Northern Leyte Valley: Part One
By the evening of 20 October the Tacloban airfield and Hill 522,
overlooking the town of Palo at the northern entrance to Leyte Valley,
were in the hands of the X Corps. The night of 20-21 October was
free from enemy activity in the sector of the 1st Cavalry Division,
and the exhausted troops were able to obtain an unquiet rest during
their first night in the Philippines. Having secured the Tacloban
airfield they were in position to march on Tacloban, the capital of
Leyte, the following morning. Tacloban is situated on a peninsula at
the head of San Pedro Bay. A string of low hills, stretching from
Anibong Point along the base of the peninsula to the southeast,
commands the approaches to the town. [466] Throughout the night the
61st Field Artillery Battalion delivered harassing fires on the hills
south of the town. [467] (Map 9)
San Juanico Strait
Drive Toward Caibaan
General Krueger wished to push rapidly through Leyte Valley and
secure its important roads and airfields before the Japanese could
regroup and offer a firm line of resistance. In the north, securing San
Juanico Strait would prevent any of the enemy from crossing over from
Samar. Control of the road that led through the interior of northern
Leyte Valley would give the possessor a firm hold on the northern
part of the valley. With a successful two-pronged attack--elements
of the 1st Cavalry Division driving north along San Juanico Strait
and units of the 24th Infantry Division pushing along Highway 2--the
X Corps would arrive at Carigara Bay. At that point the corps would
be in position to contest any Japanese amphibious movement through
Carigara Bay, and at the same time elements of the corps could drive
south through Ormoc Valley and secure the important port of Ormoc.
Preceded by a naval and air bombardment and a preparation by the
61st Field Artillery Battalion, [468] the 1st Cavalry Division at
0800 on 21 October resumed the assault against the Japanese. [469]
The division was to capture Tacloban and then secure control over San
Juanico Strait. [470] The 7th Cavalry, 2d Brigade, had been assigned
the mission of seizing Tacloban, [471] which was defended by elements
of the Japanese 33d Infantry Regiment. [472]
On the morning of 21 October the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, joined
the regiment's 2d Squadron in a drive on Tacloban. At 0800 the
7th Cavalry moved with squadrons abreast, the 1st Squadron on the
right and the 2d Squadron on the left, astride the highway leading
to Tacloban. Although the squadrons found the terrain extremely
swampy and movement difficult, by 1400 the 1st Squadron was on the
outskirts of the town and the 2d was halted at the foot of a hill
overlooking Tacloban. The Japanese had dug into the hills overlooking
the capital. The division artillery then shelled the hill and the
high ground to the north. [473] At 1500 the fire was lifted and the
forward movement proceeded.
The men of the 1st Squadron entered Tacloban to conduct a
house-to-house search for concealed Japanese. They received a
tumultuous welcome from the Filipinos who lined the sides of the
narrow streets, waving American flags and urging gifts of eggs and
fruit upon the troopers. [474] They were also welcomed by the governor
of the province. The 2d Squadron, on the other hand, was held up by an
estimated 200 Japanese who were entrenched in pillboxes and foxholes
and behind the dense vegetation that covered the hilly area. As heavy
fire from the enemy pinned down the troops, Col. Walter H. Finnegan,
the regiment's commanding officer, sent the Antitank Platoon and
elements of the Regimental Weapons Troop in support of the 2d Squadron,
where that unit faced the southern end of the hill mass. [475]
The Weapons Troop was ordered to lay aside its automatic weapons and
assault the hill with rifles, but it was pinned down by intense fire
from an enemy bunker to the immediate front. Pfc. Kenneth W. Grove,
an ammunition carrier, volunteered to clear the Japanese from the
position. He worked his way through the underbrush to the flank of
the bunker, then charged in the open against its front and killed
the gun crew. [476] The advance then continued.
The movements of the Weapons Troop and the Antitank Platoon were
successful, and by 1800 the southern half of the hill and the town
of Tacloban were in American hands. Shortly after the seizure of
the capital, General Mudge, the division commander, inspected the
town from a medium tank. At one point, where the Japanese had turned
over a truck to form a roadblock, the general personally received the
surrender of forty Formosan laborers. [477] The regimental command post
was established in the building that had housed the Leyte Intermediate
School for Girls.
The following day, after an intensive mortar, artillery, and air
bombardment on a hill southwest of Tacloban, the 2d Squadron of the
7th Cavalry moved out against the hill at 0820. Although the terrain
was rugged, the position was overrun by 1100. The 1st Squadron spent
the day mopping up the town in search of the enemy. At 1108 General
Mudge released the 8th Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Bradley, to 2d
Brigade control.
