flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness;

so it is not possible that the external reality should have to

pass through any process before consciousness could arise; what

happens is simply this, that the reality (_sat_) which subsists in all

things as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its

veil is removed by association with the v@rtti (mental mould or

state). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates

everything with which it comes into relation. Such an illumination

of objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous

if there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the

reality is hidden by the veil of ajñâna (nescience). This veil is

removed as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a

mental mould or v@rtti, and as soon as it is removed the thing

shines forth. Even before the formation of the v@rtti the illusory

impositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively,

but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by ajñâna which is

removed by the action of the corresponding v@rtti; and as soon as

the veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The

action of the senses, eye, etc. serves but to modify the v@rtti of the

mind, and the v@rtti of the mind once formed, the corresponding

ajñâna veil which was covering the corresponding specific part of

the world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of the

object which was already present, being divested of the veil, shows

itself forth. The illusory creations were there, but they could not

be manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as the

veil is removed by the action of the v@rtti the light of reality shows

the corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itself

is the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated but

ever exists; errors of perception (e.g. silver in the conch-shell)

take place not because the do@sa consisting of the defect of the

eye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributed

to the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because it

generated a wrong v@rtti. It is because of the generation of the

wrong v@rtti that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion

"this is silver" as when we mistake the conch-shell for the silver,

it is the _cit,_ consciousness or reality as underlying the object

represented to us by "this" or "_idam_" that is the basis (_adhi@s@thâna_)

of the illusion of silver. The cause of error is our nescience or

non-cognition (_ajñâna_) of it in the form of the conch-shell, whereas

the right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-shell. The

450

basis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in my

mental state (_v@rtti_), so that the illusion is not of the form

that the "knowledge is silver" but of "this is silver." Objective

phenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expression

of illumination of them as states of knowledge is made

through the _cit_ being manifested through the mental mould or

states. Without the v@rtti there is no illuminating knowledge.

Phenomenal creations are there in the world moving about as

shadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one cit or reality,

but this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these forms

when the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removed

by their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification

(_v@rtti_). It is sometimes said that since all illumination of

knowledge must be through the mental states there is no other

entity of pure consciousness apart from what is manifested

through the states. This Vedânta does not admit, for it holds

that it is necessary that before the operation of the mental

states can begin to interpret reality, reality must already be

there and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness. Had

there been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge,

the validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has to

be admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous reality

untouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which are

material and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminous

consciousness that seems to assume diverse forms

in connection with diverse kinds of associations or limitations

(_upâdhi_). It manifests _ajñâna_ (nescience) and hence does not by

itself remove the ajñâna, except when it is reflected through any

specific kind of v@rtti. There is of course no difference, no inner

and outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousness

which is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenal

appearances of the objective world, and the consciousness that

manifests itself through the mental states. There is only one

identical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basis

of the phenomena as well, is their interpreter by a reflection

through the mental states or v@rttis.

The phenomena or objects called the drs'ya can only be determined

in their various forms and manifestations but not as

to their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an entity of

any relation such as sa@myoga (contact) or samavâya (inherence)

451

between them and the pure consciousness called the d@rk; for the

truth is this, that the d@rk (perceiver) and the d@rs'ya (perceived)

have one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are but

illusory creations on it.

It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological

illusion such as "this is silver," the knowledge of "this" as a thing

is only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived

as a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-shell are not

noticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure

consciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristics

of any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any

illusion as the piece of conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere

"this" can be. The answer of Vedânta is that when the Brahman

stands as the ground (_adhi@s@thâna_) of the world-appearance its

characteristic as sat or real only is manifested, whereas its special

character as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather it

may be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possible

because the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealed

to us in our objective consciousness; when I say "the jug is,"

the "isness," or "being," does not shine in its purity, but only as

a characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion.

In all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shines

forth in association with the manifold objects, and therefore the

Brahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is made

possible. It is again objected that since the world-appearance

can serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real and

not illusory. But the Vedânta points out that even by illusory

perceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusory

perception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snake

could do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreams

may be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physical

functions and organs of a man. So it is that the past impressions

imbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficient

to account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions produced

in actual waking life account for the dream creations.

According to the good or bad deeds that a man has done in

previous lives and according to the impressions or potencies

(_sa@mskâra_) of his past lives each man has a particular kind of

world-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannot

affect the formation of the illusory experience of the other. But

452

the experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjective

creation for each individual, for even before his cognition the

phenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowable

state of existence (_svena adhyastasya sa@mskârasya

viyadâdyadhyâsajanakatvopapatte@h tatpratîtyabhâvepi tadadhyâsasya

pûrvam sattvât k@rtsnasyâpi vyavahârikapadârthasya

ajñâtasattvâbhyupagamât_). It is again sometimes objected that illusion

is produced by malobserved similarity between the ground (_adhi@s@thâna_)

and the illusory notion as silver in "this is silver," but

no such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance.

To this Vedânta says that similarity is not an indispensable

factor in the production of an illusion (e.g. when a

white conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eye

through the influence of bile or _pitta_). Similarity helps the production

of illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressions

or memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well be

done by _ad@r@s@ta_--the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds.

In ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion of

this world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits no

other do@sa (defect) than the avidyâ (nescience) which constitutes

the appearance. Here avidyâ is the only do@sa and Brahman is the

only adhi@s@thâna or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, the

self-luminous as the adhi@s@thâna, the illusory creations could not

have been manifested at all The cause of the direct perception

of illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the adhi@s@thâna.

Hence where the adhi@s@thâna is hidden by the veil of avidyâ, the

association with mental states becomes necessary for removing

the veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous adhi@s@thâna.

As soon as the adhi@s@thâna, the ground, the reality, the blissful

self-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear.

The disappearance of the phenomena means nothing

more than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman.

The Definition of Ajñâna (nescience).

Ajñâna the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is

beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (_anâdibhâvarupatve

sati jñânanivartyatvam_). Though it manifests itself

in all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of

perception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no

beginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which

453

is beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive

(_bhâvarûpa_) it can very well constitute the essence of negation

(_abhâva_) too, for the positivity (_bhâvatva_) does not mean here the

opposite of abhâva (negation) but notes merely its difference from

abhâva (_abhâva-vilak@sa@natvamâtram vivak@sitam_). Ajñâna is not

a positive entity (_bhâva_) like any other positive entity, but it is

called positive simply because it is not a mere negation (_abhâva_).

It is a category which is believed neither to be positive in the

ordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is different

both from position as well as from negation. It is sometimes

objected that ajñâna is a mere illusory imagination of the moment

caused by defect (_do@sa_) and hence it cannot be beginningless

(_anâdi_); but Vedânta holds that the fact that it is an imagination

or rather imposition, does not necessarily mean that it is merely

a temporary notion produced by the defects; for it could have

been said to be a temporary product of the moment if the ground

as well as the illusory creation associated with it came into being

for the moment, but this is not the case here, as the cit, the

ground of illusion, is ever-present and the ajñâna therefore being

ever associated with it is also beginningless. The ajñâna is the

indefinite which is veiling everything, and as such is different

from the definite or the positive and the negative. Though it is

beginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to have

a beginning or not to have it does not in any way determine

whether the thing is subject to dissolution or not for the dissolution

of a thing depends upon the presence of the thing which

can cause it; and it is a fact that when knowledge comes the

illusion is destroyed; it does not matter whether the cause which

produced the illusion was beginningless or not. Some Vedântists

however define ajñâna as the substance constituting illusion, and

say that though it is not a positive entity yet it may be regarded

as forming the substance of the illusion; it is not necessary that

only a positive entity should be the matter of any thing, for what

is necessary for the notion of a material cause (_upâdâna_) is this,

that it should continue or persist as the same in all changes of

effects. It is not true that only what is positive can persist in

and through the effects which are produced in the time process.

Illusion is unreal and it is not unnatural that the ajñâna which

also is unreal should be the cause of it.

454

Ajñâna established by Perception and Inference.

Ajñâna defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor

negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions

as "I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else,"

or "I do not know what you say," or more particularly "I had

been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything." Such

perceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics,

and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative.

It may be objected that the perception "I do not know" is not

the perception of the indefinite, the ajñâna, but merely the negation

of knowledge. To this Vedânta says that had it been the

perception of a negation merely, then the negation must have

been associated with the specific object to which it applied.

A negation must imply the thing negatived; in fact negation

generally appears as a substantive with the object of negation

as a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation.

But the perception "I do not know or I had no knowledge" does

not involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any

specific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectless

ignorance. Such an indefinite ajñâna is positive in the sense that

it is certainly not negative, but this positive indefinite is not positive

in the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive,

for it is merely the characterless, passive indefinite showing itself

in our experience. If negation meant only a general negation,

and if the perception of negation meant in each case the perception

of a general negation, then even where there is a jug on

the ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on the

ground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there.

Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the

negation of all specific things; similarly a general negation without

any specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest

itself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledge

is thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the

latter is present the former cannot be, but the perception "I do

not know" can persist, even though many individual objects be

known to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of "I do

not know" is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is

rather better to say that it is the perception of a different category

namely the indefinite, the ajñâna. It is our common experience

455

that after experiencing the indefinite (_ajñâna_) of a specific type

we launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to be

admitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from the

perception of mere negation. The character of our perceiving

consciousness (_sâk@si_) is such that both the root ajñâna as well

as its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as represented

in mental states (_v@rtti-jñâna_), are comprehended by it.

Of course when the v@rttijñâna about a thing as in ordinary

perceptions of objects comes in, the ajñâna with regard to it is

temporarily removed, for the v@rttijñâna is opposed to the ajñâna.

But so far as our own perceiving consciousness (_sâk@si-caitanya_)

is conceived it can comprehend both the ajñâna and the jñâna

(knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things show

themselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known or

as unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends all

positives either as indefinite ajñâna or as states of knowledge

or as specific kinds of ajñâna or ignorance, but it is unable to

comprehend a negation, for negation (_abhâva_) is not a perception,

but merely the absence of perception (_anupalabdhi_). Thus when

I say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousness

with reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of a

negation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised from

the Nyâya point of view that since without the knowledge of a

qualification (_vis'e@sana_) the qualified thing (_vis'i@s@ta_) cannot be

known, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousness

without the object being known first. To this Vedânta

replies that the maxim that the qualification must be known

before the qualified thing is known is groundless, for we can as

well perceive the thing first and then its qualification. It is not

out of place here to say that negation is not a separate entity,

but is only a peculiar mode of the manifestation of the positive.

Even the naiyâyikas would agree that in the expression "there

is no negation of a jug here," no separate negation can be accepted,

for the jug is already present before us. As there are distinctions

and differences in positive entities by illusory impositions, so

negations are also distinguished by similar illusory impositions

and appear as the negation of jug, negation of cloth, etc.; so all

distinctions between negations are unnecessary, and it may be

accepted that negation like position is one which appears as many

on account of illusory distinctions and impositions. Thus the

456

content of negation being itself positive, there is no reason to

object that such perceptions as "I do not know" refer to the

perception of an indefinite ajñâna in consciousness. So also the

perception "I do not know what you say" is not the perception

of negation, for this would require that the hearer should know

first what was said by the speaker, and if this is so then it is

impossible to say "I do not know what you say."

So also the cognition "I was sleeping long and did not

know anything" has to be admitted as referring to the perception

of the indefinite during sleep. It is not true as some say that

during sleep there is no perception, but what appears to the

awakened man as "I did not know anything so long" is only an

inference; for, it is not possible to infer from the pleasant and

active state of the senses in the awakened state that the activity

had ceased in the sleep state and that since he had no object of

knowledge then, he could not know anything; for there is no

invariable concomitance between the pleasant and active state of

the senses and the absence of objects of knowledge in the immediately

preceding state. During sleep there is a mental state

of the form of the indefinite, and during the awakened state it is

by the impression (_sa@mskâra_) of the aforesaid mental state of

ajñâna that one remembers that state and says that "I did not

perceive anything so long." The indefinite (_ajñâna_) perceived in

consciousness is more fundamental and general than the mere

negation of knowledge (_jñânâbhâva_) and the two are so connected

that though the latter may not be felt, yet it can be inferred from

the perception of the indefinite. The indefinite though not definite

is thus a positive content different from negation and is perceived as

such in direct and immediate consciousness both in the awakened

state as well as in the sleeping state.

The presence of this ajñâna may also be inferred from the

manner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in consciousness,

as this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousness

which was not known or rather known as indefinite before we

say "I did not know it before, but I know it now." My present

knowledge of the thing thus involves the removal of an indefinite

which was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, just

as the first streak of light in utter darkness manifests itself by

removing the darkness[Footnote ref 1]. Apart from such an inference its

existence

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Pañcapâdikâvivara@na, Tattvadîpana_, and

_Advaitasiddhi_.]

457

is also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman

does not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If there

was no ajñâna to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself

in its fullness. Again had it not been for this ajñâna there would

have been no illusion. It is the ajñâna that constitutes the substance

of the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regarded

as constituting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as it

is unchangeable. This ajñâna is manifested by the perceiving

consciousness (_sâk@si_) and not by the pure consciousness. The

perceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which

reflects itself in the states of avidyâ (ignorance).

Locus and Object of Ajñâna, Aha@mkâra, and Anta@hkara@na.

This ajñâna rests on the pure _cit_ or intelligence. This cit or

Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not

opposed to the ajñâna or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed

to the ajñâna and destroys it only when it is reflected through the

mental states (_v@rtti_). The ajñâna thus rests on the pure cit and not

on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to

produce the notion of ego "_aham_" or the individual soul. Vâcaspati

Mis'ra however holds that the ajñâna does not rest on the pure cit

but on the jîva (individual soul). Mâdhava reconciles this view of

Vâcaspati with the above view, and says that the ajñâna may be

regarded as resting on the jîva or individual soul from this point of

view that the obstruction of the pure cit is with reference to the jîva

(_Cinmâtrâs'ritam ajñânam jîvapak@sapâtitvât jîvâs'ritam ucyate_

Vivara@naprameya, p. 48). The feeling "I do not know" seems

however to indicate that the ajñâna is with reference to the perceiving

self in association with its feeling as ego or "I"; but this

is not so; such an appearance however is caused on account of

the close association of ajñâna with anta@hkara@na (mind) both of

which are in essence the same (see Vivara@naprarneyasa@mgraha,

p. 48).

The ajñâna however does not only rest on the cit, but it has

the cit as its visaya or object too, i.e. its manifestations are

with reference to the self-luminous cit. The self-luminous cit is

thus the entity on which the veiling action of the ajñâna is noticed;

the veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminous

character, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career on

the part of the cit, nor by stopping its relations with the vi@saya,

458

but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit

seems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it does

not shine (_nâsti na prakâs'ate iti vyavahâra@h_) or rather there is no

appearance of its shining or luminosity. To say that Brahman is

hidden by the ajñâna means nothing more than this, that it is

such {_tadyogyatâ_) that the ajñâna can so relate itself with it that

it appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other

states of ajñâna-consciousness in experience. Ajñâna is thus

considered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It

is opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel

it. The action of this ajñ@ana is thus on the light of the reality

which it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved

by the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not

only with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness

but also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss;

so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our

pleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure cit

is indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting the

essence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there

is only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal

experiences of pleasure. The ajñâna is one, but it seems to obstruct

the pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it

may be said that the ajñâna has many states as constituting the

individual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the

diverse individual objects of experience. These states of ajñâna

are technically called tulâjñâna or avasthâjñâna. Any state of

consciousness (v@rttijñâna) removes a manifestation of the ajñâna

as tulâjñâna and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.

The most important action of this ajñâna as obstructing the

pure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstrated

in the notion of the ego or aha@mkâra. This notion of aha@mkâra

is a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and other

associations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.;

it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed

in the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand

limitations, characters, and associations. This illusory creation of

the notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each set

of previous false impositions determining the succeeding set of

impositions and so on. This blending of the unreal associations

held up in the mind (_anta@hkara@na_) with the real, the false with

459

the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the anta@hkara@na taken

as the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion

of the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns,

there are two entities of the ball and the fire fused into one,

so, here also when I say "I perceive", there are two distinct elements

of the self, as consciousness and the mind or antahkarana fused

into one. The part or aspect associated with sorrow, materiality,

and changefulness represents the anta@hkara@na, whereas that which

appears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self.

Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and other

unreal.

We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhâkara

sought to repudiate. Prabhâkara did not consider the self to be

self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought

(_tripu@ti_), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the

object of knowledge, and the self. He further said, that the

analogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball

and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the

anta@hkara@na are never separately experienced, and we can

never say that these two are really different, and only have an

illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (_anubhava_)

is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and

like it does not require the assistance of anything else for the

fulfilment of its purpose. But the Vedânta objects to this saying

that according to Prabhakara's supposition, it is impossible to

discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If

knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as

well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge

are indeed one and the same. Kumârila thinks this thought

(_anubhava_), to be a movement, Nyâya and Prabhâkara as a

quality of the self [Footnote ref 1]. But if it was a movement like other

movements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a

substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of

a thing, if all pervasive, then it would illuminate everything,

if of medium size, it would depend on its parts for its own

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: According to Nyâya the _âtman_ is conscious only through

association with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(_cit_).

Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable

collocations. Thus, _Nyâyamañjarî_ in refuting the doctrine of

self-luminosity {_svaprakâs'a_) says (p.432)

_sacetanas'citâ yogâttadyogena vinâ ja@da@h

nârthâvabhâsadanyaddhi caitanya@m nâma manma@he.]

460

constitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality

of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily

to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what

else could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the

self, the âtman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts any

of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else.

The self is thus the same as vijñâna, the pure consciousness,

which is always of itself self-luminous [Footnote ref 1].

Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages,

waking or sleeping, yet aha@mkâra is absent during deep sleep.

It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels "I slept

happily and did not know anything"; yet what happens is this,

that during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na and the aha@mkâra are

altogether submerged in the ajñâna, and there are only the

ajñâna and the self; on waking, this aha@mkâra as a state of

anta@hkar@na is again generated, and then it associates the perception

of the ajñâna in the sleep and originates the perception

"I did not know anything." This aha@mkâra which is a mode

(_v@rtti_) of the anta@hkara@na is thus constituted by avidyâ, and is

manifested as jñânas'akti (power of knowledge) and kriyâs'akti

(power of work). This kriyâs'akti of the aha@mkâra is illusorily

imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to

be an active agent in knowing and willing. The aha@mkâra

itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or v@rtti of

the anta@hkara@na, and as such the aha@mkâra of a past period can

now be associated; but even then the v@rtti of anta@hkara@na,

aha@mkâra, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of

the anta@hkara@na. The same anta@hkara@na is called manas in its

capacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of

knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2]. When

the pure cit shines forth in association with this anta@hkara@na, it is

called a jîva. It is clear from the above account that the ajñâna

is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But

it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support

it (_âs'raya_); its own nature as the ajñâna or indefinite is perceived

directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating

the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamakaranda_, pp. 130-140, _Citshkha_ and

_Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_, pp. 53-58.]

[Footnote 2: See _Vedânta-paribhâ@sâ_, p. 88, Bombay edition.]

461

these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself

through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in

the anta@hkara@na, and the light of the real shines forth through

these states. The anta@hkara@na of which aha@mkâra is a moment,

is itself a beginningless system of ajñâna-phenomena containing

within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as

merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the

jîva or individual soul began his career.

Anirvâcyavâda and the Vedânta Dialectic.

We have already seen that the indefinite ajñâna could be

experienced in direct perception and according to Vedânta there

are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous

Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter

has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by

which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all

the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is

different from the category of the positive and the negative, has

only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the

true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can

be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character

as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed

order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names,

all these are originated by this avidyâ, ajñâna or mâyâ is indeed

hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all

these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is

said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence

beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle

and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything

else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly

appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only

seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except

pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason.

It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the

objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and

false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must

show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All

categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to

be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before

us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

462

examined, and one cannot make such assertion about them as

that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our

fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by

S'rîhar@sa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible

within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete

account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality.

I shall give here, only one example.

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference

(_bheda_)from _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya_. Four explanations are

possible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be

perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience

(_svarûpa-bheda_) as Prabhâkara thinks; (2) the difference

between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other

(_anyonyâbhâva_), as some Naiyâyikas and Bhâ@t@tas think; (3) difference

means divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_) as the

Vais'e@sikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality

in itself like the p@rthaktva quality of Nyâya. Taking the first

alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth

represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their

mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the

cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic

of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated

into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive

in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug?

i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by

the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference

from something else, it is expected that something else such

as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also

be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if

the perception of "difference" between two things has penetrated

together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction

becomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what

we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from

something else, and if that thing from which the difference is

perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an

entity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents

its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug,

then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference

from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth

itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that

463

the jug only indicates a term from which difference

is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible,

for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent

of any association of its difference from other things,

and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If

it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation

to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference

from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty

comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the

cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of

the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would

also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but

identity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character

of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other,

but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to

ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have

not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything

might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation

between these two, then that relation would require another

relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again

require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it

may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference

to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are

viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference.

But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely

different from the perception of difference. It should also be

noted that the notion of difference is also different from the

notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say

that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say

that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear

as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth.

The notion of a jug does not require the notions of other things

for its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is different

from the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which is

the same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that the

difference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, and

not merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. This

shows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of the

thing perceived.

Again, in the second alternative where difference of two

463

things is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, we

find that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is not

in the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the same

difficulty arises; for when I say that the absence or negation of

jug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also the

residence of the absence of jug in the cloth would require

that the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reduce

difference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in the

cloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical cloth

itself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot be

explained. If this mutual negation (_anyonyabhâva_) is explained

as the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness in

the jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such quality

in jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded;

and there is no such quality in them that they can be treated as

identical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in cloth

we might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, for

clothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absence

of jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness

in the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the third

alternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics

(_vaidharmya_), then the question arises whether the

vaidharmya or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergence

as can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; if

the answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endless

vaidharmyas progressing _ad infinitum_. If the answer is in the

negative then there being no divergence between the two divergences

they become identical, and hence divergence of characteristics

as such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms of

things are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes the

other, then apart from the differences--the natural forms--the

things are reduced to formlessness (_ni@hsvarûpatâ_). If natural forms

(_svarûpa_) mean special natural forms (_svarûpa-vis'e@sa_) then as the

special natural forms or characteristics only represent difference,

the natural forms of the things as apart from the special ones

would appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that there

is no such quality as p@rthaktva (separateness) which can explain

differences of things, for there also the questions would arise as

to whether separateness exists in different things or similar ones

or whether separateness is identical with the thing in which it

exists or not, and so forth.

465

The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and

dialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chapters

of _Kathâvatthu_. In the great _Mahâbha@sya_ on Pâ@nini by Patañjali

also we find some traces of it. But Nâgârjuna was the man who

took it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all

its subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to prove

that everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was

non-existent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable and

self-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was

only the void (_s'ûnya_). S'a@nkara partially utilized this method in

his refutations of Nyâya and the Buddhist systems; but S'rîhar@sa

again revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after

having criticized the most important notions and concepts of our

everyday life, which are often backed by the Nyâya system, sought

to prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that we

cannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of

all possible definitions that the Nyâya could give necessarily led

to the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not

exist though they appeared to do so; the Vedântic contention

was that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite ajñâna

produces only appearances which when exposed to reason show

that no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in other

words the world-appearance, the phenomena of mâyâ or ajñâna,

are indefinable or anirvacanîya. This great work of S'rîhar@sa

was followed by _Tattvadîpikâ_ of Citsukha, in which he generally

followed S'rîhar@sa and sometimes supplemented him with the

addition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method of

Vedânta thus followed on one side the method of S'ûnyavâda in

annulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the other

Vijñânavâda Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating character

of knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminous

ultimate reality.

The Theory of Causation.

The Vedânta philosophy looked at the constantly changing

phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the

root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects.

The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused

by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents,

as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved

466

and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered

insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedãnta had before

it. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded

certain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of

phenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set.

In fact the concept of causation and production had in it

something quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiry

after the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental and

primary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at the

present moment when we wished to know what was the cause of

the jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effect

was only a more complex form of manifestation, what is the

ground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? If

apart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representation

of the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariably

present at an antecedent point of time, the effect springs

forth into being, we find that we are just where we were before,

and are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. The

Nyãya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in a

general way in associating certain groups of things of a particular

kind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeeding

moment as being relevant pairs of which one being present the

other also has a probability of being present, but can do nothing

more than this. It does not answer our question as to the nature

of cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensable

condition for the cause. But time, according to Nyãya,

is one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceived

as antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and these

again involve succession; thus the notions of succession of time

and of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutually

dependent upon each other (_anyonyâs'raya_) neither of these can

be conceived independently. Another important condition is

invariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariable

antecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present as

an antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman's

house, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. If it

means such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect,

it becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contributing

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are

always present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.]

467

to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence

and nothing more. If invariability means the existence of

that at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also

it fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presence

of the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it

is said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associated

with its accessory factors, then also the question remains

the same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause.

Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a

plurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that which

happening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannot

also be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particular

cause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect that

from a special kind of cause we can without fail get a special

kind of effect (cf. Vâtsyâyana and _Nyâyamañjarî_), for out of the

same clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate,

etc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, then

the question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; does

it mean the factors themselves or something else above them? On

the former supposition the scattered factors being always present

in the universe there should always be the effect; if it means

something else above the specific factors, then that something always

existing, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation

(_sâmagrî_) be defined as the last movement of the causes

immediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the

relation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible.

Moreover if movement is defined as that which produces

the effect, the very conception of causation which was required

to be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involved

in the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce

its effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically

inconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out

the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable

series of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristics

of the effects are indescribable and indefinable ajñâna of mâyâ,

and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in

themselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all

carved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and

some day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the pure

being, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon

468

which all appearances being imposed they appear as real. The

true cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through

all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon

it of ajñâna or avidyâ. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that

is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates,

etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere

appearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory. The one truth

is the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is

being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being

imposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what

is called the _satkâryavâda_ or more properly the _satkâra@navâda_

of the Vedânta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing,

and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this

much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being

which alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the

being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called

the _vivarttavâda_ as distinguished from the _sâ@mkhyayogapari@nâmavâda_,

in which the effect is regarded as the real development

of the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a

different kind of being from the cause it is called _vivartta_ but

when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called

_pari@nâma (kâra@nasvalak@sa@nânyathâbhâva@h pari@nâma@h tadvilak@sa@no

vivartta@h_ or _vastunastatsamattâko'nyathâbhâva@h pari@nâma@h

tadvi@samasattâka@h vivartta@h)_. Vedânta has as much to object

against the Nyâya as against the pari@nâma theory of causation

of the Sâ@mkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality,

and actuality--all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the

light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate

things and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality

however though phenomena are not identical with the cause,

they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (_Tadabhedam

vinaiva tadvyatireke@na durvacam kâryyam vivartta@h)_.

