A Day: 20 October 1944
Bombardment of the Shores of Leyte
The waters of Leyte Gulf were glassy calm as the convoys bearing the
assault forces steamed into their appointed positions off the shores
of Leyte in the very early morning hours of 20 October 1944.
There were three stages of the naval gunfire support: the pre-A-Day
bombardment, A-Day bombardment, and close supporting missions to be
delivered after H Hour and to continue until 24 October. A portion of
the fire support group in support of the underwater demolition teams
had bombarded the southern landing beaches and the town of Dulag
on 18 October, a process which was repeated on the following day in
support of the underwater demolition teams on the northern landing
beaches. [212]
At 0600 on A Day, 20 October, the battleships assigned to the
Southern Attack Force opened fire on the beaches. A lone Japanese
plane appeared at 0612 over the northern beaches, circled the convoy,
and despite gunfire from the Maryland and West Virginia disappeared
unscathed. [213] At 0700 the battleships of the Northern Attack Force
commenced firing. For two hours the six battleships, three to each
attack force, fired on the beaches. Since no specific targets could
be discerned or determined, the gunfire was directed at areas. Many
enemy supply dumps and minor military installations were destroyed. An
observer reported:
Gray smoke plumes are rising from the shores. Battleship
Mississippi is now working on the northern beaches. She is
joined by the Maryland whose fire has apparently caused a large
shore explosion. Jap ack-ack is fired at spotting planes but the
performance is weak.
Battleships move inshore and renew their constant
thunder. Helldivers and Avengers from our CVE's are heading toward
the shore.... [214]
At 0900 the battleships ceased their fire and the cruisers and
destroyers moved in closer to the shore to deliver their scheduled
bombardment. [215]
At 0850 gunfire was suspended in the vicinity of Catmon Hill,
the most prominent coastal terrain feature near Dulag, in order to
allow an air strike against installations in the interior by the
planes from the CVE's of the amphibious force. During the day a
total of 500 sorties by more than 140 planes were flown in direct
support. Twelve direct support missions were carried out, nine
against selected targets requested by ground troops and three against
targets of opportunity. Dawn and dusk fighter sweeps were made against
airfields. [216] The aircraft from the carriers, which were beyond the
range of the guns of enemy coastal defenses, did not attempt secondary
missions upon the completion of a mission in the target area. [217]
The principal bombing and strafing targets were revetments, dispersal
areas, supply dumps, and bivouac areas, together with aircraft on
islands near Leyte. Grounded planes were strafed and destroyed. The
commander of the escort carriers made the surprising estimate that
aircraft from his carriers had destroyed 125 planes on the ground
and damaged an additional 90 more in the first three days of this
"close support at a distance." [218] Aircraft did not bomb the shore
line, since gunfire from the vessels within the gulf was considered
more effective.
At 0900 the cruisers commenced bombarding the beaches. They were joined
at 0930 by the destroyers. At 0945 the cruisers and destroyers lifted
their fire and directed it at the inland areas, at the flanks of the
landing beaches, and at important roads and towns. [219]
At 0800 the first anchor chains of the vessels had rattled out; LCVP's
were quickly swung over the sides; boats circled mother ships and moved
to their rendezvous areas. [220] The LCI mortar and LCI rocket ships
took their places at the head of the assault waves. It was now 0945,
fifteen minutes before H Hour. The LCI's raced simultaneously to the
shores of Leyte, raking the landing beaches with rocket and mortar
fire. The bombardment grew heavier and more monotonous. Hundreds of
small boats, flanked by rocket ships and destroyers, headed toward
the beaches; thousands of rockets hit the beaches with the rumble of
an earthquake. It was impossible to distinguish one explosion from
another in the unbroken roar. [221] Over a smooth sea a hot, brilliant,
tropical sun beat down. The American forces were ready to land.
X Corps Goes Ashore
Hours earlier reveille had sounded on board the transports and the
troops had dressed by the red lights in the holds where they were
quartered. There was very little talking. Many of the men sat on their
bunks giving their weapons a final check. Others lay back and smoked
in silence. A few sought the chaplains. [222]
Missions of Sixth Army Summarized
The Sixth Army had been ordered to seize and establish beachheads in
the Dulag and Tacloban areas and to secure the airfields in order to
provide naval and air bases; and to seize such objectives in the Panaon
Strait area as would permit safe passage of naval forces through the
strait to the Camotes Sea. [223] To carry out the operation General
Krueger had assigned the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry
Division, to gain control of Panaon Strait; the XXIV Corps was to
secure the Dulag area and its airstrip; and the 1st Cavalry Division
of X Corps was to land in the Marasbaras area and, by advancing north,
capture the Tacloban airdrome, the most important A-Day objective
for the Sixth Army. At the same time, the 24th Division, less the
21st Infantry, of the X Corps was to seize Palo and advance rapidly
to the northwest. [224] The seizure of these areas would secure the
important coastal airstrips for future air operations, cut off any
Japanese attempts at reinforcement from the southern Philippines
through the Mindanao Sea and Sogod Bay, secure the important eastern
entrances into the interior, and enable the American forces to control
San Pedro Bay and San Juanico Strait.
