The victory of Hartsville brought Colonel Morgan his long-expected and
long-delayed commission of Brigadier-General. He had long been styled
General by his men, and had been of late habitually so addressed in
official communications from array headquarters. Many and urgent
applications had been made by influential parties and officers of high
rank for his promotion. General Smith had strongly urged it, General
Bragg concurring, but while Brigadiers were being uttered as rapidly
almost as Confederate money, he remained a simple Colonel. President
Davis happened to visit Murfreesboro' a few days after the Hartsville
affair, and gave him his commission, making Hanson, also, a Brigadier of
even date. This promotion of my chief made me a Colonel, and Hutchinson
a Lieutenant-Colonel, thus illustrating that many felicitous
consequences will sometimes flow from one good act. The latter had
occupied a very anomalous position; while really a Captain, he had acted
us, and been styled Lieutenant-Colonel. Being a most excellent officer,
who had seen a great deal of service, and acting as second in command of
an unusually large regiment, he was placed frequently upon detached
service, and in very responsible situations, and frequently commanded
Lieutenant-Colonels of legitimate manufacture, just as Morgan, while
only a General "by courtesy," commanded floating Brigadiers who came
within his vortex. It proved more agreeable to men, who were really
modest, to take rank by the virtue of commissions rather than by the
force of impudence, and the example was better. General Hardee urged
that the commission should be made out as Major-General, but Mr. Davis
said, "I do not wish to give my boys all of their sugar plums at once."
At Bryantsville, in Kentucky, Colonel Joseph Wheeler had been appointed
Chief of Cavalry, and Morgan, Scott, Ashby--all of the cavalry
commanders had been ordered to report to him. Colonel Wheeler was a very
dashing officer, and had done excellent service, but he had neither the
experience nor the record of Morgan, and the latter did not fancy having
to serve under him. He was with Wheeler so little, however, in Kentucky,
that he found not much inconvenience from having a "Chief of cavalry" to
superintend him. Morgan was, of course, perfectly independent upon his
retreat out of Kentucky, and in his operations afterward in North Middle
Tennessee--indeed, with the exception of having to report to General
Breckinridge, while the latter was in command at Murfreesboro', and
afterward to the Commander-in-chief, he was perfectly independent until
a period even later than that of his promotion. But this is a subject
for a later chapter. A great many injudicious friends of Morgan were
inclined to attribute the delay of his promotion to prejudice upon the
part of Mr. Davis, against him in particular, and Kentuckians in
general.
There is no doubt but that General Morgan's free and easy way of
appointing his own officers and of conducting all of his military
affairs, as well as his intense aversion to subordinate positions, had
excited much official disapprobation and some indignation against him at
Richmond. He had been careless and dilatory, too, in making out and
forwarding the muster-rolls of his regiment, an omission which was
undoubtedly censurable, and unpardonable in the eyes of the _Pundits_ of
the War Department, with whom such papers were the gospels of military
government. General Morgan paid too little attention to matters of this
kind, essential to the transaction of military business, and the proper
conduct of the affairs of the army, and the authorities resented a
neglect that looked a good deal like contumacious disrespect. He was,
however, unlucky in this respect, to some extent, for when he
appreciated, which was not until after he had raised the greater portion
of his brigade, the necessity and the propriety of making full, formal,
and prompt returns, he met with delays and accidents in transmitting
them to Richmond, which were frequent and extraordinary. The officers,
who acted as his Adjutant Generals at different periods previously to
his promotion, will remember and can affirm, that returns and rolls of
his regiments and battalions composing his brigade, were sent into them,
and forwarded by them to Richmond. Officers were especially detailed to
go to Richmond and look after these papers. And, yet, to every
application made for the appointment of bonded officers (or rather for
their commissions, for Morgan could manage appointments), by commanders
of the oldest regiments in his brigade, the Secretary of War would
politely inform the Colonel that his regiment was unknown "in the
records of this office." Judging from the frequency of this reply, and
the nature of some promotions that were made for that quarter, it would
appear that the War Department at Richmond, and the cavalry on the
western front, had no acquaintance in common. That all the evil might be
cured, papers of formidable size and appearance, nearly square (I should
say an acre by an arpent), were carefully made out, and forwarded to
Richmond, showing the date of the organization of each regiment, the
officers originally upon its rolls, all changes, and how they occurred,
up to the date of the making out of the compendious document, the names
of the officers serving in it at the time, and the manner in which they
obtained their rank, whether by appointment, election, or promotion, and
by whom appointed, when such was their status.
Notwithstanding the work expended upon the accursed things, and the
perspiration, and, I regret to say, blasphemy, which they elicited from
some of our officers, they did no good in the world; and after more
labor and tribulation, ten to one, than an advance of the whole Federal
army would have cost us, we found ourselves as much outsiders as ever.
It must be distinctly understood, that nothing here written is intended
as an insinuation against Mr. Davis; I will not do _that_ which I would
join in condemning in another man, whose antecedents are like my own.
The profound respect I feel for him, prevents any attempt, upon my part,
at even such criticism of his action as may seem legitimate; and unkind
and carping reflections upon him are more becoming in the mouths of
non-combatant rebels, than from ex-Confederate soldiers, whom
self-respect should restrain from any thing of the kind. But there were
certain officers at Richmond, who, if their souls had been tied up with
red tape, indorsed in accordance with the latest orders, and stuffed
into pigeon holes, would have preferred it to a guarantee of salvation.
I honestly believe that these gentlemen thought, that when an officer
made out a muster-roll, and forwarded it to them, he had done his full
duty to his country, had gotten through with his part of the war, and
might go to sleep without putting out pickets. It was said of a certain
Confederate General, of high rank, that he would rather have from his
subordinates "a neat and formal report of a defeat, than a slovenly
account of a victory." It might have been said of the war office gentry,
with equal propriety, that they would have preferred an army composed of
Fallstaffian regiments, all duly recorded, to a magnificent soldiery
unticketed at Richmond.
