The Return
For more than two years the high command of the Southwest Pacific had
anticipated the promised return to the Philippines. That objective
had governed nearly all of the planning and most of the earlier
invasions. Now the day had arrived. Plans had been made and troops
and cargo were aboard ships. The fleets of the Pacific Ocean Areas
and the Southwest Pacific Area were about to join forces in a mighty
assault against the Philippines.
The Convoy Forms
That part of the VII Amphibious Force which carried the 24th Infantry
Division and the Sixth Army Service Command assembled at the harbor
of Hollandia, Netherlands New Guinea. In this force were over 470
ships, ranging in size from small rocket-launching craft to 5,000-man
troopships, loaded and now waiting for the message to weigh anchor
and head for the Far Shore, as Leyte was designated. They were
scheduled to pick up that part of the force which was carrying the
1st Cavalry Division from Manus Island and then rendezvous with the
III Amphibious Force.
At 1600 on Friday, the thirteenth of October, the word was given and
the great fleet at Hollandia got under way for the target--Leyte--1,300
miles distant. [128] Minesweeping task groups had preceded it on
11 and 12 October. [129] By sundown the convoy was formed and the
ships were darkened. On 14 October the ships of the convoy crossed
the equator without ceremony. General quarters (battle drill) and
abandon ship drills were held. The part of the force carrying the 1st
Cavalry Division was sighted during the day. On the following day the
two units joined and the convoy proceeded. On 17 October the convoy
made visual contact with the tractor groups of the III Amphibious
Force. This force had come from Hawaii with the XXIV Corps to help
in the liberation of Leyte. [130]
XXIV Corps Afloat
In the early morning hours of 13 September the headquarters
of XXIV Corps at Schofield Barracks, Oahu, Hawaii, was awake and
active. Breakfast was served at 0330, and all men who had been informed
the day before that they were to embark for an unknown shore shouldered
their barracks bags and carried them to waiting trucks. By 0700 the
men had been loaded on the trucks, which took them to the narrow-gauge
Oahu railroad. In flat cars they traveled some twenty miles to Honolulu
Harbor. The usual seeming delays followed, but eventually the hot,
tired, and perspiring headquarters men boarded the George F. Clymer
and were assigned bunks. The Clymer was but one unit of a large convoy
that stretched toward the horizon in every direction. At 1115 on 15
September the convoy got under way for a destination believed to be
Yap. As the ships departed, word was received that the Yap operation
had been canceled and that Leyte was to be their destination. For
the men on board, life fell into the monotonous routine common to
all transports. Reading, card and dice games, eating, sleeping,
and interminable "bull sessions" helped to pass the time.
On the 25th of the month the Clymer anchored at Eniwetok Island,
an anchorage already crowded with hundreds of transports, warships,
and cargo vessels. The men were allowed to go ashore, where they were
given beer and other refreshments. The XXIV Corps was notified that
it would leave for Manus, in the Admiralty Islands, where further
orders would be received and the staging completed. The LST flotilla
left on 26 September and two days later the transports followed. Maps,
terrain studies, and aerial photographs were distributed and studied
en route. [131] At the same time the XXIV Corps issued a tentative
field order which was distributed to lower unit commanders, who then
held conferences and issued tentative verbal field orders. [132]
Early in October the convoy crossed the equator. On many of the ships
ceremonies were held transforming pollywogs into shellbacks, with the
result that some of the men preferred standing to sitting for a few
days. On 3 October the convoy arrived at Manus. [133] The assault
troops of the XXIV Corps were transferred from AKA's to LST's. The
96th Division on 9 October issued a final field order for the Leyte
operation. This order allowed the regimental headquarters less than
forty-eight hours to complete final orders, plans, and maps, and
distribute them to the headquarters of the assault battalions. [134]
On 11 October the LST transports carrying the assault battalions filed
out of the Manus anchorage, and on 14 October the rest of the convoy
again formed and started on the last stretch of the journey. [135]
Its progress was satisfactory, and on 15 October the President of the
United States sent his best wishes for the success of the operation to
President Sergio Osmeña of the Philippine Commonwealth, who was at sea
with the expedition. [136] When the III Amphibious Force rendezvoused
with the Seventh Fleet, the largest convoy ever seen in the Pacific
up to that time was formed. [137]
Composition of the Convoy
Thirty-four months had been spent in building and preparing these
combatant and amphibious vessels. Practically none of them were
in existence at the time Corregidor was besieged. Most of the 183
vessels of Task Force 77 were warships, while Task Forces 78 and 79,
the amphibious forces, consisted mainly of transports, cargo ships,
and a wide variety of landing ships and craft. Fully 518 ocean-going
vessels were included in Task Forces 78 and 79. [138]
Of the vessels assigned to participate in the operation, 157 were
combatant ships: 6 old battleships, 5 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers,
18 escort carriers, 86 destroyers, 25 destroyer escorts, and 11
frigates. There were 420 transport vessels, including 5 command ships,
40 attack transports, 10 LSD's, 151 LST's, 79 LCI's, 21 LCT's, and 18
high-speed transports. The remainder included patrol, mine-sweeping,
hydrographic, and service ships. [139]
The convoy did not include the combatant ships of Admiral Halsey's
Third Fleet. The main striking force of the Third Fleet was Task
Force 38, composed of four powerful carrier task groups, under Admiral
Mitscher. Each group contained fast carriers, cruisers, destroyers,
and the newest American battleships. [140]
After forming, the convoy proceeded toward the target. At this time
a disquieting report was received from the meteorologists on board
the ships: a typhoon was headed toward the Leyte Gulf area. Such a
disturbance could be fatal to the expedition. A severe storm did in
fact lash the gulf area from 14 through 17 October, but it gradually
abated and the morning of A Day, 20 October, was clear. This favorable
weather augured well for a successful landing.
