____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pramâ@nas is Caraka.

But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from

Nyâya and calls _arthâpatti arthaprâpti_ (_Caraka_ III. viii.).]

[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from Vâtsyâyana's

commentary.]

[Footnote 3: The _Nyâya sûtra_ no doubt incidentally gives a definition of

jâti as "_samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h_" (II. ii. 71).]

305

Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact

of knowledge. Both the Nyâya and the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ admit

the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of

atomic structure in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika are absent there. The

Vai'se@sika calls salvation _ni@hs'reyasa_ or _mok@sa_ and the Nyâya

_apavarga_. Mok@sa with Vais'e@sika is the permanent cessation of

connection with body; the apavarga with Nyâya is cessation of

pain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference between

the Vais'e@sika and Nyâya are said to lie with regard to theory of the

notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc.

Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which

cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment

there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness,

then from a sense of relativeness--apek@sâbuddhi--notion

of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two

things); again, the doctrine of pilupâka (changes of qualities by

heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyâya held)

was held by Vais'e@sika, which the Naiyâyikas did not admit [Footnote ref

2]. But as the _Nyâya sûtras_ are silent on these points, it is not

possible to say that such were really the differences between early

Nyâya and early Vaise@sika. These differences may be said to hold between

the later interpreters of Vais'e@sika and the later interpreters of

Nyâya. The Vais'e@sika as we find it in the commentary of

Pras'astapâda (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyâya from

the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost

the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore

preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the

Nyâya-Vais'e@sika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found

from the sixth century onwards.

The Vais'e@sika and Nyâya Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the _Vais'e@sika

sûtras_ by Ka@nâda, also called Aulûkya the son of Ulûka, though

there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha quotes a passage from

_Sa@mk@sepas'a@nkarajaya_, XVI. 68-69 in _J.A.S.B._, 1905, and another

passage from a Nyâya writer Bhâsarvajña, pp. 39-41, in _J.A.S.B._, 1914,

to show that the old Naiyâyikas considered that there was an element

of happiness (_sukha_) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the

Vais'e@sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found

in the Nyâya or the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, unless the cessation of pain

with Nyâya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss

or happiness.]

[Footnote 2: See Mâdhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha-Aulûkyadars'ana_.]

306

appears from the _Vâyu purâna_ that he was born in Prabhâsa near

Dvârakâ, and was the disciple of Somas'armâ. The time of

Pras'astapâda who wrote a bhâ@sya (commentary) of the _Vais'e@sika

sûtras_ cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity

of Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya is this that unlike other bhâ@syas

(which first give brief explanations of the text of the sûtras and

then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining

the first brief comments), it does not follow the sûtras but

is an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnote

ref 1]. There were two other bhâ@syas on the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_,

namely _Râva@na-bhâ@sya_ and _Bharâdvâja-v@rtti_, but these are now

probably lost. References to the former are found in

_Kira@nâvalîbhâskara_ of Padmanâbha Mis'ra and also in _Ratnaprabhâ_

2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this bhâ@sya, namely

_Vyomavatî_ by Vyomas'ekharâcârya, _Nyâyakandalî_ by S'ridhara,

_Kira@nâvalî_ by Udayana (984 A.D.) and _Lîlâvatî_ S'rîvatsâcârya.

In addition to these Jagadîs'a Bha@t@tâcârya of Navadvîpa and S'a@nkara

Mis'ra wrote two other commentaries on the _Pras'astapâda-bhâsya_,

namely _Bhâsyasûkti_ and _Ka@nâda-rahasya_. S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425

A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ called the

_Upaskâra_. Of these _Nyâya-kandalî_ of S'rîdhara on account of its

simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably

the best for a modern student of Vais'e@sika. Its author was a

native of the village of Bhûris@r@s@ti in Bengal (Râ@dha). His father's

name was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchokâ and he

wrote his work in 913 S'aka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes

at the end of his work.

The _Nyâya sûtra_ was written by Ak@sapâda or Gautama, and

the earliest commentary on it written by Vâtsyâyana is known

as the _Vâtsyâyana-bhâ@sya_. The date of Vâtsyâyana has not

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The bhâ@sya of Pras'astapâda can hardly he called a

bhâ@sya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and

calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories

(_Padârthadharmasa@mgraha_). He takes the categories of _dravya,

gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa_ and _samavâya_ in order and without

raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on

them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later

Nyâya-Vais'e@sika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and

dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms

contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of

pilupâka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat

occur in his narration for the first time as the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_

are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date

definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais'e@sika available to us

after Ka@nâda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th

century A.D.]

307

been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he

lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi

places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a

_Vârttika_ on Vâtsyâyana's bhâ@sya to establish the Nyâya views

and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Di@nnâga

(about 500 A.D.) in his _Pramâ@nasamuccaya_. Vâcaspatimis'ra

(840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the _Nyâyavârttika_ of

Udyotakara called _Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ_ in order to make

clear the right meanings of Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ which was sinking

in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings

(_dustarakunibandhapa@nkamagnânâm_). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote

a sub-commentary on the _Tâtparya@tîkâ_ called

_Tâtparya@tîkâparis'uddhi_. Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) wrote a

sub-commentary on that called the _Nyâyanibandhaprakâs'a_. Padmanâbha

wrote a sub-commentary on that called _Varddhamânendu_ and S'a@nkara

Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the

_Nyâyatâtparyama@n@dana_. In the seventeenth century Vis'vanâtha

wrote an independent short commentary known as _Vis'vanâthav@rtti_,

on the _Nyâya sûtra_, and Râdhâmohana wrote a separate

commentary on the _Nyâya sûtras_ known as _Nyâyasûtravivara@na_.

