crossed, the division marched toward Campbellsville. Our wounded and
dead were left under the charge of Surgeons and Chaplains, who received
every assistance, that he could furnish, from Colonel Moore, who proved
himself as humane as he was skillful and gallant. We passed through
Campbellsville without halting. On that evening a horrible affair
occurred. A certain Captain Murphy took a watch from a citizen who was
being held, for a short time, under guard, to prevent his giving
information of our approach and strength to the garrison at Lebanon.
Captain Magenis, Assistant Adjutant General of the division, discovered
that this theft had been perpetrated, and reported it to General Morgan,
who ordered Murphy to be arrested. Murphy learned that Magenis had
caused his arrest, and persuaded the guard (who had not disarmed him) to
permit him to approach Magenis. When near him, Murphy drew and cocked a
pistol, and denounced the other furiously, at the same time striking
him. Captain Magenis attempted to draw his saber, and Murphy fired,
severing the carotid artery and producing almost instant death. Murphy
made his escape on the night that General Morgan had ordered a
court-martial to try him--the night before we crossed the Ohio. The
wretch ought to have been butchered in his tracks, immediately after the
murder had been committed. There was no officer in the entire
Confederate army, perhaps, so young as he was, who had evinced more
intelligence, aptitude and zeal, than had Captain Magenis. Certainly,
there was not among them all a more true-hearted, gallant, honorable
gentleman. General Morgan deeply regretted him. His successor, Captain
Hart Gibson, was in every way qualified to discharge, with ability and
success, the duties of the position, doubly difficult in such a command
and under such circumstances.
On the night of the 4th, the division encamped five miles from Lebanon,
upon the ground whence we drove the enemy's pickets. Lebanon was
garrisoned by Colonel Hanson's regiment, the Twentieth Kentucky, and not
far off, on the road to Harrodsburg, two Michigan regiments were
stationed. On the morning of the 5th, the division approached the town,
and a demand for its surrender was made, which was declined. The first
brigade was formed on the right of the road, with two regiments in
reserve. The second was assigned the left of the road. The artillery was
planted in the center, and at once opened upon the slight works which
were thrown up, south of the town. As the regiments in the front line
advanced, the enemy retreated into the town. Both brigades lost slightly
in effecting this, and succeeded, immediately afterward, in dislodging
the enemy from the houses in the edge of the town, both on the left and
on the right. The enemy, then, mainly concentrated in the large depot
building upon the railroad; a few sought shelter in other houses.
Grigsby's and Ward's regiments, of the first brigade, held the right of
the town and the houses looking upon the depot in that quarter. From
these houses they kept up a constant fire upon the windows of the depot.
Cluke's and Chenault's regiments, the latter under command of Lieutenant
Colonel Tucker, were as effectively located and employed upon the left.
Our artillery, although under able officers, proved of little use to us
in this affair. On account of the situation of the depot in low ground,
the shots took effect in the upper part of the building (when they
struck at all), doing the occupants little damage. Lieutenant Lawrence,
however, at length posted one of his guns--the Parrots--on a hill
immediately overlooking the building, and, greatly depressing it,
prepared to fire into it at an angle which threatened mischief. But the
sharpshooters prevented his men from working the guns effectively. This
state of affairs lasted for two or three hours. The Michigan regiments,
before mentioned, drew near and threatened interference, and General
Morgan, who had sought to reduce the garrison without storming their
stronghold, in order to save his own men, at length ordered it to be
carried by assault. Smith's regiment, at first held in reserve in the
first brigade, had, previously to this determination upon the part of
the General, been engaged, but the Second Kentucky was still in reserve.
Major Webber was now ordered to bring that regiment forward, enter the
town and storm the buildings occupied by the enemy. The Second Kentucky
had tried that sort of work before, and advanced with serious mien, but
boldly and confidently. Major Webber skillfully aligned it and moved it
forward. The heavy volley it poured into the windows of the depot, drove
the defenders away from them before the regiment reached the building,
and Colonel Hanson surrendered. The other houses occupied by the enemy
were surrendered shortly afterward.
At the last moment of the fight, a sad loss befell us. Lieutenant Thomas
Morgan, younger brother of the General, was killed just before the enemy
surrendered. He was first Lieutenant of Company I, of the Second
Kentucky, but was serving at the time of his death upon my staff. He
habitually sought and exposed himself to danger, seeming to delight in
the excitement it afforded him. He had repeatedly been remonstrated with
on that day, regarding his reckless exposure of his person, and General
Morgan had once ordered him to leave the front. He was stricken by the
fate which his friends feared for him. When the Second Kentucky
advanced, he rushed in front of it, and, while firing his pistol at the
windows of the depot, was shot through the heart. He exclaimed to his
brother Calvin, that he was killed, and fell (a corpse) into the
latter's arms. He was but nineteen when killed, but was a veteran in
service and experience. The first of six brothers to join the
Confederate army, he had displayed his devotion to the cause he had
espoused in the field and the prison. I have never known a boy of so
much genius, and of so bright and winning a temper. His handsome, joyous
face and gallant, courteous bearing made him very popular. He was the
pet and idol of the Second Kentucky. General Morgan (whose love for the
members of his family was of the most devoted character) was compelled
to forego the indulgence of his own grief to restrain the Second
Kentucky, furious at the death of their favorite. When his death became
generally known, there was not a dry eye in the command.
Although our loss in killed and wounded was not heavy in numbers, it
included some valuable officers and some of our best men. We lost eight
or nine killed, and twenty-five or thirty wounded. In the early part of
the fight, Captain Franks led a party of the advance guard to the
southern end of the depot, and set it on fire. He was severely wounded
in doing this, making the third officer, occupying the position of
second in command of the advance guard, wounded in four days. The loss
in the guard fell principally upon members of the "Old Squadron." Of
these were killed Lieutenant Gardner and private Worsham; and Sergeant
William Jones and privates Logwood and Hawkins were badly wounded, all
very brave men and excellent soldiers. A gallant deed was performed, on
that day, by private Walter Ferguson, one of the bravest men I ever
knew; poor fellow, he was hung by Burbridge afterward. His friend and
messmate Logwood lay helpless not far from the depot, and Ferguson
approached him under the galling fire from the windows, lifted and bore
him off. Several men were lost out of the Second Kentucky; among them
Sergeant Franklin, formerly Captain of a Mississippi company in the Army
of Northern Virginia.
A large quantity of ammunition, many fine rifles, an abundant supply of
medicines, and a field full of ambulances and wagons were the fruits of
this victory. The prisoners were double-quicked to Springfield, eight
miles distant, for the dilatory Michiganders had at length began to
move, and there was no reason for fighting, although we could have
whipped them. At Springfield the prisoners were paroled. Company H, of
the Second Kentucky, was detached here, and a company of the Sixth
Kentucky went off without leave or orders. Company H was sent to
Harrodsburg to occupy the attention of Burnside's cavalry. The division
marched all night, reaching Bardstown at 4 o'clock on the morning of the
6th. During the night Lieut.-Colonel Alston (acting chief of staff to
General Morgan) lay down to sleep in the porch of a house, and awakened
to find himself in the hands of the enemy.
At Bardstown, Captain Sheldon, of Company C, Second Kentucky, detached
at Muldraugh's hill to reconnoiter toward Louisville, and rejoin us at
Bardstown, was patiently watching a party of twenty Federal soldiers,
whom he had penned up in a stable. The tramp of the column marching
through the town alarmed them, and they surrendered. Leaving Bardstown
at ten A.M. on the 6th, the division marched steadily all day. Just at
dark the train from Nashville was captured at a point some thirty miles
from Louisville. A little of Ellsworth's art applied here discovered for
us the fact that Morgan was expected at Louisville, confidently and
anxiously, but that an impression prevailed that he would meet with a
warm reception. He had no idea of going to receive it.
We marched during the entire night, and on the next morning, after
crossing the bridge over Salt river, halted for two or three hours.
