On the 5th, the command under General Morgan, in person, moved to
Liberty, which the enemy had by this time evacuated. Scouts and pickets
were thrown out, but although the enemy were reported to be still at
Alexandria in large force, there was no collision even with his
videttes. After remaining at Liberty a few hours, General Morgan
withdrew, moving about ten o'clock at night, to Smithville again. He had
no desire to attack the enemy, if in any such force as he was
represented to be, nor was he willing to await an attack in the then
condition of his command. A report, too, had reached him, which turned
out to be unfounded, that McMinnville had been taken, that afternoon, by
another expedition from Murfreesboro'.
We remained at Smithville until the 7th, and then returned to Liberty,
in accordance with orders from General Wheeler, who had reached
Alexandria on the same evening, with Wharton's division. Two or three
days subsequently, General Wheeler proceeded to Lebanon with all of the
troops at his disposal, and sending, thence, five hundred men to La
Vergne, under Lieutenant Colonel Ferril, of the Eighth Texas, to
intercept and capture railroad trains, he moved with the remainder of
his forces to the "Hermitage," on the Nashville and Lebanon pike, twelve
miles from Nashville. Here he left all of his command, except one
regiment, to repel any advance from Nashville--and proceeded with that
regiment and two or three pieces of artillery to the river--distant
about four miles--and fired across it with artillery at a train of cars,
knocking the engine off the track. No movement was made by the enemy
from Nashville, and on the same evening General Wheeler returned to
Lebanon. The next day, the party sent to La Vergne returned also.
Colonel Ferril had captured a train, taking a number of prisoners,
released some men of our division captured at Snow's hill and on their
way to Nashville, and he had gotten, besides, nearly forty thousand
dollars in greenbacks--Quartermaster's funds. This money, General
Wheeler appropriated to buying fresh horses for the men who had captured
it.
General Wheeler remained at Lebanon three days. During that time, the
enemy advanced once from Murfreesboro', but retreated before reaching
our pickets. Upon our return from Lebanon, a portion of the forces,
only, were sent to Alexandria; more than half, under command of General
Wheeler, passed through Rome, to the immediate vicinity of Carthage.
Remaining here during the night, General Wheeler, just at daylight, fell
back toward Alexandria, reaching that place about 1 or 2 P.M. Wharton's
division was again encamped here, and Morgan's division, under my
command, was sent to Liberty, except Smith's regiment which was
stationed near Alexandria.
General Morgan on the night of the 5th, had returned to McMinnville, and
had not since rejoined us. Two or three days after this, the enemy moved
out from Carthage, so far as New Middleton, ten miles from Alexandria,
where General Wheeler attacked them and drove them back to Carthage. On
the 19th or 20th, the enemy advanced upon McMinnville with a strong
force of infantry, cavalry and artillery. There was no cavalry force at
the place at all, except General Morgan's escort (forty or fifty
strong), but there was some ninety infantry, under command of Major
Wickliffe of the Ninth Kentucky infantry, stationed there. After a good
deal of preliminary reconnoitering and some skirmishing with the men of
the escort, the enemy's cavalry dashed into the town, eight abreast,
driving out General Morgan and several officers, who happened to be
collected at McMinnville upon sick leave, or on special duty of some
sort. Among them were Colonel Cluke, Lieutenant Colonel Martin, and
Major McCann. Exchanging a few shots with the cavalry, this party
retreated upon the Sparta road--McCann's horse was shot in the melee
and fell, bringing him to the ground. He sprang to his feet and standing
in front of the charging column, shouted "You have got the old chief at
last," seeking to produce the impression that he was General Morgan and
so favor the latter's escape. He was ridden over, severely sabered, and
captured; but having been placed in an old stable, and allowed a canteen
of apple brandy, he got the guard drunk and dug out under the logs,
during the night, effecting his escape. Lieutenant Colonel Martin
received a bad wound through the lungs, but sat on his horse and
escaped. All of the others escaped uninjured. The infantry retreated, in
perfect order, to the mountains two or three miles distant. The enemy
pursued, but were driven back by the volleys given them whenever they
pressed closely.
When the news of this affair reached General Wheeler's headquarters,
General Wharton urged that the entire force should be withdrawn from
Alexandria and Liberty, and concentrated at Smithville. He believed that
the enemy, in withdrawing from McMinnville, would come by Liberty--the
infantry moving through Mechanicsville, and the cavalry through
Smithville. This route, they might calculate, would remove them from all
danger of molestation by any infantry force sent after them from our
army, and would bring them right upon the flank of our cavalry, which
could annoy their rear if they retreated through Woodbury, but would,
perhaps, be driven off by the movement upon Liberty. Then, a good pike
conducted them to Murfreesboro', and their cavalry, coming on from
Smithville, protected their rear.
A concentration of our whole force at Smithville, would not only make us
secure, but would enable us to punish the cavalry severely, if the
movement was made as Wharton anticipated. We remained, however, in the
same positions, picketing and scouting vigilantly. The enemy moved
exactly as Wharton had foreseen that they would do, and the troops at
Liberty fell back to Alexandria, whence, both divisions retreated across
Caney Fork, to Buffalo valley.
The road by which we moved was a rough and bad one, and the ford at
which we crossed, execrable, making it a tedious affair. A demonstration
was made, on the same day, from Carthage, but too late to interfere with
our retreat. Morgan's division, during these operations, on account of
heavy detachments having been made from it, and pretty heavy straggling,
was very much reduced.
During a week or ten days' stay in Buffalo valley, the stragglers were
collected and the regiments were gotten into pretty good order again.
Cluke's, Chenault's, and Morgan's regiments were still stationed upon
the Cumberland, in Wayne, Clinton and Cumberland counties. The latter
regiment was driven away from Celina, some time in the early part of
May; it had been posted there to protect the collection of commissary
stores for Wheeler's corps. After taking the town of Celina, the Federal
forces burned it and took position along the Cumberland, on the northern
side, confronting our forces on the southern. Pegram's brigade was also
stationed at Monticello, in Wayne county, Kentucky. It was attacked and
driven away on the 28th of May. General Morgan after these affairs
occurred, was ordered to move with his division to Wayne county, and
drive the enemy from the region south of the Cumberland; or if he found
him too strong to be driven, and he manifested an intention (which was
somewhat feared) of pressing into East Tennessee, to at least retard his
advance.
When General Morgan reached Monticello, which the enemy had evacuated
shortly after the affair with Pegram, he found Cluke, with his own
regiment and Chenault's, lying in front of a superior Federal force in
Horseshoe bottom on Greasy creek, in the western end of Wayne county.
Cluke had been skirmishing with them for two or three days. General
Morgan sent couriers to hasten the march of his other regiments--the
Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Kentucky, and Ninth Tennessee, and of his
artillery.
Notwithstanding that the utmost expedition was used, we did not arrive
upon the ground until after 3 P.M., although the order arrived at 9 or
10 A.M. During the day, Cluke and Chenault were fighting with the enemy,
at intervals, neither losing nor gaining ground. When we arrived, these
regiments had almost entirely expended their ammunition, and averaged
but two cartridges per man. The rough road over which we had marched,
and the rapidity with which the march was made, had not only caused the
Artillery to be left far in the rear, but had told severely on the
column. Several horses dropped dead. Many gave out so completely that
they had to be left. The strength of the five regiments was reduced to
eight hundred men, when they arrived upon the field.
