CHAPTER V_A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Many scholars are of opinion that the Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga

represent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also

suggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them.

It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the

systematic Sâ@mkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had

decidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known

to every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the

Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of

the systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is

therefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different

systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It

seems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism

first.

The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha.

It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different

philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before

Buddhism. The doctrines of the Upani@sads are well known, and

these have already been briefly described. But these were not the

only ones. Even in the Upani@sads we find references to diverse

atheistical creeds [Footnote ref 1]. We find there that the origin of the

world and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought

that "time" was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these

had sprung forth by their own nature (_svabhâva_), others that

everything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable

destiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or

through matter combinations in general. References to diverse

kinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no

detailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upani@sad

type of materialists the two schools of Cârvâkas (Dhûrtta

and Sus'ik@sita) are referred to in later literature,

though the time in which these flourished cannot rightly

be discovered [Footnote ref 2]. But it seems

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[Footnote 1: S'vetâs'vatara, I. 2, _kâla@h svabhâbo niyatiryad@rcchâ

bhutâni yoni@h puru@sa iti cintyam._]

[Footnote 2: Lokâyata (literally, that which is found among people in

general) seems to have been the name by which all carvâka doctrines

were generally known. See Gu@naratna on the Lokâyatas.]

probable however that the allusion to the materialists contained

in the Upani@sads refers to these or to similar schools. The

Cârvâkas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any

other holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life

and consciousness were the products of the combination of matter,

just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with

yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses

(_madas'akti_). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as

there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So

long as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as everything

will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt

to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in

the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can

be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the

distribution of the middle term (_hetu_) has not depended upon

some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy

the validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case

any inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and

there is no certitude about it. They were called Cârvâka because

they would only eat but would not accept any other religious or

moral responsibility. The word comes from _carv_ to eat. The

Dhûrtta Cârvâkas held that there was nothing but the four

elements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the

result of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no

virtue or vice. The Sus'ik@sita Cârvâkas held that there was

a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with

the destruction of the body. The original work of the Cârvâkas

was written in sûtras probably by B@rhaspati. Jayanta and Gu@naratna

quote two sûtras from it. Short accounts of this school may be

found in Jayanta's _Nyâyamañjarî_, Mâdhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_

and Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_. _Mahâbhârata_ gives

an account of a man called Cârvâka meeting Yudhi@s@thira.

Side by side with the doctrine of the Cârvâka materialists we

are reminded of the Âjîvakas of which Makkhali Gosâla, probably

a renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mahâvîra and a contemporary

of Buddha and Mahâvîra, was the leader. This was a thorough-going

determinism denying the free will of man and his moral

responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of

Makkhali's system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximate

or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They

become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one's

own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends

on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy,

or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due

to fate, to their environment and their own nature [Footnote ref 1]."

Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught

that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds; there is no

other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any

former lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that

we can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought to

an end at death [Footnote ref 2].

There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the

sacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any

person could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upani@sad

teaching that the Brahman, the self, is the ultimate reality and

being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do

not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the

real and true, and this is self. Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions

that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes

into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some

unknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably

come to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in

the country and these were accepted partly on the strength of

traditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue

of the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they

gave to those who performed them. But these had no rational

basis behind them on which they could lean for support. These

were probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the

nebulous Sâ@mkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain

sections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting

a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which

thenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity

to come. If the Being of the Upani@sads, the superlatively motionless,

was the only real, how could it offer scope for further new

speculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of

interest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous concourse

of circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the

direction to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical

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[Footnote 1: _Sâmaññaphala-sutta_, _Dîgha_, II. 20. Hoernlé's article on

the Âjîvakas, E.R.E.]

[Footnote 2: _Sâmaññaphala-sutta_, II. 23.]

force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that

was inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into

account the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha,

we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic

contribution to philosophy.

Buddha: his Life.

Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C.

in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in

the now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana,

a prince of the Sâkya clan, and his mother Queen Mahâmâyâ.

According to the legends it was foretold of him that he would

enter upon the ascetic life when he should see "A decrepit old

man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk." His father tried

his best to keep him away from these by marrying him and

surrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions,

issuing from the palace, he was confronted by those four

things, which filled him with amazement and distress, and

realizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined to

forsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to

immortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his "Great

Renunciation" when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled

on foot to Râjag@rha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvelâ, where in

company with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of

extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length

that his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down senseless

and was believed to be dead. After six years of this great

struggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won by

the way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course

of life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment. Thereafter

the Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in

travelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine to

all who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha

realized that the time drew near for him to die. He then entered

into Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attained

nirvâna [Footnote ref 1]. The vast developments which the system of this

great teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and in

other countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will

probably take yet many years more before even the materials for

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[Footnote 1: _Mahâparinibbânasuttanta_, _Dîgha_, XVI. 6, 8, 9.]

such a study can be collected. But from what we now possess

it is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful and

subtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to overestimate

the debt that the philosophy, culture and civilization

of India owe to it in all her developments for many succeeding

centuries.

Early Buddhist Literature.

The Buddhist Pâli Scriptures contain three different collections:

the Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to the

discipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generally

to the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in a

scholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhistic religious

history of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite dates

for the collection or composition of the different parts of the

aforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas were

however composed before the Abhidhamma and it is very

probable that almost the whole of the canonical works were

completed before 241 B.C., the date of the third council during

the reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine

(Dhamma) of the Buddhistic faith whereas the Vinaya deals

only with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks.

The subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as that

of the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma.

Buddhaghos@a in his introduction to _Atthasâlinî_, the commentary

on the _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, says that the Abhidhamma is so called

(_abhi_ and _dhamma_) because it describes the same Dhammas as are

related in the suttas in a more intensified (_dhammâtireka_) and

specialized (_dhammavisesatthena_) manner. The Abhidhammas

do not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, but

they deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already found

in the suttas. Buddhagho@sa in distinguishing the special features

of the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirement

of the former leads one to attain meditation (_samâdhi_) whereas

the latter leads one to attain wisdom (_paññâsampadam_). The force

of this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of the

suttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which is

not to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves in

enumerating the Buddhistic doctrines and defining them in a

technical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned

insight into the doctrines than directly to generate a craving

for following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow.

The Abhidhamma known as the _Kathâvatthu_ differs from the

other Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the views

of the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceed

in the form of questions and answers, and the answers of the

opponents are often shown to be based on contradictory

assumptions.

The suttas contain five groups of collections called the Nikâyas.