Captains Taylor and Merriwether, of the Tenth Kentucky, were sent
forward to capture boats to enable us to cross the Ohio, and went about
their errand in good earnest. On the afternoon of that day, Captain
Davis, A.A. General of the first brigade, was selected by General Morgan
to undertake a service very important to the success of the expedition.
He was directed to proceed, with Company D of the Second Kentucky, and
Company A, of Cluke's regiment, to cross the river at Twelve Mile
Island, seize boats and cross the river, keep the militia of lower
Indiana employed in watching their own "firesides," chicken coops, and
stables, so that the column might be comparatively free from
molestation, in at least one direction, and to rejoin the division at
Salem, Indiana. These two companies, the two detached at Springfield--or
rather one detached there; the other marched off without leave--and
Captain Salter's company detached near Columbia, to attract Burnside's
attention to the country around Crab Orchard, Stanford, etc., (whither
he at once hastened and did splendid service, keeping the enemy as
busily employed as an ordinary-sized brigade might have done), these
companies made five, in all, which were permanently detached from the
division.
On the afternoon of the 7th, the column halted at Garnettsville, in
Hardin county, and went into camp. It has been frequently surmised, in
the North, that Morgan crossed the Ohio river to escape from Hobson. Of
all the many wildly and utterly absurd ideas which have prevailed
regarding the late war, this is, perhaps, the most preposterous. It is
difficult to understand how, even the people whose ideas of military
operations are derived from a vague rendition of the newspaper phrases
of "bagging" armies, "dispositions made to capture," "deriving material
advantages," when the derivers were running like scared deer, it is hard
to comprehend how even such people, if they ever look upon maps, or
reflect for a moment upon what they read, can receive, as correct, such
assertions as the one under consideration. Hobson was from twenty-four
to thirty-six hours behind us. He was pursuing us, it should be stated,
with the cavalry of Judah's corps--he was, at any rate, a good fifty
miles in our rear, and could learn our track only by following it
closely. General Morgan, if anxious to escape Hobson, and actuated by no
other motive, would have turned at Bardstown, and gone out of Kentucky
through the western part of the State, where he would have encountered
no hostile force that he could not have easily repulsed. It was not too
late to pursue the same general route when we were at Garnettsville.
Roads, traversable by artillery and excellent for cavalry, ran thence in
every direction. Hobson would have had as little chance to intercept us,
as a single hunter has to corner a wild horse in an open prairie. To
rush across the Ohio river, as a means of escape, would have been the
choice of an idiot, and yet such conduct has been ascribed to the
shrewdest, most wide-awake, most far-seeing Captain (in his own chosen
method of warfare), the greatest master of "cavalry strategy," that ever
lived. That military men in the North should have entertained this
opinion, proves, only, that in armies so vast, as that which the United
States put into the field, there must necessarily be many men of very
small capacity. General Morgan certainly believed that he could, with
energy and care, preserve his command from capture after crossing the
Ohio, but he no more believed that it would be safer, after having
gained the Northern side of the river, than he believed that it was
safer in Kentucky than south of the Cumberland.
The division marched from Garnettsville, shortly after midnight, and by
9 or 10 A.M. we were in Brandenburg, upon the banks of the river. Here
we found Captains Samuel Taylor and Clay Merriwether, awaiting our
arrival. They had succeeded in capturing two fine steamers; one had been
taken at the wharf, and, manning her strongly, they cruised about the
river until they found and caught the other. We were rejoined here by
another officer, whose course had been somewhat eccentric, and his
adventure very romantic. This was Captain Thomas Hines, of the Ninth
Kentucky, then enjoying a high reputation in our command for skill,
shrewdness, and exceeding gallantry, but destined to become much more
widely celebrated. While the division was lying along the Cumberland in
May, Captain Hines had been sent to Clinton county, with the men of the
Ninth Kentucky, whose horses were especially unserviceable, to place
them where, with good feeding, rest and attention, the stock might be
recruited--to establish, in other words, what was technically known as a
"convalescent camp," and in regimental "slang," a "dead horse camp."
Captain Hines established his camp and put it into successful operation,
but then sought permission to undertake more active and exciting work.
He was not exactly the style of man to stay quiet at a "convalescent
camp;" it would have been as difficult to keep him there, as to confine
Napoleon to Elba, or force the "Wandering Jew" to remain on a cobbler's
bench. He obtained from General Morgan an order to take such of his men
as were best mounted, and scout "north of the Cumberland." He,
therefore, selected thirty or forty of his "convalescents," whose horses
were able to hobble, and crossed the river with them. Immediately
exchanging his crippled horses for good, sound ones, he commenced a very
pleasant and adventurous career, which lasted for some weeks. He
attacked and harassed the marching columns of the enemy, and kept the
smaller garrisons constantly in fear, and moved about with such
celerity that there was no getting at him, occasionally interluding his
other occupations by catching and burning a railroad train. He once came
very near being entirely destroyed. The enemy succeeded, on one
occasion, in eluding his vigilance and surprising him. While he and his
men were peacefully bathing in a creek, molesting no one, they were
suddenly attacked. Several were captured and the rest were dispersed,
but Hines collected them, again, in a day or two.
After a while, finding Kentucky grow warm for him, and not wishing to
return to the command to be remanded to the "convalescent camp," he
determined to cross over into Indiana and try and stir up the
"copperheads." He thought that (according to the tenor of his
instructions), he had the right to do so. The order did not specify when
he should return from his scout, and Indiana was certainly "north of the
Cumberland." He accordingly crossed into Indiana--made his presence
known to the people of the State in various ways--and penetrated as far
into the interior of the State, as Seymour, at the junction of the Ohio
and Mississippi and Cincinnati and Indianapolis Railroads. He here
effected a junction with a greatly more numerous body of militia, which
induced him to retrace his steps rapidly to the Ohio (which he
recrossed), and arrived at Brandenburg on the very day that we got
there. We found him leaning against the side of the wharf-boat, with
sleepy, melancholy look--apparently the most listless, inoffensive youth
that was ever imposed upon. I do not know what explanation he made
General Morgan (of the lively manner in which he had acted under his
order), but it seemed to be perfectly satisfactory, and he was ordered
to report to Colonel Morgan to assume the position left vacant by the
wounding of Captain Franks.
Just before the crossing of the river was commenced, an unexpected
fusillade was delivered, from the Indiana shore, upon the men who showed
themselves in the little town and upon the boats, which was soon
followed by the sharp report of a rifled-cannon. The river at this
point is some eight hundred or a thousand yards wide--and the musketry
produced no effect. The shell, however, from the piece of artillery
pitched into a group on the river bank, scattering it, and wounding
Captain Wilson, Quartermaster of the First Brigade. The mist, hanging
thick over the river, had prevented us from seeing the parties who
directed this firing, take position. Soon the mist lifted or was
dispersed by the bright sun, and disclosed a squad of combatants posted
behind one or two small houses, a clump of hay stacks, and along the
brink of the river on the other side. Apparently, from the mixture of
uniforms and plain clothes, which could be discovered by the glass, this
force was composed of militia and some regular troops. Several shots
were fired from the gun while we were getting our pieces in readiness to
reply--but as soon as Lawrence opened upon them with his Parrots, a
manifest disposition to retire was seen among our friends who had shown
themselves so anxious to give us a warm and early welcome. They
attempted to carry the piece of artillery off with them, but were
induced by Lawrence to relinquish it. It was mounted upon the wheels of
a wagon from which the body had been removed, and, as they moved it by
hand, its transportation was difficult and tedious and very disagreeable
under fire.
