THE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VEDÂNTA
Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential
than the Dialectic of controversy.
_Pramâ@na_ in Sanskrit signifies the means and the movement
by which knowledge is acquired, _pramâtâ_ means the subject or
the knower who cognizes, _pramâ_ the result of pramâ@na--right
knowledge, _prameya_ the object of knowledge, and _prâmâ@nya_ the
validity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge is
sometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge to
its object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion of
validity in the mind of the subject--the knower (that his perceptions
are true), which moves him to work in accordance with
his perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for the
attainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things.
The question wherein consists the prâmâ@nya of knowledge has
not only an epistemological and psychological bearing but a
metaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of knowledge
based on an analysis of psychological experience, and on
the other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with the
theory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justify
a theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and interpretation
of experience which the others sometimes ignored or
sometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of different
schools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat one
another in actual debates, and the result of these debates was frequently
very important in determining the prestige of any school
of thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Nyâya
or Mîmâ@msâ thinker in a great public debate attended by many
learned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame at
once spread all over the country and he could probably secure a
large number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputation
were often undertaken by great masters all over the country
for the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schools
and of securing adherents to their own. These debates were therefore
not generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical
407
mood with the object of arriving at the truth but in order to
inflict a defeat on opponents and to establish the ascendency of
some particular school of thought. It was often a sense of personal
victory and of the victory of the school of thought to which the
debater adhered that led him to pursue the debate. Advanced
Sanskrit philosophical works give us a picture of the attitude
of mind of these debaters and we find that most of these
debates attempt to criticize the different schools of thinkers by
exposing their inconsistencies and self-contradictions by close
dialectical reasoning, anticipating the answers of the opponent,
asking him to define his statements, and ultimately proving that
his theory was inconsistent, led to contradictions, and was opposed
to the testimony of experience. In reading an advanced work on
Indian philosophy in the original, a student has to pass through an
interminable series of dialectic arguments, and negative criticisms
(to thwart opponents) sometimes called _vita@n@dâ_, before he can
come to the root of the quarrel, the real philosophical divergence.
All the resources of the arts of controversy find full play
for silencing the opponent before the final philosophical answer
is given. But to a modern student of philosophy, who belongs to
no party and is consequently indifferent to the respective victory
of either side, the most important thing is the comprehension of
the different aspects from which the problem of the theory of
knowledge and its associated metaphysical theory was looked at
by the philosophers, and also a clear understanding of the deficiency
of each view, the value of the mutual criticisms, the speculations
on the experience of each school, their analysis, and their
net contribution to philosophy. With Vedânta we come to an
end of the present volume, and it may not be out of place here
to make a brief survey of the main conflicting theories from the
point of view of the theory of knowledge, in order to indicate the
position of the Vedânta of the S'a@nkara school in the field of
Indian philosophy so far as we have traversed it. I shall therefore
now try to lay before my readers the solution of the theory
of knowledge (_pramâ@navâda_) reached by some of the main
schools of thought. Their relations to the solution offered by
the S'a@nkara Vedânta will also be dealt with, as we shall attempt
to sketch the views of the Vedanta later on in this chapter.
408
The philosophical situation. A Review.
Before dealing with the Vedânta system it seems advisable
to review the general attitude of the schools already discussed to
the main philosophical and epistemological questions which determine
the position of the Vedânta as taught by S'a@nkara and
his school.
The Sautrântika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man is
concerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (_puru@sâdrtka_).
This however cannot be done without right knowledge (_samyagjñâna_)
which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said
to be right when we can get things just as we perceived them.
So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned,
it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore
this does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about
knowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or
contradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how
far our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our
actions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get
in our practical experience (_arthaprâdpakatva_). The perception is
right (_abhrânta_ non-illusory) when following its representation we
can get in the external world such things as were represented by
it (_sa@mvâdakatva_). That perception alone can be right which is
generated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination.
When I say "this is the cow I had seen," what I see is the
object with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that
this is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is
not perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by
the visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which
I see now never existed before so as to be invested with this
or that permanent name. This association of name and permanence
to objects perceived is called _kaipanâ_ or _abhilâpa_.
Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhilâpa
association (_kalpanâpo@dha_), for though this is taken as a part of
our perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and
hence its association with the object is an evident error. The
object as unassociated with name--the nirvikalpa--is thus what
is perceived. As a result of the pratyak@sa the manovijñâna or
thought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also
determined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an
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object of knowledge (_grâhya_), and by the fact of the rise
of such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing
realizable or attainable in the external world. The special
features of the object undefinable in themselves as being
what they are in themselves (_svalak@sa@na_) are what is
actually perceived (_pratyak@savi@saya_) [Footnote ref 1].
The _pramâ@naphala_ (result of perception) is the
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[Footnote 1: There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word
"svalak@sa@na" of Dharmakîrtti between ray esteemed friend Professor
Stcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmakîrtti held
that the content of the presentative element at the moment of perception
was almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, "According to your
interpretation svalak@sa@na mean,--the object (or idea with Vijñânavâdin)
_from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated_,
this I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past and
future has been taken away, what remains? _The present_ and the present
is a _k@sa@na_ i.e. nothing.... The reverse of k@sa@na is a k@sa@nasamtâna
or simply sa@mtâna and in every sa@mtâna there is a synthesis ekîbhâva
of moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi = nis'caya =
kalpana = adhyavasâya)...There is in the perception of a jug _something_
(a k@sa@na of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the _idea_ of
a jug (which is always a sa@mtâna, always vikalpita), and if you take
the idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains:
k@sanasya jñânena prâpayitumas'akyatvât. This is absolutely the Kantian
teaching about _Synthesis of Apprehension_. Accordingly pratyak@sa is a
_transcendental_ source of knowledge, because practically speaking it
gives no knowledge at all. This _pramâ@na_ is _asatkalpa_. Kant says
that without the elements of intuition (= sense-knowledge = pratyak@sa =
kalpanâpo@dha) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements of
intellect (kalpanâ = buddhi = synthesis = ekîbhâva) they would be blind.
Empirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory of
Dharmakîrtti. He is a Vijñânavâdî as I understand, because he maintains
the cognizability of ideas (vijñâna) alone, but the reality is an
incognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is bâhya, it is
artha, it is arthakriyâk@sa@na = svalak@sa@na; that is the reason for
which he sometimes is called Sautrântika and this school is sometimes
called Sautranta-vijñânavâda, as opposed to the Vijñânavâda of As'vagho@sa
and Âryâsanga, which had no elaborate theory of cognition. If the jug as
it exists in our representation were the svalak@sa@na and paramârthasat,
what would remain of Vijñânavâda? But there is the perception of the jug
as opposed to the _pure idea_ of a jug (s'uddhâ kalpanâ), an element of
reality, the sensational k@sa@na, which is communicated to us by sense
knowledge. Kant's 'thing in itself' is also a k@sa@na and also an element
of sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmakîrtti
has also _s'uddhâ kalpanâ_ and _s'uddham pratyak@sam_. ...And very
interesting is the opposition between pratyak@sa and anumâna, the first
moves from k@sa@na to sa@mtâna and the second from sa@mtâna to k@sa@na,
that is the reason that although bhrânta the anumâna is nevertheless
pramâ@na because through it we indirectly also reach k@sa@na, the
arthakriyâk@sa@na. It is bhrânta directly and pramâ@na indirectly;
pratyak@sa is pramâ@na directly and bhrânta (asatkalpa) indirectly... ."
So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers are
concerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushes
the interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive "this is
blue," the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative
element of sense-knowledge (_svalak@sa@na_) and the affirmation
(_nis'caya_). So far we are in complete agreement. But Professor
Stcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a k@sa@na (moment)
and is nothing. I also hold that it is a k@sa@na, but it is nothing
only in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving
affirmation such as "this is blue." The affirmative process
occurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative
element of the first moment (_pratyak@sabalotpanna_ N.T., p. 20) but
this presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative
process of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannot
express its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other
ideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form
a part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be its
own specific nature (_svalak@sa@na_). But what is this specific nature?
Dharmakîrtti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he means
those specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when
the object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (_yasyârthasya
sannidhânâsannidhânâbkyâm jñânapratibhâsabhedastat svalak@sa@nam_ N.,
p. 1 and N.T., p. 16). Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specific
characteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the
object itself; it is the appearance of the "blue" in its specific
character in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative
or ideational process, the result is the concept or idea "this is blue"
(_nîlasarûpa@m pratyak@samanubhûyamâna@m nîlabodharûpamavasthâpyate ...
nîlasârûpyamasya pramâ@nam nîlavikalpanarûpa@m tvasya pramâ@naphalam_,
N.T.p. 22). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue
(_nîlanirbhâsa@m hi vijñânam_, N.T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance
(_yatkiñcit arthasya sâk@sâtkârijñânam tatpratyak@samucyate_, N.T. 7) and
this is real (_paramârthasat_) and valid. This blue sensation is
different from the idea "this is blue" (_nîlabodha_, N.T. 22) which is
the result of the former (_pramâ@naphala_) through the association of
the affirmative process (_adhyavasâya_) and is regarded as invalid for
it contains elements other than what were presented to the sense and is
a _vikalpapratyaya_. In my opinion _svalak@sa@na_ therefore means pure
sensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object
and with Dharmakîrtti this is the only thing which is valid in perception
and vikalpapratyaya or pramânaphala is the idea or concept which follows
it. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the
construction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage
of the first moment of sensation-presentation (_k@sa@nasya
prâpayitumas'akyatvât_, N.T. 16). N.T. = _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_,
N = _Nyâyabindu (Peterson's edition).]
410
ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing
the means which being followed the thing can be got (_yena k@rtena
artha@h prâpito bhavati_). Pramâ@na then is the similarity of the
knowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which we
assure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is
perceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience.
Yet this later stage is pramâ@naphala and not pramâ@na which
consists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other associations),
and which determines the attitude of the perceiver towards
the perceived object. The pramâ@na therefore only refers
to the newly-acquired knowledge (_anadhigatâdhigant@r_) as this is
of use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the objective
world. This account of perception leaves out the real
epistemological question as to how the knowledge is generated
by the external world, or what it is in itself. It only looks to
the correctness or faithfulness of the perception to the object and
its value for us in the practical realization of our ends. The
question of the relation of the external world with knowledge as
determining the latter is regarded as unimportant.
