UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The War in the Pacific
LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES
by
M. Hamlin Cannon
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1954
This volume, one of the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR
II, is the fifth to be published in the subseries THE WAR IN THE
PACIFIC. All the volumes will be closely related, and the series
will present a comprehensive account of the activities of the
Military Establishment during World War II. A tentative list of
subseries is appended at the end of this volume.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 53--61979
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government
Printing Office Washington 25, D. C.--Price of this volume, $6.75
(Cloth)
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor
Advisory Committee
(As of 1 May 1953)
James P. Baxter Brig. Gen. Verdi B. Barnes
President, Williams College Army War College
John D. Hicks Brig. Gen. Leonard J. Greeley
University of California Industrial College of the Armed Forces
William T. Hutchinson Brig. Gen. Elwyn D. Post
University of Chicago Army Field Forces
S. L. A. Marshall Col. Thomas D. Stamps
Detroit News United States Military Academy
Charles S. Sydnor Col. C. E. Beauchamp
Duke University Command and General Staff College
Charles H. Taylor
Harvard University
Office of the Chief of Military History
Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith, Chief [1]
Chief Historian Kent Roberts Greenfield
Chief, War Histories Division Col. G. G. O'Connor
Chief, Editorial and Publication Division Col. B. A. Day
Chief, Editorial Branch Joseph R. Friedman
Chief, Cartographic Branch Wsevolod Aglaimoff
Chief, Photographic Branch Maj. Arthur T. Lawry
The History of
THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC
prepared under the direction of Louis Morton
The Fall of the Philippines
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
Victory in Papua
Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
Campaign in the Marianas
The Approach to the Philippines
Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
Triumph in the Philippines
Okinawa: The Last Battle
Strategy, Command, and Administration
... to Those Who Served
FOREWORD
With the Leyte Campaign the War in the Pacific entered a decisive
stage. The period of limited offensives, bypassing, and island hopping
was virtually over. American troops in greater numbers than ever
before assembled in the Pacific Theater, supported by naval and air
forces of corresponding size, fought and overcame Japanese forces of
greater magnitude than any previously met.
Though the spotlight is on the front-line fighting, the reader will
find in this volume a faithful description of all arms and services
performing their missions. The account is not exclusively an infantry
story. It covers as well the support of ground fighting on Leyte by
large-scale naval operations and by land-based air power under the
most adverse conditions. In addition, careful attention to logistical
matters, such as the movement of supplies and the evacuation of the
wounded, gives the reader a picture of the less spectacular activities
of an army in battle.
ORLANDO WARD
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
Chief of Military History
Washington, D. C.
30 January 1953
THE AUTHOR
M. Hamlin Cannon received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
from the American University of Washington, D.C. He is already
known to American historians for his writings on Mormon and Civil
War history which have appeared in historical journals. During World
War II he served with the Navy in Australia and New Guinea.
PREFACE
The landing of the American forces on Leyte on 20 October 1944 brought
to fruition the long-cherished desire of General Douglas MacArthur to
return to the Philippine Islands and avenge the humiliating reverses
suffered in the early days of World War II. The successful conclusion
of the campaign separated the Japanese-held Philippine Archipelago
into two parts, with a strong American force between them. More
important, it completed the severance of the Japanese mainland from
the stolen southern empire in the Netherlands Indies from which oil,
the lifeblood of modern warfare, had come.
The Leyte Campaign, like other campaigns in the Pacific, was
waged on the land, in the air, and on and under the sea. In this
operation all branches of the American armed forces played significant
roles. Therefore, although the emphasis in this volume is placed upon
the deeds of the United States Army ground soldier, the endeavors
of the aviator, the sailor, the marine and the Filipino guerrilla
have been integrated as far as possible into the story in order to
make the campaign understandable in its entirety. At the same time,
every effort has been made to give the Japanese side of the story.
Obviously, to include every exploit of every branch of the armed
forces, of the Filipinos, and of the Japanese would be far beyond
the compass of a single volume. A careful selectivity was necessary
throughout in order to avoid the Scylla of omission while skirting
the Charybdis of oversimplification. Despite these precautions,
because of the nature of the available documentary evidence, I may
have unwittingly fallen into some of the very pitfalls that I tried
to avoid.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude and thanks to the many people
who have given fully of their time and talents in the preparation of
this volume.