These are (1) _Dîgha Nikâya_, called so on account of the length

of the suttas contained in it; (2) _Majjhima Nikâya_ (middling

Nikâya), called so on account of the middling extent of the

suttas contained in it; (3) _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ (Nikâyas relating

to special meetings), called sa@myutta on account of their being

delivered owing to the meetings (_sa@myoga_) of special persons which

were the occasions for them; (4) _A@nguttara Nikâya_, so called because

in each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussion

increase by one [Footnote ref 1]; (5) _Khuddaka Nikâya_ containing

_Khuddaka pâ@tha, Dhammapada, Udâna, Itivuttaka, Sutta Nipâta,

Vimâna-vatthu, Petavatthu, Theragathâ, Therîgathâ, Jâtaka, Niddesa,

Pa@tisambhidâmagga, Apadâna, Buddhava@msa, Caryâpi@taka._

The Abhidhammas are _Pa@t@thâna, Dhammasa@nga@ni, Dhâtukathâ,

Puggalapaññatti, Vibha@nga, Yamaka_ and _Kathâvatthu_.

There exists also a large commentary literature on diverse parts

of the above works known as atthakathâ. The work known as

_Milinda Pañha_ (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, is

of considerable philosophical value.

The doctrines and views incorporated in the above literature

is generally now known as Sthaviravâda or Theravâda. On the

origin of the name Theravâda (the doctrine of the elders)

_Dîpava@msa_ says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council)

and collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera Vâda [Footnote ref

2]. It does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this Pâli literature

developed much since the time of Buddhagho@sa (4OO A.D.), the

writer of _Visuddhimagga_ (a compendium of theravâda doctrines)

and the commentator of _Dîghanikâya, Dhammasa@nga@ni_, etc.

Hindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influenced

by the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, but

it does not appear that Pâli Buddhism had any share in it. I

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[Footnote 1: See Buddhagho@sa's _Atthasâlini_, p. 25.]

[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _Dîpava@msa_, p. 31.]

have not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who could

be considered as being acquainted with Pâli.

The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism [Footnote ref 1].

The word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generally

in four senses: (1) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (_gu@na_), (3) cause

(_hetu_) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (_nissatta nijjîva_ [Footnote

ref 2]). Of these it is the last meaning which is particularly important,

from the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhist

philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all

reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomena

and these were called dhammas. The question arises that

if there is no substance or reality how are we to account for the

phenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passing

away and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to find

out "What being what else is," "What happening what else

happens" and "What not being what else is not." The phenomena

are happening in a series and we see that there being

certain phenomena there become some others; by the happening

of some events others also are produced. This is called

(_pa@ticca-samuppâda_) dependent origination. But it is difficult to

understand what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as

_Sa@myutta Nikâya_ (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha started

before attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable condition

are the people! they are born, they decay, they die, pass away

and are born again; and they do not know the path of escape

from this decay, death and misery.

How to know the Way to escape from this misery of decay

and death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decay

and death, depending on what do they come? As he thought

deeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decay

and death can only occur when there is birth (_jâti_), so they depend

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[Footnote 1: There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could

take the doctrine of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the

_Sa@myutta Nikâya_ as the earliest Buddhist view, as Sa@myutta does not

represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of the

twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine and

as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter

into conjectural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E.J. Thomas drew

my attention to this fact.]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasâtinî_, p. 38. There are also other senses in which

the word is used, as _dhamma-desanâ_ where it means religious teaching.

The _La@nkâvatâra_ described Dharmma as _gu@nadravyapûrvakâ dharmmâ_, i.e.

Dharmmas are those which are associated as attributes and substances.]

on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth

depend? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if

there were previous existence (_bhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. But on what does

this existence depend, or what being there is there _bhava_. Then it

occurred to him that there could not be existence unless there

were holding fast (_upâdâna_) [Footnote ref 2]. But on what did upâdâna

depend? It occurred to him that it was desire (_ta@nhâ_) on which upâdâna

depended. There can be upâdâna if there is desire (_tanhâ_) [Footnote ref

3]. But what being there, can there be desire? To this question it

occurred to him that there must be feeling (_vedanâ_) in order that

there may be desire. But on what does vedanâ depend, or rather

what must be there, that there may be feeling (_vedanâ_)? To this

it occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (_phassa_)

in order that there may be feeling [Footnote ref 4]. If there should be no

sense-contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense-contact

depend? It occurred to him that as there are six sense-contacts,

there are the six fields of contact (_âyatana_) [Footnote ref 5]. But on

what do the six âyatanas depend? It occurred to him that

there must be the mind and body (_nâmarûpa_) in order that there

may be the six fields of contact [Footnote ref 6]; but on what does

nâmarûpa depend? It occurred to him that without consciousness

(_viññâna_) there could be no nâmarûpa [Footnote ref 8].

But what being there would there

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[Footnote 1: This word bhava is interpreted by Candrakîrtti in his

_Mâdhyamîka v@rtti,_ p. 565 (La Vallée Poussin's edition) as the deed

which brought about rebirth (_punarbhavajanaka@m karma samutthâpayali

kâyena vâcâ manasâ ca_).]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 385, upâdânantida@lhagaha@na@m. Candrakîrtti

in explaining upâdâna says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast

to the materials necessary for attaining it (_yatra vastuni

sat@r@s@nastasya vastuno 'rjanâya vi@dhapanâya upâdânamupâdatte tatra

tatra prârthayate_). _Mâdhyamîka v@rtti_, p. 565.]

[Footnote 3: Candrakîrtti describes t@r@s@nâ as

_âsvadanâbhinandanâdhyavasânasthânâdâtmapriyarûpairviyogo mâ bhût,

nityamaparityâgo bhavediti, yeyam prârthanâ_--the desire that there

may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which

are dear to us. _Ibid._ 565.]

[Footnote 4: We read also of phassâyatana and phassakâya. _M. N._ II. 261,

III. 280, etc. Candrakîrtti says that _@sa@dbhirâyatanadvârai@h

k@rtyaprak@riyâ@h pravarttante prajñâyante. tannâmarûpapratyaya@m

@sa@dâyatanamucyate. sa@dbhyas`câyatanebhya@h @sa@tspars`akâyâ@h

pravarttante. M.V._ 565.]

[Footnote 5: Âyatana means the six senses together with their objects.

Âyatana literally is "Field of operation." Sa@lâyatana means six senses

as six fields of operation. Candrakîrtti has _âyatanadvârai@h_.]