411
The Yogâcâras or idealistic Buddhists take their cue from
the above-mentioned Sautrântika Buddhists, and say that since
we can come into touch with knowledge and knowledge alone,
what is the use of admitting an external world of objects as the
data of sensation determining our knowledge? You say that
sensations are copies of the external world, but why should you
say that they copy, and not that they alone exist? We never come
into touch with objects in themselves; these can only be grasped
by us simultaneously with knowledge of them, they must therefore
be the same as knowledge (_sahopalambhaniyamât abhedo
nîlataddhiyo@h_); for it is in and through knowledge that external
objects can appear to us, and without knowledge we
are not in touch with the so-called external objects. So it is
knowledge which is self-apparent in itself, that projects itself in
such a manner as to appear as referring to other external objects.
We all acknowledge that in dreams there are no external
objects, but even there we have knowledge. The question
why then if there are no external objects, there should be so
much diversity in the forms of knowledge, is not better solved
by the assumption of an external world; for in such an assumption,
the external objects have to be admitted as possessing the
infinitely diverse powers of diversely affecting and determining
our knowledge; that being so, it may rather be said that in
the beginningless series of flowing knowledge, preceding knowledge-moments
by virtue of their inherent specific qualities determine
the succeeding knowledge-moments. Thus knowledge
alone exists; the projection of an external word is an illusion of
knowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire
(_vâsanâ_) associated with it. The preceding knowledge determines
the succeeding one and that another and so on. Knowledge,
pleasure, pain, etc. are not qualities requiring a permanent entity
as soul in which they may inhere, but are the various forms
in which knowledge appears. Even the cognition, "I perceive a
blue thing," is but a form of knowledge, and this is often erroneously
interpreted as referring to a permanent knower. Though
the cognitions are all passing and momentary, yet so long as
the series continues to be the same, as in the case of one person,
say Devadatta, the phenomena of memory, recognition, etc. can
happen in the succeeding moments, for these are evidently illusory
cognitions, so far as they refer to the permanence of the objects
412
believed to have been perceived before, for things or knowledge-moments,
whatever they may be, are destroyed the next
moment after their birth. There is no permanent entity as perceiver
or knower, but the knowledge-moments are at once the
knowledge, the knower and the known. This thoroughgoing
idealism brushes off all references to an objective field of experience,
interprets the verdict of knowledge as involving a knower
and the known as mere illusory appearance, and considers the
flow of knowledge as a self-determining series in successive
objective forms as the only truth. The Hindu schools of thought,
Nyâya, Sâ@mkhya, and the Mîmâ@msâ, accept the duality of soul
and matter, and attempt to explain the relation between the
two. With the Hindu writers it was not the practical utility of
knowledge that was the only important thing, but the nature of
knowledge and the manner in which it came into being were also
enquired after and considered important.
Pramâ@na is defined by Nyâya as the collocation of instruments
by which unerring and indubitable knowledge comes into being.
The collocation of instruments which brings about definite knowledge
consists partly of consciousness (_bodha_) and partly of material
factors (_bodhâbodhasvabhâva_). Thus in perception the
proper contact of the visual sense with the object (e.g. jug) first
brings about a non-intelligent, non-apprehensible indeterminate
consciousness (nirvikalpa) as the jugness (gha@tatva) and this later
on combining with the remaining other collocations of sense-contact
etc. produces the determinate consciousness: this is a jug.
The existence of this indeterminate state of consciousness as a
factor in bringing about the determinate consciousness, cannot of
course be perceived, but its existence can be inferred from the
fact that if the perceiver were not already in possession of the
qualifying factor (_vis'e@sanajñâna_ as jugness) he could not have
comprehended the qualified object (_vis'i@s@tabuddhi_} the jug (i.e.
the object which possesses jugness). In inference (_anumâ@na_)
knowledge of the li@nga takes part, and in upamâna the sight
of similarity with other material conglomerations. In the case
of the Buddhists knowledge itself was regarded as pramâ@na;
even by those who admitted the existence of the objective world,
right knowledge was called pramâ@na, because it was of the same
form as the external objects it represented, and it was by the form
of the knowledge (e.g. blue) that we could apprehend that the
413
external object was also blue. Knowledge does not determine the
external world but simply enforces our convictions about the external
world. So far as knowledge leads us to form our convictions
of the external world it is pramâ@na, and so far as it determines our
attitude towards the external world it is pramâ@naphala. The
question how knowledge is generated had little importance with
them, but how with knowledge we could form convictions of
the external world was the most important thing. Knowledge
was called pramâ@na, because it was the means by which we
could form convictions (_adhyavasâya_) about the external world.
Nyâya sought to answer the question how knowledge was
generated in us, but could not understand that knowledge was not
a mere phenomenon like any other objective phenomenon, but
thought that though as a gu@na (quality) it was external like other
gu@nas, yet it was associated with our self as a result of collocations
like any other happening in the material world. Pramâ@na
does not necessarily bring to us new knowledge (_anadhigatâdhi-gant@r_)
as the Buddhists demanded, but whensoever there were
collocations of pramâ@na, knowledge was produced, no matter
whether the object was previously unknown or known. Even the
knowledge of known things may be repeated if there be suitable
collocations. Knowledge like any other physical effect is produced
whenever the cause of it namely the pramâ@na collocation
is present. Categories which are merely mental such as class
(_sâmânya_), inherence (_samavâya_), etc., were considered as having
as much independent existence as the atoms of the four elements.
The phenomenon of the rise of knowledge in the soul was thus
conceived to be as much a phenomenon as the turning of the
colour of the jug by fire from black to red. The element of
indeterminate consciousness was believed to be combining with
the sense contact, the object, etc. to produce the determinate
consciousness. There was no other subtler form of movement than
the molecular. Such a movement brought about by a certain
collocation of things ended in a certain result (_phala_). Jñâna
(knowledge) was thus the result of certain united collocations
(_sâmagrî_) and their movements (e.g. contact of manas with soul,
of manas with the senses, of the senses with the object, etc.). This
confusion renders it impossible to understand the real philosophical
distinction between knowledge and an external event
of the objective world. Nyâya thus fails to explain the cause
414
of the origin of knowledge, and its true relations with the objective
world. Pleasure, pain, willing, etc. were regarded as qualities
which belonged to the soul, and the soul itself was regarded
as a qualitiless entity which could not be apprehended directly
but was inferred as that in which the qualities of jñâna, sukha
(pleasure), etc. inhered. Qualities had independent existence
as much as substances, but when any new substances were
produced, the qualities rushed forward and inhered in them. It
is very probable that in Nyâya the cultivation of the art of inference
was originally pre-eminent and metaphysics was deduced
later by an application of the inferential method which gave
the introspective method but little scope for its application,
so that inference came in to explain even perception (e.g. this is
a jug since it has jugness) and the testimony of personal psychological
experience was taken only as a supplement to corroborate
the results arrived at by inference and was not used to criticize it
[Footnote ref 1].
Sâ@mkhya understood the difference between knowledge and
material events. But so far as knowledge consisted in being the
copy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from
the objects themselves; it was even then an invisible translucent
sort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external
objects possessed. But the fact that it copies those gross objects
makes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same substances
though in a subtler form as that of which the objects were
made. But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed the
form of the objects with which it came in touch, was probably
thus a subtler combination of the same elementary substances
of which matter was made up, yet there was in it another element,
viz. intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterly
different from material combinations. This element of intelligence
is indeed different from the substances or content of
the knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like a
stationary light, "the self," which illuminates the crowding,
bustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form in
accordance with the objects with which it comes in touch. This
light of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation in
consciousness as the "I," the changeless entity amidst all the
fluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge. How this
element of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_ on pramâ@na.]
415
relates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it up
into itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult point
of the Sâ@mkhya epistemology and metaphysics. The substance
of knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape of
knowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence (_puru@sa_)
when it appears as conscious. The forming of the buddhi-shape
of knowledge is thus the pramâ@na (instrument and process of
knowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapes
is criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by the
external objects (_svata@h-prâmâ@nya_ and _svata@h-aprâmâ@nya_). The
pramâ@na however can lead to a pramâ or right knowledge only
when it is intelligized by the puru@sa. The puru@sa comes in touch
with buddhi not by the ordinary means of physical contact but
by what may be called an inexplicable transcendental contact.
It is the transcendental influence of puru@sa that sets in motion
the original prak@rti in Sâ@mkhya metaphysics, and it is the same
transcendent touch (call it yogyatâ according to Vâcaspati or
samyoga according to Bhik@su) of the transcendent entity of
puru@sa that transforms the non-intelligent states of buddhi into
consciousness. The Vijñânavâdin Buddhist did not make any
distinction between the pure consciousness and its forms (_âkâra_)
and did not therefore agree that the âkâra of knowledge was
due to its copying the objects. Sâ@mkhya was however a realist
who admitted the external world and regarded the forms as
all due to copying, all stamped as such upon a translucent substance
(_sattva_) which could assume the shape of the objects.
But Sâ@mkhya was also transcendentalist in this, that it did not
think like Nyâya that the âkâra of knowledge was all that knowledge
had to show; it held that there was a transcendent element
which shone forth in knowledge and made it conscious. With
Nyâya there was no distinction between the shaped buddhi and
the intelligence, and that being so consciousness was almost like
a physical event. With Sâ@mkhya however so far as the content
and the shape manifested in consciousness were concerned it was
indeed a physical event, but so far as the pure intelligizing element
of consciousness was concerned it was a wholly transcendent
affair beyond the scope and province of physics. The rise of
consciousness was thus at once both transcendent and physical.
The Mîmâ@msist Prabhâkara agreed with Nyâya in general
as regards the way in which the objective world and sense contact
416
induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a
unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower
and the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations,
for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals
things--the direct apprehension that should be called the pramâ@na.
Pramâ@na in this sense is the same as pramiti or pramâ,
the phenomenon of apprehension. Pramâ@na may also indeed
mean the collocations so far as they induce the pramâ. For
pramâ or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists,
but it manifests itself differently under different circumstances.
The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific
attitude that is generated in us with reference to the objective
world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge,
and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the
objective field (_sa@mvâdin_). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeterminate)
means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely
a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as Nyâya
holds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes
the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as
represented by memory [Footnote ref 1].