In addition to these works on the _Nyâya sûtras_ many other

independent works of great philosophical value have been written

on the Nyâya system. The most important of these in medieval

times is the _Nyâyamañjari_ of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished

shortly after Vâcaspatimis'ra. Jayanta chooses some of the _Nyâya

sûtras_ for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyâya views quite

independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian

thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vâcaspati's

_Tâtparya@tîkâ_, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another

important work is Udayana's _Kusumâñjali_ in which he tries to

prove the existence of Îs'vara (God). This work ought to be read

with its commentary _Prakâs'a_ by Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) and its

sub-commentary _Makaranda_ by Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana's

_Âtmatattvaviveka_ is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in

which he tries to establish the Nyâya doctrine of soul. In addition

to these we have a number of useful works on Nyâya in later

times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection

with the present work. _Bhâ@sâpariccheda_ by Vis'vanâtha with

its commentaries _Muktâvalî, Dinakarî_ and _Râmarudrî, Tarkasamgraha_

with _Nyâyanir@naya, Tarkabkâ@sâ_ of Kes'ava Mis'ra with

308

the commentary _Nyâyapradîpa, Saptapadârthî_ of S'ivâditya,

_Târkikarak@sâ_ of Varadarâja with the commentary _Ni@ska@n@taka_

of Mallinâtha, _Nyâyasâra_ of Mâdhava Deva of the city of Dhâra and

_Nyâyasiddhântamañjarî_ of Jânakinâtha Bha@t@tâcarya with the

_Nyâyamanjarisara_ by Yâdavâcârya, and _Nyâyasiddhântadîpa_ of

S'a@sadhara with _Prabhâ_ by S'e@sânantâcârya.

The new school of Nyâya philosophy known as Navya-Nyâya

began with Ga@nges'a Upâdhyâya of Mithilâ, about

1200 A.D. Ga@nges'a wrote only on the four pramâ@nas admitted by the

Nyâya, viz. pratyak@sa, anumâna, upamâna, and s'abda, and not on any of

the topics of Nyâya metaphysics. But it so happened that his

discussions on anumâna (inference) attracted unusually great attention

in Navadvîpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and

commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumâna

portion of his work _Tattvacintâma@ni, and many independent

treatises on sabda and anumâna were also written by the scholars

of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home

of Nyâya studies. The commentaries of Raghunâtha S'iroma@ni

(1500 A.D.), Mathurâ Bha@t@tâcârya (1580 A.D.), Gadâdhara Bha@t@tâcârya

(1650 A.D.) and Jagadîsa Bha@t@tâcârya (1590 A.D.), commentaries

on S'iroma@ni's commentary on _Tattvacintâmani, had been

very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyâya became the

most important study in Navadvîpa and there appeared a series

of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject

[Footnote ref l].The contribution was not in the direction of

metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly

in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately

and precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts [Footnote

ref 2]. Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the

nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke

and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature

of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there

should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic

thinking and the development of a system of highly technical

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third

quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyâya was started

in Mithilâ (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century

Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyâya studies. See Mr

Cakravarttî's paper, _J. A.S.B._ 1915. I am indebted to it for some

of the dates mentioned in this section.]

[Footnote 2: _Îs'varânumâna_ of Raghunatha as well as his

_Padârthatattvanirûpa@na_ are, however, notable exceptions.]

309

expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical

expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted

even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate

and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit

ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the

importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it

can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by

attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.

I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that

so far as the logical portion of the Nyâya system is concerned,

though Ak@sapâda was the first to write a comprehensive account

of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently

worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyâya account

of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic

_Das'avaikâlikaniryukti_ of Bhadrabâhu (357 B.C.), Umâsvâti's

_Tattvârthâdhigama sûtra_, _Nyâyâvatâra_ of Siddhasena Divâkara

(533 A.D.) Mâ@nikya Nandi's (800 A.D.) _Parîk@sâmukha sûtra_, and

_Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra_ of Deva Sûri (1159 A.D.) and

_Prameyakamalamârta@n@da_ of Prabhâcandra deserve special notice.

_Pramâ@nasamuccaya_ and _Nyâyapraves'a_ of Di@nnâga (500 A.D.),

_Pramâ@nayârttika kârikâ_ and _Nyâyabindu_ of Dharmakîrtti

(650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most

interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l].

The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and

Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on

Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the

present volume.

It is interesting to notice that between the _Vâtsyâyana

bhâ@sya_ and the Udyotakara's _Vârttika_ no Hindu work on logic

of importance seems to have been written: it appears that the

science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and

the Buddhists; and it was Di@nnâga's criticism of Hindu Nyâya

that roused Udyotakara to write the _Vârttika_. The Buddhist and

the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics

as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we

come to Ga@nges'a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of

importance on Nyâya in the Buddhist style namely _Nyâyasâra_

of Bhâsarvajña. Other older Hindu works generally treated of

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Indian Logic Medieval School_, by Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na,

for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]

310

inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyâya

interest [Footnote ref 1].

The main doctrine of the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2].

The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness

took a common-sense view of things, and held that

things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange

themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues

to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by

the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce

an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or

through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence

is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver

did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same.

Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding

environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general

characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things

are testified by experience to be existing.

As the Nyâya-Vais'e@sikas depended solely on experience and

on valid reasons, they dismissed the Sâ@mkhya cosmology, but

accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (_bhûtas_), earth

(_k@siti_), water (_ap_), fire (_tejas_), and air (_marut_). These atoms

are eternal; the fifth substance (_âkâs'a_) is all pervasive and eternal.

It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading

and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests

sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows

itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves

to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf

man though he has the âkâs'a as his sense of hearing, cannot hear

on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense

organ [Footnote ref 3]. In addition to these they admitted the existence

of time (_kâla_) as extending from the past through the present to the

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Almost all the books on Nyâya and Vais'e@sika referred to

have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be

acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should

refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyâya in Bengal," by Mr.

Cakravarttî in _J.A.S.B._ 1915.]

[Footnote 2: I have treated Nyâya and Vais'e@sika as the same system.

Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded

since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some

minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those

of the other. The original character of the two systems has already

been treated.]

[Footnote 3: See _Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 59-64.]

311

endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could

have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account

for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sâ@mkhya

did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit

of kâla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its

own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms

and their movements. The appearance of kâla as a separate entity

is a creation of our buddhi _(buddhinirmâ@na) as it represents the

order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But

kâla in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is regarded as a substance existing by

itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself

as past, present, and future. Sâ@mkhya regarded it as past, present,

and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things

in its different manifesting stages of evolution _(adhvan)_. The

astronomers regarded it as being clue to the motion of the planets.

These must all be contrasted with the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika conception

of kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless

substance which appears as many in association with the changes

related to it [Footnote ref l].

The seventh substance is relative space _(dik)_. It is that substance

by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the

right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kâla like dik is

also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight

directions and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighth

substance is the soul _(âtman)_ which is all-pervading. There are

separate âtmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings

of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to _âtman_. Manas (mind) is

the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory;

all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are

generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the

objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with

the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling,

or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have

a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience

is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not

simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 64-66, and _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp.