The northernmost unit of X Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division, was to
land in the vicinity of San Jose (also called San Ricardo and San Jose
Ricardo) about three miles north of Palo, on White Beach. White Beach
extended southward 2,000 yards from the Cataisan Peninsula. There
was an interval of 1,500 yards between this beach and the northern
limit of Red Beach, which was also 2,000 yards long. [225] The 24th
Division, less the 21st Infantry, was to land in the vicinity of the
town of Palo, on Red Beach. (Map 5)
1st Cavalry Division
White Beach had a fairly good landing surface of white coral sand,
but even at high tide it was suitable only for shallow-draft landing
craft. Its average width was fifteen yards at low tide, at which
time a small irregular bank two to three feet high appeared at the
water's edge. The underwater gradient was shallow, extending out
half a mile in places. An irregular fringe of coconut trees ran the
length of the beach. In the southern section this fringe was narrow,
with very wet and swampy cleared land behind it. Highway 1 roughly
paralleled the beach about a mile inland. [226]
The roar of many guns could be heard as the 1st Cavalry Division
prepared to disembark into landing boats, which were to rendezvous
at the line of departure 5,000 yards from shore. A pall of lazily
billowing yellow smoke obscured the shores of Leyte. [227]
The 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge,
was to land on White Beach with brigades abreast--the 1st Brigade
on the left (south) and the 2d Brigade on the right (north)--and
advance inland. The 1st Brigade, under Brig. Gen. William C. Chase,
was to reconnoiter the hills on the west side of Tacloban Valley
and establish observation posts which would command the entrances
to the valley. The 2d Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Hugh F. Hoffman, had
the most important mission of the day. It was to advance northwest,
capture the Tacloban airdrome and seize the Cataisan Peninsula,
reaching Cataisan Point, the northern extremity of the peninsula,
by 1400. Col. William J. Bradley's 8th Cavalry Regiment of the 2d
Brigade was held afloat in division reserve and was to be prepared
to reinforce either the 1st or 2d Brigade. [228]
Flanked by rocket and gunboat LCI's, and preceded by amphibian tanks,
the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments, which formed the 1st Brigade,
and the 7th Cavalry, which with the 8th Cavalry (in reserve) composed
the 2d Brigade, raced for the shores of Leyte. The escorting rocket
ships laid down a heavy barrage which covered the beach defenses
to a depth of 1,800 yards inland and left the enemy incapable of
organized resistance. As the boats neared shore, only small arms and
machine gun fire opposed the landing. [229] As planned, the regiments
landed abreast, the 7th Cavalry Regiment on the right (north), the
12th Cavalry Regiment in the center, and the 5th Cavalry on the left
(south).
The 1st Squadron of the 7th Cavalry was to land north of the 2d
Squadron on the northern end of White Beach, which at this point
coincided with the narrow neck of land connecting the Cataisan
Peninsula to the rest of the island, and then go directly north to
secure the entire peninsula and the airstrip. On its left the 2d
Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was to land on the right flank of White Beach,
push inland, capture San Jose and a bridge across the Burayan River
northwest of the town, and seize a beachhead line a thousand yards
west of Highway 1 and three thousand yards from White Beach. The
Cataisan Peninsula would then be sealed off.
Both squadrons landed on schedule, with only slight opposition,
and immediately began to execute their assignments. The 2d Squadron,
within fifteen minutes after landing, knocked out two pillboxes on the
beach, killing eight Japanese in one and five in the other. It then
organized rapidly and pushed on to secure its first objective, the
town of San Jose. In the town the squadron engaged in a house-to-house
search but found few Japanese. By 1230 twenty-four Japanese had been
killed, San Jose was in American hands, and the Cataisan Peninsula
was sealed off. The 7th Cavalry Regiment established its command post
on the west side of the town at 1245. The troops of the 2d Squadron
then set out in a northwesterly direction astride the hard-surfaced,
narrow San Jose-Tacloban road, but they were slowed down by swamps
and flooded rice paddies on either side. [230] At 1400 they crossed
the Burayan River on a bridge which the 33d Infantry Regiment had
attempted to destroy but had only damaged. The engineers strengthened
the bridge so that the medium tanks could cross, and at 1420 the
forward movement continued. By 1630 the squadron had reached its
objective--a point 3,000 yards from White Beach--and immediately set
up its night perimeter.
The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, landed in amphibian tractors on the
north end of White Beach a few minutes after initial assault waves of
the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, had cleared the beach. It moved west off
the beach 100 yards, pivoted to the right, and began to move up the
Cataisan Peninsula. The squadron was expected to secure the peninsula
and the airstrip with great speed. Engineer units had landed just
behind it and were waiting to start work on the airstrip as soon as
it was seized. The 1st Squadron met with only light enemy opposition,
the chief obstacles being the swamps, unoccupied pillboxes--each
of which had to be checked--and the numerous Filipino shacks that
afforded possible protection to the enemy. By 1600 the squadron had
secured the airstrip and the Cataisan Peninsula. [231] Later in the
afternoon the squadron, less Troop A, was withdrawn from the peninsula.