One instance of uncommon gallantry, upon the part of a private
soldier--Theodore Bybee of Company C, Second Kentucky--ought to be
related. His horse fell dead beneath him, and he caught the stirrup of a
comrade, and ran thus eight or ten miles to the scene of the fighting.
As soon as we arrived, General Morgan ordered us to form for attack. No
one in the command was familiar with the ground, and the disposition of
the line was made with reference only to what could be seen.
On the left of our position, was a deep ravine, with which the road ran
parallel, and about one hundred yards distant. The whole ground was
covered, in every direction, with thick timber, except for perhaps ten
or fifteen acres directly in front of the line formed by Cluke's and
Chenault's regiments. In this open space, which was an old field and
orchard, and nearly square, was situated a small house. Just on the
other side of it, and in the edge of the woods, the enemy were posted.
The road ran through the center of it, and, immediately after entering
the woods at the northern extremity, turned to the left, crossing the
ravine.
The mistake General Morgan made in supposing that the road continued to
run straight, and thus inducing him to make no inflection of his line on
the right of the road, toward the enemy's left flank, prevented his
capturing a good many prisoners, and perhaps the enemy's artillery.
Cluke's and Chenault's regiments were, together, not more than three
hundred and fifty strong, upon the field. The Fifth Kentucky, and Ninth
Tennessee were formed about one hundred yards in the rear of Cluke and
Chenault, and were placed under command of Colonel Smith. The Third and
Sixth Kentucky, were formed about two hundred yards in the rear of
Colonel Smith's line and a little further to the right. The Second
Kentucky, and Colonel Morgan's regiment, which had also arrived, were
held in reserve, the former on foot, the latter mounted. All of the
horses were placed on the left of the road. Just as these dispositions
were completed, the enemy opened upon us with two pieces of artillery,
which did no damage, except to the horses, several of which were killed.
As no artillery had been used previously, General Morgan thought that
its appearance upon the field betokened the arrival of reinforcements to
the enemy, perhaps in considerable numbers, and he thought, for a
moment, of withdrawing his troops. In this view, every officer about him
at the time, concurred, except Colonel Morgan.
A few seconds of time elapsing, it was demonstrated that before we could
retreat, we would be forced to repulse the enemy. At the roar of the
guns, they came charging across the open ground, yelling like devils, or
rebels. The crash of musketry, for a minute, in the limited space, was
quite heavy. Cluke's line quickly discharged all of its ammunition, and
then gave back before the enemy's determined rush, without, however,
losing its formation, or any of the men turning their faces from the
enemy. These two regiments were exceedingly reliable in battle.
After this line had _backed_ some twenty-five paces, Smith's line came
to its support, and the men in the latter, passing through the intervals
between the files of the former, poured into the faces of the Federals,
at that time almost mingled with the men of Cluke's and Chenault's
regiments, a volley which amazed and sent them back. As our line pressed
after them across the open ground, the artillery, only a short distance
off, told severely on it and continued its fire until our foremost were
close upon the guns.
The enemy made a stand at the point where the road crosses the ravine,
to enable the guns to escape, but the Third and Sixth Kentucky coming
up, they were again driven. So dense was the woods, that pursuit was
almost impossible. Colonel Morgan dashed down the road, but secured only
a few prisoners. The enemy conducted the retreat with the most perfect
coolness. About three hundred yards from the point where the last stand
was made, one company halted and picketed the road, while all the rest
(as we afterward ascertained) continued to rapidly retreat to the river.
Our loss in this skirmish, which lasted about half an hour, was, in the
first brigade, ten killed and sixteen wounded, and in the second five or
six killed and wounded. The enemy lost, I believe, twenty-one killed,
and a smaller number of wounded. His loss was in all, as nearly as I
remember, thirty-one or two. Very few prisoners were taken. General
Morgan, despairing of being able to surround or rush over the enemy, in
the rugged, wooded country, sent a flag of truce, proposing a surrender.
Captain Davis, Assistant Adjutant General of the first brigade (who bore
the flag), was detained until communication could be had with Colonel
Jacobs, who commanded all the United States forces in that immediate
region. Colonel Jacobs was some distance off, on the other side of the
river, and it was growing dark. General Morgan sent another message,
demanding the release of Captain Davis, and declaring his intention of
advancing as soon as that was done. Immediately upon the return of
Captain Davis, the column was moved forward. The pickets saluted the
advance guard with a volley, and gracefully fell back, and although we
pressed on close to the river, we saw nothing more of them. As late as
the close of the war, no answer had been received from Colonel Jacobs,
although that officer was distinguished for his courtesy as well as
gallantry.
The division remained on the line of the Cumberland, picketing from
Stagall's ferry to Celina for nearly three weeks. The headquarters of
the first brigade was at Albany, county seat of Clinton county, that of
the second at Monticello, county seat of Wayne. In that time the ranks
filled up again, nearly all absentees, with or without leave, returning.
The horses were grazed on the rich grass and carefully attended to, and
got in excellent condition again. Several scouting expeditions were
undertaken, during this period, against the enemy on the north side of
the river, the most successful of which were under command of Captain
Davis and Captain Thomas Franks, of the Second Kentucky. Each of these
officers, with two companies, penetrated far into the enemy's lines, and
attacking and routing the forces that they met, with small loss to
themselves, brought off prisoners, horses, and captured property of
various kinds. These expeditions were not only of essential use in
annoying the enemy, but were absolutely necessary to the maintenance of
a proper spirit and energy among our men, whose _morale_ and discipline
were, invariably, sensibly impaired by an indolent and monotonous life.
This period of the history of Morgan's cavalry has been generally
esteemed one of entire inaction, upon the part of both leader and men.
It is true that nothing was done in all this period, which would at all
compare with the dashing, enterprising career of the previous year. But
a great deal of useful, if not brilliant service, was performed, and a
vast deal of hard work was cheerfully gone through with. The public had
become so accustomed to expect "raids" and "dashes" from Morgan, that
they thought his command idle and useless, when engaged in the
performance of regular routine duty. It should be remembered that, at
the very time when Morgan's division was thought to be so inactive, it
was constantly occupied with exactly the kind of service at which the
other cavalry, except Forrest's, were always engaged.
During the winter and spring of 1863, and until nearly the middle of
the summer, our command was guarding and picketing a long front, and
scouting thoroughly a great extent of country besides. For six months
the country about Liberty, Alexandria and Lebanon, and that about
Monticello and Albany, was in a great measure committed to Morgan's
care. This gave him a front of quite one hundred and fifty miles to
watch and guard, and at least half of the time he had to do it
single-handed. Then there was a great portion of Middle Tennessee, and
of Southern, Central and Eastern Kentucky, which his scouts constantly
traversed. It is fair to say that from January to July 1863, inclusive,
the period of the supposed inaction, during which time Morgan made no
"raid," nor achieved any very brilliant success, that in all that time,
our division was as constantly serving, fought and won as many
skirmishes, guarded and scouted as great an extent of country, captured
as many prisoners, and gave the Confederate Government as little trouble
on the subject of supplies, as any other cavalry division in the
Confederate army.