With this class Morgan was always unpopular; not that a stronger
personal dislike was felt for him, in the official bosom, than for other
men of the same stamp and style, but all such men were gravely disliked
by this class. Such men were developing new ideas, not to be found in
the books which the others had studied, and were in the habit of
consulting. They were managing cavalry and winning fights in a
thoroughly irregular and revolutionary manner; there was grave cause for
apprehension that, if they were given high rank and corresponding
command, they would innovate upon established infantry _tactique_, in
the same unprecedented and demoralizing style. Mr. Davis did not dislike
Morgan, but simply entertained no particular fancy for him, and did not
believe that he was really a superior, although a successful officer;
in fact, he knew very little about him.
To say Mr. Davis disliked Kentuckians, is absurd. The Kentucky vanity is
as irritable, although not as radical, as the Virginian, and sees a
slight in every thing short of a caress. He appointed some fifteen
general officers from Kentucky, and he permitted the Kentucky loafers to
secure their full share of "soft places." General Bragg, doubtless, was
entirely free from any blinding affection for Kentuckians, and few of
them felt a tenderness for him. Despite the terrors of his stern rule,
they let few occasions escape of evincing their feeling toward him. It
was said, I know not how truly, that at a later date General Bragg told
Mr. Davis that "General Morgan was an officer who had few superiors,
none, perhaps, in his own line, but that he was a _dangerous man_, on
account of his intense desire to act independently."
When Morgan received this rank, his brigade was quite strong, and
composed of seven regiments, Breckinridge's and Stoner's battalions were
consolidated, and formed a regiment above the minimum strength.
Breckinridge became Colonel, and Stoner Lieutenant Colonel. Shortly
after the Hartsville fight, Colonel Adam R. Johnson reached
Murfreesboro' with his regiment. It had been raised in Western Kentucky,
and was very strong upon the rolls, but from losses by capture, and
other causes, had been reduced to less than four hundred effective men.
It was a fine body of men, and splendidly officered. Martin, the
Lieutenant Colonel, was a man of extraordinary dash and resolution, and
very shrewd in partisan warfare. Owens, the Major, was a very gallant
man, and the disciplinarian of the regiment.
On the 14th of December, an event occurred which was thought by many to
have materially affected General Morgan's temper, and subsequent
fortunes. He was married to Miss Ready, of Murfreesboro', a lady to whom
he was devotedly attached, and who certainly deserved to exercise over
him the great influence which she was thought to have possessed. The
marriage ceremony was performed by General Polk, by virtue of his
commission as Bishop, but in full Lieutenant General's uniform. The
residence of the Honorable Charles Ready, father of the bride, held a
happy assembly that night--it was one of a very few scenes of happiness
which that house was destined to witness, before its olden memories of
joy and gayety were to give place to heavy sorrow and the harsh
insolence of the invader. The bridegroom's friends and brothers-in-arms,
and the Commander-in-Chief, and Generals Hardee, Cheatham and
Breckinridge felt called upon to stand by him on this occasion.
Greenfell was in a high state of delight; although he had regretted
General Morgan's marriage--thinking that it would render him less
enterprising--he declared, that a wedding, at which an Episcopal
bishop-militant, clad in general's uniform officiated, and the chief of
an army and his corps commanders were guests, certainly ought not to
soften a soldier's temper. On his way home that night he sang Moorish
songs, with a French accent, to English airs, and was as mild and
agreeable as if some one was going to be killed.
The seven regiments which composed the brigade, represented an aggregate
force of over four thousand in camp--when they were gotten together,
which was about the 18th, the Second Kentucky returning then from
Fayetteville. Several hundred men, however, were dismounted, and totally
unarmed and unequipped. This force was so unwieldy, as one brigade, that
General Morgan determined to divide it into two parts, which should be
organized in all respects as two brigades, and should lack but the
sanction of the General commanding (which he hoped to obtain), to be
such in reality. He accordingly indicated as the commanders of the two
brigades (as I shall call them for the sake of convenience), Colonel
Breckinridge and myself. There was no doubt of Colonel A.R. Johnson's
seniority to all the other colonels, but, for some reason, he positively
declined to accept the command of either brigade, and signified his
willingness to serve in a subordinate capacity.
Instances of senior officers waiving rank, and consenting to serve under
their juniors, were not unfrequent at that period, and continued to
occur in Morgan's command. Such conduct was generous, and prompted by
the manliest and most patriotic motives; but I can not help thinking
that it is an unsafe practice, and one that may lead to very great
injuries to the service in which it commonly obtains. The spirit which
prompted many officers (for instance, who outranked General Morgan), to
serve subordinately to him, because of the influence upon the troops of
his high reputation, and because of his recognized skill, was perhaps, a
proper as well as a chivalric one. But, except where the talent,
character and influence of the junior, are as rare as acknowledged, and
as commanding as in the case of Morgan or of Forrest, it is better for
the senior to assume his legal position. No bad effects ever resulted
from this practice in our command, partly, because it was one which had
a "genius and constitution" of its own, but, chiefly because (I do not
think I am speaking too highly of my old comrades), it was officered by
a class of men of remarkable intelligence, and singular directness as
well as strength of character. But, supposing this custom to prevail,
generally, how apparent are the results prejudicial to discipline and
efficiency, which may be naturally expected to flow from it.