By the end of 22 October the capital of Leyte and its hill defenses
were securely in American hands. The 7th Cavalry was one day ahead
of schedule, a fact partly explained by the unexpectedly light
resistance of the Japanese and partly by the vigor of the 7th Cavalry's
advance. [478]
On the morning of 22 October the 8th Cavalry made a "victory" march
through liberated Tacloban and went into perimeter to the west of
the 7th Cavalry on the hills overlooking the town. Troop C went to
Anibong Point in order to guard the brigade flank from a suspected
Japanese barge landing through San Juanico Strait.
Shortly after the command post was opened at 1830, the 8th Cavalry
received orders for the 1st Squadron to depart at 0700 on the
following day. It was to pass through the 7th Cavalry and secure the
bridge crossing the Diit River so as to protect the 2d Squadron,
8th Cavalry. The latter was directed to move northwest across the
mountains, seize Santa Cruz, which was on Carigara Bay about sixteen
miles northwest of Tacloban, and locate the remnants of the Japanese
who had opposed the 7th Cavalry in its advance through the city.
The 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, passed through the 7th Cavalry at 0900
on the morning of 23 October. By nightfall the squadron had crossed
and secured the Diit River bridge and routed small groups of the
enemy. The 2d Squadron experienced difficulty in securing Filipino
carriers for the trip up the Diit River and across the unmapped and
unknown mountains to Santa Cruz. It resolved the situation by driving
a truck through the streets and seizing every able-bodied Filipino
in sight. These "volunteers" were sufficient to get the squadron to
its night bivouac on the Diit River. The "indignant carriers [then]
dissolved into the jungle." [479] The 2d Squadron established its
perimeter near the village of Diit.
Meanwhile, the 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division had been ordered
to move west on 21 October. This maneuver was designed to protect
the southern flank of the 2d Brigade and to prevent the Japanese
from reinforcing their troops in Tacloban. The 1st Brigade moved
out at 0800 toward Caibaan, the 12th Cavalry on the right and the
5th Cavalry on the left. [480] Troop B of the 12th Cavalry advanced
toward the barrio of Utap, and though it ran into enemy opposition it
was able to secure the town after being reinforced by the regimental
and brigade reconnaissance platoons. Swampy ground made the going
very difficult. The troops captured a large Japanese supply dump
which contained quantities of foodstuffs, vehicles, and equipment,
and valuable documents. [481]
The 1st and 2d Squadrons of the 5th Cavalry advanced abreast toward
Caibaan and the high ground beyond the town. They encountered only
sporadic rifle fire in Caibaan but at the foot of one of the hills they
met determined opposition from about half a company of Japanese. After
an exchange of fire, the Japanese signified they wished to surrender
by waving a white flag. The heavy machine guns were brought into
position and the American soldiers signalled for the Japanese to
disrobe in order to forestall their using concealed grenades or other
weapons. The Japanese opened fire and wounded five men. The automatic
weapons then returned the fire, killing thirteen of the enemy. The
remaining Japanese withdrew over the hill, and contact was lost.
There was no enemy activity in the 5th Cavalry's sector during
the night of 21-22 October, and at 0645 the advance elements of
the 1st Squadron began to move up the steep east slope of a hill
west of Caibaan. The squadron continued its advance, and at 1200
engaged in a short skirmish between the hill and Caibaan, killing ten
Japanese. The difficult terrain, rather than the Japanese, slowed the
advance. Hampered by tall cogon grass, which cut off every breeze,
the troops struggled up steep slopes and sharp ridges. Exposed to
the hot sun and burdened with equipment and ammunition, they were
soon exhausted. At 1447 the 5th Cavalry received orders to halt all
forward movement until further notice. The 1st Squadron was in bad
condition physically, since it had been steadily on the move for a
day and a half and had consumed all its rations and water. At the
end of the day, 22 October, the squadron was still at the base of
the hill, but the rest of the regiment had reached Caibaan. [482] On
the following day elements of the 5th Cavalry were sent to Tacloban
to act as a guard of honor for General MacArthur. The other units
remained in position. [483]
Restoration of Civil Government
The guard of honor, consisting of 1st Lt. John Gregory and thirty
enlisted men of the 5th Cavalry, arrived at Tacloban later on 23
October. President Osmeña of the Philippine Commonwealth was also
present, having come ashore for the occasion. [484] A simple but
impressive ceremony was held in front of the municipal building
of Tacloban, though the interior of the edifice was a shambles of
broken furniture and scattered papers. A guard of honor of "dirty and
tired but efficient-looking soldiers" [485] was drawn up in front
of the government building. General MacArthur broadcast an address
announcing the establishment of the Philippine Civil Government with
President Osmeña as its head. Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland then read
the official proclamation. President Osmeña spoke appreciatively of
American support and of the determination of the Filipinos to expel
the enemy. "To the Color" was sounded on the bugle, and the national
flags of the United States and the Philippines were simultaneously
hoisted on the sides of the building. Colonel Kangleon of the guerrilla
forces was then decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross.
