MÎMÂ@MSÂ PHILOSOPHY [Footnote ref 1]
A Comparative Review.
The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika philosophy looked at experience from
a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any
such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our
common sense experience should be considered as coming out of
an original universal (e.g. prak@rti of the Sâm@khya). Space, time,
the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are
substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material
things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many
entities which have distinct and separate existence but which
manifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also
karma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and even
the class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering in
substances. Knowledge (_jñâna_) which illuminates all things is
regarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are
other qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely
as the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is
also viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other
physical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical
circumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the
combination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and
the objects of sense, knowledge (_jñâna_) is produced. Soul with
Nyâya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc.
inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action,
class notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate entity, as
without it the different entities being without any principle of
relation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction.
Sâ@mkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of an
infinite number of reals of three different types, which by their
combination were conceived to be able to produce all substances,
qualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to exist
between substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived
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[Footnote 1: On the meanirg of the word Mîmâ@msâ see Chapter IV.]
368
that these were but so many aspects of a combination of the three
types of reals in different proportions. The reals contained within
them the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge,
willing, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantly
and new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collocations
did not bring about any new thing but brought about a
phenomenon which was already there in its causes in another
form. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with them
merely a form of subtle illuminating matter stuff. Sâ@mkhya holds
however that there is a transcendent entity as pure consciousness
and that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contact
this pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought-matter
into conscious thought or experience of a person.
But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and
separate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly
be demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this has
been pointed out by the Nyâya school in a very strong and
emphatic manner. Even Sâ@mkhya did not try to prove that the
existence of its transcendent puru@sa could be demonstrated in
experience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the
existence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of
a permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing states
of knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle
towards virtue and emancipation. Sâ@mkhya had first supposed
knowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and
then had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as
puru@sa (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here
in some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by
the inadequate analysis of consciousness (_buddhi_) as being
non-intelligent and incessantly changing.
Nyâya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self
on the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality,
and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis
is again based upon another uncritical assumption that substances
and attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature
of the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was
a quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance
in which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon
the self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their
conclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-conscious
369
thought. Of course it is true that Sâ@mkhya had approached
nearer to this view than Nyâya, but it had separated
the content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it
threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite
unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem
to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification
of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this
could not be done except by what may be regarded as a makeshift--a
transcendent illusion running on from beginningless
time. These difficulties occurred because Sâ@mkhya soared to a
region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common
sense experience. The Nyâya position is of course much worse
as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve anything,
but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could
not be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on
a one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common
sense experience that substances are different from qualities and
actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the
whole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is,
to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary
that the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought
to the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and
an account of experience should be given according to its verdict.
No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores
the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is
a relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction
is ushered in by the Mîmâ@msâ system. The _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_
were written by Jaimini and the commentary (_bhâ@sya_) on it was
written by S'abara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made
by Kumârila, who preceded the great S'a@nkarâcârya, and a disciple
of Kumârila, Prabhâkara.
The Mîmâ@msâ Literature.
It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew
in India in the Brâhma@nas. This system once set up gradually
began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details
of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some
generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of
India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old
rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition
370
had it, and this it seems gave rise to the sm@rti literature. Discussions
and doubts became more common about the many
intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries
into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and
priests. These represent the beginnings of Mîmâ@msâ (lit. attempts
at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were
different schools of this thought. That Jaimini's _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_
(which are with us the foundations of Mîmâ@msâ) are only a comprehensive
and systematic compilation of one school is evident from
the references he gives to the views in different matters of other
preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not
available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has
written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it
may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so
masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other
attempts that were made before him. Jaimini's _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_
were probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the ground work
of the Mîmâ@msâ system. Commentaries were written on it by
various persons such as Bhart@rmitra (alluded to in _Nyâyaratnâkara_
verse 10 of _S'lokavârttika_), Bhavadâsa {_Pratijñasûtra_ 63}, Hari and
Upavar@sa (mentioned in _S'âstradîpikâ_). It is probable that at least
some of these preceded S'abara, the writer of the famous commentary
known as the _S'abara-bhâ@sya_. It is difficult to say anything
about the time in which he flourished. Dr Ga@ngânâtha
Jhâ would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current
verse which speaks of King Vikramâditya as being the son
of S'abarasvâmin by a K@sattriya wife. This bhâ@sya of S'abara
is the basis of the later Mîmâ@msâ works. It was commented
upon by an unknown person alluded to as Vârttikakâra by
Prabhâkara and merely referred to as "yathâhu@h" (as they say)
by Kumârila. Dr Ga@nganâtha Jhâ says that Prabhâkara's commentary
_B@rhatî_ on the _S'abara-bhâ@sya_ was based upon the work
of this Vârttikakâra. This _B@rhatî_ of Prabhâkara had another
commentary on it--_@Rjuvimâlâ_ by S'alikanâtha Mis'ra, who also
wrote a compendium on the Prabhâkara interpretation of Mîmâ@msâ
called _Prakara@napañcikâ_. Tradition says that Prabhâkara
(often referred to as Nibandhakâra), whose views are
often alluded to as "gurumata," was a pupil of Kumârila. Kumârila
Bha@t@ta, who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporary
of S'a@nkara (788 A.D.), wrote his celebrated independent
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exposition of S'abara's bhâ@sya in three parts known as _S'lokavârttika_
(dealing only with the philosophical portion of S'abara's
work as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as
Tarkapâda), _Tantravârttika_ (dealing with the remaining three
chapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and
_@Tup@tîkâ_ (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books)
[Footnote ref 1]. Kumârila is referred to by his later followers
as Bha@t@ta, Bha@t@tapâda, and Vârttikakâra. The next great Mîmâ@msâ
scholar and follower of Kumârila was Ma@n@dana Mis'ra, the author of
_Vidhiviveka, Mîmâ@msânukrama@nî_ and the commentator of _Tantravârttika,_
who became later on converted by S'a@nkara to Vedantism. Pârthasârathi
Mis'ra (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his _S'âstradîpikâ,
Tantraratna,_ and _Nyâyaratnamâlâ_ following the footprints
of Kumârila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumârila,
the names of Sucarita Mis'ra the author of _Kâs'ikâ_ and Somes'vara
the author of _Nyâyasudhâ_ deserve special notice. Râmak@r@s@na
Bha@t@ta wrote an excellent commentary on the _Tarkapâda_ of
_S'âstradîpikâ_ called the _Yuktisnehapûra@nî-siddhânta-candrikâ_ and
Somanâtha wrote his _Mayûkhamâlikâ_ on the remaining chapters
of _S'âstradîpikâ_. Other important current Mîmâ@msâ works which
deserve notice are such as _Nyâyamâlâvistara_ of Mâdhava, _Subodhinî,
Mîmâ@msâbâlaprakâs'a_ of S'a@nkara Bha@t@ta, _Nyâyaka@nikâ_ of
Vâcaspati Mis'ra, _Mîmâ@msâparibhâ@sa_ by K@r@s@nayajvan,
_Mîmâ@msânyâyaprakâs'a_ by Anantadeva, Gâgâ Bha@t@ta's
_Bha@t@tacintâma@ni,_ etc. Most of the books mentioned here have been
consulted in the writing of this chapter. The importance of the
Mîmâ@msâ literature for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are all
Vedic duties to be performed according to its maxims, but even the
sm@rti literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and rituals
of Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explained
by them. The legal side of the sm@rtis consisting of inheritance,
proprietory rights, adoption, etc. which guide Hindu civil life even
under the British administration is explained according to the
Mîmâ@msâ maxims. Its relations to the Vedânta philosophy will
be briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations with
Nyâya-Vais'e@sika have also been pointed out in various places of this
chapter. The views of the two schools of Mîmâ@msâ as propounded
by Prabhâkara and Kumârila on all the important topics have
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[Footnote 1: Mahâmahopadhyâya Haraprasâda S'âstrî says, in his
introduction to _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_, that "Kumârila preceded
Sa@nkara by two generations."]
