The Japanese Reaction
The Japanese undertook the defense of Leyte with serene
assurance. Their pilots had erroneously reported the naval battle
off Formosa as a great victory and declared that only remnants of
the once strong American Navy remained. The defeatist attitude of
the summer of 1944 vanished.
During the summer there had been disagreement among the Japanese
military leaders. Imperial General Headquarters felt that the decisive
battle should be fought on Luzon and only delaying actions taken in
other areas. To this the 14th Area Army agreed. The Southern Army,
on the other hand, believed that it would be impossible to wage a
successful battle on Luzon if other areas, especially the Visayan
Islands, were allowed to fall into American hands. Since these islands,
if captured, could be used as Allied air bases, the decisive battle
should be fought whenever and wherever the Americans attacked. [288]
Confident that the U. S. fleet had suffered grievously in the battle
off Formosa, the Japanese closed ranks and all the commands agreed
that the time was most opportune to deliver the coup de grâce. The
foolhardy Americans would take a severe drubbing, and Japan, after
a long series of humiliating and costly defeats, would regain the
initiative. It was therefore a jubilant Imperial General Headquarters
that ordered its armed forces to do battle with the Americans.
The essence of the Imperial General Headquarters plan was simple. The
American convoys and carriers were to be given complete freedom in
their journey to the Philippine Islands. When they were sufficiently
close to make retreat difficult, the main strength of the Japanese
Army, Navy, and Air Forces would descend upon them and deliver a
knockout blow. If the operation were launched too early, the Americans
could annihilate the inferior Japanese air strength before the battle
could be fought; if too late, the Americans could escape and the
objective would be lost. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore,
was "patiently waiting" for the opportune moment. [289]
The Air Forces
On the evening of 17 October the 4th Air Army, upon receiving word that
the U. S. forces were in the vicinity of Suluan Island, ordered the
entire 2d Air Division to attack the Americans. The main strength of
the fighter units was to be concentrated in the central and southern
Philippines areas. Although bad weather prevented a reconnaissance,
the increase in American air raids on the central and southern
Philippines made it imperative for the Japanese to attack with their
main air force. The 2d Air Division was ordered to move from Clark
Field on Luzon to Bacolod on Negros Island. It was unable to do this
because of the bad weather, and it was therefore unable to forestall
the American landings. The commander of the 4th Air Army decided on
21 October, as a result of the American landings, to use the entire
air force under his command, employing the 7th Air Division and the
30th Fighter Group, in addition to the 2d Air Division. The 12th Air
Brigade of the 30th Fighter Group had just arrived in the Philippines
from Japan, via Shanghai, and it was necessary to employ this brigade
immediately because of the impending battle in Leyte Gulf.
All the various units were to launch an attack against the American
land forces and shipping by the evening of 23 October. On 24 October
there was to be a series of aerial attacks, the first early in the
morning with the entire force; the second consisting of two waves;
the third by the entire force in the evening; and during the night
by waves of heavy and light bombers and assault planes. [290]
The Americans anticipated increased aerial activity over Leyte, and
therefore the number of fighters was increased on 24 October to 36,
on call from 0545 till dark, with an additional 16 fighters ready for
immediate action upon request. Twenty-eight of the 36 were assigned
to the attack force commanders and 8, retained by General Krueger,
patrolled the beachhead area and provided additional fighters when
and where they were needed.