Few Filipinos except representatives of the local government were
present for the ceremony. Apparently the inhabitants had not heard of
it, or did not know that they were permitted to attend. Information
quickly spread, however, that the civil government had assumed control,
and as General MacArthur and his party left town the civil population
cheered them. [486]
Drive up the Strait
Though the 1st Cavalry Division had secured Tacloban and the region
surrounding it, there remained the important task of seizing San
Juanico Strait to prevent the Japanese from bringing in reinforcements
from Samar. (See Map 2.) [487] San Juanico Strait, connecting the
Leyte Gulf with Samar Sea, forms a narrow passage between Leyte and
Samar Islands. Highway 1 ends on its western shore, some fourteen miles
north of Tacloban at Guintiguian, a small barrio (not shown on the map)
two miles north of San Isidro. A ferry between Guintiguian and La Paz,
just across the strait on Samar, links the road networks of the two
islands. The 2d Brigade's mission was to seize Guintiguian on Leyte;
La Paz on Samar (including the establishment of a bridgehead on the
north bank of the Silaga River, three miles northeast of La Paz); and
Babatngon on the north coast of Leyte. By shore-to-shore operations
it was also to seize Basey on the island of Samar and the area north
and west of it. [488]
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
PROCLAMATION
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES:
I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand
again on Philippine soil--soil consecrated in the blood of our
two peoples. We have come, dedicated and committed, to the task of
destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives,
and of restoring, upon a foundation of indestructible strength,
the liberties of your people.
At my side is your President, Sergio Osmeña, worthy successor of
that great patriot, Manuel Quezon, with members of his cabinet. The
seat of your government is now therefore firmly re-established
on Philippine soil.
The hour of your redemption is here. Your patriots have
demonstrated an unswerving and resolute devotion to the principles
of freedom that challenges the best that is written on the pages
of human history. I now call upon your supreme effort that the
enemy may know from the temper of an aroused and outraged people
within that he has a force there to contend with no less violent
than is the force committed from without.
Rally to me. Let the indomitable spirit of Bataan and Corregidor
lead on. As the lines of battle roll forward to bring you within
the zone of operations, rise and strike. Strike at every favorable
opportunity. For your homes and hearths, strike! For future
generations of your sons and daughters, strike! In the name of
your sacred dead, strike! Let no heart be faint. Let every arm
be steeled. The guidance of divine God points the way. Follow in
His Name to the Holy Grail of righteous victory!
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR.
General Hoffman had been warned that his 2d Brigade would be assigned
the mission of securing San Juanico Strait and possibly landing
on Samar; he therefore directed an overwater reconnaissance of the
sector. Consequently, on 23 October the staff officers of the 8th
Cavalry and of the 1st Squadron of the regiment boarded an LCI at the
Tacloban dock. The landing craft made the trip through San Juanico
Strait to the barrio of Babatngon on Janabatas Channel without
incident. On the return trip, the officers observed some Japanese
positions which overlooked the ferry crossing at the Guintiguian
landing on Leyte. The party made a brief reconnaissance of the
Guintiguian side of the ferry landing and of La Paz on the Samar
side. There was no enemy contact. [489]
As a consequence General Hoffman, in issuing his orders for the next
day, assigned the following missions: the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry,
under Maj. Leonard E. Smith would embark at 0630 on 24 October,
and move overwater to seize the town of Babatngon. This operation
would seal off the western entrance into San Juanico Strait. Troop C,
reinforced, of the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, under Maj. F. Raymond
King, was also to embark at 0630 from Tacloban and move north to
seize the ferry crossing between Guintiguian and La Paz. At the same
time the rest of the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, under Lt. Col. Mayers
Shore, would drive north along the highway and effect a juncture with
C Troop at Guintiguian. [490]
The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, sailed for Babatngon at 1030 on 24
October. The trip was uneventful, and at 1330 the squadron arrived
at Babatngon, sent out security patrols, and established a perimeter
defense. On 25 October the Japanese launched an air attack, hitting
an LCI in the Babatngon harbor. Eight men were killed and seventeen
wounded, all of them Navy personnel. [491] For the next few days
the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, made a series of overwater movements
through Carigara Bay and exploited the lack of any strong Japanese
resistance along the northeast coast of the Leyte Valley. [492]
Reinforced Troop C of the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, was ready to
sail by 0630 on 24 October but was delayed by a Japanese air attack
on the shipping in Tacloban harbor and San Pedro Bay, made by about
fifty medium bombers and Army fighters. Before they could reach the
beachhead area, many of the Japanese planes were shot down by Navy
combat air patrol fliers, who also beat off another wave of about
thirty more planes. Two of the American planes crash-landed on the
Tacloban airfield, while a third landed in the water. [493] There
was minor damage to American shipping.
