the stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (_mahâkaru@nâ_) for all

beings, practise all virtues (_pâramitâs_) and many other meritorious

deeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out a

universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless

numbers of _kalpas_, recognize truthfully and adequately the

principle of equality (_samatâ_)among people; and do not cling

to the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what is

meant by the activity of tathatâ. The main idea of this tathatâ

philosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent "thatness" is

at once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidyâ veils

it or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as the

pure thatness also perfumes the avidyâ there is a striving for the

good as well. As the stage of avidyâ is passed its luminous

character shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which only

illusorily appeared as the many of the world.

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view

of an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth than

that of the nihilistic idealism of _La@nkâvatâra_. Considering the

fact that As'vagho@sa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his early

life, it is easy to guess that there was much Upani@sad influence in

this interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourably

with the Vedânta as interpreted by S'a@nkara. The _La@nkâvatâra_

admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas

(heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self

(_âtman_). But As'vagho@sa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality

as the ultimate truth. Nâgârjuna's Mâdhyamika doctrines which

eclipsed the profound philosophy of As'vagho@sa seem to be more

faithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijñânavâda

creed of Buddhism as explained in the La@nkâvatâra [Footnote ref 1].

The Mâdhyamika or the S'ûntavâda school.--Nihilism.

Candrakîrtti, the commentator of Nâgârjuna's verses known as

"_Mâdhyamika kârikâ_," in explaining the doctrine of dependent

origination (_pratîtyasamutpâda_) as described by Nâgârjuna starts

with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word

pratîtyasamutpâda means the origination (_utpâda_) of the nonexistent

(_abhâva_) depending on (_pratîtya_) reasons and causes

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As I have no access to the Chinese translation of

As'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotpâda S'âstra_, I had to depend entirely on

Suzuki's expressions as they appear in his translation.]

139

(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation pratîtya

means each and every destructible individual and pratîtyasamutpâda

means the origination of each and every destructible individual.

But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does

not suit the context in which the Pâli Scriptures generally speak

of pratîtyasamutpâda (e.g. _cak@su@h pratîtya rûpâni ca utpadyante

cak@survijñânam_) for it does not mean the origination of each and

every destructible individual, but the originating of specific

individual phenomena (e.g. perception of form by the operation in

connection with the eye) depending upon certain specific conditions.

The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example

if we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual percept,

we see that there cannot be any contact between visual

knowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be

intelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we

interpret the maxim of pratîtyasamutpâda as this happening that

happens, that would not explain any specific origination. All

origination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor

by others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason.

For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself.

To suppose that it is originated by others would also mean

that the origination was of a thing already existing. If again

without any further qualification it is said that depending on

one the other comes into being, then depending on anything any

other thing could come into being--from light we could have darkness!

Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others,

it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them

together. A thing also could not originate without any cause,

for then all things could come into being at all times. It is therefore

to be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this

so-called dependent origination (_pratîtyasamutpâda_) it was referred

to as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and

senses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is

not thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance

(_avidyâ_). The only thing which is not lost (_amo@sadharma_) is

nirvâ@na; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena

(_sa@mskâra_) are false and are lost with their appearances

(_sarvasa@mskârâs'ca m@r@sâmo@sadharmâ@na@h_).

It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appearances

140

are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no

good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the

case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion

should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the

nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence

of the people that things are true. Those who are really

wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly

they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with

the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus

there are neither works nor cycles of births (_sa@msâra_) and also he

does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of

any of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnakû@tasûtra that

howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover consciousness

(_citta_); what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist,

and what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, and

as such it cannot be said to have any nature at all; and that which

has no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction.

He who through his false knowledge (_viparyyâsa_) does not comprehend

the falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be

real, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (_sa@msâra_). Like all

illusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm

of rebirth and sorrow.

It may again be objected that if there is nothing true

according to the nihilists (_s'ûnyavâdins_), then their statement that

there is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candrakirtti

in replying to this says that with s'ûnyavâdins the truth is absolute

silence. When the S'ûnyavâdin sages argue, they only accept for

the moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with

them in their own manner to help them to come to a right

comprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite

of all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances,

that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that

we call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as these

phenomena have no true essence.

When the doctrine of pratîtyasamutpâda is described as "this

being that is," what is really meant is that things can only be

indicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have

no essence or true nature. Nihilism (_s'ûnyavâda_) also means just

this. The true meaning of pratîtyasamutpâda or s'ûnyavâda is

this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that

141

appear [Footnote ref 1]. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither

produced nor destroyed; they really neither come nor go. They

are merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (_s'ûnya_)

does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of

position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any

intrinsic nature of their own (_ni@hsvabhâvatvam_).

The Madhyamaka or S'ûnya system does not hold that anything

has any essence or nature (svabhâva) of its own; even

heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat

and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions,

and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the

nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the

true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on

anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed

out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it

exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot

affirm the essence of other things to it (_parabhâva_). If we

cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently

assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first

believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are

not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (_abhâva_),

but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot

speak of anything negative either [Footnote ref 2].

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process

going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of

change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we

can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things;

for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment

after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to

justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes

from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyed

also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere,

and so a process (_sa@msâra_) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot

be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had

suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the

second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact

there being no relation between the two, the temporal determination

as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a

self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Mâdhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 50.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. pp. 93-100.]

142

may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if

the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression,

for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character

and takes up another at the same identical moment which is

inconceivable [Footnote ref 1].