Softening the Target
Early Strikes
Allied aircraft had already visited the Philippine Archipelago. The
first aerial strikes since 1942 were made in the early fall of 1944. On
1 September B-24's from New Guinea bases initiated their first
large-scale air attack against airdromes in the Davao area, though
bad weather prevented the protective fighter escort from attacking the
target. The airborne defense encountered was surprisingly light--only
three intercepting fighters opposed the strike. The bombers dropped
100 tons of bombs, destroying 34 planes on the ground and killing
about 100 men. [141] Two American bombers were shot down and six
received minor damages. [142] General MacArthur believed that the
Japanese were conserving their air strength in order to concentrate
it against anticipated Allied landings. [143]
On 4 September the first aerial reconnaissance flights were made over
Leyte. During the period 9-14 September, Admiral Mitscher launched
a large-scale, carrier-based air assault against the Japanese air
defenses in the Philippine Islands in order to protect the Palau and
Morotai landings. On 9 September aircraft from the carriers attacked
airdromes and installations in the Mindanao area, destroying 60
aircraft on the ground and 8 in the air. On 12 September the attack
was directed against the Visayan Islands. Of an estimated air strength
of 225 aircraft in the sector, 125 were destroyed on the ground and
75 in the air. During the night of 12 September the Japanese flew in
reinforcements from Luzon. A Third Fleet strike on 13 September against
the reinforced air strength destroyed an estimated 135 aircraft on
the ground and 81 in the air. On the 14th, the Third Fleet planes
encountered no enemy air opposition but destroyed from 10 to 15
aircraft on the ground. The air strength which the enemy had conserved
for an anticipated American invasion was thus decimated. About 500,
or approximately 57 percent of the 884 aircraft believed to be in the
Philippines, were rendered nonoperational or destroyed. This successful
knocking out of the Japanese air strength in the Philippine Islands
was an important factor in the decision to speed up the landing at
Leyte by two months.
On 21 September Central Pacific carrier-based aircraft directed their
attention to the Luzon area. In spite of their vigorous defense of
the Luzon airfields, the Japanese lost an estimated 110 aircraft in
the air and 95 on the ground. These included not only combat aircraft
but also reconnaissance, transport, and training planes. The remaining
air strength in the area was estimated to be 350 aircraft, of which
10 percent were in Mindanao, 20 percent in the Visayan Islands,
and 70 percent in Luzon.
At the same time, the carrier-based aircraft made strong strikes
against enemy shipping in the central and southern Philippines. It
was estimated that from 1 September to 15 September 105 merchant
vessels were sunk in those waters by carrier planes, destroyers,
cruisers, and submarines. Although exact information was lacking on
the number of enemy vessels present in the Visayan and Mindanao areas,
it was thought that 50 percent of the Japanese merchant marine in
those areas was eliminated. A successful attrition of the Japanese
air and naval strength in the Philippines had been accomplished. [144]
The Third Fleet's carriers then started to neutralize the approaches
to the Philippine Islands. The carrier-based aircraft launched
strikes against enemy aircraft staging areas in the Ryukyus, of which
Okinawa is the largest and most important. As a result of attacks on
10 October, they destroyed an estimated 23 enemy planes in the air
and 88 on the ground or in the water. Admiral Halsey reported that
his flyers sank 1 subtender, 1 mine sweeper, 1 destroyer escort,
2 mine-craft, 4 midget submarines, 20 cargo ships, and 45 other
craft. In addition, nearly as many ships, mostly of small size,
were damaged. [145] On 11 October the flyers struck at Luzon.
Air and Naval Action in the Formosa Area
The plans of the Third Fleet called for strong carrier-based strikes
against Formosa on 12 and 13 October. The four task groups of Task
Force 38 were assigned targets in the southern Formosa, northern
Formosa, central Formosa, and the Takao areas, respectively. (Takao
is a port city on the southwest coast of Formosa.) After a fast run
on the night of 11-12 October the carriers of Task Force 38 arrived
in position off Formosa in the early morning. Although the Japanese
were aware of the approach of the task force, they made no attacks
against it before dawn. As the first fighters started sweeps over
their respective areas, heavy opposition developed, but it dropped
markedly during the day. From 12 to 14 October the Japanese lost some
280 aircraft, [146] while the Americans lost 76. As a result of the
operation, the Japanese lost half of their naval air strength. This
loss gave assurance that the U. S. forces would have air superiority
over the Leyte area on A Day. [147]
On the evening of 13 October the American heavy cruiser Canberra
was torpedoed eighty-five miles off Formosa. Admiral Halsey kept
his forces in the area another day in order to afford protection to
the Canberra. Attacks, therefore, continued against enemy aircraft,
airfields, and installations. By this time, Japanese reinforcements
had arrived. On the evening of 14 October an aerial torpedo hit the
heavy cruiser Houston.
