GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS
OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?
It is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy
in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have
been written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came
one after another and offered their independent speculations
on philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in
chronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon
the influence of one school upon another or upon the general
change from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy.
Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had
their beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and
it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began,
or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many
divergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these
were formulated just after the earliest Upani@sads had been composed
or arranged.
The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant
half-sentences (_sûtras_) which did not elaborate the subject in
detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads
of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already
thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences
were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had
direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeed
difficult to guess from the sûtras the extent of their significance,
or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were
originally intended by them. The sûtras of the Vedânta system,
known as the S'ârîraka-sûtras or Brahma-sûtras of Bâdarâya@na
for example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise
to more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one
of which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high
esteem and respect in which these writers of the sûtras were held
by later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to
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offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of
the existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of
the system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of
these systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since
the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or
other of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought
up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independence
of their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school
to which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession of
free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish,
India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary
views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained
and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other
rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish
the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an
example, the Nyâya system of philosophy consisting of a number
of half-sentences or sûtras is attributed to Gautama, also called
Ak@sapâda. The earliest commentary on these sûtras, called the
_Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya_, was written by Vâtsyâyana. This work was
sharply criticized by the Buddhist Di@nnâga, and to answer these
criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary
called the _Bhâ@syavâttika_ [Footnote ref 1]. As time went on the original
force of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of
the school. At this Vâcaspati Mis'ra wrote a commentary called
_Vârttika-tâtparya@tîkâ_ on this second commentary, where he tried
to refute all objections against the Nyâya system made by other
rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary,
called _Nyâya-tâtparya@tîkâ_, had another commentary called
_Nyâya-tâtparya@tîkâ-paris'uddhi_ written by the great Udayana. This
commentary had another commentary called _Nyâya-nibandha-prakâs'a_
written by Varddhamâna the son of the illustrious Ga@nges'a. This
again had another commentary called _Varddha-mânendu_ upon it by
Padmanâbha Mis'ra, and this again had another named
_Nyâya-tâtparyama@n@dana_ by S'a@nkara Mis'ra. The names of
Vâtsyâyana, Vâcaspati, and Udayana are indeed very great,
but even they contented themselves by writing commentaries
on commentaries, and did not try to formulate any
_______________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: I have preferred to spell Di@nnâga after Vâcaspati's
_Tâtparyatîkâ_ (p. I) and not Dignnâga as it is generally spelt.]
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original system. Even S'a@nkara, probably the greatest man of
India after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the
_Brahma-sûtras_, the Upani@sads, and the _Bhagavadgîtâ_.
As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents
and troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least prepared.
Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and
subtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the
defects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was
originally formulated in the sûtras had probably but few problems
to solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of
other schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems
in which the original views were more or less involved but to
which no attention had been given before.
The contributions of the successive commentators served to
make each system more and more complete in all its parts, and
stronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully
against the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system
in the sûtras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if
we take it along with its developments down to the beginning
of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man
strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible
to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is
necessity that each system should be studied and interpreted in
all the growth it has acquired through the successive ages of
history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole [Footnote
ref 1]. In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems
which had their importance only so long as they lived and were
then forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each
system grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents
through all the successive ages of history, and a history of this
growth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system
is therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth
it attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose
selfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history.
______________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest
one or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot be
carried all through, for the supplementary information and arguments
given by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborations
of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.]
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Growth of the Philosophic Literature.
It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated,
and what were the influences that led to it. We know that a
spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the
earliest Upani@sads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final
essence or truth was the âtman, that a search after it was our
highest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we
can only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everything
else and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we
want (_neti neti_). Philosophical enquires were however continuing
in circles other than those of the Upani@sads. Thus the Buddha
who closely followed the early Upani@sad period, spoke of and enumerated
sixty-two kinds of heresies [Footnote ref 1], and these can hardly be
traced in the Upani@sads. The Jaina activities were also probably
going on contemporaneously but in the Upani@sads no reference
to these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there
were different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than
those of the Upani@sad sages, of which we have but scanty records.
It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated
among the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upani@sad
circles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antagonistic
and heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these
sages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were probably
discussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time
when some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama
or Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on various
topics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified
and arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and
recorded it in sûtras. These sûtras were intended probably for
people who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus
could easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases contained
in the aphorisms. The sûtras thus contain sometimes
allusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in
which they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed
of the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and
conveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken
chain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however
free to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Brahmajâla-sutta, Dîgha_, 1. p. 12 ff.]
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views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary
views with which they did not agree or which they found it difficult
to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools
often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems
unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent
of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with
the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to
offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize
them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications
generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any
serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers,
for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations
of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They
would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things
only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent.