But then again the question arises that if there is no process,

and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what

is then the nirvâ@na which is described as the final extinction of

all afflictions (_kles'a_)? To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does

not agree to such a definition of nirvâ@na. Nirvâ@na on the Madhyamaka

theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that

which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased

or as anything which is produced (_aniruddham anntpannam_}. In

nirvâ@na all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease

to exist in nirvâ@na, but like the illusory snake in the rope they

never existed [Footnote ref 2]. Nirvâ@na cannot be any positive thing or

any sort of state of being (_bhâva_), for all positive states or things

are joint products of combined causes (_sa@msk@rta_) and are liable to

decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since

we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a

negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are

communicated as being in a state of change and process coming

one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth

can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be

produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be

determined as existent or non-existent. Nirvâ@na is merely the

cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (_prapañcaprav@rtti_). It

cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for

these conceptions belong to phenomena (_na câprav@rttimatram

bhâvâbhâveti parikalpitum pâryyate evam na bhâvâbhâvanirvâ@nam_,

M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known,

and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to

appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon,

a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings [Footnote ref 3].

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any

bondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, like

the mirage, the dream, the mâyâ, and the magic without any real

nature (_ni@hsvabhâva_). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Madhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 194.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid_. pp.162 and 201.]

143

one is trying to win a real nirvâ@na [Footnote ref 1]. It is this false

egoism that is to be considered as avidyâ. When considered deeply it is

found that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence.

Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (_avidyâ_), there

would have been no conformations (_sa@mskâras_), and if there were

no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so

on; but it cannot be said of the ignorance "I am generating the

sa@mskâras," and it can be said of the sa@mskâras "we are being

produced by the avidyâ." But there being avidyâ, there come the

sa@mskarâs and so on with other categories too. This character of

the pratîtyasamutpâda is known as the coming of the consequent

depending on an antecedent reason (_hetûpanibandha_).

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence

on conglomeration or combination (_pratyayopanibandh_).

It is by the combination (_samavâya_) of the four elements, space

(_âkâs'a_) and consciousness (_vijñâna_) that a man is made. It is

due to earth (_p@rthivî_) that the body becomes solid, it is due to

water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is

digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due

to âkâs'a that there is porosity, and it is due to vijñâna that

there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination

that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think

that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be

allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or

souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and

attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come

the sa@mskâras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness

(_râga, dve@sa, moha_); from these proceed the vijñâna and

the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name

and form (_nâmarûpa_), from these proceed the senses (_@sa@dayatana_),

from the coming together of those three comes contact (_spars'a_);

from that feelings, from that comes desire (_tr@s@nâ_) and so on.

These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence

or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all [Footnote ref 2].

The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or

non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism

(_s'âs'vatavâda_) or nihilism (_ucchedavâda_), and it is for this reason

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Mâdhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.]

[Footnote: _Ibid._ pp. 209-211, quoted from _Sâlistambhasûtra_.

Vâcaspatimis'ra also quotes this passage in his _Bhâmatî_ on

S'a@nkara's _Brahma-sûtra_.]

144

that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (_madhyamaka_) [Footnote

ref 1]. Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth

(_samv@rtisatya_) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true

reality (_paramârthasatya_) in them or anything else. Morality

plays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any

other Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nâgârjuna's

_Suk@rllekha_ as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from

the Tibetan translation.

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (_asâra_) give according to

the moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there

is no better friend than giving.

7. Exhibit morality (_s'îla_) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless,

for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of

the moving and immovable.

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality,

patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having

reached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina

prince.

9. View as enemies, avarice (_mâtsaryya_), deceit (_s'â@thya_), duplicity

(_mâyâ_), lust, indolence (_kausîdya_), pride (_mâna_), greed (_râga_),

hatred (_dve@sa_) and pride (_mada_) concerning family, figure, glory,

youth, or power.

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door

for anger; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall

attain the degree of an anâgâmin (a saint who never suffers rebirth).

21. Do not look after another's wife; but if you see her, regard her,

according to age, like your mother, daughter or sister.

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the

six senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the

wise praise the first as the greater hero.

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly

conditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour,

blame and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts.

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend,

careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you

must) honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family.

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity,

joy and indifference; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you

(certainly) will obtain the happiness of Brahman's world (_brahmavihâra_).

41. By the four dhyânas completely abandoning desire (_kâma_), reflection

(_vicâra_), joy (_prîti_), and happiness and pain (_sukha, du@hkha_) you

will obtain as fruit the lot of a Brahman.

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am

not endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in

me; and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four

aggregates."

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Mâdhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 160.]

145

nature (_prak@rti_), not from themselves (_svabhâvât_), nor from the Lord

(_îs'vara_), nor yet are they without cause; know that they arise from

ignorance (_avidyâ_) and desire (_t@r@s@nâ_).

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (_s'îlabrataparâmars'a_),

wrong views (_mithyâd@r@s@ti_) and doubt (_vicikitsâ_) are the three

fetters.

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality,

the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one

rules (of the _prâtimok@sa_) are combined perfectly in these three.

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (_anitya_) without

substance (_anâtma_) without help (_as'ara@na_) without protector

(_anâtha_) and without abode (_asthâna_) thou O Lord of men must become

discontented with this worthless (_asâra_) kadali-tree of the orb.

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish

and subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no

other higher necessity than this.

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dignity

of the quieting and the subduing nirvâ@na not subject to age, death or

decay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon.

107. Where there is no wisdom (_prajñâ_) there is also no contemplation

(_dhyana_), where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom; but

know that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a

grove.

Uncompromising Idealism or the School

of Vijñânavâda Buddhism.

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijñânavâda

or Yogâcâra has often been referred to by such prominent teachers

of Hindu thought as Kumârila and S'a@nkara. It agrees to a great

extent with the S'ûnyavâdins whom we have already described.

All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary

constructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the

so-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We

construct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists

by itself (_nirmmitapratimohi_) [Footnote ref 1]. There are two functions

involved in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions

(_khyâti vijñâna_), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions

(_vastuprativikalpavijñâna_). The two functions however mutually

determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished

(_abhinnalak@sa@ne anyonyahetuke_). These functions are set to work

on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent

in them in relation to the world of appearance

(_anâdikâla-prapañca-vâsanahetukañca_) [Footnote ref 2].

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Lankâvatârasûtra_, pp. 21-22.]

[Footnote 2 _Ibid._ p. 44.]

