THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY
The Origin of Jainism.
Notwithstanding the radical differences in their philosophical
notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders
of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance
in outward appearance, and some European scholars
who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples
of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot
of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina
literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it
has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong
and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist
works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their
old name Nigantha and their leader Nâtaputta Varddhamâna
Mahâvîra, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of
the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahâvîra the same kings
as reigned during Buddha's career.
Thus Mahâvîra was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike
Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder
of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed
afterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tïrtha@nkara) of
Jainism[Footnote ref 1]. His predecessor Pârs'va, the last Tîrtha@nkara but
one, is said to have died 250 years before Mahâvîra, while Pârs'va's
predecessor Ari@s@tanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before
Mahâvîra's Nirvâ@na. The story in _Uttarâdhyayanasûtra_ that a
disciple of Pârs'va met a disciple of Mahâvîra and brought about
the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahâvîra
seems to suggest that this Pârs'va was probably a historical person.
According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion
is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one
of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable
Tirthankaras. In the present period the first Tîrtha@nkara was
@R@sabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamâna Mahâvîra. All
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]
170
Tîrtha@nkaras have reached mok@sa at their death, and they
neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet
they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped [Footnote ref
1].
Two Sects of Jainism [Footnote ref 2].
There are two main sects of Jains, S'vetâmbaras (wearers of
white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally
agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets
peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as
the Tîrtha@nkaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of
Mahâvîra was not removed from the womb of Devanandâ to that
of Tris'alâ as the S'vetâmbaras contend, thirdly that a monk
who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Mok@sa,
fourthly that no woman can reach Mok@sa [Footnote ref 3]. The Digambaras
deny the canonical works of the S'vetâmbaras and assert that
these had been lost immediately after Mahâvîra. The origin of
the Digambaras is attributed to S'ivabhûti (A.D. 83) by the
S'vetâmbaras as due to a schism in the old S'vetâmbara church,
of which there had already been previous to that seven other
schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that
they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and
that under Bhadrabâhu, the eighth sage after Mahâvîra, the last
Tîrtha@nkara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphâlakas with laxer
principles, from which developed the present sect of S'vetâmbaras
(A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times
from the S'vetâmbaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of
their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history,
though there is practically no difference about the main creed.
It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit
works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than
those of the S'vetâmbaras, if we except the canonical books of
the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed
in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from
one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called
_gacchas_, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha,
which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See "_Digumbara Jain Iconography (1. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459"
of J. Burgess, and Bûhler's "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathurâ,"
in _Epigraphica Indica_, II. pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article on
Jainism, _E.R.E._]
[Footnote 2: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]
[Footnote 3: See Gu@naratna's commentary on Jainism in
_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]
171
preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahâvîra
(_sthavirâvali, pa@t@tâvali, gurvâvali_) and also many legends about
them such as those in the _Kalpasûtra_, the _Paris'i@s@ta-parvan_ of
Hemacandra, etc.
The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains.
According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of
sacred books, the fourteen Pûrvas and the eleven A@ngas. The
Pûrvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were
gradually lost. The works known as the eleven A@ngas are now
the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these
are _Âcâra, Sûtrak@rta, Sthâna, Samavâya Bhagavatî, Jñâtadharmakathâs,
Upâsakadas'âs, Antak@rtadas'âs Anuttaraupapâtikadas'âs,
Pras'navyâkara@na, Vipâka_. In addition to these there are the twelve
_Upâ@ngas_ [Footnote ref 1], the ten _Prakîr@nas_ [Footnote ref 2], six
_Chedasûtras_ [Footnote ref 3], _Nândî_ and _Anuyogadvâra_
and four _Mûlasûtras_ (_Uttarâdhyayana, Âvas'yaka,
Das'avaikâlika_, and _Pi@n@daniryukti_). The Digambaras however
assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the
present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The
original language of these according to the Jains was Ardhamâgadhî,
but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best
to call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prâkrit and that
of the later works Jaina Mahârâ@s@trî. A large literature of glosses
and commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And
besides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain
systematic expositions of their faith in Prâkrit and Sanskrit.
Many commentaries have also been written upon these independent
treatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umâsvâti's
_Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_(1-85 A.D.). Some of the most important
later Jaina works on which this chapter is based are
_Vis'e@sâvas'yakabhâ@sya_, Jaina _Tarkavârttika_, with the commentary
of S'ântyâcâryya, _Dravyasa@mgraha_ of Nemicandra (1150 A.D.),
_Syâdvâdamañjarî_ of Malli@sena (1292 A.D.), _Nyâyâvatâra_ of
Siddhasena Divâkara (533 A.D.), _Parîk@sâmukhasûtralaghuv@rtti_ of
Anantavîryya (1039 A.D.), _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da_ of Prabhâcandra
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Aupapâtika, Râjapras'nîya, Jîvâbhigama, Prajñâpanâ,
Jambudvîpaprajñapti, Candraprajñapti, Sûryaprajñapti, Nirayâvali,
Kalpâvata@msikâ, Pu@spikâ, Pu@spacûlikâ, V@r@s@nida@sâs_.]
[Footnote 2: _Catu@hs'ara@na, Sa@mstâra, Âturapratyâkhyâna, Bhaktâparijñâ,
Ta@ndulavaiyâlî, Ca@n@dâvîja, Devendrastava, Ga@nivîja, Mahâpratyâkhyâna,
Vîrastava_.]
[Footnote 3: _Nis'îtha, Mahânis'îtha, Vyavahâra, Das'as'rutaskandha,
B@rhatkalpa, Pañcakalpa_.]
172
(825 A.D.), _Yogas'âstra_ of Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.), and
_Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra_ of Deva Sûri (1086-1169 A.D.).
I am indebted for these dates to Vidyâbhû@sa@na's _Indian Logic_.
It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular
literature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and
Prâkrit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. _Samarâicca-kahâ,
Upamitabhavaprapañca-kathâ_ in Prâkrit, and the _Yas'astilaka_ of
Somadeva and Dhanapâla's _Tilakamañjarî_); Jaina Sanskrit poems
both in the Purâ@na and Kâvya style and hymns in Prâkrit and
Sanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina
dramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works,
original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature
of India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics,
poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic
deserve special notice [Footnote ref 1].
Some General Characteristics of the Jains.
The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less
than a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in
Southern India but also in the North, in the North-western provinces,
Eastern Râjputâna and the Punjab. The head-quarters of
the S'vetâmbaras are in Gujarat and Western Râjputâna, but they
are to be found also all over Northern and Central India.
The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to
bare necessaries, and these he must beg--clothes, a blanket, an alms-bowl,
a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover
his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it [Footnote ref 2]. The
outfit of nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The
Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms
of peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (_câmara_) [Footnote
ref 3]. The monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out.
The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is
regarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks
are very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend
the rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating,
studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of
their clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The
laymen should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism. _E.R.E._]
[Footnote 2: See Jacobi, _loc. cat._]
[Footnote 3: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, chapter IV.]
