The Nature of the Target
The Philippine Islands, the largest island group in the Malay
Archipelago, were discovered by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521. They became
a Spanish possession in 1565 and remained so until 10 December 1898
when they were ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris as
a result of the Spanish-American war. In the spring of 1942 Japan
secured military domination over the Islands.
The Philippine Archipelago lay in the geographical heart of the Far
Eastern theater of war. As a pivotal point of control the Islands were
centrally placed in relation to Japan, China, Burma, French Indochina,
Thailand, British Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies. Being the most
northerly part of the Malay Archipelago, the Philippines were also
close to the vital areas of Japan and the Chinese-held areas of the
Asiatic mainland. Located southeast of the continent, they occupy
much the same position with respect to the mainland of Asia that the
West Indies do with respect to North America.
The Islands are among the remnants of a great continent that once
extended over the space now occupied by the entire East Indies. There
are some 7,100 islands and islets in the Philippine Archipelago, which
has a land area of 114,830 square miles. Of these, about 460 have an
area of one square mile or more and 2,773 are named. The Philippine
Islands are divided into three main groups--Luzon and adjacent islands
in the northern sector; the Visayan Islands in the central portion,
comprising Samar, Leyte, and numerous others; and finally, in the
southern part, Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The Philippines
had a prewar population of about 16,000,000, of whom 14,550,000 were
Christians, 678,000 were Mohammedans, 626,000 were pagans, and about
64,000 were Buddhists and Shintoists. [40]
Geography of Leyte
The northeastern Visayan group, which consists mainly of Leyte
and Samar, was selected as the point of entrance into the
Philippines. Leyte had the higher potential military value. The
air distance from the capital city of Tacloban to Manila is 295
miles. Leyte is a natural gateway to the rest of the Philippines, and
its possession would greatly facilitate and support further operations
to the north as well as expedite control over the remaining islands
in the Visayan group. [41]
Leyte roughly resembles a molar tooth with its crown toward Samar
and its roots pointing to Mindanao. The eighth largest island in the
Philippines, with an area of 2,785 square miles, it runs generally from
north to south, with an approximate length of 115 miles and a width
of 15 to 45 miles. It is situated on one of the principal submerged
shelves of the Philippine Archipelago, and the waters over the shelf
have an average depth of 22 fathoms. (Map 2--inside back cover)
The Terrain
The island is mainly volcanic in origin. A range of mountains, the
topographical backbone of the island, extends southeast from Biliran
Strait in the north to Cabalian Bay in the south and separates the
Leyte and Ormoc Valleys. All of southern Leyte is mountainous and,
militarily speaking, of little importance. The northwest coast is
also rugged, and except for the port of Palompon has little tactical
significance. The heavily forested central mountain range is composed
of numerous knifelike ridges and spurs and deep ravines and serves as
an effective natural barrier between the island's eastern and western
coastal areas. It is a major obstacle to the rapid movement of troops
and can be utilized very effectively in defending the island.
Leyte Valley, a broad and fertile plain, stretches across the
northeastern part of the island from Leyte Gulf to Carigara Bay. More
than twenty-five miles wide along the shore of the gulf, it is
gradually narrowed by the mountain ranges to the north and south to
less than ten miles as it reaches Carigara Bay. Most of the island's
population live in this valley, and here too are most of the principal
cities and airfields.
The main road net of the island runs through Leyte Valley, a
great number of streams interlacing it. The numerous rice paddies,
centuries old, disrupt the natural drainage of the valley. Rarely
is the water level more than a few inches below the surface. Even
in the drier months, vehicular movement is limited to the existing
roads. In 1944 these were poor, inadequate, and ill suited for heavy
military traffic. The best of them had only a light bituminous surface
and were neither wide enough nor strong enough for two-way military
traffic. [42] It was hoped that Leyte Valley could be developed into
a large air and logistical base to support further operations, but
it was not well suited for this purpose.
The shore line of Leyte Valley along Leyte Gulf and San Pedro Bay
affords the best landing beaches on the island. This coast is
dangerous for beach landings during northeast monsoon periods,
when heavy surf, high winds, and torrential rains imperil men,
equipment, and shipping. July, August, and September are the best
months for landing. In general there are good firm sand beaches,
onto which landing craft can go directly. A road parallels the shore
line, but there are few exit roads from the beach to this road and
beyond. In many places close to the shore there are swamps and rice
paddies which prevent rapid egress from the beach. There are other
good landing beaches on the east coast of Ormoc Bay, but they are
crossed by innumerable creeks and streams.