[Footnote 6: I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering nâmarûpa

as mind and body, _Compendium_, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly

correct. The four skandhas are called nâma in each birth. These together

with rûpa (matter) give us nâmarûpa (mind and body) which being developed

render the activities through the six sense-gates possible so that there

may be knowledge. Cf. _M. V._ 564. Govindânanda, the commentator on

S'a@nkara's bhâsya on the _Brahma sûtras_ (II. ii. 19), gives a different

interpretation of Namarûpa which may probably refer to the Vijñanavada

view though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says--To think

the momentary as the permanent is Avidya; from there come the samskaras

of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first

vijñana or thought of the foetus is produced, from that alayavijnana,

and the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama)

are produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semen

and blood called rûpa. Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with

Govindananda in holding that nama signifies the semen and the ovum

while rûpa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vijñaña

entered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced through

the association of previous karma. See _Vedantakalpataru_, pp 274,

275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vijñaña into the womb compare

_D N_ II. 63.]

be viññâna. Here it occurred to him that in order that there

might be viññâna there must be the conformations (_sa@nkhâra_) [Footnote

ref 1]. But what being there are there the sa@nkhâras? Here it occurred

to him that the sa@nkhâras can only be if there is ignorance

(_avijjâ_). If avijjâ could be stopped then the sa@nkhâras will be

stopped, and if the sa@nkhâras could be stopped viññâna could be

stopped and so on [Footnote ref 2].

It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha

actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence

sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and

death (_jarâmarana_) could not have happened if there was no

birth [Footnote ref 3]. This seems to be clear. But at this point the

difficulty begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was

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[Footnote 1: It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word

here. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce

proper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical

method and he had often to use the same word in more or less different

senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore rather

elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning

which we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in _S N_ III. p. 87,

"_Sankhata@m abdisa@nkharonta_," sa@nkhara means that which synthesises

the complexes. In the _Compendium_ it is translated as will, action.

Mr. Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used

in a different sense from what we find in the word sa@nkhâta khandha

(viz mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sa@nkhâta

khandha in _Dhamma Sangam_, p 18, and another different set of 40 mental

states in _Dharmasamgraha_, p. 6. In addition to these forty

_cittasamprayuktasa@mskâra_, it also counts thirteen

_cittaviprayuktasa@mskara_. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning

attachment, antipathy and infatuation, p 563. Govindananda, the

commentator on S'a@nkara's _Brahma sutra_ (II. ii. 19), also interprets

the word in connection with the doctrine of _Pratityasamutpada_ as

attachment, antipathy and infatuation.]

[Footnote 2: _Samyutta Nikaya_, II. 7-8.]

[Footnote 3: Jara and marana bring in s'oka (grief), paridevanâ

(lamentation), duhkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness

and miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of extreme destitution) at

the prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. All

these make up suffering and are the results of jâti (birth). _M. V._

(B.T.S.p. 208). S'a@nkara in his bhâsya counted all the terms from

jarâ, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representing

the entirety of duhkhaskandha.]

enunciated in the Upani@sads. The B@rhadâra@nyaka says that just

as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort

collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of

this life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes

another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been

before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove

the doctrine of rebirth [Footnote ref 1]. All schools of philosophy

except the Cârvâkas believed in it and so little is known to us of

the Cârvâka sûtras that it is difficult to say what they did to

refute this doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does

not criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an

infinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of

a few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them

in the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the

Buddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth

might be due, had to fall back upon another existence (_bhava_).

If bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candrakîrtti takes

it to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only

take place on account of the works of a previous existence which

determined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upani@sad note

"as a man does so will he be born" (_Yat karma kurute tadabhisampadyate_,

Brh IV. iv. 5). Candrakîrtti's interpretation of "bhava"

as Karma (_punarbhavajanakam karma_) seems to me to suit

better than "existence." The word was probably used rather

loosely for _kammabhava_. The word bhava is not found in the

earlier Upani@sads and was used in the Pâli scriptures for the

first time as a philosophical term. But on what does this

bhava depend? There could not have been a previous existence

if people had not betaken themselves to things or works they

desired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accordance

with desire is called upâdâna. In the Upani@sads we read,

"whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" (_Yatkraturbhavati

tatkarmma kurute_, B@rh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to

the thing depends upon desire {_t@r@s@nâ_}, it is said that in order

that there may be upâdâna there must be tanhâ. In the Upani@sads

also we read "Whatever one desires so does he betake

himself to" (_sa yathâkâmo bhavati tatkraturbhavati_). Neither

the word upâdâna nor t@rs@nâ (the Sanskrit word corresponding

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[Footnote 1: The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu

philosophical works such as the Nyâya, etc., are slight and inadequate.]

to ta@nhâ) is found in the earlier Upani@sads, but the ideas contained

in them are similar to the words "_kratu_" and "_kâma_." Desire

(ta@nhâ) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact.

Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation [Footnote

ref 1]. These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the

whole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together)

called nâmarûpa. We are familiar with this word in the Upani@sads

but there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and

names as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable

reality [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa in the _Visuddhimagga_ says that by

"Name" are meant the three groups beginning with sensation

(i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form"

the four elements and form derivative from the four elements [Footnote

ref 3]. He further says that name by itself can produce physical

changes, such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So

form also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like

the cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and

effectuate the changes [Footnote ref 4]. But there exists no heap or

collection of material for the production of Name and Form; "but just

as when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound;

and when the sound comes into existence it does not come from

any such store; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the

cardinal or intermediate points of the compass;...in exactly the

same way all the elements of being both those with form and

those without, come into existence after having previously been

non-existent and having come into existence pass away [Footnote ref 5]."

Nâmarûpa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and

body, but only the sense functions and the body which are found

to operate in the six doors of sense (_sa@lâyatana_). If we take

nâmarûpa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend

upon the viññâna (consciousness). Consciousness has been compared

in the _Milinda Pañha_ with a watchman at the middle of

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The word âyatana is found in many places in the earlier

Upani@sads in the sense of "field or place," Châ. I. 5, B@rh. III. 9.

10, but @sa@dâyatana does not occur.]

[Footnote 2: Candrakîrtti interprets nâma as _Vedanâdayo'

rûpi@nas'catvâra@h skandhâstatra tatra bhave nâmayantîli nâma. saha

rûpaskandhena ca nâma rûpam ceti nâmarûpamucyate._ The four skandhas

in each specific birth act as name. These together with rûpa make

nâmarûpa. _M. V._ 564.]