Admiral Halsey decided to capitalize on the damage inflicted on the two
cruisers. He ordered two task groups, which included the battleships,
to retire eastward out of sight; he sent another of the task groups
to conduct intermittent air raids against northern Luzon; and he
assigned the remaining task group to protect the crippled Canberra and
Houston. Halsey instructed this last task group to send out messages in
the clear begging piteously for assistance. He hoped that by this ruse,
which he called the "Lure of the Streamlined Bait," the Japanese fleet
would be led to believe that this task group was all that remained of
the task force and would therefore sweep down for the kill. The two
task groups which had retired eastward would then appear and engage
the enemy. The Japanese swallowed the bait and dispatched destroyers
and cruisers toward the "crippled" American force. Unfortunately,
their search planes uncovered the two task forces off Formosa, and
the Japanese surface ships hastily withdrew.
The enemy pilots made such greatly exaggerated claims of success that
Imperial General Headquarters decided to order out the 2d Diversion
Attack Force against the Americans. The flying units of Carrier
Divisions 3 and 4 were transferred to the 2d Air Fleet. These air
units proceeded to Formosa on the 12th of October. Carrier Divisions
3 and 4, however, remained in the Inland Sea until they sortied forth
for the Battle of Leyte Gulf. [148] The exaggerated claims of the
Japanese air force were accepted jubilantly on the home islands. The
people felt that the American Navy had indeed been given a death
blow, and the Finance Ministry distributed "celebration sake" to
all households in the country to commemorate the event. The Tokyo
radio made the unfounded claim that "a total of 57 enemy warships
including 19 aircraft carriers and four battleships were sunk or
heavily damaged by the Japanese forces ... the enemy task forces
lost the majority of their strength and were put to rout...." [149]
It also predicted that the Allied losses would delay the invasion of
the Philippine Islands by two months. [150]
Admiral Halsey's reaction was to report that "all 3d Fleet Ships
reported by radio Tokyo as sunk have now been salvaged and are retiring
towards the enemy." [151]
The convoy, as it steamed toward Leyte, received the news of the
United States success with considerable satisfaction. At this time,
however, Admiral Halsey announced that the Third Fleet was being
deployed for action, since he was expecting the Japanese to rise
to his bait. Consequently the Third Fleet, except for the current
strike at Luzon, could not furnish any more carrier support for the
operation. [152] The Third Fleet task group which went to the Luzon
area successfully struck at enemy airfields and shipping. From 17 to
19 October it destroyed an estimated ninety-nine enemy aircraft on
the ground and ninety-five in the air. [153]
Realignment of Air Support
On the heels of Admiral Halsey's announcement that no assistance in
connection with the Leyte landings could be expected from the Third
Fleet, Far East Air Forces stated that the Fifth Air Force would
support the Leyte operation as a "priority mission." [154] At the
same time the Seventh Fleet requested intensive reconnaissance of
San Bernardino and Surigao Straits in the Leyte area. This mission
was assigned to the Fifth Air Force, which was also charged with
neutralizing the Visayan airfields. The Thirteenth Air Force was to
expedite the basing on Morotai of heavy bombers which could be called
forward in support when requested by the Fifth Air Force. From 18 to
19 October the carrier aircraft of the Seventh Fleet protected the
convoy and struck at small vessels and airfields in northern Mindanao
as well as defense and communications installations and airfields on
Leyte. [155]
Although the missions Admiral Halsey had assigned his carriers
apparently prevented any aircraft of the Third Fleet from participating
in direct support of the landings, Halsey nevertheless ordered one
of the task groups to strike at the Leyte, Samar, Cebu, and Negros
areas on 18-19 October and to provide direct air support for the
Leyte operation on 20 October. [156] Moreover, by 18 October news
was received that the Japanese had discovered the ruse and withdrawn
their warships from the Formosa area, thus leaving Admiral Halsey's
forces free to protect the operation by covering San Bernardino and
Surigao Straits. [157]
The carrier force of the Seventh Fleet was to bear the brunt of the
tactical air support. By the afternoon and night of 17 October the
weather had cleared, and flying conditions were perfect as the carriers
moved into their operation areas the following morning. The force was
divided into three units: one unit operated in the southern part of
Leyte Gulf to protect the landings at Panaon Strait; another operated
near the entrance to the gulf in order to support the landings of
the Southern Attack Force at Dulag; and the last operated southeast
of Samar Island to support the landings of the Northern Attack Force
at Tacloban.