146

unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped

(_abhûta-parikalpa-vâsanâ-vaicitra-nirodha_)

[Footnote ref 1]. All our phenomenal knowledge

is without any essence or truth (_nihsvabhâva_) and is but a

creation of mâyâ, a mirage or a dream. There is nothing which

may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the

mind (_svacitta_), which has been accustomed to create imaginary

appearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose movement

these creations take place as subject and object has no

appearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence

and extinction (_utpâdasthitibha@ngavarjjam_) and is called the

âlayavijñâna. The reason why this âlayavijñâna itself is said to be

without origination, existence, and extinction is probably this,

that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all

the phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no existence

in the sense in which the term is used and we could not

affirm any special essence of it.

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing

external but of our own mind (_svacitta_), and there is also the

beginningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world

of appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which

takes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is also

the instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On account

of these four reasons there are produced in the âlayavijñâna (mind)

the ripples of our sense experiences (_prav@rttivijñana_) as in a lake,

and these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skandhas

called _pañchavijñânakâya_ thus appear in a proper synthetic

form. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is either

identical or different from the âlayavijñâna just as the waves cannot

be said to be either identical or different from the ocean. As

the ocean dances on in waves so the citta or the âlayavijñâna

is also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (_v@rtti_). As

citta it collects all movements (_karma_) within it, as manas it

synthesizes (_vidhîyate_) and as vijñâna it constructs the fivefold

perceptions (_vijñânân vijânâti d@rs'yam kalpate pañcabhi@h_) [Footnote

ref 2].

It is only due to mâyâ (illusion) that the phenomena appear in their

twofold aspect as subject and object. This must always be regarded as

an appearance (_samv@rtisatyatâ_) whereas in the real aspect we could

never say whether they existed (_bhâva_) or did not exist [Footnote ref 3].

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Pañcâvatârasûtra_, p. 44.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_., pp. 50-55.]

[Footnote 3: Asa@nga's _Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra_, pp. 58-59.]

147

All phenomena both being and non-being are illusory (_sadasanta@h

mâyopamâ@h_). When we look deeply into them we find that

there is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even

all negations, for they are also appearances. This would make the

ultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in which

the positive and negative are one and the same (_bhâvâbhâvasamânatâ_)

[Footnote ref 1]. Such a state which is complete in itself and has no

name and no substance had been described in the La@nkâvatârasûtra

as thatness (_tathatâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. This state is also described in

another place in the _La@nkâvatâra_ as voidness (_s'ûnyatâ_) which is one

and has no origination and no essence [Footnote ref 3]. In another place

it is also designated as tathâgatagarbha [Footnote ref 4].

It may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualified

ultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic âtman or Brahman

like the tathatâ doctrine of As'vagho@sa; and we find in La@nkavatâra

that Râva@na asks the Buddha "How can you say that

your doctrine of tathâgatagarbha was not the same as the âtman

doctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those heretics

also consider the âtman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all pervading

and unchanged?" To this the Buddha is found to reply

thus--"Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of those

heretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instruction

of a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or substance

in anything (nairatmya) would frighten the disciples, that

I say that all things are in reality the tathâgatagarbha. This

should not be regarded as âtman. Just as a lump of clay is made

into various shapes, so it is the non-essential nature

of all phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics

(_sarvavikalpalak@sa@navinivrttam_) that is variously described as

the garbha or the nairâtmya (essencelessness). This explanation of

tathâgatagarbha as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order to

attract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiously

inclined to believe in the âtman doctrine [Footnote ref 5]."

So far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned,

the idealistic Buddhists (_vijñânavâdins_) agreed to the doctrine of

pratîtyasamutpâda with certain modifications. There was with

them an external pratîtyasamutpâda just as it appeared in the

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Asa@nga's _Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra_, p. 65.]

[Footnote 2: _Lankâvatârasûtra_, p. 70.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 78.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 80.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ pp. 80-81.]

148

objective aspect and an internal pratîtyasamutpâda. The external

pratîtyasamutpâda (dependent origination) is represented in the

way in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the

co-operation of diverse elements--the lump of clay, the potter,

the wheel, etc. The internal (_âdhyâtmika_) pratîtyasamutpâda

was represented by avidyâ, t@r@s@nâ, karma, the skandhas, and the

âyatanas produced out of them [Footnote ref 1].

Our understanding is composed of two categories called the

_pravichayabuddhi_ and the

_vikalpalak@sa@nagrahâbhinives'aprati@s@thapikâbuddhi_. The

pravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to take things in either

of the following four ways, that they are either this or the other

(_ekatvânyaiva_); either both or not both (_ubhayânubhaya_), either

are or are not (_astinâsti_), either eternal or non-eternal (_nityânitya_).

But in reality none of these can be affirmed of the phenomena. The second

category consists of that habit of the mind by virtue of which it

constructs diversities and arranges them (created in their turn by

its own constructive activity--_parikalpa_) in a logical order of diverse

relations of subject and predicate, causal and other relations. He who

knows the nature of these two categories of the mind knows that there

is no external world of matter and that they are all experienced only

in the mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of

smoothness (_sneha_) that constructs the water as an external substance;

it is the sense construction of activity or energy that

constructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construction

of movement that constructs the external substance of air.

In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the

real (_mithyâsatyâbhinives'a_) five skandhas appear. If these were

to appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal

relations, and if they appeared in succession there could be

no connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them

together. In reality there is nothing which is produced or

destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up

things as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as

perceivers. It is simply a convention (_vyavahâra_) to speak of things

as known [Footnote ref 2]. Whatever we designate by speech is mere

speech-construction (_vâgvikalpa_) and unreal. In speech one could not

speak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _La@nkâvatârasûtra_, p. 85.]

[Footnote 2: _Lankâvatârasûtra_, p. 87, compare the term "vyavahârika" as

used of the phenomenal and the conventional world in almost the same

sense by S'a@nkara.]

149

relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true;

the real truth (_paramartha_) can never be referred to by such

speech-construction.

