other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation.
But "when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arise
without covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, then
inasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted,
pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existent
and not liable to spring up again in the future [Footnote ref 2]."
Karma by itself without craving (_ta@nhâ_) is incapable of bearing good
or bad fruits. Thus we read in the _Mahâsatipa@t@thâna sutta_, "even
this craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and
self-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit,
the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed
life) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth) [Footnote
ref 3]." "Craving for things visible, craving for things audible,
craving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in
memory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear,
that are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does it
dwell [Footnote ref 4]." Pre-occupation and deliberation of sensual
gratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes.
And this is the first ârya satya (noble truth).
The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the utter
cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving
it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it [Footnote ref 5]."
When the desire or craving (_ta@nhâ_) has once ceased the
sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after
that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 215.]
[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 216-217.]
[Footnote 3: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. p. 340.]
[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 341.]
[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 341.]
108
fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma
finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all
ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there
is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the
effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as
Moggallâna did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma
an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of
his desire [Footnote ref 1].
Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and
mind (_kâyika_, _vâcika_ and _mânasika_). The root of this kamma
is however volition (_cetanâ_) and the states associated with it
[Footnote ref 2]. If a man wishing to kill animals goes out into
the forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them there
even after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, for
he could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he gives
an order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually
carried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (_vâcika_)
and not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether
carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (_mânasika_)
[Footnote ref 3]. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of
all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case
of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him.
Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into
four classes, viz. (1) those which are bad and produce impurity,
(2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those
which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of
both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor
bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which
contribute to the destruction of kammas [Footnote ref 4].
Final extinction of sorrow (_nibbâna_) takes place as the natural
result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have
tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and
various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vallée
Poussin has pointed out that in the Pâli texts Nibbâna has
sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation,
as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state [Footnote ref 5].
__________________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Kathâvatthu_ and Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, pp,
221 ff.]
[Footnote 2: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 88.]
[Footnote 3: See _Atthasâlinî_, p. 90.]
[Footnote 4: See _Atthasâlinî_, p. 89.]
[Footnote 5: Prof. De la Valláe Poussin's article in the _E. R.E._ on
Nirvâ@na. See also _Cullavagga_, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's _Psalms
of the early Buddhists_, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii; _Dîgha_,
II. 15; _Udâna_, VIII.; _Sa@myutta_, III. 109.]
109
Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbâna in _Pali Text Society Journal_,
1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become
identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space
(_âkâsa_) or consciousness (_viññâna_) attained to a state in which
they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having
really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of
Nibbâna seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit
of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task
to explain Nibbâna in terms of worldly experience, and there
is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that
it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly
experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive
or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not
exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to
think of a Tathâgata as existing eternally (_s'âs'vata_) or not-existing
(_as'âs'vata_) or whether he is existing as well as not
existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any
one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbâna is either a positive
and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation,
takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical.
It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for
we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to
give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as
illegitimate.
Later Buddhistic writers like Nâgârjuna and Candrakîrtti
took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpreted
it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence.
Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existence
or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There
is no difference between the worldly stage (_sa@msâra_) and Nibbâna,
for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during
the sa@msâra so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbâna.
Upani@sads and Buddhism.
The Upani@sads had discovered that the true self was ânanda
(bliss) [Footnote ref 1]. We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly
presupposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was
the self (_attâ_) it must be bliss. The Upani@sads had asserted that
the self(_âtman_) was indestructible and eternal [Footnote ref 2]. If we
are allowed
__________________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Tait, II.5.]
[Footnote 2: B@rh. IV. 5. 14. Ka@tha V. 13.]
110
to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could
conceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss,
because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed
been anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upani@sads, but he
who carefully reads the Upani@sads cannot but think that the
reason why the Upani@sads speak of the self as bliss is that it is
eternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal
was sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the
Upani@sads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that
which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self
[Footnote ref 1]. The point at which Buddhism parted from the
Upani@sads lies in the experiences of the self. The Upani@sads
doubtless considered that there were many experiences which we often
identify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is
found in the Upani@sads that there was associated with these a
permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence
which was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They considered
that this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined
as this, but could only be indicated as not this, not this (_neti
neti_) [Footnote ref 2]. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could
nowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our
changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and
therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self
was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me
as my self [Footnote ref 3].
The true self was with the Upani@sads a matter of transcendental
experience as it were, for they said that it could not
be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out
as "there," behind all the changing mental categories. The
Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But
how was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken
of as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of the
Buddha was that what people perceived there when they said
that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences
either individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did
not know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise
men, and considered himself to be endowed with form (_rûpa_)
or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He
________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikûya_, III. pp. 44-45 ff.]
[Footnote 2: See B@rh. IV. iv. Chândogya, VIII. 7-12.]
[Footnote 3: _Sa@myutta Nikaya_, III 45.]
111
experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or
experienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought
in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of
experiences that he considered as the perception of the self
[Footnote ref 1].
The Upani@sads did not try to establish any school of discipline
or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an
experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only
abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this
immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge.
The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow.
Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates,
ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorance
about the means of bringing about this extinction represent
the fourfold ignorance (_avijjâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. The avidyâ, which
is equivalent to the Pâli word avijjâ, occurs in the Upani@sads also,
but there it means ignorance about the âtman doctrine, and it is
sometimes contrasted with vidyâ or true knowledge about the self
(_âtman_) [Footnote ref 3]. With the Upani@sads the highest truth
was the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was
nothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence
was sorrow [Footnote ref 4]. This is, then, the cardinal truth of
Buddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways
represented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the
right comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (_âriya
sacca_)--sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of
sorrow, and the means thereto.
There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no
self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we
may ordinarily be led to suppose.
Thus it is said in the _Visuddhimagga_ "inasmuch however
as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming
into existence and a disappearing from existence...and is empty
of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence,--...or
in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and
similarly with reference to Karma and the rest--therefore is it
to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with
a twelvefold emptiness [Footnote ref 5]."