173
by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are
required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in
the upâs'rayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist
vihâras). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any
living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very
last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a
great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being,
not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefully
without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living
being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture,
etc., and has thrust them into commerce [Footnote ref 1].
Life of Mahâvîra.
Mahâvîra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a K@sattriya of
the Jñâta clan and a native of Vais'âli (modern Besarh, 27 miles
north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhârtha and Trîs'alâ.
The S'vetâmbaras maintain that the embryo of the Tîrtha@nkara
which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devanandâ
was then transferred to the womb of Trîs'alâ. This story the
Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents
were the worshippers of Pârs'va and gave him the name Varddhamâna
(Vîra or Mahâvîra). He married Yas'odâ and had a daughter
by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permission
of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After
twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained
omniscience (_kevala_, cf. _bodhi_ of the Buddhists). He lived to
preach for forty-two years more, and attained mok@sa (emancipation)
some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C. [Footnote ref 2].
The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.
A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and
to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or
pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chândogya Upani@sad held
that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent,
that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state
were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]
[Footnote 2: See Hoernlé's translation of _Uvâsagadasâo_, Jacobi, _loc.
cit_., and Hoernlé's article on the Âjîvakas, _E. R.E._ The S'vetâmbaras,
however, say that this date was 527 B.C. and the Digambaras place it
eighteen years later.]
174
demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g.
the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere
illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (_nâma-rûpa_) [Footnote ref
1]. What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities,
have no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere
phantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason.
The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceived
and that there is no unchanging substance behind them.
What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we
perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities
we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upani@sads
regard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent
and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance,
as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities
do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere,
for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither
be perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the
momentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of
quality as a new existence.
The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and
possibly of some of the Upani@sads too, and they had also a solution
to offer. They held that it was not true that substance
alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances.
Further it was not true as the Buddhists said that
there was no permanent substance but merely the change of
passing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views
and are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain
some elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in
experience. Experience shows that in all changes there are
three elements: (1) that some collocations of qualities appear
to remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated;
(3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities
of things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not
changing. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump
has been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is
permanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have
been lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in
it which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form,
has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Chândogya, VI. 1.]
175
another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a
thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus
when a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific
qualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold"
are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed,
and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some
new ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to
this, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the
permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in
spite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (_sat_) then is
neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing
qualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is
testified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit,
which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and
gaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent
(_dhruva_) accession of some new qualities (_utpâda_) and loss of
some old qualities (_vyaya_) [Footnote ref.1]. The solution of Jainism is
thus a reconciliation of the two extremes of Vedantism and Buddhism on
grounds of common-sense experience.
The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anekântavâda).
This conception of being as the union of the permanent and
change brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anekântavâda or
what we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme absolutism
of the Upani@sads and the pluralism of the Buddhists.
The Jains regarded all things as _anekânta_ (_na-ekânta_), or in
other words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely,
as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and
limitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its existence
as a substance (_dravya_) is of the nature of a collocation
of atoms and not as any other substance such as space (_âkâs'a_),
i.e. a gold jug is a _dravya_ only in one sense of the term and
not in every sense; so it is a _dravya_ in the sense that it is a
collocation of atoms and not a _dravya_ in the sense of space or
time (_kâla_). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at one
and the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a
composite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote: 1: See _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_, and Gu@naratna's treatment of
Jainism in _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]
176
not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atoms
only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of
earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone.
Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense
that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It
is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and unsullied
gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again
made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered
and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajñadatta.
Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only
true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug
and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner
the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a
certain limited sense. All things (_vastu_) thus possess an infinite
number of qualities (_anantadharmâtmaka@m vastu_), each of which
can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing
as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of
affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities
from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted
senses and not absolutely [Footnote ref l]. Thus in the positive relation
riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such
an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no
riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in
a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be
affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very
same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints
from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations)
can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing
in relation to this or that, are technically called _naya_ [Footnote ref
2].
The Doctrine of Nayas.
In framing judgments about things there are two ways open
to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristics
of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when
we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic
qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or
characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna on Jainamata in _@Sa@ddarsanasamuccaya_, pp.
211. etc., and also _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_.]
[Footnote 2: See _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_, and _Vis'e@sâvalyaka bhâ@sya_,
pp. 895-923.]
177
the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and
regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist
view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book
separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone perceptible
and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two
points of view are respectively called _dravyanaya_ and _paryâyanaya_
[Footnote ref 1]. The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms,
and paryayanaya in four forms, of which the first form only is important
for our purposes, the other three being important rather from the
point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted
here. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya,
sa@mgraha-naya and vyavahâra-naya.
When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point
of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may
hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are
empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say,
I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer
I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of
view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its
special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of
a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was
reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling
on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy,
whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose
sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view,
in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their
most general characteristic as "being" or as any of their special
characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is technically
called the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably
proceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most
general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may
lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other
ones. This is the point of view from which according to the
Jains the Nyâya and Vais'e@sika schools interpret experience.
Sa@mgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the
most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual
things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being."
This according to the Jains is the Vedânta way of looking at things.
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Syâdvâdama@njarî_, pp. 171-173.]
178
The vyavahâra-naya standpoint holds that the real essence
of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual practical
experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general
as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past
times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes
all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand
ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared
by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are
continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but
yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will
exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics,
go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday experience,
and none of these can be separated and held up as being
the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the
Sâ@mkhya way of looking at things.
The first view of paryâya-naya called _@rjusûtra_ is the Buddhist
view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the
past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration
of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at
any given moment. At each new moment there are new collocations
of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as
the true essence of our notion of things [Footnote ref 1].
The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or
aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number.
The above four represent only a broad classification of these. The
Jains hold that the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika, the Vedânta, the Sâ@mkhya,
and the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematize
experience from one of the above four points of view, and each regards
the interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely
true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error
(_nayâbhâsa_), for each standpoint represents only one of the many
points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirmations
from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and
under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may
be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or
judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore
be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The other standpoints of paryâya-naya, which represent
grammatical and linguistic points of view, are _s'abda-naya,
samabhirû@dha-naya_, and _evambhûla-naya_. See _Vis'e@sâvas'yaka
bhâ@sya_, pp. 895-923.]
179
things may be held to be true from other points of view. The
truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivable
from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness
therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase _syât_
(may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative,
made somehow, from some point of view and under some reservations
and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment
which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely
false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another.
This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syâdvâda [Footnote ref 1].
The Doctrine of Syâdvâda.
