THE NYÂYA-VAIS'E@SIKA PHILOSOPHY
Criticism of Buddhism and Sâ@mkhya from the
Nyâya standpoint.
The Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of
substance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of
things, on the ground that all collocations are momentary;
each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to
another group and that to another and so on. But if a collocation
representing milk generates the collocation of curd
it is said to be due to a joint action of the elements forming
the cause-collocation and the _modus operandi_ is unintelligible;
the elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separately
generate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for on
such a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrine
of momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of influence
on the part of the cause-elements and their coordination
and manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment.
The supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is the
result of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation is
against our universal uncontradicted experience that specific
elements constituting the cause (e.g. the whiteness of milk) are
the cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e.g. the
whiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness,
blackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lump
state should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities in
the iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience.
Moreover there would be no difference between material (_upâdâna_,
e.g. clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (_nimitta_
and _sahakâri_, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. in
forming the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, and
there was no room for distinguishing the material and the instrumental
causes, as such.
Again at the very moment in which a cause-collocation is
brought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its
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effect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take the
cause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influence
to produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed the
moment after it is born produce any effect? The truth is that
causal elements remain and when they are properly collocated
the effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that we
perceive things as existing from a past time. The past time is
perceived by us as past, the present as present and the future as
future and things are perceived as existing from a past time onwards.
The Sâ@mkhya assumption that effects are but the actualized
states of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holds
within it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect is
already existent even before the causal movement for the production
of the effect, is also baseless. Sâ@mkhya says that the
oil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, and
that it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from the
stone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consists
only in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent in
a potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump of
clay is called the cause and the jug the effect; of what good is it
to say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can never
carry water? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug.
What is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or was
in a potential state before, and that it has now become manifest
or actual? What does potential state mean? The potential state
of the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual state
of the jug must be admitted as non-existent before. If it is
meant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) of
which the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this does
not mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lump
of clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which it
can expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as the
potter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as the
effect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have said
that the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of Sâ@mkhya
that the substance and attribute have the same reality is also
against all experience, for we all perceive that movement and
attribute belong to substance and not to attribute. Again
Sâ@mkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different
276
from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi
non-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fuss
that the qualities of buddhi are reflected on puru@sa and then again on
buddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul
(_âtman_) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand why
Sâ@mkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that knowledge,
feeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again in
order to explain experience it brought forth a theory of double
reflection. Again Sâ@mkhya prak@rti is non-intelligent, and where
is the guarantee that she (prak@rti) will not bind the wise again
and will emancipate him once for all? Why did the puru@sa become
bound down? Prak@rti is being utilized for enjoyment by
the infinite number of puru@sas, and she is no delicate girl (as
Sâ@mkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the puru@sa
ashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure
(_sukha_), sorrow (_du@hkha_) and a blinding feeling through ignorance
(_moha_) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with what
impudence could Sâ@mkhya think of these as material substances?
Again their cosmology of a mahat, aha@mkâra, the tanmâtras,
is all a series of assumptions never testified by experience nor
by reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders.
The phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful reconstruction
in the light of reason and experience such as cannot be found in other
systems. (See _Nyâyamañjarî,_ pp. 452-466 and 490-496.)
Nyâya and Vais'e@sika sûtras.
It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyâya are
to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars
trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use
in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between
the adherents of different schools of thought trying to
defeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in
the days of the Upani@sads, and the art of disputation was regarded
even then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then by
the name _vâkovâkya_. Mr Bodas has pointed out that Âpastamba
who according to Bühler lived before the third century B.C. used the
word Nyâya in the sense of Mîmâ@msâ [Footnote ref 1]. The word Nyâya
derived
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1 _Âpastamba,_ trans. by Bühler, Introduction, p. XXVII., and
Bodas's article on the _Historical Survey of Indian Logic_ in the Bombay
Branch of J.R.A.S., vol. XIX.]
277
from the root _nî_ is sometimes explained as that by which sentences
and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning
and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of
words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing
out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered
into combination) were called Nyâya [Footnote ref 1]. Prof. Jacobi on the
strength of Kau@tilya's enumeration of the _vidyâ_ (sciences) as Ânvîk@sikî
(the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge
by further scrutiny), _trayî_ (the three Vedas), _vârttâ_ (the sciences
of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and _da@n@danîti_ (polity), and the
enumeration of the philosophies as Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Lokâyata
and Ânvîk@sikî, supposes that the _Nyâya sûtra_ was not in existence
in Kau@tilya's time 300 B.C.) [Footnote ref 2]. Kau@tilya's reference to
Nyâya as Ânvîk@sikî only suggests that the word Nyâya was not a familiar
name for Ânvîk@sikî in Kau@tilya's time. He seems to misunderstand
Vâtsyâyana in thinking that Vâtsyâyana distinguishes Nyâya
from the Ânvîk@sikî in holding that while the latter only means
the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics.
What appears from Vâtsyâyana's statement in _Nyâya sûtra_ I.i. 1
is this that he points out that the science which was known in his
time as Nyâya was the same as was referred to as Ânvîk@sikî by
Kau@tilya. He distinctly identifies Nyâyavidyâ with Ânvîk@sikî,
but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories
such as _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt) etc., though these were already contained
within the first two terms _pramâ@na_ (means of cognition) and
_prameya_ (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its
special and separate branches (_p@rthakprasthâna_) were treated,
Nyâyavidyâ would simply become metaphysics (_adhyâtmavidyâ_)
like the Upani@sads. The old meaning of Nyâya as the means of determining
the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon
by Vâtsyâyana and is sanctioned by Vâcaspati in his
_Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ_ I.i. 1). He compares the meaning of the
word Nyâya (_pramâ@nairarthaparîk@sa@nam_--to scrutinize an object by
means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word
ânvîk@sikî (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception
and scriptures). Vâtsyâyana of course points out that so far as
this logical side of Nyâya is concerned it has the widest scope for
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Kâlidâsa's _Kumârasambhava "Udghâto pra@navayâsâm
nyâyaistribhirudîra@nam_," also Mallinâtha's gloss on it.]