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Samyutta Nikâya_, II. 46.]
[Footnote 2: _Majjhima Nikâya_, I.p. 54.]
[Footnote 3: Châ. I.i. 10. B@rh. IV. 3.20. There are some passages where
vidyâ and avidyâ have been used in a different and rather obscure sense,
I's'â 9-11.]
[Footnote 4: _A@ng. Nikâya_, III. 85.]
[Footnote 5 Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap.
XVII.), p. 175.]
112
The Schools of Theravâda Buddhism.
There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the
Buddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death.
Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongst
the successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about
his doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined
upon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesâli
decided against the V@rjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas,
they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahâsa@ngha) and
came to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus
came to be called as the Mahâsa@nghikas [Footnote ref 1]. According to
Vasumitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahâsa@nghikas seceded in
400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise
first to the three schools Ekavyavahârikas, Lokottaravâdins, and
Kukkulikas and after that the Bahus'rutîyas. In the course of the
next one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the
Prajñaptivâdins, Caittikas, Aparas'ailas and Uttaras'ailas. The
Theravâda or the Sthaviravâda school which had convened the
council of Vesâli developed during the second and first century B.C.
into a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas,
Mahîs'âsakas, Kâs'yapîyas, Sa@nkrântikas (more well known as
Sautrântikas) and the Vâtsiputtrîyas which latter was again split up
into the Dharmottarîyas, Bhadrayânîyas, Sammitîyas and Channâgarikas.
The main branch of the Theravâda school was from
the second century downwards known as the Hetuvâdins or
Sarvâstivâdins [Footnote ref 2]. The _Mahâbodhiva@msa_ identifies the
Theravâda school with the Vibhajjavâdins. The commentator of the
_Kathâvatthu_ who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids sometime
in the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of
Buddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little.
Vasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The _Mahâva@msa_ differs from _Dîpava@msa_ in holding that
the Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahâsa@nghikas, but it was
the Mahâsa@nghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded
independently of them. The _Mahâbodhiva@msa_, which according to
Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.--1000 A.D., follows the
Mahava@msa in holding the Mahâsa@nghikas to be the first seceders
and Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.
Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of
Pâ@taliputra. See introduction to translation of _Kathâvatthu_ by
Mrs Rhys Davids.]
[Footnote 2: For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys
Davids's translation of _Kathâvatthu_, pp. xxxvi-xlv.]
113
certain schools, of the Mahâsa@nghikas, Lokottaravâdins,
Ekavyavahârikas, Kakkulikas, Prajñaptivâdins and Sarvâstivâdins, but
these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical
importance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that the
Mahâsa@nghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with
mind (_citta_) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the
Prajñaptivâdins held that there was no agent in man, that there was
no untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man,
(3) that the Sarvâstivâdins believed that everything existed. From
the discussions found in the _Kathâvatthu_ also we may know the
views of some of the schools on some points which are not always
devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found
by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It
is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism
were not so many different systems but only differed from one
another on some points of dogma or practice which were considered
as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now
appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their
literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises.
These schools are however not very important for a history of later
Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any
of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism
with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct
contact, are the Sarvâstivâdins including the Sautrântikas and
the Vaibhâ@sikas, the Yogâcâra or the Vijñânavâdins and the
Mâdhyamikas or the S'ûnyavâdins. We do not know which of the
diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools,
the Sautrântika, Vaibhâ@sika, Yogâcâra and the Mâdhyamika
schools. But as these schools were most important in relation
to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought,
it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can
about these systems of Buddhistic thought.
When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in
general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling them
the Vijñânavâdins or the Yogâcâras and the S'ûnyavâdins,
they often refer to the Sarvûstivûdins by which they mean
both the Sautrûntikas and the Vaibhû@sikas, ignoring the difference
that exists between these two schools. It is well to
mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the
Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravûda doctrines
114
as expressed in the Pâli works. The Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas
have been more or less associated with each other. Thus
the _Abhidharmakos'as'âstra_ of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhâ@sika
was commented upon by Yas'omitra who was a Sautrântika. The
difference between the Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas that
attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former
believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas
the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could
only be inferred from our diversified knowledge [Footnote ref 1].
Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary
_Tarkarahasyadîpikâ on @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ says that the Vaibhâsika
was but another name of the Âryasammitîya school. According to
Gu@naratna the Vaibhâ@sikas held that things existed for four moments,
the moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of
decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out
in Vastlbandhu's _Abhidharmakos'a_ that the Vaibhâ@sikas believed
these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination
with the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent
manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation
of Yas'omitra on _Abhidharmakos'a kârikâ_, V. 25). The self called
pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was
formless and was produced along with its object by the very
same conditions (_arthasahabhâsî ekasamâgryadhînah_). The Sautrântikas
according to Gu@naratna held that there was no soul but
only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past,
the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, âkâs'a and pudgala
are but names (_sa@mjñâmâtram_), mere assertions (_pratijñâmâtram_),
mere limitations (_samv@rtamâtram_) and mere phenomena (_vyavahâramâtram_).
By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal
and all pervasive soul. External objects are never directly
perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the
diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all
compounded things are momentary (_k@sa@nikâh sarvasa@mskârâh_).
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Mâdhavâcârya's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_, chapter II.
_S'âstradîpikâ_, the discussions on Pratyak@sa, Amalañanda's commentary
(on _Bhâmatî_) _Vedântakalpataru_, p 286. "_vaibhâ@sikasya bâhyo'rtha@h
pratyak@sa@h, sautrântikasya jñânagatâkâravaicitrye@n anumeya@h_." The
nature of the inference of the Sautrântikas is shown thus by
Amalânanda (1247-1260 A.D.) "_ye yasmin satyapi kâdâcitkâ@h te
tadatiriktâpek@sâ@h_" (those [i.e. cognitions] which in spite of certain
unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other
things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects)
_Vedântakalpataru_, p. 289.]