Prabhâkara rejected the Sâ@mkhya conception of a dual element
in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (_cit_) and
a material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as an
unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the
knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend
upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (_pradars'akatva_)
external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension
(_anubhûti_) has of prompting us to action in the external world;
knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its
self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart
from its self-revealing character Prabhâkara did not enquire.
Kumârila declared that jñâna (knowledge) was a movement
brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producing
consciousness (_jñâtatâ_) of objective things. Jñâna itself
cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement
necessary for producing the jñâtatâ or consciousness of things.
Movement with Kumârila was not a mere atomic vibration, but
was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the
first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next
moment, was called savikalpa.]
417
was sometimes the result. Jñâna was a movement and not the
result of causal operation as Nyâya supposed. Nyâya would
not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it
would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities,
such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment
of a physical movement. Kumârila accords the same
self-validity to knowledge that Prabhâkara gives. Later knowledge
by experience is not endowed with any special quality
which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the
previous movement. For what is called sa@mvâdi or later testimony
of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more [Footnote ref 1]. The
self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we
can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is
the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circumstances
leading to cognition of things that is called jñâna [Footnote ref 2].
Here Kumârila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge
as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was
beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.
The idealistic tendency of Vijñânavâda Buddhism, Sâ@mkhya,
and Mîmâ@msâ was manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique
character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in
touch. But Vijñânavâda denied the external world, and thereby
did violence to the testimony of knowledge. Sâ@mkhya admitted
the external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge
and pure intelligence; Prabhâkara ignored this difference,
and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge
was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and
the known, Kumârila however admitted a transcendent element
of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness,
but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question
remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of
knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects,
how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be
regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative,
either referring to one's being prompted to the objective
world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the
suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyaratnamâla_, svata@h-prâmâ@nya-nir@naya.]
[Footnote 2: See _Nyâyamañjari_ on Pramâ@na, _S'lokavârttika_ on
Pratyak@sa, and Gâgâ Bha@t@ta's _Bha@t@tâcintama@ni_ on Pratyak@sa.]
418
uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether
any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge
and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded
as the real. But the question was not asked, whether
there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth,
the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable, reality. This
philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the
Hindu mind.
Vedânta Literature.
It is difficult to ascertain the time when the _Brahma-sûtras_
were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the
other Indian systems, even of the S'ûnyavâda Buddhism (of course
according to S'a@nkara's interpretation), they cannot have been
written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in
supposing that they were written some time in the second century
B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gau@dapâda revived the monistic
teaching of the Upani@sads by his commentary on the Mâ@n@dûkya
Upani@sad in verse called _Mâ@n@dûkyakârikâ_. His disciple Govinda
was the teacher of S'a@nkara (788--820 A.D.). S'a@nkara's commentary
on the _Brahma-sûtras_ is the root from which sprang
forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedântism of great
originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Ânandagiri, a
disciple of S'a@nkara, wrote a commentary called _Nyâyanir@naya_,
and Govindânanda wrote another commentary named _Ratna-prabhâ_.
Vâcaspati Mis'ra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote
another commentary on it called the _Bhâmati._ Amalânanda
(1247--1260 A.D.) wrote his _Kalpataru_ on it, and Apyayadik@sita
(1550 A.D.) son of Ra@ngarâjadhvarîndra of Kâñcî wrote his
_Kalpataruparimala_ on the _Kalpataru._ Another disciple of S'a@nkara,
Padmapâda, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it
known as _Pañcapâdikâ_. From the manner in which the book is
begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary
on the whole of S'a@nkara's bhâsya, but it ends abruptly at the
end of the fourth sûtra. Mâdhava (1350), in his _S'a@nkaravijaya,_
recites an interesting story about it. He says that Sures'vara received
S'a@nkara's permission to write a vârttika on the bhâsya.
But other pupils objected to S'a@nkara that since Sures'vara was
formerly a great Mîmâ@msist (Ma@n@dana Misra was called Sures'vara
after his conversion to Vedântism) he was not competent to write
419
a good _vârttika_ on the bhâ@sya. Sures'vara, disappointed, wrote
a treatise called _Nai@skarmyasiddhi._ Padmapâda wrote a @tîkâ
but this was burnt in his uncle's house. S'a@nkara, who had once
seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapâda wrote it down.
Prakâs'âtman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapâda's _Pañcapâdikâ_
known as _Pañcapâdikâvivara@na. _Akha@n@dânanda wrote
his _Tattvadîpana,_ and the famous N@rsi@mhâs'rama Muni (1500)
wrote his _Vivara@nabhâvaprakâs'ikâ_ on it. Amalânanda and
Vidyasâgara also wrote commentaries on _Pañcapâdikâ,_ named
_Pañcapâdikâdarpa@na_ and _Pañcapâdikâ@tîkâ_ respectively, but
the _Pañcapâdikâvivara@na_ had by far the greatest reputation.
Vidyâra@nya who is generally identified by some with Mâdhava
(1350) wrote his famous work _Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_ [Footnote ref 1],
elaborating the ideas of _Pañcapâdikâvivara@na_; Vidyâra@nya
wrote also another excellent work named _Jîvanmuktiviveka_ on
the Vedânta doctrine of emancipation. Sures'vara's (800 A.D.)
excellent work _Nai@skarmyasiddhi_ is probably the earliest independent
treatise on S'a@nkara's philosophy as expressed in his
bhâ@sya. It has been commented upon by Jñânottama Mis'ra.
Vidyâra@nya also wrote another work of great merit known as
_Pañcadas'î,_ which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in
verse on Vedânta. Another important work written in verse on
the main teachings of S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya is _Sa@mk@sepas'arîraka_,
written by Sarvajñâtma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been
commented upon by Râmatîrtha. S'rîhar@sa (1190 A.D.) wrote
his _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya_, the most celebrated work on the
Vedânta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly
after S'rîhar@sa, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an
independent work on Vedânta dialectic known as _Tattvadîpikâ_
which has also a commentary called _Nayanaprasâdinî_ written
by Pratyagrûpa. S'a@nkara Mis'ra and Raghunâtha also wrote
commentaries on _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya._ A work on Vedânta
epistemology and the principal topics of Vedânta of
great originality and merit known as _Vedântaparibhâ@sâ_ was
written by Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra (about 155OA.D.). His son
Râmak@r@snâdhvarin wrote his _S'ikhâma@ni_ on it and Amaradâsa his
_Ma@niprabhâ._ The _Vedântaparibhâ@sâ_ with these two commentaries
forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental
principles of Vedânta. Another work of supreme importance
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Narasi@mhâcârya's article in the _Indian Antiquary_,
1916.]
420
(though probably the last great work on Vedânta) is the
_Advaitasiddhi_ of Madhusûdana Sarasvatî who followed Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra.
This has three commentaries known as _Gau@dabrahmânandî_,
_Vi@t@thales'opadhyâyî_ and _Siddhivyâkhyâ_. Sadânanda
Vyâsa wrote also a summary of it known as _Advaitasiddhisiddhântasâra_.
Sadânanda wrote also an excellent elementary work
named _Vedântasâra_ which has also two commentaries _Subodhinî_
and _Vidvanmanorañjinî_. The _Advaitabrahmasiddhi_ of Sadânanda
Yati though much inferior to _Advaitasiddhi_ is important, as it
touches on many points of Vedânta interest which are not dealt
with in other Vedânta works. The _Nyâyamakaranda_ of Ânandabodha
Bha@t@târakâcâryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very
well, as also some other important points of Vedânta interest.
_Vedântasiddhântamuktâvalî_ of Prakâs'ânanda discusses many of
the subtle points regarding the nature of ajñâna and its relations
to cit, the doctrine of _d@r@stis@r@stivâda_, etc., with great clearness.
_Siddhântales'a by Apyayadîk@sita is very important as a summary
of the divergent views of different writers on many points of
interest. _Vedântatattvadîpikâ_ and _Siddhântatattva_ are also good
as well as deep in their general summary of the Vedânta system.
_Bhedadhikkâra_ of Nrsi@mhâs'rama Muni also is to be regarded as
an important work on the Vedânta dialectic.
The above is only a list of some of the most important Vedânta
works on which the present chapter has been based.
Vedânta in Gau@dapâda.
It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of
the Vedânta thought as contained in the _Brahma-sûtras_ without
making any reference to the commentary of S'a@nkara or any
other commentator. There is reason to believe that the _Brahma-sûtras_
were first commented upon by some Vai@s@nava writers who
held some form of modified dualism [Footnote ref 1]. There have been more
than a half dozen Vai@s@nava commentators of the _Brahma-sûtras_
who not only differed from S'a@nkara's interpretation, but also
differed largely amongst themselves in accordance with the
different degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of
their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretation
was the only one that was faithful to the sûtras and to
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall
deal with the systems expounded by the Vai@s@nava commentators of the
_Brahma-sûtras_.]
421
the Upani@sads. Should I attempt to give an interpretation
myself and claim that to be the right one, it would be only
just one additional view. But however that may be, I am
myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the
_Brahma-sûtras_ were probably more faithful to the sûtras than the
interpretations of S'añkara.
The _S'rîmadbhagavadgîtâ_, which itself was a work of the
Ekânti (singularistic) Vai@s@navas, mentions the _Brahma-sûtras_ as
having the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons [Footnote ref 1].
Professor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophical
sûtras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism
found in the _Brahma-sûtras_ are not with regard to the Vijñâna-vada
of Vasubandhu, but with regard to the S'ûnyavâda, but he regards
the composition of the _Brahma-sûtras_ to be later than Nâgârjuna.
I agree with the late Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@shana in holding that
both the Yogâcâra system and the system of Nâgârjuna evolved
from the _Prajñâpâramitâ_ [Footnote ref 2]. Nâgârjuna's merit
consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support
of S'unyavâda; but so far as the essentials of S'unyavâda are
concerned I believe that the Tathatâ philosophy of As'vagho@sa
and the philosophy of the _Prajñâpâramitâ_ contained no less.
There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nâgârjuna were
better known to the Hindu writers than the _Mahâyâna sûtras_.
Even in such later times as that of Vâcaspati Mis'ra, we find
him quoting a passage of the _S'âlistambha sûtra_ to give an account
of the Buddhist doctrine of pratîtyasamutpâda [Footnote ref 3].