372
also been pointed out. Prabhâkara's views however could not
win many followers in later times, but while living it is said that
he was regarded by Kumârila as a very strong rival [Footnote ref 1]. Hardly
any new contribution has been made to the Mîmâ@msâ philosophy
after Kumârila and Prabhâkara. The _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ deal mostly
with the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in
connection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be
gleaned out of them. S'abara's contributions are also slight and
vague. Vârttikakâra's views also can only be gathered from the
references to them by Kumârila and Prabhâkara. What we know
of Mîmâ@msâ philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone.
It did not develop any further after them. Works written on the
subject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do
not know of any work on Mîmâ@msâ written in English except
the excellent one by Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ on the Prabhâkara
Mîmâ@msâ to which I have frequently referred.
The Parata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Nyâya and the
Svata@h-prâmâ@nya doctrine of Mîmâ@msâ.
The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge
(_svata@h-prâmâ@nya_) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure
of the Mîmâ@msâ philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude
of truth. The Mîmâ@msâ philosophy asserts that all knowledge
excepting the action of remembering (_sm@rti_) or memory is
valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither
depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other
knowledge for its validity. But Nyâya holds that this self-validity
of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation.
It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge
is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this
knowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive
anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this
visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is
true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge
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[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumârila, not being able to convert
Prabhâkara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended
that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhâkara whether his burial
rites should be performed according to Kumârila's views or Prabhâkara's.
Prabhâkara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by
him only to rouse up Kumârila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumârila's views
were the right ones. Kumârila then rose up and said that Prabhâkara
was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was
alive. But this has of course no historic value.]
373
it has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and
how can it certify the objective truth of its representation? In
other words, how can my perception "a blue thing" guarantee
that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively
as well? After my perception of anything as blue we do not
have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue
is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot
be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certain
that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but
there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object
from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively
valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify
its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge,
and following our perception of even a mirage we should
never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions,
and this proves that when we practically follow the
directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity,
which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perception
with what we find later on in practical experience. Again,
every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations,
and as such depends upon them for its production, and
hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else.
It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for
validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and
attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People
only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically
in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of
a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with
our perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposes
of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of
knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the
object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (_arthakriyâjñâna_
or _phalajñâna_) just as perception or knowledge represented
them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of
knowledge (_svata@h-prâmâ@nya_), but validity is ascertained by
_sa@mvâda_ or agreement with the objective facts of experience [Footnote
ref l].
It is easy to see that this Nyâya objection is based on the
supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective
collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can
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[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 160-173.]
374
only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this
theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be
experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations;
we have a perception and immediately we become aware of certain
objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the
objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that
the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis
which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme
prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a
phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we
say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external
collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted
by experience; knowledge only photographs the
objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that
knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is
only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation
to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is
not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and
interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in
things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What
we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the
agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objective
facts never come to us directly, they are always taken
on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty
than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed
different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but
these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this
is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact
before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes
different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for
experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and
not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by
us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts
are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is
what is said to be the self-validity (_svata@h-prâmâ@ya_) of knowledge
in its production (_utpatti_). As soon as knowledge is produced,
objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link
between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on
which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing
or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent
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of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well
(_svakâryakara@ne svata@h prâmâ@nya@m jñânasya_). Whenever there
is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is
certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work
(_prav@rtti_} according to its direction. There is no indecision in
our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness
of knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with
it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases
of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which
carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not
valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear
to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we
reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed
itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which
goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man
works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction
that his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper
of mind. This is what Mîmâ@msa means when it says that the
validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though
its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other
data (_jñânasya prâ@mâ@nyam svata@h aprâmâ@nya@m parata@h_). Knowledge
attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory
experience (_bâdhakajñâna_) comes in or when our organs etc. are
known to be faulty and defective (_kara@nado@sajñâna). It is from
these that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when
we take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them
not, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of
knowledge certified at the moment of its production need not
be doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find
any defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All
knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently
by itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory
is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon
a previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and
cannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself.
The place of sense organs in perception.
We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it
could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so,
the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in
376
face of the Nyâya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the
ground of diverse sense-contact the Mîmâ@msâ probably could not
afford to remain silent on such an important point. It therefore
accepted the Nyâya view of sense-contact as a condition of knowledge
with slight modifications, and yet held their doctrine of
svata@h-prâmâ@nya. It does not appear to have been conscious of
a conflict between these two different principles of the production
of knowledge. Evidently the point of view from which it looked
at it was that the fact that there were the senses and contacts
of them with the objects, or such special capacities in them by
virtue of which the things could be perceived, was with us a
matter of inference. Their actions in producing the knowledge
are never experienced at the time of the rise of knowledge, but
when the knowledge arises we argue that such and such senses
must have acted. The only case where knowledge is found to
be dependent on anything else seems to be the case where one
knowledge is found to depend on a previous experience or knowledge
as in the case of memory. In other cases the dependence
of the rise of knowledge on anything else cannot be felt, for the
physical collocations conditioning knowledge are not felt to be
operating before the rise of knowledge, and these are only inferred
later on in accordance with the nature and characteristic
of knowledge. We always have our first start in knowledge
which is directly experienced from which we may proceed later
on to the operation and nature of objective facts in relation to it.
Thus it is that though contact of the senses with the objects
may later on be imagined to be the conditioning factor, yet the
rise of knowledge as well as our notion of its validity strikes us
as original, underived, immediate, and first-hand.
Prabhâkara gives us a sketch as to how the existence of
the senses may be inferred. Thus our cognitions of objects are
phenomena which are not all the same, and do not happen always
in the same manner, for these vary differently at different moments;
the cognitions of course take place in the soul which may thus
be regarded as the material cause (_samavâyikâra@na_); but there
must be some such movements or other specific associations
(_asamavâyikâra@na_) which render the production of this or
that specific cognition possible. The immaterial causes subsist
either in the cause of the material cause (e.g. in the case of the
colouring of a white piece of cloth, the colour of the yarns which
377
is the cause of the colour in the cloth subsists in the yarns which
form the material cause of the cloth) or in the material cause itself
(e.g. in the case of a new form of smell being produced in a
substance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterial
cause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is put
in the fire and in which the smell is produced). The soul is
eternal and has no other cause, and it has to be assumed that
the immaterial cause required for the rise of a cognition must
inhere in the soul, and hence must be a quality. Then again
accepting the Nyâya conclusions we know that the rise of qualities
in an eternal thing can only take place by contact with some
other substances. Now cognition being a quality which the soul
acquires would naturally require the contact of such substances.
Since there is nothing to show that such substances inhere in
other substances they are also to be taken as eternal. There are
three eternal substances, time, space, and atoms. But time and
space being all-pervasive the soul is always in contact with them.
Contact with these therefore cannot explain the occasional rise
of different cognitions. This contact must then be of some kind
of atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul.