115
The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are
being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always
imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is
intended to be signified by that word (_anyâpoha@h s'abdârtha@h_).
Salvation (_mok@sa_) comes as the result of the destruction of the
process of knowledge through continual meditation that there
is no soul [Footnote ref 1].
One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavâdins, Sautrântikas
and the Vaibhâ@sikas or the Sarvâstivâdins appears to
refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest
with Buddhist philosophy. Thus _Abhidharmakos'a_ (v. 24...)
describes the Sarvâstivâdins as those who maintain the universal
existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjavâdins
are those "who maintain that the present elements and
those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition,
are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and
of those among the past that have already produced fruition."
There were four branches of this school represented by Dharmatrâta,
Gho@sa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrâta maintained
that when an element enters different times, its existence
changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd
or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes
though the essence remains the same. Gho@sa held that "when
an element appears at different times, the past one retains its
past aspects without being severed from its future and present
aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without
completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in
passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love
other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitra
held that an entity is called present, past and future according
as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having
once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadeva
maintained the view that just as the same woman may
be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be
called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the
preceding or the succeeding moment.
All these schools are in some sense Sarvâstivâdins, for they
maintain universal existence. But the Vaibhâ@sika finds them all
defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrâta's
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_, pp. 46-47.]
116
view is only a veiled Sâ@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa is
a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence
of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and
that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would
suppose that all the three times were found together and included
in one of them. The Vaibhâ@sika finds himself in agreement
with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time
depends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the
time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is
future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having
produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence
of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks
that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could
not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in
past times could not have produced its effects in the present
time. The Sautrântika however thought that the Vaibhâ@sika's
doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence,
for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference
appeared in it. The true view according to him was,
that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity,
the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared
from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to
exist. He objected to the Vaibhâ@sika view that the past is to
be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing
about the present on the ground that in that case there should
be no difference between the past and the present, since both
exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present
and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we
should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We
can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent
ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply
that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is
made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why
efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another
would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference
between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that
there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the
moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing
of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the
same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are
117
never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhâ@sika suggests, but
past passions leave residues which become the causes of new
passions of the present moment [Footnote ref.1].
Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of
the Vâtsiputtrîyas and the Sarvâstivâdins as represented by
Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of
the existence of soul in _Abhidharmakos'a_. The argument of
Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though
it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining
cause of perception, no such cause can be found which
may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary.
If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and
must be something different from the elements or entities of a
personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging
being would be without any practical efficiency (_arthakriyâkâritva_)
which alone determines or proves existence. The
soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a
mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are
only the elements of a personal life. But the Vâtsiputtrîya
school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the
same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is
separate from it, so the soul is an individual (_pudgala_) which has
a separate existence, though we could not say that it was
altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the
same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements
of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence
cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must
be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise
an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist.
To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a
person) does not represent an unity. "It is only an unbroken
continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which
simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the
name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned,
and is based on an analogy with their own experience,
but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving
from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as
_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished
translation from Tibetan of a small portion of _Abhidharmakoia_ by
my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful
to him that he allowed me to utilize it.]
118
belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productions
in different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves,'
'sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions
in new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta
cognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place
in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments,
these former moments coming in close succession being called
Devadatta)."
The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty,
for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces
its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of
the remembered object under certain conditions of attention,
etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or
violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of
memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind
and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying
that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only
meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the
same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say
"this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this
object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two
moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is
the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be
known by descriptions such as "this venerable man, having this
name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating
such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such
an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away
having reached an age." Only so much description can be
understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the
individual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of
sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the
former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual
is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere
thing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be
grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect.
This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other
fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we
sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but
what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc.,
fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are
119
conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some
colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation
'individual' but a common name for the different elements
of which it is composed."
The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question
whether the "living being is identical with the body or not" is
just because there did not exist any living being as "individual,"
as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living
being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would
have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was
also denied. In truth the "living being" is only a conventional
name for a set of constantly changing elements [Footnote ref 1].
The only book of the Sammitîyas known to us and that by
name only is the _Sammitîyas'âstra_ translated into Chinese between
350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however
probably lost [Footnote ref 2].
The Vaibhâ@sikas are identified with the Sarvâstivâdins who
according to _Dîpava@msa_ V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu,
branched off from the Mahîs'âsakas, who in their turn had
separated from the Theravâda school.
From the _Kathâvatthu_ we know (1) that the Sabbatthivâdins
believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment
was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual
process, (3) that consciousness or even samâdhi was nothing but
________________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: This account is based on the translation of
_A@s@tamakos'asthânanibaddha@h pudgolavinis'caya@h_, a special appendix
to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky,
_Bulletin de l' Académie des Sciences de Russie_, 1919.]
[Footnote 2: Professor De la Vallée Poussin has collected some of the
points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitîyas in the _E. R.E._
He there says that in the _Abhidharmakos'avyâkhyâ_ the Sammitîyas have
been identified with the Vâtsîputtrîyas and that many of its texts were
admitted by the Vaibhâ@sikas of a later age. Some of their views are as
follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvâna can fall away; (2) there is
an intermediate state between death and rebirth called _antarâbhava_; (3)
merit accrues not only by gift (_tyagânvaya_) but also by the fact of the
actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given
(_paribhogânvaya pu@nya_); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a
declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5)
they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from
which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala
cannot be said to be transitory (_anitye_) like the skandhas since it
transmigrates laying down the burden (_skandhas_) shouldering a new burden;
it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory
constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitîyas as sketched by
Professor De la Vallée Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala
doctrine of the Sammitîyas as sketched by Gu@naratna which we have
noticed above.]
120
a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away [Footnote ref 1].
