[Footnote 1: Gañges'a, a later naiyâyika of great reputation, describes

perception as immediate awareness (_pratyak@sasya sâk@sâtkâritvam

lak@sa@nam_).]

335

This species of contact is called sa@myukta-samaveta-samavâya,

for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour

is in samavâya relation, and in the specific colour there is the

colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavâya

relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavâya

by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory

sense is âkâs'a and the sound exists in âkâs'a in the samavâya

relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar

kind of contact called samaveta-samavâya. (5) The generic

character of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceived

by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavâya. (6) There is

another kind of contact by which negation (_abhâva_) is perceived,

namely sa@myukta vis'e@sa@na (as qualifying contact). This is so

called because the eye perceives only the empty space which is

qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation.

Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in

this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug

is only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along

with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen

that Nyâya admits not only the substances and qualities but all

kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly

apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).

The most important thing about the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika theory

of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the

contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception

of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its

usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception

and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and

the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact

between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge

is indeed _arthaprakâs'a,_ revelation of objects, and it is called

perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its

production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with

which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with

the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not

only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with

the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well.

The senses according to Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are material and we have

seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental

(_atîndriya_) power (_s'akti_) than that of actual vibratory

336

movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition [Footnote ref 1].

The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence,

but is one which is similar to the effects produced by

the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When

I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch

not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the

universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also

with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The

result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called _âlocanajñâna_

(sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the

memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character

(_sukhasâdhanatvasm@rti_) and as a result of that I perceive the

orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character [Footnote ref

2]. It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable

object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception

through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant

cause (sahakâri). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand

the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon

understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though

this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind,

yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact,

it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and

hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive

intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact

and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is

in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process.

Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable

condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses

be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals

associated with them but also with negation. A perception is

erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does

not possess (_atasmi@mstaditi_) and right knowledge (_pramâ_) is that

which presents an object with a character which it really has

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1:

_Na khalvatîndriyâ s'aktirasmâbhirupagamyate

yayâ saha na kâryyasya sambandhajñânasambhava@h.

Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 69.]

[Footnote 2:

_Sukhâdi manasâ buddhvâ kapitthâdi ca cak@su@sâ

tasya karanatâ tatra manasaivâvagamyate...

...Sambandhagraha@nakâle yattatkapitthâdivi@sayamak@sajam

jñânam tadupâdeyâdijñânaphalamiti bhâ@syak@rtas'cetasi sthitam

sukhasâdhanatvajñânamupâdeyajñânam.

_Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.]

337

(_tadvati tatprakârakânubhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. In all cases of

perceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object,

but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions

that it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as

a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a

desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate

stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus

far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is

concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the

similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream

that it is misapprehended as a stream [Footnote ref 2]. Jayanta observes

that on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing

of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense

is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the

characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by

illusion [Footnote ref 3]. In the case of mental delusions however there is

no sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant

memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions [Footnote ref 4]. This

doctrine of illusion is known as _viparîtakhyâti_ or _anyathâkhyâti._ What

existed in the mind appeared as the object before us (_h@rdaye

parisphurato'rthasya bahiravabhâsanam_) [Footnote ref 5]. Later Vais'e@sika

as interpreted by Pras'astapâda and S'rîdhara is in full agreement

with Nyâya in this doctrine of illusion (_bhrama_ or as Vais'e@sika

calls it _viparyaya_) that the object of illusion is always the right

thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion

consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics [Footnote ref 6].

I have pointed out above that Nyâya divided perception into

two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate)

according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vâcaspati

says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a

particular; the perception of an orange at this _avikalpika_ or

_nirvikalpika_ stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the

universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Udyotakara's _Nyâyavârttika_, p. 37, and Ga@nges'a's

_Tattvacintâma@ni,_ p. 401, _Bibliotheca Indica_.]

[Footnote 2: "_Indriye@nâlocya marîcîn uccâvacamuccalato nirvikalpena

g@rhîtvâ pas'câttatropaghâtado@sât viparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayo

bhrânto jâyate tasmâdvijñânasya uvabhicâro nârthasya,_ Vâcaspati's

_Tâtparyatîkâ_," p. 87.]

[Footnote 3: _Nyâyamañjarî,_ p. 88.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ pp. 89 and 184.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 184.]

[Footnote 6: _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 177-181, "_S'uktisa@myuktenendriye@na

do@sasahakârinâ rajatasa@mskârasacivena sâd@rs'yamanurundhatâ

s'uktikâvi@sayo rajatâdhyavasâya@h k@rta@h._"]

338

it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange."

The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with

the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage,

the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not

as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and

attribute (_jâtyâdisvarûpâvagâhi na tu jâtyâdînâ@m mitho

vis'e@sa@navis'e@syabhâvâvagâhîti yâvat_) [Footnote ref 1]. He thinks

that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated

with name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in

perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do

not know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary

persons, for the association of the names and relations could be

distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage [Footnote ref 2].

S'rîdhara, in explaining the Vais'e@sika view, seems to be largely

in agreement with the above view of Vâcaspati. Thus S'rîdhara says

that in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived

but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory

of other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification

such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the

universals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not

consciously ordered as "different from this" or "similar to this,"

which can only take place at the savikalpa stage [Footnote ref 3].

Vâcaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others,

but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite

subject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyâya

writers however, following Ga@nges'a, hold an altogether different

opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge

means the knowledge of mere predication without any association

with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers.

But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa

stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual

cognition and not a psychological stage. They would

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tâtparya@tikâ_, p. 81, also _ibid._ p. 91,

"_prathamamâlocito'rtha@h sâmânyavis'e@savân._"]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p.84, "_tasmâdvyutpannasyâpi nâmadheyasmara@nâya

pûrvame@sitavyo vinaiva nâmadheyamarthapratyaya@h._"]

[Footnote 3: _Nyâyakandalî,_p. 189 ff., "_ata@h savikalpakamicchatâ

nirvikalpakamapye@sitavyam, tacca na sâmânyamâtram g@rh@nâti bhedasyâpi

pratibhâsanât nâpi svalak@sa@namâtram sâmânyâkârasyâpi sa@mvedanât

vyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandhânâcca, kintu sâmânya@m

vis'e@sañcobhayamapi g@rh@nâti yadi paramida@m sâmânyamayam vis'e@sa@h

ityeva@m vivicya na pratyeti vastvantarânusandhânavirahât,

pi@ndântarânuv@rttigraha@nâddhi sâmânya@m vivicyate,

vyâv@rttigraha@nâdvis'e@soyamiti viveka@h._"]

339

not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible

to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a

quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate

(_vis'i@s@tavais'i@styajñânam prati hi vis'e@sa@natâvacchedakaprakâra@m

jñâna@m kâra@na@m_) [Footnote ref 1]. So, before any determinate knowledge

such as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it must

be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the

indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected

with universality or any other relations (_jâtyâdiyojanârahita@m

vais'i@s@tyânavagâhi ni@sprakârakam nirvikalpaka@m_) [Footnote ref 2].

But this stage is never psychologically experienced (_atîndriya_)

and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic

conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate

with a subject. Thus Vis'vanâtha says in his Siddhântamuktâvalî,

"the cognition which does not involve relationing

cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know

the jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower,

the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of

jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the

predicative quality (_vis'e@sa@natâvacchedaka_) of the predicate 'jug'

which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the

knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative

quality, the content [Footnote ref 3]." But in order that the knowledge

of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at

which the universal or the pure predication should be known

and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though

not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably

necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an

universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be

related to the particular with which it is associated.

But both the old and the new schools of Nyâya and Vais'e@sika

admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which

the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary

particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universals

and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the

perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced

by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception

consists in the attribution of jâti (universal), gu@na (quality),

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tattvacintâma@ni_ p. 812.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 809.]

[Footnote 3: _Siddhântamuktâvalî_ on _Bhâ@sâpariccheda kârikâ_, 58.]

340

kriyâ (action), nâma (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref

1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are

not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication

of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the

false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the

quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a

thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The

same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different

from that which moves. But name is completely different

from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified,

and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it

was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are

altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now

as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference

of the Nyâya ontological position with that of the Buddhists,

for we know that Nyâya and Vais'e@sika believe jâti, gu@na

and kriyâ to be different from substance and therefore the predicating

of them of substance as different categories related to it

at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as

erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vâcaspati replies that the

memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make

the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot

in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated

until the second stage through the joint action of memory

is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in

order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in

mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated

with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there

cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the

Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should

identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which

was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual

perception. To this Vâcaspati says that through the help of

memory or past impressions (_sa@mskâra_) this can be considered

as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be

the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 93-100, "_Pañca caite kalpanâ bhavanti

jâtikalpanâ, gu@nakalpanâ, kriyâkalpanâ, nâmakalpanâ dravyakalpanâ ceti,

tâs'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanât kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanât

kalpanâ ucyante._" See Dharmakîrtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4.

See also pp. 409-410 of this book.]

341

present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an

effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an

object of past experience refers to a past time and place and

is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with

an object which is experienced at the present moment. It

has to be admitted that Vâcaspati's answer is not very satisfactory

for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception

which was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see

that early Nyâya-Vais'e@sika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception

as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and

differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with

the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual

development of perception as the progressive effects of causal

operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the

self and the object under the influence of various intellectual

(e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes,

it does not, like Vedânta, require that right perception should only

give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation

as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon

the variety of causal collocations.

Mind according to Nyâya is regarded as a separate sense

and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy

and will. The later Nyâya writers speak of three other kinds

of contact of a transcendental nature called _sâmânyalak@sa@na,

jñânalak@sa@na_ and _yogaja_ (miraculous). The contact sâmânyalak@sa@na

is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a

particular we are transcendentally (_alaukika_) in contact with all

the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding

universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and

through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated

with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all

smoke in general. Jñânalak@sa@na contact is that by virtue of which

we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving

by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of

sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only,

but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact

of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental

contact (_alaukika sannikar@sa_) by virtue of which this is rendered

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tâtparya@tîkâ_, pp. 88-95.]

342

possible is called jñânalak@sa@na. But the knowledge acquired by

these two contacts is not counted as perception [Footnote ref l].