This atom may be called _manas_ (mind). This manas alone by
itself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
effort, etc. The manas however by itself is found to be devoid
of any such qualities as colour, smell, etc., and as such cannot
lead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities; hence
it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterized
by these qualities; for the cognition of colour, the mind will
need the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristic
quality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorous
characteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we know
that the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature must
be one composed of tejas or light, as colour is a feature of light,
and this proves the existence of the organ, the eye--for the cognition
of colour; in a similar manner the existence of the earthly
organ (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), the
âkâs'ic organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ of
touch) may be demonstrated. But without manas none of these
organs is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts have
to be admitted, (1) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of the
sense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the manas
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with the sense organs, and (4) of the manas with the soul. The
objects of perception are of three kinds,(1) substances, (2) qualities,
(3) jâti or class. The material substances are tangible objects of
earth, fire, water, air in large dimensions (for in their fine atomic
states they cannot be perceived). The qualities are colour, taste,
smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction,
priority, posteriority, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and
effort [Footnote ref l].
It may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion that
Kumârila Bha@t@ta was rather undecided as to the nature of the
senses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says that
the senses may be conceived either as certain functions or
activities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing things
without coming into actual contact with them, or that they might
be entities which actually come in contact with their objects [Footnote ref
2], and he prefers this last view as being more satisfactory.
Indeterminate and determinate perception.
There are two kinds of perception in two stages, the first
stage is called _nirvikalpa_ (indeterminate) and the second _savikalpa_
(determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its perception
at the first moment of the association of the senses and
their objects. Thus Kumârila says that the cognition that appears
first is a mere _âlocana_ or simple perception, called non-determinate
pertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resembling
the cognitions that the new-born infant has of things around
himself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia is
presented to consciousness; all that is present there is the
individual wherein these two subsist. This view of indeterminate
perception may seem in some sense to resemble the Buddhist
view which defines it as being merely the specific individuality
(_svalak@sa@na_} and regards it as being the only valid element in
perception, whereas all the rest are conceived as being imaginary
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napañcikâ_, pp. 53 etc., and Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ's
_Prabhâkaramimâ@msâ_, pp. 35 etc.]
[Footnote 2: _S'lokavârttika_, see _Pratyak@sasûtra_, 40 etc., and
_Nyâyaratnâkara_ on it. It may be noted in this connection that
Sâ@mkhya-Yoga did not think like Nyâya that the senses actually went
out to meet the objects (_prâpyakâritva_) but held that there was
a special kind of functioning (_v@rtti_) by virtue of which the
senses could grasp even such distant objects as the sun and the stars.
It is the functioning of the sense that reached the objects. The nature
of the v@rtti is not further clearly explained and Pârthasârathi objects
to it as being almost a different category (_tattvântara_).]
379
impositions. But both Kumârila and Prabhâkara think that both
the genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate
stage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because
we do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in
contrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus or
differentia; a thing can be cognized as an "individual" only in
comparison with other things from which it differs in certain well-defined
characters; and it can be apprehended as belonging to a
class only when it is found to possess certain characteristic features
in common with some other things; so we see that as other things
are not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept
at the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an
individual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the
characteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are perceived
at the indeterminate stage [Footnote ref 1]. So long as other things are
not remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and
hence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first
stage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past impressions
brings the present perception in relation to past ones
and realizes its character as involving universal and particular. It
is thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate
and the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case
memory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory
in the determinate perception refers to those other objects of
memory and not to the percept. It is also held that though the
determinate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet
since the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not
enter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as
a valid cognition. Kumârila also agrees with Prabhâkara in
holding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception
valid [Footnote ref 2].
Some Ontological Problems connected with the
Doctrine of Perception.
The perception of the class (_jâti_) of a percept in relation to
other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference
between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems
of jâti and avayavâvayavî (part and whole notion) were
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Compare this with the Vais'e@sika view as interpreted by
S'rîdhara.]
[Footnote 2: See _Prakara@napañcikâ_ and _S'âstradîpikâ_.]
380
the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering
into discussion about jâti, Prabhâkara first introduced the
problem of _avayava_ (part) and _avayavî_ (whole). He argues as
an exponent of svata@h-prâmâ@nyavâda that the proof of the true
existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness,
and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness
must be admitted to have its existence established. Following
this canon Prabhâkara says that gross objects as a whole exist,
since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material
cause and their connection (_sa@myoga_) is the immaterial cause
(_asamavâyikâra@na_), and it is the latter which renders the whole
altogether different from the parts of which it is composed; and
it is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the
whole is perceived. Kumârila holds that it is due to the point of
view from which we look at a thing that we call it a separate
whole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are identical,
but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing
appears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it
from the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing
appears to be a whole of which there are parts (see _S'lokavârttika,
Vanavâda_) [Footnote ref 1].
Jâti, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, is
different from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in its
entirety in each individual constituting that jâti (_vyâs'ajyav@rtti_),
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: According to Sâ@mkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity
of the universal and the particular (_sâmânyavis'esasamudâyo dravyam,
Vyâsabhâsya_, III. 44), for there is no other separate entity which is
different from them both in which they would inhere as Nyaya holds.
Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts
exist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which
they exist close together (_mrantarâ hi tadavayavâh_), and it is this
latter combination (_ayutasiddhâvayava_) which is called a dravya, but
here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is the
parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space
between them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as
Panditâs'oka has shown did not believe in any whole (_avayavi_), it
is the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole
occupying space (_paramânava eva hi pararûpades'aparihârenotpannâh
parasparasahitâ avabhâsamânâ desavitânavanto bhavanti_). The whole
is thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see _Avayavinirâkarana, Six
Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_). Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless
_(niravayava}_ and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an
object we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as different from the
parts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid
reason against it:
"_adustakaranodbhûtamanâvirbhûtabâdhakam
asandigdañca vijñânam katham mithyeti kathyate._"
_Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 550 ff.]
381
but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the
argument that jâti should be denied, because it involves the conception
of a whole (class) consisting of many parts (individuals). The
class character or jâti exists because it is distinctly perceived by
us in the individuals included in any particular class. It is eternal
in the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, even
when one of the individuals ceases to exist. When a new individual
of that class (e g. cow class) comes into being, a new
relation of inherence is generated by which the individual is
brought into relation with the class-character existing in other
individuals, for inherence (_samavâya_) according to Prabhâkara
is not an eternal entity but an entity which is both produced
and not produced according as the thing in which it exists is
non-eternal or eternal, and it is not regarded as one as Nyâya
holds, but as many, according as there is the infinite number of
things in which it exists. When any individual is destroyed, the
class-character does not go elsewhere, nor subsist in that individual,
nor is itself destroyed, but it is only the inherence of
class-character with that individual that ceases to exist. With
the destruction of an individual or its production it is a new
relation of inherence that is destroyed or produced. But the
class-character or jâti has no separate existence apart from the
individuals as Nyâya supposes. Apprehension of jâti is essentially
the apprehension of the class-character of a thing in relation to
other similar things of that class by the perception of the common
characteristics. But Prabhâkara would not admit the existence of
a highest genus sattâ (being) as acknowledged by Nyâya. He
argues that the existence of class-character is apprehended because
we find that the individuals of a class possess some common
characteristic possessed by all the heterogeneous and disparate
things of the world as can give rise to the conception of a separate
jâti as sattâ, as demanded by the naiyâyikas. That all things are
said to be _sat_ (existing) is more or less a word or a name without
the corresponding apprehension of a common quality. Our experience
always gives us concrete existing individuals, but we
can never experience such a highest genus as pure existence or
being, as it has no concrete form which may be perceived. When
we speak of a thing as _sat_, we do not mean that it is possessed
of any such class-characters as sattâ (being); what we mean
is simply that the individual has its specific existence or svarûpasattâ.