During 18 and 19 October, aircraft from the carriers struck at
enemy airfields on Cebu, Negros, and Panay Islands. There was very
little enemy activity from the Japanese airfields in the Leyte area,
since they were still sodden from the recent storms. In the two days'
strikes, the Seventh Fleet aircraft destroyed an estimated thirty-six
enemy planes and damaged twenty-eight more. [158]
Japanese Plan of Defense
The air blows on the Philippines served as a warning that the Americans
were ready to return to the Islands--an event long expected by the
Japanese. By the end of June 1944, the Japanese military situation
had considerably worsened. The outer circle of Japan's perimeter had
been pierced and the impetus of the American drive showed no signs
of slackening. (Map 4)
The Allied nations had hit the Japanese from east and west and
seriously interfered with their seaborne commerce. Japan was in grave
danger of being separated from her stolen southern area--the source
of her raw materials. Units within this area were also being forcibly
isolated from each other. The fall of Saipan had brought about a
"most serious crisis." Premier Tojo was removed and Kuniaki Koiso
formed a new cabinet. [159]
In the summer of 1944 Imperial General Headquarters had started to
strengthen the Philippines, the Ryukyus, the Kurile Islands, and Japan
itself--the "first line of sea defense." If the Allies landed forces
in any of these areas, the Japanese would concentrate their land,
air, and sea forces and attempt to repel the landing force. These
operations were known as the SHO (Victory) Operations. Defense of
the Philippines was SHO I. [160]
The Japanese strategy was simple. Japan wished to remain in the war,
and to do so she must at all costs keep open the lines of communication
to the sources of her raw materials in the Netherlands Indies.
In the first part of August 1944, the headquarters of the 14th Area
Army, which was to be charged with the defense of the Philippine
Archipelago, was organized under the command of the Southern Army,
while the 35th Army, which was to defend the Visayan Islands, was
established under the command of the 14th Area Army. [161]
The Philippine Islands were under the jurisdiction of the Southern
Army, whose command organization was extremely complex. (Chart 3)
The supreme commander was Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi. There
were four area armies in the Southern Army: the 2d Area Army occupied
Netherlands New Guinea, thence west to Timor; the 7th Area Army was
at Singapore; the Burma Area Army was at Rangoon; and the 14th Area
Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda, was in the Philippines
with its headquarters at Manila. The Southern Army also had two air
armies and three garrison armies: the 3d Air Army in Singapore; the
4th Air Army, consisting of two air divisions in the Philippines and
one air division in western New Guinea; and a garrison army stationed
in Thailand, another in French Indochina, and a third in Borneo. The
commander of the 14th Area Army maintained a staff liaison with the
4th Air Army but otherwise had no control over it.
The 1st Air Fleet, under the command of the Southwest Area
Fleet, was stationed in the Philippines, with headquarters at
Manila. Admiral Soemu Toyoda, commander in chief of the Combined
Fleet with headquarters at Tokyo, controlled the entire naval forces,
including the Southwest Area Fleet. [162]
Plans for the 14th Area Army
The Japanese during the summer of 1944 anticipated that the United
States forces would return to the Philippine Islands, but when and
where were two questions for which not even Tokyo Rose, the Japanese
radio propagandist, had the answers. Consequently, the Japanese wished
to keep their troops sufficiently mobile that reinforcements might be
rushed to the point of contact. The original plan called for the main
defensive effort of the ground forces to be made on Luzon, since there
were too few Japanese troops in the archipelago to defend all of the
Philippines. The Japanese Navy and Air Forces, however, were to carry
out "decisive" actions in the central and southern Philippines. [163]
To General Kuroda fell the task of making and executing plans for the
defense of the Philippines by the 14th Area Army. General Kuroda was
essentially a realist. He stated in June 1947 that in October 1944 he
had told Maj. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief of Army Intelligence, Imperial
General Headquarters, that "it would be best for Japan to negotiate
an immediate peace before the Americans could destroy our nation
by air power." [164] Kuroda thought that all available land forces
should be concentrated in the Luzon area in order to counterattack
any American landing within the Luzon perimeter. However, because
of their predominant aerial strength, the Americans in their next
attempt could unless they made "some terrible mistake ... land in
force and once ashore, could take the Philippines." [165] General
Kuroda's plan was never considered. Imperial General Headquarters'
plan for the defense of the Philippines called for the employment of
ten divisions and five brigades: five divisions and two brigades in
Luzon, four divisions and two brigades in the southern Philippines,
and one division and one brigade in China and Formosa. The two units
last mentioned would be rushed to the Philippines as soon as the
American landing became imminent. [166] When the Americans landed,
all of these units, acting in concert, were to participate in fighting
a decisive battle against the American troops. This plan was never
carried out in its entirety.
The Japanese occupation troops of the Philippine Islands had grown
soft and had "no particular will to fight." In the spring of 1944,
there were only minor units available to set up an organized defense.