It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system
by treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately.
This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except
when there is a specially new development, the system is to be
interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators
treating their contributions as forming one whole.
The fact that each system had to contend with other rival
systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark
upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always
written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to
be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever
he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections
put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects
of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It
is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections
and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his
destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are
referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the
views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit
style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different
from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity,
leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems,
that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid
of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not
widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced
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work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particular
system are expressed in such close interconnection with
the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood
without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in
particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth
of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian
philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual
opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at
which they ceased to grow and came to a stop--a purpose for
which a work like the present one may only be regarded as
forming a preliminary introduction.
Besides the sûtras and their commentaries there are also independent
treatises on the systems in verse called _kârikâs_, which
try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct
manner; the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ may be mentioned as a work of this
kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations,
commentaries, or general observations on any system written in
verses called the vârttikas; the _S'lokavârttika_, of Kumarila or the
_Vârttika_ of Sures'vara may be mentioned as examples. All these
of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition
to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose
in which the writers either nominally followed some selected
sûtras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class
the _Nyâyamañjarî_ of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example
and of the latter the _Pras'astapâda bhâ@sya_, the _Advaitasiddhi_ of
Madhusûdana Sarasvatî or the _Vedânta-paribhâ@sâ_ of Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra.
The more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature in
which the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highly
forcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powers
and genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaborate
them. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of India
begins from about 500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically
ends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some
minor publications are seen to come out.
The Indian Systems of Philosophy.
The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes,
namely, the _nâstika_ and the _âstika_. The nâstika (_na asti_ "it is
not") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible
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nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are
principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Cârvâka.
The âstika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Sâ@mkhya,
Yoga, Vedânta, Mîmâ@msâ, Nyâya and Vais'e@sika, generally known
as the six systems (_@sa@ddars'ana_ [Footnote ref 1]).
The Sâ@mkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kâpila, but the
earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga
system is attributed to Patañjali and the original sûtras are called
the _Pâtañjala Yoga sûtras_. The general metaphysical position
of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and
the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this
that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (_Îs'vara_) as distinct
from Âtman and lays much importance on certain mystical
practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement
of liberation, whereas the Sâ@mkhya denies the existence of
Îs'vara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture
are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and
thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system
of Sâ@mkhya associated with Kâpila and the Yoga system
associated with Patañjali are but two divergent modifications of
an original Sâ@mkhya school, of which we now get only references
here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted
as two should more properly be looked upon as two different
schools of the same Sâ@mkhya system--one may be called the
Kâpila Sâ@mkhya and the other Pâtañjala Sâ@mkhya.
The Pûrva Mîmâ@msâ (from the root _man_ to think--rational
conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy.
It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with
which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices.
______________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The word "_dars'ana_" in the sense of true philosophic
knowledge has its earliest use in the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ of Ka@nâda
(IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pi@takas
(400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions "_ditthi_" (Sanskrit--dr@sti
from the same root _d@rs'_ from which dars'ana is formed). Haribhadra
(fifth century A.D.) uses the word Dars'ana in the sense of systems of
philosophy (_sarvadars'anavâcyo' rtha@h--@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ I.).
Ratnakîrtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the
same sense ("_Yadi nâma dars'ane dars'ane nânâprakâram sattvatak-@sanam
uktamasti._" _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ in _Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts_, p.20).
Mâdhava (1331 A.D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy,
_Sarvadars'anasa@mgra@na_. The word "_mata_" (opinion or view) was also
freely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word
to denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call
those who held heretical views "_tairthika._" The words "siddha,"
"_jñânin_," etc. do not denote philosophers, in the modern sense, they are
used rather in the sense of "seers" or "perfects."]
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The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices,
and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a
sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the
general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view
with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may
be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact
nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex
Vedic context. The Mîmâ@msâ formulated some principles according
to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions
for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it
indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul,
perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in
order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite
order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and
nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and
established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is
but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a
rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical
utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary
discussions in the Mîmâ@msâ that it may be called a system of
philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of
the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this
day. The sûtras of Mîmâ@msâ are attributed to Jaimini, and S'abara
wrote a bhâ@sya upon it. The two great names in the history of
Mîmâ@msâ literature after Jaimini and S'abara are Kumârila Bha@t@ta
and his pupil Prabhâkara, who criticized the opinions of his master
so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm,
and to this day his opinions pass as _guru-mata_, whereas the views
of Kumârila Bha@t@ta pass as _bha@t@ta-mata_ [Footnote ref 1]. It may not
be out of place to mention here that Hindu Law (_sm@rti_) accepts without
any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated
by the Mîmâ@msâ.
