Southern Leyte Valley: Part Two
Before the invasion, the Japanese had reached the conclusion that if
and when the Americans landed on Leyte it would be in the Dulag area,
and their greatest efforts had therefore been directed toward making
that area impregnable. General Makino, commanding general of the 16th
Division, had stationed the following units in the Dulag sector: the
20th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Col. Keijiro Hokoda; elements
of the 22d Field Artillery Regiment; the 54th Air Field Company,
commanded by Comdr. Kazumasa Kumazawa; and the 7th Independent Tank
Company. [417] At 0300 on 21 October, General Makino withdrew from
the Dulag area to Dagami and established his command post in that
sector. [418] The effective fire of the preliminary naval bombardment
had driven the Japanese from the landing beaches.
The Dulag-Burauen Road
The beachhead quadrangle of the XXIV Corps was bounded, generally,
by the Dulag-Burauen-Dagami-Tanauan road. The sections of the road
bordering the northern edge of the quadrangle (Dagami to Tanauan)
and the eastern edge (Tanauan to Dulag) were, in general, in the
96th Division zone of action. The southern and western sides of
the quadrangle were assigned to the 7th Division. The road that ran
along the coast between Dulag and Tanauan was a one-way thoroughfare
which soon disintegrated under the heavy rainfall and military
traffic. (Map 8)
Besides the Dulag airstrip, which was approximately one mile west of
the town, there were three other airfields in the zone of action of
the 7th Infantry Division. The San Pablo airstrip was approximately
five miles west of Dulag and two miles east of Burauen. Its runway
extended generally east to west with a width of 164 feet and a length
of 4,920 feet. The field was overgrown with weeds and had not been
occupied by the Japanese. The Bayug airstrip was just north of the
highway and a half mile east of Burauen. It had a runway approximately
5,000 feet long. The Buri airstrip, the most important one in the
7th Division zone, was about one mile northeast of Burauen, ran in
a general east-west direction, and was also 5,000 feet long. [419]
Halfway to Burauen
General Hodge ordered the 7th Division to capture the Dulag airfield
and then drive west along the Dulag-Burauen road to seize Burauen
and its airfields. After this was done, the division was to turn
north along the Burauen-Dagami road and capture Dagami. [420] The
32d Infantry was to protect the division's right (north), maintain
contact with the 96th Division, and, if necessary, help the 184th
Infantry on its left to secure the Dulag airstrip west of the town of
Dulag. Securing the airstrip was to be the main effort of the 184th
Infantry. [421]
At the end of A Day (20 October), all the assault battalions of the
32d and 184th Infantry Regiments of the 7th Division were ashore. The
32d Infantry was on the right (north) flank and the 184th Infantry
on the left (south) flank. The 32d Infantry had advanced just beyond
Highway 1 in the area northwest of Dulag. [422] The 3d Battalion,
184th Infantry, was on the southern edge of the Dulag airstrip, while
the 1st Battalion of the regiment was directly left of the 3d, and the
2d Battalion was in reserve. [423] The 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry,
protecting the left flank of the XXIV Corps, was across the Daguitan
River at Dao; [424] the 1st and 2d Battalions of the same regiment
were to remain in division reserve.
The 7th Division had scarcely established itself for the night of
20 October when the Japanese launched two small-scale tank attacks
against the perimeter of the division. Since a gap existed between
the 184th and 32d Infantry Regiments, Company G of the 184th was
committed to fill the space. As the men of the company were digging
in for the night, three tanks from the 7th Independent Tank Company
came down the road and sprayed the area with machine gun fire, but
the fire was high and there were no casualties. Though the company
fired rifles, bazookas, and mortars against them, the tanks escaped
without injury. An hour later, when one of the tanks returned,
it was knocked out and its crew were killed by a rifle grenade. An
enemy scout car then dashed down the road, and its occupants killed
two men and wounded three others.
The 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, had established its night perimeter
on the edge of the Dulag airfield, with its right flank on the
Dulag-Burauen road. At 0130 three Japanese medium tanks moved along
this road. Pfc. George W. Tilk of Company M stopped one of these,
as it came into range, with one shot from his bazooka. The other
two tanks continued down the road but on their return trip they
were destroyed--one by the battalion supply detail and the other by
Pfc. Johnnie Johnson with his bazooka. [425]
The uneasy repose of the 7th Division was again broken at 0400 on 21
October when six enemy tanks attacked the sector of the 3d Battalion,
184th Infantry. Within thirty minutes the battalion knocked out two of
the tanks and forced the others to retreat. [426] The next disturbance
was at 0530 when about fifty Japanese launched a limited counterattack
against the night perimeter of Company K, 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry,
with light machine gun and rifle fire. The Americans broke up the
attack with machine guns, mortars, and artillery. [427] Daylight
revealed thirty-five enemy dead in front of the company perimeter,
and there was evidence that others had been dragged away.
Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold, commander, ordered the 184th and 32d
Infantry Regiments of the 7th Division to move west toward the Burauen
airstrips abreast. Since a gap of several hundred yards existed between
the two regiments, the battalions of the 184th Infantry were ordered
to veer to the right. At 0800 the 7th Division attacked, the 184th
Infantry on the left and the 32d Infantry on the right. There were
four battalions in the assault, from left to right: 1st Battalion,
184th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 32d
Infantry; and 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry. [428]
As the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, moved forward, it encountered
Japanese entrenched in positions along the hedgerows. Knocking
out these positions from hedgerow to hedgerow greatly retarded the
advance. The 3d Battalion on the left faced an impassable swamp. In
order to establish contact with the 184th Infantry and cover the area,
Company I moved around the left side of the swamp, and Company L went
around the right; Company K was to cover the gap between the 2d and
3d Battalions until the 2d Battalion could close it.
There was an enemy strong point between the 2d and 3d Battalions of
the 32d Infantry, but since Colonel Logie was anxious to continue the
advance of the regiment and straighten the line between the battalions,
he ordered the battalions to bypass the strong point, while the 1st
Battalion under Maj. Leigh H. Mathias was ordered to move from its
assembly area and reduce it. The lines were straightened somewhat,
but the swamps and the heavy foliage made contact very difficult.