Imperial General Headquarters and the Southern Army thought that
because of the many islands in the archipelago emphasis should be
placed on air power. Air attacks could destroy the American forces
before they arrived at the landing areas or at least before they
could make appreciable gains. The way could then be opened to turn a
defense into an offensive. [167] General Kuroda threw cold water on
this plan by bluntly stating:
That concept is good, but you cannot fight with concept
alone. Words alone will not sink American ships and that becomes
clear when you compare our airplanes with theirs. That is why the
major battles have been occurring on land. We can say that the
power of our air force is negligible at this time. No matter how
much the Fourteenth Army devotes their efforts toward air power,
in actuality, should there be a decisive fight, they must fight
on land. The preparation and conduct of an operation, and the
responsibilities thereof cannot be conducted by airplanes and air
units. The land army should initiate its own preparations. For
example, for what purpose were the group of air bases constructed
at Davao and Tacloban? Even though they are built, they aren't
used. It amounts to construction for the use of the enemy. [168]
During the month of August, the Japanese devoted their main efforts
toward strengthening the air force. After the first of September
more emphasis was placed on building up the ground troops while
the air preparations continued to some extent. The Southern Army in
late August ordered about one half of a division to Sarangani and
one division to Davao against the wishes of the 14th Area Army. This
meant a reshuffling of the troops that had been moving and repairing
defenses since the first part of August. "The order was carried out
begrudgingly." [169]
Lt Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, the commander of the 35th Army, thinking that
the American Army would land on 1 October, said: "Contrary to what
has been announced by General Headquarters our air force cannot be
prepared and equipped in time, nor can the Combined Fleet be depended
upon. The situation grows worse and for this reason the land force
preparations must be hastened. Yet, in spite of that, we must not
discourage the air forces and should do as much as possible to prepare
aggressive aerial opposition." [170]
In the middle of September, Imperial General Headquarters decided
to replace General Kuroda with General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Not only
did General Kuroda have a concept of the Philippine operations that
differed from that of his superiors, but he was charged with neglecting
his duty as field army commander. [171] Lt. Col. Seiichi Yoshie of
the Personnel Bureau of the War Ministry, who had been sent to the
Philippines to investigate personnel matters in the Southern Army,
said of the incident:
Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt. Gen. Kuroda was devoting
more time to his golf, reading and personal matters than to the
execution of his official duties. It appeared that his control
over staff officers and troops was not sufficiently strong and
that there was a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his conduct
among the troops. There were also indications that discipline
was becoming very lax.
On 4 September 1944, I left Tokyo under orders ... to
investigate. As a result I obtained many statements substantiating
the unfavorable stories in regard to Lt. Gen. Kuroda. The
recommendations of all the staff was that Lt. Gen. Kuroda be
relieved as soon as possible, and be replaced by Gen. Yamashita
... who was a superb tactician and excellent leader. [172]
General Yamashita, who was in Manchuria, received notification of
his appointment on 23 September, and on the 9th of October he assumed
command of the 14th Area Army. [173] On his arrival in the Philippines,
he found conditions were "unsatisfactory." Of the eleven members
of the old staff only five were left and the new staff officers
were unfamiliar with conditions in the Philippine Islands. [174]
The state of affairs was well exemplified by a remark of his new
chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, who arrived in the Philippines
on 20 October from Sumatra, where he had been in command of the 2d
Imperial Guards Division. [175] Upon being told that the Americans
had landed on Leyte, Muto is said to have replied, "Very interesting,
but where is Leyte?" [176]
Maj. Gen. Toshio Nishimura, one of three assistants to Yamashita,
states that the planning for the Leyte campaign was "very bad." The
supply situation, however, was favorable. Since Manila was the main
depot not only for the Philippines but also for other places in the
south such as Borneo and Singapore, a sufficient amount of everything
needed was at hand. [177]
There were two tactical concepts of defense of the islands in July
and August 1944. One was termed the policy of "annihilation at the
beachhead" and the other the policy of "resistance in depth." The
respective merits of the two concepts were bitterly debated by their
partisans. The proponents of resistance in depth thought that the
beach defenses, which had been constructed with a great deal of
labor, were useless, since it was believed they could not withstand
naval bombardment. On the other hand, the friends of annihilation
at the beachhead felt that semipermanent beach fortifications could
withstand bombardment. Imperial General Headquarters, after studying
the battle lessons of the Pacific Campaign and the actual effect of
naval bombardment, decided to adopt the resistance in depth tactics and
instructed the entire army forces to comply. Consequently, the various
group commanders abandoned their beach defenses with regret and began
to build strong fortifications in selected areas of the interior. [178]
The control of the Visayan Islands and Mindanao was vested in the 35th
Army, which was the equivalent of an American army corps. General
Suzuki, its commander, compromised between the two concepts of
defense. At a meeting of the 35th Army unit commanders in the middle
of August 1944, he stated that although the main battle was to be
fought away from the beaches some troops should remain to resist
the American landings and "therefore part of the troops must suffer
premature losses." [179]
The 16th, 102d, 30th, and the 100th Divisions, which were in
Leyte, Panay, and Mindanao, were placed under the 35th Army, whose
headquarters was at Cebu. [180]
The Suzu Plan
On 17 August General Suzuki issued the Suzu orders for the defense
of the Visayan Islands and Mindanao by the 35th Army. The 100th
Division was to protect the Davao area on Mindanao while the 16th
Division would defend Leyte. Most of the 30th Division and two infantry
battalions were made mobile units which could be rushed to annihilate
the American force wherever it landed. However, if the Americans landed
simultaneously on Davao and Leyte, the main force of the 30th Division
was to be sent to Davao and the other mobile units would go to Leyte.
