CHAPTER XIII.

After the battle of Murfreesboro', and the retreat of the arms to

Tullahoma, at which place General Bragg's headquarters were established,

the infantry went into winter quarters, and General Bragg protected the

front and flanks of his army with the fine cavalry corps of Van Dorn and

Wheeler. The former was assigned to the left, making headquarters at

Columbia, and guarding the lines far to the west, while Wheeler had the

right. This latter corps was composed of the divisions of Morgan,

Wharton, and Martin.

Although the armies were idle for months after this disposition was

made, the cavalry was never so. General Wheeler had been placed in

command of his corps by General Bragg, probably more on account of the

dislike entertained by the latter to certain other officers, than

because of the partiality he felt for him. The reputation of this

officer, although deservedly high, hardly entitled him to command some

of the men who were ordered to report to him. He became subsequently a

much abler commander than he was at the time of his preferment, but he

always exhibited some very high qualities. He was vigilant and

energetic, thoroughly instructed in the duties of his profession, and

perfectly conversant with the elaborate details of organization and

military business. While he did not display the originality and the

instinctive strategical sagacity which characterized Morgan and Forrest,

he was perhaps better fitted than either for the duties which devolve

upon the commander of large bodies of cavalry, permanently attached to

the army and required to conform, in all respects, to its movements and

necessities.

[Illustration]

Thus, it was often said of him, that "he is not a good raider, but

there is no better man to watch the front of the army." General Wheeler

possessed in an eminent degree, all of the attributes of the gentleman.

He was brave as a Paladin, just, high-toned, and exceedingly courteous.

He was full of fire and enterprise, but, while thoroughly impressed with

the necessity of order and discipline, was singularly unfortunate in

maintaining them--perhaps, because he did not keep strict enough rule

with his officers immediately next him in rank. He labored under great

disadvantages, on account of the violent and unjust prejudices excited

against him by General Bragg's preference for him and his rapid

promotion. General Morgan said to him, when first ordered to report to

him, that he (Morgan), had wished to be left free, acting independently

of all orders except from the Commander-in-Chief, but that since he was

to be subordinate to a corps commander, he would prefer him to any

other. General Morgan always entertained this opinion, and I have reason

to believe that General Wheeler reluctantly assumed command of his

division.

The history of the command, for the winter of 1863, properly commences

at the date of the return from the raid into Kentucky, described in the

last chapter. The entire division reached Smithville upon the 4th of

January, and remained in the vicinity of that little town and at Sligo

ferry until the 14th. Upon the 14th, the division was marched to

McMinnville, and encamped around that place--where General Morgan's

headquarters were then established. The first brigade lay between

McMinnville and Woodbury, at which latter point Lieutenant Colonel

Hutchinson was stationed with the Second Kentucky. The weather was

intensely cold, and all of the men who were unprovided with the means of

adequately sheltering themselves, suffered severely. Their ingenuity was

taxed to the utmost to supply the lack of cooking utensils, and it

frequently happened that they had very little to cook.

Fortunately, a great many blankets had been obtained upon the last raid,

and almost every man had gotten a gum cloth. These latter were

stretched over the rail shanties which each mess would put up; and thus

covered the sloping, shed-like structures (built of the fence rails),

made very tolerable substitutes for tents, and with the help of the

rousing fires, which were built at the front of them, were by no means

uncomfortable. Very little system was observed in the "laying out" of

the encampment--men and horses were all huddled together, for the men

did not fancy any arrangement which separated them by the slightest

distance from their horses, and the latter were always tied close to the

lairs of their masters.

Notwithstanding the lack of method and the apparently inextricable

confusion of these camps, their inmates could be gotten under arms and

formed in line of battle, with a celerity that would have appeared

marvelous to the uninitiated.

Colonel Chenault was ordered, in the latter part of January, to Clinton

county, Kentucky, to picket against a dash of the enemy from that

direction. On the 23rd of January, Colonel Breckinridge was ordered to

move to Liberty, eleven miles from Smithville and about thirty from

McMinnville, with three regiments--the Third Kentucky, under Lieutenant

Colonel Huffman, the Ninth Kentucky, under Lieutenant Colonel Stoner,

and the Ninth Tennessee, under Colonel Ward, who had come to the command

of it after Colonel Bennett's death, Colonel Adam R. Johnson was already

in the vicinity of that place with his regiment, the Tenth Kentucky.

Captain Quirk preceded these regiments with his company, and shortly

after his arrival at Liberty and before he could be supported, he, was

driven away by the enemy. He returned next morning, the enemy having

retreated. The three regiments, under Colonel Breckinridge, occupied the

country immediately in front of Liberty, picketing all of the roads

thoroughly. The enemy were in the habit of sending out strong foraging

parties from Readyville toward Woodbury, and frequent skirmishes

occurred between them and Hutchinson's scouts.

Upon one occasion, Hutchinson, with less than one hundred men, attacked

one of these parties, defeating it with smart loss, and taking nearly

two hundred prisoners and forty or fifty wagons. For this he was

complimented in general orders from army headquarters. It led, however,

in all probability, to disastrous consequences, by inducing the enemy to

employ many more troops in that quarter than he would otherwise have

sent there. This affair occurred a short time previously to the

occupation of Liberty by the force under Colonel Breckinridge, and a

much brisker condition of affairs began to prevail all along the line.

Rosecrans was determined to make his superior numbers tell, at least, in

the immediate vicinity of his army. He inaugurated a system, about this

time, which resulted in the decided improvement of his cavalry. He would

send out a body of cavalry, stronger than any thing it was likely to

encounter, and that it might never be demoralized by a complete

whipping, he would back it by an infantry force, never far in the rear,

and always ready to finish the fight which the cavalry begun. This

method benefited the latter greatly. On the 24th, the Second Kentucky

was attacked at Woodbury by a heavy force of the enemy, and a gallant

fight ensued, ending by an unhappy loss for us, in the death of

Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson.

From various causes the regiment had become much depleted, and on this

day it was reduced (by the sending off of detachments for necessary

duties), to less than four hundred men. The enemy advanced, over three

thousand strong, principally infantry, but Hutchinson determined not to

give up his position without a hard fight. He posted his men

advantageously upon the brow of a hill in front of the village,

sheltering a portion of his line behind a stone wall. The enemy preceded

his attack with a smart fire of artillery, to which Hutchinson could

make no reply, but was forced to take it patiently. But when the

infantry moved up and came within range of our riflemen, the tables were

(for a little while) completely turned, and they fell fast under a fire

that rarely failed to do deadly execution. The unequal contest lasted

more than an hour; during that time the stone wall was carried by the

enemy, but was retaken by Captain Treble and Lieutenant Lea, charging at

the head of their gallant companies. Much as he needed men, Hutchinson

kept one of his companies idle and out of the fight, but, nevertheless,

producing an effect upon the enemy. He caused Captain Cooper to show the

head of his company, just upon the brow of the hill, so that the enemy

could see it but could not judge correctly of its strength, and might

possibly think it a strong reserve.

Constantly exposed to the fire of artillery and small arms throughout

the fight, this company never flinched, nor moved from its position

until it was ordered to cover the retreat. Then it filed to the left, as

if moving to take the enemy in flank, and when the column had passed,

wheeled into the rear, under cover of the hill. Colonel Hutchinson, at

length, yielded to the conviction that he could not hold his ground

against such odds. The arrival of a fresh company enabled him to retreat

with greater security, and he ordered the line to retire. A portion of

it was pressed hard as it did so, and he rode to the point of danger to

encourage the men by his presence. He had exposed himself during the

action with even more than his usual recklessness, but with impunity.

Just as all seemed over, however, and he was laughing gleefully at his

successful withdrawal, a ball struck him upon the temple, and he fell

dead from his horse. Lieutenant Charles Allen, the gallant acting

Adjutant of the regiment, and Charles Haddox (his orderly), threw his

body upon his horse and carried it off under the hot fire.

Captain Castleman at once assumed command, and successfully conducted

the retreat. The supply of ammunition entirely gave out just after the

retreat was commenced.

Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson was, beyond all comparison, the best field

officer in Morgan's division, and indeed that I ever saw. Had he lived

and been placed in situations favorable to the development of his

talent, he would, I firmly believe, have become competent to any

command. He had more natural military aptitude, was more instinctively

the soldier; than any man I have ever known. He did not exhibit a

marked partiality and gift for a particular class of military duties, so

much as a capacity and fitness for all. He could make himself thorough

in every thing which the service required. All that a soldier ought to

know, he seemed to learn easily--all the proper feelings of a soldier

seemed his natural impulses. General Morgan felt a warm and manly

admiration for him, and reposed an implicit confidence in his character

and ability. His brother officers loved to enhance his reputation, his

men idolized him. Hutchinson had the frank generous temper, and straight

forward, although shrewd, disposition which wins popularity with

soldiers. While watchful and strict in his discipline, he was kind to

his men, careful of their wants, and invariably shared their fare,

whatever it might be. He was born to be a soldier and to rank high among

soldiers. He loved the excitement of the game of war. He loved honor, as

a western man loves the free air of the prairies--it was his natural

element. It may seem to the general reader that I have extravagantly

eulogized him, but his old-comrades will, perhaps, think that I have

said too little. When killed he was barely twenty-four, but the effects

of exposure and the thoughtful expression of his eye made him appear

several years older. His great size and erect, soldierly bearing made

him a conspicuous figure at all times, and in battle he was superb.