Especial thanks are due to Dr. John Miller, jr., who, during his tenure
as Chief of the Pacific Section, Office of the Chief of Military
History, carefully reviewed the final draft of the manuscript. His
sound advice and constructive criticism eliminated many a roadblock. I
wish, also, to thank Dr. Louis Morton, Chief of the Pacific Section,
under whose direction this volume was started; he made constructive
criticism of several of the chapters. Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield,
Chief Historian, Department of the Army, devoted much time and effort
to reviewing the manuscript and his many penetrating comments on the
various chapters were invaluable.
Appreciation is due to the people of the Historical Records Section,
Departmental Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, who
helped to locate source material and furnished working space for me
and the records. To Mrs. Lois Aldridge, Mrs. Frances Bowen, Mrs. Clyde
Christian, Miss Margaret Emerson, Mrs. Ellen Garrison, Mr. Robert
Greathouse, Miss Matilda Huber, Mrs. Margarite Kerstetter, Mr. Wilbur
Nigh, Miss Sue D. Wallace, and Miss Thelma K. Yarborough--thanks.
I wish also to thank the members of the U. S. Air Force Historical
Division, Air University, and the Naval History Branch, Naval Records
and History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, for
placing at my disposal the pertinent air and naval records.
Thanks are also due to the members of the historical sections of the
U. S. Navy and the U. S. Air Force and to the many participating
commanders of various branches of the U. S. armed forces who read
all or parts of the manuscript.
The late W. Brooks Phillips started the editing of the manuscript. He
was succeeded by Col. B. A. Day, Chief of the Editorial and Publication
Division, and Mrs. Loretto Stevens. Mrs. Stevens also prepared the
final copy for the printer. Miss Mary Ann Bacon prepared the index.
Mrs. Martha Willoughby, in addition to accomplishing the arduous
task of interpreting my handwriting, typed many of the drafts of the
manuscript and saw that the subject and predicate agreed. Mrs. Wynona
Hayden, Mrs. Stella Hess, and Mrs. Michael Miller also typed parts
of the manuscript. Miss Elizabeth Armstrong painstakingly typed the
final copy.
Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff and Lt. Col. Robert F. O'Donnell, as well as
other members of the Cartographic Branch, spent many months in research
for and preparation of the maps. At the time this volume was being
prepared for publication, no reliable maps of Leyte were available. The
maps for this volume are based on the highly inaccurate maps used by
the troops during the operation. The relief in particular, as shown
on these maps, has little in common with the terrain configuration
which confronted the troops. Thus, both military and geographical
information as given on the maps in the volume should be regarded only
as an approximation of the actual situation at the time of the battle.
Major Arthur T. Lawry selected and edited the photographs used in this
volume. Lt. Roger Pineau (USNR) furnished me the photograph of General
Suzuki. Mr. Israel Wice and his capable assistants in the General
Reference Branch were helpful at crucial stages of the manuscript.
My sincere appreciation and thanks go to Maj. Gen. Harry A. Maloney,
Chief of Military History, and to his successors, Maj. Gen. Orlando
Ward and Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith, as well as to members of their
staffs, for their understanding and co-operation.
M. HAMLIN CANNON
Washington, D. C.
15 June 1953
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. THE STRATEGIC PLAN 1
Preliminary Discussion 1
Plans Agreed Upon 8
II. THE NATURE OF THE TARGET 10
Geography of Leyte 10
The Resistance Movement on Leyte 14
Liaison Between Leyte and Australia 18
III. PLANS ARE MADE AND FORCES ARE READIED 21
Estimate of the Enemy Situation 21
The Tactical Plan 23
The Logistical Plan 35
IV. THE RETURN 40
The Convoy Forms 40
Softening the Target 42
Japanese Plan of Defense 45
Securing the Channel Approaches 54
The Convoy Enters Leyte Gulf 58
V. A DAY: 20 OCTOBER 1944 60
Bombardment of the Shores of Leyte 60
X Corps Goes Ashore 62