[Footnote 3: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 184.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 185, _Visuddhimagga_, Ch. XVII.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ pp. 185-186, _Visuddhimagga_, Ch. XVII.]

the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction [Footnote ref

1]. Buddhagho@sa in the _Atthasâlinî_ also says that consciousness means

that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics

we must say that it knows (_vijânana_), goes in advance (_pubba@ngama_),

connects (_sandhâna_), and stands on nâmarûpa (_nâmarûpapada@t@thânam_).

When the consciousness gets a door, at a place the objects of sense

are discerned (_ârammana-vibhâvana@t@thâne_) and it goes first as the

precursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye it is known only

by the consciousness, and when the dhammas are made the objects of

(mind) mano, it is known only by the consciousness [Footnote ref 2].

Buddhagho@sa also refers here to the passage in the _Milinda Pañha_

we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states

of consciousness rise one after another, they leave no gap between

the previous state and the later and consciousness therefore appears

as connected. When there are the aggregates of the five khandhas it

is lost; but there are the four aggregates as nâmarûpa, it stands on

nâma and therefore it is said that it stands on nâmarûpa. He further

asks, Is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or

different from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows

itself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those

in truth; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected

heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that

the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness

takes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So

though it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different

from them [Footnote ref 3].

To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that jâti (birth)

is the cause of decay and death, _jarâmara@na_, etc. Jâti is the

appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas [Footnote

ref 4]. Coming to bhava which determines jâti, I cannot think of any

better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 182, _Milinda Pañha_

(628).]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 112...]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 113, _Yathâ hi rûpâdîni upâdâya paññattâ

suriyâdayo na atthato rûpâdîhi aññe honti ten' eva yasmin samaye

suriyo udeti tasmin samaye tassa tejâ-sa@nkhâtam rûpa@m pîti eva@m

vuccamâne pi na rûpâdihi añño suriyo nâma atthi. Tathâ cittam

phassâdayo dhamme upâdâya paññapiyati. Atthato pan' ettha tehi

aññam eva. Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppanna@m hoti eka@msen eva

tasmin samaye phassâdihi atthato aññad eva hotî ti_.]

[Footnote 4: "_Jâtirdehajanma pañcaskandhasamudâya@h,_" Govindânanda's

_Ratnaprabhâ_ on S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya, II. ii. 19.]

suggested, namely, the works (_karma_) which produce the birth [Footnote

ref 1]. Upâdâna is an advanced t@r@s@nâ leading to positive clinging

[Footnote ref 2]. It is produced by t@r@s@nâ (desire) which again is

the result of vedanâ (pleasure and pain). But this vedanâ is of course

vedanâ with ignorance (_avidyâ_), for an Arhat may have also vedanâ

but as he has no avidyâ, the vedanâ cannot produce t@r@s@nâ in turn. On

its development it immediately passes into upâdâna. Vedanâ means

pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leads

to t@r@s@nâ (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact

(_spars'a_). Prof. De la Vallée Poussin says that S'rîlâbha distinguishes

three processes in the production of vedanâ. Thus first there is the

contact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledge

of the object, and then there is the vedanâ. Depending on _Majjhima

Nikâya_, iii. 242, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in

the case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing,

so here also vedanâ takes place simultaneously with spars'a for they

are "produits par un même complexe de causes (_sâmagrî_) [Footnote

ref 3]."

Spars'a is produced by @sa@dâyatana, @sa@dâyatana by nâmarûpa,

and nâmarûpa by vijñâna, and is said to descend in the womb

of the mother and produce the five skandhas as nâmarûpa, out

of which the six senses are specialized.

Vijñâna in this connection probably means the principle or

germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the

five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the

past karmas (_sa@nkhâra_) of the dying man and of his past

consciousness too.

We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last

thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next

_______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Govindananda in his _Ratnaprabhâ_ on S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya, II.

ii. 19, explains "bhava" as that from which anything becomes, as merit

and demerit (_dharmâdi_). See also _Vibhanga_, p. 137 and Warren's

_Buddhism in Translations_, p. 201. Mr Aung says in

_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, p. 189, that bhavo includes kammabhavo (the

active side of an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side).

And the commentators say that bhava is a contraction of "_kammabhava_"

or Karma-becoming i.e. karmic activity.]

[Footnote 2: Prof. De la Vallée Poussin in his _Théoric des Douze Causes_,

p. 26, says that _S'âlistambhasûtra_ explains the word "upâdâna" as

"t@r@s@nâvaipulya" or hyper-t@r@s@nâ and Candrakîrtti also gives the

same meaning, _M. V._ (B.T.S.p. 210). Govmdânanda explains "upâdâna"

as prav@rtti (movement) generated by t@r@s@nâ (desire), i.e. the active

tendency in pursuance of desire. But if upâdâna means "support" it would

denote all the five skandhas. Thus _Madhyamaka v@rtti_ says _upâdânam

pañcaskandhalak@sa@nam...pañcopâdânaskandhâkhyam upâdânam. M.V._ XXVII. 6.]

[Footnote 3: Poussin's _Théorie des Douze Causes_, p. 23.

birth [Footnote ref 1]. The manner in which the vijñâna produced in the

womb is determined by the past vijñâna of the previous existence is

according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image,

like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple,

like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress

of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life,

so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break,

but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being.

New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale

pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp

is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the

vijñâna resulting from his previous karmas and vijñânas enters

into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which

the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijñâna thus forms

the principle of the new life. It is in this vijñâna that name

(_nâma_) and form (_rûpa_) become associated.

The vijñâna is indeed a direct product of the sa@mskâras and

the sort of birth in which vijñâna should bring down (_nâmayati_)

the new existence (_upapatti_) is determined by the sa@mskâras [Footnote

ref 2], for in reality the happening of death (_mara@nabhava_) and the

instillation of the vijñâna as the beginning of the new life

(_upapattibhava_) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just

at the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that

they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijñâna had not entered

the womb then no nâmarûpa could have appeared [Footnote ref 3].

This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus

avidyâ and sa@mskâra of the past life produce the vijñâna, nâmarupa,

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the

plants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said "make your

resolution, 'May I be a cakravarttî king in a next existence,'"

_Sa@myutta_, IV. 303.]

[Footnote 2: "_sa cedânandavijñâna@m mâtu@hkuk@sim nâvakrâmeta, na tat

kalalam kalalatvâya sannivartteta_," _M. V._ 552. Compare _Caraka,

S'ârîra_, III. 5-8, where he speaks of a "upapîduka sattva" which

connects the soul with body and by the absence of which the character

is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is

in a pure condition one can remember even the previous births;

character, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mental

qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by the

combination of many elements, so is the foetus.]