But, in this year, the glory and the _prestige_ began to pass away from
the Southern cavalry. It was not that their opponents became their
superiors in soldiership, any more than in individual prowess. Although
the Federal cavalry had greatly improved, had become formidable for its
enterprise and fighting capacity, it can yet be said that the
Confederate cavalry, when in proper condition, still asserted its
superiority upon every field where there was an equality of forces. But
it was daily becoming more and more difficult to keep the Confederate
cavalry in good condition. An impression prevailed, no doubt a correct
one, that as for the great efforts of war, the infantry was so much more
useful and necessary, a far greater care ought to be taken of it than of
the cavalry; and, then, an idea obtained that, inasmuch as our cavalry
supplied itself so often, and occasionally so well, by its own captures,
it ought to do so all the time. A corollary resulted from these two
propositions, which played the wild with the cavalry, viz: that it was
highly improper to issue anything which the Government had to furnish
to that arm of the service. So it happened that, while to the cavalry
were entrusted the most responsible and important duties, scarcely any
encouragement or assistance was afforded it; and, on the contrary, a
tone and conduct were adopted toward it apparently expressly intended to
disgust it. I speak in reference to Western cavalry and Western affairs
altogether, for I served at no time with the Army of Northern Virginia,
and know nothing of it but the bare outline of its glorious and
unequaled record. Cavalry officers, after long and arduous service, and
a thorough initiation into all the mysteries of their craft, were
rewarded and encouraged by having some staff officer, or officer
educated to shoot heavy artillery, run steamships, or mix chemical
preparations, promoted over their heads; and were expected to be
delighted with him, although he might not practically know whether a
horse-shoe was put on with nails or with hooks and eyes, and whether
pickets were posted to look out for an enemy, or to show
Brigadier-Generals the way to their headquarters when they were lost.
Cavalry which was expected to be constantly engaging the enemy, and upon
whose efficiency and success a vast deal depended, were grudgingly
provided with or altogether denied arms and ammunition, unless they
could be captured from the enemy. Hard and constant as was the service
the cavalryman performed, exposed as he was to the severity of all sorts
of climate, without shelter, and often without the means of building the
fire which stood him in stead of tent, and sometimes had to furnish him
the strength and cheer of the food he lacked, he was yet snubbed
mercilessly, and Generals commanding stared aghast if he presumed to ask
for anything. The infantryman, lying snug and idle in camp, was given
his blanket and his tent, good clothing (if it could possibly be had)
and stout shoes (I speak, of course, in a Confederate sense); all was
done for him to get him in condition for the day of battle; they
fattened him for the sacrifice. But the cavalryman, had it not been for
his own exertions, and the energy with which he indemnified himself for
his Government's neglect of him, would not have been worth killing. When
I reflect upon the privations I have seen the men endure, and remember
that they well knew that there was no escape from them, except by taking
what they wanted wherever they found it; and remember, further, the
chances that were offered, I am lost in astonishment at their honesty
and forbearance. I am aware that our "distant brethren" of the North, or
those, rather, who will be our brethren, it is inferred, when an
amendment to the Constitution decides who and what we are--it is a
matter perfectly well understood that they will concede no such honesty
to us, and naturally enough. It is a stale, but all the more
certain-on-that-account fact, that they have discovered that "the earth
belongs to the saints," and that they "are the saints." Therefore, to
take anything (upon this continent, at least), in any manner, is to rob
the "saints;" and, while a man may pardon a fellow who robs his
neighbor, it is not in reason that he should forgive the rogue who robs
him.
One special cause of the degeneracy of the Southern cavalry, in the
latter part of the war, was the great scarcity of horses and the great
difficulty of obtaining forage within the Confederate lines, and
consequently, of keeping the horses which we had in good condition.
Morgan's men had the reputation, and not unjustly, of procuring horses
with great facility and economy. Adepts as we were, in the art of
"horse-pressing," there was this fact nevertheless to be said in favor
of the system which we adopted: while making very free with the
horse-flesh of the country into which we would raid, there was never any
wanton waste of the article. We did not kill our tired stock, as did the
Federal commanders on their "raids," when we got fresh ones. The men of
our command were not permitted to impress horses in a friendly country.
It is true that horses were sometimes stolen from people who were most
devoted to our cause, and who lived within our lines, but such thefts
did not often occur, and the perpetrators were severely punished. The
witty editors of Yankee-land would doubtless have explained our rebuke
of this practice, by an application of the old saying that "there is
honor among thieves," which would have been very just and apposite. The
difference between our thieves and those on the other side was, that the
latter were entirely destitute of every sort of honor. General Morgan
took fresh horses to enable his command to make the tremendous marches
which ensured so much of his success, and to prevent his men from
falling into the hands of the enemy, but he hedged around the practice
with limitations which somewhat protected the citizen. He required that,
in every instance where a man desired to exchange his tired horse for a
fresh one, he should have his horse inspected by his company commander,
who should certify to the condition of the horse and the necessity of
the exchange. If the company commander certified that his horse was
unfit for service, the man obtained from his regimental commander
permission to obtain a fresh one, which had also, before it was valid,
to be approved by the brigade commander. Whenever it was practicable,
the exchange was required to be made in the presence of a commissioned
officer, and, in every case, a horse, if the soldier had it, was ordered
to be left in the place of the one impressed. When a man was without a
horse, altogether, his company commander could impress one for him. No
doubt, this seems to the unmilitary reader, only systematic robbery--but
is not _that_ going on all the time, all over the world? Is it not, too,
a great comfort to the citizen, to know that (when he is robbed), there
are laws and the "proper papers" for it!
When men or officers were detected with led horses, they were punished,
and the horses were taken away from them, unless they could prove that
they were entitled to them. Morgan's men were habitually styled
"horse-thieves" by their enemies, and they did not disclaim the title--I
should like to see a statistical report showing the number of horses
stolen in Kentucky by the respective belligerents--we would lose some
laurels. The Confederate Government could not, and did not attempt to
supply the cavalry of its armies with horses. The cavalry soldier
furnished his own horse, and (if he lost him), had to make the best
shift he could for another. The cavalryman was not subjected to the
rigid discipline of the infantryman, for the reason that he was harder
to catch. It is more difficult to regulate six legs than two. For the
very reason that it was outside of the pale of regular discipline and
the highest military civilization, it was more necessary to give to the
cavalry officers who practically understood that sort of service, as
well as were men of controlling character. Such men could make of the
cavalryman, a soldier--with an inferior officer or one who was awkward
at cavalry business over him, he became an Ishmael.
There existed among the infantry, not exactly a prejudice against
cavalry (for they all wanted to join it), but that sort of feeling
against it, which is perhaps natural upon the part of the man who walks
against the man who rides. When the "web-feet" called us "buttermilk
rangers," we did not get angry with them, for we knew that they were
gallant fellows and that much walking tries the temper--but we did not
admire the official prejudice against us, and thought an affected
contempt of our arm in very bad taste, upon the part of Generals who not
only never won battles but who never tried to win them.
In the spring and summer of 1863, supplies could be obtained for neither
men nor horses of the cavalry of Bragg's army, without the greatest
difficulty and great oppression of the citizens. It was not the custom
to issue (out of army supplies), rations to the men, or forage to the
horses of the cavalry commands--they were required to provide for
themselves in these respects. It was impracticable, too, to supply them
from the stores collected for army use. Certain regions, therefore, in
which, for the proper protection of the lines, it was absolutely
necessary to keep large bodies of cavalry--sections of country not
fertile and at no time abounding in supplies--were literally stripped of
meat, grain and every thing edible. All that would feed man or horse
disappeared, as if a cloud of Titanic and omniverous locusts had
settled upon the land--and after the citizens were reduced to the
extremity of destitution and distress, the soldiers and their horses
suffered, also, with slow famine.