382
Thus the Nyâya view of perception as taking only the
thing in its pure being apart from qualities, etc, (_sanmâtra-vi@sayam
pratyak@sa@m_) is made untenable by Prabhâkara, as according to
him the thing is perceived direct with all its qualities. According
to Kumârila however jâti is not something different from the
individuals comprehended by it and it is directly perceived.
Kumârila's view of jâti is thus similar to that held by Sâ@mkhya,
namely that when we look at an individual from one point of
view (jâti as identical with the individual), it is the individual that
lays its stress upon our consciousness and the notion of jâti becomes
latent, but when we look at it from another point of view
(the individual as identical with jâti) it is the jâti which presents
itself to consciousness, and the aspect as individual becomes latent.
The apprehension as jâti or as individual is thus only a matter
of different points of view or angles of vision from which we look
at a thing. Quite in harmony with the conception of jâti, Kumârila
holds that the relation of inherence is not anything which is distinct
from the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist,
but only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves
(_S'lokavârttika, Pratyak@sasûtra_, 149, 150, _abhedât samavâyo'stu
svarûpam dharmadharmi@no@h_), Kumârila agrees with Prabhâkara
that jâti is perceived by the senses (_tatraikabuddhinirgrâhyâ
jâtirindriyagocarâ_).
It is not out of place to mention that on the evidence of
Prabhâkara we find that the category of vis'e@sa admitted by the
Ka@nâda school is not accepted as a separate category by the
Mîmâ@msâ on the ground that the differentiation of eternal
things from one another, for which the category of vis'e@sa is
admitted, may very well be effected on the basis of the ordinary
qualities of these things. The quality of p@rthaktva or specific
differences in atoms, as inferred by the difference of things they
constitute, can very well serve the purposes of vis'e@sa.
The nature of knowledge.
All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the
knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether
perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal
the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self
is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded
as perception from the point of view of self. The division
383
of the pramâ@nas as pratyak@sa (perception), anumâna (inference),
etc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with
reference to the varying modes in which they are brought within
the purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illumining
or revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could have
knowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by the
remembrance of dreams. It is knowledge (_sa@mvid_) that reveals
by its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects.
It is generally argued against the self-illuminative character of
knowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects they
are said to reveal; and if they have the same form we may rather
say that they have the same identical reality too. The Mîmâ@msâ
answer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and the
cognized were not different from one another, they could not
have been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it is
by cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. The
cognition (_sa@mvedana_) of a person simply means that such a
special kind of quality (_dharma_) has been manifested in the
self by virtue of which his active operation with reference to
a certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cognition
is that with reference to which the active operation of the
self has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely formless,
for they have the cognitional character by which things are
illumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character than
this, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only are
believed to have forms and only such forms as knowledge reveal
to us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference to
objects that were perceived previously, and of which the impressions
were left in the mind and were aroused by the unseen agency
(_ad@r@s@ta_). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of remembrance
of that which was previously experienced. Only such of the impressions
of cognized objects are roused in dreams as can beget just that
amount of pleasurable or painful experience, in accordance with the
operation of ad@r@s@ta, as the person deserves to have in accordance
with his previous merit or demerit.
The Prabhâkara Mîmâ@msâ, in refuting the arguments of those
who hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognized
by some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since we
do not experience any such double cognition and also because it
would lead us to a _regressus ad infinitum,_ for if a second cognition
384
is necessary to interpret the first, then that would require a third
and so on. If a cognition could be the object of another cognition,
then it could not be self-valid. The cognition is not of course unknown
to us, but that is of course because it is self-cognized, and
reveals itself to us the moment it reveals its objects. From the
illumination of objects also we can infer the presence of this
self-cognizing knowledge. But it is only its presence that is inferred
and not the cognition itself, for inference can only indicate the
presence of an object and not in the form in which it can be
apprehended by perception (_pratyak@sa_). Prabhâkara draws a
subtle distinction between perceptuality (_sa@mvedyatva_) and being
object of knowledge (_prameyatva_). A thing can only be apprehended
(_sa@mvedyate_) by perception, whereas inference can only
indicate the presence of an object without apprehending the
object itself. Our cognition cannot be apprehended by any other
cognition. Inference can only indicate the presence or existence
of knowledge but cannot apprehend the cognition itself [Footnote ref 1].
Kumârila also agrees with Prabhâkara in holding that perception
is never the object of another perception and that it ends
in the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception. But he
says that every perception involves a relationship between the
perceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves as
the agent whose activity in grasping the object is known as cognition.
This is indeed different from the Prabhâkara view, that
in one manifestation of knowledge the knower, the known, and
the knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine of
_tripu@tîpratyak@sa_) [Footnote ref 2].
The Psychology of Illusion.
The question however arises that if all apprehensions are
valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot
be regarded as valid? The problem of illusory perception and
its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian
philosophy. Omitting the theory of illusion of the Jains called
_satkhyâti_ which we have described before, and of the Vedântists,
which we shall describe in the next chapter, there are three
different theories of illusion, viz. (1) _âtmakhyâti_, (2) _viparîtakhyâtî_
or _anyathâkhyâti_, and (3) _akhyâti_ of the Mîmâ@msâ school. The
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Prabhâkaramîmâ@msâ,_ by Dr Ga@nganâtha Jhâ.]
[Footnote 2: _loc. cit._ pp. 26-28.]
385
viparîtâkhyâti or anyathâkhyâti theory of illusion is accepted by
the Nyâya, Vais'e@sika and the Yoga, the âkhyâti theory by
Mîmâ@msâ and Sâ@mkhya and the âtmakhyâti by the Buddhists.
The commonest example of illusion in Indian philosophy is
the illusory appearance of a piece of broken conch-shell as a piece
of silver. That such an illusion occurs is a fact which is experienced
by all and agreed to by all. The differences of view are with regard
to its cause or its psychology. The idealistic Buddhists who deny
the existence of the external world and think that there are only
the forms of knowledge, generated by the accumulated karma of
past lives, hold that just as in the case of a correct perception, so
also in the case of illusory perception it is the flow of knowledge
which must be held responsible. The flow of knowledge on account
of the peculiarities of its own collocating conditions generates
sometimes what we call right perception and sometimes wrong
perception or illusion. On this view nothing depends upon the so-called
external data. For they do not exist, and even if they did
exist, why should the same data sometimes bring about the right
perception and sometimes the illusion? The flow of knowledge
creates both the percept and the perceiver and unites them. This
is true both in the case of correct perception and illusory perception.
Nyâya objects to the above view, and says that, if
knowledge irrespective of any external condition imposes upon
itself the knower and the illusory percept, then the perception
ought to be of the form "I am silver" and not "this is silver."
Moreover this theory stands refuted, as it is based upon a false
hypothesis that it is the inner knowledge which appears as coming
from outside and that the external as such does not exist.
The viparîtakhyâti or the anyathâkhyâti theory supposes that
the illusion takes place because on account of malobservation we
do not note the peculiar traits of the conch-shell as distinguished
from the silver, and at the same time by the glow etc. of the
conch-shell unconsciously the silver which I had seen elsewhere
is remembered and the object before me is taken as silver. In
illusion the object before us with which our eye is associated is
not conch-shell, for the traits peculiar to it not being grasped, it
is merely an object. The silver is not utterly non-existent, for it
exists elsewhere and it is the memory of it as experienced before
that creates confusion and leads us to think of the conch-shell as
silver. This school agrees with the akhyâti school that the fact
386
that I remember silver is not taken note of at the time of
illusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enough
to account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definite
positive aspect associated with it, viz. the false identification of
silver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-shell before us.