We could interpret any reference to S'ûnyavâda as pointing to
Nâgârjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods
were referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference in
the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ to the _Brahma-sûtras_ clearly points out a date
prior to that of Nâgârjuna; though we may be slow to believe such
an early date as has been assigned to the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ by Telang,
yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back
as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part
of the second century B.C. The _Brahma-sûtras_ could thus be
placed slightly earlier than the date of the _Bhagavadgîtâ_.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: "Brahmasûtrapadais'caiva hetumadbhirvinis'cita@h"
_Bhagavadgîtâ_. The proofs in support of the view that the
_Bhagavadgîtâ_ is a Vai@s@nava work will be discussed in the 2nd
volume of the present work in the section on _Bhagavadgîtâ_ and
its philosophy.]
[Footnote 2: _Indian Antiquary_, 1915.]
[Footnote 3: See Vâcaspati Mis'ra's _Bhâmatî_ on S'a@nkara's bhâsya on
_Brahma-sûtra_, II. ii.]
422
I do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict with
this supposition. The fact that we do not know of any Hindu
writer who held such monistic views as Gau@dapâda or S'a@nkara,
and who interpreted the _Brahma-sûtras_ in accordance with those
monistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists
had been writing commentaries on the _Brahma-sûtras_, goes to
show that the _Brahma-sûtras_ were originally regarded as an
authoritative work of the dualists. This also explains the fact that
the _Bhagavadgîtâ_, the canonical work of the Ekânti Vai@s@navas,
should refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous
to Gau@dapâda who attempted to give an exposition of the
monistic doctrine (apart from the Upani@sads), either by writing
a commentary as did S'a@nkara, or by writing an independent
work as did Gau@dapâda. I am inclined to think therefore that
as the pure monism of the Upani@sads was not worked out in a
coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it
was dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form
of dualism which was already developing in the later days of
the Upani@sads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such
Upani@sads as the S'vetâs'vatara, and the like. The epic S'a@mkhya
was also the result of this dualistic development.
It seems that Bâdarâya@na, the writer of the _Brahma-sûtras_,
was probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his commentator
S'a@nkara. Gau@dapâda seems to be the most important
man, after the Upani@sad sages, who revived the monistic tendencies
of the Upani@sads in a bold and clear form and tried to
formulate them in a systematic manner. It seems very significant
that no other kârikâs on the Upani@sads were interpreted,
except the _Mân@dûkyakârikâ_ by Gau@dapâda, who did not himself
make any reference to any other writer of the monistic
school, not even Bâdarâya@na. S'a@nkara himself makes the confession
that the absolutist (_advaita_) creed was recovered from
the Vedas by Gau@dapâda. Thus at the conclusion of his commentary
on Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, he says that "he adores by
falling at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of his
adored, who on finding all the people sinking in the ocean made
dreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out of kindness for all
people, by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his great
churning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heart
of the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal
423
gods [Footnote ref l]." It seems particularly significant that S'a@nkara
should credit Gau@dapâda and not Bâdarâya@na with recovering the
Upani@sad creed. Gau@dapâda was the teacher of Govinda, the
teacher of S'a@nkara; but he was probably living when S'a@nkara
was a student, for S'a@nkara says that he was directly influenced by
his great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning, self-control
and modesty of the other pupils of Gau@dapâda [Footnote ref 2]. There is
some dispute about the date of S'a@nkara, but accepting the date proposed
by Bha@n@darkar, Pa@thak and Deussen, we may consider
it to be 788 A.D. [Footnote ref 3], and suppose that in order to be able to
teach S'a@nkara, Gau@dapâda must have been living till at least 800 A.D.
Gau@dapâda thus flourished after all the great Buddhist
teachers As'vagho@sa, Nâgârjuna, Asa@nga and Vasubandhu; and
I believe that there is sufficient evidence in his kârikâs for thinking
that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that
the teachings of the Upani@sads tallied with those of Buddha.
Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his kârikâs he
says that he adores that great man (_dvipadâm varam_) who by knowledge
as wide as the sky realized (_sambuddha_) that all appearances
(_dharma_) were like the vacuous sky (_gaganopamam_ [Footnote ref 4]. He
then goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (_des'ita_)
that the touch of untouch (_aspars'ayoga_--probably referring to
Nirvâ@na) was the good that produced happiness to all beings,
and that he was neither in disagreement with this doctrine nor
found any contradiction in it (_avivâda@h aviruddhas'ca_).
Some disputants hold that coming into being is of existents,
whereas others quarrelling with them hold that being (_jâta_)
is of non-existents (_abhûtasya_); there are others who quarrel
with them and say that neither the existents nor non-existents
are liable to being and there is one non-coming-into-being
(_advayamajâtim_). He agrees with those who hold that there
is no coming into being [Footnote ref 5]. In IV. 19 of his
kârikâ he again says that the Buddhas have shown that there was
no coming into being in any way (_sarvathâ Buddhairajâti@h paridîpita@h_).
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, Anandâs'rama
edition, p. 214.]
[Footnote 2: Anandâs'rama edition of S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on Gau@dapâda's
kârikâ, p. 21.]
[Footnote 3: Telang wishes to put S'a@nkara's date somewhere in the 8th
century, and Ve@nkates'vara would have him in 805 A.D.-897 A.D., as he
did not believe that S'a@nkara could have lived only for 32 years.
_J.R.A.S._ 1916.]
[Footnote 4: Compare _Lankâvatâra_, p. 29, _Katha@m ca gaganopamam_.]
[Footnote 5: Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, IV. 2, 4.]
424
Again, in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (_vastuvâdi_),
who since they found things and could deal with them and
were afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken of
origination (_jâti_). In IV. 90 he refers to _agrayâna_ which we
know to be a name of _Mahâyâna_. Again, in IV. 98 and 99
he says that all appearances are pure and vacuous by nature.
These the Buddhas, the emancipated one (_mukta_) and the leaders
know first. It was not said by the Buddha that all appearances
(_dharma_) were knowledge. He then closes the kârikâs with an
adoration which in all probability also refers to the Buddha [Footnote ref
1].
Gau@dapâda's work is divided into four chapters: (i) Âgama
(scripture), (2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4)
Alâtas'ânti (the extinction of the burning coal). The first chapter is
more in the way of explaining the Mâ@n@dûkya Upani@sad by
virtue of which the entire work is known as _Mâ@n@dûkyakârikâ_.
The second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive parts
of Gau@dapâda's work, not particularly connected with the Mâ@n@dûkya
Upani@sad.
In the first chapter Gau@dapâda begins with the three apparent
manifestations of the self: (1) as the experiencer of the
external world while we are awake (_vis'va_ or _vais'vânara âtmâ_),
(2) as the experiencer in the dream state (_taijasa âtmâ_), (3) as the
experiencer in deep sleep (_su@supti_), called the _prâjña_ when there
is no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness and pure
bliss (_ânanda_). He who knows these three as one is never
attached to his experiences. Gau@dapâda then enumerates some
theories of creation: some think that the world has proceeded
as a creation from the prâ@na (vital activity), others
consider creation as an expansion (_vibhûti_) of that cause
from which it has proceeded; others imagine that creation is
like dream (_svapna_) and magic (_mâyâ_); others, that creation
proceeds simply by the will of the Lord; others that it proceeds
from time; others that it is for the enjoyment of the Lord
(_bhogârtham_) or for his play only (_kri@dârtham_), for such
is the nature (_svabhâva_) of the Lord, that he creates, but he
cannot have any longing, as all his desires are in a state of fulfilment.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Gau@dapâda's kârikâ IV. 100. In my translation I have not
followed S'a@nkara, for he has I think tried his level best to explain
away even the most obvious references to Buddha and Buddhism in
Gau@dapâda's kârikâ. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning directly as
Gau@dapâda's kârikâs seemed to indicate. I have followed the
same principle in giving the short exposition of Gau@dapâda's
philosophy below.]
425
Gau@dapâda does not indicate his preference one way or the
other, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_),
unrelationable (_avyavahâryam_), ungraspable (_agrâhyam_), indefinable
(_alak@sa@na_), unthinkable (_acintyam_), unspeakable (_avyapades'ya_),
the essence as oneness with the self (_ekâtmapratyayasâra_),
as the extinction of the appearance (_prapañcopas'ama_),
the quiescent (_s'ântam_), the good (_s'ivam_), the one (_advaita_)
[Footnote ref 1]. The world-appearance (_prapañca_) would have ceased
if it had existed, but all this duality is mere mâyâ (magic or illusion),
the one is the ultimately real (_paramârthata@h_). In the second chapter
Gau@dapâda says that what is meant by calling the world a
dream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither exists
in the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the
present. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearance
has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams
things are imagined internally, and in the experience that we
have when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside,
but both of them are but illusory creations of the self.
What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the
moment of perception only; external objects are supposed to
have two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived,
and when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere
imagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and that
which appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary
productions in association with the sense faculties. There is first
the imagination of a perceiver or soul (_jîva_) and then along with
it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external
world. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake,
so the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms.
There is neither any production nor any destruction (_na nirodho,
na cotpatti@h_), there is no one who is enchained, no one who is
striving, no one who wants to be released [Footnote ref 2]. Imagination
finds itself realized in the non-existent existents and also in the sense
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Compare in Nâgârjuna's first kârikâ the idea of
_prapañcopas'amam s'ivam. Anirodhamanutpâdamanucchedamas'âs'vatam
anekârthamanânârthamanâgamamanirgamam ya@h pratîtyasamutpâdam
prapañcopas'amam s'ivam des'ayâmâva sambuddhastam vande vadatâmvaram_.
Compare also Nâgârjuna's Chapter on _Nirvâ@naparîk@sâ,
Pûrvopalambhopas'ama@h prapañcopas'ama@h s'iva@h na kvacit kasyacit
kas'cit dharmmo buddhenades'ita@h_. So far as I know the Buddhists
were the first to use the words _prapañcopas'aman s'ivam_.]
[Footnote 2: Compare Nâgârjuna's k@arikâ, "anirodhamanutpâdam" in
_Mâdhyamikav@rtti, B.T.S._, p. 3.]
426
of unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (_advaya_)
is false; it is only the oneness (_advayatâ_) that is good. There
is no many, nor are things different or non-different (_na nânedam
...na p@rthag nâp@rthak_) [Footnote ref 1]. The sages who have transcended
attachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the
Vedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all
appearance (nirvikalpa@h prapañcopas'ama@h_), the one [Footnote ref 2].