XXIV Corps Goes Ashore 72
Bringing in Supplies 80
VI. THE JAPANESE REACTION 85
The Air Forces 85
The Battle of Leyte Gulf 88
The Japanese Reinforce the Leyte Garrison 92
VII. SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 103
The SHO Operations 103
Enlarging the 96th Division Beachhead 107
Catmon Hill Area 114
VIII. SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 124
The Dulag-Burauen Road 124
Securing the XXIV Corps Beachhead Line 133
IX. NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 146
San Juanico Strait 146
Leyte Valley Entrance 157
X. NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 168
Drive up Leyte Valley 168
Capture of Carigara 179
XI. LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 184
Logistics 184
Medical Support 192
Civil Affairs 198
Relations With Filipino Refugees 200
XII. THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART ONE 206
The Coastal Corridor 206
Battle of Breakneck Ridge 211
XIII. THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 221
Reinforcements 221
32d Division Assumes the Offensive 223
Battle of Kilay Ridge 227
Central Mountain Range 235
XIV. MEASURE OF THE FIGHTING 244
The American Ground Forces 244
Japanese Warfare 251
XV. BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 253
American Plans and Preparations 253
Battle of Shoestring Ridge 257
Battles of the Hills 266
XVI. THE FALL OF ORMOC 275
Plan for Amphibious Movement 276
The Movement Overwater 280
Drive Toward Ormoc 284
Two Sevens Are Rolled in Ormoc 290
XVII. BATTLE OF THE AIRSTRIPS 294
The American Dispositions 296
First Japanese Effort 297
Battle of Buri Airstrip 298
Attack From the Sky 300
XVIII. LOGISTICS 306
Construction 306
Supplies 308
XIX. THE ENTRANCES TO ORMOC VALLEY 313
Southern Entrance to Ormoc Valley 313
The Mountain Passage 321
The Drive South 323
XX. SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALLEY 329
Drive From the South to the Libongao Area 330
The 32d Division Resumes the Offensive 339
Debouchment From the Mountains 342
XXI. WESTWARD TO THE SEA 347
The 77th Division Goes West 348
X Corps Goes West 354
The Japanese Retreat 358
XXII. LEYTE IS LIBERATED 361
The Eighth Army Assumes Control 361
The Road Ends 367
Appendix
A. GHQ OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NO. 70,
21 SEPTEMBER 1944 371
B. BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 378
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 380
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 383
INDEX 391
Tables
No. Page
1. Sixth Army Daily Strength Reports, 12 November-25
December 1944 222
2. Shipping Tonnage Discharged in Leyte-Samar Area,
28 October-25 December 1944 310
3. Airdrops by 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron, 11
November-25 December 1944 311
4. U. S. Army Battle Casualties at Leyte, 20 October
1944-8 May 1945 368
5. Sixth Army Battle Casualties by Arm or Service, 20
October-25 December 1944 369
Charts
1. Operational Organization for the Leyte Campaign 25
2. Organization of the Central Philippine Attack Force 29
3. Japanese Army Organization of Major Units for the Leyte
Operation 48
Maps
1. Pacific Ocean (National Geographic Society Map) Inside back cover
2. Leyte Island Inside back cover
3. Sixth Army Plan, 23 September 1944 32
4. Situation in the Pacific, Mid-October 1944 47
5. X Corps Landings, 20 October 1944 64
6. XXIV Corps Landings, 20 October 1944 73
7. 96th Division Advance, 21-30 October 1944 105
8. 7th Division Advance to Dagami, 21-30 October 1944 125
9. Securing the Tacloban Area, 21-23 October 1944 147
10. Fight for Entrance to Northern Leyte Valley, 21-25
October 1944 158
11. Drive to Jaro, 26-29 October 1944 169
12. Advance to Carigara, 30 October-2 November 1944 177
13. Battle for Northern Entrance to Ormoc Valley, 3-15
November 1944 207
14. Battle for Northern Entrance to Ormoc Valley, 16
November-14 December 1944 225
15. Shoestring Ridge, 23-25 November 1944 255
16. Shoestring Ridge, 26-27 November 1944 261
17. Battle of the Ridges, 5-12 December 1944 267
18. Situation on Leyte, 7 December 1944 274
19. Securing the Southern Entrance to Ormoc Valley,
7-15 December 1944 278
20. Japanese Attack on Burauen Airfields, 6 December 1944 295