[Footnote 2: Prof. Jacobi's "_The early history of Indian Philosophy,"
Indian Antiquary_, 1918.]
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itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences
[Footnote ref 1]. He quotes Kau@tilya to show that in this capacity Nyâya
is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its
capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the
way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that
the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this
seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vâtsyâyana himself
designates the logical portion as a p@rthakprasthâna (separate
branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vâtsyâyana or
Kau@tilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made
after Kau@tilya. Vâtsyâyana has no doubt put more stress on the
importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that
seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or
_adhyâtmavidyâ_ was acknowledged by all. But the importance of
the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of
the dharmas'âstras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend
any support to it, and Vâtsyâyana had to seek the support of
Kau@tilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kau@tilya
was not satisfied by counting Ânvîk@sikî as one of the four
vidyâs but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side
with Sâ@mkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably
even in Kau@tilya's time Nyâya was composed of two branches,
one as adhyâtmavidyâ and another as a science of logic or rather
of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external,
and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added
to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might
not attract sufficient attention. Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda
S'âstrî in an article in the _Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society_
1905 says that as Vâcaspati made two attempts to collect the
_Nyâya sûtras_, one as _Nyâyasûci_ and the other as _Nyâyasûtroddhâra_,
it seems that even in Vâcaspati's time he was not certain as to
the authenticity of many of the _Nyâya sûtras_. He further points
out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sûtras
were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China
and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyâya and Yoga. He also
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[Footnote 1: _Yena prayukta@h pravarttate tat prayojanam_ (that by which
one is led to act is called _prayojanam_); _yamartham abhîpsan jihâsan
vâ karma ârabhate tenânena sarve prâ@nina@h sarvâ@ni karmâ@ni sarvâs'ca
vidyâ@h vyâptâ@h tadâs'rayâs'ca nyâya@h pravarttate_ (all those which
one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all
beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana,
and all these depend on Nyâya). _Vâtsyâyana bhâs'ya_, I.i. 1.]
279
thinks that the sûtras underwent two additions, one at the hands
of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who
put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These
suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but
we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such
additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs
of the interpolation of many of the sûtras makes the fixing of
the date of the original part of the _Nyâya sûtras_ still more difficult,
for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and
Prof. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of the _Nyâya sûtras_ on the
basis of references to S'ûnyavâda naturally loses its value, except
on the supposition that all references to S'ûnyavâda must be later
than Nâgârjuna, which is not correct, since the _Mahâyâna sûtras_
written before Nâgârjuna also held the S'ûnyavâda doctrine.
The late Dr S.C. Vidyâbhû@sa@na in _J.R.A.S._ 1918 thinks
that the earlier part of Nyâya was written by Gautama about
550 B.C. whereas the _Nyâya sûtras_ of Ak@sapâda were written
about 150 A.D. and says that the use of the word Nyâya in the
sense of logic in _Mahâbhârata_ I.I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be
regarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any
reasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment
of the subject that the fixing of the date of Ak@sapâda was made
to fit in somehow with his idea that Ak@sapâda wrote his _Nyâya
sûtras_ under the influence of Aristotle--a supposition which does
not require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyâbhû@sa@na
has proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced
a step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part
of the Nyâya. Goldstücker says that both Patañjali (140 B.C.)
and Kâtyâyana (fourth century B.C.) knew the _Nyâya sûtras_ [Footnote ref
1]. We know that Kau@tilya knew the Nyâya in some form as Ânvîk@sikî
in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say
that the Nyâya existed in some form as early as the fourth
century B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think
that at least some of the present sûtras were written some time
in the second century A.D. Bodas points out that Bâdarâya@na's
sûtras make allusions to the Vais'e@sika doctrines and not to Nyâya.
On this ground he thinks that _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ were written before
Bâdarâyana's _Brahma-sûtras_, whereas the Nyâya sûtras were
written later. Candrakânta Tarkâla@mkâra also contends in his
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[Footnote 1: Goldstücker's _Pâ@nini_, p. 157.]
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edition of Vais'e@sika that the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ were earlier than the
Nyâya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the _Vais'e@sika
sûtras_ were written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes
one of the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, but the whole foundation of his medical
physics is based on the Vais`e@sika physics [Footnote ref 1]. The
_La@nkâvatâra sûtra_ (which as it was quoted by As'vagho@sa is earlier
than 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are
other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing
that the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ are probably pre-Buddhistic [Footnote ref 2].
It is certain that even the logical part of the present _Nyâya
sûtras_ was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by
thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I.i. 32 in which
the sûtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (_avayava_)
Vâtsyâyana says that this sûtra was written to refute the views
of those who held that there should be ten premisses [Footnote ref 3]. The
_Vais'e@sika sûtras_ also give us some of the earliest types of inference,
which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyâya
doctrine of inference [Footnote ref 4].
Does Vais'e@sika represent an Old School of Mîmâ@msâ?
The Vais'e@sika is so much associated with Nyâya by tradition
that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed
to represent an old school of Mîmâ@msâ, older than that represented
in the _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras._ But a closer inspection of the _Vais'e@sika
sûtras_ seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable
way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes
a _Vais'e@sika sûtra._ An examination of Caraka's _Sûtrasthâna_ (I.35-38)
leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some
compendium of Vais'e@sika such as that of the _Bhâ@sâpariccheda_
before him. _Caraka sûtra_ or _kârikâ_ (I.i. 36) says that the gu@nas
are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc.,
cognition, and those which begin with the gu@na "_para_" (universality)
and end with "_prayatna_" (effort) together with the sense-qualities
(_sârthâ_). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known
enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found
in the _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ (I.i. 6) which leaves out the six gu@nas,
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Caraka, S'ârîra_, 39.]