The Sabbatthivâdins or Sarvâstivâdins have a vast Abhidharma literature
still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the
Abhidharma of the Theravâda school which we have already mentioned
[Footnote ref 2]. These are 1. _Jñânaprasthâna S'âstra_ of
Kâtyâyanîputtra which passed by the name of _Mahâ Vibhâ@sâ_ from which
the Sabbatthivâdins who followed it are called Vaibhâ@sikas [Footnote ref
3]. This work is said to have been given a literary form by As'vagho@sa.
2. _Dharmaskandha_ by S'âriputtra. 3. _Dhâtukâya_ by Pûr@na.
4. _Prajñaptis'âstra_ by Maudgalyâyana. 5. _Vijñânakâya_ by Devak@sema.
6. _Sa@ngîtiparyyâya_ by Sâriputtra and _Prakara@napâda_ by Vasumitra.
Vasubandhu (420 A.D.-500 A.D.) wrote a work on the Vaibhâ@sika [Footnote
ref 4] system in verses (_kârikâ_) known as the _Abhidharmakos'a_,
to which he appended a commentary of his own which passes by the name
_Abhidharma Kos'abhâ@sya_ in which he pointed out some of the defects
of the Vaibhâ@sika school from the Sautrântika point of view [Footnote
ref 5]. This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and Gu@namati and
later on by Yas'omitra who was himself a Sautrântika and called his
work _Abhidharmakos'a vyâkhyâ_; Sa@nghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu
wrote _Samayapradipa_ and _Nyâyânusâra_ (Chinese translations of which
are available) on strict Vaibhâ@sika lines. We hear also of other
Vaibhâ@sika writers such as Dharmatrâta, Gho@saka, Vasumitra and
Bhadanta, the writer of _Sa@myuktâbhidharmas'âstra_ and _Mahâvibhâ@sâ_.
Di@nnâga(480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a Vaibhâ@sika
or a Sautrântika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu,
wrote his famous work _Pramâ@nasamuccaya_ in which he
established Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vâtsyâyana
the celebrated commentator of the _Nyâya sûtras_; but we regret
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation _Kathâvatthu_, p. xix,
and Sections I.6,7; II. 9 and XI. 6.]
[Footnote 2: _Mahâvyutpatti_ gives two names for Sarvâstivâda, viz.
Mûlasarvâstivâda and Âryyasarvâstivâda. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks
of Âryyamûlasarvâstivâda and Mûlasarvâstivâda. In his time he found
it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu
says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Paramârtha, in his life of Vasubandhu,
says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra,
who studied it there.]
[Footnote 3: Takakusu says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Kâtyâyanîputtra's work
was probably a compilation from other Vibhâ@sâs which existed before the
Chinese translations and Vibhâ@sâ texts dated 383 A.D.]
[Footnote 4: See Takakusu's article _J.R.A.S._ 1905.]
[Footnote 5: The Sautrântikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the
Vaibhâ@sikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines
as given in the Suttapi@taka.]
121
to say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit,
nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into
any of the modern European or Indian languages.
The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at
Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivâdins
from the Chinese versions of the _Abhidharmakos'a, Mahâvibhâ@sâs'âstra_,
etc., rather elaborately [Footnote ref 1]. The following is a short sketch,
which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen.
The Sabbatthivâdins admitted the five skandhas, twelve
âyatanas, eighteen dhâtus, the three asa@msk@rta dharmas of
pratisa@mkhyânirodha apratisa@mkhyânirodha and âkâs'a, and the
sa@msk@rta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rûpa
(matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental)
[Footnote ref 2]. All effects are produced by the coming together
(sa@msk@rta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the
rûpa, citta, etc., are thus called sa@msk@rta dharmas (composite
things or collocations--_sambhûyakâri_). The rûpa dharmas are
eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14
cittaviprayukta sa@mskâra dharmas (non-mental composite things);
adding to these the three asa@msk@rta dharmas we have the seventy-five
dharmas. Rûpa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the
sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or
collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell,
taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum
is known as paramâ@nu, which is the minutest form of rûpa. It
cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is
indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible.
But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary
flash into being. The simple atoms are called _dravyaparamâ@nu_
and the compound ones _sa@mghâtaparamâ@nu_. In the words of
Prof. Stcherbatsky "the universal elements of matter are manifested
in their actions or functions. They are consequently more
energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded
as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such paramâ@nus combine
together to form an a@nu, and it is in this combined form
only that they become perceptible. The combination takes
place in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Systems of Buddhistic Thought_, published by the Calcutta
University.]
[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the
Sarvâstivâdins in his bhâ@sya on the _Brahma-sûtras_ II. 2 notices some
of the categories mentioned by Sogen.]
122
others around it. The point which must be remembered in connection
with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities
of all the mahâbhûtas are inherent in the paramâ@nus. The special
characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth),
viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging
to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to
form each of the elements; the difference between the different
elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special
characteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristics
though present remained only in a potential form. The
mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of
earth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of
things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth.
The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely,
(1) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as
activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as _dh@rti_ or
attraction, _sa@mgraha_ or cohesion, _pakti_ or chemical heat, and
_vyûhana_ or clustering and collecting). These combine together
naturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction
between the Vaibhâ@sika Sarvâstivadins and other forms of Buddhism
is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regarded
as permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary
only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly,
owing to their constant change of combination. Avidyâ is not
regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of
pratîtyasamutpâda; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual,
but is rather identical with "moha" or delusion and
represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidyâ,
which through sa@mskâra, etc., produces nâmarûpa in the case of
a particular individual, is not his avidyâ in the present existence
but the avidyâ of his past existence bearing fruit in the present
life.
"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when
it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example,
clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the
name clay is lost and the name jar arises [Footnote ref 1]. The
Sarvâstivâdins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in
the case of composite things (_sa@mprayukta hetu_) and in the case of
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Sogen's quotation from Kumârajîva's Chinese version of
Âryyadeva's commentary on the _Mâdhyamika s'âstra_ (chapter XX. Kârikâ 9).]
123
the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum
of "vijñâna" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and
the aggregate of the five senses (_indriyas_) is called the perceiver.
It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a
permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a
substratum formed of them.