One instance of the kind will serve to show how destructive of the
efficiency of cavalry was service under such circumstances. When the
division was ordered to Wayne and Clinton counties, Kentucky, the Ninth
Kentucky, one of the best regiments in the cavalry of the West, was sent
to Woodbury to picket that immediate section of country. For many miles
around this little place, the country had been exhausted of provisions
and forage by the constant requisition upon it during the winter and
spring. The men of the Ninth Kentucky suffered severely for want of
rations, but they esteemed their own sufferings lightly, compared with
those of their horses. Long forage (oats, fodder, etc.) could not be
procured at all; and corn had to be hauled a distance of over thirty
miles, from a region whence other cavalry commands were also drawing
supplies of forage, or else it could only be gotten from Tullahoma out
of the forage stored there for army consumption. Consequently, corn was
rare at that time at Woodbury; two or three ears per day to each horse
was the usual issue. Upon some days none was issued. Every blade of
grass in the vicinity of the camp was eaten, and the trees were barked
by the poor animals as high as they could reach.
The men stood picket on foot; all of the stock was rendered utterly
unserviceable, and one fourth of it died. By such usage (necessary,
however,) this regiment was made unfit for active and efficient service
for months, and its discipline and morale were seriously, although only
temporarily, impaired. More than half--at any rate, a large proportion
of the cavalry of General Bragg's army were suffering, at that time,
precisely as this regiment was. In this condition of things is to be
found the explanation of the apparent degeneracy of the Confederate
cavalry, in the latter part of the war.
Another fact, too, should not be lost sight of. In common with every
other arm of the service, our cavalry became very greatly reduced in
numbers as the war wore on. We could not fill up our regiments as easily
as the Federals could fill their wasted organizations. Those who wonder
why well known Confederate regiments, brigades, and divisions did not
accomplish as much in the latter as in the early part of the war, do not
know, or do not reflect, that it was because they were reduced to a
fourth or a fifth of their original strength. This, however, was not the
case at the period of which I write. It was, too, in the summer of 1863
that serious doubt of the successful establishment of Southern
independence began to gain ground among the masses of the Southern
people; and a lukewarmness first, and next a feeling almost of
disaffection to the Confederate Government and cause widely prevailed.
This indifference was very unlike the strange absence of anxiety and
solicitude about the result of the war, which characterized its early
stages. The latter feeling proceeded from a blind and overweening
confidence, and those who entertained it were not the less intensely
patriotic and devoted to the cause. Nor was this species of
disaffection, which began to influence so many, characterized by the
slightest tendency toward treachery or renegadeism. Hundreds of
citizens, who were fiercely opposed to the administration, and cordially
disliked Mr. Davis, who had even lost much of their interest in the
Confederate army and its fortunes, nevertheless hated the Northern
people, the Federal Government, and the invading army, with a hatred
immeasureably more thorough, rabid, and ineradicable, than at the
beginning of the war, ere they knew practically what invasion was like.
With a strange inconsistency, these men would have done any thing to
have injured the enemy, even when averse to making further sacrifices
for the benefit of the Confederacy. So far from renegading and pandering
to Federal rule and success, the large majority of this class would have
pawned their souls for power to crush the Federal arms. This is why the
Southern renegade is regarded by the Southern people with loathing,
scorn, and hatred, burning and inextinguishable. Although destitution
and suffering were not general, at this time, in the South, they had
prevailed, and to a fearful extent, in many sections; and everywhere a
solemn and well-founded apprehension was felt upon the subject. Still it
took two years more of disaster--of an invasion which probed every nook
and corner of the South, and a condition of almost famine, to finally
break the spirit of the Southern people, and make them, in the
abjectness of their agony, actually welcome a peace which heralded
subjugation as a relief from the horrors of war. It was the submission
of the people which took the steel out of the army.
It is the fashion, with a certain class of Southern writers, to denounce
Mr. Davis as the author of this condition of things, and to revile the
Southern people because of their ultimate despair and surrender. Many
and great blunders were committed in the conduct of the civil and
military affairs of the Confederacy, and doubtless Mr. Davis was
responsible for some of them.
In an affair of such magnitude, as was the Southern movement and the
consequent war, errors would have characterized, in all probability, the
administration of the most practiced and skillful military and political
chiefs--how then could the administration of men, unschooled in the
practical arts of managing revolutions and wars, be free from them? The
wonder is, not that blunders were made, but that the bad effect of so
many was partially repaired. The faults, which marred our fortunes, were
the natural concomitants of a state of prolonged and constant warfare,
and the latter weakening of our people was the inevitable result of a
struggle against adverse circumstances and superior numbers and
resources. The only way to have lessened the number of the former, and
to have prevented the latter, would have been to fight, not a waiting,
but a quick war.
On the 26th, the division was ordered back to Liberty and Alexandria.
That country had been occupied and picketed, just before our return
from Albany and Monticello, by a brigade of Wharton's division,
commanded by Colonel (afterward Brigadier General) Harrison, of the
Eighth Texas, a gallant and highly esteemed officer. Breckinridge's
regiment (the Ninth Kentucky) was still kept at Woodbury. About this
time Colonel A.R. Johnson returned from Texas, and was immediately
assigned, by General Morgan, to the command of the second brigade--his
rank entitled him to be second in command. This brigade had been ably
commanded, since Gano's absence, by Cluke. Colonel Johnson retained none
of the former brigade staff, except Lieutenant Sidney Cunningham, a
brave and efficient officer, who was afterward Lieutenant Colonel of the
Fifteenth Kentucky. The effective strength of the division, at this
time, was twenty-eight hundred men. The horses were in better condition,
and the men were better provided for in every respect, than at any
period since the "December raid." New and excellent clothing had been
issued them while on the Cumberland--a thing unprecedented in the
history of the command--and their general equipment was much superior to
what it had been at the close of the winter. All were well armed, and
with the kind of guns which were always preferred in Morgan's cavalry.
The Second Kentucky had managed to get rid of a great many guns, during
the latter part of the winter and early part of the spring. The men of
this regiment were styled by General Morgan his "Regulars," on account
of their veteranship and proficiency in drill, etc., and, yet,
notwithstanding its excellent reputation, this unsoldierly practice of
losing and throwing away guns, had prevailed to such an extent in the
regiment, that, at one time, nearly one half of its members were
unarmed. The men did not seem to do it, to escape duty, or going into
battle, for they all remained in camp and answered to the bugle--it
seemed to be a fashion which they had suddenly adopted. This practice is
one of the few, for which officers, inclined to be lenient in most
particulars, may well be willing to have their men shot. Except that I
have seen it prevail, at times, among troops of unquestionable bravery
and fidelity, I would say that the most cowardly and treacherous spirit
induces it. The Second Kentucky was a regiment which never had its
superior--it possessed, not only courage and steadiness, but the highest
"dash" and inflexible constancy, and yet, at one period, the practice
which has been mentioned, prevailed in it to an extraordinary extent.
Major Webber, commanding it at the time, made every man lacking a gun,
after punishment in other ways, carry a heavy fence rail upon his
shoulder, until he procured an Enfield or Springfield rifle. The
facility with which the men found the required arms at the country
houses, induced a suspicion that many of them had previously deposited
the same guns where they subsequently got them. They were also
threatened with being left behind on the next expedition to Kentucky,
and with being sent to the infantry, if they did not speedily arm
themselves, both of which intimations had an excellent effect.