In late August, Suzuki received orders to dispose his troops as
follows: a reinforced division in the Davao area, three battalions in
the Sarangani Bay area, three battalions in the vicinity of Zamboanga,
two battalions in the Jolo Islands, a "strong unit" in the vicinity of
Surigao, and one division in the Leyte Gulf area. The 55th Independent
Mixed Brigade was to be assigned to the 35th Army. Units of the
16th Division which were in Luzon were sent to the 16th Division
on Leyte. These elements, which consisted of one engineer company,
an independent transportation unit, and a medical unit, were placed
under the commander of the 33d Infantry Regiment. [181]
Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, commanding the 16th Division, which was the
major force on Leyte, had directed his efforts since April 1944
toward the construction of defensive positions on the island. The
first line of defense, which was on the east coast in the Dulag area,
was practically completed by the middle of October. The third defensive
line was in the middle of Leyte Valley in the vicinity of Dagami. The
second line of defense was between the two others, while the bulk of
supplies was assembled in the central mountain range at Jaro.
The distribution of the other troops at the time of the American
landings was as follows: one battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment
in the Catmon Hill and Tanauan district, and the main strength of
the 33d Infantry Regiment in the Palo and Tacloban area. The larger
part of the 33d Infantry Regiment, which was less adequately trained
than the other regiments, had arrived on Leyte in mid-September from
Luzon. Its officers were unfamiliar with the terrain and did not
fortify their positions. [182]
On 17 October General Makino, having heard that American warships
had approached Leyte Gulf, alerted the 16th Division for the
impending battle and ordered all units to "shatter the enemy landing
attempts." [183] On 18 October the 14th Area Army received a report
from the 16th Division which indicated that the latter was not certain
the vessels sighted off Leyte were an enemy attacking force. They
might be ships seeking safety from the storms, or vessels damaged in
the naval battle off Formosa. Consequently, 14th Area Army was not
sure that an attack was imminent at Leyte. [184]
Plans for the 4th Air Army
The principal assignment of the 4th Air Army was to attack
American transports and interdict American shipping and, if given
the opportunity, to attack the American combatant vessels. The
4th Air Army was also to give aerial support to the movement of
reinforcements. [185]
In October the 4th Air Army issued a plan for anticipated
operations. In co-operation with the Army and the Navy, the 4th Air
Army would attempt to destroy the American forces when they struck the
Philippines. The Army air force in concert with the naval air units
would try to destroy carrier-based planes and air bases. In operations
against the American fleet, the Army and Navy air units were to have
"a unified and tactful commitment." If the naval air units could not
co-operate the Army air force was to venture a surprise attack with
a few planes. Dusk, night, and dawn attacks were to be made against
Allied air bases and all means exerted to foil Allied attempts to
establish advance bases in the Philippines. The main strength of the
fighter units was to move into the central and southern Philippines in
order to destroy the principal American landing force. The mission
of the Japanese 4th Air Army, operating from Mindanao, Celebes,
and northern Borneo, would be restricted to checking the current
attempts on the part of the Americans to establish bases on Halmahera
and western New Guinea and the destruction of the planes there. For
this purpose the Japanese air force would use bases in the southern
Philippines.
When the American convoy was sighted moving toward the Philippines, the
heavy bombers were to deploy to the central and southern Philippines
and make preparations for an immediate attack on the convoy after it
had arrived in the harbor. The fighter units were to attack Allied
aircraft and, if the circumstances were propitious, were also to attack
the convoy. If the Americans should attempt simultaneous landings at
various points, the Japanese Army air forces would "try to annihilate
the landing parties one by one," [186] acting in concert with the
Japanese Navy.
Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, the chief of staff to the commander in chief of
the Japanese Third Fleet, was highly critical of the liaison between
the Army and Navy air forces. "The Army and Navy always quarreled
with each other. In theory they were supposed to cooperate and on the
higher levels it would work, but personalities were the trouble." [187]
Japanese Navy Plans
On 21 July 1944 Admiral Toyoda received a directive which laid down
the basic policies for subsequent "urgent operations." A great deal
of the contracting empire was abandoned. The Southwest Area, which
embraced the region from Manila to Singapore, was ordered to "maintain
security of resources areas, hold vital sectors for their defense, and
place emphasis on protection for fleet anchorages." Thus the Japanese
planned to restrict battle "to the homeland and to the island chain
which protected the last links" of the empire with the south. The
forces in the Japanese home islands, the Ryukyu chain, Formosa, and
the Philippine Islands were told to take "all measures to expedite the
establishment of conditions to cope with decisive battle. In event
of enemy attack, summon all strength which can be concentrated and
hold vital sectors, in general intercepting and destroying the enemy
within the operational sphere of planes of our base air force." [188]
The success of Admiral Halsey's carrier strikes against Formosa had
considerably weakened the strength of Japanese carrier-based planes,
and less than one half of the Army planes remained. The necessity
of sending reinforcements to Formosa also weakened considerably the
Japanese aerial defense of the Philippines. The enemy became almost
completely dependent upon the remaining land-based planes. [189] Within
their capabilities the Japanese had made their plans and readied their
forces, as the American convoy steamed towards Leyte to do battle.