The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments landed on White Beach without
incident at exactly 1000. Immediately beyond the narrow landing
beach was a deep swamp through which the regiments must move to reach
Highway 1. The morass was often waist deep, in places even up to the
armpits, and men of the advancing line of troops cursed heartily as
they floundered toward the highway. [232] Under such circumstances it
was impossible for the men to carry all of their personal equipment,
and they had to make three trips in order to complete the crossing of
certain areas. At 1100 a reconnaissance platoon of the 5th Cavalry
Regiment made physical contact with elements of the 34th Infantry,
24th Division, on its left. By 1500 both cavalry regiments were
on Highway 1. They pushed westward immediately toward the next
objective--the foothills west of the highway. [233] Col. Royce
E. Drake, the commanding officer of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, went
forward with a patrol from F Troop. At 1900, about three quarters of
a mile south of Caibaan, the patrol made contact with the enemy. In
the ensuing fight ten Japanese and one American were killed and two
Americans wounded. At 1915 the 12th Cavalry Regiment closed in on
its A-Day objective and formed its night perimeter. [234] The 5th
Cavalry Regiment formed its night perimeter at 2135, a few hundred
yards short of the objective. [235]
The first elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2d Cavalry Brigade,
the corps reserve, moved to White Beach at 1040, and by 1130 the entire
reserve regiment was ashore. The regiment continued in corps reserve
throughout the day and spent its first night in the Philippines on
the western edge of San Jose. [236]
At 1400 General Mudge assumed command ashore of the 1st Cavalry
Division and by 1630 had established the divisional command post
at San Jose. [237] Preceded by a ground reconnaissance of the unit
commanders, all of the 1st Cavalry Division artillery landed on White
Beach at 1330 and immediately established a position in the vicinity
of San Jose. Before nightfall all battalions had registered and were
prepared to fire, and beginning at 2115 the 61st Field Artillery
Battalion throughout the night delivered harassing fire on the
hills south of Tacloban. [238] By the end of the day the division
had secured the Cataisan Peninsula and the Tacloban airstrip and,
after crossing Highway 1, had made physical contact with the right
flank of the 24th Infantry Division. [239]
24th Infantry Division [240]
In the southern part of the X Corps zone, to the left of the 1st
Cavalry Division, the 24th Infantry Division (less the 21st Infantry),
under Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving, was to land on Red Beach on the
morning of A Day. [241] Although there were no underwater obstacles,
mines, or barbed wire along Red Beach, the water was too shallow to
permit vessels the size of LST's to come in and make a dry landing. Red
Beach was narrow but consisted of firm sand. Back of it was flat,
marshy ground covered with palm trees and jungle growth, extending
inland in a southwesterly direction from the northern end of the
beach. General Makino had converted a small stream bed in this area
into a wide and deep tank trap which paralleled the beach for 1,500
yards. Several large, well-camouflaged pillboxes, connected by tunnels
and constructed of palm logs and earth, were scattered throughout the
area. Between the swamp and a low range of hills one and a quarter
miles inland were open fields and rice paddies. The most prominent
terrain feature was Hill 522 just north of Palo. This hill commanded
the beach area, the town of Palo, and Highway 2, leading into the
interior. It was partly wooded, and the 33d Infantry Regiment had
interlaced it with tunnels, trenches, and pillboxes.
From the beach a single deeply rutted and muddy exit road ran south
to the Palo River, where it turned westward to Highway 1. The river
was just north of the town of Palo and roughly paralleled Highway 2,
which ran in a northwesterly direction from Palo into the interior,
between the hills dominating this entrance to Leyte Valley.
The 24th Division was to occupy Palo, advance with regiments abreast
into the interior in a northwesterly direction, [242] occupy the
Capoocan-Carigara-Barugo area, and secure Highway 1 between Palo and
Tanauan. The 19th Infantry on the left (south) was to establish an
initial beachhead, advance to the west and south, seize Hill 522,
and move on and capture Palo. The 34th Infantry on the right (north)
was to establish an initial beachhead, then move westward into the
interior and be prepared to assist the 19th Infantry in the capture
of Hill 522. [243]
The assaulting forces, having been transferred to landing craft,
met at the line of departure 5,000 yards from shore. After grouping,
they dashed for the landing beaches, each regiment in column of
battalions. The division landed at 1000 with regiments abreast
according to plan. The Japanese allowed the first five waves to land,
but when the other waves were 3,000 to 2,000 yards offshore, they
opened strong artillery and mortar fire against them. [244] A number
of the landing craft carrying the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry,
were hit and four of them sunk. There were numerous casualties:
the commanding officer of Company C was killed; a squad of the
Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon was almost wiped out; and the Cannon
Company suffered the loss of two section leaders, a platoon leader,
and part of its headquarters personnel.
Among the vessels hit by Japanese artillery were four LST's, one of
which was set on fire. Of the five remaining, two were driven away
and three did not get in until much later. The enemy fired upon the
retiring LST's, which carried with them the artillery and most of
the tanks. The commanding officer of Headquarters Company and the
division quartermaster, together with the latter's executive officer,
were wounded. Many of the division headquarters personnel were killed
or wounded.
The first elements of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, inadvertently
landed 300 yards north of the assigned area and were immediately pinned
down by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. The commanding officer of
the regiment, Col. Aubrey S. Newman, arrived on the beach and, noting
the situation, shouted to his men, "Get the hell off the beach. Get
up and get moving. Follow me." [245] Thus urgently prompted, the men
followed him into the wooded area.
Company I was able to advance, but Company K ran into a defensive
position of five pillboxes along a stream about seventy-five
yards from the beach. It successfully stormed these pillboxes with
rifles, BAR's, and hand grenades. The 3d Battalion then halted for
reorganization. Company L, the reserve company, moved into the line
south of Company K to close the gap between the 19th and 34th Infantry
Regiments, a gap created when part of the 34th landed too far north.
By 1215 the 34th Infantry had cleared the beach area of the enemy,
and the 3d Battalion was ready to advance across an open swamp
to a line of trees 150 yards away. A preparatory concentration by
81-mm. mortars, tanks, and heavy machine guns was first laid down. At
1230 the 3d Battalion moved in. Although the going was rough and the
mud waist deep, the troops reached the trees at 1300 and waited for
the mortars and machine guns to arrive. The 3d Battalion then pushed
on an additional 250 yards.
The 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry, passed through the 3d Battalion,
crossed Highway 1 at 1550, and dug in for the night 100 yards west
of the highway. [246]
The 34th Infantry established contact with the 1st Cavalry Division
on the right and the 19th Infantry on the left. The 1st Battalion,
34th Infantry, remained in the beachhead area.
To the south the 19th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion in the lead,
had also struck heavy opposition on its sector of the beach. Through
error the first waves of the regiment landed almost directly behind the
34th Infantry and 800 yards north of the proposed landing point. The
later waves landed at the planned spot.
Company K did not land on schedule, because its command boat broke
down. Going in under heavy fire, the company had all its officers
except one killed or wounded. One of its platoons was unable to make
contact with the rest of the company until the following day.