The 2d and 3d Battalions came under fire from 75-mm. guns emplaced
in bunkers; tanks reduced these bunkers and the advance continued. A
report of the 32d Infantry boasts that "the reduction of pillboxes was
right down our alley." [429] By 1520 the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry,
had reached the regimental beachhead line; shortly thereafter the 2d
Battalion came abreast of the 3d.
The 1st Battalion of the 32d Infantry, however, experienced difficulty
in reducing the bypassed strong point, which it reached in the middle
of the afternoon. The Japanese defenses consisted of one 75-mm. and one
antitank gun emplaced in bunkers and four machine guns in pillboxes;
these were completely surrounded by an elaborate system of trenches
and foxholes and were occupied by approximately two platoons of
riflemen. [430] When the battalion reached the position, Companies
A and B, with Company A on the right, were on a line behind five
medium tanks and one M8 self-propelled 75-mm. howitzer from the Cannon
Company. As the troops moved across an open field toward a hedgerow,
the Japanese opened fire upon Company A. Company B also received fire
as it moved beyond the hedgerow. After several men had been killed
and others wounded, Company B halted until the Japanese positions
could be neutralized by the tanks and the howitzer.
As the tanks emerged from the hedgerow they came under heavy fire
from the Japanese antitank gun. Although some of the tanks were
hit, no serious damage was done; but the howitzer received a direct
hit that set it ablaze and exploded its ammunition. [431] The crew
abandoned the burning vehicle. Pfc. Fedele A. Grammatico crawled
up under enemy fire, removed the machine guns, which were intact,
and brought them safely back behind the lines. In the meantime,
Company A tried to advance and knock out the enemy antitank gun but
the Japanese stopped the company with direct fire.
Both companies were halted. The struggle resolved itself into a battle
between the tanks and the Japanese in entrenched positions. The tanks
finally silenced the enemy, and the infantrymen moved in with rifles
and bazookas and cleared out the foxholes. After the reduction of
this strong point, the 1st Battalion tried to overtake the 2d and
3d Battalions. This was not possible, and at 1800 the 1st Battalion
formed its own perimeter.
The 184th Infantry found little opposition in its area, but excessive
heat and the difficulty of maintaining communication in the high
cogon grass rendered its progress difficult. At 0900 the regiment
secured the Dulag airstrip and continued its forward movement against
sporadic rifle and machine gun fire. Contact had been broken with
the 32d Infantry, and at 1245 a gap of 3,000 yards existed between
the regiments. At 1515 the 184th Infantry was ordered to hold up its
advance and establish contact with the 32d. [432] It had advanced
approximately 1,000 yards beyond the division beachhead line.
On 21 October an unidentified Japanese soldier wrote in his diary:
Finally the enemy's gunfire and bombardment has reached our field
and road area (except the runway). Gunfire seems to fade to Dulag
area during the night. It seems that enemy tanks are approaching
San Pablo vicinity. We are preparing for them.... Barracks and
fuel dumps are to be burned. I am awaiting the opportune moment....
I feel alive during the night and dead during the day. Though
life and death are separated by a thin sheet of paper I will not
die until I see a face of a Yankee. [433]
During the night of 21-22 October all field artillery battalions
delivered harassing fires, and just before the assault they fired a
fifteen-minute barrage.
At 0800 the 32d Infantry moved out to the attack. The 2d Battalion on
the right faced difficult and swampy terrain lying along the winding,
steep-banked Calbasag River, which the troops had to cross twelve times
during the day's advance. In the afternoon a platoon of amphibian
tractors and another of amphibian tanks were sent to the aid of the
battalion, and engineers from the 13th Engineer Battalion constructed
temporary bridges over the river when necessary. [434] The 3d Battalion
of the regiment paced its speed of advance with that of the 2d.
In the meantime the 1st Battalion overtook the others and at 1000
moved to the right of the 3d Battalion, bringing the three units into
line. Earlier, at 0925, the 3d Battalion was advancing just to the
right of the Dulag-Burauen road when it received enemy artillery fire,
which came from four 75-mm. field pieces to the rear of a hedgerow
600 to 700 yards ahead. When the companies reached the hedgerow,
Company L received heavy fire from four machine guns which had been
emplaced to protect the field pieces.
Light machine guns and mortars were brought up, and the 31st Field
Artillery Battalion placed a five-minute concentration on the enemy
strong point. Three tanks from Company C, 767th Tank Battalion, were
poised for an assault. As soon as the artillery lifted its fire, the
tanks dashed forward and destroyed one machine gun and one 75-mm. field
piece immediately. The tanks then covered the rest of the area with
machine gun fire until Company L moved up and destroyed the remaining
gun positions with rifles and grenades. The action ended at 1240.
As the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was destroying the artillery
position, Company G of the 2d Battalion received heavy enemy machine
gun and rifle fire near the banks of the Calbasag River. The 3d
Platoon of Company G walked into an ambush of machine guns, which
fired from two pillboxes under native shacks. The platoon was pinned
down, having suffered ten casualties from the first burst of fire. To
keep the advance moving, Company G remained behind to knock out the
bunkers while Company F went forward to continue the advance with
Company E. Since the swamps prohibited the use of tanks, and the
mutually supported pillboxes prevented envelopment, and since the
nearness of friendly troops made the use of artillery dangerous,
all of Company G was held up. The 3d Platoon hugged the ground until
darkness enabled it to withdraw.
At 0900 on 22 October, planes from the Seventh Fleet bombed the
Japanese fortifications in front of the 184th Infantry. As on the
previous day, the heat, tangled foliage, and deep swamps, rather
than enemy action, slowed the advance of the regiment. Since the
184th Infantry's rate of advance was more rapid than that of the 32d
Infantry, orders were issued to the 184th after it had moved forward
an additional 2,800 yards to hold its position until the 32d Infantry
could close the gap. [435] The 184th maintained contact with the 3d
Battalion, 17th Infantry, by means of patrols.