The first brigade made headquarters at Alexandria. The regiments
composing it, and Morgan's regiment (ordered to temporarily report to
it) were encamped on the Lebanon pike, and the roads to Carthage and
Statesville. The second brigade, with its headquarters at Auburn, was
disposed upon the road to Murfreesboro', and between Auburn and
Statesville. One regiment was posted at Statesville, which little place
was nearly equi-distant from Auburn and Alexandria. The country around
was picketed and scouted thoroughly in every direction, and the
disposition of the regiments gave us such command of all the roads, that
we could have concentrated without difficulty, and as the exigency might
require, at Auburn, Alexandria, or Liberty. The period that we remained
here was passed in assiduous and diligent instruction of the troops.
Drills, dress-parades, inspections, etc., were constantly had--we had
never before had so much time for those duties, when the division was so
nearly concentrated. The strictest vigilance was maintained in our
camps, to prevent the passage through them of Federal spies, who, at
this period and at this quarter of our lines, were unusually numerous,
cunning, and audacious. The strict guard and watch maintained to
frustrate and detect these parties, operated favorably upon our own men,
who were necessarily restricted, by the unusual precautions adopted, of
much of the liberty they had previously enjoyed. The division was,
perhaps, never in as high and salutary a state of discipline as at this
time.
The enemy came near us but once during this, our last sojourn in this
country. Colonel Morgan had been sent to Baird's mill, and returning,
halted all night at Lebanon. The enemy advanced upon him at Lebanon, and
as he fell back slowly toward Alexandria, followed him. I reinforced him
with the Second Kentucky, and believing that it was a large force,
formed my brigade in front of Alexandria, and requested Colonel Johnson
to reinforce me with his brigade. He immediately set out to do so,
leaving pickets to watch the Murfreesboro' pike. While we were awaiting
his arrival, Colonel Morgan, Major Brent, (whom I should have stated was
with him, in command of a small detachment of the Fifth Kentucky), and a
portion of the Second Kentucky under Captain Franks, were skirmishing
with the enemy, who continued slowly but steadily to advance, until
reaching a locality called Watertown, he halted. Nothing had been
learned definitely of his strength, but we believed it to be large,
simply because every force previously sent against us, in this quarter,
had greatly outnumbered us. When Colonel Johnson arrived (about 1 P.M.,)
we at once moved forward to attack, but had proceeded only a short
distance, when Colonel Morgan reported that the enemy were again in
motion, pressing briskly upon him, and apparently determined to fight.
This information induced me to return to the position I had just
left--an admirable one, both to receive and return an attack--it was
about three quarters of a mile to the rear of the head of the column,
which had not yet gotten clear of it. This was a mistake greatly to be
regretted, and prevented the fight. The enemy came within a mile of the
position, maneuvered a little while, and fell back. By this time it was
getting late. We followed him with two companies and two pieces of
artillery, skirmished with and shelled him.
That night, while we still doubted their strength and intentions--they
went off entirely. I learned, then, that they were not more than
eighteen hundred strong, while we were at least twenty-five hundred.
This affair would not be worth mentioning, except that it illustrated
how a lack of enterprise, and a too great fancy for "good positions"
will sometimes prevent excellent opportunities from being improved. If I
had attacked, promptly, the whole force, in all likelihood, would have
been captured. The enemy for some reason conceived a very exaggerated
idea of our strength. Shortly after this, it was reported in
Murfreesboro', if the papers we captured spoke truth, that Wheeler's
entire corps and some infantry were stationed at Alexandria and Liberty,
harvesting the magnificent wheat crop, with which the adjacent country
teemed.
On the 10th of June, General Morgan arrived at Alexandria, and orders
were at once issued to prepare the division to march on the next day. It
soon became known to all the officers at least, that he was about to
undertake an expedition which he had long contemplated, and which he had
often solicited permission to make. This was the greatest of all his
"raids," the one known as the "Ohio raid." Although it resulted
disastrously to his own command, it had a great influence upon the
pending campaign between Bragg and Rosecrans, and greatly assisted the
former. It was beyond all comparison the grandest enterprise he ever
planned, and the one which did most honor to his genius.
The military situation in Tennessee, at that time, may be briefly
described:
General Bragg's army lay around Tullahoma, his cavalry covering his
front and stretching far out upon both wings. General Buckner was in
East Tennessee, with a force entirely inadequate to the defense of that
important region. General Bragg, confronted by Rosecrans with a vastly
superior force, dared not detach troops to strengthen Buckner. The
latter could not still further weaken his small force by sending aid to
General Bragg--if the latter should need it. General Burnside was
preparing (in Kentucky), a force, variously estimated, at from fifteen
to more than thirty thousand men, for the invasion of East Tennessee.
With this force he could easily drive out Buckner. It was estimated that
at various points in Southern Kentucky, Bowlinggreen, Glasgow, and along
the Cumberland river--and at Carthage in Tennessee, and other points in
that vicinity, there were from eight to twelve thousand Federal
troops--the greater part of them under the command of a General Judah,
whose headquarters were at Glasgow. Of these forces, some five thousand
were excellent cavalry. General Judah's official papers (captured on the
Ohio raid), gave the exact strength of his forces, but I have forgotten
it.
There was perfect unanimity of opinion (among the Confederate officers),
about the plan and method of the anticipated Federal movement. Rosecrans
(all believed), would press hard upon General Bragg--Burnside,
simultaneously, or as soon afterward as was practicable, would move
against Buckner. Judah's force could be used to keep open direct
communication between these two armies, and also as a reserve. When the
advance was fairly inaugurated, Judah, who in the meantime might guard
against the raids of our cavalry, could be concentrated and moved
through Burkesville, Livingston and Sparta--turning then, if General
Bragg staid to fight, upon the right flank of the army at Tallahoma--or,
if General Bragg retreated, pressing down through the Sequatchie valley
to Chattanooga. A junction of all these forces, it was thought, would be
made, and the Confederate army would then confront a host too formidable
to be beaten.
This was the belief which prevailed in our army regarding the intentions
of the enemy. It may have been incorrect--the feature, which we of
Morgan's cavalry especially dwelt upon, to-wit, the part, in the
supposed programme, to be played by Judah, may have been altogether
uncontemplated--perhaps he was not a man capable of having executed it.
But whatever may have been the Federal plan of the campaign, it is
certain that terrible dangers menaced the army of General Bragg, and all
the salient points of his department.
General Bragg regarded the peril with just apprehension--he took in its
full proportions. He decided and (as was conceded by all who understood
the situation), with good and sufficient reasons, to retreat beyond the
Tennessee river, and then somewhere near Chattanooga, turning upon his
foes, fight the battle which had to be delivered for the protection of
his department. But that retreat would be very hazardous. He was right
in the path of the avalanche, and the least movement upon his part might
precipitate it upon him. The difficulty and danger of crossing the
Tennessee, with Rosecrans hard upon his rear, would be greatly
augmented, if these other Federal forces were poured down upon his
flank.
General Bragg, it may be repeated, knew how to use, and invariably used,
his cavalry to good purpose, and in this emergency he resolved to employ
some of it to divert from his own hazardous movement, and fasten upon
some other quarter, the attention of a portion of the opposing forces.
He hoped, not only to give them enough to do, to prevent them from
annoying and endangering his retreat, but, also, to draw off a part of
their forces from the great battle which he expected to fight. He
selected Morgan as the officer who should accomplish this design.