136-139. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ regarded time as the cause of things

which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.]

[Footnote 2: See _Nyâyakandalî,_ pp. 66-69, and _Nyayamañjarî_, p. 140.]

312

of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas

the other things such as quality (_gu@na_), action (_karma_), sameness

or generality (_sâmânya_), speciality or specific individuality

(_vis'e@sa_) and the relation of inherence (_samavâya_) cannot show

themselves without the help of substance (_dravya_). Dravya is thus the

place of rest (_âs'rayâ_) on which all the others depend (_âs'@rta_).

Dravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa, and samavâya are the six original

entities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1].

When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and

a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way

of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics

and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any

passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and

attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref

2]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to

reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor

dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands

of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The

entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying

principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there

must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the

percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types

or categories (_padârtha_), and held that the notion of each type

was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in

number--dravya, gu@na, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red

book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which

rests the concept of "redness" and "oneness," and we thus call the

book a substance (_dravya_); dravya is thus defined as that which

has the characteristic of a dravya (_dravyatva_). So also gu@na and

karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the

same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with

Sâ@mkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Abhâva_ (negation) as dependent on bhâva (position) is

mentioned in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_. Later Nyâya writers such as

Udayana include _abhâva_ as a separate category, but S'rîdhara a

contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhâva was not

counted by Pras'astapâda as it was dependent on bhâva--"_abhâvasya

prthaganupades'a@h bhâvapâratantryât na tvabhâvât_." _Nyâyakandalî_,

p. 6, and _Lak@sa@nâvalî_, p. 2.]

[Footnote 2: "_Tattvato jñâte@su bâhyâdhyâtmike@su vi@saye@su

do@sadars'anât viraktasya samîhâniv@rttau âtmajñasya tadarthâni

karmânyakurvatah tatparityâgasâdhanâni s'rutism@rtyuditâni

asa@nkalpitaphalâni upâdadânasya âtmajñânamabhyasyata@h

prak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacaye sati

paripakvâtmajñânasyâtyantikas'arîraviyogasya bhâvât._" _Ibid._ p. 7.]

313

whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but

Nyâya-Vais'e@sika would collect "all whiteness" under the name

of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed [Footnote ref l].

They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate

mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions

could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or

not; but whenever they found that there were some experiences

which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate

entities or categories.

The six Padârthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sâmânya,

Vis'e@sa, Samavâya.

Of the six classes of entities or categories (_padârtha_) we have

already given some account of dravya [Footnote ref 2]. Let us now turn to

the others. Of the qualities (_gu@na_) the first one called _rûpa_

(colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone

and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue,

yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (_citra_). Colours are

found only in k@siti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are

permanent (_nitya_}, but the colour of k@siti changes when heat

is applied, and this, S'rîdhara holds, is due to the fact that

heat changes the atomic structure of k@siti (earth) and thus the

old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour

is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rûpa is the general

name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus _rûpatva_

(colourness), and the rûpa gu@na (quality) is that on which

rests this genus; rûpa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended

by the eye.

The second is _rasa_ (taste), that quality of things which can be

apprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent

(_ka@tu_), astringent (ka@sâya) and bitter (tikta). Only k@siti and ap

have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like

rûpa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must

be distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are

apprehended by the tongue.

The third is _gandha_ (odour), that quality which can be

apprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to k@siti alone. Water

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The reference is to Sautrântika Buddhism, "yo yo

vruddhâdhyâsavân nâsâveka@h." See Pa@n@ditâs'oka's _Avayavinirâkarana,

Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts_.

[Footnote 2: The word "padârtha" literally means denotations of words.]

314

or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence

of earth materials.

The fourth is _spars'a_ (touch), that quality which can be apprehended

only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold,

hot, neither hot nor cold. Spars'a belongs to k@siti; ap, tejas, and

vâyu. The fifth _s'abda_ (sound) is an attribute of âkâs'a. Had there

been no âkâs'a there would have been no sound.

The sixth is sa@mkhyâ (number), that entity of quality belonging

to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three,

etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative

oscillatory state of the mind (_apek@sâbuddhi_); thus when there are

two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion--This is one jug and

that is another jug. This is called apek@sâbuddhi; then in the

two jugs there arises the quality of twoness (_dvitva_) and then an

indeterminate perception (_nirvikalpa-dvitva-gu@na_) of dvitva in us

and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs.

The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a

similar manner [Footnote ref 1].

The seventh is _parimiti_ (measure), that entity of quality in

things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and

speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is

called _parima@n@dala parimâ@na_; it is eternal, and it cannot generate

the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely;

when two atoms generate a dyad (_dvya@nuka_) it is not

the measure of the atom that generates the a@nu (atomic) and

the _hrasva_ (small) measure of the dyad molecule (_dvya@nuka_),

for then the size (_parimâ@na_) of it would have been still smaller

than the measure of the atom (_parima@n@dala_), whereas the

measure of the dya@nuka is of a different kind, namely the

small (_hrasva_) [Footnote ref 2]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but

then the number (sa@mkhyâ) of the atom should be regarded as

bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (_hrasva_)

measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dya@nuka)

compose a trya@nuka the number and not the measure "small"

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This is distinctively a Vais'e@sika view introduced by

Pras'astapâda. Nyâya seems to be silent on this matter. See S'a@nkara

Mis'ra's _Upaskâra_, VII. ii. 8.]

[Footnote 2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms

as eternal as in "paramâ@nus" and non-eternal as in the dvya@nuka. The

parima@n@dala parimâ@na is thus a variety of a@nuparimâ@na. The

a@nuparimâ@na and the hrasvaparimâ@na represent the two dimensions of

the measure of dvya@nukas as mahat and dîrgha are with reference

to trya@nukas. See _Nyâyakandalî_, p. 133.]

315

(_hrasva_) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (_mahat_)

of the trya@nuka. But when we come to the region of these gross

trya@nukas we find that the "great" measure of the trya@nukas is

the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by

them. For as many trya@nukas constitute a gross body, so much

bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya@nukas

of mahat parimâ@na makes things of still more mahat parimâ@na.

The measure of trya@nukas is not only regarded as mahat

but also as dîrgha (long) and this dîrgha parimâ@na has to be admitted

as coexisting with mahat parimâ@na but not identical, for

things not only appear as great but also as long (_dîrgha_). Here

we find that the accumulation of trya@nukas means the accumulation

of "great" (_mahat_) and "long" (_dîrgha_) parimâ@na, and hence

the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater

and longer than the individual atoms which composed them.