The 184th Infantry waited most of the day for the 32d to come
abreast. By 1800 the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 32d Infantry
had advanced approximately half the distance to Burauen. The 3d
Battalion, 17th Infantry, on the southern flank of the division,
sent out reconnaissance patrols, which encountered small groups of the
enemy 1,000 to 1,200 yards south. The rest of the 17th Infantry moved
into an assembly area in the vicinity of the Dulag airfield. [436]
Changes in Plans
On the evening of 22 October both General Makino, commander of the 16th
Division on Leyte, and General Arnold, commander of the 7th Division,
made changes in their plans.
The 16th Division was divided into the Northern and Southern Leyte
Defense Forces. The Northern Leyte Defense Force, consisting of
the 9th Infantry Regiment reinforced by elements of the 22d Field
Artillery Regiment, would defend the Catmon Hill area against the
96th Division. The Southern Leyte Defense Force, which opposed
the 7th Division, was composed of the 20th Infantry Regiment, less
one battalion, the 2d Battalion of the 33d Infantry Regiment, the
7th Independent Tank Company, and two platoons of the 16th Engineer
Regiment. Some troops were to occupy the area in the vicinity of San
Pablo and the Calbasag River. The main force was to be centralized in
a prepared position near Hindang. Another group was to occupy Julita,
from which it would make small night raids. At the same time part
of this force was to operate along the right bank of the Daguitan
River, protecting the 16th Division's right flank. Another unit of
approximately 600 troops was composed of the 98th Airfield Battalion,
the 54th Airfield Company, and air-ground service units. It was
to occupy the key positions--the high ground west of Burauen, the
south end of Burauen, and the Buri airfield--and thus prevent the
Americans from using the airfield and stop the advance of American
tanks along the road. The main strength of the artillery (22d Field
Artillery Regiment, less the 6th Battery) would support the Southern
Leyte Defense Force. The engineers were to be prepared to demolish the
road between Dagami and Burauen and between Dagami and Tanauan. The
main force of the engineers was to secure the road connecting Dagami,
Hiabangan, Rizal, and Tingib. A naval unit was to protect a supply
dump east of Dagami, and all remaining units, together with the 16th
Division command post, would occupy positions in the vicinity of
Dagami. [437]
Three of the four airfields in the zone of the XXIV Corps were in
the vicinity of Burauen. General Arnold wished to seize them as
soon as possible, and at the same time he was anxious to advance so
rapidly that the Japanese would not have time to construct additional
fortified positions near the airfields. He accordingly rearranged
the assault troops. The 17th Infantry, less the 3d Battalion, with
the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, attached, was ordered to pass
through the 184th and 32d Infantry Regiments at 0830 on 23 October,
attack west astride the Dulag-Burauen road, and capture the San Pablo
airfield. The 767th Tank Battalion, in support of the regiment, was
either to precede the 17th Infantry or to operate with it, as the
terrain permitted. It was to jump off from the vicinity of the Dulag
airfield thirty minutes earlier than the assault units of the 17th
Infantry. The 32d and 184th Infantry Regiments were to follow 1,000
yards behind the 17th. [438] It was hoped that this "flying wedge"
formation would catch the Japanese off balance and that the rear
elements of the wedge would be able to take care of any disorganized
enemy units that had been bypassed.
On to Burauen
The flying wedge was very successful. The tanks of the 767th Tank
Battalion moved out at 0730 on the morning of 23 October. Though
one of the tanks was knocked out about 3,000 yards west of Julita
at 1000, the others reached the western edge of Burauen at 1712 and
scattered the enemy forces in that area. At 0800 the assault units
of the 17th Infantry jumped off, 400 yards to the rear of the tank
battalion. Because of the narrow front the column of troops was
elongated, and it was not until shortly after 0900 that the 1st
Battalion, 32d Infantry, was able to move forward. Because of the
difficult terrain and the blazing heat, the infantrymen experienced
difficulty in keeping up with the tanks. The troops encountered
sporadic opposition during the day, passed rapidly through the
barrios of Julita and San Pablo, and secured San Pablo airfield. At
1115 General Arnold notified Colonel Logie that the 32d Infantry was
to be responsible for the right flank of the 7th Division's zone of
action, less the 200-yard front covered by the 17th Infantry.
At 1700 the units prepared their night perimeters, the 1st Battalion of
the 32d, 400 yards south of the San Pablo airstrip; the 3d Battalion,
1,500 yards north of Julita; and the 2d Battalion in division reserve,
500 yards southeast of Julita. [439] At the same time the 17th
Infantry was on the west end of the San Pablo airfield. [440] The 184th
Infantry, minus the 2d Battalion, was south of the highway between San
Pablo and Julita. During the day's action, the commanding officer of
the Japanese 20th Infantry Regiment was killed. [441] The action for
the next few days resolved itself into two separate engagements--the
seizure of the Buri airstrip and the battle for Dagami.
Securing the XXIV Corps Beachhead Line
Burauen
The 7th Division attacked at 0830 on 24 October, using the same
formation employed on the previous day except that the 1st Battalion,
184th Infantry, reverted to regimental reserve. The 1st and 2d
Battalions, 17th Infantry, continued along the road to Burauen; the
32d Infantry crossed San Pablo airfield and then went to the right in a
north-northwest direction toward the Buri airstrip. The 2d Battalion,
17th Infantry, fought its way through the northeastern part of the
town of Burauen and managed to reach the road to Dagami. As the main
part of Burauen is south and west of the road, the barrio was in the
zone of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, which was advancing along
the left side of the road.