This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the

world, the different followers of S'a@nkara Vedânta in explaining

the cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the

mâyâ, ajñâna or avidyâ, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes

on them both. Thus Sarvaj@nâtmamuni, the writer of

_Sa@nk@sepa-s'ârîraka_ and his followers think that the pure Brahman

should be regarded as the causal substance (_upâdâna_) of the

world-appearance, whereas Prakâs'âtman Akhan@dânanda, and

469

Mâdhava hold that Brahman in association with mâyâ, i.e. the

mâyâ-reflected form of Brahman as Îs'vara should be regarded

as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance

is an evolution or pari@nâma of the mâyâ as located in Îs'vara,

whereas Îs'vara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others

however make a distinction between mâyâ as the cosmical factor

of illusion and avidyâ as the manifestation of the same entity

in the individual or jîva. They hold that though the world-appearance

may be said to be produced by the mâyâ yet the

mind etc. associated with the individual are produced by the

avidyâ with the jîva or the individual as the causal matter

(_upâdâna_). Others hold that since it is the individual to whom

both Îs'vara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is better

rather to think that these are all manifestations of the jîva in

association with his avidyâ or ajñâna. Others however hold that

since in the world-appearance we find in one aspect pure being

and in another materiality etc., both Brahman and mâyâ are to

be regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causal

matter, upâdâna and mâyâ as the entity evolving in pari@nâma.

Vâcaspati Mis'ra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of

the world-appearance through mâyâ as associated with jîva.

Mâyâ is thus only a sahakâri or instrument as it were, by which

the one Brahman appears in the eye of the jîva as the manifold

world of appearance. Prakâs'ânanda holds however in his _Siddhânta

Muktâvalî_ that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffected

even as illusory appearance, and is not even the causal

matter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in the

phenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is the

product of mâyâ, which is both the instrumental and the upâdâna

(causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergences

of view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affect

the principal Vedânta text that the only unchangeable cause is

the Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have only

a temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word mâyâ

was used in the @Rg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power and

wonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlying

it was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it began

to be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the B@rhadâra@nyaka,

Pras'na, and Svetâs'vatara Upani@sads the word means magic. It

is not out of place here to mention that in the older Upani@sads

470

the word mâyâ occurs only once in the B@rhadâra@nyaka and once

only in the Pras'na. In early Pâli Buddhist writings it occurs

only in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhagho@sa

uses it in the sense of magical power. In Nâgârjuna and the _Lankâvatâra_

it has acquired the sense of illusion. In S'a@nkara the

word mâyâ is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principle

of creation as a s'akti (power) or accessory cause, and as the

phenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance.

It may also be mentioned here that Gau@dapâda the teacher

of S'a@nkara's teacher Govinda worked out a system with the help

of the mâyâ doctrine. The Upani@sads are permeated with the

spirit of an earnest enquiry after absolute truth. They do not

pay any attention towards explaining the world-appearance or

enquiring into its relations with absolute truth. Gau@dapâda asserts

clearly and probably for the first time among Hindu thinkers, that

the world does not exist in reality, that it is mâyâ, and not reality.

When the highest truth is realized mâyâ is not removed, for it is

not a thing, but the whole world-illusion is dissolved into its own

airy nothing never to recur again. It was Gau@dapâda who compared

the world-appearance with dream appearances, and held that objects

seen in the waking world are unreal, because they are capable

of being seen like objects seen in a dream, which are false and

unreal. The âtman says Gau@dapâda is at once the cognizer and

the cognized, the world subsists in the âtman through mâyâ.

As âtman alone is real and all duality an illusion, it necessarily

follows that all experience is also illusory. S'a@nkara expounded

this doctrine in his elaborate commentaries on the Upani@sads

and the Brahma-sûtra, but he seems to me to have done little

more than making explicit the doctrine of mâyâ. Some of his

followers however examined and thought over the concept of

mâyâ and brought out in bold relief its character as the indefinable

thereby substantially contributing to the development of

the Vedânta philosophy.

Vedânta theory of Perception and Inference [Footnote ref 1].

Pramâ@na is the means that leads to right knowledge. If

memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra and his son Râmak@r@s@na worked out a

complete scheme of the theory of Vedântic perception and inference.

This is in complete agreement with the general Vedânta metaphysics.

The early Vedântists were more interested in demonstrating the illusory

nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory.

It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as

worked out by Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra he was largely indebted to the Mîmâm@sâ

school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamâna s'abda and

anupalabdhi also Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra accepted the Mîmâm@sâ view. The

Vedantins, previous to Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra, had also tacitly followed

the Mîmâm@sâ in these matters.]

471

pramâ@na is to be defined as the means that leads to such right

knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge

(_pramâ_) in Vedânta is the knowledge of an object which has not

been found contradicted (_abâdhitârthavi@sayajñânatva_). Except

when specially expressed otherwise, pramâ is generally considered

as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired

(_anadhigata_) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections

are sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a

few minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive

moments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired

in the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedânta

considers that so long as a different mental state does not arise,

any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as

remaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive

one thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a

series of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledge

of the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledge

of the preceding moments, for so long as any mental

state has any one thing for its object it is to be considered as

having remained unchanged all through the series of moments.

There is of course this difference between the same percept of a

previous and a later moment following in succession, that fresh

elements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though

the content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned

remains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses

though the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed.

When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state

representing the book is not changed every second, and hence

there can be no _such supposition_ that I am having separate mental

states in succession each of which is a repetition of the previous

one, for so long as the general content of the mental state remains

the same there is no reason for supposing that there has been any

change in the mental state. The mental state thus remains the

same so long as the content is not changed, but though it remains

the same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneous

472

addition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of the

external world should be regarded as right knowledge until the

absolute is realized.

When the anta@hkara@na (mind) comes in contact with the

external objects through the senses and becomes transformed as

it were into their forms, it is said that the anta@hkara@na has

been transformed into a state (_v@rtti_) [Footnote 1]. As soon as the

anta@hkara@na has assumed the shape or form of the object of its

knowledge, the ignorance (_ajñâna_) with reference to that object is

removed, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness

(_cit_) shows the object which was so long hidden by

ignorance. The appearance or the perception of an object

is thus the self-shining of the cit through a v@rtti of a form

resembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-supposes

that by the action of ajñâna, pure consciousness or being

is in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite of

the cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is

but the transformation of ignorance (ajñâna), the former cannot

manifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance

they are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. The

diversified objects of the world are but transformations of

the principle of ajñâna which is neither real nor unreal. It

is the nature of ajñâna that it veils its own creations. Thus

on each of the objects created by the ajñâna by its creating

(_vik@sepa_) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (âvara@na) capacity.

But when any object comes in direct touch with anta@hkara@na

through the senses the anta@hkara@na becomes transformed into

the form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veil

on that particular ajñâna form--the object, and as the self-shining

cit is shining through the particular ajñâna state, we

have what is called the perception of the thing. Though there is

in reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet the

ajñâna has created such illusory distinctions as individual souls

and the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vedânta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The

same anta@hkara@na, according to its diverse functions, is called mânâs,

buddhi, aha@mkâra, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called

mânâs, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As

presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness aha@mkâra, and as

producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications

or states (v@rtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special

kind of modification of ajñâna as anta@hkara@na).]

473

etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary

and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajñâna forms

so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the

subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on

the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation

(_abheda_) of the subjective consciousness with the objective

consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the

specific mental states

(_tattadindriyayogyavi@sayâvacchinnacaitanyâbhinnatvam

tattadâkâravi@sayâvacchinnajñânasya tattadams'e pratyak@satvam_).

This union in perception means that the objective has at that

moment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of

the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the anta@hkara@na

is called jîvasâk@si.

Inference (_anumâna_), according to Vedânta, is made by our

notion of concomitance (_vyâptijñâna_) between two things, acting

through specific past impressions (_sa@mskâra_). Thus when I see

smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke

with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I

infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and

the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance

revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between

the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is

generated by the perception of two things together, when no

case of the failure of concomitance is known (_vyabhicârâjñâna_)

regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether

subjective, the Vedântist does not emphasize the necessity

of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (_bhûyodars'anam

sak@rddars'anam veti vis'e@so nâdara@nîya@h_). Vedânta is

not anxious to establish any material validity for the inference,

but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of

concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the

concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory

instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedânta whether this

concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases.