One of the Japanese planes crashed less than 200 yards from elements
of Troop C but the force got under way. The troopers, after running
down and killing five Japanese in a canoe, arrived at La Paz, Samar,
their destination, without further excitement and established a
roadblock on the road leading to Basey.
The 1st Squadron of the 8th Cavalry, which was to travel overland
by Highway 1 to make junction with Troop C at the ferry crossing,
broke camp at 0700 on the morning of the 24th. The squadron was
accompanied by a platoon of light tanks and weapons carriers with
rations and ammunition. Since the passage was through enemy-held
territory and over unfamiliar terrain, and since the strength of the
Japanese forces was unknown, it was estimated that it would take the
squadron a minimum of two days to cover the sixteen and a quarter
miles between the two forces. The commanding officer of the squadron,
however, by utilizing stream-crossing expedients to the utmost in
snaking tanks and vehicles across the many intersecting streams and
by driving the troops, was able to complete the difficult march to
Guintiguian and go into perimeter with all his men except a rear guard
at 2130 on the same day. At the end of 24 October, the 8th Cavalry,
less the 2d Squadron, was in a position from which it could defend
its beachhead on Samar. [494]
At 2300 an estimated hundred Japanese from the 2d Battalion, 9th
Infantry Regiment, attacked the roadblock which had been established
on the road leading to Basey. The Japanese opened up with machine
gun fire and tossed several grenades against the position. The
defenders repelled the attack with machine gun and mortar fire,
but for the remainder of the night "confusion reigned supreme and
the odds and ends were not rounded up until the next morning." [495]
During the next three days the 8th Cavalry consolidated its position
and extended its perimeter to include a bridgehead on the Silaga River.
By the end of 27 October the 1st Cavalry Division had seized
Tacloban and gained control of San Juanico Strait. Because of supply
difficulties the 2d Brigade on 25 October had ordered the 2d Squadron,
8th Cavalry, to discontinue its movement toward Santa Cruz, to remain
in bivouac along the upper reaches of the Diit River and patrol that
area. At this time the casualties of the 1st Cavalry Division amounted
to 4 officers and 36 enlisted men killed, 14 officers and 185 enlisted
men wounded, and 8 enlisted men missing in action. [496] During the
same period, the division reported it had killed 739 of the enemy
and had taken prisoner 7 Japanese, 1 Formosan, and 1 Chinese. [497]
The opposition had been light--much lighter than had been
expected. Elements of the division had therefore been sent south to
reinforce the 24th Division, which had borne the brunt of the Japanese
opposition in the X Corps sector in its drive through northern Leyte
Valley toward Carigara Bay.
Leyte Valley Entrance
Defense at Pawing
At the end of 20 October the 24th Division had established a firm
beachhead near Palo, averaging a mile in depth, and had secured Hill
522 which overlooked Palo. [498] (Map 10) The 24th Division was to
seize Palo and drive astride the road that ran northwest through
the Leyte Valley to Carigara. The 34th Infantry, in the vicinity of
Pawing, had its 2d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. James F. Pearsall,
Jr., 100 yards west of Highway 1, with the northern elements of the
battalion in contact with the 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division
on the right. The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, was just short of
the highway. The leading elements of the 19th Infantry were on Hill
522. [499]
At 0100 on 21 October three companies of Japanese, [500] part of
the 33d Infantry Regiment, [501] under cover of darkness and aided
by heavy machine gun and mortar fire, struck from the south along
Highway 1. The leading elements made a double envelopment of the
American flanks while the main force came down the road and attacked
the perimeter of the 2d Platoon of Company G. By 0200 the enemy,
still employing machine gun and mortar fire, had pushed to within a
few yards of the American positions and had killed or wounded everyone
but Pvt. Harold H. Moon, Jr., in the first two positions.
The Japanese then centered their fire upon Private Moon, who, although
wounded by this fire, replied with his submachine gun. An enemy officer
attempted to throw grenades at Moon's position and was killed. The
Japanese then brought up a light machine gun to within twenty yards
of his position. Moon called back the range correction to friendly
mortars which knocked out the machine gun. For over four hours he
held back the enemy. At dawn an entire platoon with fixed bayonets
charged toward him. From a sitting position he fired into the Japanese,
killed eighteen, and repulsed the attack. He then stood up and threw
a grenade at a machine gun that had opened up on his right. He was
hit and instantly killed. [502] The Japanese then resumed their
attack, but the remnants of Moon's platoon fixed bayonets, charged,
and succeeded in breaking through the enemy line.
In the meantime the enemy hit the perimeter of Company L. For
several hours the Japanese felt out the company positions, and then,
covered by three machine guns, they charged in platoon strength on
the east side of the company's perimeter. The company, supported
by mortar fire, retaliated and assaulted the Japanese in front of
the perimeter. Attempted movements around both the enemy flanks
failed. A frontal assault, protected by fire from both flanks, was
then successfully made by the company, and the Japanese force was
routed. There were 105 enemy dead in the immediate area of the company.