Now the hrasva parimâ@na of the dyads is not regarded as having

a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct

type of measure which is called small (_hrasva_). As accumulation

of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness,

grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the

hrasva (small) parim_a@na ought to generate still more hrasva

parim_a@na, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of

the dyads was the cause of the measure of the trya@nukas, the

trya@nukas should be even smaller than the dya@nukas. So also if

the atomic and circular (_parima@n@dala_) size of the atoms is regarded

as generating by their measure the measure of the dya@nukas,

then the measure of the dya@nukas ought to be more atomic

than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should

not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced

by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be

regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign

to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the

cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness

and the parima@n@dala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to

generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect.

But since the dyads and the trya@nuka molecules are seen to

be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are

not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued

that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the

measure of their effects, but it is their _number_ which is the cause

316

of the measure of the latter. This explains a@nuparimâ@na, hrasva

parimâ@na, mahat parimâ@na, and dîrgha parimâ@na. The parimâ@na

of âkâs'a, kâla, dik and âtman which are regarded as all-pervasive,

is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimâ@nas

of the atoms, âkâs'a, kâla, dik, manas, and âtman are regarded

as eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parimâ@nas as belonging to

non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.

The eighth is _p@rthaktva_ (mutual difference or separateness of

things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things

appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is

perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation

such as this jug is not this pot.

The ninth is _sa@myoga_ (connection), that entity of gu@na by

virtue of which things appear to us as connected.

The tenth is _vibhâga_ (separation), that entity of gu@na which

destroys the connection or contact of things.

The eleventh and twelfth gu@nas, _paratva_ and _aparatva_, give

rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote

and near.

The other gu@nas such as _buddhi_(knowledge),_sukha_ (happiness),

_du@hkha_ (sorrow), _icchâ_ (will), _dve@sa_ (antipathy or hatred) and

_yatna_ (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.

The characteristic of _gurutva_ (heaviness) is that by virtue of

which things fall to the ground. The gu@na of _sneha_ (oiliness)

belongs to water. The gu@na of _sa@mskâra_ is of three kinds, (i) _vega_

(velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions,

(2) _sthiti-sthâpaka_ (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing

tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) _bhâvanâ_

is that quality of âtman by which things are constantly practised or by

which things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref l].

_Dharma_ is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy

happiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 2]. _Adharma_ is

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda says that bhâvanâ is a special characteristic

of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which

things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through

unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India),

repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the

sa@mskâra becomes particularly strong. See _Nyâyakandalî_, p. 167.

Ka@nâda however is silent on these points. He only says that by a

special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the sa@mskâra,

memory (sm@rti) is produced (ix. 2. 6).]

[Footnote 2: Pras'astapâda speaks of _dharma_ (merit) as being a quality

of the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admit

that dharma is a power of karma (_nakarmasâmarthyam_). Sacrifice etc.

cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generate

the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action

is destroyed its power (_sâmarthya_) cannot last. So dharma is to be

admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct

which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions

of time, place, etc. Faith (_s'raddhâ_), non-injury, doing good to all

beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of

anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods,

fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of

duties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by

Pras'astapâda as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to

these duties and the _yamas_ and _niyamas_ (cf. Patañjali's Yoga) and

attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padârthas attains a dharma

which brings liberation (_mok@sa_). S'rîdhara refers to the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga

account of the method of attaining salvation (_Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 272-280).

See also Vallabha's _Nyâyalilâvatî_, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)]

317

the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a

man to suffer. _Ad@r@s@ta_ or destiny is that unknown quality of

things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and

arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with

their merits or demerits.

_Karma_ means movement; it is the third thing which must

be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or gu@na. There

are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction,

(4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of

karmas rest on substances just, as the gu@nas do, and cause the

things to which they belong to move.

_Sâmânya_ is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect

of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite

of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of

them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows.

In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all

perceived as _sat_ or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness,

which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gu@na,

and karma. This sameness is called _sâmânya_ or _jâti_, and it is

regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gu@na, or

karma. This highest genus _sattâ_ (being) is called _parajâti_ (highest

universal), the other intermediate jâtis are called aparajâti (lower

universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gu@na, or

still more intermediate jâtis such as _gotvâjâti_ (the genus cow),

_nîlatvajâti_ (the genus blue). The intermediate jâtis or genera

sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as

_pas'utva_ (animal jâti) and _gotva_ (the cow jâti); here however

gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jâti.

The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jâti which

from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.

318

This jâti or _sâmânya_ thus must be regarded as having a separate

independent reality though it is existent in dravya, gu@na and

karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent

reality of sâmânya, but said that the sameness as cow

was really but the negation of all non-cows (_apoha_). The perception

of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this

is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who

should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent

reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns

on his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika said that negation

of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived

as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained

by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Sâmânya has

thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as

sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that

object [Footnote ref l]. This jâti is eternal or non-destructible, for even

with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jâti, the

latter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2].

Through _vis'e@sa_ things are perceived as diverse. No single

sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees

with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the

existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves.

The, specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated

souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The Buddhist Panditâs'oka says that there is no single thing

running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the

sâmânya could be established, for if it did exist then we could have

known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action

of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If

there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish

jâti in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the

action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should

require one common factor to hold them together, then these should

require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum.

Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent

(_yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat_). Sâmânya is

such, therefore sâmânya is non existent. No sâmânya can be admitted to

exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past

experiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed and

transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no sâmânya

can be pointed out as being externally perceptible

--_Sâmânyadûsanadikprasaritâ_--in _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_. The Vedanta

also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know

jâti as a separate substance. So it discards jâti. See _Vedântaparibhâsâ_,

_Sikhamani_ and _Mamprabhâ_, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's

_Khan@danakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086.]

[Footnote 2: Similarity (sâdrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category,

for it is defined as identity in difference (_tadbhinnatve sati

tadgatabhûyodharmavattvam_).]

319

is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the

yogins who can perceive them.

_Samavâya_, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation

by virtue of which two different things such as substance and

attribute, substance and karma, substance and sâmânya, karana

(cause) and kârya (effect), atoms and vis'e@sa, appear so unified

that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality.