Leyte Gulf is large and open, offering an excellent anchorage
for a considerable number of vessels, including those of largest
size. Carigara Bay, to the north of the island, is twenty miles wide,
but shallow waters, swamps, and the hilly terrain of its eastern and
western sides restrict its value for military operations. A narrow neck
of the central mountain range separates the bay from the northern end
of Ormoc Valley. San Juanico Strait, which separates Leyte from Samar
in the north, connects Carigara Bay and San Pedro Bay, the latter being
a northern extension of Leyte Gulf. The strait is thirteen and a half
miles long with an average width of a quarter to a half mile. Small
landing craft can navigate the channel, but there are strong tidal
currents which cause violent rips and swirls at many points.
Wedged in between the central mountain range and the hill mass of the
northwest coast of Leyte, the Ormoc Valley, about five miles wide in
its largest part, extends from Ormoc Bay to the north for fifteen miles
where a narrow neck of the central ridge separates it from Carigara
Bay. Through the valley runs a narrow road, its northern portion marked
by steep grades and sharp curves. Halfway along, a branch road zigzags
its course to Port Palompon on the west coast. Although most of the
southern part of the valley is under cultivation, there are large
patches of forest, scrub growth, and cogon grass in the north. [43]
The largest city on the island, the provincial capital, is Tacloban,
which lies at the head of San Pedro Bay. As the only sizable port in
the area, it handles most of the outbound shipping, mainly from Leyte
and Samar. Its prewar population was about 31,000. Other important
towns are Carigara and Barugo on the north coast; Baybay and Ormoc,
the leading ports on the west coast; and Palo, Tanauan, and Abuyog
along the east coast. All the more significant towns are situated on
the main road system of the island, and the larger coastal barrios
(villages) have roads of a sort.
The road system is divided into a northern and a southern coastal
road net. The former, which is the better, was designed for the
transportation of agricultural produce from the northern interior areas
to Tacloban. The latter is composed of narrow, roundabout roads that
are constantly in need of repair. The two systems are joined by a road,
scarcely better than a trail, which runs west of Abuyog and corkscrews
its way through heavily forested mountains to Baybay. Another road,
long, narrow, and broken in parts, goes north from Baybay to Ormoc
and thence through the Ormoc Valley to Carigara.
The Tacloban airstrip, the principal airfield on the island, was
located on the Cataisan Peninsula, which lies just southeast of
Tacloban. The Japanese had constructed another airfield, known as
the Dulag airstrip, two miles west of Dulag; three others--the Buri,
Bayug, and San Pablo airstrips--near Burauen, five miles west of Dulag;
and still another at Valencia in the Ormoc Valley, eight miles north
of Ormoc.
Control of the island of Leyte is dependent upon control of the Leyte
and Ormoc Valleys and their adjacent hills and mountains. Thus, before
a successful movement into Leyte Valley could be assured, control of
the high ground in the vicinity of Palo would be essential. Continued
dominance over the valley is dependent upon control of the high ground
at its northwestern end in the vicinity of Pinamopoan on Carigara Bay,
possession of which would preclude infiltration from Ormoc Valley. The
control of Ormoc Valley and use of the excellent anchorage and harbor
facilities of Ormoc Bay is dependent upon control of the lowland in
the vicinity of Ormoc city and the commanding hills to the east.
The People
In 1939 the total population of Leyte was 915,853, of whom more
than 912,000 were native Visayans of Malaysian stock. The largest
other group consisted of 3,076 Chinese, half of whom were engaged
in retail trade. There was a sprinkling of other national groups--40
Spaniards, 20 Germans, 81 from other European countries, 56 Americans,
and 73 Japanese.
Because of their insular position and somewhat primitive culture,
the inhabitants are primarily an agricultural and fishing people. The
principal crops are rice, sugar cane, corn, and copra. Judged by
Occidental standards, the mode of farming is backward and shows
little tendency to progress. The Filipinos who have been exposed
to industrial life, however, have been able to adapt themselves to
employment in the limited trade crafts and manufacturing on the island.