[Footnote 3: _Madhyamaka v@riti_ (B.T.S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from

_Dîgha_, II. 63, "si le vijñâna ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel

la namarupa s'y constituerait-il?" Govindânanda on S'a@nkara's commentary

on the _Brahma-sûtras_ (II. ii. 19) says that the first consciousness

(vijñâna) of the foetus is produced by the sa@mskâras of the previous

birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nâma) and from that

the white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus

(_kalala-budbudâvasthâ_} is produced.]

@sa@dâyatana, spars'a, vedanâ, t@r@s@nâ, upâdâna and the bhava

(leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava

produces the jâti and jarâmara@na of the next life [Footnote ref l].

It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain

extending in three sections over three lives are all but the

manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they naturally

determine one another. Thus _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_

says "each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite

term 'sorrow,' etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences

of birth. Again when 'ignorance' and 'the actions of the

mind' have been taken into account, craving (_t@r@s@nâ_), grasping

(_upâdâna_) and (_karma_) becoming (_bhava_) are implicitly accounted

for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping

and (_karma_) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance

and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also;

and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even

the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are

accounted for. And thus:

Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold 'fruit.'

Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make up

the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. sa@nkhâra and

viññâna, 2. vedanâ and tanhâ, 3. bhava and jâti) and the four

groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the

Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant

group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) [Footnote ref

2]."

These twelve interdependent links (_dvâdas'â@nga_) represent

the pa@ticcasamuppâda (_pratâtyasamutpâda_) doctrines (dependent

origination) [Footnote ref 3] which are themselves but sorrow and lead to

cycles of sorrow. The term pa@ticcasamuppâda or pratîtyasamutpâda has

been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature [Footnote ref

4].

___________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pâli

texts; but Buddhagho@sa mentions it in _Suma@ngalavilâsinî_ on _Mahânidâna

suttanta_. We find it also in _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, VIII. 3. Ignorance

and the actions of the mind belong to the past; "birth," "decay and death"

to the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled as

tri@kâ@n@daka (having three branches) in _Abhidkarmakos'a_, III. 20-24.

Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "_sa

pratîtyasamutpâdo dvâdas'â@ngastrikâ@n@daka@h pûrvâparântayordve dve

madhye@s@tau_."]

[Footnote 2: Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of

_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, pp. 189-190.]

[Footnote 3: The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list

given in the _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. 23 f., avijjâ and sa@nkhâra

have been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and it

has been said that "Cognition turns back from name and form; it goes

not beyond."]

[Footnote 4: _M. V._ p. 5 f.]

Samutpâda means appearance or arising (_prâdurbhdâva_) and pratîtya

means after getting (_prati+i+ya_); combining the two we

find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending

on which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and

paccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in

the same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also

used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijjâ is the

paccaya of sa@nkhâra it is meant that avijjâ is the ground (_@thiti_)

of the origin of the sa@nkhâras, is the ground of their movement,

of the instrument through which they stand (_nimitta@t@thiti_), of

their ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their

intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause

and of their function as the ground with reference to those which

are determined by them. Avijjâ in all these nine ways is

the ground of sa@nkhâra both in the past and also in the future,

though avijjâ itself is determined in its turn by other grounds [Footnote

ref 1]. When we take the betu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot

think of anything else but succession, but when we take the

paccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the

cause as ground. Thus when avijjâ is said to be the ground

of the sa@nkhâras in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems

reasonable to think that the sa@nkhâras were in some sense

regarded as special manifestations of avijjâ [Footnote ref 2]. But as this

point was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would

be unwise to proceed further with it.

The Khandhas.

The word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree

and is generally used to mean group or aggregate [Footnote ref 3]. We

have seen that Buddha said that there was no âtman (soul). He said

that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul,

they really only found the five khandhas together or any one of

them. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical

states which are immediate with us and are divided into five

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Pa@tisambhidâmagga_, vol. I.p. 50; see also _Majjhima

Nikâya_, I. 67, _sa@nkhâra...avijjânidânâ avijjâsamudayâ avijjâjâtikâ

avijjâpabhavâ_.]

[Footnote 2: In the Yoga derivation of asmitâ (egoism), râga (attachment),

dve@sa (antipathy) and abhinives'a (self love) from avidyâ we find also

that all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growth

of avidyâ (_pañcaparvî avidyâ_).]

[Footnote 3: The word skandha is used in Chândogya, II. 23 (_trayo

dharmaskandhâ@h yajña@h adhyayanam dânam_) in the sense of branches

and in almost the same sense in Maitrî, VII. II.]

classes: (1) rûpa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense

data, etc., (2) vedanâ (feeling--pleasurable, painful and indifferent),

(3) saññâ (conceptual knowledge), (4) sa@nkhâra (synthetic

mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound

sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts),

(5) viññâna (consciousness) [Footnote ref 1].

All these states rise depending one upon the other (_pa@ticcasamuppanna_)

and when a man says that he perceives the self he only deludes himself,

for he only perceives one or more of these. The word rûpa in rûpakhandha

stands for matter and material qualities, the senses, and the sense

data [Footnote ref 2]. But "rûpa" is also used in the sense of pure

organic affections or states of mind as we find in the _Khandha Yamaka_,

I.p. 16, and also in _Sa@myutta Nikâya_, III. 86. Rûpaskandha according

to _Dharmasa@mgraha_ means the aggregate of five senses, the five

sensations, and the implicatory communications associated in sense

perceptions _vijñapti_).

The elaborate discussion of _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ begins by defining

rûpa as "_cattâro ca mahâbhûtâ catunnañca mahâbhntanam

upâdâya rûpam_" (the four mahâbhûtas or elements and that

proceeding from the grasping of that is called rûpa) [Footnote ref 3].

Buddhagho@sa explains it by saying that rûpa means the four mahâbhûtas

and those which arise depending (_nissâya_) on them as

a modification of them. In the rûpa the six senses including

their affections are also included. In explaining why the four

elements are called mahâbhûtas, Buddhagho@sa says: "Just as a

magician (_mâyâkâra_) makes the water which is not hard appear

as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold;

just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself

appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselves

blue make themselves appear as blue (_nîlam upâdâ rûpam_),

not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red

or white (odâtam upâdârûpam), so on account of their similarity

to the appearances created by the magician they are called

mahâbhûta [Footnote ref 4]."

In the _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ we find that the Buddha says, "O

Bhikkhus it is called rûpam because it manifests (_rûpyati_); how

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikâya_, III. 86, etc.]

[Footnote 2: _Abhidhammatthasangaha_, J.P.T.S. 1884, p. 27 ff.]

[Footnote 3: _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, pp. 124-179.]