In the third chapter Gau@dapâda says that truth is like the
void(_âkâs'a_) which is falsely concieved as taking part in birth
and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; but
howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from
âkâs'a. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams
(_svapna_) and mâyâ (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed
upon the one (_advaita_) by mâyâ. The truth is immortal, it cannot
therefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All
birth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposition
of mâyâ upon it [Footnote ref 3]. One mind appears as many in the dream,
as also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the
mind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearless
state, the extinction of all sorrow, final ceasation. Thinking everything
to be misery (_du@hkham sarvam anusm@rtya_) one should stop
all desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any
birth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken
the mind (_citta_) into its final dissolution (_laya_) and pacify it
when distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects
when it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (_sukham_) and by
wisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless
and still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction;
when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect
Brahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come into
being, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (_sarvajña_).
In the fourth chapter, called the Alats'ânti, Gau@dapâda further
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Compare _Mâdhyamikakârikâ, _B.T.S._, p.3 _anekârtham
anânârtham_, etc.]
[Footnote 2: Compare _Lankâvatârasûtra_, p.78,
_Advayâsamsâraparinirvâ@nvatsarvadharmâ@h tasmât tarhi mahâmate
S'unyatânutpâdâdvayani@hsvabhâvalak@sa@ne yoga@h kara@niya@h_;
also 8,46, _Yaduta svacittavi@sayavikalpad@r@s@tyânavabodhanât vijñânânâm
svacittad@r@s@tyamâtrânavatâre@na mahâmate vâlaprthagjanâ@h
bhâvâbhâvasvabhâvaparamârthad@r@s@tidvayvâdino bhavanti_.]
[Footnote 3: Compare Nâgârjuna's kârikâ, _B.T.S._ p. 196, _Âkâs'am
s'as'as'@r@ngañca bandhyâyâ@h putra eva ca asantas'câbhivyajyante
tathâbhâvena kalpanâ_, with Gau@dapâda's kârikâ, III. 28, _Asato
mâyayâ janma tatvato naiva jâyate bandhyâputro na tattvena mâyâya
vâpi jâyate_.]
427
describes this final state [Footnote ref l]. All the dharmas
(appearances) are without death or decay [Footnote: ref 2].
Gau@dapâda then follows a dialectical form of argument which
reminds us of Nâgârjuna. Gau@dapâda continues thus: Those who
regard kâra@na (cause) as the kâryya (effect in a potential form)
cannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (_aja_), for it
suffers production; how can it be called eternal and yet changing?
If it is said that things come into being from that which has no
production, there is no example with which such a case may be
illustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from that
which has itself suffered production. How again can one come to a
right conclusion about the _regressus ad infinitum_ of cause and
effect (_hetu_ and _phala_)? Without reference to the effect there
is no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect.
Nothing is born either by itself or through others; call it either
being, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth,
neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature
(_svabhâvatah_), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannot
be said to have a production. All experience (_prajñapti_) is
dependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and there
would be none of the afflictions (_sa@mkles'a_) that we suffer. When
we look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be
dependent, but when we look at them from the point of view of
reality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (_citta_)
does not come in touch with objects and thereby manifest
them, for since things do not exist they are not different from
their manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particular
case that the mind produces the manifestations of objects while
they do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for in
present, past, and future the mind never comes in touch with
objects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations.
Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are
ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are
really traversing the reason of vacuity (_khe_), for all production
is but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn is
perceived as being born, the essence then is the absence of
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The very name Alâta@sânti is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare
Nâgârjuna's kârikâ, _B.T.S._, p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the
_S'ataka_.]
[Footnote 2: The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance or
entity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini,
"Codanâlak@sa@nah arthah, dharmah." Dharma is determined by the injunctions
of the Vedas.]
428
production, for it being of the nature of absence of production it
could never change its nature. Everything has a beginning and
an end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like
a magical or illusory elephant (_mâyâhastî_) and exists only as far
as it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus
the appearance of production, movement and things, but the one
knowledge (_vijñâna_) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness
(_avastutva_), the cessation (s'ântam). As the movement of
burning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is the
movement (_spandita_) of consciousness that appears as the perceiving
and the perceived. All the attributes (e.g. straight or
curved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality it
does not possess them; so also all the appearances are imposed
upon consciousness, though in reality they do not possess
them. We could never indicate any kind of causal relation
between the consciousness and its appearance, which are therefore
to be demonstrated as unthinkable (_acintya_). A thing
(_dravya_) is the cause of a thing (_dravya_), and that which is not
a thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but all
the appearances are neither things nor those which are not
things, so neither are appearances produced from the mind
(_citta_) nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long as
one thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle of
existence (_sa@msâra_), but when that notion ceases there is no
sa@msâra. All things are regarded as being produced from a
relative point of view only (_sa@mv@rti_), there is therefore nothing
permanent (_s'âs'vata_). Again, no existent things are produced,
hence there cannot be any destruction (_uccheda_). Appearances
(_dharma_) are produced only apparently, not in reality; their
coming into being is like mâyâ, and that mâyâ again does not
exist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out of
seeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible.
As in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all
appearances. That which appears as existing from an
imaginary relative point of view (_kalpita sa@mv@rti_) is not
so in reality (_para-mârtha_), for the existence depending on
others, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all not
a real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do exist
and not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving or
steady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded.
429
It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the
Mâdhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nâgârjuna's kârikâs and
the Vijñânavâda doctrines, as found in _La@nkâvatâra_, that it is
needless to attempt to prove it, Gau@dapâda assimilated all the
Buddhist S'ûnyavâda and Vijñânavâda teachings, and thought that
these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upani@sads.
It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long
as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and
for the teachings which he believed to be his. Gau@dapâda took
the smallest Upani@sads to comment upon, probably because he
wished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitations
of the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truth
that he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggested
that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable
vijñâna or vacuity would hold good of the highest âtman of the
Upani@sads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the
Upani@sad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upani@sads
guaranteed in detail the truth of Gau@dapâda's views it was left
for his disciple, the great S'a@nkara, to examine and explain.
Vedânta and S´a@nkara (788-820 A.D.).
Vedânta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be
the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upani@sads and
summarized in the _Brahma-sûtras_ of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads
form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is
therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mîmâ@msâ or the
Mîmâmsâ (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished
from the Mîmâ@msâ of the previous part of the Vedas and the
Brâhma@nas as incorporated in the _Pûrvamîmâ@msâ sûtras_ of
Jaimini. Though these _Brahma-sûtras_ were differently interpreted
by different exponents, the views expressed in the earliest commentary
on them now available, written by S'a@nkarâcârya, have
attained wonderful celebrity, both on account of the subtle and
deep ideas it contains, and also on account of the association of the
illustrious personality of S'a@nkara. So great is the influence of the
philosophy propounded by S´a@nkara and elaborated by his illustrious
followers, that whenever we speak of the Vedânta philosophy
we mean the philosophy that was propounded by S'a@nkara. If
other expositions are intended the names of the exponents have
to be mentioned (e.g. Râmânuja-mata, Vallabha-mata, etc.), In this
430
chapter we shall limit ourselves to the exposition of the Vedânta
philosophy as elaborated by S'a@nkara and his followers. In S'a@nkara's
work (the commentaries on the _Brahma-sûtra_ and the ten
Upani@sads) many ideas have been briefly incorporated which as
found in S'a@nkara do not appear to be sufficiently clear, but are
more intelligible as elaborated by his followers. It is therefore
better to take up the Vedânta system, not as we find it in S'a@nkara,
but as elaborated by his followers, all of whom openly declare
that they are true to their master's philosophy.
For the other Hindu systems of thought, the sûtras (_Jaimini
sûtra, Nyâya sûtra,_ etc.) are the only original treatises, and no
foundation other than these is available. In the case of the
Vedânta however the original source is the Upani@sads, and
the sûtras are but an extremely condensed summary in a
systematic form. S'a@nkara did not claim to be the inventor or
expounder of an original system, but interpreted the sûtras
and the Upani@sads in order to show that there existed a connected
and systematic philosophy in the Upani@sads which was also
enunciated in the sûtras of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads were a
part of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by the
Hindus. If S'a@nkara could only show that his exposition of them
was the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon the
highest authority would be accepted by all Hindus. The most
formidable opponents in the way of accomplishing his task were
the Mîma@msists, who held that the Vedas did not preach any
philosophy, for whatever there was in the Vedas was to be
interpreted as issuing commands to us for performing this or
that action. They held that if the Upani@sads spoke of Brahman
and demonstrated the nature of its pure essence, these were mere
exaggerations intended to put the commandment of performing
some kind of worship of Brahman into a more attractive form.
S'a@nkara could not deny that the purport of the Vedas as found
in the Brâhma@nas was explicitly of a mandatory nature as declared
by the Mîmâ@msâ, but he sought to prove that such could
not be the purport of the Upani@sads, which spoke of the truest
and the highest knowledge of the Absolute by which the wise
could attain salvation. He said that in the karmak@n@da--the
(sacrificial injunctions) Brâhma@nas of the Vedas--the purport of
the Vedas was certainly of a mandatory nature, as it was intended
for ordinary people who were anxious for this or that pleasure,
431
and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute
truth, but the Upani@sads, which were intended for the wise who
had controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly
joys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahman
as the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas
were intended for two classes of persons. S'a@nkara thus did not
begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and
psychological analysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to show
by textual comparison of the different Upani@sads, and by reference
to the content of passages in the Upani@sads, that they
were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he
understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that
the uncontradicted testimony of all the Upani@sads was in favour
of the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and
apparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of the
texts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prak@rti, etc. of the
Sâ@mkhya. He had also to interpret the few scattered ideas
about physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the
Upani@sads consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In order
to show that the philosophy of the Upani@sads as he expounded it
was a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections that
his opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to
criticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to
be self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of the
Upani@sads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and
wrong. This he did not only in his bhâsya on the _Brahma-sûtras_
but also in his commentaries on the Upani@sads. Logic with him
had a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aid
which it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the
Upani@sad texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted
testimony of the Upani@sads as the absolute truth.