Company L, on the right, met little opposition on landing, established
contact with the 34th Infantry, and reached the initial phase line
500 yards in from the beach. Company I, on the left, encountered
stiff resistance fifty yards off the beach. The defenses of the 33d
Infantry Regiment in this sector consisted of a tank ditch and light
automatic weapons, mortars, 75-mm. guns, and light and heavy machine
guns in prepared positions. Company I hit a group of pillboxes and
knocked out several of them as well as a 75-mm. gun. In this action
Pfc. Frank B. Robinson played a spectacular role. Crawling behind a
pillbox, he dropped three grenades into it and then reached down and
pulled the machine gun barrel out of line. After a further advance of
200 yards, when a flame thrower aimed at a pillbox failed to ignite,
he threw a bundle of lighted papers in front of the pillbox. The
operator of the flame thrower then fired through the blaze and the
charge was ignited. By openly exposing himself to fire from a third
pillbox, Robinson enabled tanks to locate its position. [247]
During the next few hours platoons and squads fought independently. The
3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, drove into the interior about 500 yards,
where it reorganized, made contact with adjacent units, and then
established its perimeter on Highway 1. [248]
The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, had come in under intense fire in
which several boats were hit, and numerous casualties occurred. The
battalion landed 300 yards north of its selected area, moved in
200 yards, and then made a left, oblique turn in order to reach its
predetermined assembly area. Company B suffered several casualties
when it ran into strong rifle and pillbox fire, which pinned it
down. The company was ordered to break off fighting and move to
the northern edge of the Japanese positions. Lt. Col. Frederick
R. Zierath, the commanding officer of the battalion, ordered the
self-propelled guns to be brought up. They successfully neutralized
the pillbox and a supporting position behind it. Company C, landing
on the left flank of the battalion, was immediately pinned down by
hostile fire. Zierath ordered it to disengage and proceed to the
designated assembly area. Company A, which was split by enemy fire,
regrouped inland and reached the assembly area just ahead of Company C.
The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, arrived at the beach just as the 1st
Battalion was bypassing the initial resistance. By noon its first
defense was formed around the beachhead. At 1245 Company E, with a
rocket launcher, silenced a 75-mm. gun which had been firing on the
LST's. In its advance the company located two more 75-mm. guns which
had been abandoned. Company G relieved Company E and prepared to move
along the beach road southwest toward Palo. As the point started to
move out at 1300 it was attacked by approximately a platoon from the
33d Infantry Regiment which attempted to retake the gun positions. The
Japanese were repulsed by rifle fire, leaving eleven dead.
At 1430 Company G, in resuming its advance, ran at once into a series
of mutually supporting pillboxes about 500 yards inland, where the
beach road turns to meet Highway 1. A stiff rifle fire fight followed,
in which the Americans suffered fifteen casualties. Since darkness
was approaching, the battalion broke off the action and dug in along
the road for the night.
While the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was proceeding cautiously
forward the 1st Battalion was working toward Hill 522. This hill,
which rose directly from the river's edge north of Palo, overlooked the
landing beaches and its upward trails were steep and winding. Hill 522
presented the most significant terrain feature which would have to be
overcome before the American forces could push into the interior from
Palo and it constituted one of the chief objectives for A Day. Three
months earlier General Makino had started to fortify it, impressing
nearly all of the male population of Palo for the work. By A Day they
had constructed five well-camouflaged pillboxes of rocks, planking,
and logs, covered with earth. Numerous tunnels honeycombed the hill;
the communications trenches were seven feet deep.
During the preliminary bombardments the Navy had delivered some of
its heaviest blows on the hill, and the bombardment was continued
by Battery B of the 13th Field Artillery Battalion and Battery A
of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion. The 1st Battalion of the 19th
Infantry sent reconnaissance parties to locate a northern route to
the hill. The plan had been to move inland from the extreme south of
the beachhead, but that area was still in Japanese hands. At 1430,
when scouts reported finding a covered route on the northern side
of the hill, the 1st Battalion immediately moved out in a column of
companies. The column had barely started when Company A, in the lead,
was held up by enemy fire from the five pillboxes. The remainder of
the battalion moved north around Company A, and, skirting the woods,
attacked Hill 522 from the northeast, with Company C on the right
and Company B on the left.
The men, although tired from the day's activity and strain, made steady
progress up the slope. As the troops moved upward, American mortars
started to shell the crest of the hill. It was thought that this was
artillery fire and a request was made that it be lifted. It came,
however, from the chemical mortars. After a short delay the firing
ceased. At dusk Company B reached the first crest of the hill and was
halted by fire from two enemy bunkers. The company thereupon dug in.
At the same time scouts from Company C reached the central and
highest crest of the hill and espied about two platoons of Japanese
coming up the other side. They shouted for the remainder of the
company to hurry. Company C got to the top of the hill barely ahead
of the Japanese, and a sharp engagement took place in which about
fifty Japanese were killed. Company C held the highest crest of the
hill. During this attack, 1st Lt. Dallas Dick was struck in the leg
and his carbine was shot from his hands, but he continued to command
his unit until his evacuation forty-eight hours later.
During the night the Japanese made frequent but unsuccessful attempts
to infiltrate the company area and in the darkness they carried
away their dead and wounded. During the action to secure Hill 522,
fourteen men of the 1st Battalion were killed and ninety-five wounded;
thirty of the latter eventually rejoined their units. General Irving,
who had assumed command of the 24th Division ashore at 1420, later
said that if Hill 522 had not been secured when it was, the Americans
might have suffered a thousand casualties in the assault.
By the end of A Day, the division had crossed Highway 1 and established
physical contact with the 1st Cavalry Division on its right flank. In
spite of strong opposition on its left flank, the 24th Division
had secured Hill 522, which dominated the route into the interior
and overlooked the town of Palo, the entrance point into Leyte
Valley. Furthermore, the X Corps had now secured a firm beachhead
area averaging a mile in depth and extending over five miles from
the tip of the Cataisan Peninsula to the vicinity of Palo, and had
captured the important Tacloban airstrip on the Cataisan Peninsula.