According to his own standards, the Filipino lives well enough. His
chief foods are rice or corn, fish, camotes (sweet potatoes), and
occasionally chicken or other meat. The men's clothing is simple;
the average man has several changes of cheap cotton shirts and pants
made of imported cotton cloth or, in the more remote districts,
from homespun material.
Most of the dwelling houses are made of bamboo and sheathed with
palm leaves on roof and sides. The material is gathered locally and
tied with rattan. The houses rarely consist of more than two rooms,
and many are raised on pilings, with space for the family pig and
chickens underneath. In one of the rooms, or outdoors, is an open
fireplace with a mud and stone hearth for cooking. There is little
furniture, and in three out of four families the personal possessions
would not be worth more than ten dollars.
Less than 5 percent of the people have a rising standard of
living. This higher standard is exemplified by a better type of
habitation, which ranges from a three-room house to a dwelling similar
to that of the American middle class. The diet of more prosperous
Filipinos is basically the same as that of the poorer class, but it
offers a greater variety. Clothing follows the Occidental fashion. The
wealthiest people and those with foreign education or contacts, who
make up less than 1 percent of the population, dress and live in the
same manner as Occidentals.
The Japanese, during their occupation, governed through the old
administrative organization of the province. They and their puppet
officials also set up larger governing bodies that exercised superior
jurisdiction. On 6 February 1944 the puppet president of the Philippine
Republic, José Laurel, appointed a commissioner who held supervisory
power over the local governments in the Visayan Provinces.
The governor of the province of Leyte, who previously had been
an elected official, was appointed by the president. He was the
chief operative and administrative head of the province and on all
provincial administrative matters his decision was final. The treasurer
of the province, who reported directly to the governor, was its chief
financial officer and tax assessor. He collected all taxes and license
fees, national and local, and prepared financial statements for the
governor but he had no say in administrative matters. The law officer
of the province was legal adviser to the governor and to the municipal
authorities. He could advise only on administrative matters.
The Japanese Military Administration maintained liaison between
the Japanese Army and the civil government. The military police
collected military intelligence and information and disseminated
propaganda. The Japanese allowed only one political party on the
Islands--the Kalibapi--to which all government officials were
required to belong. This party was one of the principal propaganda
agencies, being the prime mover of the pacification programs in the
province, and exercised general supervision over the local neighborhood
associations. The latter helped in maintaining law and order, assisted
the constabulary, and aided in the distribution of scarce commodities.
It should be emphasized that during most of the occupation there were
few Japanese on Leyte. Southern Leyte in general maintained the same
Filipino institutions and officials as in the prewar years. The heel
of the Japanese conqueror pressed but lightly on most of the people
of Leyte. Beginning in early 1944, however, the Japanese Army forces
on the island were reinforced. From that time forward the Filipinos
had their crops appropriated and in other ways were subjected to the
will of the Japanese. Misery, hunger, and poverty became commonplace
and a resistance movement grew.
The Resistance Movement on Leyte
The Organizing of Guerrilla Bands
A period of uncertainty and confusion followed the surrender of the
American and Filipino forces in the Philippines in the spring of
1942. Civilians and members of the armed forces who did not surrender
to the Japanese Army fled into the hills. Some went because they wanted
to continue the fight, others because they felt that the chaotic
conditions on the Islands would afford unequaled opportunities for
looting and pillaging.
Once in the hills, the men formed themselves into guerrilla bands. [44]
At first all of the bands, because of their lack of money and supplies,
freely raided farms and storehouses for food and equipment whenever
they had the opportunity. Moreover, there were real bandit groups
who frequently and wantonly raped the countryside. For a time all
of the groups were discredited by the people. Gradually, however,
strong men emerged who formed the guerrilla bands into semi-military
organizations. The leader of each band, who was generally an ex-member
of the armed forces, gave himself a "bamboo commission," usually
considerably higher than the one he had hitherto possessed.
The following oath of allegiance taken by the members of one of the
bands is probably typical:
I do solemnly swear that I shall obey orders from my superior
officer; that I shall fight the enemy of the Government of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the United States of
America whosoever and wherever he maybe [sic] in the territory
of the Philippines; that I shall never allow myself nor any
arm or ammunition to be caught by the enemy; that I shall never
turn traitor to my country nor the United States of America; and
muchless [sic] reveal to the enemy any secret of the Army to which
I honorably belong; that I shall never abandon a wounded brother
in arms; that I join the United Forces in the Philippines without
personal or party interest, but with the determination to sacrifice
myself and all that is mine for FREEDOM and DEMOCRACY; that I shall
protect the lives and property of all loyal Filipinos everywhere.