Taller than all around him, his form, of immense muscular power, dilated

with stern excitement--always in the van--he looked, as he sat upon his

colossal gray charger, like some champion of an age when one man could

stay the march of armies. There was some thing in his look which told

his daring nature. His aquiline features, dark glittering eye, close

cropped black hair, and head like a hawk's, erect and alert, indicated

intense energy and invincible courage. Hutchinson's death cast a deep

gloom over his regiment and (as Major Bowles, who then became Lieutenant

Colonel, was absent when it occurred) an unfortunate quarrel broke out

between two of the officers respecting seniority and the right to

command it. This quarrel was espoused by their respective friends, and

a state of feeling was induced which greatly impaired the efficiency of

the regiment, until it was settled by the appointment of Captain Webber

to the Majority. Webber had nothing to do with the dispute, but a

committee appointed by General Morgan to investigate and decide the

claims of all the Captains to seniority, pronounced him senior to both

the contestants.

On the 14th of February, Colonel Cluke was sent into Eastern and Central

Kentucky, for purposes which will be explained in the account which will

be given of his operations. He took with him his own regiment, two

companies under Major Steele--Company A, of the Second, and Companies C

and I of the Third Kentucky--and about seventy men of the Ninth Kentucky

under Lieutenant Colonel Stoner.

These detachments weakened the effective strength of the command at a

time when it was engaged in service which tasked its energies to the

utmost. That portion of "the front" which General Morgan was expected to

protect, may be described as extending from Woodbury, in Tennessee, to

Wayne county, in Kentucky, in an irregular curved line more than one

hundred and twenty miles in length. It was exceedingly important that

this entire line should be well picketed and closely watched, but it was

necessary to give especial attention to that section of it in Tennessee

(which was immediately confronted by formidable numbers of the enemy)

and here, consequently, the greater part of the division was employed.

While it was necessary to keep strict ward at Woodbury, upon the left

flank of this line, and a force adequate to the thorough picketing and

scouting of that region was always kept there--the chief interest

centered at Liberty, for here the efforts of the enemy to break the line

and drive back the forces guarding it, were most frequently and

energetically directed. This little hamlet is situated twenty-nine miles

from Murfreesboro', by the turnpike, and almost due Northeast of it. A

line drawn from Carthage to Woodbury would pass through Liberty, and

the latter is distant some eighteen miles from each. Carthage is a

little east of north, Woodbury a little west of south, from Liberty.

About twenty-one or two miles from Liberty, and west of south, is

Readyville--where was stationed at the time of which I write, a strong

Federal force. Readyville is ten miles from Murfreesboro', and about the

same distance northwest of Woodbury. Lebanon, twenty-six miles from

Liberty by the turnpike which runs through Alexandria, and northwest of

it, was at this time, permanently occupied by neither side, but both

Federal and Confederate troops occasionally held it. Carthage, far upon

the flank and virtually in the rear of the forces at Liberty, was

occupied by a Federal garrison, which varied in strength, as the plans

of the Federal Generals required. It could be reinforced and supplied

from Nashville by the river, upon which it is situated, and it was well

fortified.

A direct advance upon Liberty from Murfreesboro' promised nothing to the

attacking-party but a fight in which superior numbers might enable it to

dislodge the Confederates, and force them to retreat to Smithville;

thence, if pressed, to McMinnville or Sparta. If such a movement were

seconded by a cooperative one from Carthage, the effect would be only to

hasten the retreat, for the country between Carthage and Smithville is

too rugged for troops to traverse it with ease and dispatch, and they

would necessarily have to march directly to Liberty, or to a point but a

very short distance to the east of it. It may be stated generally that

the result would be the same were an advance made upon Liberty by any or

all of the routes coming in upon the front, and the enemy at Carthage

was dangerous only when the Confederates exposed their rear by an

imprudent advance. A rapid march through Woodbury upon McMinnville might

bring the enemy at any time entirely between Liberty and the army at

Tullahoma, or if he turned and marched through Mechanicsville, dash and

celerity might enable him to cut off the force at Liberty entirely.

When it is remembered that about the only point of importance outside

of Murfreesboro' and Nashville, and short of the line I have described

(with the exception of Lebanon), whether north or south of the river,

was occupied by a Federal garrison large enough to undertake the

offensive, and that the country was traced in every direction by

innumerable practicable roads, it will be clear that sleepless vigilance

and the soundest judgment were necessary to the protection of the

Confederate forces stationed in it. The three regiments encamped in the

vicinity of Liberty numbered about one thousand effectives, and the

other regiments under Colonel Gano, including all which were not

detached in Kentucky, under Colonels Cluke and Chenault, were posted in

the neighborhood of Woodbury and McMinnville, and were about the same

aggregate strength.

During the latter part of January and in February and March, the entire

command was kept constantly and busily employed. Scouts and expeditions

of all kinds--dashes at the enemy and fights between reconnoitering

parties were of almost daily occurrence, and when Colonels Gano and

Breckinridge were not harassing the enemy, they were recipients of like

attention from him. Perhaps no period in the history of Morgan's cavalry

of equal duration can be cited, in which more exciting and arduous

service was performed. I regret that my absence from it at that time,

and consequent want of familiarity with these events, renders it

impossible that I shall describe them with the minuteness and accuracy

which belong only to the personal observer. It has been said, in

allusion to this period and the action then of Morgan's command, "If all

the events of that winter could be told, it would form a book of daring

personal adventures, of patient endurance, of great and continued

hardship, and heroic resistance against fearful odds." The narration of

these scenes in the simple language of the men who were actors in them,

the description by the private soldiers of what they dared then, and

endured, the recital of men (unconsciously telling their own heroism)

would be the proper record of these stirring and memorable months. They

could tell how, worn out with days and nights of toil, the brief repose

was at length welcome with so much joy. Frequently the rain and sleet

would beat in their faces as they slept, and the ice would thicken in

their very beds. Happy were the men who had blankets in which to wrap

their limbs, other than those which protected their horses' backs from

the saddle. Thrice lucky those who could find something to eat when they

lay down, and another meal when they arose. It oftenest happened that

before the chill, bleak winter's day had broken, the bugle aroused them

from comfortless bivouacs, to mount, half frozen and shivering, upon

their stiff and tired horses and, faint and hungry, ride miles to attack

a foe, or contest against ten-fold odds every foot of his advance.

Some of the personal adventures, so frequent at that time, will perhaps

be found interesting. An expedition undertaken by General Morgan

himself, but, unlike most of those in which he personally commanded,

unsuccessful, is thus related: "Upon January 29th, General Morgan,

accompanied by Major Steele, Captain Cassell, and a few men, came to

Liberty to execute a dangerous plan. It was to take fifty picked men,

dressed in blue coats, into Nashville, burn the commissary stores there,

and in the confusion of the fire, make their escape. He had an order

written, purporting to be from General Rosecrans, to Captain Johnson,

Fifth Kentucky cavalry, to proceed from Murfreesboro' to Lebanon, thence

to Nashville, arrest all stragglers, make all discoveries, etc. I can

not recollect now from what commands the fifty men were selected, but

know that Steele, Cassell, and Quirk went along. The plan was frustrated

by an accident. As General Morgan rode up to Stewart's ferry, over Stone

river, a Captain of a Michigan regiment, with some twenty men, rode up

to the other side. Morgan immediately advanced a few feet in front of

his command, touched his hat, and said, "Captain, what is the news in

Nashville?"

Federal Captain--"Who are you?"

"Captain Johnson, Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, just from Murfreesboro',

_via_ Lebanon, going to Nashville by General Rosecrans' order--what is

your regiment?" "---- Michigan." Morgan then asked: "Are you going

further?"--"No." "Have you any news of Morgan?" With perfect self

possession Morgan answered: "His cavalry are at Liberty--none closer."

He then said to Quirk: "Sergeant, carry as many men over at a load as

possible, and we will swim the horses. It is too late to attempt to

ferry them over."

"The Michigan Captain started to move on when Morgan asked him to wait

and they would ride to Nashville together. When he consented, most of

his men got down and tried to warm themselves by walking, jumping, etc.

Quirk pushed across with about a dozen men, reached the bank, and

started the boat back; unfortunately, as his men climbed the bank, their

gray pants showed, the Michiganders became alarmed, and Quirk had to

attack forthwith. The Captain and some fifteen men surrendered

immediately; the remainder escaped and ran to Nashville, giving the

alarm. Morgan declared that if he had succeeded in capturing them all,

he would have gone immediately into Nashville. Those who knew him best,

will most readily believe it."