Pleasures and pains (_sukha_ and _du@hkha_) are held by Nyâya

to be different from knowledge (jñâna). For knowledge interprets,

conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to

appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel

that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot

be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then

that experience which generates sukha in one should have generated

the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should

have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not

happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might

not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's

sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain,

it is evident that there must be some differences between the

pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different,

and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case

was associated with sukha and in another case with du@hkha,

This shows that sukha and du@hkha are not themselves knowledge.

Such is the course of things that sukha and du@hkha are generated

by the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through

or in association with other objects either in direct perception or

in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in

the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be

remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes

in their production.

The yogins are believed to have the pratyak@sa of the most

distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power

by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive

the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their

mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions

of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may

have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1:_Siddhântamuktâvalî_ on _Kârikâ_ 63 and 64. We must remember

that Ga@nges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in the

_Nyâya sûtra_ which we have discussed above, and held that perception

should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character

of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception

as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle

(_Tattvacintâma@ni_, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him

as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the

definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by

Udyotakara as mentioned above.]

343

and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhânajñâna,

which is also to be regarded as a pratyak@sa directly

by the mind. This is of course different from the other form

of perception called mânasa-pratyak@sa, by which memories of

past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept

visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive

that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the

eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual

percept with it. According to Vedânta this acquired perception

is only a case of inference. The prâtibha-pratyak@sa however is

that which is with reference to the happening of a future event.

When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective

cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to

the self by the mind as "I know this pot." This is effected by

the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition

which had already been generated in the soul. This second

reperception is called anuvyavasâya, and all practical work can

proceed as a result of this anuvyavasâya [Footnote ref. l].

Inference.

Inference (_anumâna_) is the second means of proof (prâmâ@na)

and the most valuable contribution that Nyâya has made has

been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a

thing on the strength of the mark or liñga which is associated

with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember

that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire

in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically

called liñga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been

made (the hill in this example) is called pak@sa, and the term

"fire" is called sâdhya. To make a correct inference it is

necessary that the hetu or liñga must be present in the pak@sa,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This later Nyâya doctrine that the cognition of self in

association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be

contrasted with the _triputîpratyak@sa_ doctrine of Prabhâkara, which

holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously

in knowledge. Vyavasâya (determinate cognition), according to Ga@nges'a,

gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am

aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding

the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasâya (cognition), "_idamaha@m

jânâmîti vyavasâye na bhâsate taddhakendriyasannikar@sâbhâvât

kintvida@mvi@sayakajñânatvavis'i@s@tasya jñânasya vais'i@styamâtmani

bhâsate; na ca svaprakâs'e vyavasâya tâd@rs'a@m svasya vais'i@s@tya@m

bhâsitumarhati, pûrva@m vis'e@sa@nasya tasyâjñânât, tasmâdidamaha@m

jânâmiti na vyavasâya@h kintu anuvyavasâyah." _Tattvacintâma@ni_, p. 795.]

344

and in all other known objects similar to the pak@sa in having the

sâdhya in it (sapak@sa-sattâ), i.e., which are known to possess the

sâdhya (possessing fire in the present example). The liñga must

not be present in any such object as does not possess the

sâdhya (_vipak@sa-vyâv@rtti_ absent from vipak@sa or that which does

not possess the sâdhya). The inferred assertion should not be

such that it is invalidated by direct perception {_pratyak@sa_) or

the testimony of the s'âstra (_abâdhita-vi@sayatva_). The liñga

should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way

could also be possible (_asat-pratipak@sa_). The violation of any

one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu

as determining the inference, and thus would only make the

hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvâbhâsa or

seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made.

Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible

is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the

pak@sa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvâbhâsa is technically

called _asiddha-hetu_. Again, hetvâbhâsa of the second type,

technically called _viruddha-hetu_, may be exemplified in the case

that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being

created" is present in the opposite of sâdhya {_vipak@sa_), namely

non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality

which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type,

technically called _anaikântika-hetu_, is found in the case that

sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "being

an object of knowledge" (_prameyatva_) is here the hetu, but it is

present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sâdhya), as well

as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the

sâdhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the

sâdhya is not absolute (_anaikântika_). A fallacy of the fourth

type, technically called _kâlâtyayâpadi@s@ta_, may be found in the

example--fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc.

Here pratyak@sa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is

fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called _prakara@nasama_, is to be

found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same

time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-eternal,

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Nyâya did not believe in the

doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mîmâ@msâ did. Eternality

of sound meant with Mîmâ@msâ the theory that sounds existed as eternal

indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under

certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of

movement of the vocal muscles.]

345

since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like

âkâs'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.

The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against

inference by the Cârvâkas, that inferential arguments are

valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity

of nature in two relations, viz. _tâdâtmya_ (essential

identity) and _tadutpatti_ (succession in a relation of cause and

effect). Tâdâtmya is a relation of genus and species and not

of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer

that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related

to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of

the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a

pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity

(_tâdâtmya_). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of

succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.

Nyâya holds that inference is made because of the invariable

association (_niyama_) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance of

which with the sâdhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions

noted above) with the sâdhya, and not because of such specific

relations as tâdâtmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the

inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the

essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument

that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well;

for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both

ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a

pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with

those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential

identity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark)

with the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama.

The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect)

is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the

case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of

other types of inference, where the association as cause and

effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is

inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the

li@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted

above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].