The nothingness (_s'ûnyata_) of things may be viewed from

seven aspects--(1) that they are always interdependent, and hence

have no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot

be determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms

of others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference

to an "other" is also undetermined, and hence they are all indefinable

(_laksanas'ûnyata_); (2) that they have no positive essence

(_bhâvasvabhâvas'ûnyatâ_), since they spring up from a natural

non-existence (_svabhâvâbhâvotpatti_); (3) that they are of an unknown

type of non-existence (_apracaritas'ûnyatâ_), since all the skandhas

vanish in the nirvana; (4) that they appear phenomenally as connected

though non-existent (_pracaritas'ûnyatâ_), for their skandhas

have no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but

yet they appear to be somehow causally connected; (5) that none

of the things can be described as having any definite nature,

they are all undemonstrable by language (_nirabhilapyas'ûnyatâ_);

(6) that there cannot be any knowledge about them except that

which is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires

which pollute all our vision; (7) that things are also non-existent

in the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and

time in which they are not (_itaretaras'ûnyatâ_).

There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal

nor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a mâyâ; the

two kinds of negation (_nirodha_) are âkâs'a (space) and nirvana;

things which are neither existent nor non-existent are only

imagined to be existent by fools.

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of

this school, that the reality is called the tathâgatagarbha (the

womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal

appearances of the clusters (_skandhas_), elements (_dhâtus_), and

fields of sense operation (_âyatanas_) only serve to veil it with

impurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a

universal soul as the reality. But the _La@nkâvatâra_ attempts to

explain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to

the tathâgatagarbha as the reality is only a sort of

false bait to attract those who are afraid of listening

to the nairâtmya (non-soul doctrine) [Footnote ref 1].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _La@nkâvatârasûtra_, p. 80.

150

The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold

knowledge of (1) _svacittad@rs'hyabhâvanâ_, (2)

_utpâdasthitibha@ngavivarjjanatâ_,

(3) _bâhyabhâvâbhâvopalak@sa@natâ_ and

(4) _svapratyâryyajñânâdhigamâbhinnalak@sa@natâ_. The first means

that all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind.

The second means that as things have no essence there is no origination,

existence or destruction. The third means that one should

know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said

either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely

like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire

(_vâsanâ_) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us

to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the

nature of all things.

The four dhyânas spoken of in the _Lankâvatâra_ seem to be

different from those which have been described in connection with

the Theravâda Buddhism. These dhyânas are called (1) _bâlopacârika_,

(2) _arthapravichaya_, (3) _tathatâlambana_ and (4) _tathâgata_.

The first one is said to be that practised by the s'râvakas

and the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the

doctrine that there is no soul (_pudgalanairâtmya_), and that everything

is transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all

things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on

till all conceptual knowing ceases (_âsa@mjñânirodhât_); we have

what is called the vâlopacârika dhyâna (the meditation for beginners).

The second is the advanced state where not only there is

full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the

comprehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics

may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that

appears. This is called the _arthapravicayadhyâna_, for the sage

concentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out

(_pravichaya_) the nature of all things (_artha_).

The third dhyâna, that in which the mind realizes that the

thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances,

is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness

(_tathatâ_). This dhyâna is called _tathatâlambana_, because it has for

its object tathatâ or thatness.

The last or the fourth dhyâna is that in which the lapse of

the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness

and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized;

151

and nirvâna is that in which all root desires (_vâsanâ_) manifesting

themselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with knowledge

and perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This

cannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it cannot

be called destruction, for only compounded things (_sa@msk@rta_)

suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or

destruction. This nirvâna is different from that of the s'râvakas

and the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state

nirvâ@na, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics

of all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to

things and cease to make erroneous judgments [Footnote ref 1].

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground)

of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is

said that the world is mâyâ or illusion, what is meant to be

emphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The phenomena

that seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere

constructions of tainted imagination, and the tathatâ or thatness

is nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or

nature of the imagination (_vikalpa_) tainted with the associations

of beginningless root desires (_vâsanâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. The tathatâ has

no separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the

course of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore

also spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind

(_cittavimukta_), for here there is no construction of imagination

(_sarvakalpanavirahitam_) [Footnote ref 3].

Sautrântika Theory of Perception.

Dharmottara (847 A.D.), a commentator of Dharmakîrtti's [Footnote ref 4]

(about 635 A.D.) _Nyâyabindu_, a Sautrantika logical and epistemological

work, describes right knowledge (_samyagjñâna_) as an

invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Lankâvatarasûtra_, p. 100.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p. 109.]

[Footnote 3: This account of the Vijñanavada school is collected mainly

from _Lankâvatârasûtra_, as no other authentic work of the Vijñânavâda

school is available. Hindu accounts and criticisms of this school may be

had in such books as Kumarila's _S'loka vârttika_ or S'a@nkara's bhasya,

II. ii, etc. Asak@nga's _Mahâyânasûtralamkâra_ deals more with the duties

concerning the career of a saint (_Bodhisattva_) than with the metaphysics

of the system.]

[Footnote 4: Dharmakîrtti calls himself an adherent of Vijñanavâda in his

_Santânântarasiddhi_, a treatise on solipsism, but his _Nyâyabindu_ seems

rightly to have been considered by the author of _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippani_

(p. 19) as being written from the Sautrântika point of view.]

152

desires to have (_samyagjñânapûrvikâ sarvapuru@sârthasiddhi_) [Footnote

ref 1]. When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any

knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right

knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one

can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (_arthâdhigati_).

The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual

presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing

represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it

(_arthâdhigamât samâpta@h pramâ@navyâpârah_). Thus there are

three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge:

(1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it,

and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with

our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference

is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical

need by representing the presence of objects in certain connections

and helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation

is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly

through the li@nga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the

realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed

in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought

by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to

the realization of the object represented by it could not be called

right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the

perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions,

are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization

of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt

that since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived

at the moment of perception was not the same as that

which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents

which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself

realized by the realization of other existents of the same series

(_nîlâdau ya eva santâna@h paricchinno nilajñânena sa eva tena

prâpita@h tena nilajñânam pramâ@nam_) [Footnote ref 2].