A short time after the fight at Woodbury, Lieutenant Colonel Bowles,

with the greater part of the Second Kentucky, and supported by a

battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Malone (Alabama), engaged a large

force of the enemy at Bradyville. Attacking the advance-guard of this

force (before he became aware of the strength of the main body), Colonel

Bowles drove it in confusion and rout, into the town, and even forced

back for some distance (so impetuous was his charge), the regiments sent

to its support.

In reckless, crushing attack, Colonel Bowles had no superior among the

officers of the division. His dauntless and rash bravery gave great

weight to a charge, but, unluckily, he was perfectly indifferent about

the strength of the enemy whom he charged. On this occasion greatly

superior forces closed in on both flanks of his command, and a part of

the enemy driving away Malone's battalion, gained his rear before he

could disentangle himself. Quick fighting and fast running alone saved

the regiment, but it was a "hard party" to capture, and it got away with

a very slight loss in prisoners. Several men in the extreme rear were

sabered, but, of course, not killed. One man of Company K, who had an

axe strapped on his back, was collared by a Federal Captain, who struck

him on the head with his saber. The "old regular" deliberately

unstrapped his axe, and with one fierce blow shivered his assailant's

skull.

The sloughs and mud holes were frequent and deep. Some of the men

declared that they would "dive out of sight at one end of them and come

up at the other." Lieutenant Colonels Huffman and Martin were especially

enterprising during the early part of February, in the favorite feat of

wagon catching, and each attacked with success and profit large foraging

parties of the enemy. They some times ran into more difficult situations

than they had bargained for, and it must be recorded that each had, on

more than one occasion, to beat a hasty and not altogether orderly

retreat. But these mishaps, invariably repaired by increased vigor and

daring, served only to show that officers and men possessed one of the

rarest of soldierly qualities, the capacity to receive a beating and

suffer no demoralization from it. I have heard an incident of one of

these dashes of Martin, related and vouched for by reliable men who

witnessed it, which ought to be preserved. Martin had penetrated with a

small force into the neighborhood of Murfreesboro', and upon his return

was forced to cut his way through a body of the enemy's cavalry. He

charged vigorously, and a melee ensued, in which the combatants were

mixed all together. In this confused hand-to-hand fight, Captain Bennett

(a dashing young officer, whose coolness, great strength and quickness

had made him very successful and celebrated in such encounters), was

confronted by an opponent who leveled a pistol at his head, and at the

same time Bennett saw one of the men of his company just about to be

shot or sabered by another one of the enemy. Bending low in his saddle

to avoid the shot aimed at himself, Captain Bennett _first_ shot the

assailant of his follower and then killed his own foe. Upon one

occasion, Captain Quirk in one of his many daring scouts got into a

"tight place," which is thus briefly narrated by one familiar with the

affair:

"On the same day, Captains Quirk and Davis (the latter of South

Carolina), Colonel Breckinridge's aide, started for a sort of fancy trip

toward Black's shop. Below Auburn they met Federal cavalry and charged;

the enemy had prepared an ambuscade, which Quirk's men saw in time to

avoid--but not so Quirk, Davis and Tom Murphy, who being splendidly

mounted, were ahead. Into it, through it they went. Quirk unhurt--Davis

wounded and captured, and Tom Murphy escaping with what he described 'a

hell of a jolt,' with the butt of a musket in the stomach. Davis some

how managed to escape, and reached our lines in safety, but with a

severe flesh wound in the thigh." Captain Davis became afterward

Assistant Adjutant General of the first brigade.

The following report of what was justly entitled "one of the most

dashing and brilliant scouts of the war," will give an idea of how this

force, so small and so constantly pressed, yet managed to assume the

offensive, and of how far it would strike:

REPORT OF CAPTAIN T.H. HINES,

_Liberty, Tennessee_, March 3, 1863.

Colonel William C.P. Breckinridge, commanding 2nd Brigade, General

Morgan's Division, Sir: Having been detailed with a detachment of

thirteen men and one Lieutenant, J.M. Porter, of my company, to proceed

to Kentucky, south of Barren river, for the purpose of destroying the

Federal transports from plying between Bowlinggreen, Kentucky, and

Evansville, Indiana, I have the honor of submitting my report. The

detachment left this point at twelve o'clock, February 7th; on the

evening of the 8th, crossed the Cumberland river at Granville,

Tennessee. The night of the 11th, reached the vicinity of Bowlinggreen,

but unfortunately our presence, force and design becoming known to the

Federal authorities by the capture of Doctor Samuel Garvin, who had

volunteered to accompany us, we were under the necessity of altering

materially the plan of operations. We disbanded to meet on the night of

the 20th, twelve miles south of Bowlinggreen. On the morning of the

21st, we burned the depot and three cars at South Union, on the

Louisville and Memphis railroad, all stored with Federal property. At

12 o'clock, P.M., on the 25th, captured the steamer "Hettie Gilmore,"

in the employ of the Federal Government, and heavily laden with stores

for the Army of the Cumberland, all of which we destroyed, paroling the

boat. Made a circuit of forty miles, destroyed a train of twenty-one

cars and an engine at Woodburn, on the Louisville and Nashville

railroad, at 6 o'clock, P.M., February 26th. The whole amount of

Federal property destroyed on the 21st, 25th and 26th, inclusive, can

not fall short of half a million of dollars. In conclusion, Colonel, we

have been twenty-one days, one hundred and fifty miles within the

enemy's lines, traveled in thirty-six hours one hundred miles, injured

the Federal Government half a million dollars, caused him to collect

troops at points heretofore unprotected, thereby weakening his force in

front of our army. After destroying the train at Woodburn, and being

closely pursued by the enemy, we swam an angry little stream known as

Drake's creek, in which attempt Corporal L.H. McKinney was washed from

his horse and drowned. He was indeed a gallant soldier and much beloved

by his comrades. Too much praise can not be given to Lieutenant Porter

and the brave, true men who accompanied me on this trip, bearing all

the fatigue and danger incident to such a scout without a murmur. I

have the honor to be with great respect, Your obedient servant,

T. HENRY HINES, Capt. Comd'g Scouts.

* * * * *

Sometime during February two fine regiments, the Fifth and Sixth

Kentucky were added to the division. These regiments were commanded

respectively, by Colonels D.H. Smith and Warren Grigsby. They had been

recruited while General Bragg occupied Kentucky, for Buford's brigade,

but upon the dissolution of that organization they were assigned at the

request of their Colonels, to General Morgan's command. The material

composing them was of the first order and their officers were zealous

and efficient.

Sometime in the same month an order was issued from army headquarters,

regularly brigading Morgan's command. The Second, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth

Kentucky and Ninth Tennessee, were placed in one brigade, the first. The

Third, Eighth, Eleventh and Tenth Kentucky, composed the second brigade.

Colonels Smith and Grigsby were both the seniors of the other Colonels

of the first brigade, but each refused to take command, on account of

their recent attachment to the command, and Colonel Breckinridge was

assigned to the temporary command of it. Colonel Adam Johnson was senior

Colonel of the division, but was absent during the greater part of the

winter, and Colonel Gano took command of the second brigade. The

regiments, however, were so disposed and scattered, that the brigades

were not practically organized for some time after the order was issued.

The history of the Ninth Tennessee regiment illustrates how much can be

done by the efforts of an intelligent, zealous and firm officer, however

discouraging may appear the prospect when he undertakes reforms. The men

of this regiment, recruited principally in Sumner and Smith counties of

Middle Tennessee, were capable, as the result showed, of being made

excellent soldiers, but their training had commenced under the most

inauspicious circumstances. They were collected together (as has been

previously related) in August, 1862, in a camp at Hartsville, and their

organization was partially effected in the neighborhood of a strong

enemy, while they were entirely without arms or any support and

protecting force. Several times during this period, they were attacked

by the enemy and scattered in all directions--the fact that they always

reassembled promptly demonstrating their excellent character.

When General Morgan returned from Kentucky, this regiment joined him at

Gallatin. Its commander, Colonel Bennett, was deservedly popular for

many genial and noble qualities. He was high minded, brave and generous,

but neglected to enforce discipline among his men, and his regiment was

utterly without it. Upon his death, Colonel William Ward succeeded to

the command, and a marked change and improvement was at once

perceptible. He instituted a far stricter discipline, and enforced it

rigidly; he constantly drilled and instructed his men, and requiring a

higher standard of efficiency in the officers, greatly improved them. At

the same time he exercised the utmost care and industry in providing for

all the wants of his regiment. In a very short time, the Ninth became,

in all respects, the equal of any regiment in Morgan's division.

Colonel Ward's first exploit, with his regiment thus reformed, was to

attack and completely defeat a foraging party, capturing several wagons

and seventy-five prisoners. He then performed, with great ability, a

very important duty, that of harassing General Crook's command, which

had been stationed opposite Carthage, on the south side of the

Cumberland. Colonel Ward, avoiding close battle, annoyed and skirmished

with this force so constantly, that it never did any damage, and finally

recrossed the river. From this time, the Ninth Tennessee did its fair

share of dashing and successful service.