The Leyte area was subjected to a heavy air assault on the same day, 24
October, when an estimated 150 to 200 enemy planes (mostly twin-engined
bombers) approached northern Leyte. Sixty-six were definitely shot
down and eighteen others were probably shot down. [291] On the
American side, forty combat air patrol and ten direct supporting
planes participated in this engagement. Three American aircraft
crash-landed--two on the Tacloban airstrip and one in the water. [292]
Only a small percentage of the American air activity was directed
toward the neutralization of the enemy air force, as most of the
available aircraft were attacking the Japanese fleet. The Japanese
were determined to "make Leyte the decisive air battlefield as well as
the decisive ground and naval battlefield of the Philippines." [293]
For the first time since the Allied counteroffensive in the Pacific had
started rolling, the Japanese, for an extended period, risked aircraft
in great numbers in daylight raids as well as at night. The shipping
off Tacloban and Dulag and the Tacloban airfield were the principal
targets, though other air installations on the island were hit. An
example of the enemy's dogged determination occurred during the evening
and night of 27 October. At twilight, twelve enemy fighters and dive
bombers dropped 100-pound bombs in the vicinity of Tacloban and tried
repeatedly but unsuccessfully to strafe the Tacloban airstrip. After
a lull, the Japanese aircraft renewed the aerial assault just before
midnight and continued almost uninterruptedly until dawn. Between
2332 and 0125, there were nine raids of two to four planes each;
between 0340 and 0450, three raids of two to four planes each; and
between 0454 and 0555 five additional planes made an attack on the
area. [294] The Tacloban airstrip frequently was "well illuminated"
by burning aircraft. [295]
The 2d Air Division assaulted American shipping from 24 through 28
October, but because of the increasing necessity for giving air cover
to the convoys the main strength of fighters of the 4th Air Army was
used to protect the transportation of reinforcements of the 14th
Area Army of Leyte. From 25 October on, the Bacolod airfield and
the air forces protecting the Japanese convoys going to Leyte were
attacked by American bombers and suffered serious losses. Since it
had to participate in every phase of the action, the losses of the
4th Air Army were heavy. [296]
After 1 November the Japanese increasingly felt the American air power
through attacks upon their air bases and shipping. Their fighter units,
which had suffered considerable losses in protecting the convoys,
were ordered to counterattack. They were not successful. At the same
time the 4th Air Army received orders to protect the reinforcement
convoys in the Manila area. By this time the Japanese air forces'
wings had been clipped and "what had once been a formidable weapon
was transformed into a sacrificial army of guided missiles." [297]
The suicidal kamikaze pilot became the sole hope of the Japanese
air forces.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf
Japanese Naval Plans
On 21 July the chief of the naval general staff, Imperial
General Headquarters, issued a directive for subsequent "urgent
operations." [298] The operational policy to be followed by the
Combined Fleet was as follows:
1. Make utmost effort to maintain and make advantageous use of
the strategic status quo; plan to smash the enemy's strength;
take the initiative in creating favorable tactical opportunities,
or seize the opportunity as it presents itself to crush the enemy
fleet and attacking forces.
2. Co-operate in close conjunction with the Army, maintain the
security of sectors vital to national defense, and prepare for
future eventualities.
3. Co-operate closely with related forces to maintain security
of surface routes between Japan and vital southern sources of
materials. [299]
On 26 July the chief of the naval general staff informed Admiral
Toyoda, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, that the future "urgent
operations" were to be known as the SHO (Victory) Operations. There
would be four SHO Operations. The first was to cover the defense of
the Philippine Archipelago. [300] It was essentially the last chance
for Japan to remain in the war. Said Admiral Toyoda of the situation
at the time of the battle of Leyte Gulf:
Since without the participation of our
Combined Fleet there was no possibility of
the land-based forces in the Philippines having
any chance against your forces at all, it
was decided to send the whole fleet, taking
the gamble. If things went well, we might
obtain unexpectedly good results; but if the
worst should happen, there was a chance
that we would lose the entire fleet. But I felt
that that chance had to be taken....
Should we lose in the Philippines operations,
even though the fleet should be left, the shipping
lane to the south would be completely
cut off, so that the fleet, if it should come back
to Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel
supply. If it should remain in southern waters,
it could not receive supplies of ammunition
and arms. There would be no sense in saving
the fleet at the expense of the Philippines. [301]
Since their carrier force was weak, the Japanese had developed a
plan based upon the main gunnery strength of the fleet and upon
the land-based air forces. Battleships and cruisers from a southern
base were to approach Leyte from the south, fight their way to the
landing beaches, and destroy Allied assault shipping. A decoy force
was to attempt to lure the U.S. carrier task force away from the
main action. Shore-based air forces were to inflict maximum damage
on the American carrier forces whenever and wherever possible,
but once the invasion came they were to conserve their strength
until the day of the landings, when all the Allied assault shipping
would be concentrated off the beaches and when their attacks on the
U.S. carriers would assist the advancing Japanese fleet. The plan
was designed to get the Japanese naval gunnery force into a position
where it could do the greatest damage. Little attention was paid