XXIV Corps Goes Ashore
While the X Corps was engaged in seizing a beachhead and capturing
the Tacloban airfield, the XXIV Corps was carrying out its mission
more than fourteen miles to the south. (Map 6) It was to land in
the Dulag-San Jose area and establish a beachhead between Dulag and
Tanauan. The Dulag airstrip was the primary objective. The 7th and
96th Divisions--the 7th on the left (south) and the 96th on the right
(north)--made the landings. The most prominent terrain feature near
the shore line is a short, finger-like hill range between the mouth
of the Labiranan River and the village of Pikas. Ranging from 400
feet at its southern extremity, known as Labiranan Head, to 1400
feet at Catmon Hill, southeast of Pikas, this hill mass dominates
the surrounding plain for miles around. (The entire hill mass will
hereafter be referred to as Catmon Hill.)
The 9th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion, was guarding the
Catmon Hill area while the 20th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion,
was defending the Dulag area. [249]
Immediately northwest of Dulag and just off the beach was a swamp,
[250] and along the coast were coconut groves interspersed with rice
fields. Many streams and rivers cut across the coastal plain. [251]
Between Dulag and Labiranan Head was a good section of firm sand beach,
backed by a broad alluvial plain extending ten miles inland.
96th Infantry Division
In the early morning hours of 20 October the Southern Attack Force
moved to a location off the shores of Leyte near the town of Dulag. The
96th Division was to land with regiments abreast in the area between
the Calbasag River and the town of San Jose--the 382d Infantry on
the left (south) and the 383d Infantry on the right (north). The
southern half of the division's beachhead area was designated Blue
Beaches 1 and 2, and the northern half was known as Orange Beaches
1 and 2. The beaches had an average length of about 525 yards. The
northern extremity of Orange Beach was about ten miles from the
southernmost beach of the 24th Division in the X Corps sector.
The order to "land the landing force" of the 96th Division came at
0845, and LVT's immediately began to spill out of the LST's and head
for the line of departure. By 0930 the assault waves, preceded by the
amphibian tank wave, had arrived at their appointed position 4,500
yards offshore. [252] At the head of the column were LCI gunboats
which were to give fire support and act as guides for succeeding
waves. The assault waves then headed for Blue and Orange Beaches.
When the landing craft were within 100 yards of the shore, the
LCI's fired into the interior and to each side of the landing
beaches. Thereupon the amphibian tanks began to fire directly beyond
the beaches, in front of the advancing assault forces. The 382d
Infantry under Col. Macey L. Dill landed at 0950 on Blue Beach, and
the 383d Infantry under Col. Edwin T. May landed ten minutes later
on Orange Beach.
The 383d Infantry landed with two battalions abreast--the 2d
Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right. By 1045 both
battalions had landed all of their assault troops and had advanced
1,200 yards inland, encountering no resistance except intermittent
mortar fire from the 9th Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Catmon
Hill. [253] Immediately beyond the highway the two battalions reached
an unsuspected swamp. The amphibian tanks bogged down at 1045 and
were unable to catch up with the assault troops during the rest of
the day. Intermittent Japanese fire continued to fall on the beach
area. The 2d Battalion crossed the swamp without encountering the
enemy and established its night perimeter 2,600 yards inland from
the landing beaches.
The 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, pushed northwest through the barrio
of San Jose, which was on the beach, and along the marshy ground and
swamps on the south bank of the Labiranan River for 2,200 yards. It
crossed the river at 1610. Company C placed a roadblock at the point
where Highway 1 crossed the Labiranan River. After advancing 400 yards
farther northwest the battalion ran into fire from elements of the
9th Infantry Regiment. At 1900 the battalion, still under enemy fire,
dug in for the night. At the close of the day's action it was at the
base of Labiranan Head in a position which would permit an attack to
be launched on that terrain feature from the west.
The 3d Battalion, which had been held afloat in regimental reserve,
came ashore at 1045. It mopped up in the rear of the 1st and 2d
Battalions and established its night perimeter 800 yards away from the
1st Battalion on the south bank of the Labiranan River. During the
day the 383d Infantry Regiment, slowed by the terrain, had advanced
2,600 yards inland. [254]
As heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire fell on the beach, the 382d
Infantry also landed with two battalions abreast--the 2d Battalion
to the right (north) at Blue Beach 2 and the 3d Battalion to the left
(south) at Blue Beach 1. The 2d Battalion, though momentarily stopped
by debris on the shore, was able to advance quickly and by 1025 had
penetrated 300 yards inland. This gain was increased to 700 yards
by 1115. The battalion crossed Highway 1 before it encountered the
first defensive positions of the 9th Infantry Regiment, a series
of zigzag deserted trenches roughly paralleling the beach. Although
the 2d Battalion met no enemy opposition, the intense heat and the
swampy ground made progress slow. At 1630, when the battalion formed
a perimeter for the night, it had pushed inland approximately 2,500
yards.
The amphibian tractors carrying the 3d Battalion, 382d Infantry, were
held up by the tank barriers of coconut logs and debris on the beach,
and the troops were forced to debark at the water's edge. Several
hundred yards off the beach this battalion began to receive heavy
fire from Hill 120, which was about 600 yards from the beach. The
hill dominated the regimental beach area [255] and was the A-Day
objective for the battalion. The fire pinned down the battalion,
which thereupon called for mortar support and naval gunfire. The
resulting barrage forced the Japanese out of their positions, and at
1040 the battalion advanced and captured Hill 120.
