe to Cavite. The 24th Division, thus freed, was to
continue pressing the attack to its front with the utmost vigor. [553]
The American advance had been so rapid that General Suzuki did not
have sufficient time to put into effect his plan for making Jaro the
assembly ground for the 35th Army. He was forced to use the Carigara
area as the new point of rendezvous for his troops. On the evening
of 28 October Colonel Newman planned his attack for the remaining
distance to Carigara. He hoped that the troops would make a swift
passage, but later events proved that the Japanese intended to contest
the advance bitterly.
Drive From the North
At the close of 27 October the 7th Cavalry, less the 1st Squadron,
was in reserve, while the 1st Squadron was at Babatngon sending
patrols along the north coast of Leyte and the southwest coast of
Samar. The 1st Squadron of the 8th Cavalry was patrolling Samar in the
La Paz area and the 2d Squadron of the regiment was patrolling from
its bivouac area in the upper reaches of the Diit River. In order to
protect the rear of the 24th Division in its forward advance, the 1st
Squadron of the 12th Cavalry, which had been in reserve, was ordered to
Castilla. The squadron closed on Castilla at 1200 on 28 October. [554]
In accordance with orders from General Sibert, General Mudge
reassigned the various elements of the 1st Cavalry Division. On 28
October General Hoffman issued orders for his 2d Cavalry Brigade to
move toward Carigara. The 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, was to establish
a base at San Miguel, secure Cavite with one troop, patrol and mop
up the north and northwest area up to and including the Barugo road,
and maintain contact with patrols of the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry,
that would be operating southeast from Barugo. The 1st Squadron,
7th Cavalry, while maintaining a platoon at Santa Cruz and a troop
at Babatngon, was to move to the Barugo-Carigara area and mop up and
patrol the area to the south and southeast. [555]
In accordance with this plan. Troop C of the 7th Cavalry was to
proceed by water from Babatngon to Barugo and then overland to feel
out the enemy position in Carigara. Troop C, under 1st Lt. Tower
W. Greenbowe, on 28 October made the overwater and overland movements
without incident. The troop entered the eastern end of Carigara without
opposition, but as it neared the main intersection it received fire
from several buildings. In anticipation of this contingency, the men
of Troop C had been well deployed when they entered the town, and
were able to return the fire immediately. As the fight progressed,
the Japanese transported their dead and wounded to five trucks near
the beach road. The fire fight continued until late in the afternoon
when Lieutenant Greenbowe withdrew his force to Barugo, and evacuated
his dead and wounded with him. The enemy had suffered an estimated
75 casualties; Greenbowe's force had 3 men killed, 9 wounded, and 1
missing. The mutilated body of the missing man was found later. [556]
Since intelligence reports stated that as many as 5,000 Japanese
were in Carigara, General Sibert decided that the attack on the town
should be a two-division operation. While the 24th Division was
fighting its way up the road from Jaro to Carigara, additional 2d
Cavalry Brigade units assembled in the Barugo area. The 1st Squadron
of the 7th Cavalry joined its C Troop at Barugo on 29 October; the 2d
Squadron, 8th Cavalry, moved from San Miguel to Barugo on 31 October;
and the advance headquarters of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and the
2d Cavalry Brigade arrived at Barugo on 31 October and 1 November,
respectively. Attached to the 7th Cavalry Regiment was the 2d Squadron,
5th Cavalry, which closed into the Barugo area on 1 November via
Cavite and San Miguel. [557]
Drive to Tunga
On 29 October the Japanese had prepared new plans for the defense
of Leyte. (See Map 2) In order to simplify planning, the 35th Army
headquarters was relieved of command responsibility for Samar by
the 14th Area Army. Almost simultaneously, the 35th Army received
the erroneous report that the Japanese naval forces had destroyed a
large part of the U. S. Navy on 24 and 25 October in engagements off
Leyte and that the losses would prevent the Americans from continuing
the operation. On the contrary, the American naval forces had secured
a decisive victory. The Japanese reverse seriously affected General
Suzuki's attempt to put his new plans for the 35th Army into effect.