to getting it out. "The war had reached a point where the Japanese
fleet, hopelessly outnumbered and, as imminent events would prove,
even more hopelessly out-classed, could not risk the fleet action it
had previously desired but was forced to expend itself in suicidal
attack upon the United States transports." [302]
Upon receiving information on 17 October that American vessels were
off the shores of Suluan Island, Admiral Toyoda immediately alerted
his forces. On 18 October Toyoda, after intercepting American messages
dealing with the landings on the island approaches to Leyte Gulf,
activated his plan for the defense of the Philippine Islands. The
target date (X Day) for the fleet engagement was set for 22 October
but logistical difficulties caused a series of delays and on 21
October Admiral Toyoda changed X Day to 25 October. "From the far
corners of the shrinking Empire the whole combatant strength of the
Japanese Navy converged on Leyte Gulf." [303]
The Naval Battle [304]
The strongest Japanese naval force--the 1st Diversion Attack
Force--moved from the south, reached Brunei Bay in northwest Borneo
on 20 October, and after refueling split into two parts and proceeded
on its way two days later. The main strength of the 1st Diversion
Attack Force, under Admiral Kurita, sailed northeast up the west coast
of Palawan (one of the Visayan Islands), and then turned eastward
through the waters of the central Philippines to San Bernardino Strait,
while the smaller unit commanded by Vice Adm. Shoji Nishimura moved
eastward through the Sulu Sea in order to force an entrance at Surigao
Strait. The 2d Diversion Attack Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Kiyohide
Shima, after leaving the Pescadores on 21 October, sailed south,
past western Luzon, and after refueling in the Calamian Islands,
just south of Mindoro, proceeded to follow and support the southern
part of the 1st Diversion Attack Force in forcing Surigao Strait.
The Main Body, consisting chiefly of partially empty carriers with
a destroyer escort, departed on the 20th, and on the evening of
the 22d turned southwest toward Luzon. It was commanded by Vice
Adm. Jisabuto Ozawa. The Main Body was to act as a decoy to draw
off the main American strength. The Japanese submarines off Formosa
were ordered south toward the eastern approaches to the Philippine
Archipelago and the 2d Air Fleet, shortly before 23 October, began
to arrive on Luzon. [305]
There were two American fleets in Philippine waters--the Seventh
Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid, whose superior was General MacArthur,
and the Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey, whose superior was Admiral
Nimitz. The Seventh Fleet, which consisted of 6 old battleships, 16
escort carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 30 destroyers,
and 10 destroyer escorts, had escorted the convoy to Leyte and now
stood by to protect it as it unloaded. The Third Fleet was composed
of Task Force 38 under Admiral Mitscher. It consisted of four task
groups which averaged 23 ships each, divided about as follows:
2 large carriers, 2 light carriers, 2 new battleships, 3 cruisers,
and 14 destroyers. The task force was to secure air supremacy over
the Philippines, protect the landings, and apply unremitting pressure
on Japan. If the opportunity to destroy the major portion of the
Japanese fleet should arise or could be created, that destruction
was to be its primary task.
The Japanese had 4 carriers, 7 battleships, 19 cruisers, 33 destroyers,
and 2 battleship-carriers which carried no aircraft; there were 108
planes on the carriers and about 335 shore-based planes in the Luzon
area. [306]
On 23 October two American submarines, the Dace and the Darter,
encountered the 1st Diversion Attack Force and sank two heavy cruisers,
the Atago and Maya, off the western coast of Palawan. The former
was Kurita's flagship; its sinking forced the Japanese admiral to
transfer hurriedly to another vessel. The submarines also seriously
damaged another heavy cruiser.
Upon receiving information that the Combined Fleet was steaming toward
the Philippines, Admiral Oldendorf's fire support group of the Seventh
Fleet moved to the southern end of Leyte Gulf and formed a battle
line across the mouth of Surigao Strait while motor torpedo boats
patrolled within the strait and about its southern entrance. Halsey's
Third Fleet moved toward San Bernardino Strait. The escort carriers
from Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet cruised off Leyte Gulf. [307]
On the 24th, after receiving a report from the submarine, the
carriers of the Third Fleet sent aircraft to search to the west and
southwest. These aircraft sighted the main part of the 1st Diversion
Attack Force south of Mindoro, and sighted and attacked the smaller
force under Admiral Nishimura off Negros, slightly damaging a
battleship and a destroyer. The aircraft of the carriers from their
position off San Bernardino Strait struck repeatedly at Kurita's
force while the smaller Nishimura force was left to the battleships in
the gulf. One Japanese battleship of the 1st Diversion Attack Force
was sunk, one heavy cruiser rendered impotent, and minor damage was
inflicted on other battleships. The Japanese were forced temporarily
"to reverse course to westward." [308]
The aircraft from the Japanese 2d Air Fleet attempted to aid the
naval forces which were moving eastward through the Philippines. In
co-operation with some aircraft from the Main Body, which was now
about 100 miles east of Luzon, they attacked the northernmost unit
of the American carriers. Halsey's airmen sighted and reported the
sacrificial Japanese Main Body in the afternoon. Not knowing that
this force consisted mainly of empty carriers and believing that
the 1st Diversion Attack Force had been severely damaged, Admiral
Halsey withdrew the battleships and carriers of his Third Fleet and
steamed north to meet the new threat, leaving San Bernardino Strait
wide open. At midnight Kurita's 1st Diversion Attack Force moved
unmolested through San Bernardino Strait and turned south toward
Leyte Gulf. The Japanese strategy had worked.