His disciples followed him in all, and moreover showed in great
detail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradicted
either in perceptual experience or in rational thought, and that
all the realistic categories which Nyâya and other systems
had put forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They also
supplemented his philosophy by constructing a Vedânta epistemology,
and by rethinking elaborately the relation of the mâyâ,
the Brahman, and the world of appearance and other relevant
topics. Many problems of great philosophical interest which
432
had been left out or slightly touched by S'a@nkara were discussed
fully by his followers. But it should always be remembered that
philosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be taken
as but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening our
faith in the truth revealed in the Upani@sads. The true work of
logic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsetting
the instructions of the Upani@sads is logic gone astray. Many
lives of S'a@nkarâcârya were written in Sanskrit such as the
_S'a@nkaradigvijaya_, _S'a@nkara-vijaya-vilâsa_, _S'a@nkara-jaya_,
etc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700
and 800 A.D. in the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father S'ivaguru
was a Yajurvedi Brâhmin of the Taittirîya branch. Many miracles
are related of S'a@nkara, and he is believed to have been the
incarnation of S'iva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year and
became the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing in
a mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came over
to Benares and thence went to Badarikâs'rama. It is said that
he wrote his illustrious bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtra_ in his twelfth
year. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten Upani@sads.
He returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided to
travel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of other
schools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went to
meet Kumârila, but Kumârila was then at the point of death, and
he advised him to meet Kumârila's disciple. He defeated Ma@n@dana
and converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He then
travelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywhere
he established his Vedânta philosophy, which from that time forth
acquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life of
India.
S'a@nkara carried on the work of his teacher Gaudapâda and
by writing commentaries on the ten Upani@sads and the _Brahma-sûtras_
tried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one which
was intended to be preached in the Upani@sads and the _Brahma-sûtras_
[Footnote: 1]. Throughout his commentary on the _Brahma-sûtras_,
there is ample evidence that he was contending against some
other rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held
that the Upani@sads partly favoured the Sâ@mkhya cosmology
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The main works of S'a@nkara are his commentaries (bhâ@sya) on
the ten Upani@sads (Îs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mu@ndaka, Mâ@n@dûkya,
Aitareya, Taittirîya, B@rhadâra@nyaka, and Chândogya), and on the
_Brahma-sûtra_.]
433
of the existence of prak@rti. That these were actual textual
interpretations of the _Brahma-sûtras_ is proved by the fact that
S'a@nkara in some places tries to show that these textual constructions
were faulty [Footnote ref 1]. In one place he says that others (referring
according to Vâcaspati to the Mîmâ@msâ) and some of
us (referring probably to those who interpreted the sûtras and
the Upani@sads from the Vedânta point of view) think that the
soul is permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposed
to the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unity
of the self (_âtmaikatva_) that this S'ârîraka commentary of
mine is being attempted [Footnote ref 2]. Râmânuja, in the introductory
portion of his bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtra,_ says that the views of
Bodhâyana who wrote an elaborate commentary on the _Brahma-sûtra_
were summarized by previous teachers, and that he was
following this Bodhâyana bhâ@sya in writing his commentary. In
the _Vedârthasa@mgraha_ of Râmânuja mention is made of Bodhâyana,
Tanka, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bhâruci as Vedântic authorities,
and Dravi@dâcâryya is referred to as the "bhâ@syakâra" commentator.
In Chândogya III. x. 4, where the Upani@sad cosmology
appeared to be different from the _Vi@s@nupurana_ cosmology, S'a@nkara
refers to an explanation offered on the point by one whom
he calls "âcâryya" (_atrokta@h parihârah âcâryyaih_) and Ânandagiri
says that "âcâryya" there refers to Dravi@dâcâryya. This Dravi@dâcâryya
is known to us from Râmânuja's statement as being a
commentator of the dualistic school, and we have evidence here
that he had written a commentary on the Chândogya Upani@sad.
A study of the extant commentaries on the _Brahma-sûtras_ of
Bâdarâya@na by the adherents of different schools of thought
leaves us convinced that these sûtras were regarded by all as
condensations of the teachings of the Upani@sads. The differences
of opinion were with regard to the meaning of these sûtras and
the Upani@sad texts to which references were made by them
in each particular case. The _Brahma-sûtra_ is divided into four
adhyâyas or books, and each of these is divided into four chapters
or pâdas. Each of these contains a number of topics of discussion
(_adhikara@na_) which are composed of a number of sûtras, which
raise the point at issue, the points that lead to doubt and
uncertainty, and the considerations that should lead one to favour
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See note on p. 432.]
[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtras_, I. iii. 19.]
434
a particular conclusion. As explained by S'a@nkara, most of these
sûtras except the first four and the first two chapters of the
second book are devoted to the textual interpretations of the
Upani@sad passages. S'a@nkara's method of explaining the absolutist
Vedânta creed does not consist in proving the Vedânta to
be a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, but
in so interpreting the Upani@sad texts as to show that they all agree
in holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be the
only truth. In Chapter I of Book II S'a@nkara tries to answer
some of the objections that may be made from the Sâ@mkhya
point of view against his absolutist creed and to show that some
apparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not present
any real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refute
the Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Nyâya-Vais'e@sika, the Buddhist, Jaina, Bhâgavata
and S'aiva systems of thought. These two chapters and
his commentaries on the first four sûtras contain the main points
of his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showing
that the conclusion of the sûtras was always in strict agreement
with the Upani@sad doctrines. Reason with S'a@nkara never
occupied the premier position; its value was considered only
secondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding
of the revealed scriptures, the Upani@sads. The ultimate truth cannot
be known by reason alone. What one debater shows to be
reasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what he
shows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater.
So there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logic
and argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be found
in the Upani@sads; reason, discrimination and judgment are all to
be used only with a view to the discovery of the real purport
of the Upani@sads. From his own position S'a@nkara was not thus
bound to vindicate the position of the Vedânta as a thoroughly
rational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend on
its rationality but on the authority of the Upani@sads. But what
was true could not contradict experience. If therefore S'a@nkara's
interpretation of the Upani@sads was true, then it would not contradict
experience. S'a@nkara was therefore bound to show that
his interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience.
If he could show that his interpretation was the only interpretation
that was faithful to the Upani@sads, and that its apparent
contradictions with experience could in some way be explained,
435
he considered that he had nothing more to do. He was not writing
a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the
whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upani@sads and not
simply a system spun by a clever thinker, which may erroneously
appear to be quite reasonable, Ultimate validity does not belong
to reason but to the scriptures.
He started with the premise that whatever may be the reason
it is a fact that all experience starts and moves in an error which
identifies the self with the body, the senses, or the objects of the
senses. All cognitive acts presuppose this illusory identification,
for without it the pure self can never behave as a phenomenal
knower or perceiver, and without such a perceiver there would
be no cognitive act. S'a@nkara does not try to prove philosophically
the existence of the pure self as distinct from all other
things, for he is satisfied in showing that the Upani@sads describe
the pure self unattached to any kind of impurity as the ultimate
truth. This with him is a matter to which no exception can be
taken, for it is so revealed in the Upani@sads. This point being
granted, the next point is that our experience is always based
upon an identification of the self with the body, the senses, etc. and
the imposition of all phenomenal qualities of pleasure, pain, etc.
upon the self; and this with S'a@nkara is a beginningless illusion.
All this had been said by Gau@dapâda. S'a@nkara accepted Gau@dapâda's
conclusions, but did not develop his dialectic for a positive
proof of his thesis. He made use of the dialectic only for the
refutation of other systems of thought. This being done he
thought that he had nothing more to do than to show that his
idea was in agreement with the teachings of the Upani@sads. He
showed that the Upani@sads held that the pure self as pure being,
pure intelligence and pure bliss was the ultimate truth. This
being accepted the world as it appears could not be real. It must
be a mere magic show of illusion or mâyâ. S'a@nkara never tries
to prove that the world is mâyâ, but accepts it as indisputable.
For, if the self is what is ultimately real, the necessary conclusion
is that all else is mere illusion or mâyâ. He had thus to
quarrel on one side with the Mîmâ@msâ realists and on the other
with the Sâ@mkhya realists, both of whom accepted the validity
of the scriptures, but interpreted them in their own way. The
Mîmâ@msists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be
interpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action,
436
or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that
the Upani@sads being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted
as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of
actions. The description of Brahman in the Upani@sads does not
therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman,
but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as
possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman
should be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a
nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would
then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates.
S'a@nkara could not agree to such a view. For his main point was
that the Upani@sads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman.
No meditation or worship or action of any kind was required;
but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when
the truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the
ultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas,
the karmakâ@n@da (those dealing with the injunctions relating
to the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior
types of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upani@sads,
the jñânakâ@n@da (those which declare the nature of ultimate
truth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who
had transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, and
who had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly
joy. Throughout his commentary on the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ S'a@nkara
tried to demonstrate that those who should follow the injunctions
of the Veda and perform Vedic deeds, such as sacrifices,
etc., belonged to a lower order. So long as they remained in
that order they had no right to follow the higher teachings of
the Upani@sads. They were but karmins (performers of scriptural
duties). When they succeeded in purging their minds of all
desires which led them to the performance of the Vedic injunctions,
the field of karmamârga (the path of duties), and wanted
to know the truth alone, they entered the jñânamârga (the way
of wisdom) and had no duties to perform. The study of Vedânta
was thus reserved for advanced persons who were no longer
inclined to the ordinary joys of life but wanted complete
emancipation. The qualifications necessary for a man intending
to study the Vedânta are (1) discerning knowledge about what is
eternal and what is transitory (_nityânityavastuviveka_), (2)
disinclination to the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world or of
437
the after world (_ihâmutraphalabhogavirâga_), (3) attainment of
peace, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep concentration
and faith (_s'amadamâdisâdhanasampat_) and desire for salvation
(_mumuk@sutva_). The person who had these qualifications should
study the Upani@sads, and as soon as he became convinced of the
truth about the identity of the self and the Brahman he attained
emancipation. When once a man realized that the self alone
was the reality and all else was mâyâ, all injunctions ceased to
have any force with him. Thus, the path of duties (_karma_) and
the path of wisdom (_jñâna_) were intended for different classes of
persons or adhikârins. There could be no joint performance of
Vedic duties and the seeking of the highest truth as taught in
the Upani@sads (_jñâna-karma-samuccayâbhâva@h_). As against the
dualists he tried to show that the Upani@sads never favoured any
kind of dualistic interpretations. The main difference between
the Vedânta as expounded by Gau@dapâda and as explained by
S'a@nkara consists in this, that S'a@nkara tried as best he could to
dissociate the distinctive Buddhist traits found in the exposition
of the former and to formulate the philosophy as a direct
interpretation of the older Upani@sad texts. In this he achieved
remarkable success. He was no doubt regarded by some as a
hidden Buddhist (_pracchanna Bauddha_), but his influence on
Hindu thought and religion became so great that he was regarded
in later times as being almost a divine person or an
incarnation. His immediate disciples, the disciples of his disciples,
and those who adhered to his doctrine in the succeeding
generations, tried to build a rational basis for his system in a
much stronger way than S'a@nkara did. Our treatment of S'a@nkara's
philosophy has been based on the interpretations of Vedânta
thought, as offered by these followers of S'a@nkara. These interpretations
are nowhere in conflict with S'a@nkara's doctrines, but
the questions and problems which S'a@nkara did not raise have
been raised and discussed by his followers, and without these one
could not treat Vedânta as a complete and coherent system of
metaphysics. As these will be discussed in the later sections,
we may close this with a short description of some of the main
features of the Vedânta thought as explained by S'a@nkara.