The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow,
red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of
appearance (_sa@msthâna_) of long, short, round, square, high, low,
straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (_kâyendriya_) has for
its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness,
roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These
qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by
the objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted
under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch
which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of
wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other
energies; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which
excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire
becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The
indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse
thought (_vijñâna_); each of the five senses is an agent without
which none of the five vijñânas would become capable of perceiving
an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely
material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal
sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal
senses consists of a combination of paramâ@nus, which are extremely
pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is
the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from
one another with respect to the manner and form of their respective
atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is
performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed
on our person which is designated as avijñapti rûpa. It is called
rûpa because it is a result or effect of rûpa-contact; it is called
avijñapti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energy
is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is
the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma
done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered
as twofold, namely, that as thought (_cetana karma_) and that as
activity (_caitasika karma_). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz.
124
that due to body-motion (_kâyika karma_) and speech (_vâcika
karma_). Both these may again be latent (_avijñapti_) and patent
(_vijñapti_), giving us the kâyika-vijnñpti karma, kâyikâvijñapti
karma, vâcika-vijñapti karma and vâcikâvijñapti karma. Avijñapti
rûpa and avijñapti karma are what we should call in modern
phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corresponding
to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity
there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself
in future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known but
are similar to those which are known, they are called avijñapti.
The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it
wills (_cetati_), manas because it thinks (_manvate_) and vijñâna
because it discriminates (_nirdis'ati_). The discrimination may be
of three kinds: (1) svabhâva nirdes'a (natural perceptual discrimination),
(2) prayoga nirdes'a (actual discrimination as present,
past and future), and (3) anusm@rti nirdes'a (reminiscent discrimination
referring only to the past). The senses only possess the
_svabhâva nirdes'a_, the other two belong exclusively to manovijñâna.
Each of the vijñânas as associated with its specific sense discriminates
its particular object and perceives its general characteristics;
the six vijñânas combine to form what is known as the
Vijñânaskandha, which is presided over by mind (_mano_). There
are forty-six caitta sa@msk@rta dharmas. Of the three asa@msk@rta
dharmas âkâs'a (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction,
establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance
(_nîrûpâkhya_, non-rûpa). The second asa@msk@rta dharma, apratisa@mkhyâ
nirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused
by the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my
attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because
they are non-existent but because the conditions which would
have made them visible were absent. The third asa@msk@rta
dharma, pratisa@mkhyâ nirodha, is the final deliverance from
bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These
are called asa@msk@rta because being of the nature of negation
they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution.
The eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of right
views, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood,
right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture [Footnote ref 1].
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hînayâna
thinker (about 250 A.D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as
Satyasiddhi school, which propounded the same sort of doctrines as
those preached by Nâgârjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit
and I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.]
125
Mahâyânism.
It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahâyânism took
its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahâsa@nghikas
separated themselves from the Theravâdins probably some time in
400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those
elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be
labelled as Mahâyâna were gradually on the way to taking their
first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works
which are regarded as various Mahâyâna sûtras, some of which
are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others
as late as 300 or 400 A.D.[Footnote ref 1]. These Mahâyânasûtras, also
called the Vaipulyasûtras, are generally all in the form of instructions
given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or
compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and
were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravâda
school.
The word Hînayâna refers to the schools of Theravâda, and
as such it is contrasted with Mahâyâna. The words are generally
translated as small vehicle (_hîna_ = small, _yâna_ = vehicle) and great
vehicle (_mahâ_ = great, _yâna_ = vehicle). But this translation by
no means expresses what is meant by Mahâyâna and Hînayâna
[Footnote ref 2]. Asa@nga (480 A.D.) in his _Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra_ gives
__________________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Quotations and references to many of these sûtras are found in
Candrakîrtti's commentary on the _Mâdhyamîka kârikâs_ of Nâgârjuna; some of
these are the following: _A@s@tasâhasrikâprajñâpâramitâ_ (translated into
Chinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), _S'atasâhasrikâprajñâpâramitâ, Gaganagañja,
Samâdhisûtra, Tathâgataguhyasûtra, D@r@dhâdhyâs'ayasañcodanâsûtra,
Dhyâyitamu@s@tisûtra, Pitâputrasamâgamasûtra, Mahâyânasûtra,
Mâradamanasûtra, Ratnakû@tasûtra, Ratnacû@dâparip@rcchâsûtra,
Ratnameghasûtra, Ratnarâs`isûtra, Ratnâkarasûtra,
Râ@s@trapâlaparip@rcchâsûtra, La@nkâvatârasûtra, Lalitavistarasûtra,
Vajracchedikâsûtra, Vimalakîrttinirdes'asûtra, S'âlistambhasûtra,
Samâdhirajasutra, Sukhâvatîvyûha, Suvar@naprabhâsasûtra,
Saddharmapu@n@darika (translated into Chinese A.D. 255),
Amitâyurdhyânasûtra, Hastikâkhyasûtra, etc.]
[Footnote 2: The word Yâna is generally translated as vehicle, but a
consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to
suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle
(_Lalitavistara_, pp. 25, 38; _Prajñâpâramitâ_, pp. 24, 319;
_Samâdhirâjasûtra_, p. 1; _Karu@nâpu@ndarîka_, p. 67; _La@nkâvatârasûtra_,
pp. 68, 108, 132). The word Yâna is as old as the Upani@sads where we read
of Devayâna and Pit@ryâna. There is no reason why this word should be
taken in a different sense. We hear in _La@nkâvatâra_ of S'râvakayâna
(career of the S'râvakas or the Theravâdin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayâna
(the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha
yâna (career of the Buddhas), Ekayâna (one career), Devayâna (career of
the gods), Brahmayâna (career of becoming a Brahmâ), Tathâgatayâna
(career of a Tathâgata). In one place _Lankâvatâra_ says that ordinarily
distinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career,
but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (_Lankâvatâra_, p. 68).]