In the early morning hours, Admiral Oldendorf's warships destroyed the
Nishimura force as it sailed into Surigao Strait. Of two battleships,
one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers, only the cruiser and
one destroyer escaped from the strait, and the cruiser, which had
been damaged, was sunk by aircraft from the U. S. carriers the next
morning. [309] Admiral Shima's 2d Diversion Attack Force, entering the
same strait thirty minutes after Nishimura's force, suffered damage to
a light cruiser that was hit by American torpedo boats. Shima's force
then made an abortive attack, during which its flagship was damaged
by collision, and withdrew without having engaged. The Third Fleet
far to the north fell upon the decoy forces, sank all four carriers
of the Main Body and thus "wrote an end to the Japanese carrier air
force." [310]
Admiral Kurita's 1st Diversion Attack Force "for which so much had been
sacrificed" [311] encountered Kinkaid's carriers and destroyers off
the coast of Samar. Admiral Kinkaid was ill prepared to meet the main
thrust of the Japanese Navy, since his carriers were protected only by
destroyers and destroyer escorts. His "handling of the exceedingly
difficult situation" was "superb." [312] The aircraft from his
carriers under Rear Adm. Clifton A. F. Sprague rose to the occasion
and gave a "magnificent performance," [313] continually attacking
the much stronger 1st Diversion Attack Force. Kurita's forces sank
one carrier, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort but lost three
heavy cruisers and had one crippled. The American fighting strength
was greatly diminished at the very time it was needed to protect the
amphibious shipping that had carried the Sixth Army, and which still
lay near the shores of Leyte Gulf. Just as it appeared inevitable that
Kurita would move in and deliver the coup de grâce, he suddenly broke
off the engagement and retired toward San Bernardino Strait. After the
war he stated in justification of this strange move: "The conclusion
from our [the Japanese] gunfire and anti-aircraft fire during the
day had led me to believe in my uselessness, my ineffectual position,
if I proceeded into Leyte Gulf where I would come under even heavier
aircraft attack. I therefore concluded to go north and join Admiral
Ozawa for coordinated action against your northern Task Forces." [314]
Said Admiral Sprague: "The failure of the enemy main body and
encircling light forces to completely wipe out all vessels of
this Task Unit can be attributed to our successful smoke screen,
our torpedo counterattack, continuous harassment of enemy by bomb,
torpedo, and strafing air attacks, timely maneuvers, and the definite
partiality of Almighty God." [315]
The battle for Leyte Gulf was over. It had ended in a resounding
victory for the Americans, whose losses of 1 light carrier, 2 escort
carriers, 2 destroyers, and 1 destroyer escort were small in comparison
with the Japanese losses of 3 battleships, 1 large carrier, 3 light
carriers, 6 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers. [316]
As the Japanese retreated throughout the 25th and 26th of October,
carrier- and land-based aircraft struck at the enemy vessels and
inflicted fresh injuries upon them.