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedent

of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding

of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of

_Nyâyaybindu_, Vinîtadeva and S'antabhadra (seventh century), are found in

_Nyâyabindu@tîkâtippanî_, a commentary of _Nyayabindutikâ_ of Dharmmottara,

but their texts are not available to us.]

[Footnote 2: _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippanî_, p. 11.]

153

that right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the rise

of any right perception, there is a memory of past experiences,

desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with

it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the

object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right

knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object.

Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the

object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it

is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in

connection with our achieving the object presented by perception.

Perception (_pratyaks'a_) has been defined by Dharmakîrtti as

a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unassociated

by any names or relations (_kalpanâ_) and which is not erroneous

(_kalpanâpo@dhamabhrântam_) [Footnote ref 1]. This definition does not

indeed represent the actual nature (_svarûpa_) of perception, but only

shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything

may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a perception

is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that

if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it,

he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him

by his perception (_tasmâdgrâhye arthe vasturûpe yadaviparyastam

tadabhrântamiha veditavyam_}. It is said that a right perception

could not be associated with names (_kalpanâ_ or _abhilâpa_). This

qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not

directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing

only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being

the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded

as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present

the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also

must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are

when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work

of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced

by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of

previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The definition first given in the _Pramânasamucaya_ (not

available in Sanskrit) of Di@nnâga (500 A.D.) was "_Kalpanâpodham_."

According to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (_nirvikalpa

jñâna_) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses

that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate

knowledge (_savikalpa jñâna_), as formed by the conceptual activity of

the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before,

cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to

the senses.]

154

to the sense

(_pûrvad@r@s@tâparad@r@s@tañcârthamekîkurvadvijñânamasannihitavi@sayam

pûrvad@r@s@tasyâsannihitatvât_). In all illusory perceptions it is the

sense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiological

causes. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the

object correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation through

the senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those

features which are its and its alone (_svalak@sa@nam_). The validity of

knowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented

by it (_arthena saha yatsârûpyam sâd@rs'yamasya jñânasya tatpramâ@namiha_).

But the objection here is that if our percept is only

similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which

is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes

invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which

appears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of their

sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (_taditi sârûpyam

tasya vas'ât_) and our perception of the object becomes possible.

It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of

having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between

the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and

the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of

causation but of a determinant and a determinate

(_vyavasthâpyavyavasthâpakabhâvena_). Thus it is the same cognition

which in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object

of perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the

percept (_tata ekasya vastuna@h kiñcidrûpam pramâ@nam kiñcitpramâ@naphalam

na virudhyate_). It is on account of this similarity

with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the

definite awareness (_vyavasthâpanaheturhi sârûpyam_), so that by

the determinate we know the determinant and thus by the

similarity of the sense-datum with the object {_pramâ@na_) we come

to think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue"

(_pramâ@naphala_). If this sameness between the knowledge and its

object was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from

the awareness (_sârûpyamanubhûtam vyavasthâpanahetu@h_). The

object generates an awareness similar to itself, and

it is this correspondence that can lead us to the realization

of the object so presented by right knowledge [Footnote ref l].

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting

the _Nyâyabindu, Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, Nyâyabindu@tîkâ@tippanî_ (St Petersburg,

1909), no other works dealing with this interesting doctrine of perception

are available to us. _Nyâyabindu_ is probably one of the earliest works in

which we hear of the doctrine of _arthakriyâkâritva_ (practical fulfilment

of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded

as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakîrtti's works and the profuse

references by Hindu writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word

_arthakriyâ_ is found in Candrakîrtti's commentary on Nâgârjuna and also

in such early works as _Lalitavistara_ (pointed out to me by Dr E.J.

Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word has no

philosophical significance there.]

155

Sautrântika theory of Inference [Footnote ref 1].

According to the Sautrântika doctrine of Buddhism as described

by Dharmakîrtti and Dharmmottara which is probably the

only account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to

us in Sanskrit, inference (_anumâna_) is divided into two classes,

called svârthânumâna (inferential knowledge attained by a person

arguing in his own mind or judgments), and parârthânumâna (inference

through the help of articulated propositions for convincing

others in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the

validity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of

the external world. Inference copied external realities as much

as perception did; just as the validity of the immediate perception

of blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing

perceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also,

so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the

external fact thus inferred (_sârûpyavas'âddhi tannîlapratîtirûpam

sidhyati_).

The reason by which an inference is made should be such

that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to

be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not

exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint

conditions that an unfailing connection (_pratibandha_) between

the reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is

not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where

the thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not

exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the

above case. This law (_niyama_) is essential for establishing the

unfailing condition necessary for inference [Footnote ref 2]. This

unfailing natural connection (_svabhâvapratibandha_) is found in two types

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As the _Pramâ@nasamuccaya_ of Diñnâga is not available in

Sanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic except

what can be got from the _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_ of Dharmmottara.]

[Footnote 2: _tasmât niyamavatorevânvayavyatirekayo@h prayoga@h karttavya@h

yena pratibandho gamyeta sâdhanyasa sâdhyena. Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_, p. 24.]

156

of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is contained

in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where

the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred

is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines

may come to think that pines are called trees because they are

tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small

pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness

forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being

a species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of the

species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could

infer the latter from the former but not _vice versa_; this is called

the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (_tâdâtmya_).

The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect

which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke

the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of

these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected

with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no

inference is warrantable.

This natural indissoluble connection (_svabhâvapratibandha_),

be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the

genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is

the ground of all inference [Footnote ref 1]. The svabhâvapratibandha

determines the inseparability of connection (avinâbhâvaniyama) and

the inference is made not through a series of premisses, but

directly by the li@nga (reason) which has the inseparable connection

[Footnote ref 2].