The 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, which had been in floating reserve,
landed on Blue Beach 1 and moved to the foot of Hill 120 to support
the 3d Battalion. Immediately beyond the hill there was a small meadow
rimmed by a deep swamp. The enemy fired upon the hill throughout the
day but could not dislodge the 3d Battalion. This steady fire and the
presence of the swamp limited the A-Day advance of the 3d Battalion
to 1,300 yards inland from the landing beach.
At the end of the day, despite the swampy terrain and the harassing
fire of the Japanese, the 382d Infantry had advanced approximately
2,500 yards on the northern flank and 1,300 yards on the southern
flank. Contact had been established at 1600 with the 32d Infantry,
7th Division, on the left flank, and the 383d Infantry, 96th Division,
on the right flank. [256]
At 1630 the assault forces of the 96th Division consolidated their
positions and set up defense perimeters for the night. During the
day the division had captured the barrio of San Jose, established
control over both sides of the Labiranan River, captured Hill 120
overlooking the beach area, and progressed well inland. Although all
units of the division fell considerably short of the objective for
A Day, this delay was due fully as much to the swampy and difficult
terrain as it was to enemy resistance. The 381st Infantry Regiment
remained in Sixth Army floating reserve throughout the day. [257]
Maj. Gen. James L. Bradley arrived ashore at 1750, and at 1800
he assumed command of the 96th Infantry Division. The three light
artillery battalions of the division had landed and were in position
by 1800.
7th Infantry Division
Concurrently with the landings of the 96th Division, the 7th Division,
on the left, was establishing a beachhead in its zone of action
just south of the 96th Division. At 0800 the assault troops of the
7th Division began to clamber down the nets of their transports into
landing boats which were to carry them in the dash for the shore. [258]
By 0815 they were boated and at the line of departure.
The 7th Division was to land on Violet and Yellow Beaches. Violet Beach
extended 785 yards north from the northern edge of Dulag. The northern
half of Yellow Beach, called Yellow Beach 2, which was south of Violet
Beach and contiguous to it, was 400 yards long. Between the northern
and southern halves of Yellow Beach was a swamp. The southern half of
Yellow Beach, Yellow Beach 1, was approximately 425 yards in length
and was located south of Dulag and north of the Daguitan River mouth.
The 7th Division was to go ashore between the Calbasag and Daguitan
Rivers with regiments abreast--the 32d Infantry on the right (north)
and the 184th Infantry on the left (south); the 17th Infantry, less
its 3d Battalion, was in reserve. The principal A-Day objectives
were the barrio of Dulag and its airstrip. The 3d Battalion, 17th
Infantry, was to swing south and secure the bridge and the crossing
of the Daguitan River at Dao and the crossing of the Talisay River.
The 32d Infantry, under Col. Marc J. Logie, was to land on the northern
and southern portions of Violet Beach, drive into the interior,
and protect the right flank of the division. The 184th Infantry,
commanded by Col. Curtis D. O'Sullivan, was to land on Yellow Beach 1
and Yellow Beach 2 and then drive inland, directing its main effort
toward an early seizure of the airfield west of Dulag. It was also
to seize and secure the crossings of the Daguitan River.
After the landing waves had formed at the line of departure, the
landing craft started for the beaches, preceded by the 776th Amphibian
Tank Battalion. As it got ashore, the tank battalion received hostile
mortar and small arms fire that came from a tank barrier of coconut
palm logs near the water's edge. The battalion overcame this opposition
fifteen minutes after landing and advanced a distance of 200 yards
inland to positions from which it could support the infantry. [259]
According to plan, the 32d and 184th Infantry Regiments followed
abreast. The 32d Infantry landed with two battalions abreast--the 2d
on the right and the 3d on the left. The regiment encountered minor
resistance at the beach, consisting of light rifle fire and sporadic
artillery and mortar fire. By 1023 the 3d Battalion had landed all its
assault troops and by 1030 seven assault waves of the 2d Battalion
had reached the shore. As the two battalions proceeded inland, they
met opposition from the enemy.
The 2d Battalion landed on the edge of a cemetery in which were small
groups of the enemy very much alive. By 1100 these were subdued by
rifle fire and the battalion was able to advance without difficulty
into the interior. At about 1300 the 2d Platoon of Company F, after
advancing some 600 yards, ran into fire from three pillboxes concealed
in the tall cogon grass on the right flank. Tanks were brought up to
knock out the enemy pillboxes. The advance then continued. By 1315
the 2d Battalion made physical contact with elements of the 96th
Division on the right. Shortly after 1400 the 2d and 3d Battalions
of the 32d Infantry made contact and reached Highway 1. [260]
Companies L and K of the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, landed
abreast. Company L, on the left, ran into heavy fire from Japanese
machine gunners who had waited until the leading elements of the
company exposed themselves. The Japanese were entrenched in bunkers
emplaced in hedgerows and banana groves. The pillboxes, which were
mutually supporting, were located at the ends of the hedgerows and
occasionally in the middle of an open field. Each pillbox had machine
guns and antitank guns. Company L suffered a number of casualties
and was pinned down. The enemy gunners then turned to Company K and
stopped its forward movement. In the space of fifteen minutes two
officers and six men of the 3d Battalion were killed, and one officer
and eighteen men wounded. Of the medium tanks that had come ashore at
1030, three were sent to support Company L and two to support Company
K. The latter two were knocked out before they could adjust their
fire on the pillboxes. The leading tank sent in support of Company L
was knocked out by a direct hit from an antitank gun. With two tanks
remaining, it was decided to hit the flanks of the entrenched pillboxes
at 1345. A platoon of Company K went to the right and another platoon
from the company to the left. Simultaneously the remaining elements
of the two companies, coordinating with the tanks, assaulted the
pillboxes. The heavy volume of fire kept the enemy guns quiet until
they could be finished off with grenades. The pillboxes were knocked
out without further casualties.