The âkhyâti theory of Mîmâ@msâ holds that since the special
peculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed, it is erroneous
to say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-shell as
the silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-shell is not cognized
at all. What happens here is simply this, that only the
features common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the perceiver
fails to apprehend the difference between these two things,
and this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certain
weakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by the
common features of the conch-shell and silver is not apprehended,
and the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some past
time that has appeared before him is not perceived; and it is as
a result of this non-apprehension of the difference between the
silver remembered and the present conch-shell that the illusion
takes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of a
dual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such is
different from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly a
matter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as the
difference between the remembrance of silver and the sight of
the present object is not apprehended, the illusory perception
appears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a real
valid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity on
the part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiver
would be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the case
of a real perception. Kumârila agrees with this view as expounded
by Prabhâkara, and further says that the illusory judgment is as
valid to the cognizor at the time that he has the cognition as any
real judgment could be. If subsequent experience rejects it, that
does not matter, for it is admitted in Mîmâ@msâ that when later
experience finds out the defects of any perception it can invalidate
the original perception which was self-valid at the time of its
production [Footnote Ref. 1]. It is easy to see that the Mîmâ@msâ had to
adopt this view of illusion to maintain the doctrine that all cognition
at the moment of its production is valid. The âkhyâti theory
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napañcikâ, S'âstradîpikâ_, and _S'lokavârttika_,
sûtra 2.]
387
tries to establish the view that the illusion is not due to any
positive wrong knowledge, but to a mere negative factor of non-apprehension
due to certain weakness of mind. So it is that
though illusion is the result, yet the cognition so far as it is cognition,
is made up of two elements, the present perception and
memory, both of which are true so far as they are individually
present to us, and the cognition itself has all the characteristics of
any other valid knowledge, for the mark of the validity of a cognition
is its power to prompt us to action. In doubtful cognitions also,
as in the case "Is this a post or a man?" what is actually perceived
is some tall object and thus far it is valid too. But when this
perception gives rise to two different kinds of remembrance (of
the pillar and the man), doubt comes in. So the element of apprehension
involved in doubtful cognitions should be regarded
as self-valid as any other cognition.
Inference.
S'abara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation
has been known to exist between two things, we can have the
idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind
of knowledge is called inference. Kumârila on the basis of this
tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice
that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire)
subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent
relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend
upon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also necessary
that the two things (smoke and fire) coexisting in a third
thing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence of
one thing should also be cases involving the existence of the
other, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e.g. fire),
though including all the cases of the existence of the other
(smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter
(smoke) may not exist. When once a permanent relation, whether
it be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity of
the constellation of K@rttikâ with Rohi@nî, where, by the rise of the
former the early rise of the latter may be inferred), or a case of
identity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or
a case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and
a third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of
cases, is perceived, they fuse together in the mind as forming
388
one whole, and as a result of that when the existence of the
one (e.g. smoke) in a thing (hill) is noticed, we can infer the
existence of the thing (hill) with its counterpart (fire). In all
such cases the thing (e.g. fire) which has a sphere extending
beyond that in which the other (e.g. smoke) can exist is called
_gamya_ or _vyâpaka_ and the other (e.g. smoke) _vyâpya_ or _gamaka_
and it is only by the presence of gamaka in a thing (e.g. hill,
the pak@sa) that the other counterpart the gamya (fire) may be
inferred. The general proposition, universal coexistence of the
gamaka with the gamya (e.g. wherever there is smoke there is
fire) cannot be the cause of inference, for it is itself a case
of inference. Inference involves the memory of a permanent
relation subsisting between two things (e.g. smoke and fire) in a
third thing (e g. kitchen); but the third thing is remembered only
in a general way that the coexisting things must have a place
where they are found associated. It is by virtue of such a memory
that the direct perception of a basis (e.g. hill) with the gamaka
thing (e.g. smoke) in it would naturally bring to my mind that
the same basis (hill) must contain the gamya (i.e. fire) also.
Every case of inference thus proceeds directly from a perception
and not from any universal general proposition. Kumârila holds
that the inference gives us the minor as associated with the major
and not of the major alone, i.e. of the fiery mountain and not of
fire. Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it was
known in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the possessor
of fire, yet the case of the mountain was not anticipated
and the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly new
knowledge (_des'akâlâdhikyâdyuktamag@rhîtagrâhitvam anumânasya,
Nyâyaratnâkara_, p. 363) [Footnote ref 1]. It should also be noted that in
forming the notion of the permanent relation between two things,
a third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered
and for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough
that in the large number of cases where the concomitance was
noted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomitance
failed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances
in which the absence of the gamya or vyâpaka was marked by an
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumârila
was indebted to Di@nnâga for this; for Di@nnâga's main contention is that
"it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is
the fiery hill that is inferred" for otherwise inference would give us
no new knowledge see Vidyâbhû@sa@na's _Indian Logic_, p. 87 and
_Tâtparya@tikâ_, p. 120.]
389
absence of the gamaka or vyâpya, should also be noted, for a
knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for
the forming of the notion of the permanent relation [Footnote ref 1]. The
experience of a large number of particular cases in which any two
things were found to coexist together in another thing in some
relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure
creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the
gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist
in exactly the same relation [Footnote ref 2]. In those cases where the
circle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the
existence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other.
It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases
of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of
coexistence as well.
The question arises that if no inference is possible without
a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity
of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded
as self-valid. To this Kumârila's answer is that memory
is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramâna, as it does
not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the
acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence
of two things in another was known in a number of cases,
yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya
in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the
gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not
perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the
gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.
As regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicit
statement of the process of inference for convincing others
(_pârârthânumâna_) both Kumârila and Prabhâkara hold that three
premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three
premisses pratijñâ, hetu and d@rstânta may quite serve the purpose
of an anumâna.
There are two kinds of anumâna according to Kumârila
viz. pratyak@satod@rstasambandha and sâmânyatod@r@s@tasambandha.
The former is that kind of inference where the permanent
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Kumârila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance
(_vyâpti_) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the
positive ones.]
[Footnote 2: "_tasmâdanavagate'pi sarvatrânvaye sarvatas'ca vyatireke
bahus'ah sâhityâvagamamâtrâdeva
vyabhicârâdars'anasanâthâdanumânotpattira@ngîkartavya@h._"
_Nyâyaratnâkara_, p. 288.]
390
relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and
fire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where
the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete
things but between two general notions, as in the case of movement
and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is
change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the
change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held
that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals
[Footnote ref 1].
Prabhâkara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the
permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact
that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke)
is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both
subsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation between
two things is the main point, whereas in all other associations
of time and place the things in which these two subsist
together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things
(e.g. fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact that
though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the
concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute [Footnote
ref 2]. When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that
the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the
presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any
smoke is seen. Prabhâkara counts separately the fallacies of the
minor (_pak@sâbhâsa_), of the enunciation (_pratijñâbhâsa_) and of
the example (_d@r@s@tântâbhâsa_) along with the fallacies of the middle
and this seems to indicate that the Mîmâ@msâ logic was not altogether
free from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke
includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there
would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential
cognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhâkara,
for he does not admit that a pramâ@na should necessarily bring
us any new knowledge, for pramâ@na is simply defined as "apprehension."
So though the inferential cognition always pertains to
things already known it is yet regarded by him as a pramâ@na,
since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _S'lokavârttika, Nyâyaratnâkara, S'âstradîpikâ,
Yuktisnehapûra@nî, Siddhântacandrikâ_ on anumâna.]