This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why

substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jâti in substance

and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they

are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place

between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected

and may later on be connected (_yutasiddha_), such as when I put

my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances

and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na by

virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavâya

however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and

gu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as

one inseparable whole (_ayutasiddha_). This relation is thus a

separate and independent category. This is not regarded as

many like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal because

it has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed

but the samavâya relation which was never brought into being

by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].

These six things are called the six padârthas or independent

realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.

The Theory of Causation.

The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika in most of its speculations took that

view of things which finds expression in our language, and which

we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The Vedânta does not admit the existence of the relation of

samavâya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance

and qualities). Thus S'a@nkara says (_Brahma-sûtrabhâ@sya II. ii. 13_)

that if a samavâya relation is to be admitted to connect two different

things, then another samavâya would be necessary to connect it with

either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that

another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (_anavasthâ_).

Nyâya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to

remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of

_anavasthâ_--_prâmâ@nikî_ (valid infinite, as in case of the question

of the seed and the tree, or of the avidyâ and the passions), and another

_aprâmâ@nikî anavasthâ_ (vicious infinite) as when the admission of

anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]

320

they admitted dravya, gu@na, karma and sâmânya, Vis'e@sa they

had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did

not admit that things were continually changing their qualities,

and that everything could be produced out of everything by a

change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms.

In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the

effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that

the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the

accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the

wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed

the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent

before but was newly produced. This is what is called the

doctrine of _asatkâryavâda_. This is just the opposite of the

Sâ@mkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed _nâbhâvo

vidyate sata@h_) and that the non-existent could never be

produced (_nâsato vidyate bhâvah_). The objection to this view is

that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible

things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The

Nyâya-Vais'e@sika answer is that the view is not that anything

that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced

was non-existent [Footnote ref 1].

It is held by Mîmâ@msâ that an unseen power resides in the

cause which produces the effect. To this Nyâya objects that this

is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for

there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental

operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained

by molecular movement (_parispanda_). There is nothing

except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence)

between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of

an antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what

succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well

(_anyathâsiddhis'ûnyasya niyatâpûrvavarttitâ_). Unconditionality

and invariability are indispensable for _kâryakâra@na-bhâva_ or

cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or

adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also

be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only

collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional

upon something else (_na svâtantrye@na_). The potter's stick is an

unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamuñjari_, p. 494.]

321

of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment

or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is

not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be

regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable

antecedents or what enters into the production of their

co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they

are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those

of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the

sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably

precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and âkâs'a (ether) as the

substrate and vâyu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into

the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional

antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration

of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the

conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent

of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar),

the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the

potter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be

unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally

all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with

or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded

as causal conditions. Thus Dr. Seal in describing it rightly

remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to

complete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral,

secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the

irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of

energy. This test the Nyâya would accept only in the sense of

an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (_parispanda

eva bhautiko vyâpâra@h karotyartha@h atîndriyastu vyâparo

nâsti._ Jayanta's Mañjari Âhnika I), but would emphatically

reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious

causal power or efficiency (_s'akti_) [Footnote ref 1]." With Nyâya all

energy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyâya--its

insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations

of the different causal conditions--that these operations are of

the nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds

to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy,

i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely

repudiates the Sâ@mkhya conception of power or productive

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]

322

efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (_atîndriya_) and finds

nothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complements

of operative conditions (_kâra@na-sâmagrî_), and nothing

in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results

from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions [Footnote ref 1].

Certain general conditions such as relative space (_dik_), time

(_kâla_), the will of Îs'vara, destiny (_ad@r@s@ta_) are regarded

as the common cause of all effects (_kâryatva-prayojaka_). Those are

called _sâdhâra@na-kâra@na_ (common cause) as distinguished from the

specific causes which determine the specific effects which are called

_sâdhâra@na kâra@na_. It may not be out of place here to notice that

Nyâya while repudiating transcendental power (_s'akti_) in the mechanism

of nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of

metaphysical conditions like merit (_dharma_), which constitutes a

system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical

systems and order of nature.

The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species,

is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained

only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in

presence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from

a certain _a priori_ principle like that of causality or identity of

essence [Footnote ref 2].

The material cause such as the clay is technically called the

_samavâyi-kâra@na_ of the jug. _Samavâya_ means as we have seen

an intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A kâra@na is called

_samavâyi_ when its materials are found inseparably connected

with the materials of the effect. Asamavâyi-kâra@na is that which

produces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of

the samavâyi or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of

the colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the

colour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay

in inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This

colour of the clay is thus called the asamavâyi cause of the jug.

Any quality (_gu@na_) or movement which existing in the samavâya

cause in the samavâya relation determines the characteristics of

the effect is called the asamavâyi-kâra@na. The instrumental

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]

[Footnote 2: See for this portion Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of the

Ancient Hindus_, pp. 263-266. _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_ on Buddhism.

_Nyâyamañjarî Bhâ@sâ-pariccheda_, with _Muktâvalî_ and _Dinakarî_, and

_Tarkas@mgraha_. The doctrine of Anyathâsiddhi was systematically

developed from the time of Ga@nges'a.]

323

_nimitta_ and accessory (_sahakâri_) causes are those which help the

material cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheel

and the stick may be regarded as the nimitta and the sahakãri

causes of the effect.

We know that the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika regards the effect as nonexistent,

before the operation of the cause in producing it, but it

holds that the gu@nas in the cause are the causes of the gu@nas in

the effect, e.g. the black colour of the clay is the cause of the

black colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as an

extraneous cause to generate other qualities; thus when a clay

jug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though the

colour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another important

exception is to be found in the case of the production of

the parimâ@nas of dvya@nukas and trasare@nus which are not produced

by the parimâ@nas of an a@nu or a dya@nuka, but by their

number as we have already seen.

Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti).

The doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems

except the Mîmâ@msâ [Footnote ref 1]. According to the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika

view Îs'vara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings

desires to bring about dissolution (_sa@mhâreccho bhavati_). Simultaneously

with it the ad@r@s@ta force residing in all the souls and

forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act

(_s'akti-pratibandha_). As a result of this no further bodies, senses,

or other products come into being. Then for the bringing about

of the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of Îs'vara)

the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations

as bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to

the disintegrated atomic state, then all ap, then all tejas and then

all vâyu. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associated

with dharma, adharma and past impressions (_sa@mskâra_) remain

suspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know that

souls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless,

non-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connected

with bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity of

manas. In the state of pralaya owing to the ad@r@s@ta of souls the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The doctrine of pralaya and s@r@s@ti is found only in later

Nyâya-Vais'e@sika works, but the sûtras of both the systems seem to be

silent on the matter.]