The 17th Infantry reached the edge of Burauen at 1030. As the troops
explored the situation, they found that though there was no organized
resistance in the town, scattered throughout Burauen were elements of
the 20th Infantry Regiment, dug in under the buildings in spider holes
and armed with satchel charges, Bangalore torpedoes made of bamboo,
and antitank mines. [442]
As the American tanks moved through the barrio, some of the Japanese
jumped out of their spider holes and held explosive charges against
the tanks in an attempt to destroy them at the cost of their own
lives. The assault forces of the 17th Infantry, despite the difficulty
of flushing the enemy from the spider holes under the buildings, made
steady progress and by 1400 had mopped up and secured the town. The
battalions re-formed and were ready to go north to Dagami.
The Buri Airstrip
At 0800 on 24 October, Colonel Logie was transferred to the
headquarters of the 7th Division and Lt. Col. John M. Finn assumed
command of the 32d Infantry. Colonel Finn ordered the 1st Battalion,
32d Infantry, to advance to positions across the San Pablo airfield
and then continue the attack northwest toward the Buri airstrip. The
2d Battalion remained in division reserve.
The Buri airfield was northeast of Burauen, with a heavily wooded
area on its northern edge. On the northern and western edges the
Japanese had constructed pillboxes in the high grass and heavy brush,
together with mutually supporting machine gun pillboxes interlaced
with extensive trench systems. On the southern side of the airstrip
the enemy had twenty strong field fortifications. Approximately
1,000 enemy troops were defending the sector--elements of the 20th
Infantry Regiment, the 98th Airfield Battalion, and the 54th Airfield
Company. The airfield had been extensively mined with 100-pound
aerial bombs buried nose up in the runway and scattered throughout
the dispersal area. Some of these bombs had electric fuzes and could
be detonated by enemy troops hidden in foxholes a short distance
away. [443]
The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, met no resistance as it moved out
from the vicinity of the San Pablo airstrip at 1123, but when the
battalion was 1,000 yards northwest of the airfield it ran into
well-camouflaged enemy positions. About 1400 the battalion attacked
the emplacements with Company A on the right, Company C on the left,
and Company B in reserve on the right rear of Company A. In the face
of intense enemy resistance, Company A moved forward and placed heavy
rifle and machine gun fire on the Japanese positions, which crumpled
under the attack. [444]
Although Company C fought valiantly to keep abreast of Company A,
the bulk of the enemy strength was in front of it. Heavy machine gun
fire on its left flank and in front pinned the company down and kept
it from moving forward. This delay created a gap between the two
companies which a platoon from Company B was ordered to fill.
When he found that Company C could not move, Major Mathias, commander
of the 1st Battalion, started out to locate Company A but was wounded
before he could reach it. Maj. Robert C. Foulston, Jr., the battalion's
executive officer, assumed command of the battalion as Major Mathias
was evacuated.
Intense enemy rifle and machine gun fire hit both of the flanks and
the front of Company C and forced the company to start a confused
withdrawal. The 2d Platoon pulled back, but four of its men were cut
off from the others and went the wrong way. These men, picking up
another who was seriously wounded, proceeded three quarters of a mile
behind the Japanese lines before they discovered their mistake. To
cover the withdrawal of the rest of the company a holding force,
consisting of one platoon from Company C and one platoon from Company
B, together with a section of heavy machine guns, was set up about
500 yards to the rear of Company C.
As Company C started its withdrawal, the enemy moved forward. Keeping
well concealed, the Japanese edged forward and laid down a heavy volume
of rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire on the troops, but the holding
force stopped the advance. An intense fire fight broke out in which
both sides suffered many casualties. The Americans held on grimly.
At 1530 Colonel Finn ordered the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, to move
to the left of the 1st Battalion, but the swamps and heavy foliage
made progress slow. By 1630 the 3d Battalion was 600 yards to the
left rear of the 1st Battalion.
During the fight Colonel Finn went forward. Grasping the seriousness
of the situation, he ordered the 1st Battalion to withdraw to San
Pablo airstrip and sent one platoon of the 3d Battalion to assist
the 1st Battalion in its withdrawal. The rest of the 3d Battalion was
to protect the withdrawal of the 1st. The troops rapidly carried out
the orders and withdrew to the airstrip. The 2d Battalion, released
from division reserve that evening, moved up on line with the 3d
Battalion. The 32d Infantry formed a defensive perimeter for the
night. [445]
During the day the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, captured a Japanese
private, Isamu Nakamaru, who had been a mechanic with the 7th
Independent Tank Company. He informed his captors that his company
originally had eleven tanks. Eight of these were lost in the action
near Julita; the others were at Buri but were out of commission. All
the tanks were obsolete and had been used mainly to clear and roll
the airstrips. [446]
On the morning of 25 October the 49th Field Artillery Battalion fired
concentrations from 0800 to 0830 in front of the 32d Infantry and
covered an area of 400 yards on each side of the Buri airstrip. [447]
At 0700 the 3d Battalion moved to the right and in front of the
1st. The 32d Infantry was to move out at 0830 with the 2d and 3d
Battalions abreast, each battalion to be preceded by a platoon
of tanks.
At 0830 the battalions attacked, both advancing 1,500 yards before
they encountered any serious obstacle. The 2d Battalion on the right
ran into the system of bunkers that protected the Buri airstrip. The
3d Battalion halted and waited for the 2d to overcome the bunkers and
move forward. Though an antitank gun was brought up to fire on the
bunkers, two futile attacks were launched against them and it became
apparent that the 2d Battalion would be considerably delayed. Colonel
Finn therefore ordered the 3d Battalion to advance and secure the
edge of the Buri airstrip, and, with its reserve company, to close
the gap thus created.