[Footnote 2: See the next section.]
[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana's Bhâ@sya on the _Nyâya sûtras,_ I.i.32. This is
undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in
_Das'avaikâlikaniryukti_ as noted before.]
[Footnote 4: _Nyâya sûtra_ I.i. 5, and _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ IX. ii. 1-2,
4-5, and III. i. 8-17.]
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heaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness(_sneha_),
elasticity (_sa@mskâra_), merit (_dharma_) and demerit (_adharma_);
in one part of the sûtra the enumeration begins with "para"
(universality) and ends in "prayatna," but buddhi (cognition)
comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in
prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list
and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's
sûtra was written at a time when the six gu@nas left out in the
Vais'e@sika enumeration had come to be counted as gu@nas, and
compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated.
_Bhâ@sâpariccheda_ (a later Vais'e@sika compendium), is a compilation
from some very old kârikâs which are referred to by Vis'vanâtha
as being collected from "_atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h_"--(from
very ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka's definition of sâmânya
and vis'e@sa shows that they had not then been counted as separate
categories as in later Nyâya-Vais'e@sika doctrines; but though
slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition
one finds in the _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ that sâmânya (generality) and
vi'se@sa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka's sûtras were
therefore probably written at a time when the Vais'e@sika doctrines were
undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning
to be written on them.
The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist
doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is
no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the
argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an
object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I." There
is also no other reference to any other systems except to some
Mîmâ@msâ doctrines and occasionally to Sâ@mkhya. There is no
reason to suppose that the Mîmâ@msâ doctrines referred to allude
to the _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ of Jaimini. The manner in which the
nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyâya
phraseology of "_pûrvavat_" and "_s'e@savat_" was not known. _Vais'e@sika
sûtras_ in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate
cause [Footnote ref 3]. We know that the S'vetâs'vatara Upani@sad refers to
those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha's article in _J.A.S.B._,
1908.]
[Footnote 2: Caraka (I.i. 33) says that sâmânya is that which produces
unity and vis'e@sa is that which separates. V.S. II. ii. 7. Sâmânya and
vis'e@sa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).]
[Footnote 3: _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).]
282
systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient
view [Footnote ref 1]. These considerations as well as the general style of
the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these
sûtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability
are pre-Buddhistic.
The _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ begins with the statement that its object
is to explain virtue, "dharma" This is we know the manifest duty
of Mîmâ@msâ and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini
begins his _Mîmâ@msâ sûtras_ by defining "dharma". This at first
seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vais'e@sika, viz, the description
of the nature of padartha [Footnote ref 2]. He then defines dharma as
that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (_nihsreyasa_) and
says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate
this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions
(of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives
bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us
through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must
be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts [Footnote ref 3].
The fact that the Vais'e@sika begins with a promise to describe dharma
and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions
and also the _ad@r@s@ta_ (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit
accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many
of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book
by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce
any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows
that Ka@nâda's method of explaining dharma has been by showing
that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and
actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a
good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption
of ad@r@s@ta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The
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[Footnote 1: S'vetâs'vatara I.i.2]
[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the _Kalâpa
Vyâkara@na_, in which it is said that the description of the six categories
by Ka@nâda in his _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, after having proposed to describe
the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while
intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himâlaya).
"_Dnarma@m vyâkhyâtukâmasya @sa@tpadârthopavar@nana@m Himavadgantukâmasya
sâgaragamanopamam_."]
[Footnote 3: The sutra "_Tadvacanâd âmnâyasya prâmâ@nyam_ (I.i.3 and
X.ii.9) has been explained by _Upaskâra_ as meaning "The Veda being the
word of Îs'vara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no
mention of Îs'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later
Nyâya ideas into the Vais'e@sika. Sûtra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of
VI.ii.1.]
283
description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but
is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these
cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on
the supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance
of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards
magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies,
V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion
of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations
have taken place), and the original movement of the
mind are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. In V. ii. 17 the movement
of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the
assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the
movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in
_Upaskara_) are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) is
said to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to the
annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths
Vais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced)
and the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are founded
on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience
are due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend all
life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or
the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air,
death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena
by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2),
in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy.
Ka@nâda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding
substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of
metaphysics to ad@r@s@ta But what leads to ad@r@s@ta? In answer to
this, Ka@nâda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or
sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (_snana_),
fasting, holy student life (_brahmacarya_), remaining at the house
of the teacher (_gurukulavasa_), retired forest life (_vanaprastha_),
sacrifice (_yajña_), gifts (_dana_), certain kinds of sacrificial
sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the
prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras)
(VI. ii. 2).
He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure
food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary
being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food
leads to prosperity through ad@r@s@ta. He also described how
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feelings of attachment to things are also generated by ad@r@s@ta.
Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Ka@nâda is busy in showing
the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference
to our chapter on Mîmâ@msâ will show that the later Mîmâ@msâ
writers agreed with the Nyâya-Vais`e@sika doctrines in most of their
views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points
in which Mîmâ@msâ differs from Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are (1) self-validity
of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief
in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (according
to Kumârila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego.
Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject
of discussion in the Vais'e@sika. But as no Îs'vara is mentioned,
and as all ad@r@s@ta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we
may assume that Vais'e@sika had no dispute with Mîmâ@msâ. The
fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due
to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the
_Vais`e@sika sûtras._ It is probable that Ka@nâda believed that the
Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i.
1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with
Mîmâ@msâ suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never
written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in
the days of the _Vais'e@sika sûtras,_ the view was probably what is
represented in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras._ As there is no reference to
Îs`vara and as ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of actions
in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all
atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais'e@sika was
as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mîmâ@msâ philosophers.