324

atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the

part of Îs'vara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to

give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings.

At the time of creation, Îs'vara wishes to create and this desire

of Îs'vara works in all the souls as ad@r@s@ta. This one eternal

desire of Îs'vara under certain conditions of time (e.g. of pralaya)

as accessory causes (_sahakâri_) helps the disintegration of atoms

and at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process

of integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation.

When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called

ad@r@s@ta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this

ad@r@s@ta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play.

At the time of creation action first begins in the vâyu atoms by

the kinetic function of this ad@r@s@ta, by the contact of the souls

with the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact

with one another and the dvya@nukas are formed and then in a

similar way the trya@nukas are formed, and thus vâyu originates.

After vâyu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of water

atoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earth

atoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the

gross form, the god Brahmâ and all the worlds are created by

Îs'vara and Brahmâ is directed by Îs'vara to do the rest of the

work. Brahmâ thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of

the fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. Îs'vara brings

about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good

of all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they

may lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for

the attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover Îs'vara

arranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of

pains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in

our ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes

or punishments according to good or bad deeds [Footnote ref 1]. Many Nyâya

books do not speak of the appointment of a Brahmâ as deputy

for supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma

according to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya and

creation were brought about in accordance with the karma of

men, or that it may be due to a mere play (_lîlâ_) of Îs'vara.

Îs'vara is one, for if there were many Îs'varas they might quarrel.

The will of Îs'vara not only brings about dissolution and creation,

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 48-54.]

325

but also acts always among us in a general way, for without it

our karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of

pleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the

exterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen.

The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions.

Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications

take place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire

(_icchâ_) of Îs'vara may thus be compared with the _icchâ_ of Îs'vara

as we find it in the Yoga system.

Proof of the Existence of Îs'vara.

Sâ@mkhya asserts that the teleology of the prak@rti is sufficient

to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The

Mîmâ@msakas, the Cârvâkas, the Buddhists and the Jains all

deny the existence of Îs'vara (God). Nyâya believes that Îs'vara

has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing

atoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If

this be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement

must also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is

Îs'vara. This world is not momentary as the Buddhists suppose,

but is permanent as atoms, is also an effect so far as it is a

collocation of atoms and is made up of parts like all other individual

objects (e.g. jug, etc.), which we call effects. The world

being an effect like any other effect must have a cause like any

other effect. The objection made against this view is that such

effects as we ordinarily perceive may be said to have agents

as their causes but this manifest world with mountains, rivers,

oceans etc. is so utterly different in form from ordinary effects

that we notice every day, that the law that every effect must have

a cause cannot be said to hold good in the present case. The

answer that Nyâya gives is that the concomitance between two

things must be taken in its general aspect neglecting the specific

peculiarities of each case of observed concomitance. Thus I had

seen many cases of the concomitance of smoke with fire, and had

thence formed the notion that "wherever there is smoke there is

fire"; but if I had only observed small puffs of smoke and small

fires, could I say that only small quantities of smoke could lead

us to the inference of fire, and could I hold that therefore large

volumes of smoke from the burning of a forest should not be

sufficient reason for us to infer the existence of fire in the forest?

326

Thus our conclusion should not be that only smaller effects

are preceded by their causes, but that all effects are invariably

and unconditionally preceded by causes. This world therefore

being an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is

Îs'vara. This cause we cannot see, because Îs'vara has no visible

body, not because he does not exist. It is sometimes said that

we see every day that shoots come out of seeds and they are

not produced by any agent. To such an objection the Nyâya

answer is that even they are created by God, for they are also

effects. That we do not see any one to fashion them is not

because there is no maker of them, but because the creator cannot

be seen. If the objector could distinctly prove that there was

no invisible maker shaping these shoots, then only could he point

to it as a case of contradiction. But so long as this is not done

it is still only a doubtful case of enquiry and it is therefore legitimate

for us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shoots

as well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause.

This cause is Îs'vara. He has infinite knowledge and is all merciful.

At the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like our

father who is always engaged in doing us good [Footnote ref 1].

Tht Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Physics.

The four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms.

These have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), viscosity

(or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour,

taste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation of

heat. Âkâs'a (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less being

only as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travel

wave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combination

is only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannot

exist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmospheric

air however consists of atoms in an uncombined state.

Two atoms combine to form a binary molecule (_dvya@nuka_). Two,

three, four, or five dvya@nukas form themselves into grosser molecules

of trya@nuka, catura@nuka, etc. [Footnote ref 2]. Though this was the

generally current view, there was also another view as has been pointed

out by Dr B.N. Seal in his _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_, that

the "atoms have also an inherent tendency to unite," and that

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Jayanta's _Nyâyamañjarî,_ pp. 190-204, and Udayana's

_Kusumâñjali_ with _Prakâs'a_ and _Îs'varânumâna_ of Raghunâtha.]

[Footnote 2: _Kadâcit tribhirârabhyate iti trya@nukamityucyate, kadâcit

caturbhirârabhyate kadâcit pañcabhiriti yathe@s@ta@m kalpanâ.

Nyâyakandalî_, p. 32.]

327

they do so in twos, threes, or fours, "either by the atoms falling into

groups of threes, fours, etc., directly, or by the successive addition

of one atom to each preceding aggregate [Footnote ref l]." Of course the

atoms are regarded as possessed of an incessant vibratory motion. It

must however be noted in this connection that behind this

physical explanation of the union of atoms there is the ad@r@s@ta, the

will of Îs'vara, which gives the direction of all such unions in harmony

with the principle of a "moral government of the universe,"

so that only such things are produced as can be arranged for the

due disposal of the effects of karma. "An elementary substance

thus produced by primary atomic combination may however suffer

qualitative changes under the influence of heat (_pâkajotpatti_)"

The impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a dvya@nuka into the

atoms and transforms the characters of the atoms determining

them all in the same way. The heat particles continuing to impinge

reunite the atoms so transformed to form binary or other

molecules in different orders or arrangements, which account for

the specific characters or qualities finally produced. The Vais'e@sika

holds that there is first a disintegration into simple atoms, then

change of atomic qualities, and then the final re-combination,

under the influence of heat. This doctrine is called the doctrine

of _pîlupâka_ (heating of atoms). Nyâya on the other hand thinks

that no disintegration into atoms is necessary for change of qualities,

but it is the molecules which assume new characters under the

influence of heat. Heat thus according to Nyâya directly affects

the characters of the molecules and changes their qualities without

effecting a change in the atoms. Nyâya holds that the

heat-corpuscles penetrate into the porous body of the object and

thereby produce the change of colour. The object as a whole is

not disintegrated into atoms and then reconstituted again, for

such a procedure is never experienced by observation. This is

called the doctrine of _pi@tharapâka_ (heating of molecules). This

is one of the few points of difference between the later Nyâya

and Vais'e@sika systems [Footnote ref 2].