The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance

(_anvayavyâpti_) that the Vedânta allows. So the

Vedânta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyâya

supported, viz. _anvayavyatireki_ (by joining agreement in presence

with agreement in absence), _kevalânvayi_ (by universal agreement

where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and

474

_kevalavyatireki_ (by universal agreement in absence). Vedânta

advocates three premisses, viz. (1) _pratijña_ (the hill is fiery);

(2) _hetu_ (because it has smoke) and (3) _d@rs@tânta_ (as in the

kitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyâya maintained [Footnote

ref 1]. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedânta as

being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the

one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false,

we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (_Brahmabhinnam

sarvam mithyâ Brahmabhinnatvât yedevam tadevam yathâ s'uktirûpyam_).

First premiss (_pratijñâ_) all else excepting Brahman is false; second

premiss (_hetu_) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss

(_dr@s@tânta_) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch [Footnote

ref 2].

Âtman, Jîva, Îs'vara, Ekajîvavâda and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda.

We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous

(_svayamprakâs'a). But what does this mean? Vedânta

defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but

is yet immediate and direct with us (_avedyatve sati

aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam_). Self-luminosity thus means the

capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness

without in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever

anything is described as an object of consciousness, its character

as constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not

be present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another.

This makes it dependent on some other such entity which can

produce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all its

objects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for

its manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug,

the cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousness

to manifest it, then that might again require another, and

that another, and so on _ad infinitum_ (_anavasthâ_). If consciousness

did not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation,

then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he

had seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness

(_anubhûti_) manifests itself and thereby maintains the appearance

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vedanta would have either pratijñâ, hetu and udâharana, or

udâhara@na, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyâya, viz.

pratijña, hetu, udâhara@na, upanaya and nigamana.]

[Footnote 2: Vedântic notions of the pramâna of upamana, arthapatti,

s'abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mîmâm@sâ view, do not

require to be treated here separately.]

475

of all our world experience. This goes directly against

the jñâtatâ theory of Kumârila that consciousness was not immediate

but was only inferable from the manifesting quality

(_jñâtatâ_) of objects when they are known in consciousness.

Now Vedânta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness

is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object

of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in

consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it

is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The

self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is

never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the

perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association

comprehended under the term aha@mkâra (ego). The real self is

identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness.

This real self called the âtman is not the same as the jîva or

individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences

of worldly life. Îs'vara also must be distinguished from this

highest âtman or Brahman. We have already seen that many

Vedântists draw a distinction between mâyâ and avidyâ. Mâyâ

is that aspect of ajñâna by which only the best attributes

are projected, whereas avidyâ is that aspect by which impure

qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are

more of a creative, generative (_vik@sepa_) type, whereas in the latter

veiling (_âvara@na_) characteristics are most prominent. The relation

of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with mâyâ and

avidyâ (also called ajñâna) was believed respectively to explain the

phenomenal Îs'vara and the phenomenal jîva or individual. This

relation is conceived in two ways, namely as upâdhi or pratibimba,

and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is

like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image,

though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes

the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The

sun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the

impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may

be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of

water and yield different kinds of images possessing different

characteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenally

have all the appearance of reality. The other conception

of the relation is that when we speak of âkâs'a (space) in the jug

or of âkâs'a in the room. The âkâs'a in reality does not suffer

476

any modification in being within the jug or within the room. In

reality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (_avachinna_)

within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited

by the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the

âkâs'a limited within it will remain as separate from the âkâs'a

limited within the room.

Of the Vedântists who accept the reflection analogy the followers

of N@rsi@mhâs'rama think that when the pure cit is reflected

in the mâyâ, Îs'vara is phenomenally produced, and when in the

avidyâ the individual or jîva. Sarvajñâtmâ however does not

distinguish between the mâyâ and the avidyâ, and thinks that

when the cit is reflected in the avidyâ in its total aspect as cause,

we get Îs'vara, and when reflected in the anta@hkara@na--a product

of the avidyâ--we have jîva or individual soul.

Jîva or individual means the self in association with the ego

and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels,

suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jîva also three

stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na

is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajñâna and the

jîva in this state is called prâjña or ânandamaya. In the dream-state

the self is in association with a subtle body and is called

taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a

subtle and gross body is called vis'va. So also the self in its pure

state is called Brahman, when associated with mâyâ it is called

Îs'vara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as

controlling them, it is called hira@nyagarbha; when with the gross

elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virâ@t

puru@sa.

The jîva in itself as limited by its avidyâ is often spoken of

as pâramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and

the ego in the waking states as vyavahârika (phenomenal), and

when in the dream states as dream-self, prâtibhâ@sika (illusory).

Prakâs'âtmâ and his followers think that since ajñâna is one

there cannot be two separate reflections such as jîva and Îs'vara;

but it is better to admit that jîva is the image of Îs'vara in the

ajñâna. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with mâyâ is

Îs'vara, and this when again reflected through the ajñâna gives

us the jîva. The manifestation of the jîva is in the anta@hkara@na

as states of knowledge. The jîva thus in reality is Îs'vara and

apart from jîva and Îs'vara there is no other separate existence of

477

Brahma-caitanya. Jîva being the image of Îs'vara is thus dependent

on him, but when the limitations of jîva are removed

by right knowledge, the jîva is the same Brahman it always was.

Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the

avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possible

of things which have colour, and therefore jîva is cit limited (avacchinna)

by the anta@hkara@na (mind). Îs'vara is that which is beyond

it; the diversity of anta@hkara@nas accounts for the diversity

of the jîvas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are

not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining

or comprehending the relation of Îs'vara and jîva. In the

Vedânta system Îs'vara has but little importance, for he is but a

phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more

powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of

us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and

both jîva and Îs'vara are but illusory impositions on it. Some

Vedântists hold that there is but one jîva and one body, and

that all the world as well as all the jîvas in it are merely his

imaginings. These dream jîvas and the dream world will

continue so long as that super-jîva continues to undergo his

experiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary

individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary

salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of

the imaginary jîvas. The cosmic jîva is alone the awakened jîva

and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the

doctrine of ekajîva (one-soul).

The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some

Vedântists that there are many individuals and the world-appearance

has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person

creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective

datum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception

of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a

rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and

agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen

the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and

there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory

perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no

corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must

be distinguished from the normal Vedânta view which holds

that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these

478

are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently

and have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparison

with the truth or reality which is ever the same constant

and unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance.

According to the other view phenomena are not

objectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that

the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the

perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion

occurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist

before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion,

and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is therefore

called the theory of d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda, i.e. the theory that the

subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there

are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions.

In the normal Vedânta view however the objects of

the world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with

which the subjective perceptions are created. The objective

phenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of ajñâna,

but still these phenomena of the ajñâna are there as the common

ground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objective

epistemology whereas the d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda has no proper

epistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined

by his own subjective avidyâ and previous impressions as modifications

of the avidyâ. The d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda theory approaches

nearest to the Vijñânavâda Buddhism, only with this difference

that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being

Vedânta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable

reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary

perceptions are but impositions on it.

The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that

both are modifications of ajñâna. It is indeed difficult to

comprehend the nature of ajñâna, though its presence in consciousness

can be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism

all our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and

become self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedânta explains

the reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these

indefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes

of the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continue

from beginningless time consists in this, that the real in

its full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse

479

that we get of it is always through manifestations of forms

and names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable,

incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under

certain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real,

and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a

positive being which is undeniable. This positive being is only

the highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms

and names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or a

cup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being

apart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that

is imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have

being in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually misattributing

the characteristics of the unreal forms--the modes of

ajñâna and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our

experience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us to

conceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajñâna.

Moreover such is the nature of ajñânas that they are knowable

only by a false identification of them with the self-luminous

Brahman or âtman. Being as such is the highest truth, the

Brahman. The ajñâna states are not non-being in the sense of

nothing of pure negation (_abhâva_), but in the sense that they are

not being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being,

the ajñâna, and this illumination means nothing more than a

false identification of being with non-being. The forms of ajñâna

if they are to be known must be associated with pure consciousness,

and this association means an illusion, superimposition, and

mutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness these

cannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alone

that is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the ajñâna

states in themselves as apart from the âtman we fail in a dilemma,

for knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, and

when it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thus

apart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no other

kind of its existence is known to us. If ajñâna had been a non-entity

altogether it could never come at all, if it were a positive

entity then it would never cease to be; the ajñâna thus is a

mysterious category midway between being and non-being and

undefinable in every way; and it is on account of this that it is

called _tattvânyatvâbhyâm anirvâcya_ or undefinable and undeterminable

either as real or unreal. It is real in the sense that it is

480

a necessary postulate of our phenomenal experience and unreal

in its own nature, for apart from its connection with consciousness

it is incomprehensible and undefinable. Its forms even while they

are manifested in consciousness are self-contradictory and incomprehensible

as to their real nature or mutual relation, and

comprehensible only so far as they are manifested in consciousness,

but apart from these no rational conception of them can be

formed. Thus it is impossible to say anything about the ajñâna

(for no knowledge of it is possible) save so far as manifested in

consciousness and depending on this the D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâdins asserted

that our experience was inexplicably produced under the influence

of avidyâ and that beyond that no objective common ground

could be admitted. But though this has the general assent of

Vedânta and is irrefutable in itself, still for the sake of explaining

our common sense view (_pratikarmavyavasathâ_) we may

think that we have an objective world before us as the common

field of experience. We can also imagine a scheme of things and

operations by which the phenomenon of our experience may be

interpreted in the light of the Vedânta metaphysics.

The subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as the

âtman, the one highest reality, secondly as jîva or the âtman as

limited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiated

from the âtman, but âtman is regarded as identical with the psychosis

thus appearing as a living and knowing being, as _jîvasâk@si_ or

perceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the jîva comprehends,

knows, or experiences; thirdly the anta@hkara@na psychosis or

mind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidyâ manifestations,

just as the outer world objects are exterior centres of

avidyâ phenomena or objective entities. The anta@hkara@na is not

only the avidyâ capable of supplying all forms to our present experiences,

but it also contains all the tendencies and modes of

past impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. The

anta@hkara@na is always turning the various avidyâ modes of it into

the jîvasâk@si (jîva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), and

these are also immediately manifested, made known, and transformed

into experience. These avidyâ states of the anta@hkara@na

are called its v@rttis or states. The specific peculiarity of the

v@rttiajñânas is this that only in these forms can they be superimposed

upon pure consciousness, and thus be interpreted as states of consciousness

and have their indefiniteness or cover removed. The

481

forms of ajñâna remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled only

so long as they do not come into relation to these v@rttis of

anta@hkara@na, for the ajñâna can be destroyed by the cit only in the

form of a v@rtti, while in all other forms the ajñâna veils the cit

from manifestation. The removal of ajñâna-v@rttis of the anta@hkara@na

or the manifestation of v@rtti-jñâna is nothing but this, that

the anta@hkara@na states of avidyâ are the only states of ajñâna

which can be superimposed upon the self-luminous âtman

(_adhyâsa_, false attribution). The objective world consists of the

avidyâ phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivity

consists in this that avidyâ in this form cannot be superimposed

on the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. These

avidyâ phenomena may be regarded as many and diverse, but in

all these forms they serve only to veil the cit and are beyond

consciousness. It is only when they come in contact with the avidyâ

phenomena as anta@hkara@na states that they coalesce with the

avidyâ states and render themselves objects of consciousness or

have their veil of âvara@na removed. It is thus assumed that in

ordinary perceptions of objects such as jug, etc. the anta@hkara@na

goes out of the man's body (_s'arîramadhyât_) and coming in

touch with the jug becomes transformed into the same form,

and as soon as this transformation takes place the cit which

is always steadily shining illuminates the jug-form or the jug.

The jug phenomena in the objective world could not be manifested

(though these were taking place on the background of

the same self-luminous Brahman or âtman as forms of the highest

truth of my subjective consciousness) because the ajñâna phenomena

in these forms serve to veil their illuminator, the self-luminous.

It was only by coming into contact with these phenomena

that the anta@hkara@na could be transformed into corresponding

states and that the illumination dawned which at once revealed

the anta@hkara@na states and the objects with which these states or

v@rttis had coalesced. The consciousness manifested through the

v@rttis alone has the power of removing the ajñâna veiling the

cit. Of course there are no actual distinctions of inner or outer,

or the cit within me and the cit without me. These are only of

appearance and due to avidyâ. And it is only from the point of

view of appearance that we suppose that knowledge of objects

can only dawn when the inner cit and the outer cit unite together

through the anta@hkara@nav@rtti, which makes the external objects

482

translucent as it were by its own translucence, removes the ajñâna

which was veiling the external self-luminous cit and reveals the

object phenomena by the very union of the cit as reflected

through it and the cit as underlying the object phenomena. The

pratyak@sa-pramâ or right knowledge by perception is the cit, the

pure consciousness, reflected through the v@rtti and identical with

the cit as the background of the object phenomena revealed by

it. From the relative point of view we may thus distinguish three

consciousnesses: (1) consciousness as the background of objective

phenomena, (2) consciousness as the background of the jîva

or pramâtâ, the individual, (3) consciousness reflected in the v@rtti

of the anta@hkara@na; when these three unite perception is effected.

Pramâ or right knowledge means in Vedânta the acquirement

of such new knowledge as has not been contradicted by

experience (_abâdhita_). There is thus no absolute definition of

truth. A knowledge acquired can be said to be true only so long

as it is not contradicted. Thus the world appearance though it

is very true now, may be rendered false, when this is contradicted

by right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus the

knowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true

absolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousness

which is never contradicted in any experience at any time. The

truth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding out

whether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experience

or not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is to

be regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will be

contradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized.

The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated

by a false identification of anta@hkara@na transformations as

pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated

the perceptions, "I am happy," or "I am sorry." In continuous

perception of anything for a certain time as an object

or as pleasure, etc. the mental state or v@rtti is said to last in the

same way all the while so long as any other new form is not

taken up by the anta@hkara@na for the acquirement of any new

knowledge. In such case when I infer that there is fire on the

hill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the anta@hkara@na

v@rtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matter

of inference, for the anta@hkara@na v@rtti cannot be in touch with the

fire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of

483

mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as

inference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquired

perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is

odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal

wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it

to be odoriferous. Vedânta does not admit the existence of the

relation called _samavâya_ (inherence) or _jâti_ (class notion); and

so does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the

other class called inference, and holds that both perception and

inference are but different modes of the transformations of the

anta@hkara@na reflecting the cit in the corresponding v@rttis. The

perception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the anta@hkara@na

v@rtti transformed into the form of an object with which it is

in contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity of

the cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception in

the subjective aspect is regarded as the identity of the subjective

cit with the objective cit. This identity of course means that

through the v@rtti the same reality subsisting in the object and

the subject is realized, whereas in inference the thing to be inferred,

being away from contact with anta@hkara@na, has apparently

a different reality from that manifested in the states of consciousness.

Thus perception is regarded as the mental state representing

the same identical reality in the object and the subject by

anta@hkara@na contact, and it is held that the knowledge produced

by words (e.g. this is the same Devadatta) referring identically

to the same thing which is seen (e.g. when I see Devadatta

before me another man says this is Devadatta, and the knowledge

produced by "this is Devadatta" though a verbal (_s'âbda_)

knowledge is to be regarded as perception, for the anta@hkara@na

v@rtti is the same) is to be regarded as perception or pratyak@sa.

The content of these words (this is Devadatta) being the same

as the perception, and there being no new relationing knowledge as

represented in the proposition "this is Devadatta" involving the

unity of two terms "this" and "Devadatta" with a copula, but

only the indication of one whole as Devadatta under visual perception

already experienced, the knowledge proceeding from

"this is Devadatta" is regarded as an example of nirvikalpa

knowledge. So on the occasion of the rise of Brahma-consciousness

when the preceptor instructs "thou art Brahman" the

knowledge proceeding from the sentence is not savikalpa, for

484

though grammatically there are two ideas and a copula, yet

from the point of view of intrinsic significance (_tâtparya_) one

identical reality only is indicated. Vedânta does not distinguish

nirvikalpa and savikalpa in visual perception, but only in s'âbda

perception as in cases referred to above. In all such cases the

condition for nirvikalpa is that the notion conveyed by the

sentence should be one whole or one identical reality, whereas

in savikalpa perception we have a combination of different

ideas as in the sentence, "the king's man is coming" (_râjapuru@sa

âgacchatî_). Here no identical reality is signified, but what is

signified is the combination of two or three different concepts [Footnote

ref 1].

It is not out of place to mention in this connection that

Vedânta admits all the six pramâ@nas of Kumârila and considers

like Mîmâ@msâ that all knowledge is self-valid (_svat@ah-pramâ@na_).

But pramâ has not the same meaning in Vedânta

as in Mîmâ@msâ. There as we remember pramâ meant the

knowledge which goaded one to practical action and as such

all knowledge was pramâ, until practical experience showed the

course of action in accordance with which it was found to be

contradicted. In Vedânta however there is no reference to action,

but pramâ means only uncontradicted cognition. To the definition

of self-validity as given by Mîmâ@msâ Vedânta adds another

objective qualification, that such knowledge can have svata@h-prâmâ@nya

as is not vitiated by the presence of any do@sa (cause

of error, such as defect of senses or the like). Vedânta of course

does not think like Nyâya that positive conditions (e.g. correspondence,

etc.) are necessary for the validity of knowledge,

nor does it divest knowledge of all qualifications like the

Mîmâ@msists, for whom all knowledge is self-valid as such. It

adopts a middle course and holds that absence of do@sa is a necessary

condition for the self-validity of knowledge. It is clear that

this is a compromise, for whenever an external condition has to

be admitted, the knowledge cannot be regarded as self-valid,

but Vedânta says that as it requires only a negative condition

for the absence of do@sa, the objection does not apply to it, and it

holds that if it depended on the presence of any positive condition

for proving the validity of knowledge like the Nyâya,

then only its theory of self-validity would have been damaged.