As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one
of the main points of quarrel between the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and
the Mîmâ@msâ, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Ka@nâda gives reasons
in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33
till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the
eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mîmâ@msâ view as we know
from the later Mîmâ@msâ writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question
of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyâya view is
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sûtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my
opinion wrongly interpreted by S'a@nkara Mis'ra in his _Upaskâra_ (II. ii.
36 by adding an "_api_" to the sûtra and thereby changing the issue, and
II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyabhava" as
sâ@mkhya and bhava instead of sâ@mkhya and abhava, which in my opinion
is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound
as we find in the later Nyâya Vais'e@sika view.]
285
that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the
seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally
this is regarded as the Vais'e@sika view as well. But in Vais'e@sika
III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its
activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this
inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the
activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no
certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is
suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted
on the authority of the scriptures (_âgama_). To this the final
Vais'e@sika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self
in our feeling as "I" (_aham_), and we have therefore not to depend
on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus
the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional
proof of what we already find in perception as "I" (_aham_) (III. ii.
10-18, also IX. i. 11).
These considerations lead me to think that the Vais'e@sika
represented a school of Mîmâ@msâ thought which supplemented
a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.
Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika sûtras.
The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining
virtue (_dharma_) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is
that by which prosperity (_abhyudaya_) and salvation (_ni@hs'reyasa_)
are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the
Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and
salvation. Then it turns back to the second sûtra and says that
salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special
excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of
substance (_dravya_), quality (_gu@na_), class concept (_sâmdânya_),
particularity (_vis'e@sa_), and inherence (_samavâyay_) [Footnote ref 1].
The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and
mind. The gu@nas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure,
separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to
species [Footnote ref 2]. Action (_karma_) means upward movement
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Upaskâra_ notes that vis'e@sa here refers to the ultimate
differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this
system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same
element has specific features of difference.]
[Footnote 2: Here the well known qualities of heaviness (_gurutva_),
liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness (_sneha_), elasticity (_sa@mskâra_),
merit (_dharma_), and demerit (_adharma_) have been altogether omitted.
These are all counted in later Vais'e@sika commentaries and compendiums.
It must be noted that "_gu@na_" in Vas'e@sika means qualities and not
subtle reals or substances as in Sâ@mkhya Yoga. Gu@na in Vas'e@sika would
be akin to what Yoga would call _dharma_.]
286
downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal
movement. The three common qualities of dravya, gu@na and karma
are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause,
and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other
dravyas and the gu@nas other gu@nas. But karma is not necessarily
produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or
its effect but the gu@nas are destroyed both by the cause and by
the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses
karma and gu@na and is regarded as the material (_samavayi_) cause.
Gu@nas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gu@nas, and are
not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is
devoid of gu@na, cannot remain at one time in more than one
object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of
contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi)
of (derivative) dravyas, gu@na, and karma, gu@na is also the non-material
cause (_asamavayi_) of dravya, gu@na and karma. Karma
is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion
(_vega_). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be
produced even without karma [Footnote ref 1]. Dravya is the general effect
of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to gu@na in this that it does not produce
karma. The numbers two, three, etc, separateness, contact
and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma
not being connected with more than one thing is not produced
by more than one thing [Footnote ref 2]. A dravya is the result of many
contacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many
colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and
contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In
denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the
cause of dravya and karma [Footnote ref 3].
In the second chapter of the first book Ka@nâda first says that
if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause
even though there may not be the effect. He next says that
genus (_samanya_) and species (_visesa_) are relative to the understanding;
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See
_Upaskara_ I.i. 22.]
[Footnote 2: If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the
movement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving.]
[Footnote 3: It must be noted that karma in this sense is quite different
from the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action
which is the cause of rebirth.]
287
being (_bhâva_) indicates continuity only and is hence
only a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action
maybe both genus and species, but visesa as constituting the ultimate
differences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient).
In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being
(_sattâ_) in virtue of which things appear as existent, all other
genera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or
species. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it
is different from dravya, gu@na and karma, and yet exists in them,
and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that something
is and must be regarded as a category existing as one
identical entity in all dravya, gu@na, and karma, for in its universal
nature as being it has no special characteristics in the
different objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of
thingness (_dravyatva_) qualitiness (_gu@natva_) or actionness (_karmatva_)
are also categories which are separate from universal being
(_bhâva_ or _sattâ_) for they also have no separate genus or species
and yet may be distinguished from one another, but bhâva or
being was the same in all.
In the first chapter of the second book Ka@nâda deals with
substances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch, water,
colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (_snigdha_), fire,
colour and touch, air, touch, but none of these qualities can be
found in ether (_âkâs'a_). Liquidity is a special quality of water
because butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids
only when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself [Footnote
ref 1]. Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by
touch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred
from the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing inferred
from touch possesses motion and quality, and does not
itself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (dravya)
and is eternal [Footnote ref 2]. The inference of air is of the type of
inference of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics
called _sâmânyato d@r@s@ta_. The name of air "_vâyu_" is derived
from the scriptures. The existence of others different from us
has (_asmadvis'i@s@tânâ@m_) to be admitted for accounting for the
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is
important for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka.]
[Footnote 2: Substance is that which possesses quality and motion. It
should be noted that the word "_adravyatvena_" in II. i. 13 has been
interpreted by me as "_adravyavattvena_."]
288
giving of names to things (_sa@mjñâkarma_). Because we find
that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented
by us) [Footnote ref 1]. On account of the fact that movements rest only in
one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupied
space, would not lead us to infer the existence of âkâs'a
(ether). Âkâs'a has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance
in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a
quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched,
there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this
substance is âkâs'a. It is a substance and eternal like air. As
being is one so âkâs'a is one [Footnote ref 2].
In the second chapter of the second book Ka@nâda tries to
prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire,
and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the
notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is
one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, because
the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space
supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much
nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have
diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the
sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound
is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises
when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features
coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered,
or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some
other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way
but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely
grasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the question
whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons
to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with
a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.