Chemical compounds of atoms may take place between the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Utpala's commentary on _Brhatsamh@itâ_ I. 7.]

[Footnote 2: See Dr B.N. Seal in P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, pp. 190-191,

_Nyâyamañjarî_, p 438, and Udyotakara's _Vârttika_. There is very little

indication in the Nyâya and _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ that they had any of

those differences indicated here. Though there are slight indications of

these matters in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ (VII. 1), the _Nyâya sûtras_ are

almost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theory

of creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place after

Vâtsyâyana.]

328

atoms of the same bhûta or of many bhûtas. According to the

Nyâya view there are no differences in the atoms of the same

bhûta, and all differences of quality and characteristics of the

compound of the same bhûta are due only to diverse collocations

of those atoms. Thus Udyotakara says (III. i. 4) that there is no

difference between the atom of a barley seed and paddy seed,

since these are all but atoms of earth. Under the continued impact

of heat particles the atoms take new characters. It is heat and

heat alone that can cause the transformations of colours, tastes

etc. in the original bhûta atoms. The change of these physical

characters depends on the colours etc. of the constituent substances

in contact, on the intensity or degree of heat and also on the

species of tejas corpuscles that impinge on the atoms. Heat breaks

bodies in contact into atoms, transforms their qualities, and forms

separate bodies with them.

Pras'astapâda (the commentator of Vais'e@sika) holds that in

the higher compounds of the same bhûta the transformation takes

place (under internal heat) in the constituent atoms of the compound

molecules, atoms specially determined as the compound

and not in the original atoms of the bhûta entering into the composition

of the compound. Thus when milk is turned into curd,

the transformation as curd takes place in the atoms determined

as milk in the milk molecule, and it is not necessary that the

milk molecule should be disintegrated into the atoms of the

original bhûta of which the milk is a modification. The change

as curd thus takes place in the milk atom, and the milk molecule

has not to be disintegrated into k@siti or ap atoms. So again in

the fertilized ovum, the germ and the ovum substances, which in

the Vais'e@sika view are both isomeric modes of earth (with accompaniments

of other bhûtas) are broken up into homogeneous earth

atoms, and it is these that chemically combine under the animal

heat and biomotor force vâyu to form the germ (_kalala_). But

when the germ plasm develops, deriving its nutrition from the

blood of the mother, the animal heat breaks up the molecules of

the germ plasm into its constituent atoms, i.e. atoms specifically

determined which by their grouping formed the germ plasm.

These germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with the atoms of

the food constituents and thus produce cells and tissues [Footnote ref 1].

This atomic contact is called _ârambhaka-sa@myoga_.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Dr B.N. Seal's _Positive Sciences,_ pp. 104-108, and

_Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 33-34, "_S'arîrârambhe paramânava eva kâra@nam na

s'ukra-s'onitasannipâta@h kriyâvibhâgâdinyâyena tayorvinâs'e sati

utpannapâkajai@h paramâ@nubhirârambhât, na ca s'ukras'onitaparamâ@nûnâ@m

kas'cidvis'e@sa@h pârthivatvâvis'e@sât....Pitu@h s'ukra@m mâtuh s'onita@m

tayos sannipâtânantara@m ja@tharânalasambandhât s'ukra-s'onitârambhake@su

paramâ@nu@su pûrvarûpâdivinâs'e samâ@nagu@nântarotpattau

dvya@nukâdikrame@na kalalas'arirotpatti@h tatrântahkara@napraves'o...tatra

mâturâhâraraso mâtrayâ sa@mkrâmate, ad@r@s@tavas'âttatra

punarja@tharânalasambandhât kalalârambhakaparamâ@nu@su

kriyâvibhâgadinyâyena kalalas'arîre na@s@te samutpannapâkajai@h

kalalârambhakaparamâ@nubhirad@r@s@tavas'âd

upajâtakriyairâhâraparamâ@nitbhi@h saha sambhûya

s'arîrântaramârakkyate."_.]

329

In the case of poly-bhautik or bi-bhautik compounds there is

another kind of contact called _upa@s@tambha_. Thus in the case of

such compounds as oils, fats, and fruit juices, the earth atoms

cannot combine with one another unless they are surrounded by

the water atoms which congregate round the former, and by the

infra-atomic forces thus set up the earth atoms take peculiar

qualities under the impact of heat corpuscles. Other compounds

are also possible where the ap, tejas, or the vâyu atoms form the

inner radicle and earth atoms dynamically surround them (e.g.

gold, which is the tejas atom with the earth atoms as the surrounding

upa@s@tambhaka). Solutions (of earth substances in ap)

are regarded as physical mixtures.

Udayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all the

stores of heat required for chemical change. But there are

differences in the modes of the action of heat; and the kind of

contact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemical

action which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from what

transforms flavour or taste.

Heat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitely

small particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions rectilineally

with inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate through

the interatomic space as in the case of the conduction of heat, as

when water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparency

light rays penetrate through the inter-atomic spaces with _parispanda_

of the nature of deflection or refraction (_tiryag-gamana_).

In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound

back--which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike the

atoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform

the physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recombine

them, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable

velocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemical

combination [Footnote ref l]. Govardhana a later Nyâya writer says that

pâka means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Hindus_.]

330

changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates

or changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the

same a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When

grass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of

heat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into

such forms as those that belong to milk [Footnote ref 1].

In the Nyâya-Vais`e@sika system all action of matter on matter

is thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (_prayatna_) is

distinguished from all forms of motion as against the Sâ@mkhya

doctrine which considered everything other than puru@sa (intelligence)

to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore

to be subject to vibratory motion.

The Origin of Knowledge (Pramâ@na).

The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the

most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We

have already seen that Sâ@mkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing

that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the

object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was

then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or puru@sa.

The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to

a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence

of the self.