Brahman according to S'a@nkara is "the cause from which
(proceeds) the origin or subsistence and dissolution of this world
which is extended in names and forms, which includes many
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agents and enjoyers, which contains the fruit of works specially
determined according to space, time, and cause, a world which is
formed after an arrangement inconceivable even by the (imagination
of the) mind [Footnote ref 1]." The reasons that S'a@nkara adduces for the
existence of Brahman may be considered to be threefold: (1) The
world must have been produced as the modification of something,
but in the Upani@sads all other things have been spoken of
as having been originated from something other than Brahman,
so Brahman is the cause from which the world has sprung into
being, but we could not think that Brahman itself originated from
something else, for then we should have a _regressus ad infinitum_
(_anavasthâ_). (2) The world is so orderly that it could not have
come forth from a non-intelligent source. The intelligent source
then from which this world has come into being is Brahman.
(3) This Brahman is the immediate consciousness (_sâk@si_) which
shines as the self, as well as through the objects of cognition
which the self knows. It is thus the essence of us all, the self,
and hence it remains undenied even when one tries to deny it,
for even in the denial it shows itself forth. It is the self of us all
and is hence ever present to us in all our cognitions.
Brahman according to S'a@nkara is the identity of pure intelligence,
pure being, and pure blessedness. Brahman is the self of
us all. So long as we are in our ordinary waking life, we are
identifying the self with thousands of illusory things, with all that
we call "I" or mine, but when in dreamless sleep we are absolutely
without any touch of these phenomenal notions the nature of our
true state as pure blessedness is partially realized. The individual
self as it appears is but an appearance only, while the real truth
is the true self which is one for all, as pure intelligence, pure
blessedness, and pure being.
All creation is illusory mâyâ. But accepting it as mâyâ, it
may be conceived that God (Îs'vara) created the world as a mere
sport; from the true point of view there is no Îs'vara who creates
the world, but in the sense in which the world exists, and we all
exist as separate individuals, we can affirm the existence of
Îs'vara, as engaged in creating and maintaining the world. In
reality all creation is illusory and so the creator also is illusory.
Brahman, the self, is at once the material cause (upâdâna-kâra@na)
as well as the efficient cause (nimitta-kâra@na) of the world.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's commentary, I.i. 2. See also Deussen's _System of
the Vedânta_.]
439
There is no difference between the cause and the effect, and the
effect is but an illusory imposition on the cause--a mere illusion
of name and form. We may mould clay into plates and jugs and
call them by so many different names, but it cannot be admitted
that they are by that fact anything more than clay; their transformations
as plates and jugs are only appearances of name and
form (_nâmarúpa_). This world, inasmuch as it is but an effect
imposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existent
(_vyavahârika_) as mere objects of name and form (_nâmarûpa_), but
the cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality(_pâramârthika_)
[Footnote ref 1].
The main idea of the Vedânta philosophy.
The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedãnta philosophy
as taught by the @S'a@kara school is this, that the ultimate
and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as
many in different individuals. The world also as apart from
us the individuals has no reality and has no other truth
to show than this self. All other events, mental or physical,
are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable
truth underlying them all is the self. While other
systems investigated the pramanas only to examine how far
they could determine the objective truth of things or our attitude
in practical life towards them, Vedãnta sought to reach
beneath the surface of appearances, and enquired after the final
and ultimate truth underlying the microcosm and the macrocosm,
the subject and the object. The famous instruction of
@S'vetaketu, the most important Vedânta text (mahâvâkya) says,
"That art thou, O S'vetaketu." This comprehension of my self
as the ultimate truth is the highest knowledge, for when this
knowledge is once produced, our cognition of world-appearances
will automatically cease. Unless the mind is chastened and purged
of all passions and desires, the soul cannot comprehend this
truth; but when this is once done, and the soul is anxious for
salvation by a knowledge of the highest truth, the preceptor
instructs him, "That art thou." At once he becomes the truth
itself, which is at once identical with pure bliss and pure intelligence;
all ordinary notions and cognitions of diversity and of the
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: All that is important in S'a@nkara's commentary of the
_Brahma-sûtras_ has been excellently systematized by Deussen in his
_System of the Vedanta_; it is therefore unnecessary for me to give any
long account of this part. Most of what follows has been taken from
the writings of his followers.]
440
many cease; there is no duality, no notion of mine and thane; the
vast illusion of this world process is extinct in him, and he shines
forth as the one, the truth, the Brahman. All Hindu systems believed
that when man attained salvation, he became divested of all
world-consciousness, or of all consciousness of himself and his interests,
and was thus reduced to his own original purity untouched
by all sensations, perceptions, feelings and willing, but there the
idea was this that when man had no bonds of karma and no desire
and attachment with the world and had known the nature of
his self as absolutely free and unattached to the world and his
own psychosis, he became emancipated from the world and all
his connections with the world ceased, though the world continued
as ever the same with others. The external world was a reality
with them; the unreality or illusion consisted in want of true
knowledge about the real nature of the self, on account of which
the self foolishly identified itself with world-experiences, worldly
joys and world-events, and performed good and bad works accordingly.
The force of accumulated karmas led him to undergo
the experiences brought about by them. While reaping the fruits
of past karmas he, as ignorant as ever of his own self, worked
again under the delusion of a false relationship between himself
and the world, and so the world process ran on. Mufti (salvation)
meant the dissociation of the self from the subjective psychosis
and the world. This condition of the pure state of self was regarded
as an unconscious one by Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and Mîma@msâ,
and as a state of pure intelligence by Sâ@mkhya and Yoga. But
with Vedânta the case is different, for it held that the world as
such has no real existence at all, but is only an illusory imagination
which lasts till the moment when true knowledge is acquired.
As soon as we come to know that the one truth is the self, the
Brahman, all our illusory perceptions representing the world as
a field of experience cease. This happens not because the connections
of the self with the world cease, but because the appearance
of the world process does not represent the ultimate and
highest truth about it. All our notions about the abiding
diversified world (lasting though they may be from beginningless
time) are false in the sense that they do not represent the real
truth about it. We not only do not know what we ourselves
really are, but do not also know what the world about us is.
We take our ordinary experiences of the world as representing
441
it correctly, and proceed on our career of daily activity. It is no
doubt true that these experiences show us an established order
having its own laws, but this does not represent the real truth.
They are true only in a relative sense, so long as they appear to
be so; for the moment the real truth about them and the self is
comprehended all world-appearances become unreal, and that one
truth, the Brahman, pure being, bliss, intelligence, shines forth as
the absolute--the only truth in world and man. The world-appearance
as experienced by us is thus often likened to the
illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; for the moment
the perception appears to be true and the man runs to pick
it up, as if the conch-shell were a real piece of silver; but
as soon as he finds out the truth that this is only a piece of
conch-shell, he turns his back on it and is no longer deluded
by the appearance or again attracted towards it. The illusion
of silver is inexplicable in itself, for it was true for all purposes
so long as it persisted, but when true knowledge was
acquired, it forthwith vanished. This world-appearance will also
vanish when the true knowledge of reality dawns. When false
knowledge is once found to be false it cannot return again.
The Upani@sads tell us that he who sees the many here is
doomed. The one, the Brahman, alone is true; all else is but
delusion of name and form. Other systems believed that even
after emancipation, the world would continue as it is, that
there was nothing illusory in it, but I could not have any
knowledge of it because of the absence of the instruments by
the processes of which knowledge was generated. The Sâ@mkhya
puru@sa cannot know the world when the buddhi-stuff
is dissociated from it and merged in the prak@rti, the Mîmâ@msâ
and the Nyâya soul is also incapable of knowing the world
after emancipation, as it is then dissociated from manas. But
the Vedânta position is quite distinct here. We cannot know
the world, for when the right knowledge dawns, the perception
of this world-appearance proves itself to be false to the
person who has witnessed the truth, the Brahman. An illusion
cannot last when the truth is known; what is truth is known to
us, but what is illusion is undemonstrable, unspeakable, and
indefinite. The illusion runs on from beginningless time; we do
not know how it is related to truth, the Brahman, but we know
that when the truth is once known the false knowledge of this
442
world-appearance disappears once for all. No intermediate link
is necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of buddhi or
manas, but just as by finding out the glittering piece to be a conch-shell
the illusory perception of silver is destroyed, so this illusory
perception of world-appearance is also destroyed by a true
knowledge of the reality, the Brahman. The Upani@sads held
that reality or truth was one, and there was "no many" anywhere,
and S'añkara explained it by adding that the "many" was merely
an illusion, and hence did not exist in reality and was bound
to disappear when the truth was known. The world-appearance
is mâyâ (illusion). This is what S'añkara emphasizes in expounding
his constructive system of the Upani@sad doctrine.
The question is sometimes asked, how the mâyâ becomes associated
with Brahman. But Vedânta thinks this question illegitimate,
for this association did not begin in time either with
reference to the cosmos or with reference to individual persons.
In fact there is no real association, for the creation of illusion
does not affect the unchangeable truth. Mâyâ or illusion is no
real entity, it is only false knowledge (_avidyâ_) that makes the
appearance, which vanishes when the reality is grasped and found.
Mâyâ or avidyâ has an apparent existence only so long as it
lasts, but the moment the truth is known it is dissolved. It is
not a real entity in association with which a real world-appearance
has been brought into permanent existence, for it only has
existence so long as we are deluded by it (_prâtîtika-sattâ_).