The plans provided for the calling up of the 102d Division from Panay
and the 1st and 26th Divisions from Luzon. These divisions were to land
at Ormoc and then proceed in three columns northward along Highway 2
through Ormoc Valley to the shores of Carigara Bay. They were then to
advance eastward and destroy the American forces in the area between
Tacloban and Tanauan. Since it was assumed that Carigara would remain
in Japanese hands, the 68th Brigade, serving as 35th Army reserve,
was expected to land in the north in the vicinity of Carigara. At the
same time the 30th Division was to land at Albuera on the west coast
and drive overland to Burauen, in order to support the operations of
the main body of the 35th Army. [558]
Although the American naval victory and rapid advance of land forces
prevented the Japanese from bringing this plan to full fruition,
sizable enemy forces opposed the drive of U.S. troops toward
Carigara. About 28 October the 41st Infantry Regiment moved from
Carigara to the southeast section of Jaro. The 169th Independent
Infantry Battalion of the 102d Division, together with a battalion
(Tempei Battalion) of the 57th Independent Mixed Brigade, was in the
Carigara area. The advance elements first engaged the Americans about
30 October. [559] These units, however, continued out past Jaro and
took up positions in the mountains.
On the night of 29 October the 34th Infantry had captured Jaro and was
about ten miles from Carigara along the Jaro-Carigara highway. (Map
12) At 0800 on 30 October Colonel Newman ordered the 3d Battalion
of the 34th Infantry to start for Carigara down the highway. As the
battalion left the outskirts of Jaro, with Company L in the lead,
it came under fire from Japanese who were dug in under shacks along
the road. Upon a call from the commanding officer of Company L,
the tanks came up in a column, fired under the shacks, and then
retired. The leading platoon was drawn back so that artillery fire
might be placed on the Japanese, but the enemy could not be located
precisely enough to use the artillery. Colonel Newman then ordered a
cautious movement forward without artillery support, a squad placed
on each side of the road and two tanks in the center. The squads had
advanced only fifty yards when Japanese fire again pinned them down.
When Colonel Newman came forward and discovered why the advance was
held up he declared, "I'll get the men going okay." [560] Upon hearing
that the regimental commander was to lead them, the men started to move
forward. The Japanese at once opened fire with artillery and mortars,
and Colonel Newman was hit in the stomach. Although badly wounded he
tried to devise some means of clearing the situation. After sending
a runner back with orders to have Colonel Postlethwait fire on the
Japanese position, he said, "Leave me here and get mortar fire on
that enemy position." [561] As soon as possible Colonel Newman was
put on a poncho and dragged back to safety. [562]
Meanwhile the troops, unable to move forward, broke contact with
the Japanese in an orderly fashion. Lt. Col. Chester A. Dahlen, the
regimental executive officer, assumed command and at 1209 ordered that
the attack be resumed. [563] The 3d Battalion was to move northwest
along the road to Carigara for 3,000 yards and then set up a night
perimeter. The 2d Battalion, in support astride the highway, was to
secure the high ground 500 yards northwest of Jaro, while the 1st
Battalion was to move to the town of Jaro from its position at the
Mainit River bridge.
The artillery concentrated its fire on the area to the front, and
at 1230 the 3d Battalion renewed the attack with Company K on the
left of the road and Company I on the right. After the troops had
proceeded about 200 yards, heavy artillery, machine gun, mortar,
and rifle fire pinned them down. Company L in the rear thereupon
attempted a flanking movement to the left across an open field but
came under heavy fire from a ridge that commanded the road. All the
companies were forced to pull back. At the end of the day's action,
the forward elements were still on the outskirts of Jaro.
During the night, the 11th, 52d, and 63d Field Artillery Battalions
fired continuously in support of the 34th Infantry. The corps artillery
placed harassing and interdiction fire along the Jaro-Carigara
road. [564]
On the morning of 31 October Colonel Dahlen ordered the 3d Battalion
to move toward Tunga along the Jaro-Carigara road. The 2d Battalion
was to pass through the 3d along the highway, and the 1st Battalion
was to be prepared to follow the 2d. [565] The 19th Infantry was
to protect the rear of the 34th Infantry and forestall any attempt
by the Japanese to send reinforcements from north of the Binahaan
River. The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, was to move to Jaro via
Tingib and Macanip to assist the 34th Infantry. [566]
At 0820 the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, supported by the 2d Battalion,
attacked along the Jaro-Carigara highway. Company L went down the
highway and then to the rear of the hill from which it had been
repulsed the previous day; Company I moved forward astride the road;
and Company K was in reserve. As advanced elements of Company I reached
a stream, they came under intense fire but moved to a position from
which they could attack the reverse slope of the hill. Other elements
of the company moved off the road to the top of the hill. When they
pushed westward along the crest they discovered another hill behind it.
In the meantime the troops that had attacked the reverse slope came
under intense fire from the second hill. Concentrated fire was laid
on the second hill and a heavy machine gun was sent to the top of the
first. Company I, protected by the fire, was thus able to assault
and take the first hill. Company K, the reserve company, thereupon
occupied the hill. These assaults drove the enemy into Company L, which
was at the foot of the hill. A determined three-hour fight followed,
and, although at one time elements of the company were driven across
the highway, the company retaliated and eventually cleared the area
of Japanese.