The second type of inference known as parârthânumâna

agrees with svârthânumâna in all essential characteristics; the

main difference between the two is this, that in the case of

parârthânumâna, the inferential process has to be put verbally in

premisses.

Pandit Ratnâkarasânti, probably of the ninth or the tenth century

A.D., wrote a paper named _Antarvyâptisamarthana_ in which

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _na hi yo yatra svabhâvena na pratibaddha@h sa tam

apratibaddhavi@sayamavs'yameva na vyabhicaratîti nâsti

tayoravyabhicâraniyama. Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_, p. 29.]

[Footnote 2: The inseparable connection determining inference is only

possible when the li@nga satisfies the three following conditions,

viz. (1) pak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in the pak@sa--the thing

about which something is inferred); (2) sapak@sasattva (existence of the

li@nga in those cases where the sâdhya oc probandum existed), and

(3) vipak@sâsattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sâdhya

did not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism,

e.g. The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike

a lake.]

157

he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those

cases which possess the li@nga or reason with the cases which

possess the sâdhya (probandum) but between that which has the

characteristics of the li@nga with that which has the characteristics

of the sâdhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance

is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen,

etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the

characteristic of the li@nga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the

characteristic of the sâdhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature

of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (_antarvyâpti_),

whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing

possessing li@nga and that possessing sâdhya, is known as outer

concomitance (_bahirvyâpti_) and generally accepted by the Nyâya

school of thought. This antarvyâpti doctrine of concomitance is

indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of

some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early

as the _Kathâvatthu_ (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of

the _Yamaka_ points out that Buddhist logic at the time of As'oka

"was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process

of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses

such as the udâhara@na (_Yo yo aggimâ so so dhûmavâ_--whatever is

fiery is smoky), the upanayana (_ayam pabbato dhûmavâ_--this

hill is smoky) and the niggama (_tasmâdayam aggimâ_--therefore

that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the

method of the arguments which are found in the _Kathâvatthu_ as

follows:

"Adherent. Is _A B_? (_@thâpanâ_).

Opponent. Yes.

Adherent. Is _C D_? (_pâpanâ_).

Opponent. No.

Adherent. But if _A_ be _B_ then (you should have said) _C_ is _D_.

That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but _D_ of _C_ is false.

Hence your first answer is refuted.")

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @thâpanâ,

because the opponent's position, _A_ is _B_, is conditionally

established for the purpose of refutation.

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed

pâpanâ because it is got from the antecedent. And the conclusion

158

is termed ropa@na because the regulation is placed on the

opponent. Next:

"If _D_ be derived of _C_.

Then _B_ should have been derived of _A_.

But you affirmed _B_ of _A_.

(therefore) That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but not of _D_ or _C_ is

wrong."

This is the pa@tiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted

with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the

consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major

in the latter method we get

"If _A_ is _B_ _C_ is _D_.

But _A_ is _B_.

Therefore _C_ is _D_.

By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished

[Footnote ref 1]."

The Doctrine of Momentariness.

Ratnakîrtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of

all existence (_sattva_), first, by the concomitance discovered by the

method of agreement in presence (_anvayavyâpti_), and then by the

method of difference by proving that the production of effects

could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent

and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness

as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of

producing anything (_arthakriyâkâritva_). The form of the first

type of argument by anvayavyâpti may be given thus: "Whatever

exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example

the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussing

are existents and are therefore momentary." It cannot

be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an

existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain

effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these

are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing

no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible,

for those which are done now could not be done again in the

future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote: 1: See introduction to the translation of _Kathâvatthu_

(_Points of Controversy_) by Mrs Rhys Davids.]

159

produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in that case one

might as well expect that there should not be any effect even at

the present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing

anything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does produce

at one moment and does not produce at another, this

contradiction will prove the supposition that the things were

different at the different moments. If it is held that the nature

of production varies at different moments, then also the thing at

those two moments must be different, for a thing could not have

in it two contradictory capacities.

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment the

work of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do

so, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the

future, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the

capacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two

moments (_s'aktâs'aktasvabhavatayâ pratik@sa@nam bheda@h_). The

capacity of producing effects (_arthakriyâs'akti_), which is but the

other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness

(_k@sa@nikatvavyâpta_).

The Nyâya school of philosophy objects to this view and says

that the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effect

produced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regarded

as existence or being, then the being or existence of the effect

cannot be known, until that has produced another effect and

that another _ad infinitum_. Since there can be no being that has

not capacity of producing effects, and as this capacity can

demonstrate itself only in an infinite chain, it will be impossible

to know any being or to affirm the capacity of producing effects

as the definition of existence. Moreover if all things were

momentary there would be no permanent perceiver to observe

the change, and there being nothing fixed there could hardly be

any means even of taking to any kind of inference. To this

Ratnakirtti replies that capacity (_saâmarthya_) cannot be denied,

for it is demonstrated even in making the denial. The observation

of any concomitance in agreement in presence, or agreement in

absence, does not require any permanent observer, for under

certain conditions of agreement there is the knowledge of the

concomitance of agreement in presence, and in other conditions

there is the knowledge of the concomitance in absence. This

knowledge of concomitance at the succeeding moment holds within

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itself the experience of the conditions of the preceding moment,

and this alone is what we find and not any permanent observer.

The Buddhist definition of being or existence (_sattva_) is

indeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed that

in all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined of

being;--seed was but the capacity of producing shoots, and

even if this capacity should require further capacity to produce

effects, the fact which has been perceived still remains, viz. that

the existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producing

the shoots and thus there is no vicious infinite [Footnote ref l].

Though things are momentary, yet we could have concomitance between

things only so long as their apparent forms are not different

(_atadrûpaparâv@rttayoreva sâdhyasâdhanayo@h pratyak@se@na

vyâptigraha@nât_). The vyâpti or concomitance of any two things

(e.g. the fire and the smoke) is based on extreme similarity and not

on identity.