The Sixth Army summarized its view of the probable consequences if
the battle had gone against the U. S. Navy as follows:
Had the [Japanese] plan succeeded the effect on the Allied troops
on Leyte in all likelihood would have been calamitous, for these
troops would have been isolated and their situation would have been
precarious indeed. If it had been victorious in the naval battle,
the Japanese fleet could have leisurely and effectively carried
out the destruction of shipping, aircraft, and supplies that were
so vital to Allied operations on Leyte. An enemy naval victory
would have had an adverse effect of incalculable proportions not
only upon the Leyte Operation, but upon the overall plan for the
liberation of the Philippines as well. [317]
The Sixth Army, however, was depicting the worst of all possible
contingencies. Admiral Halsey's conclusion is quite different:
That Kurita's force could have leisurely and effectively carried
out the destruction of shipping, aircraft, and supplies in Leyte
Gulf was not in the realm of possibilities.... Kurita would have
been limited to a hit-and-run attack in the restricted waters of
Leyte Gulf. He would further have been subjected to the attack of
the cruisers present in Leyte Gulf. He would have been limited
to minor damage.... The statement that an enemy naval victory
would have an effect of incalculable proportions not only on the
Leyte operation, but upon the overall plan for the liberation
of the Philippines as well, can only be premised on the thought
that our naval forces would be almost totally destroyed. The
prognostication of such a condition could be reasoned on none of
the facts existing during this three days' engagement. [318]
The Japanese Reinforce the Leyte Garrison
The Japanese felt that the honors of the battle were evenly divided
and consequently continued with their program of making Leyte the
decisive battle of the Philippines. Although the American fleet had
soundly whipped the Japanese Navy, the Japanese were still able to
send reinforcements in great numbers to their Leyte garrison. Because
of the lack of sufficient aerial strength, the Americans were unable
to check the steady flow of troops into the port of Ormoc.
American Aerial Retaliation
The carrier strikes of the Seventh and Third Fleets up to and through
A Day had been most successful in forestalling any concentrated
effort on the part of the Japanese against the American shipping
in Leyte Gulf and the troops on the coastal strand. Thereafter, the
Japanese unleashed a furious air assault on the American forces and
shipping. [319]
At the same time, American aircraft from the carriers struck at the
Japanese troops and their installations in close support of the ground
troops. The first called-for air strike was at 0834 on 21 October
against bridges over streams that were not fordable along the road
leading from Ormoc to Carigara, in order to prevent enemy movement
along this road. [320] A total of 121 missions were flown in support
of ground units during the first four days, of which only 33 had been
requested by the air liaison parties. The targets for these missions
included artillery and mortar positions, fuel and supply dumps,
bridges, pillboxes, and other installations, together with trucks,
armored vehicles, and tanks. [321]
During the initial stages of the campaign, Navy flyers gave efficient
close support to the ground forces. [322] The average time required
to carry out each of these support missions was approximately one
hour, though the usual difficulties of locating friendly troops
and pinpointing the target were present. Enthusiastic reports on
the effectiveness of this co-operation from naval air were made by
the 7th Division. Members of this division, which formerly had been
supported by Army and Navy air forces, found Navy air support in the
first days on Leyte far more satisfactory than that which the Army
Air Forces had been able to provide in the past. They believed that
this superiority was due to the system that the Navy had worked out
for directing strikes at close-in targets without endangering friendly
ground forces, and to the Navy's use of rehearsals with ground units
to establish mutual understanding and confidence. [323]
The Battle of Leyte Gulf interfered greatly with the close support
rendered by the Navy, since the carrier-based planes had to be
withdrawn. The combat air patrol assignments were also disrupted
because of surface engagements and the repairing of the CVE's. [324]
At this time the Japanese had about 432,000 men in the Philippines,
including air force and construction units. Most of them believed
that they were well prepared to meet the Americans. In fact a staff
officer of the 14th Area Army, upon hearing that the Americans had
landed on Leyte, is reported to have jumped up and exclaimed: "Good,
they have picked the place where our finest troops are located." [325]
It was also thought that the American troops on Leyte were "having
a difficult time." [326] Nevertheless, General Yamashita, who had
succeeded Kuroda as the commanding general of the 14th Area Army,
sent the 1st Division and other units to Leyte. The Japanese felt that
"if the decisive battle in Leyte results in failure, it will upset
the entire operation in the Philippines and the decisive battle in
Luzon will be lost." [327]
By the 25th of October a battalion of the 55th Independent Mixed
Brigade and one of the 57th Independent Mixed Brigade from Cebu,
together with two battalions of the 30th Division, had arrived on Leyte
to reinforce the 16th Division. Shortly after the Sixth Army landed,
the 35th Army commander, General Suzuki, received orders from General
Yamashita to undertake an all-out offensive against the Americans. All
Japanese air, naval, and land forces were to participate. [328]
On 22 October the 14th Area Army asked the 35th Army how the 26th
Division and 68th Independent Mixed Brigade were to be utilized if
the Japanese decisively won the pending naval battle. The 35th Army
stated that if the Japanese Navy were victorious, the units were
to prevent the landing of more Americans at Leyte Gulf, but if it
were unsuccessful the troops were to be landed at Carigara Bay. The
optimism of the Japanese was high. Said Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu Tomochika,