By this time it was dawn, and Pearsall's men began extensive
countermeasures. Concentrated mortar fire was laid down, and, since
Japanese artillery was shelling the American positions, artillery
and air strikes were requested. At 0900 Battery A of the 63d Field
Artillery Battalion fired 150 rounds on the Japanese. [503]
At a point 1,500 yards south of Pawing naval flyers from the Seventh
Fleet strafed the enemy and, in co-operation with the artillery fire,
successfully broke the back of the offensive. The enemy scattered
into the rice paddies. Members of the 2d Battalion were then able
to go down the road and mop up. More than 600 Japanese were killed
during the engagement. [504] Company G, which had borne the brunt of
the attack, lost fourteen men killed and had twelve wounded.
The battalion had scarcely finished breakfast when at 1000 it was given
the mission of seizing a hill mass immediately west of its position
at Pawing. After artillery and naval gunfire had been placed upon the
hill for fifteen minutes, [505] E Company was to take the northern
knoll of the hill mass and F Company to take the southern knoll. It
was not until 1400, however, that the attack jumped off. Company E
met no opposition, and within twenty-five minutes was able to occupy
its objective.
Company F, commanded by Capt. Paul Austin, had more difficulty. Its
objective was a steep hill, heavily covered with cogon grass ten to
twelve feet high, which limited visibility to a few feet. A trail
ran west from a small clump of trees to the top of the hill, and
then south along the crest of the ridge where the grass was only six
inches high. The company proceeded west in a column of platoons and at
1430 reached the foot of the hill. At the western edge of the group
of trees, the 1st and 3d Platoons turned left and advanced directly
toward the highest point of the hill. The 2d Platoon, with machine
guns, continued up the path.
As the 2d Squad of the 1st Platoon reached the crest and as the
1st Squad had nearly done so, an estimated 200 Japanese from the
33d Infantry Regiment opened fire upon the troops with rifles
and two machine guns that were emplaced upon a knoll overlooking
the trail. Enemy riflemen also rolled grenades down upon the 1st
Squad. These actions pinned down both of the squads.
Protected by the machine gun fire, other enemy riflemen worked north
along the reverse slope of the ridge and began to throw grenades down
upon the 2d Platoon. The Japanese possessed a seemingly inexhaustible
supply of grenades, which they rolled down upon the Americans with
telling effect. Company F was unable to advance. By 1500 the 1st and
2d Squads of the 1st Platoon were forced off the forward slope. The
2d Platoon also had been unable to go ahead, and the company had
suffered fourteen casualties. Captain Austin ordered his company to
disengage for reorganization. Since the American mortars could not
fire directly upon the Japanese for fear of hitting friendly troops,
they were forced to fire over the enemy and gradually shorten the range
as the American troops disengaged. Consequently the fire at first was
not too effective. By 1600 the reorganization was complete, but Colonel
Pearsall decided to delay the attack until artillery support could be
obtained. Company F formed its night perimeter 500 yards from Pawing.
The following morning arrangements were made for an air strike by Navy
flyers on the positions of the 33d Infantry Regiment on the hill. It
was not until afternoon, however, that the strike could be effected. At
1345 the 63d Field Artillery Battalion marked with smoke the right
and left limits for the air strike. [506] At 1410 naval dive bombers
bombed and strafed the hill for ten minutes with very good results,
and the Japanese power to resist was broken. [507] Captain Austin's
Company F, accompanied by Colonel Newman, the regimental commander,
then moved out. Supported by artillery fire, Company F captured the
entire ridge by 1515 without a single casualty. The Pawing area was
now securely in American hands. Farther south the 19th Infantry was
engaged in fulfilling its mission of capturing the town of Palo.
Capture of Palo
At the end of the first day's fighting, C Company of the 19th Infantry
had just secured the top of Hill 522 and Company B at dusk had been
pinned down at the southern crest. The following morning artillery fire
effectively knocked out some enemy pillboxes on the north crest. Both
companies then simultaneously launched an attack down the far slope
of the hill. In the sharp fight that followed fifty Japanese from the
33d Infantry Regiment were killed and the hill was secured. [508] It
was not until late in the day, however, that supplies could be brought
to the troops and the wounded be evacuated. The 1st Battalion spent
the next few days mopping up the area and sealing off the tunnels
with grenades.