Leaving the piece, they fell back to a wooded ridge five or six hundred
yards from the river bank and parallel with it. The Second Kentucky and
Ninth Tennessee were immediately put across the river, leaving their
horses on the Kentucky shore, and were formed under the bluff bank. As
they ascended the bank they were greeted by a volley from the enemy
which did no damage, and Colonel Ward and Major Webber at once pressed
them on toward the ridge. Scarcely had the boats returned, and while yet
the two regiments on the other side were moving across the open fields
between the river and the ridge, when a small boat which had for some
minutes been in sight, steaming rapidly down the river, began to take a
part in the affair. We had watched her with great interest, and were
inclined to think, from her bold unhesitating advance, that she was a
river gunboat, and when she came within a mile of the town all doubts
upon the subject were dispelled. Suddenly checking her way, she tossed
her snub nose defiantly, like an angry beauty of the coal-pits, sidled a
little toward the town, and commenced to scold. A bluish-white,
funnel-shaped cloud spouted out from her left-hand bow and a shot flew
at the town, and then changing front forward, she snapped a shell at the
men on the other side. The ridge was soon gained by the regiments,
however, the enemy not remaining to contest it, and they were sheltered
by it from the gunboat's fire. I wish I were sufficiently master of
nautical phraseology to do justice to this little vixen's style of
fighting, but she was so unlike a horse, or a piece of light artillery,
even, that I can not venture to attempt it. She was boarded up tightly
with tiers of heavy oak planking, in which embrasures were cut for the
guns, of which she carried three bronze twelve-pounder howitzers,
apparently. Captain Byrnes transferred the two Parrots to an eminence
just upon the river and above the town, and answered her fire. His solid
shot skipped about her, in close proximity, and his shells burst close
to her, but none seemed to touch her--although it was occasionally hard
to tell whether she was hit or not. This duel was watched with the most
breathless interest by the whole division; the men crowded in intense
excitement upon the bluffs, near the town, to witness it, and General
Morgan exhibited an emotion he rarely permitted to be seen.
Two of his best regiments were separated from him by the broad river,
and were dismounted, a condition which always appeals to a cavalryman's
strongest sympathies; they might at any moment, he feared, be attacked
by overwhelming forces, for he did not know what was upon the other
side, or how large a swarm Hines had stirred up in the hornet's nest. He
himself might be attacked, if delayed too long, by the enemy that he
well knew must be following his track. Independently of all
considerations of immediate danger, he was impatient at delay and
anxious to try his fortune in the new field he had selected. There were
many with him who could appreciate his feelings. Behind us two broad
States separated us from our friends--a multitude of foes, although we
thought little of them, were gathering in our rear.
On the other side of the great river were our comrades needing our aid,
perhaps never to be received. When we, too, were across, we would stand
face to face with the hostile and angry North--an immense and infuriated
population, and a soldiery out-numbering us twenty to one, would
confront us. Telegraph lines, tracing the country in every direction,
would tell constantly of our movements; railways would bring assailants
against us from every quarter, and we would have to run this gauntlet,
night and day, without rest or one moment of safety, for six hundred
miles. As we looked on the river, rolling before us, we felt that it
divided us from a momentous future, and we were eager to learn our fate.
After an hour perhaps had elapsed, but which seemed a dozen, the gunboat
backed out and steamed up the river. Her shells had nearly all burst
short, doing no damage. The boats were put to work again without a
moment's delay, to ferry the command over. First, the horses of the men
on the other side were carried to them, affording them exquisite
gratification. Although no time was lost, and the boats were of good
capacity, it was nearly dark before the first brigade was all across.
The gunboat returned about five P.M., accompanied by a consort, but a
few shots from the Parrots, which had been kept in position, drove them
away without any intermission having occurred in the ferriage. The
second brigade and the artillery were gotten across by midnight. One of
the boats, which was in Government employ, was burned; the other was
released.
The first brigade encamped that night about six miles from the river. "A
great fear" had fallen upon the inhabitants of that part of the State of
Indiana. They had left their houses, with open doors and unlocked
larders, and had fled to the thickets and "caves of the hills." At the
houses at which I stopped, every thing was just in the condition in
which the fugitive owners had left it, an hour or two before. A bright
fire was blazing upon the kitchen hearth, bread half made up was in the
tray, and many indications convinced us that we had interrupted
preparations for supper. The chickens were strolling before the door
with a confidence that was touching, but misplaced. General Morgan rode
by soon afterward, and was induced to "stop all night." We completed the
preparations, so suddenly abandoned, and made the best show for Indiana
hospitality that was possible under the disturbing circumstances.
On the next day, the 9th, the division marched at an early hour, the
second brigade in advance. At the little town of Corydon, Colonel
Morgan's advance guard found a body of militia posted behind rail
barricades. He charged them, but they resolutely defended their rail
piles, killing and wounding several men, among the latter Lieutenant
Thorpe, of Company A, Second Kentucky, Colonel Morgan's acting Adjutant,
and a very fine young officer. A demonstration was made upon the flank
of the enemy, by one regiment of the second brigade, and Colonel Morgan
again advanced upon their front, when, not understanding such a fashion
of fighting upon two or three sides at once, the militia broke and ran,
with great rapidity, into the town, their progress accelerated (as they
got fairly into the streets) by a shot dropped among them from one of
the pieces.
Passing through Corydon, we took the Salem road, and encamped some
sixteen or eighteen miles from the latter place. On the morning of the
10th, we set out for Salem. Major Webber was ordered to take the
advance, and let nothing stop him. He accordingly put his regiment at
the head of the column, and struck out briskly. Lieutenant Welsh, of
Company K, had the extreme advance with twelve men. As he neared Salem,
he saw the enemy forming to receive him, and, without hesitation, dashed
in among them. The party he attacked was about one hundred and fifty
strong, but badly armed and perfectly raw, and he quickly routed them.
He pursued as they fled, and soon, supported by Captain W.J. Jones'
company, drove them pell-mell into the town. Here some two or three
hundred were collected, but, as the Second Kentucky came pouring upon
them, they fled in haste, scattering their guns in the streets. A small
swivel, used by the younger population of Salem to celebrate Christmas
and the Fourth of July, had been planted to receive us: about eighteen
inches long, it was loaded to the muzzle, and mounted in the public
square by being propped against a stick of fire wood. It was not fired,
however, for the man deputed to perform that important duty, somewhat
astounded by the sudden dash into the town, dropped the coal of fire
with which he should have touched it off, and before he could get
another the rebels captured the piece. The shuddering imagination
refuses to contemplate the consequences had that swivel been touched
off. Major Webber might have had some trouble with this force, which was
being rapidly augmented, but for the promptness and vigor of his attack.
He made favorable mention of Captain Cooper, of Company K, and
Lieutenant West, of Company I, for gallant and judicious conduct.
A short halt was made in Salem to feed men and horses, and during that
time several railroad bridges were burned. The Provost guard had great
difficulty in restraining the men from pillaging, and was unsuccessful
in some instances, Major Steele, of the Third Kentucky, had been
appointed Provost Marshal of the division, and was assisted by picked
officers and men from each of the brigades. Major Steele was a most
resolute, vigilant, energetic officer, and yet he found it impossible to
stop a practice which neither company nor regimental officers were able
to aid him in suppressing. This disposition for wholesale plunder
exceeded any thing that any of us had ever seen before. The men seemed
actuated by a desire to "pay off" in the "enemy's country" all scores
that the Federal army had chalked up in the South. The great cause for
apprehension, which our situation might have inspired, seemed only to
make them reckless. Calico was the staple article of appropriation--each
man (who could get one) tied a bolt of it to his saddle, only to throw
it away and get a fresh one at the first opportunity. They did not
pillage with any sort of method or reason--it seemed to be a mania,
senseless and purposeless. One man carried a bird-cage, with three
canaries in it, for two days. Another rode with a chafing-dish, which
looked like a small metallic coffin, on the pummel of his saddle, until
an officer forced him to throw it away. Although the weather was
intensely warm, another, still, slung seven pairs of skates around his
neck, and chuckled over his acquisition. I saw very few articles of real
value taken--they pillaged like boys robbing an orchard. I would not
have believed that such a passion could have been developed, so
ludicrously, among any body of civilized men. At Piketon, Ohio, some
days later, one man broke through the guard posted at a store, rushed in
(trembling with excitement and avarice), and filled his pockets with
horn buttons. They would (with few exceptions) throw away their plunder
after awhile, like children tired of their toys.