In the conference between them, General Morgan expressed a perfect
confidence in his ability to effect all that was desired of him, but
dissented from General Bragg in one important particular. The latter
wished him to confine himself to Kentucky--giving him _carte blanche_ to
go wherever he pleased in that State, and urging him to attempt the
capture of Louisville. General Morgan declared, that, while he could by
a dash into Kentucky and a march through that State, protect General
Bragg's withdrawal from the position his army then held, he could not
thus accomplish the other equally important feature of the plan, and
draw off troops which would otherwise strengthen Rosecrans for the
decisive battle.
A raid into Kentucky would keep Judah busy, and hold Burnside fast until
it was decided, but, he contended it would be decided very soon, and he
would be driven out or cut to pieces in a few days, leaving the Federal
forces so disposed that they could readily commence their previously
determined operations. A raid into Indiana and Ohio, on the contrary, he
contended, would draw all the troops in Kentucky after him, and keep
them employed for weeks. Although there might be sound military reasons
why Judah and Burnside should not follow him, but should stick to what
the Confederate officers deemed the original programme of Rosecrans,
General Morgan urged, that the scare and the clamor in the States he
proposed to invade, would be so great, that the military leaders and the
administration would be compelled to furnish the troops that would be
called for. He thought that, even if he lost his command, he could
greatly benefit General Bragg by crossing the Ohio river and only in
that way.
General Bragg refused him permission to make the raid as he desired to
make it and ordered him to confine himself to Kentucky. I was not
present at the interview between them, but General Morgan told me that
General Bragg had ordered him to operate in Kentucky, and further stated
that he intended, notwithstanding his orders, to cross the Ohio. I do
not mean to justify his disobedience of orders, but simply to narrate
the facts as I learned them, and to explain General Morgan's ideas
regarding the movement, which were definite and fixed. This expedition
into the Northwestern States had long been a favorite idea with him and
was but the practical development of his theory of the proper way to
make war, to-wit: by going deep into the country of the enemy. He had
for several weeks foreseen the necessity of some such diversion in
General Bragg's behalf, and believed that the period for the
accomplishment of his great desire was at hand.
He had ordered me, three weeks previously, to send intelligent men to
examine the fords of the upper Ohio--that at Buffington among them--and
it is a fact, of which others, as well as myself, are cognizant, that he
intended--long before he crossed the Ohio--to make no effort to recross
it, except at some of these fords, unless he found it more expedient,
when he reached that region, to join General Lee, if the latter should
still be in Pennsylvania.
Never had I been so impressed with General Morgan's remarkable
genius--his wonderful faculty of anticipating the exact effect his
action would have upon all other men and of calculating their
action--his singular power of arriving at a correct estimate of the
nature and capacities of a country, which he knew only by maps and the
most general description--and the perfect accuracy with which he could
foretell the main incidents of a march and campaign--as when he would
briefly sketch his plan of that raid. All who heard him felt that he was
right in the main, and although some of us were filled with a grave
apprehension, from the first, we felt an inconsistent confidence when
listening to him. He did not disguise from himself the great dangers he
encountered, but was sanguine of success. As it turned out, only the
unprecedented rise in the Ohio caused his capture--he had avoided or had
cut his way through all other dangers.
On the 11th of June, the division marched from Alexandria to the
Cumberland and crossed the river not far from the little town of Rome.
General Morgan desired to attack the Federal force stationed at
Carthage, and strongly fortified. General Bragg had authorized him to do
so.
The division encamped two or three miles from the northern bank of the
river, and not far from the turnpike which runs from Carthage to
Hartsville. Information had been received that the mail passed on this
road twice or three times a week, guarded by a small escort, and that
comfortably lined sutlers' wagons sometimes accompanied the cavalcade
for the benefit of the protection the escort afforded. Colonel Ward was
sent, with two or three companies of his regiment, to a point on the
pike some eight miles from Carthage, and two or three from our
encampment. He reached it just before sundown, and shortly afterward the
mail train, accompanied by several sutlers' wagons, and under charge of
an escort eighty or a hundred strong, came by, no one apparently
suspecting the slightest danger, and all keeping careless watch. When
the procession came opposite to where Colonel Ward had posted his men
(some seventy yards from the road), the Colonel gave the order to fire
in a loud voice. At the unexpected command, which so suddenly indicated
danger, mail-carriers, sutlers, and guard halted in amazement, and when
the answering volley broke upon them, they went in every direction in
the wildest confusion. Not a shot was fired in return, but the escort
manifested plainly that it felt a very inferior degree of interest in
the integrity of postal affairs.
Few prisoners were taken, but the mail and the wagons were secured. In
one of the latter, a corpulent sutler was found, wedged in a corner, and
much alarmed. He was past speaking when drawn out, but faintly signed
that a bottle he had in his pocket should be placed to his lips.
That evening a staff officer arrived from General Bragg with orders to
General Morgan. He was instructed to make no attack upon Carthage, but
to march as rapidly as possible to Monticello, and strive to intercept a
Federal raiding party which had broken into East Tennessee, under
Brigadier General Saunders, and was threatening Knoxville. Upon the next
morning, consequently, we recrossed the Cumberland and marched in the
direction ordered. After passing through Gainesboro', we got into a very
rugged country and upon the very worst roads. At Livingston we were
overtaken by a tremendous rain, which lasted for two or three days, and
rendered the road almost impassable for artillery. This retarded our
march very greatly, and we arrived at Albany three days later than we
would otherwise have done, to learn that the enemy had already passed
out of East Tennessee by way of Jamestown.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING ROUTE TAKEN BY GEN. MORGAN THROUGH Kentucky
and Indiana JULY, 1863.]
The second brigade was encamped in Turkey-neck Bend of the Cumberland
river, some fifteen miles in direct line from Burkesville. The first
brigade was encamped along the river, from a point opposite Burkesville
to Irish Bottom. The division remained here for three or four days,
awaiting the return of General Morgan, who had left us at the recrossing
of the Cumberland to go to McMinnville and hurry forward some supplies
and ammunition. These stores were hauled to our camp in six wagons,
which had nearly not gotten to us at all. The heavy rains which had so
retarded the march of the division to Albany, had made the roads which
these wagons had traveled perfect quagmires. When they reached the Obie
and Wolf rivers, which are six miles apart at the points where the road
from Sparta to Monticello crosses them, they met with a very
discouraging sight. These little rushing mountain streams were much
swollen and too deep for any kind of fording. General Morgan instructed
his Acting Inspector, Captain D.R. Williams, an officer of great energy,
to have the wagons taken to pieces, and stowed, with their contents, in
canoes, and so ferried across. In this manner, all were crossed in a
single night. The mules were made to swim.
On the 2nd of July, the crossing of the Cumberland began, the first
brigade crossing at Burkesville and Scott's ferry, two miles above, and
the second crossing at Turkey-neck Bend. The river was out of its banks,
and running like a mill-race. The first brigade had, with which to cross
the men and their accouterments, and artillery, only two crazy little
flats, that seemed ready to sink under the weight of a single man, and
two or three canoes. Colonel Johnson was not even so well provided. The
horses were made to swim.
Just twelve miles distant upon the other side, at Marrowbone, lay
Judah's cavalry, which had moved to that point from Glasgow, in
anticipation of some such movement upon Morgan's part as he was now
making. Our entire strength was twenty-four hundred and sixty effective
men--the first brigade numbering fourteen hundred and sixty, the second
one thousand. This, however, was exclusive of artillery, of which we had
four pieces--a section of three-inch Parrots attached to the first
brigade, and a section of twelve-pound howitzers attached to the second.