The senior officer who "waives his rank," may do it in perfect good
faith, and believing that the junior whom he consents to serve under,
is, for certain reasons, the most proper man to command--and yet, if
things go wrong, he may not unnaturally complain or advise with an
emphasis and a freedom that may embarrass the commander to whom it is
addressed, and create the most improper feeling among other subordinates
and the men. Or if matters do not go so far as this, there may yet arise
a regret, in the mind of the officer who has relinquished his right to
command, when he sees, or thinks he sees, evidences of incompetency in
the conduct of the other--and a corresponding jealousy may be thus
awakened in the mind of the junior commanding--and that harmony which is
so necessary to efficiency may become impaired. Independently of these
considerations, there is the fact that this condition is abnormal and
highly irregular. The men and subaltern officers will recognize it to be
so, and it may become more difficult to maintain the requisite
subordination and respect for rank. It is a great deal better than to
follow this practice--to adopt and run almost to extremes, the system of
rapid promotion for merit and distinguished conduct. The probable evils
of the one practice, which have been indicated, can prevail under no
system where every man fills his legitimate place. There was some
discussion as to whether Cluke or Breckinridge should command one of the
brigades, after Johnson declined. It was a mooted question, whether
Cluke's rank as Colonel dated from the period at which he received his
commission to raise a regiment, or from the period at which his regiment
became filled. In the former case, he would rank Breckinridge; in the
latter, he would not. None of us, then, (with the exception of Johnson),
had received our commissions, although our rank was recognized.
There was no wrangle for the position, however, between these officers,
as might be inferred from my language. On the contrary, each at first
declined, and urged the appointment of the other. General Morgan settled
the matter by appointing Breckinridge.
The first brigade (mine) was composed of the Second Kentucky,
Lieut.-Colonel Hutchinson, commanding; Gano's regiment, the Third
Kentucky, Lieut.-Colonel Huffman commanding (Gano was absent on
furlough); Cluke's regiment, the Eighth Kentucky, Colonel Leroy S. Cluke
commanding; Palmer's battery of four pieces (two twelve-pounder
howitzers, and two six-pounder guns,) was attached to this brigade. The
second brigade (Breckinridge's) was composed of his own regiment, the
Ninth Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Stoner commanding; Johnson's
regiment, the Tenth Kentucky, Colonel Johnson commanding; Chenault's
regiment, the Eleventh Kentucky, Colonel Chenault commanding; and
Bennett's regiment, the Fourteenth Tennessee, Colonel Bennett
commanding. To this brigade was attached one three-inch Parrot,
commanded by Captain White, and the two mountain howitzers under
Lieutenant Corbett.
On the 21st of December, the division was in camp at and around
Alexandria. The first brigade was reviewed on that day, and numbered, of
cavalry, eighteen hundred effective men. There were in its ranks more
men than that number. The Second Kentucky mustered seven hundred and
forty, and the other two regiments about six hundred each. There were in
this brigade, however, nearly two hundred men unarmed but mounted. The
entire strength of the brigade, of armed and unarmed men, including
Palmer's battery, was very little short of two thousand and one hundred
men. The second brigade was, including artillerists, about eighteen
hundred strong, but it, too, had some unarmed men in its ranks. These
fellows without guns were not so useless as might be imagined, for (when
it was satisfactorily ascertained that it was not their own fault that
they were unarmed, and that they could be trusted) they were employed as
horse-holders. The division, therefore, including Quirk's "scouts,"
reporting to division headquarters, numbered quite three thousand and
nine hundred. In General Morgan's report of the expedition undertaken
into Kentucky immediately after this organization, the strength of the
division is estimated at thirty-one hundred armed men. This was a
mistake upon the part of his Adjutant-General, which I sought to correct
at the time. The proportion of men without guns was nothing like so
large. Just before the march was taken up for Kentucky from Alexandria,
Colonel Greenfell, still acting as General Morgan's Adjutant-General up
to that date, resigned his position and declined to accompany him upon
the expedition. The cause of his dissatisfaction was the appointment of
Breckinridge to the command of the second brigade. A great many believed
and said that he was disappointed at not obtaining command of the
brigade himself, but I am satisfied that such was not the case. It is
difficult to understand how a practical man can behave as he did on that
occasion, unless his own interests, or those of a friend, are involved,
and there is, consequently, a general disposition to attribute such
conduct to interested motives. I talked to Greenfell, and believe that
he had, from some cause, conceived a violent dislike for Breckinridge,
and, moreover, he had come to regard an interference in the affairs of
the command as his right. At any rate when General Morgan declined to
accept his suggestions upon the subject, and requested him to desist
from agitating it, he became so thoroughly disgusted that he declined to
act longer with the command. As he was not regularly in the Confederate
service, there was nothing to be done but let him go when and where he
pleased.
Captain W.M. Maginis, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General of the second
brigade, was immediately appointed in his stead. This officer was very
young, but had seen a great deal of arduous service. He had served in
the infantry for more than a year; he had seen Belmont, Shiloh,
Farmington, and Perryville, had behaved with the greatest gallantry, and
had won the encomiums of his chiefs. He had been assigned to staff duty
just before he came to us, and had acted in the capacity of ordnance
officer, I believe, for General Walthall, an officer who, of the first
class himself, would have only the same sort about him. He had been
assigned upon General Morgan's application (at my urgent request) to his
command, and, as has been stated, was on duty with the first brigade,
when General Morgan suddenly stood in need of an Assistant
Adjutant-General, and took him, intending to keep him temporarily. He
was so much pleased with him that, upon his return from this expedition,
he procured his commission in the Adjutant and Inspector General's
Department, and his assignment to him. He remained with General Morgan
until his death.