Nyâya-Vais`e@sika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage

of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably,

and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (_sâmagrî_)

which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well

as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted

and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus

called pramâ@na or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge

[Footnote ref 2]. None of the separate elements composing

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Govardhana's _Nyâyabodhinî_ on _Tarkasa@mgraha_, pp. 9, 10.]

[Footnote 2: "_Avyabhicârinîmasandigdhârthopalabdhi@m vidadhatî

bodhâbodhasvabhâvâ sâmagrî pramâ@nam._" _Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 12.

Udyotakara however defined "pramâ@na" as upalabdhihetu (cause of

knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have

followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyâpâra or movement of

the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with

them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vâcaspati says: "_siddhamindriyâdi,

asiddhañca tatsannikar@sâdi vyâpârayannutpâdayan kara@na eva caritârtha@h

kar@na@m tvindriyâdi tatsannikar@sâdi vâ nânyatra caritarthamiti

sâk@sâdupalabdhâveva phale vyâprîyate._" _Tâtparya@tîkâ_, p. 15. Thus it

is the action of the senses as pramâ@na which is the direct cause of

the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken

place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as

causes in some sense. _"Pramât@rprameyayo@h. pramâne

caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetu@h.

Pramât@rprameye tu phaloddes'ena prav@rtte iti taddhetû kathañcit."

Ibid._ p. 16.]

331

the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only

their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for

sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal

collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of

course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated

from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the

preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly.

These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate

cognition as qualification (vis'e@sa@na) in determinate perceptions,

the knowledge of li@nga in inference, the seeing of similar things in

upamâna, the hearing of sound in s'abda) but also the assemblage

of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception,

capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for

the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements

all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce

further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations

that is called pramâ@na.

Nyâya argues that in the Sâ@mkhya view knowledge originates

by the transcendent influence of puru@sa on a particular

state of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does

not belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains

within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept

(knowledge). The puru@sa to whom the knowledge belongs, however,

neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as

it always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendental

contact of the puru@sa with buddhi is but a mere semblance

or appearance or illusion, then the Sâ@mkhya has to admit

that there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge

is false. And since all knowledge is false, the Sâ@mkhyists have

precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.

There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine

that simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the

knowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the

rise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither

is the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the

knowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is

evident that this view does not explain why knowledge should

332

express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are

both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes

this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the

object. The doctrine of the Vijñâna vâdins, that it is knowledge

alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also

irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and object

in such a manner that knowledge as object should require

the knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case we

might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also

require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on

_ad infinitum_. Again if pramâ@na be defined as _prâpa@na_ (capacity

of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being

momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot

be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called

pramâ@na. These views moreover do not explain the origin of

knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like

any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same

way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes

intellectual and physical [Footnote ref 1]. There is no transcendent

element involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production

on the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena

are produced [Footnote ref 2].

The four Pramâ@nas of Nyâya.

We know that the Carvâkas admitted perception (_pratyak@sa_)

alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the

Vais'e@sika admitted two sources, pratyak@sa and inference (_anumâna_);

Sâ@mkhya added _s'abda_ (testimony) as the third source;

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 12-26.]

[Footnote 2: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Gañges'a,

a later naiyâyika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of

our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with

the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to

successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure

that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be

successful, I call it valid knowledge. _Tattvacintâma@ni_, K.

Tarkavâgîs'a's edition, _Prâmâ@nyavâda_.

"The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ tacitly admit the Vedas as a pramâ@na. The view

that Vais'e@sika only admitted two pramâ@nas, perception and inference, is

traditionally accepted, _"pratyak@sameka@mcârvâkâ@h ka@nâdasugatau puna@h

anumânañca taccâpi,_ etc." Pras'astapâda divides all cognition (_buddhi_)

as _vidyâ_ (right knowledge) and _avidyâ_ (ignorance). Under _avidyâ_ he

counts _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt or uncertainty), _viparyaya_ (illusion or

error), _anadhyavasâya_ (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who

had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it

may be) and _svapna_ (dream). Right knowledge (_vidyâ_) is of four kinds,

perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages

(_âr@sa_). Interpreting the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI.

i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy

character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in

themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the

trustworthy character of their author. _Arthâpatti_ (implication) and

_anupalabdhi_ (non-perception) are also classed as inference and _upamâna_

(analogy) and _aitihya_ (tradition) are regarded as being the same as

faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]

333

Nyâya adds a fourth, _upamâna_ (analogy). The principle on which

the four-fold division of pramâ@nas depends is that the causal

collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature

or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is

different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of

our perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda

(testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge

being different in each case, and the manner or conditions

producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be

admitted that inference and s'abda are different pramâ@nas, though

they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyâya

thus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upamâna

within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production

of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different

pramâ@nas [Footnote ref 1].

Perception (Pratyak@sa).

The naiyâyikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which

they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements.

These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic

of that element of which they were composed. Thus the

ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of

âkâs'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The

eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things.

Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects

by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them.

The cognitive senses (_vâk, pâni, pâda, pâyu_, and _upastha_) recognized

in Sâ@mkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such

for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the

general motor functions of the body.

Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the

contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error

not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1:

_Sâmagrîbhedâi phalabhedâcca pramâ@nabheda@h

Anye eva hi sâmagrîphale pratyak@sali@ngayo@h

Anye eva ca sâmagrîphale s'abdopamânayo@h. Nyâyamañjari_, p. 33.]

334

as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just

at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate

[Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow,

the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be

counted as perception but as sound-knowledge (_s'abda-pramâ@na_).

That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact

of the senses with the object is said to be the product of

the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate

(_nirvikalpa_) and (_savikalpa_) determinate. Indeterminate perception

is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of

perception in which it appears without any association with name.

Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage

is just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics

and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete

experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their

characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no

association of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the

names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate

perception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyak@sa. If at the time

of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known

to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should

be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that

product is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which results

from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with

the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is

held by the later naiyâyikas that we are not conscious of it

directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first

stage without which the determinate consciousness could not

arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage

in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the

other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception.

The contact of the sense with the object is regarded

as being of six kinds: (1) contact with the dravya (thing) called

sa@myoga, (2) contact with the gu@nas (qualities) through the thing

(_sa@myukta-samavâya_) in which they inhere in samavâya (inseparable)

relation, (3) contact with the gu@nas (such as colour etc.) in

the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness

(rûpatva), which inhere in the gu@nas in the samavâya relation.

___________________________________________________________________