The doctrine of Syâdvâda holds that since the most contrary
characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing,
affirmation made from whatever standpoint (_naya_) cannot be regarded
as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some _syâdasti_ or
"may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense;
all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense
(_syâdavaktavya_); all affirmations are true as well as false in some
sense (_syâdasti syânnâsti_); all affirmations are true as well as
indefinite (_syâdasti câvaktavyas'ca_); all affirmations are false as
well as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite
in some sense (_syâdasti syânnâsti syâdavaktavyas'ca_). Thus we may
say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to
say explicitly that "may be (syât) that the jug is," otherwise if
"being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being,
it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a
cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined
by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute
existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the
form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of
existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence
in general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence
"the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is," "the tree is," "the
cloth is," etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the
negation of all other things in the world; each quality or characteristic
(such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined
by the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue,
golden), etc., of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Vis'e@sâvas'yaka bhâ@sya_, pp. 895, etc., and
_Syâdvâdamañjarî_, pp. 170, etc.]
180
the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those
constituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined.
What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the
rest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view
the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked
at from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being
(of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one may
say, may be it is an affirmation of being (_syâdasti_), may be it is a
negation of being (_syânnâsti_); or I may proceed in quite another
way and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which
naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judgment
"the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not
there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug
is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us
in saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is," and "may
be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two
aspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is,"
and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood
here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics
constituting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis
on the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not." Both the
affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is
put on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try
to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments
regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence
of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable--_avaktavya,_ for
how can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yet
such is the nature of things that we cannot but do it. Thus all
affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are
thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these four
again we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be that
the jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and
is unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable.
Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its
nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of
them any of the above seven alternatives (technically called _saptabha@ngî_
holds good [Footnote ref 1]. The Jains say that other Indian systems each
from its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Syâdvâdamañjarî_, with Hemacandra's commentary, pp. 166,
etc.]
181
point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality
is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional,
and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or
senses (_upâdhi_). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation
which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or
contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of
any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly
permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing
and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent
and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also
only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite,
the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense
or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of
judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation,
and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of
the naya doctrine with the syâdvâda doctrine is therefore this,
that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as
many alternatives as are indicated by syâdvâda. The validity of
such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne
in mind when making any judgment according to any naya,
the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutely
according to any particular naya without any reference to
other nayas as required by the syâdvâda doctrine the nayas are
wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such
judgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas
(_nayâbhâsa_) [Footnote ref 1].
Knowledge, its value for us.
The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on _Nyâyabindu_
says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in
which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them
to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found
to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the
task of examining the nature of true knowledge (_samyagjñâna_ or
_pramâ@na_). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us
to attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement with the
above view of knowledge of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 2]. They also
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The earliest mention of the doctrine of syâdvâda and
saptabha@ngî probably occurs in Bhadrabâhu's (433-357 B.C.) commentary
_Sûtrak@rtânganiryukti_.
[Footnote 2: See _Pramâ@na-naya-tattvâlokâla@mkâra_ (Benares), p. 16; also
_Parîk@sâ-mukha-sûira-v@rtti_ (Asiatic Society), ch. I.]
182
say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The
validity (_prâmâ@nya_) of anything consists in this, that it directly
helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad
for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can
adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what
is good for us and avoid what is bad [Footnote ref 1]. The conditions that
lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence
of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an
object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection.
For we are not concerned with how a cognition is
produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes.
It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain
conditions assume such a special fitness (_yogyatâ_) that we can
have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they
generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under
certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditions
we do not know it [Footnote ref 2]. The enquiry as to the nature of the
special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possible
does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such
a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but
little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the
acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by
knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects.
Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well
as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to
suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of
external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate,
and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other
characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual
experience, but are derived only by imagination (_utprek@sâ_), and
that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity
of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (_nirvikalpa
jñâna_). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand
reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives
a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of
their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our
immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes.
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Pramâ@na-naya-tattvâlokâla@mkâra,_ p. 26.]
[Footnote 2: See _Parî@sa-mukha-sûtra,_ II. 9, and its v@rtti, and also the
concluding v@rtti of ch. II.]
183
Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to
us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us
the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the
attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if
knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been
impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that
it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for
serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradicted
it should be held as true. False knowledge is that which represents
things in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in a
badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion
consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. perceiving a snake
where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is
no untruth in that [Footnote ref 1]. The error thus consists in this,
that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a
snake under relations and environments in which it was not then existing
is what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake
was later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood therefore
consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. True
knowledge therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful
representation of its object as is never afterwards found to be
contradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association
with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and
distinct, and is called perceptional (_pratyak@sa_); when attained
otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then
called non-perceptional (_parok@sa_ [Footnote ref 2]).
Theory of Perception.
The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the
theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the
Jains think that perception (_pratyak@sa_) reveals to us the external
objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of
colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul
________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or
other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgment as do not actually
exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When
I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though its
relationing with the "this" as "this is a snake" does not exist, for the
snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called
_satkhyâti_ or misrelationing of existents (_sat_)].
[Footnote 2: See _Jaina-tarka-vârttika_ of Siddhasena, ch. I., and v@rtti
by S'antyâcârya, Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra, ch. I.,
_Parîksâ-mukha-sûtra-v@rtti,_ ch. I.]
184
from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it
before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vijñânavâdin
Buddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge
of external objects by perception is gained through the senses.
The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished
from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which
alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive
senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are
only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the
five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains
of itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with
those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account
of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself
before. The process of external perception does not thus involve
the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise
of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with
the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch
with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge
which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is
associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example,
I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledge
of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and
hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the
rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into
myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledge
of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this
happens in association with the eye; I say that I see through
the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have
only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As
experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable
to assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceeding
in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas
(mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and the
hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve
its purpose [Footnote ref 1]. Perception of an object means
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu âtmâ ca
indriyam...anupahatacak@surâdides'e@su eva âtmana@h
karmak@sayopas'amaslenâsthagitagavâk@satulyâni cak@surâdîni
upakara@nâni. Jaina-Vâttika-V@rtti,_ II. p. 98. In many places,
however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as
senses, and living beings are often classified according to the number
of senses they possess. (See _Pramâ@namîmâ@msâ._ See also
_Tattvârthâ-dhigamasûtra_, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to
the sense organs. The denial of separate senses is with reference to
admitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate
category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like
windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the
sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination;
for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that
the veil which as observing it is removed.]
185
that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has
been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the
karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence
of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense
organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists
and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence
of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savikalpa
(determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct
revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materials
were necessary for the development of determinate
perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who
regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of
indeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception.
The determinate stage with them is the result of the application
of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence
does not truly represent the presentative part [Footnote ref 1].
Non-Perceptual Knowledge.
Non-perceptual knowledge (_parok@sa_) differs from pratyak@sa
in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the
latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function
in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction
they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge
was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us
clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter.
Parok@sa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory,
etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.
Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to
have five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because
of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the
kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called
respectively _pratijñâ, hetu, drs@tânta, upanaya_ and _nigamana_, except
for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two
propositions which actually enter into the inferential process
(_Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 108, 109). When we make an
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1 _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 8-11.]
186
inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as
above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected
with the probandum either as coexistence (_sahabhâva_) or as invariable
antecedence (_kramabhâva_) will from the mere statement
of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the
conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of
five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child
than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an
inference [Footnote ref 1].
As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the
authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give
us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who
have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and
right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all
ignorance [Footnote ref 2].
Knowledge as Revelation.
The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of
anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us.
That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that
_____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: As regards concomitance (_vyâpti_) some of the Jaina logicians
like the Buddhists prefer _antarvyâpti_ (between smoke and fire) to
bahirvyâptî (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire).
They also divide inference into two classes, svârthânumâna for one's own
self and _parârthânumâna_ for convincing others. It may not be out of
place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabâhu
in his Das'avaikâlikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for
making an inference; (1) _Pratijñâ_ (e.g. non-injury to life is the
greatest virtue), (2) _Pratijñâvibhakti_ (non-injury to life is the
greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) _Hetu_ (because
those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious
to do them honour), (4) _Hetu vibhakti_ (those who do so are the only
persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) _Vipak@sa_
(but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina
scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins),
(6) _Vipak@sa prati@sedha_ (it is not so, it is impossible that those
who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve
honour), (7) _D@r@s@ânta_ (the Arhats take food from householders as
they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects),
(8) _Âs'a@nkâ (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats,
for they cook for them), (9) _Âs'a@nkâprati@sedha_ (this cannot be,
for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be
said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) _Naigamana_
(non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyâbhû@sa@na's _Indian
Logic_). These are persuasive statements which are often actually
adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these
are irrelevant. When Vâtsyâyana in his _Nyâyasûtrabhâ@sya_, I. 1. 32,
says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as
against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he
probably had this Jaina view in his mind.]
[Footnote 2: See _Jainatarkavârttika_, and _Parîk@sâmukhasûtrav@rtti_, and
_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ with Gu@naratna on Jainism.]
187
which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was
with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically
each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect
they supposed that there was a succession of different units of
effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of
new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary.
The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect
may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert
only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding
experience. When we have a unit of experience we
suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so,
the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect
produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time,
and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experience
shows that not all of an object is found to be changing
every moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is
found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as earrings
or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face
of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes
every moment and that new things are being renewed at each
succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and
unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the
conception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence
associated with change--_paryâya_ (acquirement of new qualities
and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other
systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one
particular standpoint (_naya_) whereas they alone carefully weigh
experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths
indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and
limitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of
_arthakriyâkâritva_ the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting
on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they
became one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable
abstract speculations which went directly against experience.
Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor
the external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which
reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies
at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself
as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my
own self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge
188
in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the
rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it.
The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective
collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness
that they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment.
Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred
in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us
as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character
of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent
of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious
and an unconscious element in knowledge as Sâ@mkhya does. Nor
should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it
reveals, as the Sautrântikas think, for then by copying the materiality
of the object, knowledge would itself become material.
Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the
self revealing all objects by itself. But the Mîmâ@msâ view that the
validity (_prâmâ@nya_) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself
_svata@hprâmâ@nya_) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically
the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence
(sa@mvâda) with facts. But in those cases where by previous
knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced
there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without
reference to objective facts (_prâmâ@nyamutpattau parata eva
jñaptau svakârye ca svata@h paratas'ca. abhyâsânabhyâsâpek@sayâ_) [Footnote
ref 1]. The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But
that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypothesis,
for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This
brings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics.
The Jîvas.
The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be
divided into the living (_jîva_) and the non-living (_ajîva_). The
principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most
erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property
of the body [Footnote ref 2] It is on account of this life-principle that
the body appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is
directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things
are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 38-43.]
[Footnote 2: See _Jaina Vârttika,_ p. 60.]
189
a description. This is directly against the view of the great
Mîmâ@msa authority Prabhâkara [Footnote ref 1]. The soul in its pure state
is possessed of infinite perception (_ananta-dars'ana_), infinite
knowledge (_ananta-jñâna_), infinite bliss (_ananta-sukha_) and infinite
power (_ananta-vîrya_) [Footnote ref 2]. It is all perfect. Ordinarily
however, with the exception of a few released pure souls (_mukta-jîva_)
all the other jîvas (_sa@msârin_) have all their purity and power
covered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating
in them from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number.
They are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerable
space-points in our mundane world (_lokâkâs`a_), have a limited
size (_madhyama-parimâ@na_) and are neither all-pervasive (_vibhu_)
nor atomic (_anu_); it is on account of this that _jîva_ is called
_Jivâstikâya_. The word _astikâya_ means anything that occupies
space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and
contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body
which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and
smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to
the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it
lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot,
wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel
it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained
as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines
the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The
Jains divide the jîvas according to the number of sense-organs
they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess
only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that
of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste.
Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell.
The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in
addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all
the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely
men, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these
an inner sense-organ namely _manas_ by virtue of which they are
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalamârta@nda,_ p. 33.]
[Footnote 2: The Jains distinguish between _dars'ana_ and _jñâna_.
Dars'ana is the knowledge of things without their details, e.g. I see
a cloth. Jñâna means the knowledge of details, e.g. I not only see the
cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, where it
was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first dars'ana and
then jñâna. The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all
things as well as infinite knowledge of all things in all their details.]
190
called rational (_sa@mjñin_) while the lower animals have no reason
and are called _asamjnin_.
Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains
regard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being animated
by souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of
souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives;
they live and die and are born again in another elementary body.
These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case
they are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants.
Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other
plants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all
the functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common.
Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they
exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants
of which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle and
invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world.
The whole universe is full of minute beings called _nigodas_; they
are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters,
having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing extreme
pains. The whole space of the world is closely packed with
them like a box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supply
of souls in place of those that have reached Moksa. But an
infinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed to
replace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvana of all the
souls that have been liberated from beginningless past down to
the present. Thus it is evident the sa@msâra will never be empty
of living beings. Those of the _nigodas_ who long for development
come out and continue their course of progress through successive
stages [Footnote ref 1].
Karma Theory.
It is on account of their merits or demerits that the jîvas are
born as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have already
noticed in Chapter III that the cause of the embodiment of soul
is the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections of
the pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter.
Those which obscure right knowledge of details (_jñâna_) are
called _jñânâvara@nîya_, those which obscure right perception
(_dars'ana_) as in sleep are called _dars'anâvaranîya_, those which
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._, and
_Lokaprakâs'a_, VI. pp. 31 ff.]