Mâyâ therefore is a category which baffles the ordinary logical
division of existence and non-existence and the principle of excluded
middle. For the mâyâ can neither be said to be "is" nor
"is not" (_tattvânyatvâbhyâm anirvacanîyâ_). It cannot be said that
such a logical category does not exist, for all our dream and
illusory cognitions demonstrate it to us. They exist as they are
perceived, but they do not exist since they have no other independent
existence than the fact of their perception. If it has
any creative function, that function is as illusive as its
own nature, for the creation only lasts so long as the error lasts.
Brahman, the truth, is not in any way sullied or affected by association
with mâyâ, for there can be no association of the real with the empty,
the mâyâ, the illusory. It is no real association but a mere appearance.
443
In what sense is the world-appearance false?
The world is said to be false--a mere product of mâyâ. The
falsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involved
in the category of the indefinite which is neither _sat_ "is"
nor _asat_ "is not." Here the opposition of the "is" and "is not"
is solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is "is
not," since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, and
has its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledge
dawns. It is not therefore "is not" in the sense that a "castle in
the air" or a hare's horn is "is not," for these are called _tuccha_,
the absolutely non-existent. The world-appearance is said to be
"is" or existing, since it appears to be so for the time the state of
ignorance persists in us. Since it exists for a time it is _sat_ (is),
but since it does not exist for all times it is _asat_ (is not). This
is the appearance, the falsehood of the world-appearance (_jagat-prapañca_)
that it is neither _sat_ nor _asat_ in an absolute sense. Or
rather it may also be said in another way that the falsehood of
the world-appearance consists in this, that though it appears to
be the reality or an expression or manifestation of the reality, the
being, _sat_, yet when the reality is once rightly comprehended, it
will be manifest that the world never existed, does not exist,
and will never exist again. This is just what we find in an illusory
perception; when once the truth is found out that it is a conch-shell,
we say that the silver, though it appeared at the time of
illusory perception to be what we saw before us as "this" (this
is silver), yet it never existed before, does not now exist, and
will never exist again. In the case of the illusory perception of
silver, the "this" (pointing to a thing before me) appeared as
silver; in the case of the world-appearance, it is the being (_sat_),
the Brahman, that appears as the world; but as in the case when
the "this" before us is found to be a piece of conch-shell, the
silver is at once dismissed as having had no existence in the "this"
before us, so when the Brahman, the being, the reality, is once
directly realized, the conviction comes that the world never
existed. The negation of the world-appearance however has no
separate existence other than the comprehension of the identity
of the real. The fact that the real is realized is the same as that
the world-appearance is negated. The negation here involved
refers both to the thing negated (the world-appearance) and the
444
negation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when the
conviction of the negation of the world is also regarded as false
(for if the negation is not false then it remains as an entity different
from Brahman and hence the unqualified monism fails), then this
reinstates the reality of the world-appearance; for negation of the
world-appearance is as much false as the world-appearance itself,
and hence on the realization of the truth the negative thesis,
that the world-appearance does not exist, includes the negation
also as a manifestation of world-appearance, and hence the only
thing left is the realized identity of the truth, the being. The
peculiarity of this illusion of world-appearance is this, that it
appears as consistent with or inlaid in the being (_sat_) though it
is not there. This of course is dissolved when right knowledge
dawns. This indeed brings home to us the truth that the world-appearance
is an appearance which is different from what we
know as real (_sadvilak@sa@na_); for the real is known to us as
that which is proved by the prama@nas, and which will never
again be falsified by later experience or other means of proof.
A thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted;
but since at the dawn of right knowledge this world-appearance
will be found to be false and non-existing, it cannot be regarded
as real [Footnote ref l]. Thus Brahman alone is true, and the
world-appearance is false; falsehood and truth are not contrary entities
such that the negation or the falsehood of falsehood will mean truth.
The world-appearance is a whole and in referring to it the
negation refers also to itself as a part of the world-appearance
and hence not only is the positive world-appearance false, but
the falsehood itself is also false; when the world-appearance is
contradicted at the dawn of right knowledge, the falsehood itself
is also contradicted.
Brahman differs from all other things in this that it is self-luminous
(_svaprakâs'a_) and has no form; it cannot therefore be the
object of any other consciousness that grasps it. All other things,
ideas, emotions, etc., in contrast to it are called _d@rs'ya_ (objects of
consciousness), while it is the _dra@s@tâ_ (the pure consciousness
comprehending all objects). As soon as anything is comprehended as
an expression of a mental state (_v@rtti_), it is said to have a form and
it becomes d@rs'ya, and this is the characteristic of all objects of
consciousness that they cannot reveal themselves apart from being
manifested as objects of consciousness through a mental state.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Advaitasiddhi, Mithyâtvanirukti_.]
445
Brahman also, so long as it is understood as a meaning of the
Upani@sad text, is not in its true nature; it is only when it shines
forth as apart from the associations of any form that it is svaprakâs'a
and dra@s@tâ. The knowledge of the pure Brahman is devoid of any
form or mode. The notion of _d@rs'yatva_ (objectivity) carries with
it also the notion of _ja@datva_ (materiality) or its nature as
non-consciousness (_ajñânatva_) and non-selfness (_anâtmatva_) which
consists in the want of self-luminosity of objects of consciousness.
The relation of consciousness (_jñâna_) to its objects cannot be
regarded as real but as mere illusory impositions, for as we shall
see later, it is not possible to determine the relation between
knowledge and its forms. Just as the silver-appearance of the
conch-shell is not its own natural appearance, so the forms in
which consciousness shows itself are not its own natural essence.
In the state of emancipation when supreme bliss (_ânanda_) shines
forth, the ânanda is not an object or form of the illuminating
consciousness, but it is the illumination itself. Whenever there
is a form associated with consciousness, it is an extraneous illusory
imposition on the pure consciousness. These forms are different
from the essence of consciousness, not only in this that they
depend on consciousness for their expression and are themselves
but objects of consciousness, but also in this that they are all
finite determinations (_paricchinna_), whereas consciousness, the
abiding essence, is everywhere present without any limit whatsoever.
The forms of the object such as cow, jug, etc. are limited
in themselves in what they are, but through them all the pure
being runs by virtue of which we say that the cow is, the jug is,
the pot is. Apart from this pure being running through all the
individual appearances, there is no other class (_jâti_) such as
cowness or jugness, but it is on this pure being that different
individual forms are illusorily imposed (_gha@tâdîkam sadarthekalpitam,
pratyekam tadanubiddhatvena pra@tîyamânatvât_). So
this world-appearance which is essentially different from the
Brahman, the being which forms the material cause on which it
is imposed, is false
(_upâdânani@s@thâiyaniâbhâvapratiyogitvalak@sa@namithyâtvasiddhi@h
--as Citsukha has it).
The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena.
The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception
of silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly
illusions is called _prâtibhâsika,_ as they are contradicted by other
446
later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never
contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called _vyavahârika_
(from _vyavahâra_, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our
practical movements). So long as the right knowledge of the
Brahman as the only reality does not dawn, the world-appearance
runs on in an orderly manner uncontradicted by the accumulated
experience of all men, and as such it must be held to be true.
It is only because there comes such a stage in which the world-appearance
ceases to manifest itself that we have to say that from
the ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance is
false and unreal. As against this doctrine of the Vedânta it is
sometimes asked how, as we see the reality (_sattva_) before us,
we can deny that it has truth. To this the Vedânta answers
that the notion of reality cannot be derived from the senses, nor
can it be defined as that which is the content of right knowledge,
for we cannot have any conception of right knowledge without
a conception of reality, and no conception of reality without a
conception of right knowledge. The conception of reality comprehends
within it the notions of unalterability, absoluteness, and
independence, which cannot be had directly from experience,
as this gives only an appearance but cannot certify its truth.
Judged from this point of view it will be evident that the true
reality in all our experience is the one self-luminous flash of
consciousness which is all through identical with itself in all its
manifestations of appearance. Our present experience of the
world-appearance cannot in any way guarantee that it will not
be contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all
experience is the being (_sat_) and not its forms. This being that
is associated with all our experience is not a universal genus nor
merely the individual appearance of the moment, but it is the
being, the truth which forms the substratum of all objective events
and appearances (_ekenaiva sarvânugatena sarvatra satpratîti@h_).
Things are not existent because they possess the genus of being
(_sat_) as Nyâya supposes, but they are so because they are themselves
but appearance imposed on one identical being as the basis
and ground of all experience. Being is thus said to be the basis
(_adhi@s@thâna_) on which the illusions appear. This being is not
different with different things but one in all appearances. Our
perceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as a
guarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them
447
could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and s'ruti (scriptures)
did not point the other way. Perception can of course invalidate
inference, but it can do so only when its own validity
has been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner.
But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance,
for our present perceptions cannot prove that these
will never be contradicted in future, and inference and s'ruti are
also against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance
cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted
by inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception
in this case is contradicted by inference and we have
hence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend
(_upajîvya_) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such
dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely
valid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained by
proper examination and enquiry (_parîk@sâ_), which may convince
us that there is no error in it. True it is that by the universal
testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and
realization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved
beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality.
But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with
any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never
be contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vedânta also
admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the
world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it
cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when
to the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to
exist. The experience, observation, and practical utility of the
objects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will
never be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of the
world-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedânta inference
that the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself
to be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as
one dawns in us. The testimony of the Upani@sads also contradicts
the perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold
aspect.
Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is
false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation
between the consciousness (_d@rk_) and the objects of consciousness
(_d@rs'ya_). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of
448
connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been
so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its
connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine
any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for
it can neither be contact (_sa@myoga_) nor inherence (_samavâya_);
and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no
other. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness,
but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot
be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect
like the jñâtatâ of Mîmâ@msâ is produced upon the object, for such
an effect is not admissible or perceivable in any way; nor can
objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us)
associated with the object as Prabhakâra thinks, for there are
many things which are the objects of our consciousness but not
considered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean
that the thing is the object of the thought-movement (_jñâna-kâra@na_)
involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference
to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects
of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is
not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement?
Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own
forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though
this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of
inference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does
not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever
way we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately
and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also
seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting
between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be
admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all
nothing but illusory.
Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness
yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted
even by Vedânta that this can only take place through specific
sense-contact and particular mental states (_v@rtti_) or modes; but
if that be so why not rather admit that this can take place
even on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifold
external world without? The answer that the Vedânta gives to
such a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has
not to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one
449