On the beach the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, on the morning of
21 October waited for naval gunfire to knock out positions that
blocked the beach road to Palo. These defenses consisted of mutually
supporting well-constructed pillboxes reinforced with logs and earth,
with intercommunicating trenches and foxholes. They were designed to
be used in resisting attacks from the beach and from the north. After
an all-night mortar concentration, naval gunfire was directed against
the positions, and at 1400 the 3d Battalion attacked. When within 200
yards of a road bend, Company I and elements of the Antitank Company,
leading the main assault, met strong resistance, which forced the
company to dig in. The other companies occupied the same positions
they had held the previous day. [509] During the night Company C of
the 85th Chemical Battalion, expending 500 rounds of ammunition,
laid intermittent fire from the 4.2-inch mortars on the Japanese
positions. [510]
At 0900 on 22 October the 3d Battalion, with Company I in the lead,
attacked with the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, which had been released
from division reserve, on its left flank. This co-ordinated advance
pushed past the defensive positions of the 33d Infantry Regiment,
many of which had been abandoned. The positions of the 3d Battalion,
19th Infantry, were taken over by the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry. The
latter battalion patrolled the road and eliminated scattered Japanese
pockets of resistance south to the Palo River.
The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was to secure Palo, which is situated
about one mile inland on the south side of the Palo River. The town
is an important road junction, the meeting point of the Leyte Valley
and east coast road systems. The coastal road, Highway 1, which
goes through Palo, crosses a steel bridge over the Palo River on the
edge of the town. Highway 2, a one-lane all-weather road for most of
its length, extends west to Barugo and Carigara. [511] Just outside
Palo are two hills, one on each side of the highway, which guard the
entrance into the interior. The Americans termed them Hills B and
C. Elements of the 33d Infantry Regiment were guarding Palo. [512]
Early in the morning of 21 October, the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,
moved west through enemy machine gun and rifle fire and bypassed the
enemy defensive position that had held it up the previous day. At
1155 the battalion reached the junction of the beach road and Highway
1. During the movement two men were killed and two wounded. At the road
junction, the battalion dispersed with machine gun fire a column of
about thirty-five Japanese moving south on Highway 1. Artillery fire
was then laid on a grove of trees, west of the road, to which the
enemy had fled. As the battalion proceeded south along the highway
between the road junction and the bridge, it came under artillery
fire from an undetermined source. The tempo of the march into Palo
was accelerated--"the troops wanted to move as rapidly as possible
from that vicinity. They double timed across the bridge." [513]
At 1500 they entered Palo without further opposition. [514]
The residents of the town were crowded into the church. As the
Americans entered, the church bell rang and the Filipinos came out and
greeted the troops. After the first exuberant welcome had subsided,
the soldiers ordered the civilians back into the church until they
could secure the town. In the house-to-house search, the troops found
some booby traps made from coconuts [515] and encountered Japanese
entrenched under and between houses in the western sector of the
town. Although the battalion had expected to outpost the entire town,
the menace of the Japanese appeared so threatening that a night
perimeter was established around the town square.
Defense of Palo
During the early part of the night there was continuous rifle fire from
individual Japanese. The 13th Field Artillery Battalion had arrived and
began to fire on the roads leading into the town, expending some 300
rounds of ammunition. At midnight some Japanese ammunition stored in a
house exploded, and the ensuing fire lasted for three hours. At 0400
on 22 October elements of the 33d Infantry Regiment counterattacked
along Highway 2 [516] but were repulsed by fire from the outposts. The
enemy then struck at the juncture of the left flank of Company F and
the right flank of Company G. The 81-mm. mortars of the 2d Battalion
fired on this point, expending all their ammunition. In the meantime
Battery B of the 13th Field Artillery Battalion and elements of the
63d Field Artillery Battalion moved up to within a hundred yards of
the front outposts and fired. The enemy stubbornly continued to fight,
throwing "everything he had into the attack." [517] At the same time
nearly a platoon of the enemy came out at the curve of the beach road
and started toward the bridge on Highway 1 at Palo, but these troops
were dispersed by light machine gun fire. Artillery fire forced the
Japanese to withdraw, and they were thrown back on all fronts. [518]
Though the battalion had lost 16 men killed and 44 wounded, it had
killed 91 Japanese. After the engagement, the battalion requested
additional ammunition, supplies, and equipment, and transportation
for the wounded. [519] The requests were complied with, though not
without danger since the Japanese had mined the road.