21. Mountain Passage, 25 November-22 December 1944 321
22. Seizure of Ormoc Valley, 15-21 December 1944 329
23. Opening the Palompon Road, 22-31 December 1944 348
Illustrations
Page
Conference at Pearl Harbor 5
Guerrillas Prepare for Inspection at Consuegra 15
Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita 51
Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki 51
Patrol of Company F, 6th Rangers 56
Convoy Off Leyte 61
Landing Beaches 63
Troops of the 1st Cavalry Division 66
75-mm. M8 Self-Propelled Howitzers 70
Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert 71
Beach Area 75
Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger and Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon 79
Unloading Supplies at Dulag 81
Japanese Air Attacks 87
Air Strikes Against Japanese Installations 95
Antiaircraft Gun 97
Lockheed P-38 98
Japanese Convoy Under Attack 100
Landing Areas and Leyte Valley 106
Crew of a Light Armored Car M8 109
Filipino Civilian Guides U. S. Tank 113
San Vicente Hill 118
105-mm. Self-Propelled Howitzer M7 Firing 120
Dulag and Bayug Airstrips 126
Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge 127
Disabled M4 Tank 132
Burauen 134
Engineer Troops 140
A Patrol From the 7th Cavalry 149
Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge 150
8-inch Howitzers Readied for Action 151
General MacArthur 153
Proclamation to the People of the Philippine Islands 154
Tacloban 156
Tank-Supported Infantrymen of the 34th Regiment 160
Palo 162
Pastrana 172
U. S. Antitank Platoon 174
155-mm. Guns Firing on Carigara 180
U. S. Patrol Crossing the Canomontag River 182
Access Road From White Beach 186
Tanauan Airstrip 189
LST's Unloading at Tacloban Airfield 191
Road Conditions 193
A Litter Squad Evacuates a Casualty 196
A Casualty Receives Treatment 196
An Operating Room at the Station Hospital, Tanauan 197
A Casualty is Evacuated by Ship to a Rear Area 197
An Officer of a Civil Affairs Unit 200
Refugee Area on Orange Beach Near Dulag 202
Engineers Remove Land Mines 214
View From the Ridges Looking North up the Limon Valley 217
American Troops in Limon 226
Lt. Col. Thomas E. Clifford, Jr. 229
Filipino Carriers Haul Supplies 236
Foothills of Central Mountain Range 238
General MacArthur and Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold 245
Troops of the 77th Division Board LCI's at Tarragona 281
Convoy Carrying 77th Division Approaches Deposito 282
A Patrol of the 307th Infantry 288
Aerial View of Ormoc 292
Buri Airstrip 299
San Pablo Airstrip 301
Operational Losses at the Burauen Airfields 307
Approach Road to Quartermaster Service Center 309
Heavy Machine Guns Cover Crossing 315
U. S. and Japanese Tanks 327
Japanese Dug-in Positions Along Highway Banks 332
Japanese Light Tank 335
Palompon After Allied Bombings 350
All illustrations but one are from Department of Defense files. The
photograph of Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki on page 51 was contributed by
Lt. Roger Pineau (USNR).
LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES
CHAPTER I
The Strategic Plan
"It is with the deepest regret that I must inform you that conditions
over which I have no control have necessitated the surrender of
troops under my command." [2] With this message of 20 May 1942,
from Lt. Col. Theodore M. Cornell, U.S. Army, to Bernardo Torres,
Governor of Leyte, the control which the United States had held over
the island since 1898 came to an end. Nearly two and a half years were
to elapse before the sound of naval guns in Leyte Gulf would announce
to the world the opening of the Leyte Campaign, the first phase of
the re-entry of American forces into the Philippine Archipelago. (Map
1--inside back cover)
The primary purpose of the Leyte Campaign was to establish an air
and logistical base in the Leyte area in order to support operations
in the Luzon-Formosa-China coast area and particularly to nullify
Japanese strength in Luzon. Leyte is one of the Visayan Islands,
which constitute the geographical heart of the Philippines. It was
hoped that the fertile Leyte Valley, broad and flat, could be utilized
for major airfields and base sites from which large-scale operations
could be launched against the rest of the Philippines.