But some account should be given of the operations of Colonel Chenault,

in Clinton and Wayne counties, Kentucky, and of Colonel Cluke, in the

interior of the State. I can best describe the service of the first

named of these commands by copying, _verbatim_, from the diary of a

gallant field officer of the regiment. He says: "The regiment started"

(January 15th) "in a pelting rain for Albany, Kentucky--we marched

through mud, rain and snow for five days, swimming both Collins and Obie

rivers, and reached Albany on the morning of the 22nd of January, 1863,

all much exhausted, and many men dismounted. We find Albany a deserted

village. It was once a flourishing village of five hundred inhabitants,

and is the county seat of Clinton county. It is now tenantless and

deserted, store houses, hotel, lawyers' offices, churches, dwelling

houses and court house unoccupied and going to decay. Where was once

joy, peace, prosperity and busy bustling trade, wicked war has left

nought but desolation, ruin and solitude. We camped in the town, and

were surrounded with a country teeming with good rations and abundance

of forage.

"January 24th. With one hundred men I went on a scout to Monticello,

distant twenty-five miles from Albany, drove a Yankee company, commanded

by Captain Hare, out of Monticello and across the Cumberland

river--captured two prisoners. From this date until the 15th February,

we scouted and picketed the roads in every direction, and had good

rations and forage, with comfortable quarters, but heavy duty, the whole

regiment being on duty every two days. 'Tinker Dave' annoyed us so much

that we had to establish a chain picket every night around the entire

town. Colonel Jacob's Yankee regiment is at Creelsboro', twelve miles

distant, and Woolford's brigade is at Burkesville, fourteen miles

distant. Our little regiment is one hundred and twenty miles from

support, and it is only by vigilance and activity that we can save

ourselves. An order was received yesterday from the War Department

forever fixing our destiny with Morgan.

"Learning from newspapers, that our Scouts brought in, that Woolford

would make a speech in Burkesville on the 12th day of February, I

started from Albany, with two companies, early that morning, and forming

my men behind a hill, I watched from the bushes near the river the

assembling of the crowd at the court house. At 1 o'clock the bell rang.

A short time before that, the guard at the ferry, in four hundred yards

of the court house, composed almost entirely of soldiers, and after

speaking commenced I charged on foot to a school house immediately on

the banks of the river, and from there drove the pickets, that had

dismounted, away from their horses, and also broke up the speaking in

tremendous disorder. We killed a number of horses, and the killed and

wounded among the Yankees were seven. The boys christened the school

house Fort McCreary, but it did not last long, for the night after we

left the Yankees crossed the river and burned it.

"February 19th. Colonel Cluke passed within a few miles of us, and sent

an order from General Morgan for two companies. Companies D and E,

Captains Dickens and Terrill, were sent him.

"March 4th. By order of General Morgan I moved with three companies from

Albany to Monticello to-day; am camping in the town. The citizens are

hospitable and polite. Woolford, with a very large force, is around

Somerset. I am kept very busy picketing and scouting; it is General

Morgan's object to occupy all the country this side of the Cumberland

until Cluke's return from Kentucky.

"March 10th. To-day the balance of the regiment under Colonel Chenault

arrived at Monticello. We have raised one company of new recruits since

coming to Kentucky.

"March 20th. I crossed Cumberland river with twenty-six men last night

in a horse trough, and then marched on foot two miles to capture a

Yankee picket. The force at the picket base fled, but I captured two

_videttes_ stationed at the river. The trip was very severe. I lost one

man.

"April 1st. General Pegram's brigade arrived to-day _en route_ for

Kentucky on a raid. The brain fever has killed seventeen of our regiment

up to this date, among them Captain Sparr and Lieutenant Covington.

"April 11th. Pegram captured Somerset, and moved on to Danville, and

thence commenced his retreat; was compelled to fight at Somerset and was

defeated; Colonel Chenault moved our regiment to the river and helped

him to cross. His forces were much scattered, and many were captured.

"April 8th. Cluke returned to-day from Kentucky; the two companies that

went from this regiment were much injured. What is left reported to-day.

Captain Terrill and Lieutenant Maupin both severely wounded at the Mt.

Sterling fight, and left behind.

"April 29th. River being fordable, the enemy crossed in heavy force both

at Mill Springs and mouth of Greasy Creek. Tucker met them on Mill

Spring road, and I met them on Greasy Creek road; Chenault with part of

the regiment remained at Monticello. The enemy was in large force, and

we were compelled to evacuate Monticello at eleven o'clock to-night, and

fell back in the direction of Travisville. Finding on the 1st day of May

that the enemy was not pressing us, we returned to Monticello, and

skirmished heavily with him; reinforcements to the enemy having arrived,

we were compelled to fall back to the Obie River."

The "brain fever," to which the writer alluded, was a very singular

disease. The patient attacked with it suffered with a terrible pain in

the back of the head and along the spine; the extremities soon became

cold, and the patient sank into torpor. It was generally fatal in a few

hours. I recollect to have heard of no recovery from it.

As has already been mentioned, Colonel Cluke was dispatched to Central

Kentucky on the 4th of February. The force under his command, in all

seven hundred and fifty effectives, was his own regiment, the Eighth

Kentucky, under the immediate command of Major Robert S. Bullock,

seventy-eight men of the Ninth Kentucky and two companies of the

Eleventh, under command of Lieut. Colonel Robert G. Stoner--entitled the

First Battalion; and two Companies C and I, of the Third Kentucky, and

Company A, of the Second Kentucky, under command of Major Theophilus

Steele--styled the Second Battalion. The two mountain howitzers ("Bull

Pups") were also attached to his command, under charge of Lieutenant

C.C. Corbett. This force was ably officered, every company having

excellent commanders. Colonel Cluke was supplied also with an efficient

staff, Captains C.C. and C.H. Morgan (of the General's own staff)

accompanied him. Lieutenant Moreland (a staff officer of the first

brigade) attended him as aide, and was eminently fitted (on account of

his earnest and serious turn of mind) to act as adviser in an expedition

wherein so many delicate and difficult questions might arise for

solution, although his extreme gravity of temper and taciturn manner

made the younger and more mercurial officers of the staff somewhat

impatient of his society.

Colonel Cluke had no officer regularly detailed as A.A.A. General.

Sergeant Lawrence Dickerson, clerk of the Adjutant's office of the first

brigade, and thoroughly competent, performed all the duties of one.

The advance guard was commanded by Lieutenant Shuck of the Eighth

Kentucky, and the scouts were commanded by Lieutenant Hopkins, of the

Second, and Lieutenant S.P. Cunningham, of the Eighth. One hundred

rounds of ammunition and six days' rations were issued to the men upon

the morning that the command marched. The weather was inclement and

intensely cold, when this expedition was commenced. A march through

sleet, rain, and snow, and over terrible roads, brought Colonel Cluke to

the Cumberland river on the evening of the 18th. Lieut.-Colonel Stoner

and Lieutenant Hopkins crossed the river, with a few men, in a canoe,

surprised and captured the Federal pickets posted to guard the ferry, at

which Colonel Cluke wished to cross, and brought over flatboats and a

coal barge, by means of which the entire command was crossed, the horses

being made to swim. So bitter was the cold that eight horses chilled to

death immediately upon emerging from the stream.

On the 19th the column reached Somerset. A strong force of the enemy had

been stationed there, but fell back to Danville on learning of Colonel

Cluke's approach. The greater part of the stores collected there fell

into Cluke's hands. Pressing on, Cluke compelled the surrender of a

detachment of Federal troops at Mt. Vernon, and did not halt until

within fifteen miles of Richmond. Wretched roads and a blinding snow

storm rendered this march harassing and tedious. The scouts moved to

within ten miles of Richmond, and Lieutenant Hopkins halting with a

portion of them, Lieutenant Cunningham went on three miles further with

eight men. He found a picket post of the enemy, where four videttes were

stationed. He answered their challenge by declaring himself and party

friends, and, advancing to the post, persuaded the Federals that they

were an advance party of Woolford's regiment, which they represented to

be returning from Tennessee to Kentucky to assist in repelling an

anticipated raid. Lieutenant Cunningham stated that all the various

Federal forces in that region were to be immediately concentrated at

Lexington, as certain information had been obtained that General

Breckinridge had entered the State at the head of ten thousand infantry.

The sergeant of the post then gave Lieutenant Cunningham a statement of

the location and strength of all the Federal commands in the vicinity,

and invited him to go to a house a short distance off, where the picket

detail to which he belonged made base. Cunningham, finding this detail

twenty-four strong, made an excuse to send back two of his own men and

one of the Federals, thus calling Hopkins to his aid, who, in an hour or

two, arrived with the other eight men of the scouts.

A skirmish immediately ensued between the parties. One Federal was

killed and two wounded--the rest were made prisoners. They were

completely deceived and surprised. The whole affair was as clever a

piece of strategy as can be found in the annals of partisan service.