191
obscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure and
pain are _vedanîya_, and those which obscure the right attitude of the
soul towards faith and right conduct _mohanîya_ [Footnote ref 1]. In
addition to these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karma
which determine (1) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar body
with its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nationality,
caste, family, social standing, etc., (4) the inborn energy of the
soul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a good
action when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called
(1) _âyu@ska karma_, (2) _nâma karma_, (3) _gotra karma_, (4) _antarâya
karma_. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are continually
producing certain subtle karma matter which in the first
instance is called _bhâva karma_, which transforms itself into _dravya
karma_ and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by coming
into contact with the passions (_ka@sâya_) of the soul. These act like
viscous substances in retaining the inpouring karma matter. This
matter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly divided
into eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is the
cause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karma
matter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively as
golden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they are
called the _les'yâs_. The feelings generated by the accumulation of
the karma-matter are called _bhâva-les'yâ_ and the actual coloration
of the soul by it is called _dravya-les'yâ_. According as any karma
matter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, it
gives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the knowledge
that we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc.,
is but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with which
the particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kind
of knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledge
of a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over our
knowledge, feeling, etc., are so removed that we have just that
kind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved to have. All
knowledge, feeling, etc., are thus in one sense generated from
within, the external objects which are ordinarily said to be
generating them all being but mere coexistent external conditions.
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge: (1) _matijñâna_
(ordinary cognition), (2) _s'ruti_ (testimony), (3) _avadhi_ (supernatural
cognition), (4) _mana@hparyâya_ (thought-reading), (5) _kevala-jñâna_
(omniscience).]
192
After the effect of a particular karma matter (_karma-varga@nâ_)
is once produced, it is discharged and purged from off the soul.
This process of purging off the karmas is called _nirjarâ_. If no
new karma matter should accumulate then, the gradual purging
off of the karmas might make the soul free of karma matter, but as
it is, while some karma matter is being purged off, other karma
matter is continually pouring in, and thus the purging and
binding processes continuing simultaneously force the soul to
continue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration, and rebirth.
After the death of each individual his soul, together with
its karmic body (_kârma@nas'arîra_), goes in a few moments to the
place of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding
or contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter.
In the ordinary course karma takes effect and produces its
proper results, and at such a stage the soul is said to be in the
_audayika_ state. By proper efforts karma may however be prevented
from taking effect, though it still continues to exist, and
this is said to be the _aupas'amika_ state of the soul. When karma
is not only prevented from operating but is annihilated, the soul
is said to be in the _k@sâyika_ state, and it is from this state that
Mok@sa is attained. There is, however, a fourth state of ordinary
good men with whom some karma is annihilated, some neutralized,
and some active (_k@sâyopas'amika_) [Footnote ref 1].
Karma, Âsrava and Nirjarâ.
It is on account of karma that the souls have to suffer all
the experiences of this world process, including births and rebirths
in diverse spheres of life as gods, men or animals, or insects.
The karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic particles of matter
(_karma-varga@nâ_}. The influx of these karma particles into the
soul is called âsrava in Jainism. These karmas are produced by
body, mind, and speech. The âsravas represent the channels or
modes through which the karmas enter the soul, just like the
channels through which water enters into a pond. But the Jains
distinguish between the channels and the karmas which actually
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The stages through which a developing soul passes are
technically called _gu@nasthânas_ which are fourteen in number. The
first three stages represent the growth of faith in Jainism, the next
five stages are those in which all the passions are controlled, in
the next four stages the ascetic practises yoga and destroys all his
karmas, at the thirteenth stage he is divested of all karmas but he
still practises yoga and at the fourteenth stage he attains liberation
(see Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti, 13th verse).]
193
enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds
of âsravas, bhâvâsrava and karmâsrava. Bhâvâsrava means the
thought activities of the soul through which or on account of
which the karma particles enter the soul [Footnote ref 1]. Thus Nemicandra
says that bhâvâsrava is that kind of change in the soul (which
is the contrary to what can destroy the karmâsrava), by which
the karmas enter the soul [Footnote ref 2]. Karmâsrava, however, means the
actual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These
bhâvâsravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion
(_mithyâtva_), want of control (_avirati_), inadvertence (_pramâda_),
the activities of body, mind and speech (_yoga_) and the passions
(_ka@sâyas_). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely _ekânta_
(a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed),
_viparîta_ (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), _vinaya_
(retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit),
_sa@ms'aya_ (doubt as to right or wrong) and _ajñâna_ (want of any
belief due to the want of application of reasoning powers).
Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (_hi@msâ_), falsehood (_an@rta_),
stealing (_cauryya_), incontinence (_abrahma_), and desire to have
things which one does not already possess (_parigrahâkâ@nk@sâ_).
Pramâda or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad conversation
(_vikathâ_), passions (_ka@sâya_), bad use of the five senses
(_indriya_), sleep (_nidrâ_), attachment (_râga_) [Footnote ref 3].
Coming to dravyâsrava we find that it means that actual influx
of karma which affects the soul in eight different manners
in accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight
different kinds, namely jñânâvara@nîya, dars'anâvara@nîya, vedanîya,
mohanîya, âyu, nâma, gotra and antarâya. These actual
influxes take place only as a result of the bhâvâsrava or the reprehensible
thought activities, or changes (_pari@nâma_) of the soul.
The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas
is called bhâvabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the
actual impure connections of the karmas is technically called
dravyabandha. It is on account of bhâvabandha that the actual
connection between the karmas and the soul can take place [Footnote ref 4].
The actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29.]
[Footnote 2: Nemicandra's commentary on _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29, edited
by S.C. Ghoshal, Arrah, 1917.]
[Footnote 3: See Nemicandra's commentary on S'I. 30.]
[Footnote 4: Nemicandra on 31, and _Vardhamânapurâ@na_ XVI. 44, quoted by
Ghoshal.]
194
of dust on the body of a person who is besmeared all over with
oil. Thus Gunaratna says "The influx of karma means the
contact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the
particular kind of karma, with the soul just like the sticking of
dust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of
the soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes
so completely covered with them that in some sense when looked
at from that point of view the soul is sometimes regarded as a
material body during its sa@msâra stage [Footnote ref 1]." From one
point of view the bondage of karma is only of _puf@nya_ and _pâpa_
(good and bad karmas) [Footnote ref 2]. From another this bondage is of
four kinds, according to the nature of karma (_prak@rti_) duration of
bondage (_sthiti_), intensity (_anubhâga_) and extension (_prades'a_).
The nature of karma refers to the eight classes of karma already
mentioned, namely the jñanavaraniya karma which obscures the
infinite knowledge of the soul of all things in detail,
dars'anâvara@nîya karma which obscures the infinite general knowledge
of the soul, vedanîya karma which produces the feelings of
pleasure and pain in the soul, mohanîya karma, which so infatuates
souls that they fail to distinguish what is right from
what is wrong, âyu karma, which determines the tenure of any
particular life, nâma karma which gives them personalities, gotra
karma which brings about a particular kind of social surrounding
for the soul and antaraya karma which tends to oppose the performance
of right actions by the soul. The duration of the stay
of any karma in the soul is called sthiti. Again a karma may be
intense, middling or mild, and this indicates the third principle
of division, anubhâga. Prades'a refers to the different parts of
the soul to which the karma particles attach themselves. The
duration of stay of any karma and its varying intensity are due
to the nature of the kasayas or passions of the soul, whereas the
different classification of karmas as jñânâvaranîya, etc., are due to
the nature of specific contact of the soul with karma matter [Footnote
ref 3].