While this fight was going on the 2d Battalion, with Company E as
the point, moved along the highway toward Tunga. At 1130 the Japanese
opened fire on Company E at the Ginagan River. Tanks, which had been
brought up, fired with machine guns at the enemy positions on the left
of the road. The Japanese retaliated with mortar and artillery fire,
pinning down an antitank gun crew and Company E's mortar section. The
artillery fired a concentration on the Japanese positions and the
advance was able to continue.
At 1430 the enemy reopened fire on the 2d Battalion at the Yapan
River. Company G was in the lead, with the 2d Platoon on the left of
the road and the 3d Platoon on the right. Company E was on Company
G's left flank. With all the troops in a skirmish line, the 2d
Battalion, with tanks, moved down the road to attack. When Company
G came under fire the tanks went to its assistance, and the Japanese
then concentrated their fire on the armor.
Meanwhile Company E pushed down the left side of the road but was
halted by fire from an enemy pillbox on a knoll. A self-propelled
105-mm. howitzer was brought up, and fire from this weapon
completely disorganized the Japanese and forced them to desert their
position. When the howitzer had exhausted its ammunition, another
was brought up to replace it. By this time, however, the enemy's
artillery was registering on the spot and the second was disabled
before it could fire a shot.
Elements of the 41st Infantry Regiment, protected by artillery,
gathered in front of Company E and emplaced machine guns in a position
from which they could enfilade the company. Thereupon Company E
committed its reserve platoon to its left flank but shortly afterward
received orders to protect the disabled howitzer and dig in for the
night. A tank was sent up to cover the establishment of the night
perimeter. Company G received orders to fall back and dig in for the
night, and upon its withdrawal the Japanese concentrated their fire
on Company E. Although badly shaken, Company E held on and protected
the howitzer. A tank was sent forward to tow the weapon, but since it
was untowable because of broken treads the crew sent a shell through
it to prevent its use by the enemy. Company E then disengaged and
fell back through Company F, as Company G had done.
Under the protective cover of night, the 41st Infantry Regiment
retreated.
During the day the 19th Infantry had followed closely, protecting the
rear of the 34th Infantry and the southern flank of the 24th Division
and blocking off the enemy escape routes. That night General Irving
gave the plan of action for the following day--1 November--for the
24th Division. The 19th Infantry was to continue to block the enemy
escape routes and protect the southern flank of the division along
the Binahaan River east from Tingib to Yapad, move a battalion into
Jaro, establish a roadblock in the vicinity of Jaro, and protect the
line of communications behind the advance of the 34th Infantry as
far as Gibucauan. The 34th Infantry was to continue advancing along
the Jaro-Carigara highway, seizing every opportunity to make a wide
envelopment, especially from the northeast. [567]
In accordance with this order, Companies A and B, 34th Infantry,
were sent at 0820 to make a wide flanking movement eastward to Tuba
and then strike at Tunga from the northeast. At 0900, after patrols
had reported no enemy contact, the 2d Battalion moved on down the
Jaro-Carigara highway.
Both battalions proceeded rapidly. At 0900 the 1st Battalion was in
Tuba, and at 1100 the 2d had passed through the scene of the previous
day's fighting and was in Giagsam. The troops found much matériel,
including two 37-mm. guns and numerous range finders, machine guns,
rifles, packs, and helmets, which the enemy had left in his precipitous
flight. Both battalions closed on Tunga. They paused for rest and
then moved on down the highway toward Carigara. At 1600 when the 34th
Infantry formed its perimeter for the night, its advance unit, the
1st Battalion, was 1,000 yards from Sagkanan, and its rearmost unit,
the 3d Battalion, was at Tunga. [568]
On the previous day the regimental headquarters had moved into Jaro. It
had been a bloody road to Carigara, but the 24th Division was knocking
at the back door for admittance as the 1st Cavalry Division on the
north was demanding entrance at the front door.
Capture of Carigara
By 31 October it became evident to the Americans that there was unusual
activity on the part of the Japanese, who were apparently building
strong defensive positions around Carigara and pouring reinforcements
into the town. Statements by reconnaissance parties and reports from
guerrillas led to the belief that 2,000 to 3,000 Japanese were in
the town and its environs. [569] The enemy was capable of bringing
up a considerable number of reinforcements along the Ormoc road,
or of attacking the American left flank from the south. [570] The
situation remained unchanged on 1 November.