The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the
inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must
be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact
of the senses and their object inheres.
The knowledge of sense-objects (_indriyârtha_) is the reason by
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I have differed from _Upaskâra_ in interpreting
"_sa@mjñâkarma_" in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while
_Upaskâra_ makes it a _dvandva_ compound. Upaskâra's interpretation
seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for
the existence of God.]
[Footnote 2: This interpretation is according to S'a@nkara Mis'ra's
_Upaskâra._]
289
which we can infer the existence of something different from the
senses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The
types of inferences referred to are (1) inference of non-existence of
some things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existence
of some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of the
existence of some things from the existence of others. In all
these cases inference is possible only when the two are known to
be connected with each other (_prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya_) [Footnote
ref 1]. When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have
_anapades'a_ (fallacious middle) and _sandigdha_ (doubtful middle);
thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it
has a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of
soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses
and objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of
the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way
in which the existence of one's own soul is inferred [Footnote ref 2], i.e.
by virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In
the second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only
when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects
proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance
and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneity
of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it
may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).
The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling
of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections
pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance
and eternal can be proved after the manner of vâyu. An objector
is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his
soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of _sâmânyatod@r@s@ta_
inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition
to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but
that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of
soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But
the Vais'e@sika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to
which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of
falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: In connection with this there is a short reference to the
methods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear.
There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference
are only pointed out as the basis.]
[Footnote 2: The forms of inference used show that Ka@nâda was probably not
aware of Gautama's terminology.]
290
then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences
as "I am Yajñadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the
good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference
lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction.
When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajñadatta goes,
there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajñadatta the
body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think
that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else.
As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure,
pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many
by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on
the strength of the scriptures [Footnote ref 1].
In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that
which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered
eternal (_nitya_). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can
only take place because of the cause. When we speak of anything
as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that
also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal
is ignorance (_avidyâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. Colour is visible in a thing
which is great (_mahat_) and compounded. Air (_vâyu_) is not perceived to
have colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not
the actuality of colour (_rûpasamskâra_--i.e. in air there is only
colour in its unmanifested form) in it. Colour is thus visible only
when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions [Footnote
ref 3]. In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also
explained. Number, measure, separateness, contact, and disjoining, the
quality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they
abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The
number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the
eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva)
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I have differed here from the meaning given in _Upaskâra_. I
think the three sûtras "_Sukhaduhkhajñananispattyavis'esadekatmyam,"
"vyavasthato nana,"_ and _"vastrasâmarthyat ca"_ originally meant that
the self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also
because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures,
they are regarded as many.]
[Footnote 2: I have differed here also in my meaning from the _Upaskâra,_
which regards this sûtra "_avidya_" to mean that we do not know of any
reasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms.]
[Footnote 3: This is what is meant in the later distinctions of
_udbhûtarûpavattva_ and _anudbhûtarûpavattva_. The word _samskâra_ in
Vais'e@sika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection
(_samavaya_), production (_udbhava_) and not being overcome
(_anabhibhava_). For the last three senses see _Upaskâra_ IV. i. 7.]
291
are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch,
and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain,
etc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile
sense) [Footnote ref 1].
In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the
earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There
cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the
three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one
of them acts as the central radicle (_upa@s@tambhaka_). Bodies are of
two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwise
produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance
with special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due
to special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to
be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been
given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and
also on account of the authority of the Vedas.
In the first chapter of the fifth book action (_karma_) is discussed.
Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said
that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the
soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due
to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of
the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is
not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the
hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the
soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of
heaviness (_gurutva_) the flail will fall when not held by the hand.
Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed
motions (_nodanavis'e@sa_) which are generated by special kinds of
efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep.
The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown
cause (_adr@s@takâranaka_). The arrow first acquires motion by
specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia
(_vegasamskâra_) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls
down through heaviness.
The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explanations
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: This portion has been taken from the _Upaskâra_ of S'ankara
Mis'ra on the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ of Ka@nâda. It must be noted here
that the notion of number according to Vais'e@sika is due to mental
relativity or oscillation (_apeksabuddhijanya_). But this mental
relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or
touched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend
on the visual or the tactual sense.]
292
of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical
importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained
as being due to unknown cause (_ad@r@s@takâritam_) and no explanation
is given as to the nature of this unknown (_ad@r@s@ta_).
It is however said that with the absence of _ad@r@s@ta_ there is no contact
of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore
mok@sa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the
self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind
is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes
steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, âkâs'a are
regarded as inactive.
The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts
are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account
of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain
Vedic performances, which brings in ad@r@s@ta, purification and impurities
of things, how passions are often generated by ad@r@s@ta,
how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how mok@sa
takes place as a result of the work of the soul.
In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal
things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The
change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning
in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size
is visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many
causes [Footnote ref 1], but the atom is therefore different from those
that have great size. The same thing may be called great and small
relatively at the same time. In accordance with a@nutva (atomic) and
mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The
eternal size of _parima@n@dala_ (round) belongs to the atoms. Âkâs'a
and âtman are called _mahân_ or _paramamahân_ (the supremely
great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure
it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being
of the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat), Atomic size
(parima@n@dala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and
the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether
(âkâs'a) are regarded as eternal.
In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity
and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from
other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality;
the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I have differed from the _Upaskâra_ in the interpretation of
this sûtra.]
293
neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (_ekap@rthaktva_).
The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc.
Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the
effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither
contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist
independently (_yutasiddhyabhâvât_). In the eighth book it is said
that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension
of qualities, action, generality, and particularity
perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the
cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the
cause of taste, colour and touch[Footnote ref 1]. In the ninth book
negation is described; non-existence (_asat_) is defined as that to
which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things
may become non-existent and that which is existent in one
way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind
of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of
existence and non-existence [Footnote ref 2]. All negation can be directly
perceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the
mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also
made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the
yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).