At 1330 the regimental headquarters of the 19th Infantry moved into
Palo. The regiment's 3d Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion at the
same time, thus enabling the latter to attack Hill B at 1425. [520]
The 3d Battalion spent the rest of the day and the following day
mopping up in Palo and sending probing patrols southward in order to
make contact with the XXIV Corps. [521] A patrol in Palo killed seven
Japanese dressed in civilian clothing, one of whom, a lieutenant,
had his insignia pinned inside his clothes. [522]
On the night of 23 October Col. Tatsunosuke Suzuki, the commanding
officer of the 33d Infantry Regiment, led a raiding detachment,
armed with rifles, sabres, grenades, and mines, into Palo from the
southwest. [523] Using Filipino civilians in front of them, the men
of the detachment tricked the guards at the outpost into believing
that they were guerrillas. The Japanese were thus able to capture two
machine guns and a 37-mm. gun. They penetrated to the town square and
charged, throwing explosives into houses, trucks, and a tank, and broke
into an evacuation hospital where they killed some wounded. They then
moved toward the bridge and mounted the captured machine guns on it,
[524] firing until their ammunition was exhausted and then abandoning
the guns. The American guards on the other side of the bridge, however,
were able to fire upon the bridge and its approaches so effectively
that they killed fifty Japanese, according to a count made the next
morning. The raid was completely broken up, and sixty Japanese,
including Colonel Suzuki, were killed. The American casualties were
fourteen killed and twenty wounded.
The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, had sent Company K to reconnoiter to
the south and if possible make contact with the XXIV Corps. On the
morning of the 24th the company entered San Joaquin to the south of
Palo. By 1600 the town had been secured and the company was prepared
to defend it. Engineers began to repair the damaged bridge so that
armored units could proceed southward along Highway 1. On the morning
of 25 October Company K advanced south from San Joaquin and by 1200 had
secured positions on the north bank of the Binahaan River, from which
patrols were sent into Tanauan. At 1430 the patrols met a motorized
unit of the 96th Division, establishing contact for the first time
between the X and XXIV Corps. The rest of the battalion moved out
of Palo the same morning and was able to advance rapidly with little
opposition and set up a perimeter at Castilla, 8,000 yards southwest
of Palo.
Thus the northern and southern approaches to Palo and the beachhead
area east of the town had now been secured. But on the western edge
of Palo were the two hills athwart Highway 2 and blocking passage into
Leyte Valley. Hill B on the southern side of the highway and Hill C on
the northern side would have to be secured before the Americans could
advance. Preliminary reconnaissance had revealed that these hills were
strongly held, and since the 24th Division, contrary to expectations,
had encountered considerably stronger opposition than the 1st Cavalry
Division, General Sibert decided to detach the 1st Brigade from the 1st
Cavalry Division and place it under X Corps control. The 2d Squadron
of the 5th Cavalry remained in position on the high ground west of
Tacloban, while the regiment's 1st Squadron moved into position in
Pawing, to relieve the 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry. The 12th Cavalry
assembled in the vicinity of Marasbaras in X Corps reserve. [525]
Capture of Hill C
At 0800 on 23 October the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, commanded by
Maj. Edwin N. Edris, and the 1st Platoon, 603d Tank Company, assembled
500 yards north of Hill 522 preparatory to launching an attack on
Hill C. [526] It was reported that 300 Japanese were in a strong
defensive position between Hills C and 331, the latter located west
of Pawing. Consequently, an air strike was called for and delivered
on the area, after which the battalion started for Hill C. The first
obstacle encountered was a small ridge known as Hill Nan, and just
beyond this ridge was another hill mass known as Hill Mike. Company
B advanced up Hill Nan in a skirmish line. When the company neared
the crest of the ridge, a machine gun 200 yards to its front opened
up, and at the same time the Japanese from dug-in positions on the
reverse slope began to throw grenades over the crest. The company
was halted. Three times during the afternoon it reached the crest,
only to be driven back by enemy fire. Several counterattacks were
repulsed, but the machine gun was not silenced.
At 1800 the company received orders to disengage so that artillery
fire might be laid upon the enemy positions. The Japanese immediately
counterattacked. An American lieutenant and a sergeant of the company
rushed to the crest with grenades which they threw upon the advancing
Japanese. This action enabled the company to disengage and return to
the assembly area with only a few casualties.
During the night artillery and 4.2-inch mortar fires were placed on
the ridge. As a result, on the following day, 24 October, the 1st
Battalion secured it without meeting any resistance. With this ridge
in American hands, the 3d Battalion was able to pass through the 1st
Battalion and secure without opposition Hill Mike, the last remaining
obstacle before Hill C. During the night artillery pounded Hill C.
On the morning of 25 October the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, moved
out to attack Hill C, with Companies I and K abreast. [527] Although
the troops found the hill difficult to climb, elements of Company
K reached its crest without opposition. The enemy started his usual
tactics of throwing grenades over the crest of the hill at Company I
as it neared the top. Since the company had suffered many casualties,
a platoon from Company K was sent to reinforce Company I. Finally, at
1700, the company took the crest of the hill and dug in for the night.