Securing the Channel Approaches
Landings of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion
The forward part of the convoy, which was carrying the 6th Ranger
Infantry Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Henry A. Mucci, had
experienced stormy weather since leaving Hollandia, but by dawn of the
17th the storm had slackened, though the ocean was still choppy. The
transports carrying the reinforced 6th Ranger Battalion, preceded by
three mine sweepers, entered Leyte Gulf. [190]
The USS Crosby, carrying Company D, arrived on schedule off Suluan
Island, the outermost of the islands guarding Leyte Gulf. For twenty
minutes the cruiser Denver shelled the island. Under lowering skies
and in a driving rain which rendered impossible the anticipated air
support, [191] Company D, under 1st Lt. Leslie M. Gray, disembarked
from the transport and headed for the island in landing craft. The
mission of the unit was to secure mine charts which were believed to be
located in a lighthouse on the island. At 0805 the boats touched shore.
The landing was unopposed. The men immediately filed south 500
yards on a trail along the coast and then headed east toward the
lighthouse. On the way, four buildings, one of which contained a
Japanese radio, were found and set ablaze. The company then continued
along the trail. Suddenly the enemy fired from a concealed position,
killing one man and wounding another. When Company D went into attack
formation, the enemy force disappeared into the heavy jungle bordering
the trail. The march was resumed and the company reached its objective
without further incident. The lighthouse, which had been damaged by
naval bombardment, and adjoining buildings were deserted. [192]
In searching the documents found in the lighthouse, the company failed
to turn up the hoped-for enemy mine charts. [193] It returned to the
beachhead area and, finding that the landing boats had been hopelessly
battered and broken up by the surf, formed a perimeter for the night.
As Company D was moving along the coast of Suluan Island, naval fire
blasted away at the extreme northwest coast of Dinagat Island. At 0900
the first assault waves of the 6th Rangers, minus Companies D and B,
started for the beach. Although coral reefs approximately one hundred
yards offshore grounded the boats so that the men had to wade the
remainder of the distance, the companies were all ashore by 1230. No
Japanese were on the island and the troops accomplished their mission,
the erection of a navigation light at Desolation Point to guide the
movement of the main portion of the convoy.
Company B of the 6th Rangers was to have landed on Homonhon Island at
the same time landings were made on Suluan and Dinagat. Its mission,
too, was the emplacement of a navigation light, but bad weather
and choppy seas kept the troops confined to the ship throughout the
17th. [194] On the morning of the 18th, the ship's address system
clanged out general quarters. The men went below, put on their gear,
and checked their weapons. At 0900 the troops were told to prepare to
disembark. They bolted up the ladders and spilled out over the deck to
the davits. [195] The boats were lowered and the first wave started for
the beach. At the same time the guns from the destroyer and frigate
which had escorted the transport concentrated fire against the shore
line for twelve minutes. Three minutes later, the boats grounded on a
coral reef forty yards from the beach, and the men waded the remaining
distance to shore. They encountered no resistance and at 1038 the
company commander, Capt. Arthur D. Simons, notified the battalion
commander, "Beachhead secured, supplies ashore. No resistance. No
casualties." [196] The company set up a channel light.