Colonel Finn also ordered the 1st Battalion to move closer to the
right flank of the 3d and prevent an enemy envelopment. Meanwhile,
strong patrols which the 3d Battalion had sent to within 300 yards
of the airstrip reported that they had encountered only one strong
point in the 3d Battalion's zone of advance. In order that the 3d
Battalion could be certain it was moving in the direction of the
airstrip, Colonel Finn requested an artillery liaison plane to drop
a flare over the southwest edge of the airfield. After this was done
the battalion resumed its attack and at 1700 reached the edge of the
airstrip. Fortunately the battalion immediately went into a defensive
position, for at 1715 a sharp enemy assault had to be repulsed with
machine gun and rifle fire. [448]
Meanwhile the 2d Battalion probed at the bunkers located at the edge
of the heavy woods on the northern fringe of the Buri airfield. These
defenses consisted of three bunkers connected by an elaborate system
of trenches and spider holes. Both flanks of the 2d Battalion received
machine gun fire, which became heavier upon any attempt to carry out an
enveloping movement. Under cover of fire from American heavy machine
guns, the 2d Battalion withdrew its wounded. It then formed a night
perimeter and waited for heavier supporting weapons to be brought up.
On the following day the 2d Battalion was to move from its night
perimeter on a 400-yard front and secure the western end of the
airstrip. The 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was to follow the 1st
Battalion and protect the regiment from an attack from the north. Each
of the assault battalions was to have attached a platoon of medium
tanks and a platoon from the Cannon Company. [449]
On the morning of 26 October, the 49th Field Artillery Battalion for
ten minutes concentrated its fire for 500 yards on each side of the
airstrip. At 0800 the 32d Infantry attacked. The artillery fire had
been effective, and the 2d Battalion knocked out the pillboxes that had
stopped its advance the previous day. Aided by tanks, the battalion was
able to advance 700 yards along the south side of the airstrip by 1700.
The 1st battalion, on the right, passed through the 3d and attacked
west on the north side of the airstrip on a 400-yard front toward the
other end of the airstrip. The 1st Battalion immediately encountered
a highly intricate system of pillboxes and bunkers, which slowed the
attack until the tanks arrived. From that time on, a fiercely contested
struggle continued throughout the afternoon. The battalion employed
tanks, antitank guns, artillery, and mortars to cover its advance,
and destroyed many bunkers with grenades, demolition charges, and
automatic rifles. [450]
Company B bore the brunt of the assault and, fighting tenaciously,
had battled through 900 yards of the fortified area by 1700. The 1st
and 2d Battalions made contact on the edge of the airstrip and formed
their night perimeters; the 3d Battalion protected the rear. During
the night the 32d Infantry repulsed several light counterattacks.
On the following day, 27 October, the time for the attack was set
an hour earlier in the hope that the Japanese would be caught off
guard. At 0700 the 32d Infantry moved out, with the assault battalions
in the same formation as on the previous day. [451] To their happy
surprise the troops encountered little opposition as they readily
secured bunker after bunker. The 20th Infantry Regiment had spent
its strength. The American troops found enemy dead "in every bunker,
trench, foxhole and bush," and wreckage of enemy 75's, machine guns,
grenade launchers, and rifles was scattered about. More than 400
Japanese dead were found in the sector of the 1st Battalion. [452]
The infantrymen encountered only an occasional rifleman while mopping
up. By 1130 the Buri airstrip was secured.
On 28 October the 2d Battalion was alerted to move to Abuyog at
0400 on the following day. The 3d Battalion was ordered to move to
Guinarona for possible attachment to the 17th Infantry, which had
committed all three of its battalions in the fight north along the
Burauen-Dagami road.
On to Dagami
After securing the barrio of Burauen at 1300 on 24 October, the
17th Infantry had rested for an hour before attacking along the
Burauen-Dagami road. [453] The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, remained
attached to the 17th. As the 17th Infantry started north, a patrol
of four jeeps was sent ahead to reconnoiter. It encountered a strong
force of the enemy on a road that forked off to the Buri airfield, and
after a short but determined fire fight the enemy withdrew north. On
its return the patrol reported that the road to Dagami had been mined
with aircraft bombs that were buried nose up in the road and covered
with palm fronds and other vegetation. A platoon from Company A, 13th
Engineer Battalion, removed the mines and the column continued forward.
About 1530 the right flank of the 17th Infantry came under mortar and
machine gun fire which came from a ridge north of Burauen and east of
the road to Dagami. The ridge was about 700 yards long, 50 feet high,
heavily wooded, and covered with dense undergrowth. Most of the fire
seemed to be coming from an eastern spur that overlooked the Bayug
and Buri airfields. On the left (west) of the road the terrain was
flat and marshy.
At 1630 the 17th Infantry began to form its night perimeter on the
southern edge of the ridge. The 1st Battalion protected the left (west)
flank and tied in at the road with the regiment's 2d Battalion. The
lines of the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, covered the forward line
of the ridge that extended to the rear where the 2d Battalion, 184th
Infantry, held the entrance to the eastern finger. The perimeter of
the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, extended south to tie in with the
1st Battalion, 17th Infantry.
Only the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, was able to set up its night
perimeter without incident. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, ran
into determined resistance but was able to establish a firm bivouac
for itself, using the vacated enemy positions. The 2d Battalion,
17th Infantry, received scattered rifle fire but did not encounter
any of the enemy. During the night the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry,
and the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, were harassed by patrols of ten
to twenty Japanese each, probing for a break in the lines.
Shortly after nightfall there were two abortive charges against the
American lines. As soon as the troops heard the enemy, they called for
protective fire, which prevented any of the Japanese from entering the
lines. The enemy, however, continually fired into the area throughout
the night. Earlier in the day an American tank had bogged down in a
swamp to the left of the road, and the crew was forced to abandon it
under fire, leaving the guns intact. During the night the Japanese
captured the tank and sprayed the areas of the 1st Battalion, 17th
Infantry, and the regimental command post with the tank's 37-mm. and
machine guns, and with four of their own machine guns. Fortunately
the bullets passed harmlessly over the heads of the troops.
During the night Lt. Col. Francis T. Pachler discussed plans for
the following day, 25 October, with his battalion commanders. He was
faced with a choice between two courses of action. On the one hand,
he could take advantage of the tactical surprise occasioned by his
rapid advance, attempt to bypass the Japanese forces on the ridge,
and make a dash along the Burauen-Dagami road, disregarding losses
that might be inflicted on his flank; or, on the other hand, he could
destroy the enemy forces on the ridge before advancing to Dagami. The
first alternative must allow for a strong possibility that fire from
the 32d Infantry, which was pushing west, might fall upon the 17th
Infantry if it continued its advance before the Buri airfield was
secured. After prolonged discussion, Pachler decided to destroy the
enemy forces on the ridge before proceeding to Dagami.