Preliminary Discussion
Behind the decision to go into Leyte lay a series of strategically
significant victories, which had followed a staggering initial
reverse. American prewar plans for the Pacific had originally been
based on the assumption that only the United States and Japan would
be at war and that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be in existence. [3]
But the destruction of the fleet at Pearl Harbor and the entrance of
Germany and Italy into the war nullified these plans. The strategy of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff [4] in early 1942, therefore, was concerned
chiefly with trying to limit the rapid advance of the Japanese and
with keeping the line of communications to Australia open. The Pacific
Theater was divided into command areas--the Southwest Pacific Area,
with General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander (he referred to
himself, however, as Commander in Chief), and the Pacific Ocean Area
(which included the Central Pacific), with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
as Commander in Chief. [5]
In 1942 and 1943 the Allied forces had halted the Japanese at Papua
and Guadalcanal and started to push them back. On 8 May 1943 the Joint
Chiefs approved a "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan," which
was endorsed by the Combined Chiefs in December. The objective of the
plan was to secure the unconditional surrender of Japan, an objective
that might necessitate an invasion of the Japanese home islands. As
such an invasion promised to be a "vast undertaking," it would be
necessary to secure a large supply base from which a great aerial
offensive could be mounted against Japan. According to the original
plan this base was to be located in China, but the Mariana Islands were
afterward substituted for China. The plan called for the acquisition
of successive island bases which could be used as "steppingstones,"
preferably those which would shorten the sea route, provide for its
security, and at the same time deny to the Japanese bases from which
they might interfere with the Allied line of communications. The main
effort was to be through the waters of the Pacific Ocean. Nimitz'
operations were to be conducted west through the Japanese mandated
islands while MacArthur's proceeded northwest along the New Guinea
coast. The two series of operations were to be mutually supporting. [6]
Although no specific islands were named in the Strategic Plan,
the Philippine Archipelago, because of its strategic position and
long possession by the United States, naturally loomed large in the
planning. The Philippines lie athwart all sea routes south from Japan
to the economically important Netherlands Indies--rich in rubber, tin,
oil, and rice. The capture of the Philippines would help to sever this
line of communications and would furnish an excellent staging area
for attacks against China, Formosa, or Japan. Aside from strategic
considerations, the liberation of the Islands was important for
reasons of Far Eastern politics and prestige. [7] The obligation of the
United States to the subjugated Filipino people could not be lightly
ignored. Furthermore, General MacArthur was imbued with a burning
determination to return to the Philippine Islands and avenge the
humiliating defeats suffered by the American forces in 1941 and 1942.
By the spring of 1944 the operations in the Pacific were going
so well that the successes had exceeded even the most optimistic
hopes of any of the planning officers. On 12 March the Joint Chiefs
ordered General MacArthur to prepare plans for a return to Mindanao,
southernmost island of the Philippines, with a target date of 15
November 1944. [8] General MacArthur on 15 June issued a plan for
his future operations. The entrance into the Philippines was to be
accomplished in two phases. The first would be a preliminary operation
on 25 October into the Sarangani Bay area in southern Mindanao in
order to establish land-based air forces to augment the carrier-based
air support for the principal effort. The major effort was to be
an amphibious landing operation with forces mounted from New Guinea
for the seizure on 15 November of airfields and bases on Leyte. [9]
The latter was to follow quickly on the heels of the first operation
in order to take full advantage of the surprise tactics.
Leyte occupies a commanding position in the Philippine Islands. Because
of its central location, its repossession by the United States would
not only divide the Japanese forces in the Philippines but would also
provide an excellent anchorage in Leyte Gulf, together with sites
for bases and airfields from which land-based aircraft could bomb all
parts of the Philippines, the coast of China, and Formosa. To an even
greater extent than Mindanao, Leyte could be made into an excellent
springboard from which to launch subsequent operations against the
Japanese in Formosa or in the rest of the Philippines.
In his planning, General MacArthur recognized that the Leyte operation,
his most ambitious to date, would require "massed carrier-based
air support" and all of the "combined amphibious and naval forces
available at the time." [10]
By June 1944 General MacArthur's forces had pushed up the New Guinea
coast to the island of Biak, about nine hundred nautical miles
southeast of Davao, Mindanao, while those of Admiral Nimitz were
poised to strike at Saipan some twelve hundred miles northeast of
Davao. In most of their previous campaigns the Americans had struck
with overwhelming force at weakly held Japanese garrisons. Since
the tide of war was now so favorable to the Allied cause, the Joint
Chiefs thought that the Pacific timetable of pending operations
might be accelerated. On 13 June they had therefore asked MacArthur
and Nimitz their opinions with regard to three ways proposed for
speeding up operations: "(a) By advancing target dates of operations
now scheduled through operations against Formosa; (b) By by-passing
presently selected objectives prior to operations against Formosa;
and (c) By by-passing presently selected objectives and choosing new
ones including the home islands." Although the Philippine Islands
were not explicitly named as targets that might be bypassed, they
were certainly included by implication. [11]
On 18 June General MacArthur replied to the query of the Joint Chiefs,
[12] and on 4 July Admiral Nimitz made known his opinions. [13]
On the advancement of the target dates, both commanders were in
complete agreement--it was impossible unless certain conditions
could be changed. The logistic resources in the Southwest Pacific
were being strained to the limit to meet the fixed target dates,
while the strengthening of Japanese garrisons made it unlikely that
the Central Pacific could make its present scheduled dates.