I make this LOYALTY OATH without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD. [45]
For some time the various guerrilla bands on Leyte operated separately,
and there was little or no co-operation between them. They were united,
however, in their hatred of the Japanese. Jealousy and strife between
groups were rampant, but circumstances gradually compelled the smaller
bands to submit to absorption, either by force or persuasion, into
the larger and more powerful groups. The fact that there were few
Japanese on the island enabled the guerrillas and loyal provincial
officials to organize the governments of most of the barrios.
All of the guerrillas declared that their primary purpose was to aid
the civilians, maintain peace and order, and keep the Japanese from
abusing the people. They also assumed control over various phases
of public activities--the allotment of food supplies, the issue of
emergency currency, and the punishment of criminals. The guerrillas
in northern Leyte depended upon voluntary contributions to support
them, while those in southern Leyte levied a loyalty tax. Hard money
having been driven out of circulation, the guerrilla units tried to
issue paper, which was acceptable only in those regions where the
particular unit was active. There was no widespread circulation or
acceptance of any of the guerrilla money.
The most important of the guerrilla leaders on Leyte were
Lt. Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon and Brig. Gen. Blas E. Miranda. Colonel
Kangleon had served for twenty-seven years in the Philippine Army
and was a graduate of the Philippine Academy and General Service
School. General Miranda, [46] a former member of the Philippine
Constabulary, was very hostile to the Japanese and to anyone who
surrendered to them. He killed many former prisoners, whom the Japanese
had released, on the pretext that they were enemy spies. Miranda was
especially bitter toward Kangleon, a former prisoner of the enemy.
Official recognition from General MacArthur's headquarters was
slow in reaching the guerrillas on Leyte, a fact that brought about
misunderstandings. General MacArthur had early established contact with
Col. Macario Peralta on Panay and Col. Wendell Fertig on Mindanao. In
the middle of February 1943 MacArthur sent Lt. Comdr. Charles Parsons,
USNR, to the Islands by submarine. Before his departure, General
Headquarters had established the policies to be followed. The prewar
military districts, as of December 1940, were to be revived. [47] Since
General MacArthur had received information that Colonel Fertig had
successfully created an effective guerrilla organization on Mindanao
and Colonel Peralta one on Panay, he recognized them as commanders of
the 10th and 6th Military Districts, respectively. Radio communication
from MacArthur's headquarters informed Peralta and Fertig of the
appointments on 21 February 1943. Commander Parsons also carried
formal letters, dated 13 February 1943, making these appointments.
Parsons safely reached the Philippines in early March and established
friendly relations with Colonel Fertig. While on Mindanao he made
several local trips, one to southern Leyte where he heard of Colonel
Kangleon who had escaped from the Butuan prison camp and returned to
his home. Parsons visited Kangleon with the promise that he would
be made commander of the 9th Military District (Leyte and Samar),
and succeeded in persuading him to join the guerrilla movement on
Leyte. [48]
Until area commanders could be selected for the 7th, 8th, and
9th (Leyte) Districts, Peralta and Fertig had been authorized by
MacArthur's headquarters, through Parsons, to organize the guerrillas
on neighboring islands, as well as on their own. Each thought he
was to organize the guerrillas on Leyte. Peralta made contact with
General Miranda on northwestern Leyte; Fertig got in touch with
Colonel Kangleon. Both Peralta and Fertig told their contacts to
organize Leyte with the official sanction of General MacArthur's
headquarters. Consequently, Kangleon and Miranda each thought the
other to be a usurper. [49]
Miranda was adamant in his refusal to treat with Kangleon. Colonel
Kangleon thought that Miranda should be ordered to "forget his
established kingdom," but if this failed, he declared, the 92d
Division, commanded by himself, would "force ... Miranda to join
us." [50]
The situation became extremely tense, since both Kangleon and Miranda
felt much bitterness. In August 1943 Kangleon sent a force against
Miranda and during a clash between the two parties some of the men
were killed. Miranda was routed and many of his followers joined
Kangleon. [51] The power of Miranda was broken. Kangleon incorporated
the other guerrillas on the island into the 92d Division, and Leyte
was then unified under his command.