Videttes, posted at intervals along the river bank, would have given
General Judah timely information of this bold crossing, and he would
have been enabled to strike and crush or capture the whole force. But he
depended on the swollen river to deter Morgan, forgetting that Morgan
invariably did that which was least expected of him. As soon as the
latter learned of the strange supineness and lack of vigilance of his
foe, he commenced and hastened the work of crossing the river. About two
or three P.M., the enemy began to threaten both brigades, but did not
advance with determination. The Sixth Kentucky and Ninth Tennessee had
all been gotten across at Burkesville by this time, and portions of the
other regiments were also across, as well as two pieces of artillery.
General Morgan formed this entire force, and led it to attack the enemy
threatening Burkesville. He placed a portion of it in ambush at a point
about a mile from the town, and, when the head of the enemy's column
approached, fired such a volley into it as made it at once recoil. Then
charging, he drove the enemy back in confusion and at full speed, never
letting them halt until they reached the encampment at Marrowbone. He
pursued the force which he had routed into the camp, but was repulsed in
an attack upon the latter by the artillery and reserve forces there.
The effect of this bold dash, was to draw back the force threatening
Johnson, also, and allow him to cross without molestation. Our loss was
very slight--among other gallant fellows who were hurt, Captain Quirk
was so severely wounded in the arm that he could go no further upon the
expedition. Several prisoners were taken. The enemy, after this hint
not to interfere, remained shut up in his encampment until we were no
longer in any danger.
The division encamped that night about ten miles from the river, on the
road to Columbia. A large party of Commissaries of Subsistence were with
us, sent by General Bragg to collect supplies north of the Cumberland
and bring them to Tullahoma, escorted by one of Morgan's regiments. A
variety of causes conspired to prevent these gentlemen from returning at
the time, and in the manner contemplated by General Bragg. In the first
place, we learned, immediately after we had crossed the Cumberland, by
men who came from the rear, that General Bragg had already commenced his
retreat--this would considerably lengthen the distance which the
Commissaries would have to drive their cattle. Secondly, General Morgan
came to the conclusion that he had use for all of his troops, and that
he would not detach the regiment which was to have guarded the cattle.
This resolution not only prevented the cattle from being driven to
General Bragg, but also decided the Commissaries not to return
immediately. The country through which they would have had to pass, was
infested by a set of bushwhackers, in comparison with whose relentless
ferocity, that of Bluebeard and the Welch giants sinks into
insignificance. Chief among them was "Tinker Dave Beattie," the great
opponent of Champ Ferguson. This patriarchal old man lived in a cove, or
valley surrounded by high hills, at the back of which was a narrow path
leading to the mountain. Here, surrounded by his clan, he led a
pastoral, simple life, which must have been very fascinating, for many
who ventured into the cove never came away again. Sometimes Champ
Ferguson, with his band, would enter the cove, harry old Dave's stock
and goods, and drive him to his retreat in the mountain, to which no man
ever followed him. Then, again, when he was strong enough, he would lead
his henchmen against Champ, and slay all who did not escape. But it must
not be understood that he confined his hostility to Captain Ferguson and
the latter's men: on the contrary, he could have had, had he so chosen,
as many scalps drying in his cabin as ever rattled in the lodge of a
Camanche war-chief, and taken with promiscuous impartiality. There were
not related of Beattie so many stories, illustrative of his personal
strength and bull-dog courage, as of Champ Ferguson. I have heard of the
latter having gone, on one occasion, into a room where two of his bitter
enemies lay before the fire, both strong men and armed, and, throwing
himself upon them, he killed both (after a hard struggle) with his
knife. But Beattie possessed a cunning and subtlety which the other, in
great measure, lacked. Perhaps he was more nearly civilized. Both of
these men were known to have spared life on some rare occasions, and
perhaps none were so much astonished, thereat, as themselves. On one
occasion, Ferguson was called upon to express an opinion regarding the
character of a man who had been arrested near a spot where bushwhackers
had just fired upon the party he (Ferguson) was with, and, from several
suspicious indications, this man was thought to be one of them. By way
of giving him a chance, it was decided that Ferguson, who knew every man
in that country, should declare his doom, influenced by his previous
knowledge of him. Ferguson, somewhat to the astonishment of the
tribunal, begged that he should be released, saying, that he knew he was
a Union man, but did not believe that he was a bushwhacker. The man was
released. Subsequently, Ferguson said, after a long fit of silence, "I
have a great notion to go back and hunt that man. I am afraid I have
done wrong, for he is the best shot in this part of the State, and, if
he does turn bushwhacker, he will kill a man at every shot." Such
extreme nicety of conscience was not attributed to Beattie, nor was he
said to be as faithful to his friends as was Ferguson.
Such were the kind of men whom our friends, of the Subsistence
Department, would have had to encounter, if they had gone back. There
were, at the time, no Confederate troops in that country, and Champ
Ferguson was resting in inglorious ease at Sparta. Dave Beattie had
broken out of his cove, and was ready to hold "bloody assizes" as soon
as he secured his victims. Our friends were not accustomed to "raiding"
and to cavalry habits, but, after thorough reflection, they resolved,
with a heroism that would have done honor to the heavy artillery
service, not to return, but to face all the hardships and dangers of the
expedition. They were gallant men, and endured the tremendous fatigue,
and shared the hardships as cheerfully as if they had come legitimately
by them.
The chief of this party, Major Highley (from Mobile), was as full of
dash and as fond of adventure, as a man could be. He sought the front on
all occasions, and soon became a thorough cavalryman in all respects.
General Morgan placed him upon his staff and he proved a very efficient
officer, and seemed much gratified that his commissaries had been cut
off.
There was one case of almost abduction, however, which excited universal
regret and commiseration:
An old gentleman, from Sparta, had come with the division to Burkesville
to get a barrel of salt--as there was none to be had at Sparta. His
benevolent virtues had endeared him to all who knew him, and, so, when
it became apparent that he must go back, leaving behind him his
purchase, and at the risk of fearful dangers, or follow us through the
whole raid, he received much and unaffected condolence. He perfectly
realized his situation. He knew that, if he fell into "Tinker Dave's"
hands, he would be pickled without salt, and he had not the slightest
idea of trying it on. And yet he felt a natural sorrow at going so far
away from home. Some two weeks later, when we were in Ohio, and being
peppered by the militia, he said to an officer of the first brigade with
tears in his eyes, and a touching pathos in his voice: "Captain, I would
give my farm in White county, Tennessee, and all the salt in Kentucky
(if I had it), to stand once more--safe and sound--on the banks of the
Calf-killer creek."
On the morning of the 3rd, the division resumed its march, pushing on to
Columbia. Colonel Morgan's regiment, although included in the field
return of the first brigade, was detached and used as an advance-guard
for the column. In the afternoon, as we neared Columbia, this regiment
came upon the enemy moving out from the town. In the skirmish which
ensued, Colonel Morgan lost a few wounded--among the number Captain J.T.
Cassell, who was shot in the thigh as he was charging with his
accustomed gallantry. He was placed in an ambulance and went, in that
way, through the raid, and escaped capture. Captain Cassell had been
ordered to report to Colonel Morgan with his Company, a few weeks
previously, and was acting as second in command of the advance-guard.