Another objection raised against the doctrine of momentariness

is this, that a cause (e.g. seed) must wait for a number of other

collocations of earth, water, etc., before it can produce the effect

(e.g. the shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratnakîrtti

replies that the seed does not exist before and produce the

effect when joined by other collocations, but such is the special

effectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces both

the collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot.

How a special seed-moment became endowed with such special

effectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments which

preceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnakîrtti wishes to

draw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment reveals

a number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a number

of effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever has

being is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy.

It is not important to enlarge upon the second part of

Ratnakîrtti's arguments in which he tries to show that the production

of effects could not be explained if we did not suppose

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The distinction between vicious and harmless infinites

was known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventh

century. Jayanta quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly

(_Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 22):

"_mûlak@satikarîmâhuranavasthâm hi dû@sa@nam.

mûlasiddhau tvarucyâpi nânavasthâ nivâryate._"

The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive

at the root matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence

vicious, whereas if the root is saved there is no harm in a regress

though one may not be willing to have it.]

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all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute

the doctrines of Nyâya than an elaboration of the Buddhist

principles.

The doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollary

of the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though all

dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were all

strictly momentary (_k@sa@nika_--i.e. existing only for one moment)

was not emphasized in early Pâli literature. As'vagho@sa in his

_S'raddhotpâdas'âstra_ speaks of all skandhas as k@sa@nika (Suzuki's

translation, p. 105). Buddhaghosa also speaks of the meditation

of the khandhas as kha@nika in his _Visuddhimagga._ But from the

seventh century A.D. till the tenth century this doctrine together

with the doctrine of arthakriyâkâritva received great attention at

the hands of the Sautrântikas and the Vaibhâ@sikas. All the

Nyâya and Vedânta literature of this period is full of refutations

and criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist account

available of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen of

Ratnakîrtti. Some of the general features of his argument in

favour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of it

may be found in any of the important Nyâya works of this period

such as _Nynyamanjari, Tâtparyya@tîkâ_ of Vâcaspati Mis'ra, etc.

Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be permanent.

With the development of this doctrine they gave great

emphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and

the next moment they were destroyed. Whatever is existent is

momentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived

from the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied

the existence of any such permanent selves. What appears as

self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendencies

manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these

dissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones

appear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker.

Apart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannot

discover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product of

these ideas, emotions, etc., that yield the illusory appearance of

self at any moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant product

as it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc., at any

particular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc., change every

moment there is no such thing as a permanent self.

The fact that I remember that I have been existing for

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a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been

existing for such a long period. When I say this is that book, I

perceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that

"this book" is the same as "that book" (i.e. the book arising in

memory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident

that the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in the

past, whereas "this book" refers to the book which is before

my eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove permanence

is thus due to a confusion between an object of memory

referring to a past and different object with the object as perceived

at the present moment by the senses [Footnote ref 1]. This is true not only

of all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects but

also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of

self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions

arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But

since memory points to an object of past perception, and the perception

to another object of the present moment, identity cannot

be proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects

of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet

things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed.

Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we

have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old

hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave

the impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that

though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to

these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment

and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce

the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been

persisting through all the passing moments [Footnote ref 2]. Just as the

flame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as

if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so

all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects

around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are

being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the

objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those

of the preceding moments, it appears to us that things

have remained the same and no destruction has taken place.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See pratyabhijñânirâsa of the Buddhists, _Nyâyamañjarî_, V.S.

Series, pp. 449, etc.]

[Footnote 2: See _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_ of Gu@naratna, p. 30, and also

_Nyâyamañjarî,_ V.S. edition, p. 450.]

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The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine

of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyâkâritva).

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from

the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse

characteristics [Footnote ref 1]. What we call a thing is but a

conglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect,

determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or

as inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the

elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the

conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of

these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic,

the conglomeration is to be called a new one [Footnote ref 2]. Existence or

being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or

the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in

Sanskrit is called _arthakriyâkâritva_ which literally translated

means--the power of performing actions and purposes of some

kind [Footnote ref 3]. The criterion of existence or being is the

performance of certain specific actions, or rather existence means

that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency).

That which has produced such an effect is then called existent or _sat_.

Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding

change of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Compare _Milindapañha,_ II. I. 1--The Chariot Simile.]

[Footnote 2: Compare _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_ of Gu@naratna, A.S.'s edition,

pp. 24, 28 and _Nyâyamañjarî,_ V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the

paper on _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ by Ratnakîrtti in _Six Buddhist Nyâya

tracts_.]

[Footnote 3: This meaning of the word "arthakriyâkâritva" is different

from the meaning of the word as we found in the section "sautrântika

theory of perception." But we find the development of this meaning both

in Ratnakîrtti as well as in Nyâya writers who referred to this doctrine.

With Vinîtadeva (seventh century A.D.) the word "_arthakrîyâsiddhi_"

meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire

(_arthas'abdena prayojanamucyate puru@sasya praycjana@m dârupâkâdi

tasya siddhi@h ni@spatti@h_--the word _artha_ means need; the need of

man such as cooking by logs, etc.; _siddhi_ of that, means accomplishment).

With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later

_arthasiddhi_ means action (anu@s@thiti) with reference to undesirable

and desirable objects (_heyopâdeyârthavi@sayâ_). But with Ratnakîrtti

(950 A.D.) the word _arthakriyâkâritva_ has an entirely different sense.

It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and as

such it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence

_sattva_). Thus he says in his _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi,_ pp. 20, 21, that

though in different philosophies there are different definitions of

existence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted

definition of existence as _arthakriyâkâritva_ (efficiency of causing any

action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnakîrtti refer to the

Buddhist doctrine of _arthakriyâkâritva_ they usually refer to this

doctrine in Ratnakîrtti's sense.]

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which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot

be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once

produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in

us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but

cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect

and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming

into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things

were permanent there would be no reason why they should be

performing different effects at different points of time. Any

difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself

or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting

that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place.