[Footnote 4: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 299.]

does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and

as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the

sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rûpa

[Footnote ref 1]."

If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above

for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand

what is meant by rûpa, I think we find that that which manifested

itself to the senses and organs was called rûpa. No distinction

seems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells,

etc., as existing in the physical world and their appearance as

sensations. They were only numerically different and the appearance

of the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the senses

but the sense-data and the sensations were "rûpa." Under certain

conditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhism

did not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and

mind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that

such an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upani@sads

nor in the Sâ@mkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic.

The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and

were therefore called rûpa; the forms of affection that appeared

were also called rûpa; many other mental states or features

which appeared with them were also called rûpa [Footnote ref 2]. The

âyatanas or the senses were also called rûpa [Footnote ref 3]. The

mahâbhûtas or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations,

and they together with all that appeared in association with them were

called rûpa and formed the rûpa khandha (the classes of sense-materials,

sense-data, senses and sensations).

In _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ (III. 101) it is said that "the four

mahâbhûtas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communication

of the rûpakkhandha (_rûpakkhandhassa paññâpanâya_). Contact

(sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of

feelings (_vedanâ_); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya

for the communication of the saññâkkhandha; sense-contact is

also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the

sa@nkhârakkhandha. But nâmarûpa is the hetu and the paccaya for

the communication of the viññânakkhandha." Thus not only feelings

arise on account of the sense-contact but saññâ and sa@nkhâra

also arise therefrom. Saññâ is that where specific knowing or

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikâya_, III. 86.]

[Footnote 2: _Khandhayamaka_.]

[Footnote 3: _Dhammasanga@ni_, p. 124 ff.]

conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive

knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.

Mrs. Rhys Davids writing on saññâ says: "In editing the

second book of the Abhidhamma pi@taka I found a classification

distinguishing between saññâ as cognitive assimilation on occasion

of sense, and saññâ as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of

naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition

(_patigha-saññâ_). This, writes Buddhagho@sa, is perception on

occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the

impact of impressions; of external things as different, we might

say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or

name (_adhivachânâ-saññâ_) and is exercised by the _sensus communis_

(mano), when e.g. 'one is seated...and asks another who

is thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through

his speech.' Thus there are two stages of saññâ-consciousness,

1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they

are by naming [Footnote ref 1]."

About sa@nkhâra we read in _Sa@myutta Nikâya_ (III. 87) that it

is called sa@nkhâra because it synthesises (_abhisa@nkharonti_), it is

that which conglomerated rûpa as rûpa, conglomerated saññâ

as saññâ, sa@nkhâra as sa@nkhâra and consciousness (_viññâna_)

as consciousness. It is called sa@nkhâra because it synthesises

the conglomerated (_sa@nkhatam abhisa@nkharonti_). It is thus a

synthetic function which synthesises the passive rûpa, saññâ,

sa@nkhâra and viññâna elements. The fact that we hear of 52

sa@nkhâra states and also that the sa@nkhâra exercises its synthetic

activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show

that probably the word sa@nkhâra is used in two senses, as mental

states and as synthetic activity.

Viññâna or consciousness meant according to Buddhagho@sa,

as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage

at which the intellectual process started and also the final

resulting consciousness.

Buddhagho@sa in explaining the process of Buddhist psychology

says that "consciousness(_citta_)first comes into touch (_phassa_) with

its object (_âramma@na_) and thereafter feeling, conception (_saññâ_)

and volition (_cetanâ_) come in. This contact is like the pillars of

a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it

(_dabbasambhârasadisâ_). But it should not be thought that contact

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Buddhist Psychology_, pp. 49, 50.]

is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole

consciousness (_ekacittasmi@m_) it cannot be said that this comes

first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association

with feeling (_vedanâ_), conceiving (_saññâ_) or volition (_cetanâ_);

it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends

objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side

of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes

consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and

visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its _function_; or

it has impact as its _essential property_ in the sense of attainment,

owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object.

For it is said in the Commentary:--"contact in the four planes of

existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the

object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors.

For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having the

characteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact.'

But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic

of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is

quoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent

the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact.

And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or

two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would

represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision

contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the

function of impact [Footnote ref 1]'. Contact is the manifestation of the

union of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its

effect is feeling (_vedanâ_); though it is generated by the objects

it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing

(_anubhava_) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the taste

of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only

partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching,

of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere

coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling

alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste

of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states

are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of

diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king,

breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup

and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Atthasâlinî_, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.]

whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of

various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord,

expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting

of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object

by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the

food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and

as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according

to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys

the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or

experience is its function [Footnote ref 1]."

The special feature of saññâ is said to be the recognizing

(_paccabhiññâ_) by means of a sign (_abhiññânena_). According to

another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion

of the totality (of aspects)--_sabbasa@ngahikavasena_. The work of

volition (_cetanâ_) is said to be coordination or binding together

(_abhisandahana_). "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes

a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said

'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking

fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was

exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his

strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out

the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers,

etc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be

thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral

states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five

strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort

by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of

volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts [Footnote ref 2]."

It seems that probably the active side operating in sa@nkhâra was

separately designated as cetanâ (volition).

"When one says 'I,' what he does is that he refers either to

all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himself

that that was 'I.' Just as one could not say that the

fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the

pollen, so one could not say that the rûpa was 'I' or that the

vedanâ was 'I' or any of the other khandhas was 'I.' There is

nowhere to be found in the khandhas 'I am [Footnote ref 3]'."

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Atthasâlinî_, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p. 111; translation, pp. 147-148.]

[Footnote 3: _Samyutta Nikâya_, III. 130.]

Avijjâ and Âsava.

As to the question how the avijjâ (ignorance) first started

there can be no answer, for we could never say that either

ignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning [Footnote ref 1].

Its fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes

in its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we

can never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements

which bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by

certain others. This mutual determination can only take place

in and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for

there is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority

in time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into

being of the âsavas or depravities that the avijjâ came into

being, and that through the destruction of the depravities (_âsava_)

the avijjâ was destroyed [Footnote ref 2]. These âsavas are classified in

the _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ as kâmâsava, bhavâsava, di@t@thâsava and avijjâsava.

Kâmâsava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst

after the qualities associated with the senses; bhavâsava means

desire, attachment and will for existence or birth; di@t@thâsava

means the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal

or non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not

come to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are

different; avijjâsava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its

extinction and its means of extinction. _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ adds

four more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of

anterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior

and posterior together, and their mutual dependence [Footnote ref 3].