On 21 October 1943 General MacArthur recognized Colonel Kangleon as the
Leyte Area Commander, and in a letter accompanying the appointment he
told Kangleon what he expected of him. "I desire that you establish and
maintain direct communication with this headquarters at your earliest
opportunity and thereafter you keep me informed of major developments
involving enemy movement, dispositions and other activity within your
area and observation." [52]
Japanese Punitive Expeditions
In the latter part of 1943 the Japanese military authorities tried to
conciliate the guerrillas, offering, in return for their surrender,
not only freedom from punishment but also jobs and the opportunity to
resume their normal family life. A great many guerrillas took advantage
of this offer of amnesty and surrendered. [53] Among the guerrilla
units that surrendered to the Japanese were those of Maj. Marcos
G. Soliman and other subordinates of General Miranda's command. [54]
They gave themselves up in January 1944, but General Miranda himself
refused to surrender and left for either Cebu or Bohol.
After their attempts at pacification, the Japanese launched more
frequent and intensive patrols against the guerrillas. The garrison
troops that had been stationed on Leyte were reinforced. Southern
Leyte, which had known few Japanese, was "reinvolved" on 8 December
1943. The guerrillas withdrew and hid in the interior. It was
thought that after a month the troops would leave and be replaced by
constabulary officers. But after two weeks the Japanese turned their
attention to the civilians. Some they arrested and imprisoned for
days without food and water, others they tortured and executed. Houses
were broken into, property was looted, and food was stolen. Spies were
brought in from neighboring islands to locate the guerrilla hideouts.
Since the people begged for action, Colonel Kangleon held a meeting of
his unit commanders on 24 January 1944. With his officers in unanimous
accord, he issued an order to fight, commencing on 1 February 1944. All
officers and enlisted men of his command signed a loyalty oath that
they would not allow either themselves or their weapons to be captured.
From 1 February until 12 June, according to Colonel Kangleon, the
guerrillas in southern Leyte had only 10 casualties. In a report
dated 18 May 1944, the Japanese casualties were listed as 434 killed,
of whom 4 were officers, and 205 wounded.
The Japanese commander in Leyte made quite a different report. He
stated that from 1 January to 31 August his forces had taken part
in 561 engagements with the guerrillas. They had seized 7 vehicles;
7 generators; 37 radios and other items of wireless equipment;
1,556 weapons, including rifles, bayonets, and homemade shotguns;
and 55,348 rounds of ammunition, as well as sticks of dynamite. The
Japanese declared that they had taken 2,300 prisoners of war, including
3 Americans; that 6 Americans and 23,077 Filipinos had surrendered;
1,984 guerrillas had been killed; and that the Japanese casualties
amounted to 7 officers and 208 enlisted men killed, and 11 officers
and 147 men wounded. [55]
In the month of October 1944 General MacArthur's Military Intelligence
Section estimated that the strength of the guerrilla 92d Division
was as follows: Headquarters, Leyte Area Command, 23 officers and
107 enlisted men; 94th Regiment, 71 officers and 1,210 enlisted men;
95th Regiment, 78 officers and 954 enlisted men; 96th Regiment,
37 officers and 710 enlisted men; total strength, 209 officers and
2,981 enlisted men. [56]
Colonel Kangleon stated that as a result of guerrilla activities the
Japanese sent out fewer patrols, staying mainly in the towns. The
civilians, he claimed, were therefore able to plant and harvest their
crops. Despite these brave words the guerrillas were definitely on
the defensive, since Japanese intelligence had accurate information on
their movements and strength. Nevertheless, the Japanese also knew that
the guerrillas had established communication with General MacArthur
in Australia and that they were sending important information to
General Headquarters. This service the Japanese were unable to cut off.
Liaison Between Leyte and Australia
After his arrival in Australia in March 1942, General MacArthur had
maintained radio contact with Corregidor until 6 May, but because
of conditions in the Philippines radio communication with other
parts of the Islands was all but impossible. [57] Before its fall,
Corregidor maintained radio contact with military commanders on the
other islands. Afterward, a few men escaped and made their way to
Australia. The sum of information they brought was not large, but it
included the welcome news that guerrilla units were in existence all
over the Islands. In the summer of 1942 General Headquarters began
to receive messages from the guerrillas in the Philippines, though
at first General MacArthur was not sure that the messages actually
came from the guerrillas.