Colonel Pachler therefore ordered the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry,
to remain in its present position until the 2d Battalion, echeloned to
its right rear, could swing up on line facing north. While waiting
for the 2d Battalion to move up, the 1st Battalion would send a
strong reconnaissance patrol along the road north to the barrio
of Buri to determine Japanese strength, and the condition of the
road and terrain. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, would attack and
destroy the enemy force on the finger of the ridge and then come up,
also facing north.
The patrol moved out at 0730 on 25 October. A rifle platoon mounted
the tops and sides of five tanks and headed north towards Buri. On
its way, the platoon encountered and killed Japanese troops who were
emplaced in spider holes and coconut log pillboxes under buildings,
but a destroyed bridge at the edge of Buri prevented any further
advance. The platoon returned at nightfall with the report that the
road to Buri was clear and that it had killed forty-nine of the enemy.
The 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, made its move without incident. The 2d
Battalion, 184th Infantry, advancing from its position on the heavily
wooded eastern finger of the ridge, was forced to meet and destroy the
enemy force with bayonets and grenades. Its progress was slow until
a platoon of the Cannon Company and a platoon of medium tanks made
a wide encircling movement through the Bayug airstrip and were able
to bring fire to bear on the Japanese. By 1300 the enemy threat was
removed and the battalion commenced its swing to the north to join
the other two battalions. At dusk the three units were in line; the
combat teams had advanced 400 yards and formed their night perimeters.
At 1700 Colonel Pachler rearranged his troops and made plans for the
following day. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, was detached to guard
the ridge. The 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, which had been guarding the
divisional left flank south of Dao since A Day, was brought forward
by truck to rejoin the regiment. The 17th Infantry would move out
along the highway in a column of battalions--the 1st, 2d, and 3d. [454]
The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, moved out at 0700, Company A on
the left (west) and Company C on the right (east). Since the tanks
were forced to remain on the road because of swamps on either side,
tank support was reduced to a platoon. After having moved about 300
yards beyond the line of departure, Company C ran into a small pocket
of enemy resistance which it soon destroyed with hand grenades and
small arms fire; twenty-one of the enemy were killed and one was
captured. Company A also met and overcame some resistance from
enemy in foxholes in its zone, but was not held up. At 1000 the
1st Battalion received machine gun fire to its front and observed a
movement in the marsh on its right flank. When the heavy machine guns
and 81-mm. mortars were brought to bear upon the marsh, approximately
sixty Japanese began to run across the open fields. The 4.2-inch
mortars of the 91st Chemical Company also fired on the fleeing enemy.
When the forward elements were about 1,100 yards south of Ginogusan,
Company A encountered a rice paddy to its front. One platoon of the
company went left to move around the rice field, and the support
platoon was committed to close the gap thus created. As the leading
elements got past the field, an enemy force, which was entrenched just
beyond it, started firing. The rear elements of the 1st Battalion
immediately closed in and killed fifteen of the enemy with grenades
and small arms fire. In the meantime, Company C encountered about
twenty-five Japanese who had dug in under native shacks. Two tanks were
called up, and after they had knocked over the shacks the infantrymen
closed in and destroyed the enemy.
During this action the 3d Platoon of Company F, 2d Battalion,
17th Infantry, reinforced by one squad of the antitank platoon of
the battalion Headquarters Company, established a roadblock on one
of the roads that led to the Buri airfield. The troops came under
rifle and machine gun fire from their front. Within a few minutes
the platoon leader and two other men were killed and another man was
wounded. The platoon withdrew about one hundred yards and called for
an 81-mm. mortar concentration on the area. The rest of Company F
was committed against the Japanese south flank.
In the face of heavy fire Company F pushed through the difficult
terrain and forced the enemy to withdraw. However, four Japanese
machine guns remained in position and fired into the company. The
leader of the antitank squad, though wounded in both legs, ran back to
the battalion command post and asked for tanks in support. A cannon
platoon which was sent up silenced the enemy guns. While continuing
the fight during the enemy withdrawal, the company evacuated its
wounded on improvised bamboo litters.
Company F was then relieved by the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry,
which established a roadblock nearer the main highway. Company F
rejoined its battalion and the regiment formed its night perimeter
about 600 yards south of Guinarona. The night was comparatively
peaceful except for a minor bombing in the 2d Battalion area. The
troops of the 17th Infantry were ordered to move out on 27 October
in a column of battalions in the following order: 3d, 2d, and 1st,
with a distance of 500 yards between battalions. [455] Since aerial
photographs showed that all the bridges had been blown, a platoon of
the 13th Engineer Battalion was attached to the 3d Battalion.
At 0700 the regiment moved out, with the 3d Battalion in the lead,
on a 100-yard front on both sides of the highway. The tanks were
forced to stay on the road. The 3d Battalion was able to cross a small
stream south of Guinarona, although the bridge had been damaged. When
it reached the northern bank of the stream the battalion ran into the
enemy. Approximately twenty Japanese were dug in around a schoolhouse,
with two machine guns mounted in the building. Company K, the lead
company, under cover of machine gun and mortar fire, successfully
stormed the schoolhouse and killed seventeen of its defenders. The
engineer troops from the 13th Engineer Battalion advanced and quickly
repaired the bridge, after which the rest of the 17th Infantry moved
forward. Since the bridge north of Guinarona was also damaged, the same
tactics were used. The infantrymen of the lead company crossed the
stream and stood guard while the engineers repaired the bridge. For
2,500 yards the advance continued, unopposed except for small groups
of Japanese. The heavy machine guns of the regiment fired from the
flanks of the American forces and covered the swamps on both sides
of the road. The 17th Infantry went into night perimeter about 2,200
yards south of Dagami and about 200 yards south of a demolished stone
bridge. As the regiment started to dig in, enemy rifle and machine
gun fire fell on the front of the 3d Battalion but mortars returned
the fire and silenced the enemy. Although there was sporadic air and
ground activity during the night, no attempt was made to penetrate
the lines of the regiment.