But since it wants only a negative condition, no blame can be

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Vedântaparibhâ@sâ_ and _S'ikhâma@ni._]

485

attributed to its theory of self-validity. Vedânta was bound to

follow this slippery middle course, for it could not say that the

pure cit reflected in consciousness could require anything else

for establishing its validity, nor could it say that all phenomenal

forms of knowledge were also all valid, for then the world-appearance

would come to be valid; so it held that knowledge

could be regarded as valid only when there was no do@sa

present; thus from the absolute point of view all world-knowledge

was false and had no validity, because there was the

avidyâ-do@sa, and in the ordinary sphere also that knowledge was

valid in which there was no do@sa. Validity (prâmâ@nya) with

Mîmâ@msâ meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to

practical action in accordance with it, but with Vedânta it meant

correctness to facts and want of contradiction. The absence of

do@sa being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate the

correctness of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].

Vedânta Theory of Illusion.

We have already seen that the Mîmâ@msists had asserted that

all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (_yathârthâ@h

sarve vivâdaspadîbhûtâ@h pratyayâ@h pratyayatvât_). Even

illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the

distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and

the thing remembered (e.g. silver). But Vedânta objects to this,

and asks how there can be non-distinction between a thing which

is clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? If it is

said that it is merely a non-perception of the non-association (i.e.

non-perception of the fact that this is not connected with silver),

then also it cannot be, for then it is on either side mere negation,

and negation with Mîmâ@msâ is nothing but the bare presence of the

locus of negation (e.g. negation of jug on the ground is nothing but

the bare presence of the ground), or in other words non-perception

of the non-association of "silver" and "this" means barely

and merely the "silver" and "this." Even admitting for argument's

sake that the distinction between two things or two ideas

is not perceived, yet merely from such a negative aspect no one

could be tempted to move forward to action (such as stooping

down to pick up a piece of illusory silver). It is positive

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Vedântaparibhâ@sâ, S'ikhâma@ni, Ma@niprabhâ_ and Citsukha

on svata@hprâma@nya.]

486

conviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical

movement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfect

perception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated

and comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silver

appears to be like true silver before me and this generates the

movement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. For

the appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us

to behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. Thus

I may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite

this similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as

if it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mîma@msâ position

may be defined it fails [Footnote ref l]. Vedânta thinks that the illusion

is not merely subjective, but that there is actually a phenomenon

of illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects;

the difference in the two cases consists in this, that the illusion

is generated by the do@sa or defect of the senses etc., whereas the

phenomena of external objects are not due to such specific do@sas.

The process of illusory perception in Vedanta may be described

thus. First by the contact of the senses vitiated by do@sas a

mental state as "thisness" with reference to the thing before me

is generated; then in the thing as "this" and in the mental state

of the form of that "this" the cit is reflected. Then the avidyâ

(nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presence

of the do@sa, and this disturbance along with the impression of

silver remembered through similarity is transformed into the

appearance of silver. There is thus an objective illusory silver

appearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental state

generated by its contact with the illusory silver. These two

transformations, the silver state of the mind and external phenomenal

illusory silver state, are manifested by the perceiving consciousness

(_sâk@sicaitanya_). There are thus here two phenomenal transformations,

one in the avidyâ states forming the illusory objective silver

phenomenon, and another in the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti or mind state.

But in spite of there being two distinct and separate phenomena,

their object being the same as the "this" in perception, we have

one knowledge of illusion. The special feature of this theory of

illusion is that an indefinable (_anirvacanîya-khyâti_) illusory silver

is created in every case where an illusory perception of silver

occurs. There are three orders of reality in Vedânta, namely the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Vivara@na-prameya-sa@mgraha_ and _Nyâyamakaranda_ on

akhyâti refutation.]

487

_pâramârthika_ or absolute, _vyavahârika_ or practical ordinary

experience, and _prâtibhâsika,_ illusory. The first one represents

the absolute truth; the other two are false impressions due

to do@sa. The difference between vyavahârika and prâtibhâsika

is that the do@sa of the vyavahârika perception is neither discovered

nor removed until salvation, whereas the do@sa of the

prâtibhâsika reality which occurs in many extraneous forms (such

as defect of the senses, sleep, etc.) is perceived in the world of

our ordinary experience, and thus the prâtibhâsika experience

lasts for a much shorter period than the vyavahârika. But just

as the vyavahârika world is regarded as phenomenal modifications

of the ajñâna, as apart from our subjective experience and

even before it, so the illusion (e.g. of silver in the conch-shell) is

also regarded as a modification of avidyâ, an undefinable creation

of the object of illusion, by the agency of the do@sa. Thus in the

case of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silver

is created by the do@sa in association with the senses, which is

called the creation of an indefinable (_anirvacanîya_) silver of illusion.

Here the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the same

but the avidyâ of anta@hkara@na suffers modifications (_pari@nâma_)

on account of do@sa, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation.

The illusory silver is thus _vivartta_ (appearance) from the point

of view of the cit and pari@nâma from the point of view of

avidyâ, for the difference between vivartta and pari@nâma is, that

in the former the transformations have a different reality from

the cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it),

while in the latter case the transformations have the same reality

as the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the same

stuff as the avidyâ whose transformations it is). But now a

difficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due to

a coalescing of the cit underlying the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti as modified

by do@sa and the object--cit as underlying the "this" before

me (in the illusion of "this is silver"), then I ought to have the

experience that "I am silver" like "I am happy" and not that

"this is silver"; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes place

in connection with my previous notion as "this," the form of

the knowledge also is "this is silver," whereas in the notion

"I am happy," the notion of happiness takes place in connection

with a previous v@rtti of "I." Thus though the coalescing

of the two "cits" is the same in both cases, yet in one case the

488

knowledge takes the form of "I am," and in another as "this is"

according as the previous impression is "I" or "this." In dreams

also the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perception

of silver in the conch-shell. There the illusory creations are

generated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are

imposed upon the cit. The dream experiences cannot be regarded

merely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the

form that "I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc." and not

that "I remember the chariots." In the dream state all the senses

are inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there,

but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space,

time, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit. The objection that

since the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought to

last even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought

to continue even in waking life, does not hold; for in the waking

stages the anta@hkara@na is being constantly transformed into different

states on the expiry of the defects of sleep, etc., which were

causing the dream cognitions. This is called _niv@rtti_ (negation)

as distinguished from _bâdha_ (cessation). The illusory creation of

dream experiences may still be there on the pure cit, but these

cannot be experienced any longer, for there being no do@sa of

sleep the anta@hkara@na is active and suffering modifications in

accordance with the objects presented before us. This is what is

called niv@rtti, for though the illusion is there I cannot experience

it, whereas bâdha or cessation occurs when the illusory creation

ceases, as when on finding out the real nature of the conch-shell

the illusion of silver ceases, and we feel that this is not silver, this

was not and will not be silver. When the conch-shell is perceived

as silver, the silver is felt as a reality, but this feeling of reality

was not an illusory creation, though the silver was an objective

illusory creation; for the reality in the s'ukti (conch-shell) is

transferred and felt as belonging to the illusion of silver imposed upon

it. Here we see that the illusion of silver has two different kinds

of illusion comprehended in it. One is the creation of an indefinable

silver (_anirvacanîya-rajatotpatti_) and the other is the attribution

of the reality belonging to the conch-shell to the illusory

silver imposed upon it, by which we feel at the time of the illusion

that it is a reality. This is no doubt the _anyathâkhyâti_

form of illusion as advocated by Nyâya. Vedânta admits that

when two things (e.g. red flower and crystal) are both present

489

before my senses, and I attribute the quality of one to the other

by illusion (e.g. the illusion that the crystal is red), then the illusion

is of the form of anyathâkhyâti; but if one of the things is not

present before my senses and the other is, then the illusion is not

of the anyathâkhyâti type, but of the anirvacanîyakhyâti type.

Vedânta could not avoid the former type of illusion, for it believed

that all appearance of reality in the world-appearance

was really derived from the reality of Brahman, which was self-luminous

in all our experiences. The world appearance is an

illusory creation, but the sense of reality that it carries with it

is a misattribution (_anyathâkhyâti_) of the characteristic of the

Brahman to it, for Brahman alone is the true and the real, which

manifests itself as the reality of all our illusory world-experience,

just as it is the reality of s'ukti that gives to the appearance of

silver its reality.

Vedânta Ethics and Vedânta Emancipation.

Vedânta says that when a duly qualified man takes to the

study of Vedânta and is instructed by the preceptor--"Thou

art that (Brahman)," he attains the emancipating knowledge,

and the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory.