[Footnote 2: On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is
no condition (_upâdhi_) which may vitiate the inference, Prabhâkara has
nothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in
a large number of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must say
that it does not exist (_prayatnenânvi@syamâ@ne aupâdhikatvânavagamât_,
see _Prakara@napañcikâ_, p. 71).]
391
Upamâna, Arthâpatti.
Analogy (_upamâna_) is accepted by Mîmâ@msâ in a sense which
is different from that in which Nyâya took it. The man who
has seen a cow (_go_) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox
(_gavaya_), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with
the _go,_ and then cognizes the similarity of the _go_ (which is not
within the limits of his perception then) with the _gavaya._ The
cognition of this similarity of the _gavaya_ in the _go,_ as it follows
directly from the perception of the similarity of the _go_ in the
_gavaya,_ is called upamâna (analogy). It is regarded as a separate
pramâ@na, because by it we can apprehend the similarity
existing in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is
not mere remembrance, for at the time the _go_ was seen the
_gavaya_ was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen,
and what was not seen could not be remembered. The difference
of Prabhâkara and Kumârila on this point is that while the
latter regards similarity as only a quality consisting in the fact
of more than one object having the same set of qualities, the
former regards it as a distinct category.
_Arthâpatti_ (implication) is a new pramâ@na which is admitted
by the Mîmâ@msâ. Thus when we know that a person Devadatta
is alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot reconcile
these two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being
in the house without presuming his existence somewhere outside
the house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Devadatta
outside the house is called _arthâpatti_ (presumption or
implication).
The exact psychological analysis of the mind in this arthâpatti
cognition is a matter on which Prabhâkara and Kumârila
disagree. Prabhâkara holds that when a man knows that Devadatta
habitually resides in his house but yet does not find him
there, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquired
previously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, and
the cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at his
house. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the cause
of implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Devadatta,
and thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remain
somewhere outside. That can only be found by implication,
without the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed.
The mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for
392
making the presumption that he is outside the house, for he
might also be dead. But I know that Devadatta was living and
also that he was not at home; this perception of his absence from
home creates a doubt as regards my first knowledge that he is
living, and it is for the removal of this doubt that there creeps in
the presumption that he must be living somewhere else. The
perception of the absence of Devadatta through the intermediate
link of a doubt passes into the notion of a presumption that he
must then remain somewhere else. In inference there is no element
of doubt, for it is only when the smoke is perceived to exist
beyond the least element of doubt that the inference of the fire
is possible, but in presumption the perceived non-existence in the
house leads to the presumption of an external existence only
when it has thrown the fact of the man's being alive into doubt
and uncertainty [Footnote ref 1].
Kumârila however objects to this explanation of Prabhâkara,
and says that if the fact that Devadatta is living is made doubtful
by the absence of Devadatta at his house, then the doubt
may as well be removed by the supposition that Devadatta is
dead, for it does not follow that the doubt with regard to the life
of Devadatta should necessarily be resolved by the supposition
of his being outside the house. Doubt can only be removed
when the cause or the root of doubt is removed, and it does not
follow that because Devadatta is not in the house therefore he is
living. If it was already known that Devadatta was living and his
absence from the house creates the doubt, how then can the very
fact which created the doubt remove the doubt? The cause of
doubt cannot be the cause of its removal too. The real procedure
of the presumption is quite the other way. The doubt about
the life of Devadatta being removed by previous knowledge or
by some other means, we may presume that he must be outside
the house when he is found absent from the house. So there cannot
be any doubt about the life of Devadatta. It is the certainty
of his life associated with the perception of his absence from the
house that leads us to the presumption of his external existence.
There is an opposition between the life of Devadatta and his
absence from the house, and the mind cannot come to rest without
the presumption of his external existence. The mind oscillates
between two contradictory poles both of which it accepts but
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napañcikâ_, pp. 113-115.]
393
cannot reconcile, and as a result of that finds an outlet and a
reconciliation in the presumption that the existence of Devadatta
must be found outside the house.
Well then, if that be so, inference may as well be interpreted
as presumption. For if we say that we know that wherever there
is smoke there is fire, and then perceive that there is smoke
in the hill, but no fire, then the existence of the smoke becomes
irreconcilable, or the universal proposition of the concomitance
of smoke with fire becomes false, and hence the presumption
that there is fire in the hill. This would have been all right if
the universal concomitance of smoke with fire could be known
otherwise than by inference. But this is not so, for the concomitance
was seen only in individual cases, and from that came the
inference that wherever there is smoke there is fire. It cannot
be said that the concomitance perceived in individual cases suffered
any contradiction without the presumption of the universal
proposition (wherever there is smoke there is fire); thus arthâpatti
is of no avail here and inference has to be accepted. Now
when it is proved that there are cases where the purpose of inference
cannot be served by arthâpatti, the validity of inference
as a means of proof becomes established. That being done we
admit that the knowledge of the fire in the hill may come to us
either by inference or by arthâpatti.
So inference also cannot serve the purpose of arthâpatti, for
in inference also it is the hetu (reason) which is known first, and
later on from that the sâdhya (what is to be proved); both of
them however cannot be apprehended at the same moment, and
it is exactly this that distinguishes arthâpatti from anumâna.
For arthâpatti takes place where, without the presumption of
Devadatta's external existence, the absence from the house of
Devadatta who is living cannot be comprehended. If Devadatta is
living he must exist inside or outside the house. The mind cannot
swallow a contradiction, and hence without presuming the external
existence of Devadatta even the perceived non-existence cannot
be comprehended. It is thus that the contradiction is resolved by
presuming his existence outside the house. Arthâpatti is thus
the result of arthânupapatti or the contradiction of the present
perception with a previously acquired certain knowledge.
It is by this arthâpattipramâ@na that we have to admit that
there is a special potency in seeds by which they produce the
394
shoots, and that a special potency is believed to exist in sacrifices
by which these can lead the sacrificer to Heaven or some such
beneficent state of existence.
S'abda pramâ@na.
S'abda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by
most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the
Jaina, Buddhist, Cârvâka and Vais`e@sika. A discussion on this
topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore
omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the
Nyâya, and the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority
of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and
they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied
it. Some sought to establish this authority on the supposition
that they were the word of God, while others, particularly the
Mîmâ@msists strove to prove that they were not written by anyone,
and had no beginning in time nor end and were eternal.
Their authority was not derived from the authority of any
trustworthy person or God. Their words are valid in themselves.
Evidently a discussion on these matters has but little value with
us, though it was a very favourite theme of debate in the old
days of India. It was in fact the most important subject for
Mîmâ@msâ, for the _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ were written for the purpose
of laying down canons for a right interpretation of the Vedas.
The slight extent to which it has dealt with its own epistemological
doctrines has been due solely to their laying the foundation
of its structure of interpretative maxims, and not to
writing philosophy for its own sake. It does not dwell so much
upon salvation as other systems do, but seeks to serve as a
rational compendium of maxims with the help of which the
Vedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly performed.
But a brief examination of the doctrine of word (_s'abda_)
as a means of proof cannot be dispensed with in connection with
Mîmâ@msâ as it is its very soul.
S'abda (word) as a pramâ@na means the knowledge that we
get about things (not within the purview of our perception) from
relevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words of
which they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds,
viz. those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas.
The first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not
395
uttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid in
itself. The meanings of words are of course known to us
before, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof;
but the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of the
relations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged
means of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept s`abda
as a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that the
validity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of its
being uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would not
explain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for when
even the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known,
we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of any
sentence.