In August 1942 MacArthur decided to get in touch with the members of
the resistance movement in the Philippines, and for this purpose he
enlisted the services of Maj. Jesus Antonio Villamor, who had escaped
from the Islands and who volunteered to return. [58] From August
to December methods were devised and plans were made for sending
an intelligence party to the Philippines. [59] On 27 December 1942
Major Villamor received orders to return secretly to the Islands by
submarine with three other Filipino officers and two enlisted men. [60]
They were instructed to establish an intelligence and secret service
network throughout the Philippines; develop a chain of communications
within the Philippines and to Australia, together with an escape route
from the Islands for the evacuation of important personages; build
up an organization for subversive activities, propaganda, limited
resistance, and sabotage; and make an intelligence survey to obtain
information on Japanese political, military, and civil intentions
as well as the strength and disposition of Japanese military, naval,
and air forces. [61]
Armed with these instructions, Major Villamor returned to the
Philippine Islands. Slowly but carefully, from December 1942 to
November 1943, he established an intelligence network that covered
Luzon and the Visayan Islands. His story is told in part as follows:
I established this network principally with the idea that this net
would be entirely independent of all intelligence nets previously
established by the guerrillas, believing that in all probability
you [General MacArthur] could rely more on guerrilla intelligence
activities for the present. I wanted to establish something that
would really be underground and as secret as possible. For that
reason, I took my time about it. I took as much as two months to
train each individual man. I tried to impress on each man that
after he left my place, he would be on his own and that no matter
what happened to me or to the rest of the net, he would carry
on. I assured him that both GHQ and I would have faith in him. [62]
Kangleon was largely responsible for the Leyte radio network. This
intelligence network did not cover the entire island but only those
positions over which he had control. General MacArthur did not furnish
any considerable supplies for this net until shortly before his return
in October 1944. [63] On 3 July 1944 Kangleon received seventy tons
of supplies; an additional shipment of supplies and men followed on
20 July. [64] This allotment was in addition to money sent him. The
funds available to Kangleon consisted of $50,000 in prewar currency
("only a few hundred" of which were spent by him), $225,000 in "bogus
Japanese" currency, and $479,198 in emergency currency printed in
the Islands and used for "army" purposes. [65]
Several clandestine radio stations were in operation on or near
Leyte in June 1944. These were primarily contact stations established
originally to integrate more closely the activities of the various
guerrilla units with the directives of Colonel Kangleon's headquarters,
which was in touch with General Headquarters. After the Leyte Area
Command was recognized by General MacArthur, the first radio was sent
to Leyte, but the Japanese captured it early in 1944 before it could
be put to use. Kangleon received a new set from Mindanao. There were
two coastwatcher stations in operation--one in southern Leyte and
the other on Dinagat Island. These furnished MacArthur information
on the activities of the Japanese in the area. Colonel Kangleon also
used the radio set in southern Leyte to maintain contact with Colonel
Fertig on Mindanao. [66]
As a result of information received from the intelligence network,
on Leyte and in other areas, together with information from other
sources, General MacArthur's intelligence officers were able to piece
together a reasonably accurate picture of the Japanese units on Leyte,
their strength, dispositions, and fortifications.
Kangleon's network, however, was not as active as most of the
others in the Philippines that were operated by coastwatchers and
guerrillas. From March 1944, when Kangleon's network was established,
to October 1944, when the American forces returned, the monthly
totals of messages received by General Headquarters from Leyte were
as follows: March, 6; April, 7; May, 7; June, 12; July, 13; August,
13; September, 17; and October, 26. [67]
The guerrillas of the Philippine Islands made far-reaching
contributions to the war effort. They were an extremely valuable source
of intelligence; their activities forced the Japanese to retain in
the Philippines comparatively large forces which would otherwise have
been sent south; it is estimated that they killed from eight thousand
to ten thousand Japanese troops; and, finally, they bolstered the
morale, spirit, and loyalty of the Filipino people. [68] They kept
alive the hope and belief that the forces of the United States would
return and redeem the Islands.