Kâmâsava and bhavâsava can as Buddhagho@sa says be counted as one, for

they are both but depravities due to attachment [Footnote ref 4].

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap.

XVII.), p. 175.]

[Footnote 2: _M. N._ I.p. 54. Childers translates "âsava" as "depravities"

and Mrs Rhys Davids as "intoxicants." The word "âsava" in Skr. means

"old wine." It is derived from "su" to produce by Buddhagho@sa and the

meaning that he gives to it is "_cira pârivâsika@t@thena_" (on account

of its being stored up for a long time like wine). They work through the

eye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra.

As those wines which are kept long are called "âsavas" so these are also

called âsavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that

Buddhagho@sa gives is that they are called âsava on account of their

producing sa@msâradukkha (sorrows of the world), _Atthasâlinî_, p. 48.

Contrast it with Jaina âsrava (flowing in of karma matter). Finding it

difficult to translate it in one word after Buddhagho@sa, I have

translated it as "depravities," after Childers.]

[Footnote 3: See _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, p. 195.]

[Footnote 4: Buddhagho@sa's _Atthasâlinî_, p. 371.]

100

The di@t@thâsavas by clouding the mind with false metaphysical

views stand in the way of one's adopting the true Buddhistic doctrines.

The kâmasâvas stand in the way of one's entering into

the way of Nirvâ@na (_anâgâmimagga_) and the bhavâsavas and

avijjâsavas stand in the way of one's attaining arha or final

emancipation. When the _Majjhima Nikâya_ says that from the

rise of the âsavas avijjâ rises, it evidently counts avijjâ there as

in some sense separate from the other âsavas, such as those of

attachment and desire of existence which veil the true knowledge

about sorrow.

The afflictions (_kilesas_) do not differ much from the âsavas

for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar

to us, such as covetousness (_lobha_), anger or hatred (_dosa_),

infatuation (_moha_), arrogance, pride or vanity (_mâna_), heresy

(_di@t@thi_), doubt or uncertainty (_vicikicchâ_), idleness (_thîna_),

boastfulness (_udhacca_), shamelessness (_ahirika_) and hardness of heart

_anottapa_); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the âsavas.

In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha,

dosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They are

associated with the vedanâkkhandha, saññâkkhandha, sa@nkhârakkhandha

and viññânakkhandha. From these arise the three kinds

of actions, of speech, of body, and of mind [Footnote ref 1].

Sîla and Samâdhi.

We are intertwined all through outside and inside by the

tangles of desire (_ta@nhâ ja@tâ_), and the only way by which these

may be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (_sîla_),

concentration (_samâdhi_) and wisdom (_paññâ_). Sîla briefly means

the desisting from committing all sinful deeds (_sabbapâpassa

akara@nam_). With sîla therefore the first start has to be made,

for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires

and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances.

This serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper performance

of the sîla would lead one to the first two successive

stages of sainthood, viz. the sotâpannabhâva (the stage in which

one is put in the right current) and the sakadâgâmibhâva (the

stage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Samâdhi

is a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old

kilesas are destroyed and the ta@nhâ or desire is removed and

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Dhammasa@nga@ni,_ p. 180.]

101

by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It

directly brings in paññâ (true wisdom) and by paññâ the saint

achieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an

arhat [Footnote ref 1]. Wisdom (_paññâ_) is right knowledge about the

four âriya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause

of destruction.

Sîla means those particular volitions and mental states, etc.

by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions

maintains himself on the right path. Sîla thus means 1. right

volition (_cetanâ_), 2. the associated mental states (_cetasika_),

3. mental control (_sa@mvara_) and 4. the actual non-transgression

(in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind

by the preceding three sîlas called avîtikkama. Sa@mvara is

spoken of as being of five kinds, 1. Pâ@timokkhasa@mvara (the

control which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisa@mvara (the

control of mindfulness), 3. Ñânasa@mvara (the control of knowledge),

4. Khantisa@mvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriyasa@mvara

(the control of active self-restraint). Pâ@timokkhasa@mvara

means all self-control in general. Satisa@mvara means

the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good

associations when using one's cognitive senses. Even when

looking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindfulness

(_sati_) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to

think of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it

as may lead in the right direction. Khantisa@mvara is that by

which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the

proper adherence to sîla all our bodily, mental and vocal activities

(_kamma_) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (_samâdhânam,

upadhâra@na@m, pati@t@thâ_) [Footnote ref 2].

The sage who adopts the full course should also follow a

number of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting,

dining, etc., which are called the dhûta@ngas or pure disciplinary

parts [Footnote ref 3]. The practice of sîla and the dhûtangas help the

sage to adopt the course of samâdhi. Samâdhi as we have seen means

the concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (_kusalacittekaggatâ

samâdhi@h_) together with its states upon one particular

object (_ekâramma@na_) so that they may completely cease to

shift and change (_sammâ ca avikkhipamânâ_) [Footnote ref 4].

_______________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga Nidânâdikathâ_.]

[Footnote 2: _Visuddhimagga-sîlaniddeso_, pp. 7 and 8.]

[Footnote 3: _Visuddhimagga_, II.]

[Footnote 4: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 84-85.]

102

The man who has practised sîla must train his mind first

in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire

the chief concentration of meditation called jhâna (fixed and

steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind

for the acquirement of jhânasamâdhi eventually lead to it

and are called upacâra samâdhi (preliminary samâdhi) as distinguished

from the jhânasamâdhi called the appanâsamâdhi (achieved samâdhi)

[Footnote ref 1]. Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he

has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitive

desires for eating and drinking (_âhâre pa@tikkûlasaññâ_) by

emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated

in seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations

as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man

continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting

associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment

to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil,

only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows

will come [Footnote ref 2]. Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the

idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements,

k@siti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase

of a cow at the butcher's shop. This is technically called

catudhâtuvavatthânabhâvanâ (the meditation of the body as being

made up of the four elements) [Footnote ref 3]. Thirdly he has to

habituate his mind to think again and again (_anussati_) about the

virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the sa@ngha (the monks following

the Buddha), the gods and the law (_dhamma_) of the Buddha, about

the good effects of sîla, and the making of gifts (_câgânussati_),

about the nature of death (_mara@nânussati_) and about

the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction

of all phenomena (_upasamânussati_) [Footnote ref 4].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow

what appears to me to be the main line of division showing the

interconnection of jhâna (Skr. _dhyâna_) with its accessory stages

called parikammas (_Visuddhimagga,_ pp. 85 f.).]

