That the nature of every animal is adapted to the world, and to the
things contained in the world, appears to me to be evident from many
arguments. For every animal thus conspiring [into union and consent],
and having such a colligation of its parts, it follows a series
which is most excellent, and at the same time necessary, through
the attractive flux of the universe about it, which is effective of
the general ornament of the world, and the peculiar permanency of
every thing which it contains. Hence it is called κοσμος _kosmos_,
and is the most perfect of all animals. But in its parts, which
are many, and naturally different, a certain animal excels; both
from its native alliance to the world[16], and from participating
of divinity in a greater degree. [And in the nature, indeed, of
the God who is eternal, the stars called planets are comprehended,
forming the first and the greatest series[17]]. But in the sublunary
region, where bodies move in a right line, the nature of demons has
its subsistence. And in the earth, and with us, the most excellent
nature is man; but the most divine is a king, who surpasses other
men in the common nature: in his tabernacle, indeed, [i.e. in his
body], resembling other men, as being generated from the same matter,
but fashioned from the best of artificers, who fabricated him, by
using himself as the archetype. Hence, in a certain respect, a king
is one and alone; being the production of the supernal king, with
whom he is always familiar: but being beheld by his subjects in his
kingdom as in a splendid light. For a kingdom is judged and proved
to resemble the eagle, the most excellent of winged animals, which
looks undazzled at the sun. And a kingdom is, indeed, analogous
to the sun, because it is divine; and through excess of splendour
cannot be seen without difficulty, except by genuine eyes. For the
numerous splendours which surround it, and the dark vertigos which
it produces in those who survey it, as if they had ascended into a
foreign altitude, evinces that their eyes are spurious. But those who
can fitly arrive thither, on account of their familiarity with, and
alliance to it, are able to use it properly. A kingdom, therefore, is
a thing pure, genuine, uncorrupted, and through transcendency, most
divine; and difficult to be acceded to by man. Hence it is necessary
that he who is established in it should be naturally most pure and
pellucid [in his soul], in order that he may not obscure by his
stains that which is most splendid; as some persons defile the most
sacred places, and the impure pollute those they may happen to meet.
But it is requisite that a king, who associates with men, should
participate of an undefiled nature, and should know how much more
divine both himself and his qualifications are than other things;
and from the exemplars to which he assimilates himself, he should
use both himself and his subjects in the best manner. And to other
men, indeed, if they are delinquents, the most holy purification is
for them to be assimilated to their rulers, whether law or a king
administers their affairs. But kings who cannot find any thing on the
earth to imitate more excellent than their own nature, ought not to
wander any farther in search of a paradigm, but should immediately
become benefited by imitating God. For neither should any one search
for the world, since he exists in, and is a part of it; nor should he
who governs others be ignorant of him by whom he is governed. This,
however, is a most abundant ornament, that nothing [in the universe]
can be found without a ruler.
The manners of a king also ought to be the preceptors of his
government. For thus the beauty of it will immediately shine forth,
since he who imitates God through virtue will be dear to him whom
he imitates; and much more will he be dear to his subjects. For no
one who is beloved by divinity will be hated by men; since neither
do the stars, nor the whole world hate God. For if they hated their
ruler and leader, they would never be obedient to him. But because
he governs properly, mundane affairs are well governed. I therefore,
indeed, apprehend that the terrene king ought not to be deficient in
any one of the virtues which pertain to the celestial king. But as
the former is a certain foreign and external thing, in consequence
of proceeding to men from the heavens; so, likewise, his virtues may
be conceived to be the works of God, and to accede to him through
divinity. And if you consider the thing from the beginning, you
will find what I say to be true. For the terrestrial king obtains
possession of the race of men by a communion, which is the first
and the most necessary of all things. And this race is also the
possession of him who governs every thing in the universe. For it
is impossible that any thing can subsist without friendship and
communion; the truth of which may be easily seen, if the accustomed
communion which exists among citizens is supposed to be destroyed;
since this is much inferior to a divine and royal nature. For
natures of this kind are not oppressed by any such indigence; but,
conformably to intellect, they supply the wants of others, and
afford them assistance in common. For they are perfect in virtue.
But the friendship which is in a city, and which possesses a certain
common end, imitates the concord of the universe. But without the
arrangement of magistrates no city can be inhabited. In order,
however, to effect this arrangement, and to preserve the city,
laws are necessary, and a certain political domination, and also
a governor and the governed. But, the consequence of these things
is, the general good, a certain concinnity, and the consent of the
multitude in conjunction with concordant persuasion. He, likewise,
who governs according to virtue, is called a king, and is so [in
reality]; since he possesses the same friendship and communion with
his subjects as divinity possesses with the world, and the natures
which it contains. All benevolence, however, ought to be exerted; in
the first place, indeed, by the king towards his subjects; but in the
second place, by the subjects towards the king: and this benevolence
should be such as that of a parent towards his child, of a shepherd
towards his flock, and of law towards him who uses it.
For there is one virtue pertaining to the government, and to the life
of men. But no one should through indigence solicit the assistance
of others, when he is able to supply himself with what nature
requires. For though there is a general communion [in the city],
yet every one should so live as to be sufficient to himself; since
he who is sufficient to himself does not appear to require the aid
of any other person in his passage through life. If, therefore, it
is necessary to lead an active life, it is evident that a king,
though he should also assume other things, will, nevertheless, be
sufficient to himself. For he will have friends through his own
virtue; and in using these, he will not use them by any other virtue
than that by which he regulates his own life. For it is necessary
that he should follow a virtue of this kind, since he cannot procure
any thing which is more excellent. And God, indeed, not having
either ministers or servants[18], nor employing any mandate, and
neither crowning nor proclaiming those that are obedient to him, or
disgracing those that are disobedient, thus administers so great
an empire. But as it appears to me exhibiting himself to be most
worthy of imitation, he inserts in all things a vehement desire of
participating his nature. He is, however, good; and the communication
of goodness, and this, with the greatest facility, is his only work.
But those who imitate him[19], accomplish every thing in a better
manner through this imitation. And the imitation of him is to every
thing the source of sufficiency. For there is not one virtue which
makes things to be acceptable to God, and another which imitates
him; [but both these are effected by one and the same virtue].
And is not our terrestrial king in a similar manner sufficient to
himself? For assimilating himself to one, and that the most excellent
nature, he will beneficently endeavour to render all whom he governs
similar to himself. But such as offer violence to, and compel their
subjects, entirely[20] destroy in every individual of the community
a promptitude to imitate [that which is most excellent]. For without
benevolence, it is impossible there can be assimilation; since
benevolence especially destroys every thing of a terrific nature. It
is much to be wished, indeed, that human nature was not in want of
persuasion: for persuasion is the relic of human depravity, of which
this temporary animal [man] is not destitute. Persuasion, indeed, is
a thing proximate to necessity; since this first of itself performs
those things which fly from necessity. Such beings, however, as
spontaneously use what is beautiful and good, are not influenced by
the reverence of persuasion; for neither are they influenced by the
fear of necessity.
Again, a king alone is capable of effecting this good in human
nature, that through the imitation of what is more excellent, man may
pursue what is fit and decorous; and that those who are corrupted
as if by intoxication, and through a bad education have fallen
into an oblivion of that which is more excellent, may through his
eloquence be corroborated, may have their diseased minds healed, and
the oblivion which dwells in them through depravity being expelled,
may have memory for an intimate associate, from which persuasion is
produced. For this, though it originates from depraved seeds, yet is
the source of a certain good to the inhabitants of the terrestrial
region, in which language supplies what is deficient (through the
imbecility of our nature), in our converse with each other.