Leaving Salem at one or two o'clock, we marched rapidly and steadily. At
nightfall we reached Vienna, on the Indianapolis and Jeffersonville
railroad. General Morgan placed Ellsworth in the telegraph office here,
the operator having been captured before he could give the alarm.
Ellsworth soon learned all the news to be had from Louisville and
Indianapolis, some of it valuable to us. General Morgan ascertained also
that orders had been issued to the militia to fell timber and blockade
all of the roads we would be likely to travel--our rapid marching had,
hitherto, saved us this annoyance. That night we went into camp near
Lexington, a little place six or seven miles from Vienna. General Morgan
slept in the town with a small escort, and during the night a party of
Federal cavalry entered the town and advanced as far as the house in
which he slept, but retired as suddenly as they came. We moved at an
early hour on the road to Paris--Colonel Smith was detached to feint
against Madison, in order to hold there troops who might prove
troublesome if they came out. The division moved quietly through Paris,
and in the afternoon arrived in sight of Vernon. Here Colonel Smith
rejoined us. A strong force was posted in Vernon, which General Morgan
did not care to attack. Fortunately, there were men in the command who
knew the country, and the General was enabled to carry the division
around the place to the Dupont road. Skirmishers were thrown out on the
road, leading into the town which we had left, and also upon the other
road, while this movement was being executed. General Morgan sent a
demand for the surrender of the place, which was declined, but the
officer commanding asked two hours to remove the non-combatants, which
reasonable request General Morgan granted. Humane considerations are
never inopportune. By the time that the non-combatants were safely
removed, the column had become straightened out on the new road, and the
skirmishers, after they had burned a bridge or two, were withdrawn.
We encamped that night at 12 P.M., and moved next morning at 3. The
fatigue of the marches, from the date of the crossing of the Ohio to the
period of the close of the raid, was tremendous. We had marched hard in
Kentucky, but we now averaged twenty-one hours in the saddle. Passing
through Dupont a little after daylight, a new feature in the practice of
appropriation was developed. A large meat packing establishment was in
this town, and each man had a ham slung at his saddle. There was no
difficulty at any time in supplying men and horses, in either Indiana or
Ohio--forage and provisions were to be had in abundance, stop where we
would. There is a custom prevailing in those States, which is of
admirable assistance to soldiery, and should be encouraged--a practice
of baking bread once a week in large quantities. Every house is full of
it. The people were still laboring under vast apprehensions regarding
us, and it was a rare thing to see an entire family remaining at home.
The men met us oftener in their capacity of militia than at their
houses, and the "Copperheads" and "Vallandighammers" fought harder than
the others. Wherever we passed, bridges and depots, water-tanks, etc.,
were burned and the railroads torn up, but I knew of but one private
dwelling being burned upon the entire raid, and we were fired upon from
that one. The country, for the most part, was in a high state of
cultivation, and magnificent crops of wheat, especially, attracted our
notice on all sides.
What was peculiarly noticeable, however, to men who were fighting
against these people, and just from thinned out "Dixie," was the dense
population, apparently untouched by the demands of the war. The country
was full, the towns were full, and the ranks of the militia were full. I
am satisfied that we saw often as many as ten thousand militia in one
day, posted at different points. They would frequently fight, if
attacked in strong position, but could be dispersed by maneuvering. Had
they come upon us as the fierce Kentucky Home-guards would have done, if
collected in such numbers, we could not have forced our way through
them.
In this immediate country had been recruited the regiment which burned
the homes of Company F, the Mississippi company of the Second Kentucky.
Colonel Grigsby was detached with his regiment to press on and burn the
bridges near Versailles. He dashed into the town, where several hundred
militia were collected devising the best means of defending the place,
and broke up the council. He captured a large number of horses, rather
better stock than had hitherto been procured in Indiana. Marching on
steadily all day and the greater part of the next night, we reached a
point on the Ohio and Mississippi road, twenty-five miles from Harrison,
called Summansville. Here twenty-five hundred militia lay loaded into
box cars. We halted to rest, and, unconscious of our presence, although
we were close upon them, they moved off in the morning toward
Cincinnati. Moving at 5 A.M., we reached Harrison by one o'clock of the
13th. Here General Morgan began to maneuver for the benefit of the
commanding officer, at Cincinnati. He took it for granted (for it was
utterly impossible moving as rapidly as we were forced to do, and in the
midst of a strange and hostile population, to get positive information
regarding any matter), that there was a strong force of regular troops
in Cincinnati. Burnside had them not far off, and General Morgan
supposed that they would, of course, be brought there. If we could get
past Cincinnati safely, the danger of the expedition, he thought, would
be more than half over. Here he expected to be confronted by the
concentrated forces of Judah and Burnside, and he anticipated great
difficulty in eluding or cutting his way through them. Once safely
through this peril, his escape would be certain, unless the river
remained so high that the transports could carry troops to intercept him
at the upper crossings. The cavalry following in his rear could not
overtake him as long as he kept in motion, and the infantry could not be
transported so rapidly by rail to the eastern part of the State that it
could be concentrated in sufficient strength to stop him. His object,
therefore, entertaining these views and believing that the great effort
to capture him would be made as he crossed the Hamilton and Dayton
railroad, was to deceive the enemy as to the exact point where he would
cross this road, and denude that point as much as possible of troops. He
sent detachments in various directions, seeking, however, to create the
impression that he was marching to Hamilton.
After two or three hours' halt at Harrison, the division moved directly
toward Cincinnati, the detachment coming in in the course of that
afternoon. Hoping that his previous demonstrations would induce the
sending of the bulk of the troops up the road, and that if any were left
at Cincinnati his subsequent threatening movements would cause them to
draw into the city, remain on the defensive, and permit him to pass
around it without attacking him, he sought to approach the city as
nearly as possible without actually entering it and involving his
command in a fight with any garrison which might be there. He has been
sometimes accused of a lack of enterprise in not capturing Cincinnati.
It must be remembered that Cincinnati was not the objective point of
this raid; it was not undertaken to capture that city. General Morgan
knew nothing, and, in the nature of things, could know nothing of the
condition of affairs in the city, or whether it was weakly or strongly
garrisoned.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING ROUTE TAKEN BY GEN. MORGAN Through Ohio
JULY, 1863.]
Starting that morning from a point fifty miles distant from Cincinnati,
and reaching the vicinity of the city after nightfall, he must have
possessed more than human means of obtaining information, had he known
these things then, and he did not have a rapping medium on his staff.
Moreover, of the twenty-four hundred and sixty effectives with which he
had started, he had not two thousand left. He could get fights enough to
employ this force handsomely, without running into a labyrinth of
streets, and among houses (each one of which might be made a
fortification), with the hope that the town might be unoccupied with
troops, or that it might be surrendered. Our "Copperhead friends," who
could have given us the necessary information, were too loyal, or too
busy dodging Burnside's Dutch corporals to come out.
The men in our ranks were worn down and demoralized with the tremendous
fatigue, which no man can realize or form the faintest conception of
until he has experienced it. It is as different from the fatigue of an
ordinary long march, followed by some rest, as the pain given by an
hour's deprivation of water is unlike the burning, rabid thirst of
fever. Had the city been given up to us, and had the least delay
occurred in getting boats with which to cross the river, the men would
have scattered to all quarters of the city, and twenty-four hours might
have been required to collect them. In that time the net would have been
drawn around us. But it must be borne in mind (independently of all
these considerations) that General Morgan had given himself a particular
work to accomplish. He determined, as has been stated, to traverse Ohio.
To have recrossed the river at Cincinnati, would have shortened the
raid by many days, have released the troops pursuing us, and have
abandoned the principal benefits expected to be derived from the
expedition.