Prabhâkara thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters,
or are understandable as combinations of letters. The constituent
letters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and are
thus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception which
serve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. The
reason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to be
found in a separate potency existing in the letters by which the
denotation of the word may be comprehended. The perception
of each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, but
leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions
of the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings
about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing
about the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearing
a word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admitted
that the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the
purpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separate
potencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is
the direct cause of verbal cognition. Both Prabhâkara and
Kumârila agree on this point.
Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words
have natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of
their own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their
comprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will
not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the
word in question is expressive of such and such a meaning,
but the word was all along competent to denote that meaning
and it is the hearer's knowledge of that fact that helps him to
396
understand the meaning of a word. Mîmâmsâ does not think
that the association of a particular meaning with a word is due
to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings
to the words [Footnote ref 1]. Words are thus acknowledged to be denotative
of themselves. It is only about proper names that convention
is admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to see
the bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic
commandments, by the performance of which such results would
arise as could not have been predicted by any other person.
Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though
they are ever present some manifestive agency is required by
which they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency consists
of the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the
word. Nyâya thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the cause
that produces the word while Mîmâm@sâ thinks that it only manifests
to the hearer the ever-existing word.
The process by which according to Prabhâkara the meanings
of words are acquired maybe exemplified thus: a senior commands
a junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the
child on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the
senior's commands comes to understand the meaning of "cow"
and "horse." Thus according to him the meanings of words can
only be known from words occurring in injunctive sentences; he
deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things
only as related to the other factors of the injunction (_anvitâbhidhâna
vâda_), and no word can be comprehended as having any
denotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine
holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally
related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence,
thus the word _gâm_ accusative case of _go_ (cow) means that it is
intended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine
genus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of
action, viz. bringing in the sentence _gâm ânaya_--bring the cow.
Kumârila however thinks that words independently express
separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentence
expressing one connected idea (_abhihitânvayavâda_). Thus
in _gâm ânaya_, according to Kumârila, _gâm_ means the bovine
class in the accusative character and _ânaya_ independently means
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: According to Nyâya God created all words and associated them
with their meanings.]
397
bring; these two are then combined into the meaning "bring the
cow." But on the former theory the word _gâm_ means that it is
connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence
only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above
sentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannot
have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of Kumârila
which is also the Nyâya theory is called abhihitânvayavâda [Footnote ref
1].
Lastly according to Prabhâkara it is only the Veda that can
be called s'abda-pramâ@na, and only those sentences of it which
contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way
with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is
only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the
speaker. But Kumârila considers the words of all trustworthy
persons as s'abda-pramâ@na.
The Pramâ@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi).
In addition to the above pramâ@nas Kumârila admits a fifth
kind of pramâ@na, viz. _anupalabdhi_ for the perception of the
non-existence of a thing. Kumârila argues that the non-existence of
a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived
by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could
come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some
people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumâna.
They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object
there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision
of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy
to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want
of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions
are to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How
can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped?
It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of pramâ@na
namely anupalabdhi.
All things exist in places either in a positive (_sadrûpa_) or in
a negative relation (_asadrûpa_), and it is only in the former case
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Prabhâkaramîmâ@msâ_ by Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ and S.N.
Dasgupta's _Study of Patanjali_, appendix. It may be noted in this
connection that Mîmâ@msâ did not favour the Spho@ta doctrine of sound
which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of
letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was
manifested (spho@ta) but not created by the passing sounds of the
syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this
word manifestation. See Vâcaspati's _Tattvabindu, S'lokavârttika_
and _Prakara@napañcikâ_. For the doctrine of anvitâbhidhâna see
Sâhkanâtha's _Vâkyârthamât@rkâv@rttî_.]
398
that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the
latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be
had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we
designate as a separate pramâ@na as anupalabdhi. Prabhâkara
holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the
perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need
of admitting a separate pramâ@na as anupalabdhi. For what is
meant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perception
of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty
space before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought
not to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the
place is not absolutely empty. If empty space is defined as that
which is not associated with the jug, then the category of negation
is practically admitted as a separate entity. If the perception of
empty space is defined as the perception of space at the moment
which we associated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then
also want of knowledge as a separate entity has to be accepted,
which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or
negation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain
the notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best
be an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to knowledge,
or in other words to substitute for the place of the external
absence of a thing an associated want of knowledge about the
thing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends
in failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted
either in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negation
or abhâva as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted.
It is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen without
any knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the next
moment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug.
But this also means that the moment of the perception of the
ground is associated with the want of knowledge of the jug or
its negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admission
of negation as a separate category, for what other meaning can
there be in the perception of "only the ground" if it is not meant
that it (the perception of the ground) is associated with or qualified
by the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception of
the ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence of
the jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived.
The qualifying phrase that "only the ground is perceived" becomes
399
meaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are not
specified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of the
ground. And this would require that we had already the notion
of negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a special
manner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should also
be noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates the
notion of negation immediately and not through other negations,
and this is true not only of things of the present moment but also
of the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when we
remember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus a
separate pramâ@na by which the absence or want of a sensible
object--the negation of a thing--can be comprehended.
Self, Salvation, God.
Mîmâ@msâ has to accept the existence of soul, for without it
who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would
be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing
sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is
thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the
sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many,
one in each body. Prabhâkara thinks that it is manifested to us in
all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence
of self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so,
why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our
cognitions--even in those where there is no perception of the body?
Kumârila however differs from Prabhâkara about this analysis of
the consciousness of self in our cognitions, and says that even
though we may not have any notion of the parts of our body or
their specific combination, yet the notion of ourselves as embodied
beings always appears in all our cognitions. Moreover in our
cognitions of external objects we are not always conscious of the
self as the knower; so it is not correct to say that self is different
from the body on the ground that the consciousness of self is
present in all our cognitions, and that the body is not cognized in
many of our cognitions. But the true reason for admitting that
the self is different from the body is this, that movement or
willing, knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., cannot be attributed to
the body, for though the body exists at death these cannot then be
found. So it has to be admitted that they must belong to some
other entity owing to the association with which the body appears
400
to be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge,
feeling, etc. though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet perceived
by others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc.,
are perceived by other men. It is a general law of causation
that the qualities of the constituent elements (in the cause) impart
themselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the body
is made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc., and
this also corroborates the inference of a separate entity as the
vehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that
if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a
mover? But Mîmâ@msâ does not admit that movement means
atomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which
moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul.
It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter
moves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an
agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of
the body. The self must also be understood as being different
from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses
he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all
through.
The question now arises, how is self cognized? Prabhâkara
holds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from the
cognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizor
entering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both the
self and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in
what we have already described as tripu@ti-pratyâk@sa (perception
as three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illumined but
knowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and
the object in one operation. But just as in the case of a man
who walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is
regarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the
case of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet
it appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is not
soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum,
and appears in it as the cognitive element "I" which is inseparable
from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is
cognized the self also is not cognized.
Kumârila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from
the body is perceived by a mental perception (_mânasa-pratyak@sa_
as the substratum of the notion of "I," or in other words the self
perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its
401
own nature shines forth in consciousness as the "I." The objection
that the self cannot itself be both subject and object to its
own operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhâkara's
theory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yet
considers it as the subject of the operation. The analogy of
linguistic usage that though the walking affects the walker yet
he is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge,
for the usage of language is not philosophical analysis. Though
at the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet it
does not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, but
reveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception which
is distinct from the knowledge of objects. The self is no doubt
known as the substratum of "I," but the knowledge of this self
does not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects,
nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of
objects, but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition
which we represent as the "I." The self does not reveal itself as
the knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of the
mind. This is indeed different from Prabhâkara's analysis, who
regarded the cognition of self as inseparable from the object-cognition,
both being the result of the illumination of knowledge.