Paralleling the route of advance of Company L were several hedge
fences, behind which were enemy machine guns and mortars. Although
under heavy fire, the company was able to break through the first
barriers with the aid of the tanks. At 1630, since the enemy fire
continued in volume, the 32d Infantry withdrew and established a
defensive position for the night. During the day the 32d Infantry had
reached a general line along Highway 1. The 2d Battalion had advanced
400 yards beyond the highway and the 3d Battalion 100 yards. [261]
The 184th Infantry landed at 1000, two battalions abreast--the 1st
on the southern half of Yellow Beach and the 3d on the northern
half. They encountered surprisingly little resistance on either
beach and were able to push inland at a much greater speed than had
been anticipated. The 3d Battalion drove through the town of Dulag,
which lay directly in its path, to the Dulag-Burauen Highway. The 1st
Battalion pushed inland and reached the highway at 1210, just fifteen
minutes after the 3d Battalion. At 1530 the two battalions established
physical contact and maintained it throughout the day as they continued
their advance along the highway. At 1255 the 2d Battalion, 184th
Infantry, landed on Yellow Beach and went into regimental reserve on
the regiment's southern flank. As the advance of the 32d Infantry on
the right slowed up, Company G, 184th Infantry, was committed to fill
the gap which had developed between the two regiments. At 1835 the
184th Infantry, although it had failed to secure the Dulag airstrip,
formed its night perimeter along the edge of the strip. [262] At the
end of the day the regiment had no battle casualties, but three men
had been overcome by the heat. Eleven Japanese had been killed in
the regiment's zone. [263]
The 17th Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, was kept in 7th Division
reserve. The 3d Battalion of the 17th had come ashore at 1500 on the
southern end of Yellow Beach. The battalion pushed west and south
through light opposition, seizing the bridge over the Daguitan River
at Dao, and by 2100 had established a bridgehead south of the river
and made contact with the 184th Infantry on the right. At the end of
the first day's fighting the 7th Division had gained possession of the
Leyte shore in its zone and penetrated inland 600 yards on the right
and nearly 2,300 yards on the left. It had also reached the edge of
the Dulag airstrip. By nightfall the XXIV Corps had established a
firm beachhead line extending along the coast from San Jose on the
north to just below Dao on the south.
Seventy miles to the south the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th
Division, which was detailed to land in the vicinity of Panaon Strait
on 20 October at 0930, half an hour before the launching of the
great offensive, and to secure control of that entrance to Sogod Bay,
successfully accomplished its mission. It encountered no Japanese.
Thus at the end of A Day the Sixth Army had succeeded in landing
assault forces all along the eastern coast of Leyte and was in
control of Panaon Strait. Its casualties amounted to 49 men killed,
192 wounded, and 6 missing in action. There remained a gap of nearly
ten miles between the X and XXIV Corps. The Tacloban airstrip on the
Cataisan Peninsula had been secured and the American forces were
on the edge of the airstrip at Dulag. Nearly as important as the
capture of the airstrip was the seizure of Hill 522, which commanded
the entrance to the broad Leyte Valley at Palo. The advance echelon
of General Headquarters had opened on Leyte Island at 1200. [264]
On the following day, when adequate communication facilities had
been established, Generals Krueger, Sibert, and Hodge assumed command
ashore of the Sixth Army, X Corps, and XXIV Corps, respectively.
Most of the 16th Division had withdrawn during the naval and air
bombardment which took place just prior to the landing. The immediate
invasion of the troops after this pounding enabled the Americans to
secure most of the coastal defenses before the enemy could regroup
and return. As a consequence, the only Japanese forces encountered
were those left behind to fight a delaying action. The meeting with
the enemy in force was yet to come.
Bringing in Supplies
While the assault forces were securing the beaches of Leyte, supplies
were being poured in to support the operation. Within an hour after
the first assault wave hit the hostile shores, rations, equipment,
and other supplies were being rushed to the beaches. Each man going
ashore carried a change of clothing in his pack, two days' supply
of emergency rations, one day's supply of D rations, and two filled
canteens, in addition to his gas mask, weapons, and ammunition.
The Navy was responsible for transporting the troops and supplies to
the target area. Ships' companies unloaded the cargo from the cargo
vessels and transported it in small craft to the beaches. Many of
the ships had been improperly loaded for the journey to Leyte. The
cargo should have been so loaded that articles first needed would
be the last put on board; instead it had been stowed haphazardly,
with little attention given to the problem of unloading.
As a result of the faulty stowage of supplies on the ships, many
badly needed items were at the bottoms of the holds, and articles
that would not be needed until later in the operation were piled
on top of them. The supplies were set ashore in random fashion and
then were carelessly thrown on trucks and other vehicles. This sort
of handling resulted in a loss of carrying capacity, in slow removal
of the loads, and in a consequent delay in the return of vehicles to
the landing beaches.
The LSM's were used to very good advantage in the unloading of
the APA's and AKA's. Vehicles and supplies could be loaded on them
without difficulty, and in addition, two hatches on the LSM's could
be worked at the same time. On each of the APA's, AKA's, and LST's
which carried troops, a labor crew was detailed to remain on board
to assist in the unloading. [265]
At the beach, the Army took over the cargo and moved the supplies
to prearranged dumps. On the northern beaches in the X Corps sector,
the Army shore party was composed of the 532d and 592d Engineer Boat
and Shore Regiments of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. After landing,
these units facilitated the movement of troops, vehicles, and supplies
across the beaches and controlled all unloading operations. [266]
The 1122d and 1140th Engineer Combat Groups supervised the unloading
in the XXIV Corps sector. They were assisted by naval beach parties
from the VII Amphibious Force, which brought the cargo ashore.