In this night march around Cincinnati, we met with the greatest
difficulty in keeping the column together. The guides were all in front
with General Morgan, who rode at the head of the second brigade then
marching in advance. This brigade had no trouble consequently. But the
first brigade was embarrassed beyond measure. Cluke's regiment was
marching in the rear of the second brigade, and if it had kept closed
up, we would have had no trouble, for the entire column would have been
directed by the guides. But this regiment, although composed of superb
material, and unsurpassed in fighting qualities, had, from the period of
its organization, been under lax and careless discipline, and the effect
of it was now observable. The rear companies straggled, halted, delayed
the first brigade, for it was impossible to ascertain immediately,
whether the halt was that of the brigade in advance, or only of these
stragglers, and when forced to move on, they would go off at a gallop. A
great gap would be thus opened between the rear of one brigade and the
advance of the other, and we who were behind were forced to grope our
way as we best could. When we would come to one of the many junctions of
roads which occur in the suburbs of a large city, we would be compelled
to consult all sorts of indications in order to hit upon the right road.
The night was intensely dark, and we would set on fire large bundles of
paper, or splinters of wood to afford a light. The horses' tracks (on
roads so much traveled), would give us no clue to the route which the
other brigade had taken, at such points, but we could trace it by
noticing the direction in which the dust "settled," or floated. When the
night is calm, the dust kicked up by the passage of a large number of
horses will remain suspended in the air for a considerable length of
time, and it will also move slowly in the same direction that the horses
which have disturbed it have traveled. We could also trace the column by
the slaver dropped from the horses' mouths. It was a terrible, trying
march. Strong men fell out of their saddles, and at every halt the
officers were compelled to move continually about in their respective
companies and pull and haul the men who would drop asleep in the
road--it was the only way to keep them awake. Quite a number crept off
into the fields and slept until they were awakened by the enemy. The
rear of the first brigade was prevented from going to pieces,
principally by the energetic exertions of Colonel Grigsby. Major Steele
was sent in the extreme advance to drive pickets, scouts, and all
parties of the enemy which might be abroad from the road. He was given a
picked body of men, and executed the mission in fine style.
At length day appeared, just as we reached the last point where we had
to anticipate danger. We had passed through Glendale and across all of
the principal suburban roads, and were near the Little Miami Railroad.
Those who have marched much at night, will remember that the fresh air
of morning almost invariably has a cheering effect upon the tired and
drowsy, and awakens and invigorates them. It had this effect upon our
men on this occasion, and relieved us also from the necessity of groping
our way.
We crossed the railroad without meeting with opposition, and halted to
feed the horses in sight of Camp Dennison. After a short rest here, and
a picket skirmish, we resumed our march, burning in this neighborhood a
park of Government wagons. That evening at 4 P.M. we were at
Williamsburg, twenty-eight miles east of Cincinnati, having marched,
since leaving Summansville, in Indiana, in a period of about thirty-five
hours, more than ninety miles--the greatest march that even Morgan had
ever made.
Feeling comparatively safe here, General Morgan permitted the division
to go into camp and remain during the night. One great drawback upon our
marches, was the inferiority of the Indiana and Ohio horses for such
service. After parting with our Kentucky stock, the men were compelled
to exchange constantly. Sometimes three or four times in twenty four
hours. The horses obtained were, not only unable to endure the hard
riding for a reasonable length of time, but they were also unshod and
grew lame directly. After leaving Williamsburg, we marched through
Piketon (Colonel Morgan was sent with his regiment by way of
Georgetown), Jackson, Vinton and Berlin (at which latter place we had a
skirmish with the militia), and several towns whose names I have
forgotten, as well as the order in which they came. In the skirmish at
Berlin, Tom Murphy, popularly known as the "Wild Irishman," and
technically described by his officers as the "goingest man" (in the
advance-guard), was severely wounded. Small fights with the militia were
of daily occurrence. They hung around the column, wounding two or three
men every day and sometimes killing one. We captured hundreds of them
daily, but could only turn them loose again after destroying their guns.
On one occasion a very gallant fellow of the Second Kentucky, Charlie
Haddox, came upon five of them, who had made some of the command
prisoners. He captured them, in turn, and brought them in. The prisoners
who could be taken by such men hardly deserved to be released. Two men
distinguished themselves very much as advance videttes, privates Carneal
Warfield and Burks. The latter frequently caused the capture of parties
of militia, without blood-shed on either side, by boldly riding up to
them, representing himself as one of the advance guard of a body of
Federal cavalry, and detaining them in conversation until the column
arrived. But it is impossible to recount the one tenth part of the
incidents of this nature which occurred. At Wilkesville we halted again
before nightfall, and remained until 3 o'clock next morning. The
militia, about this time, turned their attention seriously to felling
trees, tearing up bridges, and impeding our progress in every
conceivable way. The advance guard was forced to carry axes to cut away
the frequent blockades. In passing near Pomeroy, on the 18th, there was
one continual fight, but, now, not with the militia only, for some
regular troops made their appearance and took part in the programme. The
road we were traveling runs for several miles at no great distance from
the town of Pomeroy, which is situated on the Ohio river. Many by-roads
run from the main one into the town, and at the mouths of these roads we
always found the enemy. The road runs, also, for nearly five miles
through a ravine, and steep hills upon each side of it. These hills were
occupied, at various points, by the enemy, and we had to run the
gauntlet. Colonel Grigsby took the lead with the Sixth Kentucky, and
dashed through at a gallop, halting when fired on, dismounting his men
and dislodging the enemy, and again resuming his rapid march. Major
Webber brought up the rear of the division and held back the enemy, who
closed eagerly upon our track.
About 1 o'clock of that day we reached Chester and halted, for an hour
and a half, to enable the column to close up, to breathe the horses, and
also to obtain a guide, if possible (General Morgan declaring that he
would no longer march without one). That halt proved disastrous--it
brought us to Buffington ford after night had fallen, and delayed our
attempt at crossing until the next morning.
Before quitting Ohio, it is but just to acknowledge the kind hospitality
of these last two days. At every house that we approached, the dwellers
thereof, themselves absent, perhaps unable to endure a meeting that
would have been painful, had left warm pies, freshly baked, upon the
tables. This touching attention to our tastes was appreciated. Some
individuals were indelicate enough to hint that the pies were intended
to propitiate us and prevent the plunder of the houses.
We reached Portland, a little village upon the bank of the river, and a
short distance above Buffington Island, about 8 P.M., and the night was
one of solid darkness. General Morgan consulted one or two of his
officers upon the propriety of at once attacking an earthwork, thrown up
to guard the ford. From all the information he could gather, this work
was manned with about three hundred infantry--regular troops--and two
heavy guns were mounted in it. Our arrival at this place after dark had
involved us in a dilemma. If we did not cross the river that night,
there was every chance of our being attacked on the next day by heavy
odds. The troops we had seen at Pomeroy were, we at once and correctly
conjectured, a portion of the infantry which had been sent after us from
Kentucky, and they had been brought by the river, which had risen
several feet in the previous week, to intercept us. If transports could
pass Pomeroy, the General knew that they could also run up to the bar at
Buffington Island. The transports would certainly be accompanied by
gunboats, and our crossing could have been prevented by the latter
alone, because our artillery ammunition was nearly exhausted--there was
not more than three cartridges to the piece, and we could not have
driven off gunboats with small arms. Moreover, if it was necessary, the
troops could march from Pomeroy to Buffington by an excellent road, and
reach the latter place in the morning. This they did. General Morgan
fully appreciated these reasons for getting across the river that night,
as did those with whom he advised, but there were, also, very strong
reasons against attacking the work at night; and without the capture of
the work, which commanded the ford, it would be impossible to cross. The
night, as I have stated, was thoroughly dark. Attacks in the dark are
always hazardous experiments--in this case it would have been doubly so.