Chief of Staff, 35th Army: "We were determined to take offensive after
offensive and clean up American forces on Leyte Island.... We seriously
discussed demanding the surrender of the entire American Army after
seizing General MacArthur." [329] Then came the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Despite the setbacks caused by this disastrous sea battle, the Japanese
continued to send troops to Leyte through Ormoc. The reinforcement of
Leyte consisted of moving five major units, in nine echelons: the 35th
Army moved as many of its units as possible from Mindanao, Cebu, and
Panay; the 1st Division was sent down from Luzon on 1 November; then
the 26th Division, the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade, and one third
of the 8th Division were sent from Luzon in the order given. [330]
On 27 October the Fifth Air Force took over the mission of supporting
the Sixth Army. As the airstrips were not in serviceable condition,
only a small detachment--the 308th Bombardment Wing--could be sent
in. Aircraft from the carriers continued to give support. The Fifth Air
Force felt that it could best check the Japanese reinforcement program,
and at the same time give more lasting support to the ground troops,
by attacking the Japanese convoys before they arrived in Leyte. The
Fifth Air Force intended also to attack large movements of land
troops, concentrations, and supply areas. Army Air Forces doctrine
assigned close support as the third priority mission of tactical air
forces. [331] Since there were always insufficient aircraft for the
missions assigned to the air forces, close support of ground troops
suffered.
The Allied Air Forces, which had been given the mission of supporting
the Leyte operation, directed its main efforts against airfields in
bypassed areas. Two fighter groups were on Morotai, one heavy bomber
group was on Noemfoor, off the north coast of New Guinea, and two
heavy bomber groups were on Biak; they completed 175 sorties in strikes
against airfields on Mindanao and the Visayan area. The main targets
of attack were on Mindanao and Cebu and in the Negros area. [332]
The XIII Bomber Command, which carried the burden of this assault,
was to neutralize targets previously hit and protect the southwestern
flank of the American forces in the Philippines. The 42d Bombardment
Group (medium bombers) in October flew the greatest number of sorties
in the history of the group up to that time. [333]
The heavy bombers (B-24's) of the 868th Bombardment Squadron, operating
from Noemfoor, had as their main target enemy shipping in the Makassar
Strait. At the same time, the B-24's that were within range of the Sulu
Sea struck at the Japanese Southern Fleet as it retreated after its
engagement with the Seventh Fleet. The fighters and medium bombers,
which had been used to strike at targets on Mindanao, were alerted
to strike any enemy naval vessels that came within range. [334]
While protecting the southwestern flank of the American forces in
the Philippines, the XIII Bomber Command was extraordinarily busy
on 26 October. Part of the Japanese naval task force, consisting of
three battleships, five cruisers, and four destroyers, had withdrawn
from the Leyte area and was in the Sulu Sea when sighted by the 307th
Bombardment Group. Twenty-eight B-24's of the bombardment group made
their principal targets two of the battleships--one of the Kongo
class and the other of the Yamato class. Three of the planes were
shot down as the Japanese skillfully and evasively maneuvered their
vessels so that none was sunk. At the same time B-24's from the 5th
Bombardment Squadron sighted and sank an enemy light cruiser at a
different location in the Sulu Sea. [335]
General MacArthur had originally allocated the attack of all
land targets in the Philippines to the Allied Air Forces, [336]
and although subsequent events occasioned a modification of this
order the Fifth Air Force officially established its advance units
on Leyte at 1600 on 27 October and assumed operational control of
land-based aircraft. [337] The 308th Bombardment Wing, the advance
echelon of the Fifth Air Force, had two major duties included in
its mission. It was to obtain air superiority over the Philippines
and to isolate the Japanese forces on the battlefield of Leyte. In
addition to these two principal tasks it was to render maximum close
support to the ground forces, establish night fighter patrols and a
system of courier aircraft, and provide maximum protection to Allied
naval vessels. [338] Among the Army flyers of the 49th Fighter Group,
an advance party of the Fifth Air Force that arrived on 27 October,
was Maj. Richard I. Bong, of the 9th Fighter Squadron, the leading ace
of the Army Air Forces. He celebrated his arrival by shooting down an
enemy plane. [339] On 28 October the Army flyers of the 7th Fighter
Squadron got their first enemy airplane on Leyte. Since there were
"only" three enemy air raids during the night, the men were able to
get some much needed sleep. [340]
The 29th of October, however, was a day of heavy action for the Army
flyers, as described in a report of the 7th Fighter Squadron:
The 29th was a day that will be long remembered.... Two more
Nips were added to the unit's score;... the 49th Group's 500th
victory. But more important at that time was the fact ... [that]
the ... road between the strip and the camp collapsed under
army traffic.... The already long hours were lengthened still
more as pilots and men were forced to arise between three and
four o'clock in the morning, make their way to the barge at
Tacloban, cross to the strip by water and then sweat out the
pre-dawn raids. At night, the planes landing at dusk had hardly
hit the runway before ... BOFORS [40-mm. antiaircraft guns] went
off and the lights went out. Then down to the end of the strip
near the gas dumps, and another session of sweating beneath A/A
[antiaircraft] awaiting the barge for the trip back to Tacloban
and then to camp. Supper was served as late as 10 o'clock ... a
few brave individuals tried an alternate road to the south,
swinging out east to White Beach above Dulag and then north along
the beach to Tacloban Strip. Japanese snipers soon put a stop to
this travel during the hours of darkness.