Entrance Into Dagami
The 17th Infantry learned from Japanese prisoners that in addition
to elements of the 20th Infantry Regiment in the Dagami sector, the
following units were present: the 2d Battalion, 33d Infantry Regiment
(about 200 men), together with scattered elements of the 16th Engineer
Regiment and the 9th Infantry Regiment. [456]
The Japanese had firmly established themselves in positions in
depth about 1,000 yards south of Dagami. These defenses consisted
of mutually supporting pillboxes made of logs and sandbags, from
which the Japanese could deliver interlocking bands of machine gun
fire. They were situated on higher ground and could be approached
only across open rice paddies. [457]
As the American forces came close to Dagami, the 17th Infantry was
moving north along the Burauen-Dagami road, and the 382d Infantry,
96th Division, was approaching the road between Dagami and Tanauan.
Lt. Col. Kakuda, the commander of the Japanese Central Area Unit of
the 20th Infantry Regiment, issued a series of operational orders. At
1800 on 27 October he ordered the 20th Infantry Regiment to take a
position southwest of Dagami and annihilate the Americans. [458]
The 17th Infantry estimated that there were from 1,500 to 2,500
Japanese in the vicinity to oppose the regiment's advance and that
about 500 of these withdrew from Dagami in orderly fashion. [459]
The commander of the 17th Infantry prescribed a column of battalions
for the attack of 28 October. The 2d Battalion would pass through the
3d Battalion, and the attack north would be in the order of 2d, 1st,
and 3d. All of the supporting arms were attached to the 2d Battalion
for its attack. [460]
At 0730 the 2d Battalion attacked and immediately met very strong
opposition. The stone bridge and road were in the middle of a strip
of waist-deep swamp 100 yards wide, which funneled out to form a
larger swamp. A crescent-shaped coconut grove lay beyond the swamp,
one end in front of the road and the other bent to the south about 800
yards west of the road. The road and the curve in the coconut grove
divided the swamp into three segments--one on each side of the road,
and the third west of and parallel to the road. In the face of intense
rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire coming from an unknown number of
Japanese, Company F and three tanks managed to cross the creek. The
tanks continued north up the road. As Company F waded through the
waist-deep swamp, it pushed through direct enemy fire and past a large
tank trap and found a line of pillboxes to its front and left flank.
The company commander ordered his unit to hold its position and then
returned south of the bridge to bring up more tanks. The 1st Platoon
of Company F moved to the left rear to protect that flank, which was
receiving considerable enemy fire. As the company commander rushed
back to get the tanks, about twenty Japanese attacked the 1st Platoon
in an attempt to envelop the left flank of the company. The platoon
leader ordered his men to hold their fire until the enemy was only five
yards away, and nearly all of the Japanese were killed in the initial
volley. The platoon held its ground to prevent any further enveloping
attempts by the Japanese. Meanwhile, Company F's commanding officer
found that no tanks were available, since they could not cross the
weakened bridge. He returned to Company F and ordered it to retire
to the tank trap, reorganize, and evacuate the wounded.
In the meantime, in order to relieve the pressure on Company G
(on the right), which had run into somewhat the same situation,
Lt. Col. William B. Moore, the battalion commander, committed Company E
to the right (east) flank. Company E initially encountered determined
opposition but managed to flank the enemy and assist Company G in
its sector. At the same time the engineer troops of the 13th Engineer
Battalion, working feverishly under heavy fire, tried to repair the
damaged bridge. One of the armored bulldozers lost three drivers,
successively, to enemy fire.
Under the close supervision of Colonel Moore, who was in the front
lines, the 2d Battalion pressed the attack. Two M8 armored cars were
brought wide around the right flank in order to avoid the swamp. With
their aid, Companies E and G rolled up the east flank of the 20th
Infantry Regiment and broke through the pillboxes in their own area.
Company C was committed to the left of Company F in order to aid
it. Although this move was partially successful, Company C found
itself pinned down by an enemy force entrenched in pillboxes and
zigzag trenches. Since the Japanese defense line extended beyond the
regiment's left (west) flank and around it to the south, Company B was
committed further left to hit the southern flank of the enemy. Although
Company B could not break through the line, it was able to locate
the enemy right flank and neutralize the fire on that flank.
One of the three tanks that had gone north in the morning returned
at 1400 and was guided into the sector of Company F. With all of its
guns blazing, the tank broke through the enemy fortifications, and
Companies C and F were then able to move in and mop up the enemy. The
other two tanks had gone up the road some 250 yards when they met
antitank fire which completely destroyed one and immobilized the other,
trapping its crew. As soon as the bridge was made passable, two M8's,
a medium tank, and a squad from Company F were sent to rescue the
trapped crew. While the medium tank and the infantry covered the
damaged tank, the M8's drew up to it and allowed its crew to escape
into their open turrets. The detail withdrew, having suffered no
casualties, and the immobilized tank was then destroyed.
At dusk the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, and the committed companies
from the 1st Battalion pushed some 300 yards beyond the enemy
strong point and formed a perimeter defense for the night. [461]
Company B on the far left flank was withdrawn and closed into the
perimeter. Although machine gun and mortar fire came from the left
line of fortifications, there was no major action on the part of the
Japanese. A few of the enemy, attempting to crawl through a trench
into the position of Company F, became ensnarled in the concertina
wire and were then destroyed by grenades.
Since the 2d Battalion had borne the brunt of the fighting on 28
October and had suffered numerous casualties, the regimental commander
decided to have the battalion drop back into reserve. Although
the drive to Dagami was to continue, the north-south line of enemy
pillboxes on the left flank of the regiment could not be ignored. At
0800 on 29 October the regimental lines were to be reorganized so
that the 3d and 1st Battalions, less Company B, would pass through
the 2d Battalion, which would become the regimental reserve. Company
B with a platoon of M8's would attack the flank and rear of the enemy
in the left line of pillboxes.