Kumârila agrees with Prabhâkara however in holding that soul
is not self-illuminating (_svayamprakâs'a_), for then even in deep
sleep the soul should have manifested itself; but there is no such
manifestation then, and the state of deep sleep appears as an
unconscious state. There is also no bliss in deep sleep, for had
it been so people would not have regretted that they had missed
sensual enjoyments by untimely sleep. The expression that
"I slept in bliss" signifies only that no misery was felt. Moreover
the opposite representation of the deep sleep state is also found
when a man on rising from sleep says "I slept so long without
knowing anything not even my own self." The self is not
atomic, since we can simultaneously feel a sensation in the head
as well as in the leg. The Jaina theory that it is of the size of
the body which contracts and expands according to the body it
occupies is unacceptable. It is better therefore that the soul should
be regarded as all-pervading as described in the Vedas. This
self must also be different in different persons for otherwise their
individual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain cannot
be explained [Footnote ref 1].
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _S'lokavârttika_, âtmavâda _S'âstra-dîpikâ_, âtmavâda and
mok@savâda.]
402
Kumârila considered the self to be merely the potency of
knowledge (jñânas'akti) [Footnote ref 1]. Cognitions of things were
generated by the activity of the manas and the other senses. This self
itself can only be cognized by mental perception, Or at the
time of salvation there being none of the senses nor the manas
the self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge
without any actual expression or manifestation. So the state of
salvation is the state in which the self remains devoid of any
of its characteristic qualities such as pleasure, pain, knowledge,
willing, etc., for the self itself is not knowledge nor is it bliss
or ânanda as Vedânta supposes; but these are generated in it by
its energy and the operation of the senses. The self being divested
of all its senses at that time, remains as a mere potency of the
energy of knowledge, a mere existence. This view of salvation
is accepted in the main by Prabhâkara also.
Salvation is brought about when a man enjoys and suffers
the fruits of his good and bad actions and thereby exhausts them
and stops the further generation of new effects by refraining from
the performance of kâmya-karmas (sacrifices etc. performed for
the attainment of certain beneficent results) and guarantees
himself against the evil effects of sin by assiduously performing
the nitya-karmas (such as the sandhyâ prayers etc., by the performance
of which there is no benefit but the non-performance
of which produces sins). This state is characterized by the
dissolution of the body and the non-production of any further
body or rebirth.
Mîmâ@msâ does not admit the existence of any God as the
creator and destroyer of the universe. Though the universe is
made up of parts, yet there is no reason to suppose that the
universe had ever any beginning in time, or that any God created
it. Every day animals and men are coming into being by the
action of the parents without the operation of any God. Neither
is it necessary as Nyâya supposes that dharma and adharma
should have a supervisor, for these belong to the performer and
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[Footnote 1: It may be mentioned in this connection that unlike Nyâya
Mîmâ@msâ did not consider all activity as being only of the nature of
molecular vibration (_parispanda_). It admitted the existence of energy
(_s'akti_) as a separate category which manifested itself in actual
movements. The self being considered as a s'akti can move the body and
yet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means the
relationing of the energy with a thing. Nyâya strongly opposes this
doctrine of a non-sensible (atîndriya) energy and seeks to explain all
action by actual molecular motion.]
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no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot
be any contact (_sa@myoga_) or inherence (_samavâya_) of dharma
and adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannot
have any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like
the carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the
world either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the
beginning there were no beings towards whom should he be
actuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself
require a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator,
no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been
running the same, without any new creation or dissolution, s@r@s@ti
or pralaya.
Mîmâ@msâ as philosophy and Mîmâ@msâ as ritualism.
From what we have said before it will be easy to see that
Mîmâ@msâ agrees in the main with Vais'e@sika about the existence
of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities,
rûpa, rasa, etc. Kumârila's differences on the points of jâti,
samavâya, etc. and Prabhâkara's peculiarities have also been
mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that
Kumârila was influenced by Sâ@mkhya thought rather than by
Nyâya. Sâ@mkhya and Vais'e@sika are the only Hindu systems which
have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics;
other systems have generally followed them or have differed from
them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhâkara and
Kumârila have thus but little importance, as they agree in
general with the Vais'e@sika view. In fact they were justified in not
laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance
of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyâya-Vais'e@sika about
the world was most suitable.
The main difference of Mîmâ@msâ with Nyâya consists of the
theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the
Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from
God, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any
other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity
of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the
advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated
to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and
there being nothing to contradict them later on there would be
nothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions
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invalid. The other pramâ@nas such as perception, inference, etc.
were described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to us
how dharma could be acquired, for dharma was not an existing
thing which could be perceived by the other pramâ@nas, but
a thing which could only be produced by acting according to
the injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of dharma
and adharma therefore the s'abdapramâ@na of the Veda was our
only source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have a
knowledge of the different means of cognition, as without them
it would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatable
Vedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolution
which is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not be
acknowledged by the Mîmâ@msâ as it would have endangered the
eternality of the Vedas. Even God had to be dispensed with on
that account.
The Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and Brâhma@nas
(also called the _vidhis_ or injunctive sentences). There are
three classes of injunctions (1) apûrva-vidhi, (2) niyama-vidhi, and
(3) parisa@nkhyâ-vidhi. Apûrva-vidhi is an order which enjoins
something not otherwise known, e.g. the grains should be washed
(we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for the
sacrifice except by the above injunction). Niyama-vidhi is that
where when a thing could have been done in a number of ways,
an order is made by the Veda which restricts us to following
some definite alternative (e.g. though the chaff from the corn
could be separated even by the nails, the order that "corn should
be threshed" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as the
only course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the niyama-vidhi
that which is ordered is already known as possible but only as
an alternative, and the vidhi insists upon one of these methods as
the only one. In apûrva-vidhi the thing to be done would have
remained undone and unknown had it not been for the vidhi.
In parisa@nkhyâ-vidhi all that is enjoined is already known but
not necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra "I take
up the rein" (_imâm ag@rbhnâ@m ras'anâ@m_) which could be used in
a number of cases should not however be used at the time of
holding the reins of an ass.
There are three main principles of interpreting the Vedic
sentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectively
they yield a meaning but not individually, then they should be
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taken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentences
can however yield meanings separately by themselves they
should not be connected together. (3) In the case of certain
sentences which are incomplete suitable words from the context
of immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied.
The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma.
The mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deities
or powers are to be taken as being for the specification of the
deity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be remembered
that as dharma can only be acquired by following
the injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted as
giving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedas
which cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as forming
part of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive.
Thus it is that those sentences in the Vedas which
describe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction
(called the _arthavâdas_) should be interpreted as forming part
of a vidhi-vâkya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Even
those expressions which give reasons for the performance of
certain actions are to be treated as mere arthavâdas and interpreted
as praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only as
mandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired.
When a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions of
the Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existence
is proved by the authority of the scriptures is generated
either in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positive
force called _apûrva_ produces in time the beneficent results of the
sacrifice (e.g. leads the performer to Heaven). This apûrva is like
a potency or faculty in the agent which abides in him until the
desired results follow [Footnote ref 1].
It is needless to dilate upon these, for the voluminous works
of S'abara and Kumârila make an elaborate research into the
nature of sacrifices, rituals, and other relevant matters in great
detail, which anyhow can have but little interest for a student
of philosophy.
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[Footnote 1: See Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ's _Prabhâkaramîmâ@msâ_ and Mâdhava's
_Nyâyamâlâvistara_.]
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