With respect to bypassing objectives prior to the seizure of Formosa,
MacArthur thought it would be "unsound" to bypass the Philippines
and launch an attack across the Pacific directly against Formosa--an
attack which would have the benefit of no appreciable land-based
air support and which would be based upon the Hawaiian Islands,
5,100 miles away. In his opinion it was essential to occupy Luzon and
establish land-based aircraft thereon before making any move against
Formosa. [14] Nimitz stated that in a series of informal discussions
between his and MacArthur's planning officers, the latter anticipated
the seizure in early September of Morotai Island, 300 statute miles
southeast of Mindanao. This was to be followed in late October by a
limited occupation of the Sarangani Bay area on Mindanao, which was
to be used primarily as a base for short-range aircraft. The major
operation was to be the occupation of Leyte about 15 November. Nimitz
thought that this timing was "optimistic." He felt that the critical
and decisive nature of the Leyte operation required "practically all
available covering and striking forces, fire support forces, and all
available assault shipping." If successful, however, the Americans
would achieve air supremacy over the Philippines. Therefore, since
the inclusion of the Leyte operation with that of Mindanao would
expedite subsequent operations, Nimitz considered it "advisable." [15]
As to the feasibility of bypassing present objectives and choosing
new ones, including the Japanese home islands, the two commanders were
not in complete agreement. MacArthur pronounced the concept "utterly
unsound," since the available shipping was limited to a seven-division
lift and there was insufficient air support. Nimitz thought that no
decision should be made until after further developments.
The proposals disturbed General MacArthur, who concluded his message
to the Joint Chiefs with the following peroration:
It is my opinion that purely military considerations demand
the reoccupation of the Philippines in order to cut the enemy's
communications to the south and to secure a base for our further
advance. Even if this were not the case and unless military
factors demanded another line of action it would in my opinion
be necessary to reoccupy the Philippines.
The Philippines is American Territory where our unsupported forces
were destroyed by the enemy. Practically all of the 17,000,000
Filipinos remain loyal to the United States and are undergoing the
greatest privation and suffering because we have not been able
to support or succor them. We have a great national obligation
to discharge.
Moreover, if the United States should deliberately bypass the
Philippines, leaving our prisoners, nationals, and loyal Filipinos
in enemy hands without an effort to retrieve them at earliest
moment, we would incur the gravest psychological reaction. We
would admit the truth of Japanese propaganda to the effect that
we had abandoned the Filipinos and would not shed American blood
to redeem them; we would undoubtedly incur the open hostility
of that people; we would probably suffer such loss of prestige
among all the peoples of the Far East that it would adversely
affect the United States for many years.... [16]
In reply, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, cautioned
MacArthur to "be careful not to let personal feelings and Philippine
politics" override the great objective, which was to end the
war. He also pointed out that "bypassing" was not "synonymous with
abandonment." [17]
Admiral William F. Halsey, the commander of the Third Fleet, and his
staff, when they heard of the proposal, were enthusiastic about the
possibility of bypassing the more immediate objectives. But in contrast
to Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, who wished to
move directly to Formosa, bypassing the Philippines, Halsey felt it
necessary and profitable to go into the Philippine Archipelago, which
he considered to be "the vulnerable belly of the Imperial dragon." [18]
Halsey stated that when Rear Adm. Robert B. Carney, his chief of staff,
was asked by King, "Do you want to make a London out of Manila?" Carney
replied, "No, sir. I want to make an England out of Luzon." [19]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that none of the currently
selected objectives could be bypassed. They continued, however, to
search for means by which the tempo of the war in the Pacific might
be accelerated.
In the latter days of July, General Marshall invited General MacArthur
to visit Pearl Harbor in order to confer with Admiral Nimitz on future
plans for the war in the Pacific. MacArthur arrived on 26 July. To his
surprise, the President of the United States was present. President
Roosevelt invited him and Admirals Halsey and Nimitz to dinner. After
dinner the President drew out a map and, pointing to Leyte, is reported
to have said, "Well, Douglas, where do we go from here?" [20]
Although Mac Arthur had been given no intimation that strategy was
going to be discussed, he launched into a long talk on the necessity
of taking Luzon before moving against Formosa. Nimitz did not enter
into the conversation. The following morning the discussions were
continued. Admiral William D. Leahy, who was present, later declared:
"Both General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz felt that they did not
require any additional reinforcements or assistance" for the scheduled
operations. [21] This Admiral Leahy considered most unusual.