On the morning of December 22nd, the division took up its march for
Kentucky. General Bragg desired that the roads which Rosecrans had
repaired in rear should again be broken, and the latter's communications
with Louisville destroyed. The service was an important one; it was meet
that, for many reasons, the expedition, the first Confederate movement
into Kentucky since Bragg's retreat, should be a brilliant one. General
Morgan had under his command at that time the largest force he ever
handled, previously or afterward, and he would not have permitted them
to have stopped him. A writer from whom I have frequently had occasion
to quote, gives a description of the commencement of the march, so
spirited and so graphic, that it will serve my purpose better than any
that I can write myself. He says:
"The regiments had been carefully inspected by the Surgeons and
Inspectors, and every sick soldier and disabled horse had been taken
from their regiments, and the stout men and serviceable horses only were
permitted to accompany the expedition. The men were never in higher
spirits or more joyous humor; well armed, well mounted, in good
discipline, with perfect confidence in their commander, and with hearts
longing for the hills and valleys, the blue-grass and woods of dear old
Kentucky; they made the air vocal with their cheers and laughter and
songs and sallies of wit. The division had never operated together
before the brigades had first been organized, therefore every regiment
was filled with the spirit of emulation, and every man was determined to
make his the crack regiment of Morgan's cavalry. It was a magnificent
body of men--the pick of the youth of Kentucky. No commander ever led a
nobler corps--no corps was ever more nobly led. It was splendidly
officered by gallant, dashing, skillful men in the flush of early
manhood; for of the seven Colonels who commanded those seven regiments,
five became brigade commanders--the other two gave their lives to the
cause--Colonel Bennett dying early in January, 1863, of a disease
contracted while in the army, and Colonel Chenault being killed on July
4, 1863, gallantly leading his men in a fruitless charge upon
breastworks at Green river bridge. This December morning was a mild,
beautiful fall day; clear, cloudless sky; bright sun; the camps in cedar
evergreens, where the birds chirped and twittered; it felt and looked
like spring. The reveille sounded before daybreak; the horses were fed,
breakfast gotten. Very early came the orders from General Morgan
announcing the organization of the brigades, intimating the objects of
the expedition, and ordering the column to move at nine o'clock. Duke in
advance. As the order was read to a regiment the utmost deathless
silence of disciplined soldiers standing at attention was broken only by
the clear voice of the Adjutant reading the precise but stirring words
of the beloved hero-chieftain; then came the sharp word of command
dismissing the parade; and the woods trembled with the wild hurrahs of
the half crazy men, and regiment answered regiment, cheer re-echoed
cheer, over the wide encampment. Soon came Duke, and his staff, and his
column--his own old gallant regiment at the head--and slowly regiment
after regiment filed out of the woods into the road, lengthening the
long column.
"After some two hours march, a cheer began in the extreme rear and
rapidly came forward, increasing in volume and enthusiasm, and soon
General Morgan dashed by, with his hat in his hand, bowing and smiling
his thanks for these flattering cheers, followed by a large and well
mounted staff. Did you ever see Morgan on horseback? If not, you missed
one of the most impressive figures of the war. Perhaps no General in
either army surpassed him in the striking proportion and grace of his
person, and the ease and grace of his horsemanship. Over six feet in
hight, straight as an Indian, exquisitely proportioned, with the air and
manner of a cultivated and polished gentleman, and the bearing of a
soldier, always handsomely and tastefully dressed, and elegantly
mounted, he was the picture of the superb cavalry officer. Just now he
was in the hight of his fame and happiness; married only ten days before
to an accomplished lady, made Brigadier justly but very tardily; in
command of the finest cavalry division in the Southern army; beloved
almost to idolatry by his men, and returning their devotion by an
extravagant confidence in their valor and prowess; conscious of his own
great powers, yet wearing his honors with the most admirable modesty,
and just starting upon a carefully conceived but daring expedition, he
was perhaps in the zenith of his fame, and though he added many a green
leaf to his chaplet, many a bright page to his history, yet his future
was embittered by the envy, jealously, and hatred that then were not
heard."
Marching all day the column reached Sand Shoals ford on the Cumberland
just before dark. The first brigade crossed, and encamped for the night
on the northern bank of the river. The second brigade encamped between
the Caney Fork and the Cumberland.
On the next day, moving at daylight, a march of some thirty miles was
accomplished; it was impossible to march faster than this, and keep the
guns up. On the 24th, the division went into camp within five miles of
Glasgow. Breckinridge sent Captain Jones of Company A, Ninth Kentucky to
discover if all was clear in Glasgow, and I received instructions to
support him with two companies under Major Steele of the Third Kentucky
who was given one of the little howitzers. Jones reached the town after
dark, and just as he entered it a Michigan battalion came into it also
from the other side. Captain Jones encountered this battalion in the
center of the town, and in the skirmish which ensued he was mortally
wounded. He was an excellent officer and as brave as steel. Poor Will
Webb was also mortally wounded--only a private soldier, but a cultivated
and a thorough gentleman; brave, and kindly, and genial. A truer heart
never beat in a soldier's bosom, and a nobler soul was never released by
a soldier's death. First Lieutenant Samuel O. Peyton was severely
wounded--shot in the arm and in the thigh. He was surrounded by foes who
pressed him hard, after he was wounded, to capture him. He shot one
assailant, and grappling with another, brought him to the ground and
cut his throat with a pocket knife. Lieutenant Peyton was by birth,
education, and character a thorough gentleman. Perfectly good natured
and inoffensive--except when provoked or attacked--and then--he
dispatched his affair and his man in a quiet, expeditious and thorough
manner. The Federal cavalry retreated from the town by the Louisville
pike.
On the next morning--Christmas--the division moved by the Louisville
pike. Captain Quirk, supported by Lieutenant Hays with the advance-guard
of the first brigade, fifty strong, cleared the road of some Federal
cavalry, which tried to contest our advance, driving it so rapidly, that
the column had neither to delay its march, nor make any formation for
fight. In the course of the day, Quirk charged a battalion, dismounted,
and formed across the road. He went through them, and as he dashed back
again, with his head bent low, he caught two balls on the top of it,
which, singularly (coming from different directions), traced a neat and
accurate angle upon his scalp.