Learning that two hundred and fifty of the enemy were at Richmond, Cluke

broke camp at an early hour and marched rapidly in hopes to capture

them. They started to Lexington, however, before he got to Richmond. The

rumor (which had been industriously circulated) that Breckinridge had

entered the State, was accomplishing its work. Major Steele was

immediately dispatched, with three companies under his command. He

overtook the rear-guard at Comb's ferry, and drove it in upon the

column--a brisk skirmish and chase ensuing--Steele driving them into

Lexington. He came very near being killed shortly afterward. Leaving his

command halted, he rode to a picket post some distance off, with one or

two men, and essayed to capture the videttes. One of them (after

signifying that he would surrender) suddenly placed his rifle to the

Major's breast and fired. A thick Mexican blanket wrapped tightly in

many folds about his body, saved his life; yet the bullet pierced the

blanket and entered his breast, breaking a rib. This wound disabled him,

at a time when his services were most needed, for several days.

On the same night, Captain C.H. Morgan and Lieutenant Corbett, while

reconnoitering near Lexington and seeking highly important information,

were captured. Colonel Cluke moved on the night of the 22nd (crossing

the Kentucky river at Boonsboro') to Winchester, reaching that place on

the 23rd. He then sent detachments in various directions to excite and

bewilder the enemy as thoroughly as possible. Major Bullock advancing

toward Lexington, Lieutenant Colonel Stoner was sent to Mt. Sterling,

and Lieutenant Cunningham was sent toward Paris. The most intense

excitement prevailed and reports were rife and believed that rebels were

flocking into the State from all directions. Cluke finding that he had

reduced the enemy to inaction, and could do so safely, permitted men who

lived in the neighboring counties to visit their homes and thus gave

greater currency to these rumors. This had been one of the objects of

the expedition. The other ends had in view, in undertaking it, to-wit:

to obtain and keep a thorough understanding of the condition of affairs

in Kentucky during the winter, and to enable the men to procure horses

and clothing, were perfectly accomplished. Lieutenant Cunningham

demonstrated successfully in the direction of Paris, confining the

troops there to the town. Lieut. Colonel Stoner moved rapidly on Mt.

Sterling and found the enemy, which had been stationed there under

Colonel Wadsworth, just evacuating the town. Stoner immediately attacked

and completely routed his enemy. The road by which the latter retreated,

was strewn for miles with overcoats, guns, wrecked wagons, and all the

debris of routed and fleeing troops. Stoner captured many prisoners and

several wagons.

On the 24th, the entire command was concentrated at Mt. Sterling, and

the day was spent in collecting and distributing horses, equipments,

etc. The enemy at Lexington having recovered by this time from the

fright given them on the 21st, by Major Steele, and learning the falsity

of the rumors of a heavy Confederate advance, now came out in search of

Cluke. On the morning of the 25th, a brigade dashed into Mt. Sterling.

The command was much weakened, not only by the detachments which had

again been sent out, but by furloughs allowed men who lived in the

immediate vicinity. It was at once driven out of the town but retreated,

unpursued, only a short distance. It has been said that the men came in

so quickly, that the command was increased from two hundred to six

hundred, before "the echoes of the enemy's artillery had died away."

This brigade which had driven out Cluke, established itself at Mt.

Sterling. Cluke now successfully inaugurated a strategy which has been

greatly and justly admired by his comrades. Lieutenant Cunningham was

sent with a few picked men to the vicinity of Lexington and directed to

spy thoroughly upon the officials there. Ascertaining enough to make the

project feasible, the Lieutenant sent a shrewd fellow (disguised in

Federal uniform) to the headquarters of the officer commanding, upon

some pretended business which enabled him to hang about the office.

While there this man purloined some printed blanks and brought them out

with him. One of these was filled up with an order (purporting to come

from Lexington to the officer in command at Mt. Sterling), instructing

him to march at once to Paris to repel a raid threatening the Kentucky

Central railroad. He was directed to leave his baggage under a small

garrison at Mt. Sterling. A courier properly dressed bore this order to

Mt. Sterling, and dashed in with horse reeking with sweat and every

indication of excited haste. He played his part so well that the order

was not criticized and induced no suspicion. This courier's name was

Clark Lyle--an excellent and daring scout.

As soon as the necessary preparations were made, the Federals marched to

Paris and Cluke re-entered the town, capturing the garrison and stores.

He remained until the 8th of March, his scouts harassing the enemy and

keeping him informed of their every movement.

Another heavy advance of the enemy induced Colonel Cluke to retreat

beyond Slate into the hills about Howard's mill.

Three companies were left in the vicinity of Mount Sterling, under

Captain Cassell. One stationed upon the North Middletown pike, was so

closely pressed by the enemy, that it was forced to cross Slate, below

Howard's mill. The other two were also hotly attacked and driven back to

Colonel Cluke's encampment, sustaining, however, but slight loss.

Falling back to Ficklin's tan yard, where it was posted in ambush, and

failing to entice the enemy into the snare, Colonel Cluke marched to

Hazelgreen, determining to await there the arrival of General Humphrey

Marshall, who was reported to be approaching (from Abingdon), with three

thousand men.

Captain Calvin Morgan volunteered to carry a message to Marshall, and

traveled (alone), the wild country between Hazelgreen and Pound Gap, a

country infested with a crowd of ferocious bushwhackers. About this

time, Cluke's whole force must have been badly off, if the language of

one of his officers be not exaggerated, who (in an account of the

encampment at Hazelgreen) declares that, "the entire command was

prostrated by a severe attack of erisipelas."

After the effects of this "attack" had somewhat worn off, Lieutenant

Colonel Stoner was sent back to Montgomery, and maintained himself there

for several days, with skill and gallantry. Threatening demonstrations

from the enemy induced Cluke to retreat from Hazelgreen and still

further into the mountains. He established himself on the middle fork of

Licking, near Saliersville. On the 19th, he found himself completely

surrounded. Fifteen hundred of the enemy had gained his rear, ten

hundred advancing from Louisa, were on his right, and eight hundred were

at Proctor, on his left. In his front was the garrison of Mt. Sterling,

five hundred strong, but likely at any time to be reinforced by the

forces then in Central Kentucky. The roads in all directions were so

well observed that he could not hope to escape without a fight.

His command was reduced to about three hundred effectives--the rest were

suffering from the erisipelas. In this emergency, Colonel Cluke

conceived a determination at once bold, and exceedingly judicious. He

resolved to march straight on Mount Sterling and attack it, at any

hazard. He trusted that the enemy would send no more troops there, but

would rather (anticipating that he would seek to escape southward), send

all that could be collected to intercept him in that quarter.

A tremendous march of sixty miles in twenty-four hours, over mountains

and across swollen streams, brought him to McIntyre's ferry of the

Licking, thirty miles from Mt. Sterling. Crossing on the night of the

20th and morning of the 21st, Major Steele was sent with his battalion

_via_, Owingsville (in Bath county), to take position on the Winchester

pike, beyond Mount Sterling, that he might give timely information of

the approach of reinforcements to the garrison. Colonel Cluke moved with

the rest of his command through Mud Lick Spring, directly to Mount

Sterling. Colonel Cluke at the head of a body of men entered the town

from the east, while Lieutenant Colonel Stoner with the two companies

from the Eleventh Kentucky, the men of the Ninth under Captain

McCormick, and Hopkins' scouts, charged in from the northwest.

The enemy fell back and shut themselves up in the court-house. Stoner

charged them, but was driven back by a terrible fire from the

windows--the garrison was stronger than the force he led against them. A

detachment of thirty men were then ordered to advance on the street into

which the Winchester pike leads, and burn the houses in which the

Federals had ensconced themselves. With torch, axe and sledge hammer

these men under McCormick and Cunningham forced their way into the heart

of the town. As they reached the "Old Hotel," which was occupied by a

body of the Federals, and used also as a hospital, a flag of truce was

displayed. McCormick, Cunningham, and six others entered, and were

coolly informed by some forty or fifty soldiers that the sick had

surrendered, but they (the soldier) had not, and threatened to fire upon

them, from the upper rooms, if they tried to escape from the building.

At the suggestion of Lieutenant Saunders, the eight Confederates forced

the sick men to leave the house with them, in a mingled crowd, thus

rendering it impossible for the Federals to fire without endangering the

lives of their comrades. Before quitting the house, they set it on fire.

In a short time the entire Federal force in the town surrendered, and

victors and vanquished went to work together to extinguish the flames.

Colonel Cluke took four hundred and twenty-eight prisoners, two hundred

and twenty wagons laden with valuable stores, five hundred mules, and

nearly one thousand stand of arms. Captain Virgil Pendleton, a most

gallant and valuable officer was killed in this affair. Captain Ferrill

and Lieutenant Maupin were seriously wounded. Cluke's loss was three

killed, and a few wounded. The enemy's but little greater.