The beachhead areas at which the supplies were unloaded varied in
quality and depth. Most of the beaches on which the 7th and 96th
Divisions landed were very good, [267] as contrasted with those in the
X Corps area where the 24th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division
came ashore. The greatest difficulty was encountered along Red Beach,
where the 24th Division landed. This stretch of coast line was ill
adapted to the unloading of supplies, having poor exits and offering
few dispersal areas ashore. [268]
LST's approaching Red Beach were under intense enemy fire. Four of them
received direct hits. [269] Nearly all of the LST's were grounded 100
to 200 yards from the beach. Only one of them was able to come within
forty to fifty yards of the beach, and it succeeded in unloading its
cargo of heavy equipment only with considerable difficulty. [270]
Another put off a bulldozer, which disappeared in seven feet of
water. With difficulty the other LST's withdrew and returned to the
transport area. [271]
The shore parties on both Red and White Beaches (X Corps sector)
did not land early enough to effect a proper organization before the
cargo began to come in. Although the parties worked hard, they were
undermanned, and it was necessary to augment them by "volunteers" in
order to unload the large volume of cargo. [272] It had been planned
to establish temporary beach dumps at the point of unloading of
each LST, but since at Red Beach the LST's could not get ashore, the
plans had to be changed. These craft were diverted to the 1st Cavalry
Division's White Beach 2,000 yards north. The LSM's and LCM's were
able to discharge their vehicles in three or four feet of water. Many
of these, being poorly waterproofed, stalled and had to be pulled
ashore. Once there, the heavily loaded vehicles churned up the sand,
and many of them sank so deeply that they had to be pulled out. [273]
The strong resistance of the Japanese and the difficult terrain
limited the depth of the 24th Division's beachhead and prevented
the establishment of division dumps beyond the beachhead areas. As a
result, most of the supplies and nearly all supporting and service
troops had to be concentrated on the first three or four hundred
yards of the beachhead. Fortunately there was no bombing or strafing
of the area, and although the development of exit roads was slow,
the congestion on the beach was cleared before trouble developed. [274]
The diversion of the 24th Division's LST's to the beaches of the 1st
Cavalry Division naturally strained the facilities of the beach and
shore parties on White Beach. The southern end of White Beach also
proved unsuitable for landing LST's, which consequently were shifted
to the northern end. [275] However, the Army shore parties organized
White Beach immediately upon landing. A two-way road was cleared along
the beach with military police directing traffic. Dump areas were
marked off by white ribbons, and sign posts were erected. The supplies
were unloaded from the landing craft by roller conveyors and "fire
brigade methods" directly onto the waiting trucks and trailers. [276]
After the ships had been unloaded the shore parties consolidated all
of the supplies into dumps as rapidly as possible. The rations and
ammunition, which were loaded on fifteen LVT's, were kept mobile to
the rear of the troops. [277]
When Leyte was substituted for Yap as the target, it had been decided
that the 96th Division should unload troops and supplies at Leyte as
rapidly as possible. Consequently, supplies were unloaded with little
regard for the order in which items would be needed ashore. [278]
There was no general unloading on the beach in the XXIV Corps
area until the late afternoon of A Day, when water, rations, and
ammunition were sent ashore. For about an hour the unloading proceeded
satisfactorily, but the beach soon became congested. The beach parties
brought in the supplies faster than they could be handled by the shore
parties. [279] At one time more than eighty loaded boats waited over
five hours before they could be unloaded. The slowness of the shore
parties in unloading the boats was not entirely their fault. Many of
the boats were improperly loaded with mixed cargo, a situation which
caused the boats to ship water. They were forced to come in to the
beach or sink. The shore parties were also handicapped by a lack of
workers. A shore party of 250 men included headquarters personnel,
military police, and communications men, leaving only fifty or sixty
workers. The unloading was further retarded by lack of sufficient
mechanical equipment and failure to make full use of available
transportation. [280]
Loose cargo piled up on the beaches faster than it could be taken to
the dump sites. [281] A deep swamp, 250 yards inland and parallel to
Blue Beach, also limited the extension of dumps in that area. The
congestion was relieved the next day, when the supplies were taken
to selected dump sites nearly as fast as they could be removed from
the boats.
In the Dulag area, the organization of the shore party and its
operations were well co-ordinated. [282] In the initial phase the
7th Division employed the "drugstore system" whereby DUKW's carried
the supplies directly to the front-line consumers of the division
from specially loaded LST's which had been anchored off the landing
beaches. [283] By using this method the division was able to deliver
critical supplies to the combat troops within an hour after the
request was received. At the same time, other supplies and equipment
could be put ashore without interruption.
In the wake of the initial assault waves, the engineer troops landed
and began at once to clear the beaches, prepare dump sites, and build
access roads. The men worked around the clock in six-hour shifts. [284]
Within four hours the 7th Division's shore party was prepared to start
full-scale operations, and two hours later began to issue supplies
to the assault forces. Since the cargo came ashore in nets, it was
possible to use cranes and bulldozers to good advantage. The cargo
was initially moved over the landing beaches to regimental beach
dumps 500 yards inland, and as vehicles landed they were driven to
temporary assembly areas or directly to their organizations. [285]
Six hours after the first assault wave hit the beaches the 7th Division
abandoned the floating drugstore system, since by that time sufficient
supplies had been brought ashore to fill requisitions directly from
the dumps. [286]
During the day a total of 107,450 tons of supplies and equipment were
discharged over the beaches of the Sixth Army. Although the beaches
in some instances were extremely congested, steps had been initiated
to relieve the situation.
News of the success of the American forces in establishing a beachhead
on Leyte--the first foothold in the Philippine Islands--was joyfully
received by the American nation. The President radioed congratulations
to General MacArthur and added, "You have the nation's gratitude
and the nation's prayers for success as you and your men fight your
way back...." [287]