In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the
middle term is described. It is said that anything connected
with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary
or as inseparably connected, will serve as li@nga (reason).
The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or
"these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may
also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism
from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal
cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (_avidyâ_) is
due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observation
due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite
of this is true knowledge (_vidyâ_). In the tenth it is said that
pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to
doubt and certainty.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Upaskâra_ here explains that it is intended that the senses
are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the
sûtras.]
[Footnote 2: In the previous three kinds of non-existence, _prâgabhâva_
(negation before production), _dhvamsâbhâva_ (negation after destruction),
and _anyonyabhava_ (mutual negation of each other in each other), have
been described. The fourth one is _sâmânyâbhâva_ (general negation).]
294
A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for
because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced.
Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Contact
is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which
inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production
of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of
fire is also a cause.
Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they
have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the
Vedas direct them, they have validity.
Philosophy in the Nyâya sûtras [Footnote ref 1].
The _Nyâya sûtras_ begin with an enumeration of the sixteen
subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (_pramâ@na_), object of right
knowledge (_prameya_), doubt (_sa@ms'aya_), purpose (_prayojana_),
illustrative instances (_d@r@s@tânta_), accepted conclusions (_siddhânta_),
premisses (_avayava_), argumentation (_tarka_), ascertainment (_nir@naya_),
debates (_vâda_), disputations (_jalpa_), destructive criticisms
(_vita@n@dâ_), fallacy (_hetvâbhâsa_), quibble (_chala_), refutations
(_jâti_), points of opponent's defeat (_nigrahasthâna_), and hold that
by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (_nihs'reyasa_), is
attained. In the second sûtra it is said that salvation (_apavarga_)
is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge
(_mithyâjñâna_), defects (_do@sa_), endeavours (_prav@rtti_, birth
(_janma_), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said
to be of four kinds, perception (_pratyak@sa_), inference (_anumâna_),
analogy (_upamana_), and testimony (_s'abda_). Perception is defined
as uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names
proceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three
kinds, from cause to effect (_pûrvavat_), effect to cause (_s'e@savat_),
and inference from common characteristics (_sâmânyato d@r@s@ta_).
Upamâna is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known
thing.
S'abda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (âpta)
[Footnote ref 2].
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in _Nyâya
sûtras_, supplemented here and there with the views of Vâtsyâyana, the
commentator. This follows the order of the sûtras, and tries to present
their ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyâya as
possible. The general treatment of Nyâya-Vais'e@sika expounds the two
systems in the light of later writers and commentators.]
[Footnote 2: It is curious to notice that Vâtsyâyana says that an ârya, a
@r@si or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an âpta (reliable authority).]
295
Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced
and which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledge
are said to be self (_âtman_), body, senses, sense-objects,
understanding (_buddhi_), mind (_manas_}, endeavour (prav@rtti), rebirths,
enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and
salvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (_prayatna_), pleasure, pain, and
knowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which
upholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain
as arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects [Footnote ref l];
the five senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivi, ap,
tejas, vâyu and âkâs'a; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are
the qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the
objects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot
occur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (_manas_).
Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and
body. Do@sas (attachment, antipathy, etc) are those which lead
men to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering [Footnote ref
2]. Ultimate cessation from pain is called _apavarga_ [Footnote ref 3].
Doubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting
opinions etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That
for attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work
is called _prayojana_.
Illustrative example (_d@r@s@tânta_) is that on which both the
common man and the expert (_parîk@saka_) hold the same opinion.
Established texts or conclusions (_siddhânta_) are of four kinds,
viz (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called
the _sarvatantrasiddhânta_; (2) those which are held by one school
or similar schools but opposed by others called the _pratitantrasiddhânta_;
(3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturally
follow called _adhikara@nasiddhânta_; (4) those of the opponent's views
which are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refute
the consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill and
bring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (_abhyupagamasiddhânta_)
[Footnote ref 4]. The premisses are five:
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Here I have followed Vâtsyâyana's meaning.]
[Footnote 2: Vâtsyâyana comments here that when one finds all things full
of misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated
with pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.]
[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana wants to emphasise that there is no bliss in
salvation, but only cessation from pain.]
[Footnote 4: I have followed Vâtsyâyana's interpretation here.]
296
(1) _pratijñâ_ (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved);
(2) _hetu_ (the reason which establishes the conclusion on the
strength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examples
or negative instances); (3) _udâhara@na_ (positive or negative
illustrative instances); (4) _upanaya_ (corroboration by the instance);
(5) _nigamana_ (to reach the conclusion which has been proved).
Then come the definitions of tarka, nir@naya, vâda, jalpa, vita@n@dâ,
the fallacies (hetvâbhâsa), chala, jâti, and nigrahasthâna, which
have been enumerated in the first sûtra.
The second book deals with the refutations of objections
against the means of right knowledge (pramâna). In refutation
of certain objections against the possibility of the happening
of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there
was always a difference between the two things regarding which
doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiating
characteristics between the two things are not noted.
Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object
to the validity of the pramâ@na in general and particularly of
perceptions on the ground that if they were generated before
the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter,
and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they
could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two
happened together then there would be no notion of succession
in our cognitions. To this the Nyâya reply is that if there were
no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of
knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all
means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any
means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no
means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds
of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous
existence of those different kinds of musical instruments,
so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence
of those objects of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].
The same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as
instruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognition
of other things may themselves be the objects of right
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Yathâpas'câtsiddhena s'abdena pûrvasiddham âtodyamanumîyate
sâdhyam ca âtodyam sâdhanam ca s'abda@h antarhite hyâtodye svanata@h
anumânam bhavatîti, vî@nâ vâdyate ve@nu@h pûryyate iti svanavis'e@se@na
âtodyavis'e@sam pratipadyate tathâ pûrvasiddham upalabdhivi@sayam
pas'câtsiddhena upalabdhihetunâ pratipadyate. Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya,_ II.
i. 15.]