Although the wounds were not serious at all, they would have stunned
most men; but a head built in County Kerry, with especial reference to
shillelagh practice, scorned to be affected by such trifles.
Breckinridge sent Johnson's regiment during the day toward
Munfordsville, to induce the belief that we were going to attack that
place. Colonel Johnson executed his mission with perfect success. That
night we crossed Green river. The first brigade being in advance had
little trouble comparatively, although Captain Palmer had to exert
energy and skill to get his battery promptly across; but the second
brigade reaching the bank of the river late at night had great
difficulty in getting across.
The division encamped in the latter part of the night at Hammondsville.
A day before, just upon the bank of the river, the most enormous wagon,
perhaps, ever seen in the State of Kentucky, was captured. It was loaded
with an almost fabulous amount and variety of Christmas nicknacks; some
enterprising settler had prepared it for the Glasgow market, intending
to make his fortune with it. It was emptied at an earlier date, in
shorter time, and by customers who proposed to themselves a much longer
credit than he anticipated. There was enough in it to furnish every mess
in the division something to eke out a Christmas supper with.
On the next day the column resumed its march amid the steadily pouring
rain, and moved through mud which threatened to ingulf every thing,
toward the Louisville and Nashville railroad. Hutchinson was sent, with
several companies of the Second Kentucky, and the Third Kentucky, to
destroy the bridge at Bacon creek. There was not more than one hundred
men, at the most, in the stockade which protected the bridges, and he
was expected to reduce the stockade with the two pieces of artillery,
which he carried with him, but there was a large force at Munfordsville,
only eight miles from Bacon creek, and General Morgan gave him troops
enough to repulse any movement of the enemy from Munfordsville to save
the bridge. A battalion of cavalry came out from Munfordsville, but was
easily driven back by Companies B and D, of the Second Kentucky, under
Captain Castleman. Although severely shelled, the garrison held out
stubbornly, rejecting every demand for their surrender. Hutchinson
became impatient, which was his only fault as an officer, and ordered
the bridge to be fired at all hazards--it was within less than a hundred
yards of the stockade, and commanded by the rifles of the garrison. It
was partially set on fire, but the rain would extinguish it unless
constantly supplied with fuel. Several were wounded in the attempt, and
Captain Wolfe, of the Third Kentucky, who boldly mounted the bridge, was
shot in the head, and lay unconscious for two hours, every one thinking
him dead, until the beating rain reviving him, he returned to duty,
suffering no further inconvenience. Some of the men got behind the
abutment of the bridge, and thrust lighted pieces of wood upon it, which
the men in the stockade frequently shot away. At length General Morgan
arrived upon the ground, and sent a message to the garrison in his own
name, offering them liberal terms if they would surrender. As soon as
they were satisfied that it was indeed Morgan who confronted them, they
surrendered. This was a very obstinate defense. A number of shells burst
within the stockade. Some shots penetrated the walls and an old barn,
which had been foolishly included within the work, was knocked to
pieces, the falling timbers stunning some of the men.
The stockade at Nolin surrendered to me without a fight. The commandant
agreed to surrender if I would show him a certain number of pieces of
artillery. They were shown him, but when I pressed him to comply with
his part of the bargain, he hesitated, and said he would return and
consult his officers. I think that (as two of the pieces shown him were
the little howitzers, which I happened to have temporarily) he thought
he could hold out for a while, and gild his surrender with a fight. He
was permitted to return, but not until, in his presence, the artillery
was planted close to the work, and the riflemen posted to command, as
well as possible, the loop-holes. He came to us again, in a few minutes,
with a surrender. The Nolin bridge was at once destroyed, and also
several culverts and cow-gaps within three or four miles of that point.
The division encamped that night within six miles of Elizabethtown. On
the morning of the 27th, the division moved upon Elizabethtown. This
place was held by about six hundred men, under a Lieutenant Colonel
Smith. As we neared the town, a note was brought to General Morgan, from
Colonel Smith, who stated that he accurately knew his (Morgan's)
strength, had him surrounded, and could compel his surrender, and that
he (Smith) trusted that a prompt capitulation would spare him the
disagreeable necessity of using force. The missive containing this
proposal--the most sublimely audacious I ever knew to emanate from a
Federal officer, who, as a class, rarely trusted to audacity and bluff,
but to odds and the _concours_ of force--this admirable document was
brought by a Dutch Corporal, who spoke very uncertain English, but was
positive on the point of surrender. General Morgan admired the spirit
which dictated this bold effort at bluffing, but returned for answer an
assurance that he knew exactly the strength of the Federal force in the
town, and that Lieutenant Colonel Smith was in error, in supposing that
he (Smith) had him (Morgan) surrounded; that, on the contrary, he had
the honor to state, the position of the respective forces was exactly
the reverse. He concluded by demanding him to surrender. Colonel Smith
replied that it was "the business of an United States officer to fight,
and not to surrender." During the parley, the troops had been placed in
position. Breckinridge was given the left of the road, and the first
brigade the right. I dismounted Cluke's regiment, and moved it upon the
town, with its left flank keeping close to the road. I threw several
companies, mounted, to the extreme right of my line, and the rear of the
town. Breckinridge deployed his own regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel
Stoner, immediately on the left of the road, stretching mounted
companies also to his left, and around the town.