126
us the reason why one school was called Hînayâna whereas the
other, which he professed, was called Mahâyâna. He says that,
considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion,
the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hînayâna
occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Mahâ
(great) Yâna, and hence it is branded as Hîna (small, or low).
This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction
between Hînayâna and Mahâyâna. The ultimate good of an
adherent of the Hînayâna is to attain his own nirvâ@na or salvation,
whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Mahâyâna
creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the
salvation of all beings. So the Hînayâna goal was lower, and in
consequence of that the instructions that its followers received,
the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were
narrower than that of the Mahâyâna adherents. A Hînayâna man
had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this
could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahâyâna adherent was
prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain
salvation. So the Hînayana adherents required only a short period
of work and may from that point of view also be called _hîna,_ or
lower.
This point, though important from the point of view of the
difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point
of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Mahâyânists
which distinguishes them from the Hînayânists from the
philosophical point of view. The Mahâyânists believed that all
things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and
void at bottom, whereas the Hînayânists only believed in the
impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than
that.
It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nâgârjuna first
preached the doctrine of S'ûnyavâda (essencelessness or voidness
of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahâyâna sûtras
either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we
take some of those sûtras which were in all probability earlier than
Nâgârjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nâgârjuna expounded
127
with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted
as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhûti saying to
the Buddha that vedanâ (feeling), samjñâ (concepts) and the
sa@mskâras (conformations) are all mâyâ (illusion) [Footnote ref 1]. All
the skandhas, dhätus (elements) and âyatanas are void and absolute
cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void
is not different from the skandhas, dhâtus and âyatanas, and this
absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge
(_prajñâpâramitâ_) [Footnote ref 2]. Everything being void there is in
reality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal
(_s'âs'vata_) nor non-eternal (_as'âs'vata_) but pure void. It should
be the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the "thatness"
(_tathatâ_) and consider all things as void. The saint (_bodhisattva_)
has to establish himself in all the virtues (_pâramitâ_), benevolence
(_dânapâramitâ_), the virtue of character (_s'îlapâramitâ_), the virtue
of forbearance (_k@sântipâramitâ_), the virtue of tenacity and strength
(_vîryyapâramitâ_) and the virtue of meditation (_dhyânapâramitâ_).
The saint (_bodhisattva_) is firmly determined that he will
help an infinite number of souls to attain nirvâ@na. In reality,
however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation;
and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid
of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for
all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage.
The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his
work on the strength of his pâramitâs, though in reality there
is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who
is to help him to attain it [Footnote ref 3]. The true prajñapâramitâ is
the absolute cessation of all appearance (_ya@h anupalambha@h
sarvadharmâ@nâm sa prajñâpâramitâ ityucyate_) [Footnote ref 4].
The Mahâyâna doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that
of S'ûnyavâda or the Mâdhyamika doctrine and Vijñânavâda.
The difference between S'ûnyavâda and Vijñânavâda (the theory
that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness)
is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them
agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything
is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But
while the S'ûnyavâdins were more busy in showing this
indefinableness of all phenomena, the Vijñânavâdins, tacitly accepting
_______________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _A@s@tesâhasiihâprajñâpâramita_, p. 16.]
[Footnote 2: Ibid p. 177.]
[Footnote 3: Ibid p. 21.]
[Footnote 4: Ibid p. 177.]
128
the truth preached by the S'ûnyavâdins, interested themselves in
explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of
beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (_vâsanâ_).
As'vagho@sa (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher
of a new type of idealism (_vijñânavâda_) known as the Tathatâ
philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation in
As'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotpâdas'âstra_ as being made from
_La@nkâvatârasûtra_, we should think of the _La@nkâvatârasûtra_ as
being one of the early works of the Vijñânavâdins [Footnote ref 1].
The greatest later writer of the Vijñânavâda school was Asa@nga
(400 A.D.), to whom are attributed the _Saptadas'abhûmi sûtra,
Mahâyâna sûtra, Upades'a, Mahâyânasamparigraha s'âstra, Yogâcârabhûmi
s'âstra_ and _Mahâyânasûtrâla@mkâra_. None of these works excepting the
last one is available to readers who have no access to the
Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are
in all probability lost. The Vijñânavâda school is known to
Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogâcâra, and it does
not seem an improbable supposition that Asa@nga's _Yogâcârabhûmi
s'âstra_ was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu,
a younger brother of Asa@nga, was, as Paramârtha (499-569) tells
us, at first a liberal Sarvâstivâdin, but was converted to Vijñânavâda,
late in his life, by Asa@nga. Thus Vasubandhu, who
wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvâstivâdins,
_Abhidharmakos'a_, devoted himself in his later life to Vijñânavâda
[Footnote ref 2]. He is said to have commented upon a number of
Mahâyâna sûtras, such as _Avata@msaka, Nirvâ@na, Saddharmapu@n@darîka,
Prajñâpâramitâ, Vimalakîrtti_ and _S'rîmâlâsi@mhanâda_, and
compiled some Mahâyâna sûtras, such as _Vijñânamâtrasiddhi,
Ratnatraya_, etc. The school of Vijñânavâda continued for at
least a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in
possession of any work of great fame of this school after him.
We have already noticed that the S'ûnyavâda formed the fundamental
principle of all schools of Mahâyâna. The most powerful
exponent of this doctrine was Nâgârjuna (1OO A.D.), a brief account
of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nâgârjuna's
kârikâs (verses) were commented upon by Âryyadeva, a disciple
of his, Kumârajîva (383 A.D.). Buddhapâlita and Candrakîrtti
(550 A.D.). Âryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at
________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Dr S.C. Vidyâbhûshana thinks that _Lankâvatâna_ belongs to
about 300 A.D.]
[Footnote 2: Takakusu's "A study of the Paramârtha's life of Vasubandhu,"
_J.R.A.S_. 1905.]