We knew nothing of the ground, and could not procure guides. Our choice
of the direction in which to move to the attack would have been purely
guess work. The defenders of the work had only to lie still and fire
with artillery and musketry directly to their front, but the assailants
would have had a line to preserve, and would have had to exercise great
care lest they should fall foul of each other in the obscurity. If this
is a difficult business at all times, how much is the danger and trouble
increased when it is attempted with broken-down and partially
demoralized men?
General Morgan feared, too, that if the attacking party was repulsed, it
would come back in such disorder and panic that the whole division would
be seriously and injuriously affected. He determined, therefore, to take
the work at early dawn and instantly commence the crossing, trusting
that it would be effected rapidly and before the enemy arrived. By
abandoning the long train of wagons which had been collected, the
wounded men, and the artillery, a crossing might have been made, with
little difficulty, higher up the river at deeper fords, which we could
have reached by a rapid march before the enemy came near them. But
General Morgan was determined (after having already hazarded so much) to
save all if possible, at the risk of losing all. He ordered me to place
two regiments of my brigade in position, as near the earthwork as I
thought proper, and attack it at daybreak. I accordingly selected the
Fifth and Sixth Kentucky, and formed them about four hundred yards from
the work, or from the point where I judged it to be located. Lieutenant
Lawrence was also directed to place his Parrots upon a tongue of land
projecting northward from a range of hills running parallel with the
river. It was intended that he should assist the attacking party, if,
for any reason, artillery should be needed. Many efforts were made,
during the night, to find other fords, but unsuccessfully.
As soon as the day dawned, the Fifth and Sixth Kentucky were moved
against the work, but found it unoccupied. It had been evacuated during
the night. Had our scouts, posted to observe it, been vigilant, and had
this evacuation, which occurred about two P.M., been discovered and
reported, we could have gotten almost the entire division across before
the troops coming from Pomeroy arrived. The guns in the work had been
dismounted and rolled over the bluff. I immediately sent Gen. Morgan
information of the evacuation of the work, and instructed Colonel Smith
to take command of the two regiments and move some four or five hundred
yards further on the Pomeroy road, by which I supposed that the garrison
had retreated. In a few minutes I heard the rattle of musketry in the
direction that the regiments had moved, and riding forward to ascertain
what occasioned it, found that Colonel Smith had unexpectedly come upon
a Federal force advancing upon this road. He attacked and dispersed it,
taking forty or fifty prisoners and a piece of artillery, and killing
and wounding several. This force turned out to be General Judah's
advance guard, and his command was reported to be eight or ten thousand
strong, and not far off. Among the wounded was one of his staff, and his
Adjutant-General was captured. I instructed Colonel Smith to bring the
men back to the ground where they had been formed to attack the work,
and rode myself to consult General Morgan and receive his orders. He
instructed me to hold the enemy in check, and call for such troops as I
might need for that purpose. This valley which we had entered the night
before, and had bivouacked in, was about a mile long, and perhaps eight
hundred yards wide at the southern extremity (the river runs here nearly
due north and south), and gradually narrows toward the other end, until
the ridge, which is its western boundary, runs to the water's edge. This
ridge is parallel with the river at the southern end of the valley, but
a few hundred yards further to the northward both river and ridge
incline toward each other. About half way of the valley (equi-distant
from either end) the road, by which we had marched from Chester, comes
in.
Colonel Smith had posted his men, in accordance with directions given
him, at the southern extremity of the valley, with the ridge upon his
right flank. At this point the ridge, I should also state, bends almost
at right angles to the westward. As I returned from consultation with
General Morgan, I found both of the regiments under Colonel Smith in
full retreat. When the main body of the enemy (which was now close upon
us) appeared, an order had been issued by some one to "rally to horses."
While doing this, the line was charged by the enemy's cavalry, of which
they had three regiments, two of them, the Seventh and Eighth Michigan,
were very fine ones. A detachment of the Fifth Indiana (led by a very
gallant officer, Lieutenant O'Neil) headed this charge. The men rallied
and turned, as soon as called on to do so, and had no difficulty in
driving back the cavalry, but a portion of the Fifth Kentucky was cut
off by this charge, and did not take part in the fight which succeeded.
These two regiments were not more than two hundred and fifty strong
each, and they were dismounted again, and formed across the valley. The
Parrot guns had been captured, and, although our line was formed close
to them, they were not again in our possession. I sent several couriers
to General Morgan, asking for the Second Kentucky, a portion of which I
wished to post upon the ridge, and I desired to strengthen the thin,
weak line with the remainder. Colonel's Johnson's rear videttes (still
kept during the night upon the Chester road) had a short time previously
been driven in, and he had formed his brigade to receive the enemy
coming from that direction. Colonel Johnson offered me a detachment of
his own brigade with which to occupy the part of the ridge immediately
upon my right--the necessity of holding it was immediately apparent to
him. Believing that the Second Kentucky would soon arrive, I declined
his offer.
The force advancing upon the Chester road was General Hobson's, which
our late delays had permitted to overtake us. Neither Judah nor Hobson
was aware of the other's vicinity, until apprised of it by the sound of
their respective guns. We could not have defeated either alone, for
Judah was several thousand strong, and Hobson three thousand. We were
scarcely nineteen hundred strong, and our ammunition was nearly
exhausted--either shot away or worn out in the pouches or
cartridge-boxes. The men, had on an average, not more than five rounds
in their boxes. If, however, either Judah or Hobson had attacked us
singly, we could have made good our retreat, in order, and with little
loss.
The attack commenced from both directions, almost simultaneously, and at
the same time the gunboats steamed up and commented shelling us without
fear or favor. I heartily wished that _their_ fierce ardor, the result
of a feeling of perfect security, could have been subjected to the test
of two or three shots through their hulls. They were working, as well as
I could judge, five or six guns, Hobson two, and Judah five or six. The
shells coming thus from three different directions, seemed to fill the
air with their fragments. Colonel Johnson's line, confronting Hobson,
was formed at right angles to mine, and upon the level and unsheltered
surface of the valley, each was equally exposed to shots aimed at the
other. In addition to the infantry deployed in front of my line, the
ridge upon the right of it was soon occupied by one of the Michigan
regiments, dismounted and deployed as skirmishers. The peculiar
formation we were forced to adopt, exposed our entire force engaged to a
severe cross fire of musketry. The Second Kentucky and Ninth Tennessee,
of the first brigade, were not engaged at all--nor the Eight and
Eleventh Kentucky, of the second brigade. These regiments, however, were
as completely under fire, in the commencement of the action, as were the
others which were protecting the retreat.
The scene in the rear of the lines engaged, was one of indescribable
confusion. While the bulk of the regiments, which General Morgan was
drawing off, were moving from the field in perfect order, there were
many stragglers from each, who were circling about the valley in a
delirium of fright, clinging instinctively, in all their terror, to
bolts of calico and holding on to led horses, but changing the direction
in which they galloped, with every shell which whizzed or burst near
them. The long train of wagons and ambulances dashed wildly in the only
direction which promised escape, and becoming locked and entangled with
each other in their flight, many were upset, and terrified horses broke
lose from them and plunged wildly through the mass. Some of them in
striving to make their way out of the valley, at the northern end, ran
foul of the section of howitzers attached to the second brigade, and
guns and wagons were rolled headlong into the steep ravine. Occasionally
a solid shot or shell would strike one and bowl it over like a tumbled
ten-pin. All this shelling did little damage, and only some twenty-odd
men were killed by the musketry--the enemy lost quite as many--but the
display of force against us, the cross fire, and our lack of ammunition,
seriously disheartened the men, already partially demoralized by the
great and unremitted fatigue.
The left flank of my line, between which and the river there was an
interval of at least three hundred yards, was completely turned, and the
Sixth Kentucky was almost surrounded. This regiment (under the command
of Major William Bullitt, an officer of the calmest and most perfect
bravery), behaved nobly. It stood the heavy attack of the enemy like a
bastion. At length seeing that General Morgan had gotten out of the
valley with the rest of the division, Colonel Johnson and myself, upon
consultation, determined to withdraw simultaneously. We had checked this
superior force for more than half an hour--which, as much as our
assailants boasted of their victory, was quite as good as an equal
number of the best of them could have done against such odds.