The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it

has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power

then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no

notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression

produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power

exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should

hold that beyond such powers as are associated with the production

of impressions or effects there should be some other

permanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existed

even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power

of producing effects and define each unit of such power as

amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be

different units of power at different moments, there should also

be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as

momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power.

This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of

momentariness shown by Ratnakîrtti.

Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems Diverged.

We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy

without briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems

which were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philosophical

circles of India. These are in brief: (1) the relation of

cause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (_avayavi_) and the

part (_avayava_), (3) the relation of generality (_samanya_) to the

specific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and

the substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the

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relation of power (_s'akti_) to the power-possessor (_s'aktimân_). Thus

on the relation of cause and effect, S'a@nkara held that cause alone

was permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent

illusions due to ignorance, Sâ@mkhya held that there was no

difference between cause and effect, except that the former was

only the earlier stage which when transformed through certain

changes became the effect. The history of any causal activity is

the history of the transformation of the cause into the effects.

Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor

effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary

existence has been determined by the destruction of its momentary

antecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality

which undergoes the change, but one change is determined by

another and this determination is nothing more than "that

happening, this happened." On the relation of parts to whole,

Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According

to it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the

individual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and

thus there is no such thing as "whole [Footnote ref 1]. The Buddhists

hold again that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone

which come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there

is no such thing as fingerness (_a@ngulitva_) as the abstract universal

of the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we

know that the Sautrântika Buddhists did not believe in the existence

of any substance apart from its attributes; what we call a

substance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation.

In the external world there are as many individual simple units

(atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each

unit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective

world. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the

assemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there

are no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of

sensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next

moment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such relation

as that of inherence (_samavâya_) in which relation the attributes

are said to exist in the substance, for since there are no

separate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation

of inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not

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believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the

power.

Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought.

In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid

to the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What

was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation

of sorrow and what could lead to it? The doctrine of _pa@ticcasamuppâda_

was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and

not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The

discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether

the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathâgata

existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early

Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on sîla, samâdhi and paññâ

and the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas

hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in

the Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with

enumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mahâyâna

scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the

non-essentialness and voidness of all _dhammas_ began to be preached.

This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagârjuna,

Âryyadeva, Kumârajîva and Candrakîrtti, is more or less a corollary

from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not

say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a

Tathâgata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was

no permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only

legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to

think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These

appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from

their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality.

The Tathatâ doctrine which was preached by As'vagho@sa oscillated

between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all

dhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the

background of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called

tathatâ, but he could not consistently say that any such permanent

entity could exist. The Vijñânavâda doctrine which also

took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the

S'ûnyavâda doctrine and the Tathatâ doctrine; but when carefully

examined it seems to be nothing but S'ûnyavâda, with an attempt

at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was

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non-essential how did it originate? Vijñânavâda proposes to give an

answer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind

generated by the beginningless vâsanâ (desire) of the mind. The

difficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathatâ doctrine that

there must be some reality which is generating all these ideas

appearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijñânavâda

doctrine. The Vijñânavâdins could not admit the existence of such

a reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not

properly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was

some sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of

heresy, but they said that this was a compromise to make the

doctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality

assumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijñânavâda

literature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we

are not in a position to judge what answers Vijñânavâda could give

on the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the

same time and the difficulty of conceiving s'ûnya (void), tathatâ,

(thatness) and the âlayavijñâna of Vijñânavâda is more or less

the same.

The Tathatâ doctrine of As'vagho@sa practically ceased with

him. But the S'ûnyavâda and the Vijñânavâda doctrines which

originated probably about 200 B.C. continued to develop probably

till the eighth century A.D. Vigorous disputes with S'ûnyavâda

doctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hindu

philosophy, after Kumârila and S'a@nkara. From the third or

the fourth century A.D. some Buddhists took to the study of

systematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindu

logicians. Di@nnâga the Buddhist logician (500 A.D.) probably

started these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrines

of the great Hindu logician Vâtsyâyana, in his Pramâ@nasamuccaya.

In association with this logical activity we find the

activity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the Sarvâstivâdins

(known also as Vaibhâ@sikas) and the Sautrântikas. Both the

Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas accepted the existence of the

external world, and they were generally in conflict with the

Hindu schools of thought Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and Sâ@mkhya which

also admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu

(420-500 A.D.) was one of the most illustrious names of this school.

We have from this time forth a number of great Buddhist

thinkers such as Yas'omitra (commentator of Vasubandhu's work),

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Dharmmakîrtti (writer of Nyâyabindu 635 A.D.), Vinîtadeva and

S'ântabhadra (commentators of Nyâyabindu), Dharmmottara

(commentator of Nyâyabindu 847 A.D.), Ratnakîrtti (950 A.D.),

Pa@n@dita As'oka, and Ratnâkara S'ânti, some of whose contributions

have been published in the _Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts_, published

in Calcutta in the _Bibliotheca Indica_ series. These Buddhist

writers were mainly interested in discussions regarding the nature

of perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and

the doctrine of causal efficiency (_arthakriyâkâritva_) as demonstrating

the nature of existence. On the negative side they were

interested in denying the ontological theories of Nyâya and

Sâ@mkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation,

relation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. These

problems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrântika and

non-Vaibhâ@sika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of

course agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existence

of a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their

doctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement between

Hindu thought up to S'a@nkara (800 A.D.) and Buddhist thought

till the time of S'a@nkara consisted mainly in the denial by the

Buddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world.

For Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even the

Vedânta of S'a@nkara admitted the existence of the permanent

external world in some sense. With S'a@nkara the forms of the

external world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a permanent

background in the Brahman, which was the only reality

behind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautrântikas

admitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrel

with Nyâya and Sâ@mkhya was with regard to their doctrine

of momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on the

different ontological problems were in accordance with their

doctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do not

hear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From this

time the disputes were mainly between the different systems of

Hindu philosophers, viz. Nyâya, the Vedânta of the school of

S'a@nkara and the Theistic Vedânta of Râmânuja, Madhva, etc.

169