129
least three other books, viz. _Catu@hs'ataka, Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti_
and _Cittavis`uddhiprakara@na_ [Footnote ref 1]. In the small work called
_Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti_ Âryyadeva says that whatever depends
for its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory;
all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions
and notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded
as mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is dependent
on others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man
should feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phenomenal
appearances. In his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_ he says
that just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflection
of a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself
colourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of imagination
(_vikalpa_). In reality the mind (_citta_) without a touch
of imagination (_kalpanâ_) in it is the pure reality.
It does not seem however that the S'ûnyavâdins could produce
any great writers after Candrakîrtti. References to S'ûnyavâda
show that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers
until the time of the great Mîmâ@msâ authority Kumârila who
flourished in the eighth century; but in later times the S'ûnyavâdins
were no longer occupying the position of strong and active disputants.
The Tathataâ Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A.D.) [Footnote ref 2].
As'vagho@sa was the son of a Brahmin named Sai@mhaguhya
who spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of
India and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was probably
converted to Buddhism by Pâr@sva who was an important
person in the third Buddhist Council promoted,
according to some authorities, by the King of Kashmere
and according to other authorities by Pu@nyayas'as [Footnote ref 3].
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Âryyadeva's _Hastabâlaprakara@nav@rtti_ has been reclaimed by
Dr. F.W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_
were published by Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda s'âstrî in the Bengal
Asiatic Society's journal, 1898.]
[Footnote 2: The above section is based on the _Awakening of Faith_, an
English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of
_S'raddhotpâdas`âstra_ by As'vagho@sa, the Sanskrit original of which
appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidence
to show that As'vagho@sa was a contemporary of Kani@ska.]
[Footnote 3: Târanâtha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple
of Nâgârjuna, _Geschichte des Buddhismus_, German translation by Schiefner,
pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's _Awakening of Faith_, pp. 24-32. As'vagho@sa wrote
the _Buddhacaritakâvya_, of great poetical excellence, and the
_Mahâla@mkâras'âstra_. He was also a musician and had invented a musical
instrument called Râstavara that he might by that means convert the
people of the city. "Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious,
inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-âtmanness
of life." Suzuki, p. 35.]
130
He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished
--the aspect as thatness (_bhûtatathatâ_) and the aspect as the cycle
of birth and death (_sa@msâra_). The soul as bhûtatathatâ means
the oneness of the totality of all things (_dharmadhâtu_). Its essential
nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account
of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious
memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (_sm@rti_)
appear under the forms of individuation [Footnote ref 1]. If we could
overcome this sm@rti "the signs of individuation would disappear and
there would be no trace of a world of objects." "All things in their
fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannot
be adequately expressed in any form of language. They
possess absolute sameness (_samatâ_). They are subject neither to
transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul"
--thatness (_bhûtatathatâ_). This "thatness" has no attribute and
it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness."
As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is
spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor
that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor
that which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness." This
bhûtatathatâ is neither that which is existence, nor that which is
non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence,
nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence;
it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is
at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity
and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is
beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept
in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be comprehended
by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is
only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of
the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that
we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the
particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call
it negation, "s'ûnyatâ," in this sense. The truth is that which
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I have ventured to translate "_sm@rti_" in the sense of vâsanâ
in preference to Suzuki's "confused subjectivity" because sm@rti in the
sense of vâsanâ is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist works
as _La@nkâvatâra_. The word "subjectivity" seems to be too European a
term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.]
131
subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (_s'ûnyatâ_) is
also void (_s'ûnya_) in its nature, that neither that which is negated
nor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure
soul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and
completely holds all things within it. On that account it may be
called affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it,
because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory
(_sm@rti_) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the
truth--the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations.
"The soul as birth and death (_sa@msâra_) comes forth from
the Tathâgata womb (_tathâgatagarbha_), the ultimate reality.
But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other.
Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus
when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation
it is called the all-conserving mind (_âlayavijñâna_).
It embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment.
Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is
free from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient
memory (_sm@rti_). It penetrates all and is the unity of all
(_dharmadhâtu_). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakâya of all
Tathâgatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence.
"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamental
truth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any
real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence--a mere imaginary
creation of the perceivers under the influence of the
delusive sm@rti. The multitude of people (_bahujana_) are said to be
lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (_avidyâ_) prevails
there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of
sm@rti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which
they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested
of this sm@rti they can then recognize that no states of mentation,
viz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have
any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation
with the one soul, for they are not self-existent.
"This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our corrupted
phenomenal experience as prajñâ (wisdom) and karma
(incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we understand
that when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of dharma,
disciplines himself truthfully (i.e. according to the dharma), and
accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i.e. the _âlayavijñâna_)
132
which implicates itself with birth and death will be broken down
and the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, and
the pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmakâya will manifest
itself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are
mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is
identical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore
ignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another sense
it is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of the
water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here
the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical
with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the
water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of
the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise
when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and
clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (_avidyâ_), the waves
of mentality (_vijñâna_) make their appearance. These three (i.e.
the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence,
and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is
annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the
essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the
enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity
or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in
the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they
neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear
nor are destroyed." It is for ever cut off from the hindrances both
affectional (_kles'âvara@na_) and intellectual (_jñeyâvara@na_), as well
as from the mind (i.e. _âlayavijñâna_) which implicates itself with
birth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal,
calm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transforms
and unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the form
of a tathâgata or in some other forms, in order that all beings
may be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity.
"Non-elightenment has no existence of its own aside from its
relation with enlightenment _a priori_." But enlightenment _a priori_
is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as
non-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses
its significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual relation
as enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestations
of non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (1) as a disturbance
of the mind (_âlayavijñâna_), by the avidyâkarma (ignorant
133
action), producing misery (_du@hkha_); (2) by the appearance of an
ego or of a perceiver; and (3) by the creation of an external world
which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Conditioned
by the unreal external world six kinds of phenomena
arise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensation);
being affected by the external world the mind becomes
conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable.