To add to the "big day"--29 October--the weather observers
reported a 50 knot gale on the way. Working after dark, pilots
and linemen minus the regular tie downs and using tent ropes
and anything available secured the airplanes to jeeps, trucks,
trailers and tractors. At night, in camp, the small typhoon hit
and with it went three or four tents, occupants of which awoke to
find themselves thoroughly drenched and at odds with the world,
Leyte in particular. [341]
Although 29 October was the most difficult day on Leyte for the
men of the 7th Fighter Squadron, they were again disheartened the
following day, when one of the squadron's pilots was shot down by
friendly antiaircraft. [342]
During the first week of November, offensive operations by the Fifth
Air Force were primarily against targets in Ormoc Valley and enemy
shipping in Ormoc Bay. The barrios of Ormoc, Valencia, and Palompon
were the first land targets. Most of the strikes, however, were
against Japanese shipping in Ormoc Bay and in the vicinity of the
Camotes Islands. [343]
By 4 November a number of P-38's had been destroyed by bombs and
strafing, some of which were completely burned up. To cut down the
aircraft losses, it was decided to have planes of some of the squadrons
use the Bayug airstrip in the Dulag area. But since this was a poor
airfield which soon became overcrowded and subject to Japanese air
attacks, it was finally abandoned. [344]
On 3 November fifteen P-38's of the 49th Bomber Group struck "one of
the most lucrative strafing targets of their history." [345] In an
early morning search for enemy shipping in Ormoc Bay the bombers found
nothing, but on their return they sighted a ten-mile-long convoy of
trucks, artillery, and tanks extending from Ormoc to Valencia. The
convoy was strafed and dispersed, leaving twenty to thirty-five
trucks destroyed and many other vehicles, including two tanks, in
flames. [346] However, two American planes were shot down by enemy
antiaircraft fire, four came in on single engines, and all showed
many bullet holes. The bombers made no further strikes against the
convoy, "as all aircraft received extremely heavy and accurate ground
fire." [347]
The airmen of the Fifth Air Force continued to hit shipping in Ormoc
Bay and in the Camotes Islands, and they also achieved success against
bridges, airfields, troops, camp areas, and transportation. [348]
Although the number of Japanese air raids had diminished by 6
November, the Americans could not yet feel that they were "out of
the rough." [349] There was insufficient direct air support for the
ground troops throughout the operation and the Japanese continued to
send troops into Ormoc. The constant stream of Japanese reinforcements
coming into Leyte augured ill for the success of the operation.
The TA Operation
The TA Operation, by which name the Japanese program for the
reinforcement of Leyte was known, continued from 23 October through
11 December. The numerical weakness of the U. S. land-based aircraft
enabled the Japanese to land many thousands of troops and tons of
supplies on Leyte. Nine convoys in all were sent to the port of
Ormoc, on the west coast. [350] As a whole, however, the operation
was "literally gruesome" to the Japanese, since their transports and
escort vessels were struck again and again by American aircraft.
The first Japanese convoy had three echelons. The first consisted of
a landing barge and an auxiliary sailing vessel carrying about 300
troops of the 102d Division. The second echelon, whose composition
was identical with the first, carried about 150 troops of the same
division. Both safely discharged their troops on 23 and 25 October,
respectively. The third echelon was made up of 2 destroyers, together
with 4 transports carrying about 2,000 men of the 30th Division. The
transports safely unloaded their passengers on 26 October, but American
airmen later sank the destroyers and all but one of the transports. The
remaining vessel was damaged.