We perceived in many cases that a li@nga (e.g. smoke) was

associated with a li@ngin (fire), and had thence formed the notion

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjari_ on anumâna.]

346

that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we

perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered

the concomitance (_vyâpti_) of smoke and fire which we had

observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill,

which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we

concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the

li@nga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its

concomitance with fire (_t@rtîya-li@nga-parâmars'a) is thus the cause

(_anumitikara@na_ or _anumâna_) of the inference (_anumiti_). The

concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called _vyâpti._ When

this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with

those having fire, it is called _bahirvyâpti_; and when it refers to the

conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any

relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was

observed, it is called _antarvyâpti._ The Buddhists since they did

not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyâpti

view of concomitance to bahirvyâpti as a means of inference [Footnote ref

1].

Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference

will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign

(_hetu_) with the signate (_sâdhya_), how are we to assure ourselves in

each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (_vyâptigraha_)

had been correct, and the observation of concomitance

had been valid. The Mîmâ@msâ school held, as we shall see in

the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case

in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases

I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there

was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire.

But Nyâya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where

there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in

all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any

smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should

be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire

should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically

called _anvayavyâpti_ and the latter _vyatirekavyâpti._ But even this

is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a

hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have

been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but

it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Antarvyâptisamarthana,_ by Ratnâkaras'ânti in the _Six

Buddhist Nyâya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica_, 1910.]

347

or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It

may be that one might never have observed smoke without an

antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even

that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in

a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass

produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained

the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately

followed by the disappearance of smoke (_yasmin sati bhavanam

yato vinâ na bhavanam iti bhuyodars'ana@m, Nyâyamañjarî,_

p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of

concomitance (_vyâpti_} between the ass and the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. But

of course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the

above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu,

and there might be some other condition (_upâdhi_) associated

with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire

in green wood (_ârdrendhana_) produced smoke, but one might

doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced

smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it.

But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged

in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would

have to be dispensed with (_vyâghâta_). Thus such doubts as

lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or

unsettle the notion of vyâpti or concomitance at which we

had arrived by careful observation and consideration [Footnote ref 2]. The

Buddhists and the naiyâyikas generally agreed as to the method

of forming the notion of concomitance or vyâpti (_vyâptigraha_),

but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance

always depended on a relation of cause and effect

or of identity of essence, whereas Nyâya held that neither the

relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of

genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was

quite a number of other types of inference which could not be

brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the

tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening

other things would happen could certainly exist, even

without the supposition of an identity of essence.

But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often

have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Tâtparya@tîkâ_ on anumâna and vyâptigraha.]

[Footnote 2: _Tâtparya@tîkâ_ on vyâptigraha, and _Tattvacintâma@ni_ of

Ga@nges'a on vyâptigraha.]

348

infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyâya holds however

that though different causes are often found to produce

the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one

effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its

other attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found

that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other

effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy

downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water

of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of

the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits

that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the

rise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street

of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances,

the special manner in which the water flows by small

rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was

due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we

see that Nyâya relied on empirical induction based on uniform

and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists

assumed _a priori_ principles of causality or identity of essence.

It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyâya

works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves

assured that there was no such upâdhi (condition) associated with

the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but

that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sâdhya in

a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce

smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to

produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition

(_upâdhi_) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on

account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and

so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in

the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so

in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the

validity of vyâpti, it is necessary that we must be assured that

there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned

the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide

experience (_bhûyodars'ana_).

Pras'astapâda in defining inference as the "knowledge of that

(e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of

the reason" described a valid reason (_li@nga_) as that which is connected

with the object of inference (_anumeya_) and which exists

wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases

349

where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyâya

qualifications of _pak@sasattva, sapak@sasattva and _vipak@sâsattva_ of

a valid reason (hetu). Pras'astapâda further quotes a verse to say

that this is the same as what Kâs'yapa (believed to be the family

name of Ka@nâda) said. Ka@nâda says that we can infer a cause

from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one

thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition

or in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We

can infer by a reason because it is duly associated

(_prasiddhipûrvakatva_) with the object of inference. What this

association was according to Ka@nâda can also be understood for

he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association,

the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred

or it has no concomitance with it (_aprasiddha_) or it has a doubtful

existence _sandigdha_). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has

horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns.

Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for

there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though

a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The

first fallacy is a combination of pak@sâsattva and sapak@sâsattva,

for not only the present pak@sa (the ass) had no horns, but no

horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipak@sasattva,

for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus,

it seems that when Pras'astapâda says that he is giving us the view

of Ka@nâda he is faithful to it. Pras'astapâda says that wherever

there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke.

When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the

smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that

there is fire. But with regard to Ka@nâda's enumeration of types of

inference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect

from the cause," etc., Pras'astapâda holds that these are not the

only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing

the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection

such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides

inference into two classes, d@r@s@ta (from the experienced characteristics

of one member of a class to another member of the same

class), and sâmânyato d@r@s@ta. D@r@s@ta (perceived resemblance) is

that where the previously known case and the inferred case is

exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point

out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of

flesh on its neck (_sâsnâ_), I can whenever I see the same hanging

350

mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But

when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended

to a different class of objects, it is called sâmânyato d@r@s@ta.

Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded

with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests,

namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with

the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of

heaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (_svanis'citârtha_)

is expressed in five premisses for convincing others

who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then

the inference is called parârthânumâna. We know that the distinction

of svârthânumâna (inference for oneself) and parârthânumâna

(inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists.

Pras'astapâda does not make a sharp distinction of two classes

of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be

conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is

called parârthânumâna. But this need not be considered as an

entirely new innovation of Pras'astapâda, for in IX. 2, Ka@nâda

himself definitely alludes to this distinction (_asyeda@m

kâryyakâra@nasambandhas'câvayavâdbhavati_). The five premisses which are

called in Nyâya _pratijñâ, hetu d@r@s@tânta, upanaya,_ and _nigamana_

are called in Vais'e@sika _pratijñâ, apades'a, nidars'ana, anusandhâna_,

and _pratyâmnâya_. Ka@nâda however does not mention the name

of any of these premisses excepting the second "apades'a." Pratijñâ is

of course the same as we have in Nyâya, and the term nidars'ana is

very similar to Nyâya d@r@s@tânta, but the last two are entirely

different. Nidars'ana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence

(e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of

an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has

no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being [Footnote ref l]).

He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example

___________________________________________________________________

{Footnote 1: Dr Vidyâbhû@sa@na says that "An example before the time of

Dignâga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the

understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has

smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asa@nga made the example more serviceable

to reasoning, but Dignâga converted it into a universal proposition, that

is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection

between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery; because

it has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (_Indian Logic_,

pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vâtsyâyana had an imperfect example

as "like a kitchen" (_s'abda@h utpatvidharmakatvâdanuya@h sthâlyâdivat_,

I.i. 36), but Pras'astapâda has it in the proper form. Whether

Pras'astapâda borrowed it from Dig@nnâga or Dig@nnâga from Pras'astapâda

cannot be easily settled.]

351

(_nidars'anâbhâsa_). Pras'astapâda's contribution thus seems to consist

of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of

the nidars'ana, but the names of the last two premisses are so

different from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable

to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional

Vais'e@sika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely

indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being

pursued in Vais'e@sika circles independently of Nyâya. There is

no reason however to suppose that Pras'astapâda borrowed anything

from Di@nnâga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes,

for, as I have shown above, most of Pras'astapâda's apparent innovations

are all definitely alluded to by Ka@nâda himself, and

Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the

question of the fallacies of nidars'ana, unless it is definitely proved

that Di@nnâga preceded Pras'astapâda, there is no reason whatever

to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former [Footnote ref 1].

The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most

important part of inference. Vâtsyâyana says that an inference

can be made by the sight of the li@nga (reason or middle) through

the memory of the connection between the middle and the major

previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it

is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the

connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded

as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to

inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is

_li@ngaparâmars'a_, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the

minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major,

for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection,

but the present perception of the middle associated with

the memory of the connection (_sm@rtyanug@rhîto li@ngaparâmars'o_).

But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance.

Udyotakara's criticisms of Di@nnâga as shown by Vâcaspati have

no reference to this point The doctrine of _tâdâtmya_ and _tadutpatti_

was therefore in all probability a new contribution to

Buddhist logic by Dharmakîrtti. Dharmakîrtti's contention was

that the root principle of the connection between the middle and

the major was that the former was either identical in essence

with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a

mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya with _Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 200-255.]

352

the desired connection [Footnote ref 1]. Vâcaspati in his refutation of

this view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a

separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedence

such that there being fire there is smoke and there being

no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with

perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the

smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless

it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated,

it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately

preceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of

argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is

known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke

can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time

and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many

cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause

and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this

morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of

identity of essence (_tâdâtmya_ as in the case of the pine and the

tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be

inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any

inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described

in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are

naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when

such is the case, though we may not know any further about the

nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former

and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under

certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there

may always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate

the validity of inference. To this Vâcaspati's answer is that if

even after observing a large number of cases and careful search

such conditions (_upâdhi_) cannot be discovered, we have to take

it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural

connection between the middle and the major. The later

Buddhists introduced the method of _Pañcakâra@nî_ in order to

determine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions

determining the causal relation are (1) neither the cause nor the

effect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate

succession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Kâryyakâra@nubhâvâdvâ svabhâvâdva niyâmakât avinâbhâvaniyamo'

dars'anânna na dars'anât. Tâtparya@tîkâ_, p. 105.]

353

immediate succession the effect disappears. But this method

cannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of cause

and effect relation; and if by the assumption of a cause-effect

relation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is better

to accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effect

relation [Footnote ref 1].

In early Nyâya books three kinds of inference are described,

namely pûrvavat, s'e@savat, and sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta. Pûrvavat is the

inference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from

heavy dark clouds; s'e@savat is the inference of causes from effects,

e.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river; sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta

refers to the inference in all cases other than those of

cause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the

tamarind from its form and colour. _Nyâyamañjarî_ mentions

another form of anumâna, namely paris'e@samâna (_reductio ad

absurdum_), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. consciousness)

of any other thing (e.g. âtman), because it was already

definitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any

other part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to

anything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of

these variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely

that of the inference of the probandum (_sâdhya_) by virtue of the

unconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called

the vyâpti-niyama. In the new school of Nyâya (Navya-Nyâya)

a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an

important place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalânvayi, and

kevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the

vyâpti has been observed by a combination of a large number of

instances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence,

as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever

there is smoke there is fire (_anvaya_), and where there is no fire,

there is no smoke (_vyatireka_)). An inference could be for one's

own self (_svârthânumâna_) or for the sake of convincing others

(_parârthânumâna_). In the latter case, when it was necessary that

an inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner,

live propositions (_avayavas_) were regarded as necessary, namely

pratijña (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), udâhara@na

(where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen),

upanaya (this hill has smoke), niga@mana (therefore it has got

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâya@na's bhâsya, Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ and

_Tâtparyya@tîkâ,_ I.i. 5.]