Admiral Nimitz reported to Admiral King that the conferences "were
quite satisfactory. The general trend of the discussion ... was along
the line of seeing MacArthur into the Central Philippines...." [22]
There was no strong disagreement between General MacArthur and Admiral
Nimitz. Admiral Leahy said, "I personally was convinced that they
together were the best qualified officers in our service for this
tremendous task, and that they could work together in full agreement
toward the common end of defeating Japan." [23]
Strong efforts were already under way to accelerate operations in the
Pacific. A shortage of shipping appeared to be the bottleneck which
halted all attempts to speed up the operational target dates. General
MacArthur at Brisbane had been directing the whole of his planning
toward the reoccupation of the Philippine Islands, and on 10 July had
issued a plan for all operations into the archipelago. According to
this plan the conquest of the Islands was to be accomplished in four
major phases.
The initial phase envisaged footholds in the southern and central
Philippines for the establishment of bases and airfields from which
subsequent operations could be supported. The first operation, planned
for 1 November 1944, was to be the seizure of the Sarangani Bay area
in southern Mindanao for the purpose of establishing land-based air
forces to augment the carrier-based air support for the advance into
Leyte. The Leyte operation, the main effort of this series, was to
come on 22 November. Major air, naval, and logistic bases were to
be constructed on the shores of Leyte Gulf for the control of Leyte,
Samar, and Surigao Strait, and for the neutralization of the Japanese
aerial strength on Luzon. [24] The other phases covered the occupation
of Luzon and the consolidation of the Philippines.
On 26 July the Joint Chiefs agreed that the primary purpose of the
occupation of the Leyte-Mindanao area was to establish air forces
there in order to reduce the enemy air strength on Luzon. Some of
Admiral Nimitz' assault craft which were suitable for shore-to-shore
operations were to be transferred to General MacArthur. The Joint
Chiefs, therefore, asked their planners to submit their views on the
possibility of advancing the target date for Leyte to 15 November by
compressing the intervals between contemplated operations or by the
elimination of certain scheduled operations. [25]
In furtherance of this directive, planning officers from Washington
met with General MacArthur and his staff in Brisbane in the early
part of August and discussed means of accelerating the target date
for Leyte. General MacArthur told them that a substantial interval
between the operations at Sarangani Bay and Leyte was necessary. His
reasons were as follows: (1) the assault shipping that was used for the
Sarangani Bay operation would have time to turn around, reload, and
then be used for the Leyte operation; (2) in the interval six combat
air groups could be installed in the Sarangani Bay area to support
the Leyte operation; and (3) the carriers would have sufficient time
to execute two strikes before the Leyte operation. [26]
The planners from Washington, however, felt that there was
sufficient assault shipping in the Pacific without using the same
craft for both the Sarangani Bay and the Leyte operations. An
enumeration of the vessels assigned to the Southwest Pacific and
the Central Pacific gave the areas more than a six-division lift. As
Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, chief of the Strategy and Policy Group,
Operations Division, War Department General Staff, in Washington,
told Col. William L. Ritchie, his deputy, who was in Brisbane,
"If you sit down and look at those figures a bit you will see that
there should be sufficient assault lift for Leyte just on playing
the numbers racket, without touching the shipping on Sarangani." [27]
Both Washington and Brisbane recognized that the operations in the
Leyte-Surigao area were necessary in order to provide air bases, depot
areas, and a fleet anchorage for any future advance whether in the
Philippines, against Formosa, or by a direct route into the Japanese
homeland. Consequently, the planners never seriously entertained any
idea of bypassing this area, although they continued to probe for
means which would accelerate the target date.
The determination of the target date was dependent upon the
availability of assault shipping and the desire of General MacArthur
to have each successive advance supported by land-based aircraft. The
existing shipping was needed for operations already scheduled. The
planners concluded that additional shipping could be made available
if certain phases of the campaigns of Central Pacific forces into
the Palaus, scheduled to start on 15 September, were canceled or
set ahead of schedule. The alternatives were to modify the concept
of providing land-based air support for subsequent operations or to
execute the Sarangani Bay and Leyte operations simultaneously. [28]
There the matter rested. Apparently the Joint Chiefs had decided that
the time was not opportune for an acceleration of the target dates.