The bulk of both brigades was held in reserve. The Parrot gun was placed
in the pike; it was opened as soon as the last message from Colonel
Smith was received; and, as suddenly as if its flash had ignited them,
Palmer's four guns roared out from the hill on the left of the road,
about six hundred yards from the town, where General Morgan himself was
superintending their fire. Cluke moved warily, as two or three stockades
were just in his front, which were thought to be occupied. When he
entered the town, he had little fighting to do, and that on the extreme
right. Stoner dashed in on the left with the Ninth Kentucky, at a swift
run. He burst into the houses occupied by the enemy at the edge of the
town, and with slight loss, compelled the inmates to surrender. The
enemy had no artillery, and ours was battering the bricks about their
heads in fine style. Palmer, who was a capital officer--cool and
clearheaded--concentrated his fire upon the building where the flag
floated, and the enemy seemed thickest, and moved his six pounders into
the very edge of the town. I sent for one of the howitzers, and when it
came under Lieutenant Corbett, it was posted upon the railroad
embankment, where it crossed the road. Here it played like a fire engine
upon the headquarters building. Breckinridge posted Company A, of his
regiment, to protect the howitzer, making the men lie down behind the
embankment.
The enemy could not well fire upon the gunners from the windows, on
account of the situation of the piece, but after each discharge would
rush out into the street and open upon them. Then the company lying
behind the embankment would retaliate on the enemy in a style which took
away their appetite for the game. It happened, however, that a staff
officer of General Morgan, passed that way, and conceiving that this
company was doing no good, ordered it, with more zeal than discretion,
to charge. The men instinctively obeyed. As they ran forward, they came
within fair view of the windows, and a heavy volley was opened upon
them, fortunately doing little damage. Their officers, knowing that the
man who gave the order, had no right to give it, called them back, and
they returned in some confusion, the enemy seized the moment, and
flocking out of the houses poured a sweeping fire down the street. The
gunners were driven away from the howitzers, and two or three hit.
Lieutenant Corbett, however, maintained his place, seated on the
carriage, while the bullets were actually hopping from the reinforce of
the piece. He soon called his men back, and resumed his fire.
It was as fine an exhibition of courage as I ever saw. Shortly after
this, there seemed to be a commotion among the garrison, and the white
flag was shown from one of the houses. Major Llewellyn, Division
Quartermaster, immediately galloped into the town, reckless of the
firing, waving a white handkerchief. Colonel Smith was not ready to
surrender, but his men did not wait on him and poured out of the houses
and threw down their arms. Among the fruits of this victory, were, six
hundred fine rifles, more than enough to arm all of our men who were
without guns. The entire garrison was captured. Some valuable stores
were also taken. On the next day, the 28th, the command moved leisurely
along the railroad, destroying it thoroughly. The principal objects of
the expedition, were the great trestle works at Muldraugh's hill, only a
short distance apart. The second brigade captured the garrison defending
the lower trestle six hundred strong; the first brigade captured the
garrison of the upper trestle two hundred strong. Both of the immense
structures were destroyed and hours were required to thoroughly burn
them. These trestles were, respectively, eighty or ninety feet high--and
each, five hundred feet long.
Cane Run bridge, within twenty-eight miles of Louisville, was destroyed
by a scouting party. Two bridges on the Lebanon branch, recently
reconstructed, were also burned. Altogether, General Morgan destroyed on
this expedition, two thousand two hundred and fifty feet of bridging,
three depots, three water stations, and a number of culverts and
cattle-guards. The impression which prevails in some quarters, that
General Morgan left the road on account of the pursuit of Colonel
Harlan, is entirely erroneous. With the destruction of the great
trestles at Muldraugh's hill, his contract with the road expired and he
prepared to return. He would have liked to have paid the region about
Lexington another visit, but General Bragg had urged him not to delay
his return. Harlan was moving slowly after us; but for the delay
consequent upon the destruction of the road, he would never have gotten
near us and, but for an accident, he would never have caught up with any
portion of the column, after we had quitted work on the railroad.
On the night of the 28th, the division had encamped on the southern bank
of the Rolling fork. On the morning of the 29th, it commenced crossing
that stream, which was much swollen. The bulk of the troops and the
artillery were crossed at a ford a mile or two above the point at which
the road from Elizabethtown to Bardstown along which we had been
encamped, crosses the Rolling fork. The pickets, rear-guard, and some
detachments, left in the rear for various purposes, in all about three
hundred men, were collected to cross at two fords--deep and difficult to
approach and to emerge from. Cluke's regiment, with two pieces of
artillery, had been sent under Major Bullock to burn the railroad bridge
over the Rolling fork, five miles below the point where we were. A
court-martial had been in session for several days, trying Lieutenant
Colonel Huffman, for alleged violations of the terms granted by General
Morgan to the prisoners at the surrender of the Bacon creek stockade.
Both brigade commanders, and three regimental commanders, Cluke,
Hutchinson, and Stoner, were officers or members of this court. Just
after the court had finally adjourned, acquitting Colonel Huffman, and
we were leaving a brick house, on the southern side of the river and
about six hundred yards from its bank, where our last session had been
held, the bursting of a shell a mile or two in the rear caught our ears.
A few videttes had been left there until every thing should have gotten
fairly across. Some of them were captured; others brought the
information that the enemy was approaching. This was about eleven A.M.
We knew that a force of infantry and cavalry was cautiously following
us, but did not know that it was so near. It was at once decided to
throw into line the men who had not yet crossed, and hold the fords, if
possible, until Cluke's regiment could be brought back. If we crossed
the river leaving that regiment on the southern side, and it did not
succeed in crossing, or if it crossed immediately and yet the enemy
pressed on vigorously after us, beating it to Bardstown--in either event
it would be cut off from us, and its capture even would be probable. No
one knew whether there was a ford lower down at which it could cross,
and all feared that if we retreated promptly the enemy would closely
follow us. I, therefore, sent a message to General Morgan, informing him
of what was decided upon, and also sent a courier to Major Bullock,
directing him to return with the regiment as soon as possible.