354

fire). Kevalânvayi is that type of inference, the vyâpti of which

could not be based on any negative instance, as in the case

"this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge

(_ida@m, vâcyam prameyatvât_)." Now no such case is known which

is not an object of knowledge; we cannot therefore know of any

case where there was no object of knowledge (_prameyatva_) and

no name (_vâcyatva_); the vyâpti here has therefore to be based

necessarily on cases of agreement--wherever there is prameyatva

or an object of knowledge, there is vâcyatva or name.

The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances

in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the

inference that earth differs from other elements in possessing

the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from

other elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident

that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the

concomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There

is only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our

inference--earth differs from other elements, since it has the

special qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in

those cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such

special traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone.

Upamâna and S'abda.

The third pramâ@na, which is admitted by Nyâya and not by

Vais'e@sika, is _upamâna_, and consists in associating a thing unknown

before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some

other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never

seen a wild ox (_gavaya_) goes to the forest, asks a forester--"what

is gavaya?" and the forester replies--"oh, you do not

know it, it is just like a cow"; after hearing this from the

forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to

be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya.

This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its

similarity to a known thing is called _upamâna_. If some forester

had pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him

that it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have

known the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would

have been due to testimony (_s'abda-prama@na). The knowledge is

said to be generated by the upamâna process when the association

of the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer

355

on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknown

animal to a known one. The naiyâyikas are thorough

realists, and as such they do not regard the observation of

similarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind.

Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the

association of the name in accordance with the perception of

similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is

called _upamâna_ [Footnote ref 1].

S'abda-pramâ@na or testimony is the right knowledge which

we derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful

persons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the

Vedas were uttered by Îs'vara himself. The Vedas give us

right knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the

utterances of the infallible Îs'vara. The Vais'e@sikas did not admit

s'abda as a separate pramâ@na, but they sought to establish the

validity of testimony (_s'abda_) on the strength of inference (_anumiti_)

on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible

person. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly

corroborated by the Vais'e@sika sûtras, which tacitly admit the

validity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this

was how Vais'e@sika was interpreted in later times.

Negation in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika.

The problem of negation or non-existence (_abhâva_) is of great interest

in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only

from the point of view of perceptibility. Kumârila [Footnote ref 2]

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_ on upamâna. The oldest Nyâya view was that

the instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the association

of the name "wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself

"upamâna." When Pras'astapâda held that upamâna should be treated as a

case of testimony (_âptavacana_), he had probably this interpretation

in view. But Udyotakara and Vâcaspati hold that it was not by the

instruction alone of the forester that the association of the name

"wild ox" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and

the memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is the

perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories

that lead us to this association called upamâna. What Vâtsyâya@na

meant is not very clear, but Di@nnâga supposes that according to

him the result of upamâna was the knowledge of similarity or the

knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vâcaspati of course holds that

he has correctly interpreted Vâtsyâya@na's intention. It is however

definite that upamâna means the associating of a name to a new object

(_samâkhyâsambandhapratipattirupamânârtha@h_, Vâtsyâya@na). Jayanta

points out that it is the preception of similarity which directly

leads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of

the forester cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently

it cannot be classed under testimony (_s'abda_). See Pras'astapâda

and _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 220-22, Vâtsyâya@na, Udyotakara, Vâcaspati and

Jayanta on _Upamâna_.]

[Footnote 2: See Kumârila's treatment of abhâva in the _S'lokavârttika_,

pp. 473-492.]

356

and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the

next chapter, hold that negation (_abhâva_) appears as an intuition

(_mânam_) with reference to the object negated where there are no

means of ordinary cognition (_pramâ@na_) leading to prove the existence

(_satparicchedakam_) of that thing. They held that the notion

"it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is no

contact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when

we turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the non-existence

of a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and

the non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see

neither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged

that if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say

the same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even

then since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-contact,

which is absent in the other case, we could never say

that both are grasped by perception. We see the ground and

remember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises

the notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual

perception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were

no tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence

at the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he

is asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where

he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware

of the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even

without perceiving the place and without any operation of the

memory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of

there being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence,

for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind,

and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could

be regarded as a reason (_li@nga_), for the non-perception of the jug

is related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no

concomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and

its non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of

non-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same difficulty

about the notion of non-existence (_abhâva_) which was sought

to be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be

admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process

of knowledge. Nyâya however says that the perception of

non-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception

of one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g.

357

there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the

ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug

arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and

there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground

should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of

the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due

to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug

is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle

that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact

with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or

non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even

without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance,

and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact.

It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required

in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation

or non-existence of other places which are far away from him.