The second convoy consisted of three echelons, composed of 3, 1,
and 4 transports respectively. The escorting vessels of the third
echelon, the only one that had an escort, consisted of 6 destroyers
and 4 coast defense vessels. The escort vessels carried the troops of
the 1st Division: the first wave about 1,000 men, the second about
100 headquarters men, and the third approximately 10,000 troops and
about 9,000 ship tons of provisions and ammunition. All vessels safely
debarked their troops on 1 and 2 November.
The 5 transports of the third convoy carried about 2,000 troops of the
26th Division and approximately 6,600 tons of supplies. The convoy
sailed from Manila on 9 November and was escorted by 1 submarine
chaser, 1 torpedo boat squadron, and 4 destroyers. On 10 November,
when the convoy reached the mouth of Ormoc Bay, American airmen
destroyed all of the escort vessels and transports before they could
unload their troops and cargo.
Each of the two echelons of the fourth convoy had 3 transports, but
only the first one had an escort--6 destroyers and 4 coast defense
vessels. The first echelon carried approximately 10,000 troops of the
26th Division and about 3,500 tons of supplies, including provisions,
ammunition, and four long-range guns. The second echelon carried
about 1,000 men of the 1st Division. Both discharged their troops
safely on 9 November, a day earlier than the anticipated arrival of
the third convoy, but because of American air action, they were able
to get only a limited part of the supplies ashore.
The fifth convoy was organized on the same pattern as its predecessor,
but the first wave had a submarine chaser as an escort while the
second had a destroyer. This convoy, which left Manila between 11 and
25 November with an unknown number of troops and quantity of supplies,
was completely destroyed en route to Leyte.
The sixth convoy, composed of 2 transports, 2 submarine chasers,
and 1 patrol boat, carried approximately 2,500 tons of provisions and
ammunition. It entered Ormoc harbor on 28 November and had completed
most of its unloading when the vessels were either sunk or set afire
by U.S. aircraft and motor torpedo boats.
There were four echelons in the seventh convoy. The composition of
the first two is unknown, but it is known that the first echelon
completed unloading at Ipil just south of Ormoc on 30 November. The
third and fourth echelons, consisting altogether of 3 transports and 2
destroyers, also carried an unknown number of troops and quantity of
supplies. As they were unloading at Ormoc on 2 December, the vessels
were attacked by American airmen who sank one of the destroyers and
damaged the other. The transports and the damaged destroyer returned
to Manila.
The 4 transports of the eighth convoy, escorted by 3 destroyers and 2
submarine chasers, carried about 4,000 troops--the main body of the
68th Independent Brigade--and an unknown quantity of provisions and
ammunition. It unloaded some of its troops and a part of the cargo at
San Isidro on the west coast of Leyte on 7 December; but immediately
thereafter, American aircraft sank the transports and heavily damaged
the destroyers.
There were two echelons in the ninth convoy. The first echelon, which
consisted of 5 transports, 3 destroyers, and 2 submarine chasers,
carried approximately 3,000 troops of the 5th Infantry Regiment,
8th Division, and about 900 tons of provisions and ammunition. In
unloading at Ormoc on 11 December, 1 destroyer was sunk and 1 destroyer
and 1 transport were damaged. The remaining vessels then moved to
Port Palompon on the west coast of Leyte and completed unloading. The
second echelon consisted of only one transport and carried an unknown
number of troops and quantity of supplies. It was able on 11 December
to elude the American airmen and complete its unloading. [351]
After the war, General Nishimura, who had been on the staff of the
14th Area Army, made the amazing statement that nearly 80 percent
of the vessels sent to Ormoc were sunk en route. Although most of
the vessels went down close enough to the Leyte shore for the troops
to swim ashore, the equipment lost could not be replaced. [352] It
is estimated that the Japanese landed more than 45,000 troops and
something over 10,000 tons of matériel. [353]
Even though the Japanese had not succeeded completely in their
reinforcement program, General Krueger was faced with a far stronger
foe than had been anticipated. The Leyte Campaign was to be long
and costly and was to upset the timetable for the impending Luzon
operation. At the end of A Day the American assault forces had firmly
established themselves on the shores of Leyte, but the battle for
the island was yet to come.