The men were remounted without confusion, and retreated in column of
fours from right of companies, and for quite a mile in perfect order.
The Sixth Kentucky formed to the "rear into line" three times, and with
empty guns, kept the pursuing cavalry at bay. But when we neared the
other end of the valley and saw that there were but two avenues of
escape from it--the men broke ranks and rushed for them. In a moment,
each was blocked. The gunboats sought to rake these roads with
grape--and although they aimed too high to inflict much injury, the hiss
of the dreaded missiles increased the panic. The Seventh Michigan soon
came up and dashed pell-mell into the crowd of fugitives. Colonel Smith,
Captain Campbell, Captain Thorpe, and myself, and some fifty other
officers and men, were forced by the charge of this regiment into a
ravine on the left of the road and soon afterward captured. Captain
Thorpe saved me from capture at an earlier date, only to ultimately
share my fate. He had acted as Adjutant General of the First Brigade,
since the detachment of Captain Davis, and had performed all of his
duties with untiring assiduity and perfect efficiency. On this day,
there was allowed opportunity for the display of courage only, and for
that he was ever distinguished.
About seven hundred prisoners were taken from us in this fight. Among
the officers captured were Colonels Ward and Morgan, Lieutenant Colonel
Huffman, who was also severely wounded, and Majors Bullock and Bullitt.
On the next day, the 20th, we were marched down the river bank some ten
miles to the transport which was to take us to Cincinnati, and she
steamed off as soon as we were aboard of her. A portion of the Ninth
Tennessee had been put across the river, in a small flat, before the
fight fairly commenced, and these men, under command of Captain
Kirkpatrick, pressed horses and made their escape. Colonel Grigsby and
Captain Byrnes also crossed the river here, and succeeded in escaping.
Between eleven and twelve hundred men retreated with General Morgan,
closely pursued by Hobson's cavalry--the indefatigable Woolford, as
usual, in the lead. Some three hundred of the command crossed the river
at a point about twenty miles above Buffington. Colonel Johnson and his
staff swam the river here and got safely ashore, with the exception of
two or three of the latter, who were drowned in the attempt.
The arrival of the gun boats prevented the entire force from crossing.
General Morgan had gained the middle of the river, and, having a strong
horse, could have gained the other shore without difficulty, but seeing
that the bulk of his command would be forced to remain on the Ohio side,
he returned to it. At this point, a negro boy named Box, a great
favorite in the Second Kentucky, thorough rebel and deeply impressed
with a sense of his own importance, entered the river and started
across; General Morgan called to him to return, fearing that he would be
drowned. "Marse John," said Box, "If dey catches you, dey may parole
you, but if dis nigger is cotched in a free State he ain't a gwine to
git away while de war lasts." He swam the river safely although nearly
run down by a gun boat. From this time, for six days, it was a continual
race and scramble. That men could have endured it, after the previous
exhausting marches, is almost incredible.
The brigades were reorganized. Colonel Cluke was placed in command of
the second, Major Webber of the first, each was a little more than four
hundred strong. "The bold Cluke" had need of all of his audacity and
vigor during these six days of trial. It is impossible for the reader to
appreciate the true condition in which these brave men were placed. Worn
down by tremendous and long sustained exertion, encompassed by a
multitude of foes, and fresh ones springing up in their path at every
mile, allowed no rest, but driven on night and day; attacked, harassed,
intercepted at every moment, disheartened by the disasters already
suffered--how magnificent was the nerve, energy and resolution which
enabled them to bear up against all this and struggle so gallantly to
the very last against capture. Major Webber had long been suffering from
a painful and exhausting disease, and when he started upon the raid he
could not climb into his saddle without assistance. But he could not
endure the thought of being absent from such an expedition. He was one
of the very best officers in the Confederate cavalry, and his ideas of
duty were almost fanatical. All through the long march to Buffington, he
rode at the head of the "old regulars," without a murmur escaping his
lips to tell of the pain which paled his brave, manly face, but could
not bend his erect form. Of his conduct after the Buffington disaster,
General Morgan, and his comrades spoke in enthusiastic praise--one
officer in describing his unflinching steadiness called him the "Iron
man." No description could do justice to these six days, and I will not
attempt one. One incident will serve to show how constantly the enemy
pressed the command. Once, when there seemed leisure for it, General
Morgan called a council of his officers. While it was in session, the
enemy were skirmishing with the advance and rear-guards of the column,
and were upon both flanks. A bullet struck within two inches of the
General's head, while he was courteously listening to an opinion. When
the council was closed, General Morgan moved the column back toward
"Blennerhassett's Island," where he had previously attempted to cross
the river. Clouds of dust marked his march (although he quitted the main
road) and also the track of his enemies, and in that way the exact
position of all the columns was known to each. That night he halted with
a bold mountain upon one side of him and the enemy on the other three.
His pursuers evidently thought that the morning would witness his
surrender, for they made no effort to force him to yield that evening.
But when night had fairly fallen and the camp fires of his foes were
burning brightly, he formed his men, partially ascended the mountain,
stole noiselessly and in single file along its rough slope and by
midnight was out of the trap, and again working hard for safety.
Here is a description from Major Webber's diary, of how General Morgan
eluded the enemy posted to ensnare him when he should cross the
Muskingum. He had been compelled to drive off a strong force in order to
obtain a crossing; after he had crossed he found himself thus situated.
"The enemy had fallen back on all of the roads--guarding each one with a
force in ambush much larger than ours--and to make our way through
seemed utterly impossible; while Hobson had made his appearance with a
large force on the opposite bank of the Muskingham so that to retrace
our steps would be ruin. Finding every road strongly guarded, and every
hill covered with troops, it would have been impossible for any one
except Morgan to have led a column out of such a place, and he did it by
what the citizens tell us, is the only place which a horse can go; and
that down a narrow pass leading up a narrow spring branch hundreds of
feet below the tops of the hills, the perpendicular sides of which
pressed closely on our horses as we passed in single file. And then we
went up another hill, or rather mountain side, up which nobody but a
Morgan man could have carried a horse. Up that hill, for at least one
thousand feet, we led our tired horses, where it seemed that a goat
couldn't climb, until we reached the plain, and were soon in the rear of
the enemy and on our road again. Colonel Cluke who was in the rear lost
two men killed.
In looking around for a place to carry the column, Adjutant S.F. McKee
and two of our men ran into an ambuscade, and were fired on, about
thirty yards distant, by three hundred men, without striking either of
them or their horses." But all this brave, persistent effort, was
unavailing. General Morgan maintained his high spirit to the last, and
seemed untouched by the weariness which bore down every one else, but he
was forced at last to turn at bay, and a fresh disaster on the 26th,
reducing his command to two hundred and fifty men, and a fresh swarm of
enemies gathering around this remnant, left him no alternative (in
justice to his men) but surrender. I may be permitted to mention (with
natural pride), that the last charge made upon this expedition, was made
by Company C, of my old regiment, the Second Kentucky, the "Regulars."
This company had maintained its organization and discipline without any
deterioration, although greatly reduced in numbers. In this last fight,
it was ordered to charge a body of Federal cavalry, who were dismounted
and lay behind a worm fence, firing upon the column with their Spencer
rifles. Led by its gallant Captain, Ralph Sheldon, one of the best of
our _best_, officers, this company dashed down upon the enemy. The tired
horses breasted the fence, without being able to clear it, knocking off
the top rails. But with their deadly revolvers our boys soon
accomplished the mission upon which they were sent.