To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary

that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a

thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only

be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as

well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehension

of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to

be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-existence

but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived

before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence

(e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (_abhâva_) can thus, according

to Nyâya, generate its cognition just as any positive

existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere

vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not,"

as position (_bhâva_) is what generates the cognition "it is."

The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold

that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with

specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now);

but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think

that negation could thus be associated with them in any

relation. There is also no relation between the negation and its

_pratiyogi_ (thing negated--e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for

when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there

is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the

relation of opposition (_virodha_), for we could have admitted it, if

358

the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug,

for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without

effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negation

is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the

nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it

will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it

will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or

that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception,

e.g. (1) svabhâvânupalabdhi (natural non-perception--there

is no jug because none is perceived); (2) kâra@nânupalabdhi

(non-perception of cause--there is no smoke here, since there is

no fire); (3) vyâpakânupalabdhi (non-perception of the species--there

is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) kâryânupalabdhi

(non-perception of effects--there are not the causes of smoke here,

since there is no smoke); (5) svabhâvaviruddhopalabdhi (perception

of contradictory natures--there is no cold touch here because

of fire); (6) viruddhakâryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory

effects--there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7)

virudhavyâptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance--past is not of necessity

destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) kâryyaviruddhopalabdhi

(opposition of effects--there is not here the causes

which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi

(opposite concomitants--there is no touch of snow here,

because of fire); (10) kâra@naviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes--there

is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire);

(11) kâra@naviruddhakâryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes--this

place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it

is full of smoke [Footnote ref 1]).

There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation,

but that does not prove that there is any reason for the

cognition of negation (_heturnâbhâvasamvida@h_). All that we can

say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use

(_yogyatâ_) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyatâ

is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage

as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort.

Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of

negation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions

which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive

perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyabindu_, p. 11, and _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 53-7.]

359

leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug

(_anupalambha@h abhâva@m vyavahârayati_) [Footnote ref 1].

The Nyâya reply against this is that the perception of positive

existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we

have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said

that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception

of the ground without the jug. But is this being without

the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then

it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even

when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over

the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a

distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground

with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground,

without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter

much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negation

is apprehended by perception as much as any positive

existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different;

just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects

there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of

negation with space and time with which it appears associated is

the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality

(_vis'e@sya vis'e@sa@na_). The relation between the negation and its

pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is

the other is not. The _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ (IX. i. 6) seems to take abhâva

in a similar way as Kumârila the Mima@msist does, though the

commentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2]. In Vais'e@sika

the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) _prâgabhâva_ (the

negation preceding the production of an object--e.g. of the jug

before it is made by the potter); (2) _dhva@msâbhâva_ (the negation

following the destruction of an object--as of the jug after it is

destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) _anyonyâbhâva_ (mutual

negation--e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_, pp. 34 ff., and also _Nyâyamañjarî_,

pp. 48-63.]

[Footnote 2 Pras'astapâda says that as the production of an effect is the

sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign

of its non-existence, S'rîdbara in commenting upon it says that the

non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (_li@nga_) of its

non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for

he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses

(_bhâvavad abhâvo'pîndriyagraha@nayogyah_) and that there is an actual

sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the

preception of non-existence (_abhâvendriyasannikar@so'pi

abhâvagraha@nasâmagrî_), Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 225-30.]

360

in the horse that of the cow); (4) _atyantâbhâva_ (a negation which

always exists--e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in

other places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1].

The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices

for the seeker of Salvation.

It is probable that the Nyâya philosophy arose in an atmosphere

of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence

of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do

not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are

_tarka_, _nir@naya_, _vâda_, _jalpa_, _vita@n@dâ_, _hetvâbhâsa_, _chala_,

_jâti_ and _nigrahasthâna_.

Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern

its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of

some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not

inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right

conclusion. When there is doubt (_sa@ms'aya_) about the specific

nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nir@naya means the

conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two

opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the

doctrines that there is or is not an âtman, in which each of them

tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is

called a _vâda_. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants

give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents.

A jalpa is called a _vita@n@dâ_ when it is only a destructive

criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without

seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvâbhâsas

are those which appear as hetus but are really not so. _Nyâya_

sûtras enumerate five fallacies (_hetvâbhâsas_) of the middle (hetu):

_savyabhicâra_ (erratic), _viruddha_ (contradictory), _prakara@nasama_

(tautology), _sâddhyasama_ (unproved reason) and _kâlâtîta _(inopportune).

Savyabhicâra is that where the same reason may prove

opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible

like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because

it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha

is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a

jug is eternal, because it is produced); prakara@nasama is that

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The doctrine of negation, its function and value with

reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects,

and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.]

361

where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form

(e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of

eternality); sâdhyasama is that where the reason itself requires

to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion,

but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not);

kâlâtîta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not

tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that

sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the

drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and

the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour

is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was

already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the

case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the

stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal.