297
knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which
are instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere
instruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge.
The means of right knowledge (pramâ@na) do not require
other sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of
a lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselves
as well.
Coming to the question of the correctness of the definition
of perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact
of the soul with the mind [Footnote ref 1]. Then it is said that though we
perceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perception
of the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we
can pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not
merely the parts collected together, for were it so one could
say that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms [Footnote ref 2].
Some objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is
wrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this
the Nyáya answer is that there is always such a difference in the
specific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particular
effect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particular
cause [Footnote ref 3]. In refuting those who object to the existence of
time on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present time
did not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible.
The past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not have
perceived things as being done in the past or as going to be
done in the future. The validity of analogy (upamána) as a
means of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved.
The four pramâ@nas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Here the sûtras, II. i. 20-28, are probably later
interpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Nyâya doctrine
of perception, but against the wording of the definition
of perception as given in the,_Nyâya sûtra_, II. i. 4.]
[Footnote 2: This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who
rejected the existence of wholes (avayavî). On this subject a later
Buddhist monograph by Pandita As'oka (9th century A.D.),
_Avayavinirâkara@na_ in _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_, may be referred
to.]
[Footnote 3: _Pûrvodakavis'i@s@tam khalu var@sodakan s'îghrataram srotasâ
bahutaraphenaphalapar@nakâs@thâdivahanañcopalabhamâna@h pûr@natvena,
nadya upari v@r@sto deva ityanuminoti nodakab@rddhimâtre@na. V@atsyâyana
bhâ@sya_, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river
is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater
augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current
large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics,
associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of
water, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river].
298
are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthâpatti (implication),
aitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood
in terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is
also understood--if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywhere
we understand that the same contains eight gallons of
corn as well) and abhâva (non-existence) as separate pramâ@nas
for the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthâpatti,
sambhava and abhâva are included within inference.
The validity of these as pramâ@nas is recognized, but they are
said to be included in the four pramâ@nas mentioned before. The
theory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternity
proved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to
refer to class-notions (_jâti_), individuals (_vyakti_), and the specific
position of the limbs (_âk@rti_), by which the class notion is manifested.
Class (_jâti_} is defined as that which produces the notion
of sameness (_samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h_).
The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of
the self or âtman. It is said that each of the senses is associated
with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity
in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and
produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from
the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there
would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men: again if there
were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize
things as having seen them before; the two images produced by
the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united
together as one visual perception of the things [Footnote ref 1]; moreover
if there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour
fruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness
belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition,
for the experience of one could not be recognized by another.
If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected
by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose
as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this
entity the knower would require some instrument by which it
would co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is
admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the
sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: According to Vâtsyâyana, in the two eyes we have two different
senses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which
works in both eyes.]
299
senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained.
Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants
show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy
and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in
previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires,
and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments
and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is
argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in
previous existences.
The body is made up of the k@siti element. The visual sense
is material and so also are all other senses [Footnote ref l]. Incidentally
the view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation
is also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three,
fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye,
and touch which are made respectively by the four elements of
earth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements
of which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made
by earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctive
quality of earth, viz. smell.
Against the Sâ@mkhya distinction of _buddhi_ (cognition) and
_cit_ (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between
the _buddhi_ and _cit_. We do not find in our consciousness two
elements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness,
but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Sâ@mkhya
epistemology that the anta@hkara@na assumes diverse forms in
cognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the supposition
of contacts of manas with the senses, âtman and external
objects. The Buddhist objection against the Sâ@mkhya explanation
that the anta@hkara@nas catch reflection from the external
world just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may
lie near it, that there were really momentary productions of
crystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at
different times is refuted by Nyâya; for it says that it cannot be
said that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to
in those cases where momentariness was actually experienced.
In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no
coming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: It is well to remember that Sâ@mkhya did not believe that the
senses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga view
represented in _Âtreya-sa@mhitâ_ (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika
or constituted of the gross elements.]
300
the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The
contact of manas with soul (_âtman_) takes place within the body
and not in that part of âtman which is outside the body; knowledge
belongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for
even when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitions
destroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous.
Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of
these can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas).
Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again
if it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be
borne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of
another. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given
as follows: (1) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign,
(5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor
and the possessed or master and servant, or things which
are generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of
husband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition,
(11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover
and covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that
which caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such
as that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection,
(19) merit and demerit [Footnote ref 1]. It is said that knowledge does
not belong to body, and then the question of the production of the body
as due to ad@r@s@ta is described. Salvation (_apavarga_) is effected by
the manas being permanently separated from the soul (âtman)
through the destruction of karma.
In the fourth book in course of the examination of do@sa
(defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of all
other defects such as râga (attachment) and dve@sa (antipathy).
As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by
destruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the
process of origination. Îs'vara is regarded as the cause of the
production of effects of deeds performed by men's efforts, for
man is not always found to attain success according to his efforts.
A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all
things have come into being by no-cause (_animitta_), for then
no-cause would be the cause, which is impossible.
The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted
on the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed.
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Nyâya sûtra_ III. ii. 44.]
301
The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (s'ûnyavâdin Bauddhas)
that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to
other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are
merely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are
then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like
the fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen.
Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means
sorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormented
by many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for
pleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamless
sleep, so there is no affliction (_kles'a_) in the man who attains
apavarga (salvation) [Footnote ref 1]. When once this state is attained all
efforts (_prav@rtti_) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless
with us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then
there are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism
(_aha@mkâra_) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects
(_do@sa_); about the nature of whole and parts and about the
nature of atoms (_a@nus_) which cannot further be divided. A discussion
is then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijñânavâdins
that nothing can be regarded as having any reality when
separated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as
leading to right knowledge.
The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition
is devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations
(_nigrahasthâna_) and futilities (_jâti_).