The qualifications necessary for the study of Vedânta are (1)

that the person having studied all the Vedas with the proper

accessories, such as grammar, lexicon etc. is in full possession of

the knowledge of the Vedas, (2) that either in this life or in another,

he must have performed only the obligatory Vedic duties (such

as daily prayer, etc. called _nitya-karma_) and occasionally obligatory

duty (such as the birth ceremony at the birth of a son,

called _naimittika-karma_) and must have avoided all actions for

the fulfilment of selfish desires (_kâmya-karmas_, such as the

performance of sacrifices for going to Heaven) and all prohibited

actions (e.g. murder, etc. _ni@siddha-karma_) in such a

way that his mind is purged of all good and bad actions (no

karma is generated by the _nitya_ and _naimittika-karma_, and as

he has not performed the _kâmya_ and prohibited karmas, he has

acquired no new karma). When he has thus properly purified

his mind and is in possession of the four virtues or means of

fitting the mind for Vedânta instruction (called _sâdhana_) he

can regard himself as properly qualified for the Vedânta instruction.

These virtues are (1) knowledge of what is eternal

490

and what is transient, (2) disinclination to enjoyments of this

life and of the heavenly life after death, (3) extreme distaste for

all enjoyments, and anxiety for attaining the means of right knowledge,

(4) control over the senses by which these are restrained

from everything but that which aids the attainment of right

knowledge (_dama_), (a) having restrained them, the attainment

of such power that these senses may not again be tempted towards

worldly enjoyments (_uparati_), (b) power of bearing extremes

of heat, cold, etc., (c) employment of mind towards the attainment

of right knowledge, (d) faith in the instructor and

Upani@sads; (5) strong desire to attain salvation. A man possessing

the above qualities should try to understand correctly

the true purport of the Upani@sads (called _s'rava@na_), and by

arguments in favour of the purport of the Upani@sads to

strengthen his conviction as stated in the Upani@sads (called

_manana_) and then by _nididhyâsana_ (meditation) which includes

all the Yoga processes of concentration, try to realize the truth

as one. Vedânta therefore in ethics covers the ground of

Yoga; but while for Yoga emancipation proceeds from understanding

the difference between puru@sa and prak@rti, with Vedânta

salvation comes by the dawn of right knowledge that Brahman

alone is the true reality, his own self [Footnote ref 1]. Mîmâ@msâ asserts

that the Vedas do not declare the knowledge of one Brahman to be the

supreme goal, but holds that all persons should act in accordance

with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of good

and the removal of evil. But Vedânta holds that though the

purport of the earlier Vedas is as Mîmâ@msâ has it, yet this

is meant only for ordinary people, whereas for the elect the

goal is clearly as the Upani@sads indicate it, namely the attainment

of the highest knowledge. The performance of Vedic

duties is intended only for ordinary men, but yet it was

believed by many (e.g. Vâcaspati Mis'ra and his followers) that

due performance of Vedic duties helped a man to acquire a

great keenness for the attainment of right knowledge; others

believed (e.g. Prakâs'âtmâ and his followers) that it served to

bring about suitable opportunities by securing good preceptors,

etc. and to remove many obstacles from the way so that it became

easier for a person to attain the desired right knowledge.

In the acquirement of ordinary knowledge the ajñânas removed

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Vedântasâra_ and _Advaitabrahmasiddhi.]

491

are only smaller states of ajñâna, whereas when the

Brahma-knowledge dawns the ajñâna as a whole is removed.

Brahma-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also a

state of knowledge, but such is its special strength that when

this knowledge once dawns, even the state of knowledge which

at first reflects it (and which being a state is itself ajñâna

modification) is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed,

only the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in its

own true light. Thus it is said that just as fire riding on a piece

of wood would burn the whole city and after that would burn

the very same wood, so in the last state of mind the Brahma-knowledge

would destroy all the illusory world-appearance and

at last destroy even that final state [Footnote ref l].

The mukti stage is one in which the pure light of Brahman

as the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss

shines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes as

illusory nothing. As all being of the world-appearance is but

limited manifestations of that one being, so all pleasures also

are but limited manifestations of that supreme bliss, a taste

of which we all can get in deep dreamless sleep. The being

of Brahman however is not an abstraction from all existent

beings as the _sattâ_ (being as class notion) of the naiyâyika, but

the concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousness

and pure bliss is always identical with itself. Being (_sat_) is pure

bliss and pure consciousness. What becomes of the avidyâ during

mukti (emancipation) is as difficult for one to answer as the

question, how the avidyâ came forth and stayed during the world-appearance.

It is best to remember that the category of the

indefinite avidyâ is indefinite as regards its origin, manifestation

and destruction. Vedânta however believes that even when the

true knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for a

while, if the individual's previously ripened karmas demand it.

Thus the emancipated person may walk about and behave like

an ordinary sage, but yet he is emancipated and can no longer

acquire any new karma. As soon as the fruits due to his ripe

karmas are enjoyed and exhausted, the sage loses his body and

there will never be any other birth for him, for the dawn of

perfect knowledge has burnt up for him all budding karmas of

beginningless previous lives, and he is no longer subject to any

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1:_Siddhântales'a_.]

492

of the illusions subjective or objective which could make any

knowledge, action, or feeling possible for him. Such a man is

called _jîvanmukta_, i.e. emancipated while living. For him all

world-appearance has ceased. He is the one light burning alone

in himself where everything else has vanished for ever from the

stage [Footnote ref 1].

Vedânta and other Indian Systems.

Vedânta is distinctly antagonistic to Nyâya, and most of

its powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it.

S'a@nkara himself had begun it by showing contradictions and

inconsistencies in many of the Nyâya conceptions, such as the

theory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of samavâya,

the conception of jâti, etc [Footnote ref 2]. His followers carried it to

still greater lengths as is fully demonstrated by the labours of

S'rîhar@sa, Citsukha, Madhusûdana, etc. It was opposed to Mîmâ@msâ so

far as this admitted the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika categories, but agreed

with it generally as regards the pramâ@nas of anumâna, upamiti,

arthâpatti, s'abda, and anupalabdhi. It also found a great supporter

in Mîmâ@msâ with its doctrine of the self-validity and self-manifesting

power of knowledge. But it differed from Mîmâ@msâ

in the field of practical duties and entered into many elaborate

discussions to prove that the duties of the Vedas referred only to

ordinary men, whereas men of higher order had no Vedic duties

to perform but were to rise above them and attain the highest

knowledge, and that a man should perform the Vedic duties

only so long as he was not fit for Vedânta instruction and

studies.

With Sâ@mkhya and Yoga the relation of Vedânta seems to

be very close. We have already seen that Vedânta had accepted

all the special means of self-purification, meditation, etc., that

were advocated by Yoga. The main difference between Vedânta

and Sâ@mkhya was this that Sâ@mkhya believed, that the stuff of

which the world consisted was a reality side by side with the

puru@sas. In later times Vedânta had compromised so far with

Sâ@mkhya that it also sometimes described mâyâ as being made

up of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Vedânta also held that according

to these three characteristics were formed diverse modifications

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Pañcadas'î_.]

[Footnote 2: See S'a@nkara's refutation of Nyâya, _S'a@nkara-bhâ@sya_, II.

ii.]

493

of the mâyâ. Thus Îs'vara is believed to possess a mind of pure

sattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted in

Vedânta in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as Sâ@mkhya

held it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that mâyâ was

believed to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, it

was indefinable and indefinite, and in its nature different from

what we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantial

nothing, a magic entity which had its being only so long

as it appeared. Prak@rti also was indefinable or rather undemonstrable

as regards its own essential nature apart from its manifestation,

but even then it was believed to be a combination of

positive reals. It was undefinable because so long as the reals

composing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belonged

to it with which it could be defined. Mâyâ however was undemonstrable,

indefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was a

separate category of the indefinite. Sâ@mkhya believed in the

personal individuality of souls, while for Vedânta there was only

one soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the mâyâ

transformations. There was an adhyâsa or illusion in Sâ@mkhya

as well as in Vedânta; but in the former the illusion was due

to a mere non-distinction between prak@rti and puru@sa or mere

misattribution of characters or identities, but in Vedânta there

was not only misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinable

creation. Causation with Sâ@mkhya meant real transformation,

but with Vedânta all transformation was mere appearance.

Though there were so many differences, it is however easy to

see that probably at the time of the origin of the two systems

during the Upani@sad period each was built up from very similar

ideas which differed only in tendencies that gradually manifested

themselves into the present divergences of the two systems.

Though S'a@nkara laboured hard to prove that the Sâ@mkhya

view could not be found in the Upani@sads, we can hardly be

convinced by his interpretations and arguments. The more

he argues, the more we are led to suspect that the Sâ@mkhya

thought had its origin in the Upani@sads. Sâ'a@nkara and his

followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from

the Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the s'ûnya

of Nâgârjuna. It is difficult indeed to distinguish between

pure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts of

S`a@nkara to the self-luminosity of the Vijñânavâda Buddhism

494

can hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truth

in the accusations against S'a@nkara by Vijñâna Bhik@su and

others that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led to

think that S'a@nkara's philosophy is largely a compound of

Vijñânavâda and S'ûnyavâda Buddhism with the Upani@sad

notion of the permanence of self superadded.