General Morgan surrendered in a very peculiar manner. He had, many days
before, heard of the retreat of General Lee, after Gettysburg, from
Pennsylvania, and of the fall of Vicksburg. In at least twenty towns
through which we had passed, in Indiana and Ohio, we had witnessed the
evidences of the illuminations in honor of these events. He feared
that, in consequence of the great excess of prisoners thus coming in
Federal possession, the cartel (providing for the exchange of prisoners
and the paroling of the excess upon either side, within a short period
after their capture) would be broken. He was anxious, therefore, to
surrender "upon terms." Aware that he was not likely to get such terms
as he wished, from any officer of the regular troops that were pursuing
him, unless he might happen to hit upon Woolford, who was as noted for
generosity to prisoners (if he respected their prowess) as for vigor and
gallantry in the field, he looked around for some militia officer who
might serve his turn. In the extreme eastern part of Ohio (where he now
was), he came into the "district" of a Captain Burbeck, who had his
militia under arms. General Morgan sent a message to Captain Burbeck,
under flag of truce, requesting an interview with him. Burbeck consented
to meet him, and, after a short conference, General Morgan concluded a
treaty with him, by which he (Morgan) engaged to take and disturb
nothing, and do no sort of damage in Burbeck's district, and Burbeck, on
his part, covenanted to guide and escort Morgan to the Pennsylvania
line. After riding a few miles, side by side, with his host, General
Morgan, espying a long cloud of dust rolling rapidly upon a course
parallel with his own (about a mile distant), and gaining his front,
thought it was time to act. So he interrupted a pleasant conversation,
by suddenly asking Burbeck how he would like to receive his (Morgan's)
surrender. Burbeck answered that it would afford him inexpressible
satisfaction to do so. "But," said Morgan, "perhaps you would not give
me such terms as I wish." "General Morgan," replied Burbeck, "you might
write your own terms, and I would grant them." "Very well, then," said
Morgan; "it is a bargain. I will surrender to you." He, accordingly,
formally surrendered to Captain Burbeck, of the Ohio militia, upon
condition that officers and men were to be paroled, the latter retaining
their horses, and the former horses and side-arms. When General
Shackleford (Hobson's second in command, and the officer who was
conducting the pursuit in that immediate region) arrived, he at once
disapproved this arrangement, and took measures to prevent its being
carried into effect. Some officers who had once been Morgan's prisoners,
were anxious that it should be observed, and Woolford generously
interested himself to have it done. The terms of this surrender were not
carried out. The cartel (as Morgan had anticipated) had been repudiated,
and the terms for which he had stipulated, under that apprehension, were
repudiated also.
Although this expedition resulted disastrously, it was, even as a
failure, incomparably the most brilliant raid of the entire war. The
purposes sought to be achieved by it were grander and more important,
the conception of the plan which should regulate it, was more masterly,
and the skill with which it was conducted is unparalleled in the history
of such affairs. It was no ride across a country stripped of troops,
with a force larger than any it should chance to encounter.
It was not an expedition started from a point impregnably garrisoned, to
dash by a well marked path to another point occupied by a friendly army.
It differed from even the boldest of Confederate raids, not only in that
it was vastly more extended, but also in the nerve with which the great
natural obstacles were placed between the little band with which it was
undertaken and home, and the unshrinking audacity with which that slight
force penetrated into a populous and intensely hostile territory, and
confidently exposed itself to such tremendous odds, and such
overwhelming disadvantages. Over one hundred thousand men were in arms
to catch Morgan (although not all employed at one time and place), and
every advantage in the way of transporting troops, obtaining
information, and disposing forces to intercept or oppose him, was
possessed by his enemy, and yet his wily strategy enabled him to make
his way to the river, at the very point where he had contemplated
recrossing it when he started from, Tennessee; and he was prevented from
recrossing and effecting his escape (which would then have been
certain) only by the river having risen at a season at which it had not
risen for more than twenty years before.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING ROUTE THROUGH VIRGINIA _Of those who made_
THEIR ESCAPE FROM OHIO, _July and August 1863_.]
The objects of the raid were accomplished. General Bragg's retreat was
unmolested by any flanking forces of the enemy, and I think that
military men, who will review all the facts, will pronounce that this
expedition delayed for weeks the fall of East Tennessee, and prevented
the timely reinforcement of Rosecrans by troops that would otherwise
have participated in the battle of Chickamauga. It destroyed Morgan's
division, however, and left but a remnant of the Morgan cavalry. The
companies in Kentucky became disintegrated--the men were either captured
or so dispersed that few were ever again available. Captain Davis
crossed into Indiana, with the two companies assigned him, but failed to
rejoin the division, and was surrounded by overwhelming numbers, and
himself and the greater part of his command captured. Some of the men in
those companies escaped--the majority of them returned to the South,
others remained in Kentucky to "guerrilla." Two fine companies of the
Ninth Tennessee, under Captains Kirkpatrick and Sisson, crossed the
river at Buffington; two companies of the Second Kentucky, under
Captains Lea and Cooper, effected a crossing a day or two later. Besides
these organized bodies of men, there were stragglers from all the
regiments to the number of three or four hundred, who escaped. These men
were collected by Colonels Johnson and Grigsby, and marched through
Western Virginia to Morristown, in East Tennessee, where all that was
left of Morgan's command was rendezvoused.
Although the consequences were so disastrous, although upon the greater
part of those who followed Morgan in this raid was visited a long,
cruel, wearisome imprisonment, there are few, I imagine, among them who
ever regretted it. It was a sad infliction upon a soldier, especially
upon one accustomed to the life the "Morgan men" had led, to eat his
heart in the tedious, dreary prison existence, while the fight which he
should have shared was daily growing deadlier. But to have, in our turn,
been invaders, to have carried the war north of the Ohio, to have taught
the people, who for long months had been pouring invading hosts into the
South, something of the agony and terror of invasion--to have made them
fly in fear from their homes, although they returned to find those homes
not laid in ashes; to have scared them with the sound of hostile bugles,
although no signals were sounded for flames and destruction--these
luxuries were cheap at almost any price. It would have been an
inexpiable shame if, in all the Confederate army, there had been no body
of men found to carry the war, however briefly, across the Ohio, and
Morgan by this raid saved us, at least, that disgrace.
One of the many articles which filled the Northern papers, upon the
disastrous termination of this expedition, prophetically declared the
true misfortune which would result to Morgan himself from his
ill-success to-wit: the loss of his unexampled prestige--hitherto of
itself a power adequate to ensure him victories, but never to be
recovered. This writer more sagacious, as well as more fair than others
of his class, said:
"The raid through Indiana and Ohio has proved an unfortunate business to
him and his command. His career, hitherto has been dashing and
brilliant, and but few rebel commanders had won a higher reputation
throughout the South. He had been glorified by rebels in arms
everywhere, but this last reckless adventure will doubtless rob his name
of half its potency. The prestige of success is all powerful, while a
failure is death to military reputation. It would now be a difficult
matter to rally to his standard as many enthusiastic and promising young
men, who infatuated and misguided, joined him during the period of his
success. Many of them blindly seemed to entertain the opinion that no
reverse could befall him, and all he had to do was to march along, and
victory after victory would perch upon his banner. They couldn't even
dream of a disaster or an end to his triumphs. Many of them have already
sadly and dearly paid for their infatuation, while others are doomed to
a similar fate. This remarkable raid, certainly the most daring of the
war, is about at an end. Morgan is trapped at last and his forces
scattered, and if he escapes himself it will only be as a fugitive. The
race he has run since crossing the Cumberland river, eluding the
thousands of troops which have been put upon his track, proved him a
leader of extraordinary ability. The object of the raid is yet a
mystery. Time alone will develop the plan, if plan there was. Moving on
with such a force, far from all support--at the very time, too, that
Bragg's army was falling back and scattering--makes the affair look like
one of simple bravado, as if the leader was willing to be captured,
provided he could end his career in a blaze of excitement created by his
dash and daring. But it is useless to speculate now. Broken into squads,
some few of his men will doubtless escape across the river, and make
their way singly to the Confederacy, to tell the story of their long
ride through Indiana and Ohio; but the power of the noted partisan
chieftain and his bold riders is a thing of the past."