Corresponding to the two modes of inrush of karmas (bhâvâsrava and
dravyâsrava) are two kinds of control opposing this inrush,
by actual thought modification of a contrary nature and by the
actual stoppage of the inrush of karma particles, and these are
respectively called bhâvasa@mvara and dravyasa@mvara [Footnote ref 4].
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna, p. 181]
[Footnote 2: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 3: Nemicandra, 33.]
[Footnote 4: _Varddhamâ@na_ XVI 67-68, and _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_
S'I. 35.]
195
The bhâvasa@mvaras are (1) the vows of non-injury, truthfulness,
abstinence from stealing, sex-control, and non-acceptance of objects
of desire, (2) samitis consisting of the use of trodden tracks in order
to avoid injury to insects (_îryâ_), gentle and holy talk (_bhâ@sa_),
receiving proper alms (_e@sa@nâ_), etc, (3) _guptis_ or restraints of
body, speech and mind, (4) _dharmas_ consisting of habits of forgiveness,
humility, straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint,
penance, abandonment indifference to any kind of gain or loss,
and supreme sex-control [Footnote ref 1], (5) _anuprek@sâ_ consisting of
meditation about the transient character of the world, about our
helplessness without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence,
about our own responsibilities for our good and bad actions, about the
difference between the soul and the non-soul, about the uncleanliness
of our body and all that is associated with it, about the influx
of karma and its stoppage and the destruction of those
karmas which have already entered the soul, about soul, matter
and the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attaining
true knowledge, faith and conduct, and about the essential principles
of the world [Footnote ref 2], (6) the _parî@sahajaya_ consisting of the
conquering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc, and
of feelings of discomforts of various kinds, (7) _câritra_ or right
conduct.
Next to this we come to nirjarâ or the purging off of the
karmas or rather their destruction. This nirjarâ also is of two
kinds bhâvanirjarâ and dravyanirjarâ. Bhâvanirjarâ means that
change in the soul by virtue of which the karma particles are
destroyed. Dravyanirjarâ means the actual destruction of these
karma particles either by the reaping of their effects or by
penances before their time of fruition, called savipâka and avipâka
nirjarâs respectively. When all the karmas are destroyed mok@sa
or liberation is effected.
Pudgala.
The _ajîva_ (non-living) is divided into _pudgalâstikâya, dharmastikâya,
adharmâstikâya, âkâs'âstikâya, kâla, pu@nya, pâpa_. The word _pudgala_
means matter [Footnote ref 3], and it is called _astikâya_
in the sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_.]
[Footnote 2: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 3: This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With the
Buddhists _pudgala_ means an individual or a person.]
196
which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two
states, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such
as the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things
are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The
smallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (_a@nu_).
The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell,
and colour. The formation of different substances is due to the
different geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combination
of the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrangement
and to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic
space (_ghanapratarabhedena_). Some combinations take place by
simple mutual contact at two points (_yugmaprades'a_) whereas
in others the atoms are only held together by the points of attractive
force (_oja@hprades'a_) (_Prajñâpanopâ@ngasûtra_, pp. 10-12).
Two atoms form a compound (_skandha_), when the one is viscous
and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or
dryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that
there was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded
the contact as essential and as testified by experience. These
compounds combine with other compounds and thus produce
the gross things of the world. There are, however, liable to
constant change (_pari@nâma_) by which they lose some of their
old qualities (_gu@nas_) and acquire new ones. There are four
elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these
are alike in character. The perception of grossness however
is not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the
atoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the
perception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise
(as the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of
a similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the combined
atoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given
in the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thing
appears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have
all acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the
dars'anavara@nîya and jñânavara@nîya veil, there arises in the soul
the perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness
(_samâna-rûpatâ_) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of
atoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow)
is technically called _tiryaksâmânya_. This sâmânya or generality
is thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity
197
(as maintained by the Naiyâyikas) but represents only the accession
of similar qualities by a similar development of qualities
of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of
qualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and
to continue for some length of time. When we think of a thing
to be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the
developing tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the
relative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to
the Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of
some old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as
a whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This
sameness of qualities in time is technically called _ûrdhvasâmânya_
[Footnote ref 1]. If the atoms are looked at from the point of
view of the change and accession of new qualities, they may be
regarded as liable to destruction, but if they are looked at from
the point of view of substance (_dravya_) they are eternal.
Dharma, Adharma, Âkâs'a.
The conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism is
absolutely different from what they mean in other systems of
Indian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell,
sound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe
(_lokâkâs'a_) and pervades every part of it. The term _astikâya_
is therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the accompanying
circumstance or cause which makes motion possible,
like water to a moving fish. The water is a passive condition
or circumstance of the movement of a fish, i.e. it is indifferent
or passive (_udâsîna_) and not an active or solicitous (_preraka_)
cause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move; but if
the fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to its
motion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move; but
if they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence of
dharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (_loka_)
in the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, the
liberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move there
because there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma [Footnote ref 2].
Adharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da_, pp. 136-143;
_Jainatarkavârttika_, p. 106.]
[Footnote 2: _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_, 17-20.]
198
helps jîvas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substance
could move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest if
there were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these two
categories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains on
account of their notion that the inner activity of the jîva or the
atoms required for its exterior realization the help of some other
extraneous entity, without which this could not have been transformed
into actual exterior motion. Moreover since the jîvas
were regarded as having activity inherent in them they would be
found to be moving even at the time of liberation (moksa), which
was undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion required
for its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absent
in the region of the liberated souls.
The category of âkâs'a is that subtle entity which pervades
the mundane universe (_loka_) and the transcendent region of
liberated souls (_aloka_) which allows the subsistence of all other
substances such as dharma, adharma, jîva, pudgala. It is not a
mere negation and absence of veil or obstruction, or mere emptiness,
but a positive entity which helps other things to interpenetrate
it. On account of its pervasive character it is called
_âkâs'âstikâya_ [Footnote ref 1].
Kâla and Samaya.
Time (_kâla_) in reality consists of those innumerable particles
which never mix with one another, but which help the happening
of the modification or accession of new qualities and the change
of qualities of the atoms. Kâla does not bring about the changes
of qualities, in things, but just as âkas'a helps interpenetration
and dharma motion, so also kâla helps the action of the transformation
of new qualities in things. Time perceived as moments,
hours, days, etc., is called _samaya_. This is the appearance of the
unchangeable kâla in so many forms. Kâla thus not only aids the
modifications of other things, but also allows its own modifications as
moments, hours, etc. It is thus a dravya (substance), and the moments,
hours, etc., are its paryâyas. The unit of samaya is the time
required by an atom to traverse a unit of space by a slow movement.