Captain Franks of the Second Kentucky was ordered to report to Colonel
Morgan, to fill the position left vacant by the disabling of Captain
Cassell. After this skirmish had lasted a short time, the Second
Kentucky was ordered up to support Colonel Morgan. Major Webber
dismounted his men and attacked with great vigor. The enemy did not
stand a moment--were driven back into the town, fought a short time from
the houses, and were soon dislodged and driven pell-mell out of the
town. Major Webber lost two men killed. The enemy's loss was also
slight. It was a detachment of Woolford's regiment, and retreated toward
Jimtown. Some disgraceful scenes occurred in Columbia as the troops were
passing through. One or two stores were broken into and plundered.
General Morgan immediately went to the spot, arrested the marauders,
punished them, and compelled the restitution of the goods.
On that evening the division encamped six or eight miles from Columbia.
A regiment of Federal infantry was stationed at Green river bridge,
where the road from Columbia to Campbellsville and Lebanon crosses the
Green river. General Morgan sent Captain Franks to watch them, who
reported that, during the entire night, he heard the ringing of axes and
the crash of falling timber. The next morning we learned what it meant.
Early on the 4th the column was put in motion, and the second brigade
(marching in front), soon came upon the enemy. Colonel Moore, the
officer commanding the Federal force (a Michigan regiment), had selected
the strongest natural position, I ever saw, and had fortified it with a
skill equal to his judgment in the selection. The Green river makes here
a tremendous and sweeping bend, not unlike in its shape to the bowl of
an immense spoon. The bridge is located at the tip of the bowl, and
about a mile and a half to the southward, where the river returns so
nearly to itself that the peninsula (at this point) is not more than one
hundred yards wide--at what, in short, may be termed the insertion of
the handle--Colonel Moore had constructed an earthwork, crossing the
narrow neck of land, and protected in front by an abattis. The road upon
which we were advancing, runs through this position. The peninsula
widens again, abruptly, to the southward of this extremely narrow neck,
and just in front of the skirt of woods, in which the work and abattis
was situated, is an open glade, about two hundred yards in extent in
every direction. Just in front of, or south of this plateau of cleared
ground, runs a ravine deep and rugged, rendering access to it difficult,
except by the road. The road runs not directly through, but to the left
of this cleared place. All around it are thick woods, and upon the east
and west the river banks are as steep and impassable as precipices. At
the southern extremity of the open ground, and facing and commanding the
road, a rifle-pit had been dug, about one hundred and twenty feet
long--capable of containing fifty or sixty men, and about that number
were posted in it. When Colonel Johnson's brigade neared the enemy, he
sent Cluke with his own regiment and the Tenth Kentucky, then greatly
reduced in numbers, to cross the river at a ford upon the left of the
road, and take position on the northern side of the river, and
commanding the bridge.
This was intended to prevent the retreat of the enemy and keep off
reinforcements that might approach from the northward. A flag of truce
was then sent to Colonel Moore, demanding the surrender of his command.
He answered, "It is a bad day for surrenders, and I would rather not."
Captain Byrnes had planted one of the Parrots, about six hundred yards
from the rifle-pit, and skirmishers had been thrown out in front of it.
As soon as the bearer of the flag returned, Byrnes opened with the gun.
He fired a round shot into the parapet thrown up in front of the trench,
knocking the fence rails, with which it was riveted, into splinters, and
probing the work. One man in the trench was killed, by this shot, and
the rest ran (just as our skirmishers dashed forward) and retreated
across the open ground to the work in the woods beyond. Now the serious
business commenced. Artillery could not be used to dislodge them from
the position which was meant to be defended in earnest. This open
ground, between the points where were constructed the rifle-pit (which
was only a blind) and the strong work where Moore intended to fight, is
the flat summit (for crest, properly speaking, it has none) of a hill,
or rather swell of land, which slopes gently away on both the northern
and southern sides. Guns planted anywhere, except upon this plateau, and
near its center, could not have borne upon the enemy's position at
all--and, if they had been planted there, every cannoneer would have
been killed before a shot could have been fired. The only way to take
the work was by a straight forward attack upon it, and Colonel Johnson
moved against it his brigade, or rather the two regiments of it, left on
the southern side of the river. The men, gallantly led, dashed across
the open ground and plunged into the woods beyond.
The Federal force, some four hundred strong, was disposed behind the
work and abattis, holding a line not much more than a hundred yards
long. The first rush carried the men close to the work, but they were
stopped by the fallen timber, and dropped fast under the close fire of
the enemy. Colonel Chenault was killed in the midst of the abattis--his
brains blown out as he was firing his pistol into the earthwork and
calling on his men to follow. The second brigade had started with an
inadequate supply of ammunition, and the fire of the attacking party
soon slackened on that account. General Morgan ordered me to send a
regiment to Colonel Johnson's assistance, and I sent the Fifth Kentucky.
Colonel Smith led his men at a double-quick to the abattis, where they
were stopped as the others had been, and suffered severely. The rush
through a hundred yards of undergrowth, succeeded by a jam and crowding
of a regiment into the narrow neck, and confronted by the tangled mass
of prostrate timber and the guns of the hidden foe--was more than the
men could stand. They would give way, rally in the thick woods, try it
again, but unsuccessfully. The fire did not seem, to those of us who
were not immediately engaged, to be heavy. There were no sustained
volleys. It was a common remark that the shots could almost be
counted--but almost every shot must have taken effect.
Our loss in less than half an hour's fighting, and with not over six
hundred men engaged, for only portions of the regiments, sent into the
fight, were engaged, was thirty-six killed, and forty-five or six
wounded. Twenty, or more of the wounded were able to ride, and in a few
days returned to duty. The loss of the enemy (according to the most
authoritative account) was nine killed, and twenty-six wounded.
Many fine officers were included in our list of casualties. Colonel
Chenault, whose death has been described--an officer who had no superior
in bravery and devotion to the cause he fought for--was a noble
gentleman. Major Brent, of the Fifth Kentucky, was killed. He was an
officer who was rapidly taking--in reputation and popularity--the place
among the field officers of the division which Hutchinson had held. He
was recklessly brave, and possessed a natural military aptitude, and a
resolution in exacting duty from his subordinate officers and men, which
made him invaluable to his regiment. Captain Treble, who a short time
previously had been transferred from the Second to the Eleventh Kentucky
(Chenault's regiment) was also killed. He displayed, in this his last
battle, the same high courage which ever animated him. Lieutenant Cowan,
of the Third Kentucky, and Lieutenants Holloway and Ferguson, of the
Fifth Kentucky--all very fine officers were also among the killed. Among
the wounded officers, of the Fifth Kentucky, was the gallant and
efficient Adjutant, Lieutenant Joseph Bowmar.
When General Morgan learned that the men were falling fast, and that no
impression was being made upon the enemy, he ordered their withdrawal.
He had not been fully aware, when the attack commenced, of the exceeding
strength of the position, although he knew it to be formidable, and he
thought it probable that the garrison would surrender to a bold attack.
It was his practice to attack and seek to capture all, but the
strongest, of the forces which opposed his advance upon his raids, and
this was the only instance in which he ever failed of success in this
policy. He believed that the position could have been eventually
carried, but (as the defenders were resolute) at a cost of time and life
which he could not afford. Colonel Moore ought to have been able to
defend his position, against direct attacks, had an army been hurled
against him. But this does not detract from the credit of his defense.
His selection of ground showed admirable judgment; and, in a brief time,
he fortified it with singular skill. He deliberately quitted a strong
stockade, near the bridge (in which other officers would, probably have
staid) and which our artillery would have battered about his ears
directly, to assume the far better position; and his resolute defense,
showed he appreciated and meant to hold it to the last. We expected to
hear of his promotion--men had been promoted for beatings received from
Morgan.