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumârila could not understand the
meaning of a Sanskrit sentence "_Atra tunoktam tatrâpinoktam iti
paunaraktam_" (hence spoken twice). _Tunoktam_ phonetically admits of
two combinations, _tu noktam_ (but not said) and _tunâuktam_ (said by
the particle _tu_) and _tatrâpi noktam_ as _tatra api na uktam_ (not
said also there) and _tatra apinâ uktam_ (said there by the particle
_api_). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean, "Not
spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice." This puzzled
Kumârila, when Prabhâkara taking the second meaning pointed out to him
that the meaning was "here it is indicated by _tu_ and there by _api,_
and so it is indicated twice." Kumârila was so pleased that he called
his pupil "Guru" (master) at this.]
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The _Vedânta sûtras_, also called Uttara Mîmâ@msâ, written by
Bâdarâya@na, otherwise known as the _Brahma-sûtras_, form the
original authoritative work of Vedânta. The word Vedânta means
"end of the Veda," i.e. the Upani@sads, and the _Vedânta sûtras_ are
so called as they are but a summarized statement of the general
views of the Upani@sads. This work is divided into four books or
adhyâyas and each adhyâya is divided into four pâdas or chapters.
The first four sûtras of the work commonly known as _Catu@hsûtrî_
are (1) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth
and decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth,
(4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upani@sads.
The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to
justifying the position of the Vedânta against the attacks of the
rival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in
dealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are
devoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of individual
Upani@sad texts. The really philosophical portion of the work is thus
limited to the first four sûtras and the first and second chapters
of the second book. The other portions are like commentaries
to the Upani@sads, which however contain many theological
views of the system. The first commentary of the _Brahma-sûtra_
was probably written by Baudhâyana, which however is not
available now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that
of the great S'a@nkara. His interpretations of the _Brahma-sûtras_
together with all the commentaries and other works that follow
his views are popularly known as Vedânta philosophy, though
this philosophy ought more properly to be called Vis'uddhâdvaitavâda
school of Vedânta philosophy (i.e. the Vedânta philosophy
of the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic
philosophy as represented by the Vai@s@navas, S'aivas, Râmâyatas,
etc., also claim to express the original purport of the Brahma
sûtras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as
Râmânuja, Vallabha, Madhva, S'rîka@n@tha, Baladeva, etc., have
written independent commentaries on the _Brahma-sûtra_ to show
that the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of
the Upani@sads and as summarized in the _Brahma-sûtras_. These
differed largely and often vehemently attacked S'a@nkara's interpretations
of the same sûtras. These systems as expounded by them also pass by
the name of Vedânta as these are also claimed to be the real
interpretations intended by the Vedânta (Upani@sads)
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and the _Vedânta sûtras_. Of these the system of Râmânuja has
great philosophical importance.
The _Nyâya sûtras_ attributed to Gautama, called also Ak@sapâda,
and the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ attributed to Ka@nâda, called also Ulûka,
represent the same system for all practical purposes. They are
in later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor
importance. So far as the sûtras are concerned the _Nyâya sûtras_
lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while
the _Vais'e@sika sûtras_ deal mostly with metaphysics and physics.
In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philosophies
of their own, which however may generally be looked upon
largely as modifications of the Sâ@mkhya and Vedânta systems,
though their own contributions are also noteworthy.
Some fundamental Points of Agreement.
I. _The Karma Theory._
It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the
Cârvâka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamental
points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India
were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the
human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in
abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of
the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the
postulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found
to be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be
their differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general
postulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the _summum
bonum_ of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in
thorough agreement. It may be worth while to note some of them
at this stage.
First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems
agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual
leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to
ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good
or bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot
be enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual
has to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to
suffer them.
The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent
at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic
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details, exactly according to the directions without the slightest
error even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical
virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately
or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the
Karma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain
mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects
without the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible
agents of ordinary cause and effect. When the sacrifice is performed,
the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called
the _ad@r@s@ta_ (the unseen) or the _apûrva_ (new), that by it the desired
object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the _modus
operandi_ of the _apûrva_ is unknown. There is also the notion
prevalent in the Sa@mhitâs, as we have already noticed, that he
who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he
who performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures.
These were probably associated with the conception of _@rta_, the
inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements
which built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well
established but not emphasized in the Upani@sads, where it is said
that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad
births.