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_, 19.]
199
Jaina Cosmography.
According to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginning
or end. Loka is that place in which happiness and misery are experienced
as results of virtue and vice. It is composed of three parts,
_ûrdhva_ (where the gods reside), _madhya_ (this world of ours), and
_adho_ (where the denizens of hell reside). The mundane universe
(_lokâkas'a_) is pervaded with dharma which makes all movement
possible. Beyond the lokâkas'a there is no dharma and therefore
no movement, but only space (_âkas'a_). Surrounding this lokakâs'a
are three layers of air. The perfected soul rising straight over
the ûrdhvaloka goes to the top of this lokakâs'a and (there being
no dharma) remains motionless there.
Jaina Yoga.
Yoga according to Jainism is the cause of moksa (salvation).
This yoga consists of jñana (knowledge of reality as it is), s'raddhâ
(faith in the teachings of the Jinas), and caritra (cessation from
doing all that is evil). This caritra consists of _ahi@msâ_ (not
taking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), _sûn@rta_
(speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), _asteya_
(not taking anything which has not been given), brahmacaryya
(abandoning lust foi all kinds of objects, in mind, speech and
body), and _aparigraha_ (abandoning attachment for all things) [Footnote
ref 1].
These strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are bent
on attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinary
householders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra,
that ordinary householders should earn money honestly, should
follow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl from
a good family, should follow the customs of the country and so
forth. These are just what we should expect from any good and
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Certain external rules of conduct are also called caritra.
These are: _Îryyâ_ (to go by the path already trodden by others and
illuminated by the sun's rays, so that proper precaution may be taken
while walking to prevent oneself from treading on insects, etc., which
may be lying on the way), _bhasâ_ (to speak well and pleasantly to all
beings), _isana_ (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner),
_dânasamiti_ (to inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressions
when taking or giving anything), _utsargasamiti_ (to take care that bodily
refuse may not be thrown in such a way as to injure any being), _manogupti_
(to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within oneself, and hold
all people to be the same in mind), _vâggupti_ (absolute silence), and
_kâyagupti_ (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kinds
of caritra are counted in _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_ 35.]
200
honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon
the virtues of ahi@msâ, sûn@rta, asteya and brahmacaryya, but the
root of all these is ahi@msâ. The virtues of sûn@rta, asteya and
brahmacaryya are made to follow directly as secondary corrollaries
of ahi@msâ. Ahi@msâ may thus be generalized as the fundamental
ethical virtue of Jainism; judgment on all actions may be
passed in accordance with the standard of ahi@msâ; sûn@rta, asteya
and brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as their transgression
leads to hi@msâ (injury to beings). A milder form of the practice
of these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and this
is called anubrata (small vows). But those who are struggling
for the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtues
according to the highest and strictest standard, and this is called
mahâbrata (great vows). Thus for example brahmacaryya for a
householder according to the anubrata standard would be mere
cessation from adultery, whereas according to mahâbrata it would
be absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex-acts.
Ahi@msâ according to a householder, according to anubrata,
would require abstinence from killing any animals, but according
to mahavrata it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to
prevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to
any living being in any way.
Many other minor duties are imposed upon householders, all
of which are based upon the cardinal virtue of ahi@msâ. These
are (1) _digvirati_ (to carry out activities within a restricted area
and thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places),
(2) _bhogopabhogamâna_ (to desist from drinking liquors, taking
flesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, and
vegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regarding
time and place of taking meals), (3) _anarthada@n@da_ consisting of
(a) _apadhyâna_ (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries,
killing of one's enemies, etc.), (b) _pâpopades'a_ (desisting from
advising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killing
of so many insects), (c) _hi@msopakâridâna_ (desisting from
giving implements of agriculture to people which will lead
to the injury of insects), (d) _pramâdacara@na_ (to desist
from attending musical parties, theatres, or reading
sex-literature, gambling, etc.), (4) _s'ik@sâpadabrata_
consisting of (a) _sâmayikabrata_ (to try to treat all beings
equally), (b) des'âvakâs'ikabrata (gradually to practise
the _digviratibrata_ more and more extensively), (c) _po@sadhabrata_
200
(certain other kinds of restriction), (d) _atithisa@mvibhâgabrata (to
make gifts to guests). All transgressions of these virtues, called
_aticâra_, should be carefully avoided.
All perception, wisdom, and morals belong to the soul, and to
know the soul as possessing these is the right knowledge of the
soul. All sorrows proceeding out of want of self-knowledge can
be removed only by true self-knowledge. The soul in itself is
pure intelligence, and it becomes endowed with the body only on
account of its karma. When by meditation, all the karmas are
burnt (_dhyânâgnidagdhakarma_) the self becomes purified. The
soul is itself the sa@msâra (the cycle of rebirths) when it is
overpowered by the four ka@sâyas (passions) and the senses. The four
ka@sâyas are _krodha_ (anger), _mâna_ (vanity and pride), _mâyâ_
(insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and _lobha_ (greed).
These ka@sâyas cannot be removed except by a control of the
senses; and self-control alone leads to the purity of the mind
(_mana@hs'uddhi_). Without the control of the mind no one can
proceed in the path of yoga. All our acts become controlled when
the mind is controlled, so those who seek emancipation should
make every effort to control the mind. No kind of asceticism
(_tapas_) can be of any good until the mind is purified. All attachment
and antipathy (_râgadvc@sa_) can be removed only by the
purification of the mind. It is by attachment and antipathy that
man loses his independence. It is thus necessary for the yogin
(sage) that he should be free from them and become independent
in the real sense of the term When a man learns to look upon
all beings with equality (_samatva_) he can effect such a conquest
over râga and dve@sa as one could never do even by the strictest
asceticism through millions of years. In order to effect this
samatva towards all, we should take to the following kinds of
meditation (_bhâvanâ_):
We should think of the transitoriness (_anityatâ_) of all things,
that what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-day,
what it was at mid-day it is not at night; for all things are
transitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of pleasure,
wealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particles
in a whirlwind.
All, even the gods, are subject to death. All our relatives will
by their works fall a prey to death. This world is thus full of
misery and there is nothing which can support us in it. Thus in
201
whatever way we look for anything, on which we can depend, we
find that it fails us. This is called as'ara@nabhâvanâ (the meditation
of helplessness).
Some are born in this world, some suffer, some reap the fruits
of the karma done in another life. We are all different from one
another by our surroundings, karma, by our separate bodies and
by all other gifts which each of us severally enjoy. To meditate
on these aspects is called ekatvabhâvanâ and anyatvabhâvanâ.
To think that the body is made up of defiled things, the flesh,
blood, and bones, and is therefore impure is called as'ucibhâvanâ
(meditation of the impurity of the body).