By 18 October, steady white lights were beaming from Dinagat and
Homonhon Islands to guide the convoy in to Leyte Island. The one
on Dinagat had a visibility of twelve miles and that on Homonhon a
visibility of ten. [197]
Mine Sweeping
The mine-sweeping plans contemplated that the mine-sweeping group
would arrive on 17 October simultaneously with the troops that were
to storm Suluan, Dinagat, and Homonhon Islands. On 11 October the
slow-moving mine sweepers lifted anchor at Manus and departed for the
objective area. They rendezvoused near the Palaus with the Dinagat
force, which had left Hollandia on 12 October. On 15 October they were
joined by the carriers and the beach demolition and bombardment and
fire support groups which had sortied from Manus on 12 October. On
14 October information was received from guerrilla sources that
there were no underwater obstacles off the beaches between Abuyog
and Tacloban. Although the northern Surigao Strait was mined, it was
considered doubtful whether the same condition existed at the southern
entrances of Leyte Gulf. [198] The mine-sweeping groups that had left
Hollandia on 11 October arrived in Leyte Gulf during the storm of the
evening of 16 October. Some of the mine sweepers had been delayed
by the storm but were able to arrive in time to begin sweeping the
channels. [199]
In the early dawn of 17 October the mine sweepers began their work
on the channel approaches to Suluan Island. [200] By 0630 they had
accomplished their task and then began to sweep the waters of the
landing areas in Leyte Gulf until the storm forced them to suspend
operations. At 1259 they resumed sweeping with great difficulty. Until
A Day, intensive area and tactical mine sweeping continued. The
sweepers started at dawn each day and worked continuously until
nightfall. By 19 October it was known that the Japanese had heavily
mined the approaches to Leyte Gulf but that there were no mines
within the gulf itself. The northern part of the main channel into
the gulf, however, was not considered safe. [201] By the same date
sweeping had been completed in the southern half, 186 mines having
been destroyed. At about 0135 on 19 October, the destroyer supporting
the mine-sweeping units which were in the gulf struck a floating mine
and while maneuvering away from the area struck another. The ship
was disabled and retired from action. By A Day, a total of 227 mines
had been destroyed and a passage approximately six miles wide had
been cleared just north of Dinagat Island. All ships were therefore
directed to enter Leyte Gulf through that portion of the strait. [202]
As the mine sweepers came close to the land, boats containing Filipinos
moved out to welcome the advance party of liberators. The reception
they met was not enthusiastic. Admiral Oldendorf, the commanding
officer of the bombardment and fire support group, "suspected that
some might have come seeking information so detained them aboard
their respective ships.... Directed no further patriots be taken
aboard ship." [203]
Underwater Demolition Teams
The naval plans for the amphibious phase of the operation contemplated
the use of seven underwater demolition teams--three to cover the
northern coast beaches and four to cover the southern beaches. The
teams, starting A minus 2 (18 October), were to locate underwater
obstructions and detonate mines. On 18 and 19 October the underwater
demolition teams made a reconnaissance of the landing areas,
accompanied by destroyers which bombarded the shores. The two days'
reconnaissance disclosed no underwater obstacles or mines in the
vicinity of the proposed landing beaches.
The Convoy Enters Leyte Gulf
By the evening of 19 October the preliminary operations were almost
completed. The beaches had been surveyed and found suitable for
landing; mines had been cleared from most of the main approach channel;
and the entrances to Leyte Gulf had been secured. [204]
All ships were to be prepared to attach paravanes (mine-cable cutting
devices) on signal at any time after noon on 19 October. [205] Since
the mine sweepers had not sufficiently cleared the gulf, paravanes were
attached preparatory to entering it. The mine sweepers were to have
escorted the convoy into the area, but since they would not be ready
for about two hours, the entry was ordered to be made without them. The
convoy hugged the Dinagat shore line so closely that the distance from
the center of the formation to the shore was only 3,800 yards. [206]
Some of the ships did not see the signal light which had been placed
on Dinagat Island by the 6th Rangers and were delayed on that account.
The convoy advanced without incident toward the target area. On the
18th Admiral Kinkaid radioed General MacArthur that the operations
were going well, though the storm had somewhat delayed matters, and
the General was made "welcome to our city." [207] MacArthur in reply
said that he was "glad indeed to be in your domicile and under your
flag. It gives me not only confidence but a sense of inspiration,"
and, probably thinking of the many arduous months of planning and
amphibious operations, he added, "As Ripley says believe it or not
we are almost there." [208]
As the convoy came ever closer to the target, the atmosphere aboard
the vessels became more and more tense. By 1800 on 19 October most of
the vessels had arrived outside the gulf. The Far Shore was now near
and could be seen vaguely in the distance. On board one of the vessels
Protestant and Catholic evening prayers were broadcast over the address
system. Some of the men felt that it gave them a lift, but many felt
that they were being administered the last rites of their church. [209]
All vessels arrived on schedule. Because the mine barrier in the
entrance had not been completely cleared, the ships entered the
gulf somewhat to the south of the center of the entrance, avoiding
the main channel and keeping close to the northern point of Dinagat
Island. Fears that strong ebb tides might impede progress of the
slower vessels through the entrance proved groundless. Paravanes
were retained until arrival in the transport areas, but no mines were
encountered. [210]
Naval plans called for bombardment of the enemy-held shores on A minus
2 (18 October), but because the water areas had not been completely
swept for mines by that time, ships could not reach the bombardment
area. On A minus 1, bombardment was chiefly for the purpose of
providing effective support and coverage for the underwater demolition
teams. However, many of the defenses and installations of the enemy
on or near the landing beaches, including buildings and supply dumps,
were neutralized or destroyed.
By the afternoon of 19 October, when it had become apparent to the
Japanese that the Americans had returned to the Philippine Islands,
General Suzuki put his defense plan into effect. He ordered the
16th Division to annihilate the American force, and, failing that,
to interfere as much as possible with the use of Leyte airfields by
the American Army. The mobile units, including two battalions from the
30th Division, were to speed to Leyte as fast as possible. Finally,
the headquarters of the 35th Army was to move to Ormoc on the west
coast of Leyte on the 23d or 24th of October. [211]
Through the night of 19-20 October, destroyers near the shore continued
to shell the Japanese forces on land. The American forces were safely
within Leyte Gulf--A Day had arrived.