To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma
doctrine as established in the âstika systems we find that it was
believed that the unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_) potency of the action generally
required some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the
merited punishment or enjoyment. These would often accumulate
and prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in
his next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely
wicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The
nature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of
pleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for
him by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences determined
for him by his action are such that they are possible to be
realized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a
goat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world
process, so there is no time at which any person first began his
actions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past
lives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of
life exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus whenever
he has any particular birth as this or that animal or man,
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the special instincts of that life (technically called _vâsanâ_) come
forth. In accordance with these vâsanâs the person passes through
the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by
his action. The length of life is also determined by the number
and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying
actions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for
giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those
actions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the
person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But
even such an emancipated (_mukta_) person has to pass through
the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the
actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds
of actions, white or virtuous (_s'ukla_), black or wicked (_k@r@s@na_),
white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (_s'ukla-k@r@s@na_) as
most of our actions are, neither black nor white (_as'uklâk@r@s@na_),
i.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not
associated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person
can so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action
that he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits.
He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which
have ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true
knowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed,
and as his acts are only of the as'uklâk@r@s@na type no fresh karma
for ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all
karma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone.
The Jains think that through the actions of body, speech
and mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is produced.
The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that
attracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and
sticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul
during the infinite number of past lives is technically called
_kârmas'arîra_, which encircles the soul as it passes on from birth
to birth. This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens
and exhausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment
of pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being
expended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by
his activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process of
suffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulated
in the soul produces a kind of coloration called _les'yâ_, such as
white, black, etc., which marks the character of the soul. The
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idea of the s'ukla and k@r@s@na karmas of the Yoga system was probably
suggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free from
passions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct,
his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is
then annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previously
earned has its predestined limits within which it must take effect
and be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strict
adherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, and
when all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of the
person rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage of
contemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activities
having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top
of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever.
Buddhism also contributes some new traits to the karma
theory which however being intimately connected with their
metaphysics will be treated later on.
2. _The Doctrine of Mukti_.
Not only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of the
inequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the case
of different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of births
and rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on the
basis of the mysterious connection of one's actions with the
happenings of the world, but they also agree in believing that
this beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and rebirths,
this running on from beginningless time has somewhere
its end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time or
in some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karma
leads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves of
all such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we should
find within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys,
neither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, wearied
by the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for and
believed that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they
generally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could
be realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all
action, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the
connection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous,
artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched
by the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance
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and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginningless
time that we connect it with these. The realization of this
transcendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless
cycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists did
not admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the final
realization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimate
dissolution called Nirvâ@na, the nature of which we shall discuss
later on.
3. _The Doctrine of Soul_.
All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence
of a permanent entity variously called atman, puru@sa or jîva.
As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed divergences
of view. Thus while the Nyâya calls it absolutely
qualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity,
Sâ@mkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness,
the Vedânta says that it is that fundamental point of unity
implied in pure consciousness (_cit_), pure bliss (_ânanda_), and pure
being (_sat_). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied
in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not
form a real part of it. The _summum bonum_ of life is attained
when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self
is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous
connections with it are absolutely dissociated.
The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the
Optimistic Faith in the end.
Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been
equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be
considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest
utterance in Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminable
chain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon as
nearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in the
meshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasures
are but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady is
painful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we are
anxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much associated
with pains they are but pains themselves. We are but duped
when we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. All
our experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow-begetting.
Sorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the
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world. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurable
appears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision as
painful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitiveness
to sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yogin
is like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain of
disturbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannot
be removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes,
for the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannot
also be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continually
being forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead to
another life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid of
it is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledge
which uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the self
is intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures,
that leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoyment
of pleasures and other emotions and activities. Through
the highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion
towards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speech
from all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the self
shines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived.
When this is once done the self can never again be associated
with passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimately
dissociated from _citta_ which contains within it the root of all
emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever
conquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in this
connection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion
to intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed
person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti
as the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic
creed of each system have developed from the logical necessity
peculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency
to shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them through
right performance and right understanding. It is only when a
man rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit for
aspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which
all worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not only
shrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character as
sorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned from
all ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation.
In fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some
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ideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the fundamental
fact from which not only her philosophy but many of the
complex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logically
deduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember
that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The
pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic
confidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of
emancipation.
Unity in Indian Sâdhana (philosophical, religious
and ethical endeavours).
As might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed upon
the general principles of ethical conduct which must be followed
for the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be controlled,
no injury to life in any form should be done, and that all
desire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which are
almost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a very
high degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and prepare
his mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainment
of his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous with
regard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There are
indeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but the
means to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essentially
the same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is only
in later times that devotion (_bhakti_) is seen to occupy a more
prominent place specially in Vai@s@nava schools of thought. Thus
it was that though there were many differences among the various
systems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world and
the means fur the attainment of the goal (_sâdhana_) being fundamentally
the same, there was a unique unity in the practical sâdhana
of almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has been
universal in India and this uniformity of sâdhana has therefore
secured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings.
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