The Union men of Mount Sterling were much mortified by this last capture

of their town. The previous evening bets were running high that Cluke

would be made prisoner. Cluke immediately evacuated the town, and was

attacked some five miles to the eastward of it, by a force of Federal

cavalry, preceding a body of infantry which were approaching to relieve

the place. An insignificant skirmish resulted, and Cluke marched to

Owingsville unpursued. On the next day he encamped at McIntyre's ferry,

and collected his entire command, now convalescent. Marshall marching

from Pound Gap, about this time, dispersed the forces which had gone to

capture Cluke at Saliersville. On the 25th, Major Steele was sent across

the Kentucky river to join General Pegram, who had advanced with a

brigade of Confederate cavalry to Danville. Major Steele reached him

much further south. As he was retreating from the State, General Pegram

halted near Somerset to fight a strong force of the enemy which was

following him and was defeated. Major Steele's battalion was highly

complimented for the part it took in the action, and in covering the

subsequent retreat. On the 26th, Colonel Cluke again advanced, and

encamped in the vicinity of Mount Sterling. He received orders soon

after from General Morgan to return, and marched southward accordingly.

Colonel Cluke had good right to be proud of this expedition. He had

penetrated into the heart of Kentucky, and maintained himself, for more

than a month, with inferior forces--always fighting and never defeated,

the enemy at last did not drive him out. He recrossed the Cumberland at

the same point, and was stationed with Colonel Chenault, in the vicinity

of Albany. Colonel Cluke's command was stronger by eighteen men when he

returned than when he set out upon his raid.

In order to trace properly the history of the division, during this

period, it is necessary that I disregard chronological arrangement, and

return to the winter in Tennessee. In the latter part of February a new

regiment was formed of Major Hamilton's battalion and some loose

companies which had long been unattached, and some which had recently

been recruited for General Morgan. Colonel R.C. Morgan (brother of the

General), was assigned to the command of this regiment, and Major

Hamilton became Lieutenant Colonel. A month or two later, a valuable

addition was made to it in Quirk's scouts. Colonel Morgan was an

excellent officer and had acted as Assistant Adjutant General to

Lieutenant General A.P. Hill through all the stern battles and glorious

campaigns, in which his chief had figured so conspicuously. Becoming

tired of staff duty, and anxious to exchange the infantry service for

the less monotonous life in the cavalry, he naturally chose his

brother's command, and obtained a transfer to it. He became a dashing

cavalry officer, and as an essential preliminary relaxed the rigidity of

some of his military notions acquired while serving on the staff. He

soon gave in to the prevalent cavalry opinion that horses were, or at

least ought to be, "common carriers." During this winter, more prisoners

were taken than there were effective men in the division, or men

actively at work. The loss in killed and wounded which it inflicted was

also severe, and the captures of stores, munitions, etc., were valuable

and heavy.

The exertions made to equip and supply the command, by the division

Quartermaster and Commissary of Subsistence, Majors Llewellyn and

Elliott, ought to be mentioned, if for no other reason than the

injustice which has been done them and the unmerited censures which have

been showered upon them. Even now, there are, doubtless, few officers or

men of the former Confederate army who can so far overcome the prejudice

deeply rooted against men who served in those departments, that they can

speak with any sort of commendation of Quartermasters and Commissaries.

It has rarely happened that even the most industrious, efficient and

honest of these officers have escaped the severest denunciation. I can

testify that both of these gentlemen strove hard to provide for the

wants of the division, although the tender attention they paid to their

own, prevented them getting credit for it. They might have done better

it is true, and the same can be said of all of us--but they certainly

did a great deal. Major Elliott was never himself except when

encompassed by difficulties--when there was really some excuse for

failure, when supplies were really hard to obtain, then he became great.

The avalanche of curses which invariably descend upon a Commissary, at

all times, never disturbed his equanimity, except when he was in a

barren country--then he would display Napoleonic resources.

Once a large lot of meat stored at Smithville took fire. He issued

cooked hams to the troops, and the loss was scarcely felt. Once he lost

all of his papers, accounts, receipts; vouchers, memoranda all went down

on abstract, L., as the Quartermaster said of himself, who was picked

off by a sharpshooter. The loss did not disturb him for a moment. He

declared he could supply every paper from memory, and produced an

entirely new set, which he claimed to be identical in substance with the

originals. Of course every one laughed at him, but in the course of

time, the old papers turned up, and, sure enough, there was not a

dollar's difference between them and the new.

The great lack of supplies necessary to the comfort of troops, required

to do constant and severe duty in such weather, told injuriously upon

the discipline of the command. It was impossible to obtain clothing,

shoes, etc., in quantities at all adequate to the demand and the

greatest efforts of energy and enterprise upon the part of the subaltern

officers, never make up for the deficiency in the regular supply of

these articles from the proper sources.

Pay was something the men scarcely expected, and it benefited them very

little when they received it. If the Confederate Government could have

made some provision, by which its soldiers would have been regularly

paid, the men would have been far better satisfied, for there is

something gratifying to human nature in the receipt of money even when

it is smartly depreciated. Certainly, if comfortable clothing and good

serviceable boots and shoes had been issued, as they were needed, and

the rations had been occasionally improved by the issue of coffee, or

something which would have been esteemed a delicacy, the discipline and

efficiency of all the troops would have been vastly promoted. It is hard

to maintain discipline, when men are required to perform the most

arduous and harassing duties without being clothed, shod, paid or fed.

If they work and fight they will have little time to provide for

themselves. But they certainly will not starve, and they object,

decidedly, to doing without clothing if by any means and exertions they

can obtain it. Then the converse of the proposition becomes equally

true, and if they provide for themselves, they will have little time to

work and fight. With cavalry, for instance, the trouble of keeping men

in camp who were hungry and half frozen, and who felt that they had done

good service, was very great. The infantryman, even if equally

destitute, could not well straggle, but the cavalry soldier had his

horse to take him, although the distance was great and the road was

rough.

When men once commenced running about, they became incorrigible in the

habit. Hunger might draw them out at first, but whisky would then become

an allurement, and a multitude of seductive inducements would cause them

to persist in the practice. In nine cases out of ten, when a man became

an inveterate straggler, he was no loss if he were shot. These seem

truisms, too palpable to need mention, but for three years they were

dinned into the ears of certain officials, and not the slightest

impression was made. These gentlemen preferred to attribute all evils,

of the peculiar class which have just been mentioned, to the inherent

and wicked antipathy to discipline, which the cavalry (they declared)

entertained. They declared, moreover, that these articles could not be

procured. This excuse passed current until the latter part of the war,

when Federal raids and dashes disclosed the fact (by destroying or

cutting them off from our use) unknown to all but the officials and

employees, that hoarded and stored them away, at the very time that the

Confederate armies were melting away for the lack of them.

It is no answer to the charge of incompetency or malfeasance upon the

part of men charged with their distribution to say, that there was not

enough to supply the demand. They should have been made to go as far as

they would. It is difficult for one unfamiliar with the workings of

these departments and the obstacles in the way of procuring supplies, to

suggest a remedy for these shortcomings, but it is certain that the

Confederacy owned cotton and tobacco and could have gotten more; that

blockade running was active and could have been stimulated. An

abstinence from certain luxurious but costly experiments might have

enabled the Confederacy to buy more clothing, shoes, and meat. The

opinion is hazarded with diffidence, and is that of one who was

naturally prone to attach more importance to the sustenance of the

military than of the naval power of the Confederacy, but would it not

have been better to have expended upon the army the money paid for the

construction of those fine and high-priced iron-clads, which steamed

sportively about for a day or two after they left the stocks, and were

then inevitably scuttled?

The winter wore away, and the condition of affairs in Tennessee, as

described in the first part of this chapter, continued unchanged. Three

times the enemy advanced in heavy force (cavalry, infantry, and

artillery) to Liberty. Upon each occasion, the regiments stationed there

under Colonel Breckinridge, after skillfully and courageously contesting

his advance for many miles to the front of Liberty, fell back to Snow's

Hill, three miles to the east of it, and returned to press hard upon the

enemy's rear when he retired. At length, upon the 19th of March, when

Colonel Ward was absent with his regiment reconnoitering in the

direction of Carthage, and the force at Liberty was weakened by other

detachments, until it was scarcely more than six hundred strong,

information was received that the enemy were advancing and were near

Milton, a small village about eighteen miles from Liberty. General

Morgan had, the day before, notified Colonel Breckinridge of his

intention to be at Liberty on the 19th. Colonel Breckinridge, when it

became clear that the enemy was certainly pressing, posted his command

in a good position upon the Murfreesboro' pike, and sent a courier to

Gano with a request that the latter would promptly join him with his

entire effective force. Colonel Breckinridge says of this disposition of

his command: "To delay the enemy and give Gano time to come up, the

pickets were strengthened and thrown forward. The enemy, being infantry,

came on slowly but gradually drove our pickets nearly in. The peculiar

formation of the ground gave the brigade great advantage, and admirably

concealed its weakness. The enemy made demonstrations, but made no

attack, and before nightfall bivouacked in line in sight of our

skirmishers. Just at dark Morgan rode upon the ground, and was received

with deafening cheers; and soon afterward Colonel Gano came up. Under

cover of night the enemy withdrew to Auburn."