The later Nyâya works divide savyabhicâra into three classes,

(1) sâdhâra@na or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is

an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire

is also an object of knowledge), (2) asâdhâra@na or too restricted

(e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this

cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the

sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasa@mhârin or unsubsuming

(e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of

knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be

found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion

may also be drawn). The fallacy _satpratipak@sa_ is that in

which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite

conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is

non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy _asiddha_ (unreal)

is of three kinds (i) _âs'rayâsiddha_ (the lotus of the sky is fragrant

because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in

the sky), (2) _svarûpâsiddha_ (sound is a quality because it is

visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) _vyâpyatvâsiddha_ is that

where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence

is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because

there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red

hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated

with smoke. The fallacy _bâdhita_ is that which pretends to prove

a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot

because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the

fallacies counted by Vais'e@sika. Contrary to Nyâya practice

362

Pras'astapâda counts the fallacies of the example. Di@nnâga also

counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is

incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms;

but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakîrtti counted also the

fallacies of the pak@sa (minor); but Nyâya rightly considers that

the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard

inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the

intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the

purpose of defeating him. Jâti consists in the drawing of contradictory

conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with

the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthâna

means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving

self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is

conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious

opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating

tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical

work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to

emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his _Nyâyamañjarî_ that these

had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant

disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils.

If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the

pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow,

and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding

onward for the attainment of mok@sa should acquire these devices

for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge

of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyâya sûtra as

being necessary for the attainment of salvation [Footnote ref l].

The doctrine of Soul.

Dhûrtta Cârvâkas denied the existence of soul and regarded

consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were

other Cârvâkas called Sus'ik@sita Cârvâkas who admitted the

existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death.

The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self.

The naiyâyikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics

mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience.

They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing,

etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 586-659, and _Târkikarak@sâ_ of

Varadarâja and _Niska@n@taka_ of Mallinâtha, pp. 185 ff.]

363

some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self

is not proved according to Nyâya merely by the notion of our

self-consciousness, as in the case of Mîmâ@msâ, for Nyâya holds

that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may

be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or

I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot

be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we

cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the

inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to

which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced

as a result of collocations. Never has the production of

âtman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any

destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not

located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at

the same time in all places (_vibhu_), and does not travel with

the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though

âtman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are

seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation

of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested

or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness

as a result of suitable collocations [Footnote ref l].

Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different

facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than

the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and

pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures

and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be

due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed

in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world

must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as

the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.

Îs'vara and Salvation.

Nyâya seeks to establish the existence of Îs'vara on the basis of

inference. We know that the Jains, the Sâ@mkhya and the Buddhists did

not believe in the existence of Îs'vara and offered many antitheistic

arguments. Nyâya wanted to refute these and prove the existence

of Is'vara by an inference of the sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta type.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1:_Jñânasamavâyanibandhanamevâtmanas'cetayit@rtvam_, &c. See

_Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 432 ff.]

364

The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the

world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never

produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to

this view the Nyâya holds that the world as a whole is also an

effect like any other effect. Many geological changes and landslips

occur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in

nature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but a

result of production. But even if this is not admitted by the

atheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of

the universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a

difference between the order and arrangement of human productions

(e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe;

and therefore from the order and arrangement(_sannives'a-vis'i@s@tatâ_)

of the universe it could not be argued that the universe was

produced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order and

arrangement that is found in human productions that a creator

or producer could be inferred. To this, Nyâya answers that the

concomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement"

in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not with

specific cases of "order and arrangement," for each specific case

may have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar

other specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same

kind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard

the specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and consider

the concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general.

So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order and

arrangement" in general with "the existence of a creator," and

thus though the order and arrangement of the world may be

different from the order and arrangement of things produced by

man, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would

not be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many

effects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground

without any creator being found to produce them, does not hold,

for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created

by a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has

a creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in

its construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order

and arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an

effect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator.

Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes,

365

so Îs'vara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus

omniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not

require memory; all things are perceived by him directly without

any intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He is

always happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the

karma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or

protects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the

results of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless

can by its will produce changes in our body and through it in

the external world, so Îs'vara also can by his will create the

universe though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any

association of body with Îs'vara is indispensable for our conception

of him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body,

so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of

our body take place, so also by his will changes and movements

are produced in the atoms [Footnote ref l].

The naiyâyikas in common with most other systems of Indian

philosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that

the small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of

sorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (_sarva@m

du@hkha@m vivekina@h_); the wise therefore is never attached to the

so-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows.

The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (_mithyâjñâna_)

which consists in thinking as my own self that which

is not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge;

when once the true knowledge of the six padârthas and

as Nyâya says, of the proofs (_pramâ@na_), the objects of knowledge

(_prameya_), and of the other logical categories of inference is

attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can

be removed by constant thinking of its opposite (_pratipak@sabhâvanâ_),

namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any

pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but

pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it

will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction

of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and

ignorance about them (collectively called do@sa, cf. the kles'a of

Patañjali) are also destroyed.

With the destruction of attachment actions (_prav@rtti_) for the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote:1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 190-204,_ Îs'varânumâna_ of Raghunâtha

S'iro@ma@ni and Udayana's _Kusumâñjalî_.]

366

fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with

it sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment,

actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the

production of body and its experiences. With the cessation of

sorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of all

its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains

in its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Nyâya-Vais'e@sika

is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a

state of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in

its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness

in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute

happiness (_ânanda_), though really speaking the state of mukti

can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in

its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain,

knowledge, willing, etc. [Footnote ref 1].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 499-533.]