On 27 August General MacArthur furnished General Marshall a timetable
for future operations by his forces. On 15 September a division and
a reinforced regiment were to seize Morotai in order "to protect
the western flank" and to provide land-based aircraft for advances
northward. On 15 October a division less one regimental combat team
was to land in the Talaud Islands northwest of Morotai in order "to
neutralize the [Japanese] western flank," to establish air bases
from which the neutralization of Mindanao and the western Visayan
Islands could be accomplished, and to set up a base for airborne
troops. On 15 November two divisions were to land in the Sarangani
Bay area in order to construct bases for land-based aircraft that
were to support the Leyte operation. On 7 December a regimental
combat team and a parachute battalion were to drop on Mindanao and
establish an airfield for fighter cover for the aerial neutralization
of the western Visayan Islands and southern Luzon. On 20 December
five divisions were to land on Leyte for the purpose of providing
"major air and logistic bases for operations to the northward." The
plan was predicated on the assumption that there would be available
in the Pacific sufficient amphibious lift and fleet support. [29]
Plans Agreed Upon
On 1 September 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 171st meeting
reviewed the situation in the Pacific. The time had come when it
was necessary to issue a directive for future operations in that
area. After much discussion, the Joint Chiefs left in abeyance the
question of what operation should follow Leyte but "directed the Joint
Staff Planners to prepare, as a matter of urgency, a directive to the
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, and the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas, to carry out the Leyte operation." [30]
Accordingly, on 8 September, the two commanders were given the
following missions: General MacArthur, after conducting the necessary
preliminary operations, was to take the Leyte-Surigao area on 20
December, with Admiral Nimitz furnishing fleet support and additional
assault shipping. Both commanders were to arrange for co-ordination
of plans and mutual support of operations; to co-ordinate plans with
General Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, United States Army
forces, China, Burma and India, in order to get maximum support from
that theater; and to arrange with General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding
General, Twentieth Air Force, for supporting operations. [31]
Concurrently with the issuance of this directive, momentous events
were taking place in the Pacific. Admiral Halsey was in command of
scheduled operations against the Palau Islands. On 7 and 8 September
aircraft from his carriers struck at Yap and the Palau Islands,
against which Admiral Nimitz had scheduled operations, and for the
next two days bombed Mindanao. On the 12th and 14th the bombers hit
the central Philippines in support of the operations against the
Palau Islands and Morotai.
Admiral Halsey advised Admiral Nimitz that, as a result of the strikes,
few serviceable planes in the Philippines were left to the Japanese,
the bulk of the enemy's oil supplies was destroyed, there was "no
shipping left to sink," the "enemy's non-aggressive attitude [was]
unbelievable and fantastic," and "the area is wide open." [32]
Halsey also told Nimitz that one of his downed carrier pilots had
been told by his Filipino rescuers that there were no Japanese on
Leyte. [33] He therefore felt that it was time to accelerate the
operations in the Pacific, and he strongly recommended that the
intermediate operations--Yap, Talaud, and the Sarangani Bay area on
Mindanao--be canceled. Leyte could be seized immediately and cheaply
without any intermediate operations. Halsey's fleet could cover the
initial landing until land-based aircraft could be established. The
force intended for the occupation of Yap could be made available to
General MacArthur. [34]
When this message was received, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were
attending a conference in Quebec. The recommendations were transmitted
to Quebec by Admiral Nimitz, who offered to place at MacArthur's
disposal the III Amphibious Force, including the XXIV Corps, which
was loading at Pearl Harbor for Yap. General Marshall so informed
General MacArthur and asked his opinion on the proposed change of
target date. [35]
The message reached MacArthur's headquarters at Hollandia, on New
Guinea, while MacArthur was en route to Morotai and observing radio
silence. His chief of staff advised General Marshall that although the
information from the rescued pilot that there were no Japanese on Leyte
was incorrect, the intermediate operations could be eliminated. The
1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division with sufficient
service troops were available for the Leyte operation; adequate air
strength could be provided; the logistic support was practicable;
and the XXIV Corps could be used. [36]
General Marshall received this answer at Quebec on 15 September while
he, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, and General Arnold were at a formal
dinner given by Canadian officers. The Americans withdrew from the
table for a conference. Within an hour and a half after the message
arrived, the Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur and Nimitz to cancel
the three intermediate operations of Yap, Talaud, and Sarangani,
co-ordinate their plans, and invade Leyte on 20 October. [37]
Later that evening, as he was on his way to his quarters after the
dinner, General Marshall received this message: "Subject to completion
of arrangements with Nimitz, we shall execute Leyte operation on 20
October.... MacArthur." [38]
On 3 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General MacArthur
to occupy Luzon on 20 December 1944, the date originally set for
the entrance into Leyte. [39] The decision had been made. General
MacArthur was to return to the Philippine Islands in force.