General Morgan, in his official report of the fight which ensued on the

next day at Milton, says: "On the evening of the 19th inst. I reached

Liberty, Tenn., and learned that the Federals were moving upon that

place from Murfreesboro', their numbers being variously reported at from

two thousand to four thousand infantry, and two hundred cavalry, with

one section of artillery. At the time I reached my videttes on the

Milton road, the enemy was within five miles of Liberty; it being near

night, they fell back to Auburn, and encamped. Determining to attack

them next morning, I ordered Colonels Breckinridge and Gano, who were in

command of brigades, to move within four miles of the enemy, and hold

themselves in readiness to move at any moment. In the meantime, I sent

the 'scouts' to watch the movements of the enemy and to report, and to

see if any reinforcements came up; also, to send me information when the

enemy moved, for I was determined not to make the attack at Auburn, as

they held a very strong position, and I was desirous they should move

beyond a gorge in the mountains before the attack was commenced; for, if

they had been permitted to take position there, it would have been

impossible to dislodge them. After daylight, one of the scouts returned,

bringing intelligence that the enemy was moving. Captain Quirk was

ordered to move forward with his company, and attack the enemy's rear

when they passed the mountain, and retard their progress until the main

column arrived. When within a mile of Milton, Captain Quirk came up with

their rear guard and commenced a vigorous attack upon them. The enemy

immediately halted, deploying their skirmishers to the rear, and,

bringing their pieces into position, commenced shelling Captain Quirk's

men and the road upon which they had advanced. In a short time I arrived

upon the ground. Finding that the main column of the enemy was still

falling back, and their artillery was unsupported by any troops (with

the exception of their skirmishers) I determined, if possible, to

capture it. I, therefore, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Martin to move to

the left with his regiment, and Colonel Breckinridge to send one to the

right--to go forward rapidly and when within striking distance, to move

in and cut off the pieces. Having two pieces of artillery, I ordered

them to go forward on the road, supported by Colonel Ward's regiment,

dismounted, and the remainder of the command to move in column in

supporting distance.

"Just before the two regiments which had moved to the right and left

reached the proper place to move upon the artillery, the enemy's

skirmishers and artillery fell back rapidly upon their main column,

which occupied a steep hill covered with cedars. They placed their

battery on a line, with their column on the road immediately upon their

right. To reach this position we would have to pass through a cedar

brake, the ground being very rough and broken. A few of the enemy's

skirmishers were thrown forward to that point. I ordered my two pieces

of artillery to move upon the left of the road until they reached a

point within four hundred yards of the enemy's artillery and then to

silence their guns.

"They went forward gallantly, supported by a part of Ward's regiment.

Lieutenant Colonel Martin who still occupied his position on the left

was ordered forward to threaten the right of the enemy. At the same

time, I ordered the command under Colonel Gano to move up, dismount and

attack the enemy, vigorously, immediately in the front. Colonel

Breckinridge was ordered to move to the right with his command and

attack their extreme left. Captain Quirk, in the meantime, had been

ordered to get upon the pike, immediately in the rear of the enemy,

which he did in a most satisfactory manner, capturing fifteen or twenty

prisoners.

"He remained in the rear of the enemy until reinforcements came to them

from Murfreesboro' (being only thirteen miles distant), when he was

driven back. When our artillery opened, the whole command moved forward.

Colonel Martin charged up in most gallant style, and had a number of his

horses killed with canister, as the guns of the enemy were turned upon

him. The remainder of the command was moved up to within one hundred

yards of the main column of the Federals and dismounted. Moving rapidly

to the front, they drove in the enemy's skirmishers, and pushed forward

in the most gallant manner upon the hill occupied by the enemy, which

was about sixty yards from the cedar brake alluded to. Colonel

Breckinridge who commanded our extreme right, had his men dismounted,

and went boldly up, the enemy's artillery being at this time moved from

the pike to a position upon the top of the hill immediately in their

center; but this was not accomplished until it came near being captured

by Colonel Grigsby, who was within fifty yards of it and moving rapidly

upon it, when his ammunition giving completely out, he was forced to

halt, and the battery was saved. It was near this point that Colonel

Napier was severely wounded while cheering and leading his men up.

Colonel Grigsby was also wounded while in front of his command and

encouraging his men. At the same time the firing from the center of the

line nearly ceased; a few scattering shots, now and then, gave evidence

that nearly all of the ammunition was exhausted. Two more rounds would

have made our victory complete, and two thousand Federals would have

been the result of the day's fighting."

Finding his ammunition completely gone, General Morgan ordered a

withdrawal, and his forces fell back to Milton, the enemy neither firing

upon nor pursuing them. Here he found an ordnance train and four pieces

of artillery which had been sent from McMinnville. He was encouraged to

renew the attack, hoping to capture the entire opposing force. "Martin

was placed in the same position which he had previously occupied, and

Gano, whose entire command had by this time arrived, was sent to the

right.

The artillery took position in about eight hundred yards of the enemy's

battery, and commenced a rapid and severe fire upon them. They had again

taken position upon the pike, from which they were soon driven by

Lieutenant Lawrence, who was in command of my battery. Our pieces were

served with the greatest precision and coolness, and the men stood by

their guns like veterans. Although they had but few men in the fight,

the casualties were two killed and eighteen wounded, showing the

determination with which they held their position. Too much praise can

not be awarded to Lieutenant Lawrence. Three times the enemy had to

change the position of their battery, and were silenced until reinforced

by additional guns. While this artillery duel was progressing, my men

were moving to the front and were about dismounting, when Captain Quirk

was driven from the rear by a large force of the enemy which had just

arrived in time to save the force in our front. I immediately ordered my

entire command to fall back to Milton, and from thence to Liberty. The

enemy did not follow."

General Morgan expressed his perfect satisfaction with the conduct of

the officers and men in this fight, and complimented his brigade

commanders and his personal staff.

One reason of the want of success in the first onset was the fatigue of

men and horses by the long and rapid ride to Auburn, and thence to the

position taken by the enemy. In the stretching gallop down the road,

which General Morgan ordered in his impatience to overtake the enemy,

and apprehensive lest they should get away, the column necessarily

became prolonged, the men scattered, and many (their horses falling)

dropped out entirely. But few men, consequently, were available when the

attack commenced. As the detached portions of regiments, divided by this

speedy march, came up, there was, necessarily, some confusion, and some

difficulty in putting them, at once, promptly and smoothly into the

fight.

For these reasons, and on account of the usual details for horse

holders, perhaps not more than one thousand men were engaged on our

side, and these (as has been just explained) could not be handled as

effectively as was necessary to force a strong position, held by

superior numbers. Colonel Ward's regiment is frequently alluded to in

General Morgan's report, but it should be stated that the bulk of that

regiment was absent, only sixty men (one of its companies), under

Captain Cates, were present. The scanty supply of ammunition, however,

and its failure at the critical moment, was the principal cause of the

repulse, or rather withdrawal of our troops. All who have given any

account of this battle concur in praising the conduct of the combatants.

It was fought with the utmost determination, and with no flinching on

either side.

One incident is thus described by an eye-witness:

"Just here Martin performed one of those acts of heroic, but useless

courage, too common among our officers. When his regiment wavered and

commenced to fall back, he halted until he was left alone; then at a

slow walk, rode to the pike, and with his hat off rode slowly out of

fire. He was splendidly mounted, wore in his hat a long black plume, was

himself a large and striking figure, and I have often thought that it

was the handsomest picture of cool and desperate courage I saw in the

war."

Our loss in this fight was very heavy, especially in officers. The list

of wounded officers was large. Captains Sale, Marr, Cooper and Cossett,

and a number of other officers, were killed. Captain Sale was the third

Captain of Company E, Second Kentucky, who was killed. Captain Cossett,

of the Ninth Tennessee, was under arrest at the time, for charges of

which he was acquitted after death. He was killed, fighting with his

musket, as a volunteer. General Morgan's clothing was torn with balls.

About this time an impression prevailed at General Bragg's Headquarters,

that the enemy was about to evacuate Murfreesboro' and, perhaps,

Nashville. General Morgan had come to Liberty on the 19th, in order to

reconnoiter with reference to ascertaining the truth of this rumor.

Upon the day before, Colonel Breckinridge had been ordered to move to

Lebanon with his brigade, and a section of Byrne's battery, and was

informed that he would be supported by Gano. In the order he was told:

"The object of these demonstrations is to discover, if possible, whether

the rumored evacuation of Murfreesboro' by the Federals is true, and if

so, to what point they are moving their forces. In the event that they

are falling back to Nashville, the command will move from Lebanon, cross

the river and attack and harass them. At Lebanon, or within twenty-four

hours after your arrival at that point, certain information can be

obtained as to what is taking place on the enemy's lines. In the event

your pickets or scouts report an advance from Readyville or

Murfreesboro', you will not leave your present position."

Upon the 19th the following dispatch came from General Bragg's

Headquarters to Wheeler:

"_To Major General James Wheeler, McMinnville, Tennessee:_

"Ascertain what direction the enemy takes after leaving Gallatin.

[Signed] "GEO. WM. BRENT, _A.A. Gen'l_."

This proved conclusively that General Bragg believed that Nashville and

the whole of Middle Tennessee was about to be evacuated by the Federal

army.