The second phenomenon is succession. Following upon
intelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well
as disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states.
The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and
succession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there
arises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attachment
to names or ideas (_sa@mjñâ_), etc. By clinging the mind
hypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things.
The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (_karma_). On
account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations
of deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenon
is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering
arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of
its freedom." All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through
avidyâ.
The relation between this truth and avidyâ is in one sense
a mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kinds
of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay
[Footnote ref 1]. Likewise the undefiled (_anâsrava_) and ignorance
(_avidyâ_) and their various transient forms all come from one and the
same entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all
eternity abiding in Nirvâ@na.
It is by the touch of ignorance (_avidyâ_) that this truth assumes
all the phenomenal forms of existence.
In the all-conserving mind (_âlayavijñâna_) ignorance manifests
itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that
which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and
that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (_manas_).
Five different names are given to the ego (according to its different
modes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness
(_karmavijñâna_) in the sense that through the agency of
ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or
_____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Compare Chândogya, VI. 1. 4.]
134
awakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (_prav@rttiivijñâna_)
in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there
evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is
representation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (_manas_}
represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirror
reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the
representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance,
with the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneously
and without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness,
in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled
as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in the
sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness
of attention (_manaskâra_) it (_manas_) retains all experiences and
never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well
as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution,
painful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present
or in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciously
recollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates things
to come. Therefore the three domains (_kâmaloka_, domain of
feeling--_rûpaloka_, domain of bodily existence--_arûpaloka_, domain
of incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of the
mind (i.e. _âlayavijñâna_ which is practically identical with
_bhûtatathatâ_). Since all things, owing the principle of their
existence to the mind (_âlayavijñâna_), are produced by sm@rti,
all the modes of particularization are the self-particularizations
of the mind. The mind in itself (or the soul) being however free from
all attributes is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion
that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatized
and established only through ignorance (_avidyâ_) and memory
(_sm@rti_), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They
arise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. When
the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but
when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears.
By ego-consciousness (_manovijñâna_) we mean the ignorant mind
which by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception of
I and Not-I and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of
sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness,
because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the
prejudices (_âsrava_), intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believing
in the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes
135
oblivious of the principle of sameness (_samatâ_) that underlies all
things which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show no
sign of becoming.
Non-enlightenment is the _raison d'étre_ of samsâra. When
this is annihilated the conditions--the external world--are also
annihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also
annihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilation
of the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an unruffled
sea when all winds which were disturbing it and producing
the waves have been annihilated.
In describing the relation of the interaction of avidyâ (ignorance),
karmavijñâna (activity-consciousness--the subjective mind),
vi@saya (external world--represented by the senses) and the tathatâ
(suchness), As'vaghosa says that there is an interperfuming of
these elements. Thus As'vaghosa says, "By perfuming we mean
that while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no
odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet
acquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the substance
with which they are perfumed. Suchness (_tathatâ_) is likewise
a pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming
power of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to
do with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the
work of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness.
Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the _raison d'étre_ of
all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness
and produces sm@rti. This sm@rti in its turn perfumes ignorance.
On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunderstood.
On account of its being misunderstood an external world
of subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming
power of memory, various modes of individuation are produced.
And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer
as the result miseries mentally as well as bodily." Again "suchness
perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming
the individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of
birth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirvâna. This
longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn
perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we
are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves
of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and
we also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing
136
but the illusory manifestations of the mind (_âlayavijñâna_) and
have no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand
the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform
those actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We
should neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By
virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable
âsa@nkhyeyakalpas [Footnote ref 1] we get ignorance annihilated. As
ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (_âlayavijñâna_) is no longer
disturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no
longer disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world
is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition
of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all
annihilated, it is said that we attain Nirvâ@na and that various
spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished." The Nirvâ@na
of the tathatâ philosophy is not nothingness, but tathatâ (suchness
or thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbance
which produces all the diversity of experience.
To the question that if all beings are uniformly in possession
of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it
that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do,
As'vagho@sa's reply is that though all beings are uniformly in
possession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the principle
of individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in such
manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, and
hence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principle
in one's own being which, embraced and protected by the love
(_maitrî_) and compassion (_karu@nâ_) of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas,
is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe
in nirvâ@na, to cultivate the root of merit (_kus'alamûla_), to habituate
oneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequence
of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, receiving
instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and induced
to practise good deeds, etc., till one can attain to Buddhahood and
enter into Nirvâ@na. This implies that all beings have such perfuming
power in them that they may be affected by the good wishes
of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the path
of virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvas
and sometimes seeing them, "all beings thereby acquire (spiritual)
benefits (_hitatâ_)" and "entering into the samâdhi of purity, they
_____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Technical name for a very vast period of time.]
137
destroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all-penetrating
insight that enables them to become conscious of the absolute oneness
(_samatâ_) of the universe (_sarvaloka_) and to see innumerable Buddhas
and Bodhisattvas."
There is a difference between the perfuming which is not in
unison with suchness, as in the case of s'râvakas (theravâdin
monks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who only
continue their religious discipline but do not attain to the state
of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness.
But those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison with
suchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allow
themselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma.
The incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance from
all eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood one
at once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma
(i.e. suchness) however works on to eternity without any interruption.
For this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of great
wisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadhâtu (universe),
the true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in its
own nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the
pure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is called
the tathâgatagarbha or the dharmakâya. It may be objected that
since thatness or suchness has been described as being without
characteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracing
all merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits,
it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because all
objects in the world are of one and the same taste; and being
of one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of particularization
or of dualistic character. "Though all things in their
(metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth are
free from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenment
there originates a subjective mind (_âlayavijñâna_) that becomes
conscious of an external world." This is called ignorance or
avidyâ. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectly
pure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assign
to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It is
called universal illumination, because there is nothing for it to
illumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever,
though the stage of the perfuming of avidyâ comes to an end with
the Buddhas when they attain to nirvâ@na. All Buddhas while at
138