Caraka, Nyâya sûtras and Vais'e@sika sûtras.
When we compare the _Nyâya sûtras_ with the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_
we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes
have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The large
amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art
for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was
probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises
which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering
themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their
opponents [Footnote ref 2]. This assumption is justified when
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana notes that this is the salvation of him who has
known Brahman, IV. i. 63.]
[Footnote 2: A reference to the _Suvar@naprabhâsa sûtra_ shows that the
Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving
their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to
the worship of Sarasvatî (goddess of learning), who they supposed would
help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information
and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.]
302
we compare the futilities (jâti) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to
disputations as found in the _Nyâya sûtra_ with those that are
found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There
are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the
_Nyâya sûtra_ and _Caraka-sa@mhitâ_ which have treated of these
matters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g.
d@r@s@tânta, prayojana, pratijñâ and vita@n@dâ) follows very closely
the definitions given of those in the _Nyâya sûtras_. There are
others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthâna, etc.,
where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are
some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. _prati@s@thâpanâ,
jijñâsâ, vyavasâya, vâkyado@sa, vâkyapras'a@msâ, upalambha,
parihâra, abhyanujñâ_, etc.) which are not found in the
_Nyâya sûtra_ [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the various types of futilities
(jâti) and points of opponent's refutation (nigrahasthâna) mentioned in
the _Nyâya sûtra_ are not found in _Caraka_. There are some terms which
are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. _aupamya_ in
_Caraka, upamâna_ in _Nyâya sûtra, arthâpatti_ in _Nyâya sûtra_ and
_arthaprâpti_ in _Caraka_. Caraka does not seem to know anything
about the Nyâya work on this subject, and it is plain that the
treatment of these terms of disputations in the _Caraka_ is much
simpler and less technical than what we find in the _Nyâya sûtras_.
If we leave out the varieties of jâti and nigrahasthâna of the
fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the
treatment of Caraka and that of the _Nyâya sûtras_. It seems therefore
in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the _Nyâya
sûtras_ were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation
to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation
was earlier, whereas the compilation of the _Nyâya sûtras_ represents
a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had
necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied
in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work.
It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have
been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing
through the _Nyâya sûtras_ is that of a polemic against the doctrines
which could be attributed to the Sautrântika Buddhists, the
Vijñânavâda Buddhists, the nihilists, the Sâ@mkhya, the Cârvâka,
and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Like Vais'e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold division
of inference (_anumâna_) as _pûrvavat, s'e@savat and sâmânyatod@r@s@ta_.]
303
further allusion elsewhere. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ as we have already
seen had argued only against the Mîmâ@msâ, and ultimately agreed
with them on most points. The dispute with Mîmâ@msâ in the
_Nyâya sûtras_ is the same as in the Vais'e@sika over the question
of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the
self-validity of knowledge (_svata@h prâmâ@nyavâda_)and the akhyâti
doctrine of illusion of the Mîmâ@msists, which form the two chief
points of discussion between later Mîmâ@msâ and later Nyâya,
are never alluded to in the _Nyâya sûtras_. The advocacy of Yoga
methods (_Nyâya sûtras_, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be
an alien element; these are not found in Vais'e@sika and are not in
keeping with the general tendency of the _Nyâya sûtras_, and the
Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahâmahopâdhyâya
Haraprasâda S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.
The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional
knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the
self (âtman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they
also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived
under special conditions of sa@mskâra (conglomeration etc.).
The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity
(_ayaugapadya_) of knowledge and efforts is almost
the same with Vais'e@sika as with Nyâya. The _Nyâya sûtras_
give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring
in the questions of sa@mskâra or udbhûtarûpavattva which Vais'e@sika
does. On the question of inference Nyâya gives three
classifications as pûrvavat, s'e@savat and samânyatod@r@s@ta, but no
definition. The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not know of these classifications,
and give only particular types or instances of inference
(V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made
when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation
of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind
of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and
so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference
without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyâpti
(concomitance of _hetu_ (reason) and _sâdhya_ (probandum)) which became
so important in later Nyâya has never been properly formulated
either in the _Nyâya sûtras_ or in the Vais'e@sika. _Vais'e@sika
sutra_, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance
between hetu and sadhya (_prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya_),
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _J.A.S.B._ 1905.]
304
but the technical vyâpti is not known, and the connotation of
the term _prasiddhipûrvakatva_ of Vais'e@sika seems to be more
loose than the term _vyâpti_ as we know it in the later Nyâya. The
_Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not count scriptures (_s'abda_) as a separate
pramâ@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas.
With _Nyâya sûtras_ s'abda as a pramâ@na applies not only to the
Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and
Vâtsyâyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three
kinds _@r@si, ârya_ and _mleccha_ (foreigners). Upamâna which is
regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyâya is not even
referred to in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_. The _Nyâya sûtras_ know of
other pramâ@nas, such as _arthâpatti, sambhava_ and _aitihya_, but
include them within the pramâ@nas admitted by them, but the
_Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The
_Vais'e@sika sûtras_ believe in the perception of negation (abhâva) through
the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i.
1-10). The _Nyâya sûtras_ (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhâva as
non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another
to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks
are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that
absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though
there is thus an agreement between the Nyâya and the _Vais'e@sika
sûtras_ about the acceptance of abhâva as being due to perception,
yet their method of handling the matter is different. The _Nyâya
sûtras_ say nothing about the categories of _dravya, gu@na, karma,
vis'e@sa_ and _samavâya_ which form the main subjects of Vais'e@ska
discussions [Footnote ref 3]. The _Nyâya sûtras_ take much pains to prove
the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have
been important with Vais'e@sika. The slight reference to this
question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient.
The _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ do not mention the name of "Îs'vara," whereas
the _Nyâya sûtras_ try to prove his existence on eschatological
grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self
in the _Nyâya sûtras_ are mainly on the ground of the unity of
sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the