General Morgan did not believe so, nor did Colonel Breckinridge, who was

charged with the scouting of all the extreme right flank. The latter

officer says: "It is true, that, at this time, General Rosecrans ordered

back his sick, his surplus baggage, camp followers, increased his guard

at every station in his rear, displayed greater vigilance at his

pickets, vailed his movements in greater secrecy, and became stringent

in his rules about passes to and from his camps and lines. All our

scouts reported these movements, and our Generals concluded he meant a

retreat. Morgan believed otherwise," etc.

General Morgan, in reality, believed that these were all the indications

of an advance rather than of retreat, and he confidently anticipated the

former in the early part of April. On the 3rd of April there _was_ an

advance, which, although not of the entire Federal army, yet

comprehended so large a part of it, as to completely rid the country, in

which our command had been wintering, of their presence for a short

time.

This force approached Liberty on the 2nd of April, causing the

concentration there of both brigades, with the exception of the

detachments necessarily sent to observe different important points. The

entire command, after some skirmishing, took position near Liberty, but

to the east of it, and encamped in line of battle, on the night of the

2nd.

The enemy retreated about a mile and bivouacked. Scouts were sent

through his camp that night and discovered that behind the cavalry, was

a heavy infantry force. Other scouts also reported that Hazen was

advancing from Readyville and Crook from Carthage. Colonel Ward was sent

to watch the Carthage roads, and all the rest were disposed to resist

the advance of the enemy directly in front. Colonel Gano was senior

officer and leaving Breckinridge to conduct the retreat to "Snow's

hill," he took charge of the preparations for defense there.

"Snow's hill" was regarded by the majority of the officers (who had

served about Liberty) as a very strong position, but, I believe, that

they all agreed subsequently that the opinion was a mistaken one. As a

defensive position against attack from an enemy who came through

Liberty, it possessed no strong features at all--in reality the

advantages were all on the side of the attacking party if he possessed a

numerical strength which would enable him to occupy all the approaches

to the position and maintain a connected line. It is a long slope, or

rather collection of sloping ridges, which, beginning at the table land

eastward of the valley in which Liberty is situated, point due westward.

The road from Liberty to Smithville runs through the center of the

position upon Snow's hill, which was selected for defense, but bends and

curves according to the necessities of the grade. The ridges all point

toward Liberty and are parallel to the general direction of the road.

They can not be called rugged and inaccessible, for although their

northern and southern sides are somewhat precipitous, the back-bone of

each is comparatively smooth and the ascent is by no means abrupt or

difficult from the points where they subside into the valley to their

summit at the eastern ends. The ravines between these ridges can be

readily traversed by troops and the bluffs at the eastern extremity of

each, or where they "head," can be easily climbed. It is true, that the

conformation of the ground presents at one side, a serious obstacle to

an attacking force. The base of these ridges, which have been described,

or the parent hill, of which they seem to be offshoots, is separated

from the level ground to the eastward by a singular and deep gulf, some

two or three hundred yards wide and I know not how long. This abyss (it

may be called) is crossed by a sort of natural wall, or what would be

termed in railroad parlance, "fill," the sides of which are very abrupt

and steep. It is not more than thirty or forty feet wide, and the road

runs along it. To the southward of this deep, long chasm, is a gap in

the hill through which ran a road by which the rear of the entire

position could be gained. If this gap had been occupied and the narrow

road across the wide, deep chasm had been adequately commanded by

earthworks which could protect the defenders from artillery planted on

the tops of the hills, the position would have been impregnable,

perhaps, from attack against its front, and the enemy could have carried

it only by marching far around upon one or the other flank. But the

position always selected by our forces, stationed there, for fight, was

about half way down the ridges toward Liberty. Here the enemy's

artillery had full play at them, his infantry marching up the ravines

and ridges had an equal chance with them, for there was no cover and all

were equally exposed; the regiments defending the position were

necessarily separated from each other and could not act in concert,

their horses embarrassed them, unless carried a long distance to the

rear, and their every movement was completely apparent to the enemy. The

left flank was, also, always in danger, and if turned by cavalry, the

retreat would be necessarily compromised.

During the night of the 2nd, the Sixth Kentucky and Quirk's scouts were

posted to watch the enemy, and the rest of the command was withdrawn to

the eastward of Liberty and took position upon the hill. Two guns of

Byrne's battery were planted, to sweep the road, a few hundred yards

from the town. At daylight the enemy's cavalry charged the force in

front of the town and drove it back. Major Bullitt, commanding Sixth

Kentucky, held them back for a while, but their numbers and the dash

with which they came told, and they forced him to rapid retreat. Soon

their close pursuit brought the enemy within the range of the guns, and

their fire made them call a halt, and Bullitt and Quirk charged in their

turn. The Confederates, however, were borne steadily backward.

To the eastward of Liberty the enemy met with another check at the long

covered bridge over Dry creek about a mile from the town. The guns were

planted to command the bridge and masked; when the enemy had crowded it

full, Byrnes opened and burst his shells right in their midst. In a

short time answering artillery drove the Confederates away.

Established on Snow's hilt, the line was not able to remain long in

position under the heavy fire of artillery and the attack of the

infantry. A long column of cavalry moved up Dry creek, and turning upon

the left flank, came through the gap which has been mentioned.

Lieutenant Colonel Huffman was sent with the Third Kentucky, to check

them, but, unluckily, did not reach the gap in time. He prevented,

however, their further advance until the troops under Colonel

Breckinridge (which about the same time began to retreat) had passed the

point where this force could have cut them off.

I came up to the rear, about this time, in company with Colonel

Smith--we had ridden from McMinnville together and had heard

cannonading, and learned that there was a fight going on. We saw nothing

of it, however, but it's effects upon the stragglers and "bummers," who

seemed to have unaccountably increased. I had been absent from the

command for more than two months, but knew of the gallant service it had

done, and took for granted that its _morale_ was unimpaired. Colonel

Smith, who had left Liberty only two or three days before, was more

surprised than myself at the stream of stragglers which we met. The

moral condition of the men was the most singular I ever witnessed. There

was no panic, no running, jostling, wild fear. They rode along quietly,

talked rationally, seemed utterly free from any lively and immediate

apprehension, but "just couldn't be made to fight," and yet quiet and

"serene" as seemed to be their timidity, it made some of them go clear

off, swim unfordable streams, and stay away for days. We were unprovided

with a guard, and although we could stop these fellows, until the road

was packed and jammed with them, it was utterly impossible to make them

turn back. At length, in disgust, we gave up the attempt, and rode on to

see what was the condition of affairs nearer the scene of actual

fighting. Colonel Smith hastened to his regiment, and I went in quest of

Colonels Gano and Breckinridge, and kept a watch for the Second

Kentucky.

I met the column of Colonel Breckinridge retreating, but in excellent

order; the ranks were depleted by the stragglers, but the men who were

left were as firm and cool as ever. The same was true of that portion of

Colonel Gano's brigade which I saw. The men were occasionally cheering,

and seemed perfectly ready to return, if necessary, to fight. When

Lieutenant Colonel Huffman, in accordance with orders sent him by

Colonel Gano, undertook to withdraw from his position upon the left,

his men became crowded and confused, on account of the peculiar

conformation of the ground. The enemy, taking advantage of this

confusion, charged him. The Fourth Regulars came vigorously upon his

rear, and did smart damage. The regiment recoiled in disorder for some

distance. At length, Gano, with some thirty or forty men, charged the

Fourth Regulars, and checked them. Quirk dashed to his assistance with

about the same number of men, and the enemy was driven completely away.

No further pursuit was attempted, and the column retreated toward

Smithville. On the way Lieutenant Colonel Martin was sent with a few men

to watch the roads leading from the ground in possession of the enemy,

to the Smithville and McMinnville road, in order to prevent any effort

of the enemy to surprise us upon that road. The wagon train had been

previously ordered to move through Smithville to McMinnville by this

same road. Some of Martin's men (dressed in blue overcoats) came out

upon the road, suddenly, in front of the train. The teamsters took them

to be Yankees, and the wildest stampede ensued. The teamsters and wagon

attachees ran in every direction, crazy with fright. Some turned their

teams and put back to Smithville, others floundered off of the road and

tried to drive through thickets that a child's toy cart could scarcely

have been hauled through. Many wagons were, consequently, smashed up

before the panic could be abated.

That night we encamped some fourteen miles from McMinnville. At this

date Colonel Gano's connection with the command ceased, and we lost the

benefit of his character as an officer and man. No officer had won more

and better merited distinction, and his popularity was justly very

great. Functional disease of the heart, brought about by exposure, hard

work and intense excitement, compelled him to withdraw, for a time, from

active service, and when he returned, with re-established health, to the

field, it was to win new laurels and accomplish brilliant work in the

Trans-Mississippi.

The division received more injury from this affair than I would have

supposed a hard fight and serious defeat would have done it. Nearly two

weeks were required to collect the fugitives.

General Morgan, on his way to join us on the night of the 3rd, met a

straggler, wandering loosely about, and demanded sternly why he was

absent from his regiment, "Well, General," answered the fellow,

ingenuously, "I'm scattered."