Plans of X Corps
In view of the apparent strength of the Japanese defenders,
General Sibert felt that no means should be left untried to insure
the successful reduction of the strong point. Both the corps and
division artillery were to fire on the town, with a heavy 15-minute
preparation from 0745 to 0800 on the front of the 24th Infantry
Division to a depth of 1,000 yards. Immediately thereafter a series of
concentrations covering 1,000 yards in depth would be fired from 0800
to 0840, advancing at the rate of 100 yards every four minutes. All
available artillery except one light battalion of the 24th Infantry
Division would then fire in front of the 1st Cavalry Division to a
depth of 1,000 yards from 0845 to 0900. Thereafter the artillery of
each division would support its own division. [571]
The 2d Brigade, reinforced, was to seize Carigara from Barugo,
[572] while the 34th Infantry would attack along the Jaro-Carigara
highway. General Hoffman of the 2d Cavalry Brigade commanded the attack
against Carigara. In preparation for the combined assault, the forces
of the 1st Cavalry Division had been gathering in the Barugo area.
On 1 November General Hoffman arrived at Barugo, examined the troops,
and made last-minute arrangements. The assault from the north was to
be in a column of squadrons: 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry; 2d Squadron,
8th Cavalry; and the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, in reserve. The squadron
last mentioned was to establish and maintain communication with the
34th Infantry, which was to move out in a column of battalions, wait
on the outskirts of Carigara until the town had been secured by the 2d
Cavalry Brigade, and then flank the town and move on to Capoocan. [573]
During the day of 1 November and the night following, General Suzuki
withdrew his troops from Carigara and established very strong
positions in the mountains southwest of the town in the vicinity
of Limon. By "clever deception as to his strength and intentions,"
the enemy completely deluded the Americans into believing that his
major force was still in Carigara. [574]
Seizure of Carigara
Unaware of the Japanese withdrawal, the Americans proceeded with
the execution of their plans. During the American artillery fire on
the morning of 2 November some of the shells landed in the sector of
the 7th Cavalry, an accident which delayed the attack until 0935. At
that hour the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, followed by the 2d Squadron,
8th Cavalry, jumped off. Since the bridge over the Canomontag River
had been destroyed by the enemy and the river was not fordable,
it was necessary to utilize native canoes, only two of which were
available. This procedure consumed much time, but by 1130 the troops
completed the crossing. Troop E, 5th Cavalry, made contact with the
34th Infantry at 1100. Since the troops encountered no resistance, the
1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, followed by the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry,
entered the town at 1200 and established a perimeter. General Mudge,
the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, entered the town with the
assault cavalry troops. [575] The 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, outposted
the western and southern sections of the town. Patrols from the 34th
Infantry were already in Carigara.
At 0800 on 2 November the 34th Infantry moved out, the 1st Battalion
leaving its bivouac area 1,000 yards southeast of Sagkanan and going
down the highway, followed by the 2d Battalion, less Company G, and
the 3d Battalion. Company G of the 2d Battalion was to reconnoiter
the western side of Carigara in case an enveloping movement became
necessary. [576]
By 0900 the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, reached a small bridge
at the outskirts of Carigara and awaited word from the 1st Cavalry
Division. After a wait of one and a half hours, patrols were sent
into the western portion of Carigara, but they reported no enemy
contact. All was quiet and the town deserted. The battalion then
skirted Carigara and proceeded along the coast toward Capoocan. It
encountered difficulty in crossing the Carigara River, since the
bridge had been destroyed, but was able to get as far as Balud, where
it set up a night perimeter after being halted by enemy fire. The
2d Battalion moved to the Carigara River, where it dug in for the
night and was rejoined there by G Company. The 3d Battalion set up
its perimeter just behind the 2d, and the regimental headquarters of
the 34th Infantry was set up in Carigara.
In the advance through northern Leyte Valley the 24th Division had
lost 210 killed, 859 wounded, and 6 missing in action, but it had
killed an estimated 2,970 Japanese and taken 13 prisoners.
With the capture of Carigara, the second phase of General Krueger's
plan for the liberation of Leyte was completed. Panaon and San
Juanico Straits, respectively south and north of the island, had
been seized. Elements of the Sixth Army were on the west coast in
the vicinity of Baybay on the shores of Ormoc Bay, and others were at
Carigara near the northern entrance to Ormoc Valley. The two forces
were poised for a co-ordinated drive toward Ormoc Valley--the last
important Japanese stronghold on the island. Nearly all the tactically
significant airfields and ports, together with Leyte Valley, were in
the hands of the Sixth Army. Victory appeared to be in sight--but
continued reinforcement of the island by the Japanese and delay in
the construction program for building Leyte Valley into a major air
and supply base were matters of grave concern.