The ground on which we were posted was favorable to the kind of game we
were going to play. Upon each flank were thick woods extending for more
than a mile back from the river. Between these woods was a large meadow,
some three hundred yards wide, and stretching from the river bank for
six or eight hundred yards to a woods again in the back ground, and
which almost united the other two. In this meadow and some two hundred
yards from the river was a singular and sudden depression like a
terrace, running straight across it. Behind this the men who were posted
in the meadow were as well protected as if they had been behind an
earthwork. On the left the ground was so rugged as well as so wooded
that the position there was almost impregnable. There was, however, no
adequate protection for the horses afforded at any point of the line
except the extreme left.
The Federal force advancing upon us consisted of nearly five thousand
infantry, two thousand cavalry, and several pieces of artillery. This
force, which, if handled vigorously and skillfully, if its march had
even been steadily kept up, would have, in spite of every effort we
could have made, swept us into the turbid river at our backs, approached
cautiously and very slowly. Fortunate as this was for us--indeed, it was
all that saved us--the suspense yet became so sickening, as their long
line tediously crept upon us and all around us, that I would almost have
preferred, after an hour of it had elapsed, that Harlan had made a
fierce attack.
We were not idle during this advance, but the skirmishers were keeping
busy in the edges of the woods on our flanks, and the men in the meadow
were showing themselves with the most careful regard to an exaggerated
idea being formed of their numbers. When the enemy reached the edge of
the woods which fringed the southern extremity of the meadow, and had
pressed our skirmishers out of it and away from the brick-house and its
out-buildings, the artillery was brought up and four or five guns were
opened upon us. Just after this fire commenced, the six-pounders sent
with Bullock galloped upon the ground, and a defiant yell a short
distance to the right told that Cluke's regiment, "The war-dogs," were
near at hand. I was disinclined to use the six-pounders after they came,
because I know that they could not effectively answer the fire of the
enemy's Parrots, and I wished to avoid every thing which might warm the
affair up into a hot fight, feeling pretty certain that when that
occurred, we would all, guns and men, "go up" together. Major Austin,
Captain Logan, and Captain Pendleton, commanding respectively
detachments from the Ninth, Third, and Eighth Kentucky, had conducted
the operations of our line up to this time with admirable coolness and
method.
The guns were sent across the meadow rapidly, purposely attracting the
attention of the enemy as much as possible, to the upper ford. A road
was cut through the rough ground for them, and they were crossed with
all possible expedition. Cluke threw five companies of his regiment into
line; the rest were sent over the river. We now wished to cross with the
entire force that was on the southern side, but this was likely to prove
a hazardous undertaking with an enemy so greatly out-numbering us lying
just in our front. A courier arrived just about that time from General
Morgan with an order to me to withdraw. In common with quite a number of
others, I devoutly wished I could. The enemy's guns--the best served of
any, I think, that I ever saw in action--were playing havoc with the
horses (four were killed by one shell), and actually bursting shells in
the lower ford with such frequency as to render the crossing at it by a
column out of the question.
Our line was strengthened by Cluke's five companies to nearly eight
hundred men, but when the enemy moved upon us again, his infantry
deployed in a long line, strongly supported, with a skirmish line in
front, all coming on with bayonets glistening, the guns redoubling their
fire, and the cavalry column on the right flank (of their line)
apparently ready to pounce on us too, and then the river surging at our
backs, my blood, I confess, ran cold.
The final moment seemed at hand when that gallant rear-guard must give
way and be driven into the stream, or be bayoneted on its banks. But not
one fear or doubt seemed to trouble for a moment our splendid fellows.
They welcomed the coming attack with a glad and defiant cheer and could
scarcely be restrained from rushing to meet it. But we were saved by the
action of the enemy.
The advancing line was withdrawn (unaccountably to us) as soon as it had
come under our fire. It did not recoil--it perhaps had not lost a man.
It was at once decided that a show of attack, upon our part, should be
made on the center, and I ordered Captain Pendleton to charge upon our
left, with three companies, and silence a battery which was annoying us
very greatly; under cover of these demonstrations we had determined to
withdraw. Just after this arrangement was made, I was wounded in the
head by the explosion of a shell, which burst in a group of us true to
its aim. The horse of my acting Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Moreland, was
killed by a fragment of it. Colonel Breckinridge at once assumed
command, and energetically and skillfully effected the safe withdrawal
of the entire force. Pendleton accomplished by his charge all that was
expected. He killed several cannoneers and drove all from the guns,
silencing them for a quarter of an hour. He, himself, was badly wounded
by the fragment of a shell which burst short.
Aided by this diversion and the one made upon the front, every thing was
suddenly thrown into columns and dashed across the river, leaving the
army on the other side cheated of its prey which it ought to have
secured. The troops were gotten across the more readily because of the
discovery of a third ford in the rear of Cluke's position. It was
accidentally found at the last moment. Our loss was very slight, except
in horses. The enemy did not attempt pursuit. No eulogium could do
justice to the conduct of the men engaged in this affair--nothing but
their perfect steadiness would have enabled any skill to have rescued
them from the danger. Captains Pendleton, Logan, Page, and Hines, and
Major Austin, deserved the warmest praise. Cluke acted, as he did always
where courage and soldierly conduct were required, in a manner that
added to his reputation. Breckinridge's skill and vigor, however, were
the chief themes of conversation and praise.
On that night the division encamped at Bardstown. Colonel Chenault, on
the same day, destroyed the stockade at Boston, and marched on after the
division at Bardstown.
Leaving that place on the 30th, the column reached Springfield at 3 P.M.
"Adam Johnson had been ordered to move rapidly in advance, and attack
the pickets in front of Lebanon; which he had executed with such vigor
as to make Colonel Hoskins believe he intended to attack him, and he
called in a regiment of cavalry stationed near New Market, thereby
opening the way for us to get out without a fight."
At Springfield General Morgan learned that his situation was hazardous,
and one that would elicit all of his great powers of strategy and
audacity. The enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his troops from the
Southern part of the State, and had concentrated them at Lebanon, only
eight miles distant from his then position, and right in his path. This
force was nearly eight thousand strong and well supplied with artillery.