The 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry, which had been relieved by the 1st
Squadron, 5th Cavalry, moved out of Pawing at 0700 on 24 October. At
1030 it received orders to seize a small hill southeast of Hill
C. With Company E in the lead, the battalion proceeded in single file
up the hill, which was covered with cogon grass. As it had hitherto
been the practice of the Japanese to withhold their main fire until
the Americans neared the top of a hill, the troops expected little
opposition before reaching the crest. But while the company was still
a considerable distance from the top, elements of the 33d Infantry
Regiment opened up with rifles, machine guns, and grenades. This fire
pinned the company down, and the men immediately sought concealment
in the cogon grass. Light machine guns were brought up, but, because
of the steepness of the slope, they were ineffective. Artillery
and mortars fired for two hours against the entrenched Japanese
positions. At 1610 Company E renewed the attack and this time secured
the hill with little opposition. The 34th Infantry now occupied the
hills on the north side of Highway 2.
Seizure of Hill B
On 22 October the 3d Battalion of the 19th Infantry had relieved the
2d Battalion of the regiment at Palo, and the regimental commander
ordered the 2d Battalion to proceed against Hill B. [528] Earlier,
the 2d Battalion had sent patrols out preparatory to attacking the
hill. The 13th Field Artillery Battalion laid maximum supporting fires
on Hill B as naval bombers strafed it. [529] The 2d Battalion moved
out to the attack at 1425, and the concentrated artillery fire enabled
it to secure without resistance a ridge east of Hill B and then push
on down the road toward the hill. But as Company E, the lead company,
reached the foot of Hill B, it was met by a large group from the 33d
Infantry Regiment coming east down the road and around the hill. The
Japanese had left riflemen dug in on the steep banks of the road and
had posted others in the trees along the road. Some of these riflemen
allowed part of the American troops to pass and then opened fire. A
sharp fire fight broke out in which Company E killed an estimated
hundred of the enemy before being forced to withdraw to the ridge,
where the 2d Battalion dug in for the night. During the night the
13th Field Artillery fired on Hill B. At 0730 the following day the 2d
Battalion sent out two patrols to scout the enemy positions. The patrol
on the right flank was stopped by machine gun fire at a point 200 yards
west of the ridge and was forced to return. Mortar fire was placed
on the enemy machine guns, after which the 2d Battalion advanced,
reaching what was believed to be the crest of Hill B at 1530. [530]
As the forward progress was more difficult than had been expected, the
2d Squadron of the 12th Cavalry was sent to relieve the 1st Battalion,
19th Infantry, which had been engaged in mopping up Hill 522. [531]
This relieved battalion was given the mission of attacking Hill 85,
to the south of Palo, where the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop
had located a strong enemy position. During the night the artillery
placed concentrated fire upon Hill 85.
At 0800 on 24 October the men of the 2d Battalion moved out,
attempting to complete the capture of Hill B. [532] They were held
up by well-emplaced pillboxes and foxholes on the highest crest of
the ridge, having discovered that the crest they had first occupied
was not the true crest. Since the 33d Infantry Regiment seemed to
be well emplaced on the hill, Lt. Col. Robert B. Spragins had his
battalion move to the right. It took up a position overlooking a
narrow asphalt road that ran from Highway 2 to a Japanese supply
dump to the south. Colonel Spragins decided to attack Hill B from
this position on the following morning.
The 13th Field Artillery Battalion again pounded the enemy positions
on the hill during the night. On the morning of 25 October the
2d Battalion attacked with Companies G and E abreast. The troops
moved down the slope, across the road, and up the hill, with no
opposition. On reaching the crest, they were met by heavy fire that
came from well-constructed emplacements. Some of these positions were
six feet deep and five feet wide. Very heavy fighting broke out in
which the companies were barely able to hold their positions. The
11th and 52d Field Artillery Battalions fired in front of Hill B,
[533] and the enemy fire was silenced. Company E was forced back,
but Company G held on.
Although the hill was in American hands, the hold was very
precarious. Colonel Spragins therefore moved the rest of the battalion
up to Company G and ordered the latter to move out to a far ridge
in order to secure the hill firmly. This move was accomplished at
twilight. The rest of the battalion moved out to join Company G.
Starting in the dark, the battalion lost its way. At midnight the
troops came to the true crest of the ridge where the enemy had
an observation post surrounded by prepared positions. All were
empty. The Japanese had formed the habit of going to the villages
for the night and returning in the morning to man their posts. The
night movement of the battalion "literally caught them napping away
from their defenses." [534] The battalion had not reached Company G,
but it set up a defensive perimeter for the night. The hills guarding
Leyte Valley were now in American hands.
During the day the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, secured complete
control of Hill 85 without opposition. The battalion found an abandoned
position, mortar ammunition, and six dead Japanese.
By the end of 25 October the X Corps had made substantial progress
toward securing northern Leyte Valley. After capturing Tacloban,
the 1st Cavalry Division had pushed north and secured control over
San Juanico Strait. The 24th Division had secured Palo and the hill
fortresses that blocked the entrance into northern Leyte Valley. The
corps was now in a position to launch a drive into the interior of
the valley.