At 0800, under cover of a heavy artillery concentration from the 49th
Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 17th Infantry,
passed through the 2d Battalion without incident. Company B, reinforced
by the platoon from the Cannon Company, moved out to destroy the
enemy force on the regiment's left flank. The company fought the
Japanese from pillbox to pillbox, catching the enemy on his flanks
and rear by rifle and machine gun fire, together with time-burst fire
from the self-propelled howitzers. This completely demoralized the
Japanese, some of whom threw down their arms and tried unsuccessfully
to escape. More than 120 enemy dead were counted in the area. The 1st
Battalion entered the southern part of Dagami without encountering
serious resistance. It then came under artillery fire from the hills
west of the town.
The 3d Battalion proceeded east of the road in a column of companies in
the order L, K, and I, and met no serious opposition until it reached
a cemetery south of Dagami. Overgrown with weeds seven to ten feet
high and containing stone crypts built off the ground, the cemetery
was divided by a path running east to west. As Company L moved into
the burial ground, Company I swung around the right (east) side to
come into position for the night. The leading elements of Company
L passed through the cemetery and Company I moved into position
without incident, but as the 1st Platoon of Company L, the reserve
platoon, crossed the path, a headstone tilted back and from the open
grave four Japanese opened fire with an American Browning automatic
rifle and other small arms. The small arms of the 1st Platoon had no
effect and it became necessary to bring forward a flame thrower to
burn the enemy out. At the same time the platoon received fire from
other open graves, from which the Japanese had removed the bodies. By
punching holes through the stone they used the crypts as individual
foxholes. The platoon broke into small units and pushed through the
cemetery, destroying the enemy forces wherever they could be located.
Company K, which followed Company I, placed two platoons abreast
behind Company L. As it came through the weeds past the cemetery path a
Japanese officer charged on the right flank with his saber and wounded
one man before he could be brought down. Since the platoons were
also receiving heavy fire from the tombs, the commander of Company
K drew his men back to the path where they reorganized. Preceded by
a battery of six flame throwers, the men then marched shoulder to
shoulder through the cemetery and burnt out the enemy. About 1900
the regiment completed the action and formed its night perimeter.
During the fighting, the regimental operations officer, hearing the
heavy fire and not being able to communicate with the 3d Battalion
headquarters, called Company K direct to ascertain if the Japanese had
broken through the American lines. "Hell no," was the reported reply,
"we're breaking through theirs and fighting for our bivouac." [462]
During the night small infiltration parties of Japanese tried
unsuccessfully to penetrate the regiment's defenses, and sporadic
artillery fire was received from the hills west of Dagami.
By 1040 on 30 October Dagami was securely in American hands, and the
17th Infantry continued to mop up for the rest of the day. The 19th
Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division, X Corps, across the Binahaan
River north of Dagami, was reached by an airdrop message from the
artillery spotter plane, and patrols reached the 382d Infantry
of the 96th Division on the east. The mission of the 17th Infantry
Regiment--securing the town of Dagami and effecting junction with the
X Corps and the 96th Division--was completed. The regiment spent the
next two days in mopping up and patrolling the area around Dagami.
The 7th Division had secured the limits of its beachhead line, but
the southern approaches to the line had not yet been secured. The
road farther south, running across the island from Abuyog on the east
coast to Baybay on the west coast, offered a potential route along
which the Japanese might pour in reinforcements.
At 0530 on 29 October the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, left Burauen
for Abuyog via Dao and the coastal road, Highway 1. Its progress was
impeded by muddy roads and the previous destruction of the bridge over
the Bito River. The battalion, less one company, crossed the river
by DUKW's at 0940 and by 1000 was in Abuyog, having encountered no
Japanese. The 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, acting as an advance
guard for the battalion, pushed west from Abuyog inland four miles
on the road toward Baybay.
On 30 and 31 October the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, remained
at Abuyog, but on the latter day it sent Company G, reinforced,
toward Baybay on the Abuyog-Baybay road, which corkscrewed through
the mountains for about twenty-seven miles between the east and west
coasts. The company encountered no Japanese. On 1 November no forward
progress was made, but all elements of the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry,
patrolled. On 2 November Company G moved along the road and closed
in on Baybay at 2200.
Far to the south the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Division, had been
engaged since A Day in extensive patrolling of the Panaon Strait
area. On 31 October the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, left the Bayug
airfield for Dulag and at 2200 sailed from Dulag to relieve the
21st Infantry. The battalion arrived at Panaon Island at 0700 on 1
November and during the day effected the relief of the 21st Infantry,
which then moved north to rejoin the 24th Division. [463]
The initial mission of the 7th Infantry Division--to land between the
Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers, advance rapidly inland along the axis
of the Dulag-Burauen road, seize hostile airstrips in its zone of
action, secure the Burauen-Dagami road, and protect the XXIV Corps'
left (south) flank--had been accomplished.
Since landing, the 7th Division had killed an estimated 4,211 Japanese
and had taken 19 prisoners. [464] Up to 1000 on 1 November, 32 officers
and 290 enlisted men of the division had been killed; 48 officers,
1 warrant officer, and 777 enlisted men wounded; 15 officers and 223
enlisted men injured; and 21 enlisted men were missing in action. [465]
By 2 November, General Hodge's XXIV Corps had finished its assigned
role for the second phase of General Krueger's plan for the capture of
the island of Leyte. It had seized the southern part of Leyte Valley
with its important roads, airfields, and potential base sites. An
element of the corps had pushed to the west coast of the island,
and was preparing for the move toward the important port of Ormoc as
part of the third phase of the plan. General Makino had been forced
to give up his Dagami headquarters and other positions on the heights
overlooking the town. Far to the north, the X Corps was engaged in
securing the northern part of Leyte Valley.