He had also received intelligence that a large force was marching from
Glasgow to intercept him at Columbia, should he succeed in evading the
force at Lebanon. Harlan was not so far in his rear that he could afford
to dally. "In this emergency," he said, "I determined to make a detour
to the right of Lebanon, and by a night march to conceal my movements
from the enemy, outstrip the column moving from Glasgow to Columbia, and
cross the Cumberland before it came within striking distance." Shortly
before midnight, therefore, on the night of the 30th, the column moved
from Springfield, turning off from the pike on to a little, rarely
traveled, by-road, which passes between Lebanon and St. Mary's. Numerous
fires were built in front of Lebanon, and kept up all night to induce
the belief that the division was encamped there and would attack in the
morning. The night was intensely dark and bitterly cold, the guides were
inefficient, and the column floundered along blindly; the men worn out
and half frozen, the horses stumbling at every step--nothing preserved
organization and carried the column along but the will of the great
Captain in the front and the unerring sagacity which guided him. It is
common to hear men who served in Morgan's cavalry through all of its
career of trial and hardship, refer to the night march around Lebanon as
the most trying scene of their entire experience.
Morning found the column only eight miles from Springfield, and two and
a half from Lebanon. At that place, however, the garrison were drawn up,
confidently expecting attack from another direction. By 1 P.M., of the
31st, the column reached the top of Muldraugh's hill, on the Lebanon and
Columbia road, and soon after nightfall was in Campbellsville.
Just after the column had crossed the hill, a hand-to-hand fight
occurred between Captain Alexander Treble and Lieutenant George Eastin,
on the one side, and Colonel Halisey, of the Federal cavalry, and one of
the latter's Lieutenants, on the other. Treble and Eastin had, for some
purpose, fallen behind the rear-guard and were chased by Halisey's
regiment, which was following us to pick up stragglers. Being both well
mounted, they easily kept ahead of their pursuers, until, looking back
as they cantered down a long straight stretch in the road, they saw
within three hundred yards, perhaps, of them, four men who were far in
advance of the rest of the pursuers.
Treble and Eastin were both high-strung men and they did not like to
continue to run from that number of enemies. So as soon as they reached
a point in the road where it suddenly turned, they halted a few yards
from the turn. They expected to shoot two of the enemy as soon as they
came in sight and thought that they would then have little trouble with
the others. But it so happened that only two, Halisey and his
Lieutenant, made their appearance; the other two, for some reason,
halted; and what was stranger, Treble and Eastin, although both
practiced shots, missed their men. Their antagonists dashed at them and
several shots were fired without effect. The combatants soon grappled,
man to man, and fell from their horses. Treble forced the head of his
man into a pool of water just by the side of the road and, having half
drowned him, accepted his surrender. Eastin mastered Halisey and,
putting his pistol to his head, bade him surrender. Halisey did so, but,
still retaining his pistol, as Eastin let him arise, he fired, grazing
the latter's cheek, who immediately killed him. Eastin brought off his
saber, which he kept as a trophy.
In Campbellsville, luckily, there was a large supply of commissary
stores, which were immediately issued to the division. Leaving early on
the next morning, the 1st of January, 1863, the column reached Columbia
at three P.M. All that day the roaring of artillery was distinctly heard
by many men in the column. There was no cannonading going on--at least,
in the volume which they declared that they heard--except at
Murfreesboro', far distant, where the battle between the armies of Bragg
and Rosecrans was raging; but it seems incredible that even heavy guns
could have been heard at that distance.
Just before night fall, the column moved from Columbia and marched all
night--a dark, bitter night and a terrible march--to Burkesville. The
Cumberland was crossed on the 2nd and the danger was over. The division
then moved leisurely along, through Livingston, crossing Caney Fork at
Sligo Ferry, and reached Smithville on the 5th. Here it halted for
several days to rest and recruit men and horses, both terribly used up
by the raid.
The results of this expedition were the destruction of the railroads
which has been described, the capture of eighteen hundred and
seventy-seven prisoners, of a large number of stores, arms, and
government property of every description. Our loss was only twenty-six
in killed and wounded (only two killed), and sixty-four missing.
During our absence, the sanguinary battle of Murfreesboro' was fought,
ending in the withdrawal of Bragg to Tullahoma, much, it is claimed, to
the surprise of his adversary. General Bragg had sent officers to Morgan
(who never reached him until it was too late) with instructions to him
to hasten back, and attack the enemy in the rear. It was unfortunate
that these orders were not received. To do General Bragg justice, he
managed better than almost any commander of the Confederate armies to
usefully employ his cavalry, both in campaigns and battles. In the
battle of Murfreesboro', he made excellent use of the cavalry on the
field. Wharton and Buford, under command of Wheeler, three times made
the circuit of the Federal army and were splendidly efficient; at one
time Wheeler was master of all between the immediate rear of Rosecrans
and Nashville.
Perhaps Morgan's raid was delayed a little too long, as well as that of
Forrest into Western Tennessee (undertaken about the same time, and in
prisoners, captures of all sorts, and interruption of the enemy's
communications, as successful as Morgan's); but these expeditions drew
off and kept employed a large number of troops whose presence in the
great battle would have vastly aided Rosecrans.
The Confederate Congress thought this expedition worthy of recognition
and compliment, and passed a joint resolution of thanks, as follows:
"_Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States of America_:
That the thanks of Congress are due, and are hereby tendered to Gen.
John H. Morgan, and the officers and men of his command, for their
varied, heroic, and invaluable services in Tennessee and Kentucky,
immediately preceding the battle before Murfreesboro'--services
which have conferred upon their authors fame as enduring as the
records of the struggle which they have so brilliantly illustrated.
Approved May 17, 1863."