[Footnote 2: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic

attitude, "_Imañ ca pana âhâre pa@tikulasaññâ@m anuyuttassa bhikkhu@no

rasata@nhâya cittam pa@tilîyati, pa@tiku@t@tati, pa@tiva@t@tati; so,

kantâranitthara@na@t@thiko viya puttama@msa@m vigatamado âhâra@m âhâreti

yâvad eva dukkhassa ni@t@thara@natthâya_," p. 347. The mind of him who

inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from

all desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off

from them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food

without any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son to

sustain himself in crossing a forest.]

[Footnote 3: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 347-370.]

[Footnote 4: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 197-294.]

103

Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or preparations

called the upacâra samâdhi we come to those other

sources of concentration and meditation called the appanâsamâdhi

which directly lead to the achievement of the highest samâdhi.

The processes of purification and strengthening of the mind

continue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts

which lead the mind to its final goal Nibbâna. In the first part

of this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and

notice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases and

think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are,

and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies

and convince himself that they being in essence the same as the

dead carcases are as loathsome as they [Footnote ref.1] This is called

asubhakamma@t@thâna or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our

bodies. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the

body as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter

into the first jhâna by leading his mind away from his body.

This is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulness

about the nature of the body [Footnote ref 2]. As an aid to concentration

the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling

(_passâsa_) and the exhaling (_âssâsa_) of his breath, so that instead

of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be

aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to

mark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his

mind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole

process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course.

This is called the anapânasati or the mindfulness of inhalation

and exhalation [Footnote ref 3]

Next to this we come to Brahmavihâra, the fourfold meditation

of metta (universal friendship), karu@nâ (universal pity),

muditâ (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and

upekkhâ (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his

friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to

the meditation on universal friendship, one should start with thinking

how he should himself like to root out all misery and become

happy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully,

and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also

have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think

that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is not

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga,_ VI.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 239-266.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ pp. 266-292.]

104

connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself

to such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any

difference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others.

He should never become angry with any person. Should he at any

time feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on

him by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling

his sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He

should think that if he should allow himself to be affected by

anger, he would spoil all his sîla which he was so carefully practising.

If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury,

should he himself also do the same by being angry at it? If he

were finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself

indulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas

are momentary (_kha@nikattâ_); that there no longer existed the

khandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the infliction

of any injury being only a joint product, the man who was

injured was himself an indispensable element in the production

of the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and

there could not thus be any special reason for making him responsible

and of being angry with him. If even after thinking

in this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by

indulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through

his bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man

by being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not

to him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to

free his mind from anger against his enemies and establish himself

in an attitude of universal friendship [Footnote ref 1]. This is called

the mettâ-bhâvana. In the meditation of universal pity (_karu@nâ_)

also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and

foes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for

those who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither

acquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to

Nibbâna, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow [Footnote

ref 2].

We next come to the jhânas with the help of material things

as objects of concentration called the Kasi@nam. These objects of

concentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour,

yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space

(_parîcchinnâkâsa_). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth

and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 295-314.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ pp. 314-315.]

105

with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds

that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his

mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to

concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.

In the first stages of the first meditation (_pathamam jhânam_)

the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding

it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse

relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive

meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in

which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms

but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without

any quivering. This state is called vicâra (steadily moving). The

first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhagho@sa's _Visuddhimagga_

to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas

the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the

least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with

a buoyant exaltation (_pîti_) and a steady inward bliss called sukha

[Footnote ref 1] instilling the mind. The formation of this first

jhâna roots out five ties of avijjâ, kamacchando (dallying with

desires), vyâpâdo (hatred), thinamiddham (sloth and torpor),

uddhaccakukkuccam (pride and restlessness), and vicikicchâ (doubt).

The five elements of which this jhâna is constituted are vitakka,

vicâra, plti, sukham and ekaggata (one pointedness).

When the sage masters the first jhâna he finds it defective

and wants to enter into the second meditation (_dutiyam jhânam_),

where there is neither any vitakka nor vicâra of the first jhâna,

but the mind is in one unruffled state (_ekodibhâvam_). It is a

much steadier state and does not possess the movement which

characterized the vitakka and the vicâra stages of the first jhâna

and is therefore a very placid state (_vitakka-vicârakkhobha-virahe@na

ativiya acalatâ suppasannatâ ca_). It is however associated

with pîti, sukha and ekaggatâ as the first jhâna was.

When the second jhâna is mastered the sage becomes disinclined

towards the enjoyment of the pîti of that stage and becomes

indifferent to them (_upekkhako_). A sage in this stage sees the

objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all

the âsavas of the sage become loosened (khî@nâsava). The

enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Where there is pîti there is sukha, but where there is sukha

there may not necessarily be pîti. _Vîsuddhimagga_, p. 145.]

106

mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes

to turn back to the enjoyment of pîti again. The two characteristics

of this jhâna are sukha and ekaggatâ. It should however

be noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here,

the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it

(_atimadhhurasukhe sukhapâramippatte pi tatiyajjhâne upekkhako,

na tattha sukhâbhisangena âka@d@dhiyati_) [Footnote ref 1]. The earth

ball (_pa@thavî_) is however still the object of the jhâna.

In the fourth or the last jhâna both the sukha (happiness) and

the dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment

and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by

supreme and absolute indifference (_upekkhâ_) which was slowly

growing in all the various stages of the jhânas. The characteristics

of this jhâna are therefore upekkhâ and ekaggatâ. With the

mastery of this jhâna comes final perfection and total extinction

of the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an

arhat [Footnote ref 2]. There is no further production of the khandhas,

no rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and

sufferings--Nibbâna.

Kamma.

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fool who is blinded

with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he

thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he

comes again and again within my grasp." In the Digha Nikâya

also we read how Pâyâsi was trying to give his reasons in support

of his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are there

beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or

result of deeds well done or ill done [Footnote ref 3]." Some of his

arguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell

us that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that

if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed

in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at

the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautions

we do not find at the time of the death of any person that

his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of

the departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his arguments

with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga_, p. 163.]

[Footnote 2: _Majjhima Nikâya_, I.p. 296, and _Visuddhimagga_, pp.

167-168.]

[Footnote 3: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. p. 349; _D. N._ II. pp. 317

ff.]

107

Pâyâsi's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine

of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the

Upani@sads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In

the _Milinda Pañha_, we find Nâgasena saying "it is through a

difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some

long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some

handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some

rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree,

some wise and some foolish [Footnote ref 1]." We have seen in

the third chapter that the same soil of views was enunciated by the

Upani@sad sages.