To think that if the mind is purified by the thoughts of universal
friendship and compassion and the passions are removed,
then only will good {_s'ubha_) accrue to me, but if on the contrary
I commit sinful deeds and transgress the virtues, then all evil
will befall me, is called âsravabhâvanâ (meditation of the befalling
of evil). By the control of the âsrava (inrush of karma)
comes the sa@mvara (cessation of the influx of karma) and the
destruction of the karmas already accumulated leads to nîrjarâ
(decay and destruction of karma matter).
Again one should think that the practice of the ten dharmas
(virtues) of self control (_sa@myama_), truthfulness (_sûn@rta_), purity
(_s'auca_), chastity (_brahma_), absolute want of greed (_akiñcanatâ_),
asceticism (_tapas_), forbearance, patience (_ks'ânti_), mildness
(_mârdava_), sincerity (_@rjutâ_), and freedom or emancipation from
all sins (_mukti_} can alone help us in the achievement of the
highest goal. These are the only supports to which we can
look. It is these which uphold the world-order. This is called
dharmasvâkhyâtatâbhâvanâ.
Again one should think of the Jaina cosmology and also
of the nature of the influence of karma in producing all the
diverse conditions of men. These two are called _lokabhâvanâ_
and _bodhibhâvanâ_.
When by the continual practice of the above thoughts man
becomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings,
and becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with a
mind full of peace he gets rid of all passions, and then he should
take to the performance of dhyâna or meditation by deep concentration.
The samatva or perfect equality of the mind and dhyâna
are interdependent, so that without dhyâna there is no samatva
203
and without samatva there is no dhyâna. In order to make the
mind steady by dhyâna one should think of _maitrî_ (universal
friendship), _pramoda_ (the habit of emphasizing the good sides of
men), _karu@nâ_ (universal compassion) and _mâdhyastha_ (indifference
to the wickedness of people, i.e. the habit of not taking any
note of sinners). The Jaina dhyâna consists in concentrating
the mind on the syllables of the Jaina prayer phrases. The
dhyâna however as we have seen is only practised as an aid to
making the mind steady and perfectly equal and undisturbed
towards all things. Emancipation comes only as the result of the
final extinction of the karma materials. Jaina yoga is thus a complete
course of moral discipline which leads to the purification
of the mind and is hence different from the traditional Hindu
yoga of Patañjali or even of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1].
Jaina Atheism [Footnote ref 2].
The Naiyâyikas assert that as the world is of the nature of
an effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent and
this agent is Îs'vara (God). To this the Jain replies, "What does
the Naiyâyika mean when he says that the world is of the nature
of an effect"? Does he mean by "effect," (1) that which is made
up of parts (_sâvayava_), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of a
non-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone as
having been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (_vikâritvam_).
Again, what is meant by being "made up of parts"? If it
means existence in parts, then the class-concepts (_sâmânya_)
existing in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hence
destructible, but these the Naiyâyikas regard as being partless and
eternal. If it means "that which has parts," then even "space"
(_âkâs'a_) has to be regarded as "effect," but the Naiyâyika regards
it as eternal.
Again "effect" cannot mean "coinherence of the causes of a
thing which were previously non-existent," for in that case one
could not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of the
elements of earth, etc., are regarded as eternal.
Again if "effect" means "that which is regarded by anyone as
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:_Yogas'âstra,_ by Hemacandra, edited by Windisch, in
_Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft_, Leipsig, 1874,
and _Dravyasa@mgraha_, edited by Ghoshal, 1917.]
[Footnote 2: See Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_.]
204
having been made," then it would apply even to space, for when
a man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space in
the hollow which he dug.
If it means "that which is liable to change," then one could
suppose that God was also liable to change and he would require
another creator to create him and he another, and so on _ad
infinitum_. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable to
change with reference to his creative activity.
Moreover, we know that those things which happen at some
time and do not happen at other times are regarded as "effects."
But the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that things
contained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are "effects," then
that would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and
thought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these
are contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtue
of that. And even atoms would be "effects," for they also undergo
changes of colour by heat.
Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a
whole is an "effect." And every effect has a cause, and so the
world as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the
cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it is
argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human
causation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human
beings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly
an effect of the type of effects produced by human beings
but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because
water-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in
inferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke.
If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the
inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to produce
such an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing
old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were produced
by intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which
we do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects,
and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is
said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been
made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer
the agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having
been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have
a vicious circle (_anyonyâs'raya_).
205
Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by
an agent, then such an agent should have a body for we have
never seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is held
that we should consider the general condition of agency only,
namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that
this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind
of body. If you take the instances with some kind of effects such
as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that
these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it
is said that these are also made by God, then you have an
argument in a circle (_cakraka_), for this was the very matter which
you sought to prove.
Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists.
Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in
that case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the
world, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does
he produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is impossible,
for there cannot be any knowledge and will without a
body. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any
other kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there
cannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that
he is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that
he can be all-creator.
Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless
God can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take
to creation through a personal whim? In that case there would
be no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it
in accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then
he is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it
through mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose
there should have been only happiness in the world and nothing
else. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they
suffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious
actions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such
a blind destiny (ad@r@s@ta) might take the place of God. If He took
to creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things
without a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain
people and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism
on behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took
place simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of
206
admitting him at all? You may rather say that the world came
into being out of its own nature.
It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help
of any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create
this world. This is against all experience.
Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists,
you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to
qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has
no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will.
But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the production
of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied
a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then
there could not have been diverse kinds of creation and destruction.
Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one
unchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character
of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which
knowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not
aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is
omniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any
knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any
perception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot
have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposition
of a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this
also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if
there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositions
also. Even without an omniscient God you could explain
all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of
karma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods
too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be
quarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of
a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and
wife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can
co-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if
there were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate
that in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think
his nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in whichever
way one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it
is absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense
with the supposition altogether [Footnote ref 1].
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_,_ Gu@naratna on Jainism, pp.
115-124.]
207
Mok@sa (emancipation).
The motive which leads a man to strive for release (_mok@sa_) is
the avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the
state of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is
also a state of pure and infinite knowledge (_anantajñâna_) and infinite
perception (_anantadars'ana_). In the sa@msâra state on account
of the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn
out imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and
that time as ordinary knowledge (_mati_), testimony (_s'ruta_),
supernatural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (_avadhi_), and direct
knowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (_mana@hparyâya_).
In the state of release however there is omniscience
(_kevala-jñâna_) and all things are simultaneously known to the
perfect (_kevalin_) as they are. In the sa@msâra stage the soul always
acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though
remaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage
the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus
it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance
as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change
meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities.
It may not be out of place to mention here that though the
karmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways
yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action
(_anantavîrya_), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and
infinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time
by the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this
power man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated.
If man had not this anantavîrya in him he might have been eternally
under the sway of the accumulated karma which secured
his bondage (_bandha_). But since man is the repository of this
indomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and
produce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his
highest good.
208