SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were officers?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you cannot remember what service?
SCHELLENBERG: No, that I cannot tell you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful to the Tribunal for letting
me ask these questions.
COL. AMEN: That is all for this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the witness can go then.
[_The witness left the stand._]
COL. AMEN: I wish to call as the next witness, Alois Höllriegel.
[_The witness, Höllriegel, took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
ALOIS HÖLLRIEGEL (Witness): Alois Höllriegel.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty
and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and
add nothing.”
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down if you want to.
COL. AMEN: What position did you hold at the end of the war?
HÖLLRIEGEL: At the end of the war I was Unterscharführer at Mauthausen.
COL. AMEN: Were you a member of the Totenkopf SS?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes; in the year 1939 I was drafted into the SS.
COL. AMEN: What were your duties at the Mauthausen Concentration Camp?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I was until the winter of 1942 with a guard company, and I
stood guard. From 1942 until the end of the war I was detailed to the
inner service of the concentration camp.
COL. AMEN: And you therefore had occasion to witness the extermination
of inmates of that camp by shooting, gassing, and so forth?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, I saw that.
COL. AMEN: And did you make an affidavit in this case to the effect that
you saw Kaltenbrunner at that camp?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And that he saw and was familiar with the operation of the
gas chamber there?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Did you also have occasion to see any other important
personages visiting that concentration camp?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I remember Pohl, Glücks, Kaltenbrunner, Schirach, and the
Gauleiter of Styria, Uiberreither.
COL. AMEN: And did you personally see Schirach at that concentration
camp at Mauthausen?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Do you remember what he looks like so that you could identify
him?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I think that he has probably changed a little in recent
times, but I would certainly remember him.
COL. AMEN: How long ago was it that you saw him there?
HÖLLRIEGEL: That was in the fall of 1942. Since then I have not seen
him.
COL. AMEN: Will you look around the courtroom and see whether you can
see Schirach in the courtroom?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Which person is it?
HÖLLRIEGEL: In the second row, the third person from the left.
COL. AMEN: The affidavit to which I referred was Exhibit Number USA-515.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number?
COL. AMEN: 2753-PS.
[_Turning to the witness._] I now show you a copy of Document Number
2641-PS and ask you whether you can recognize the place where those
individuals are standing?
HÖLLRIEGEL: As far as can be seen from the picture, it is a quarry.
Whether it is at Mauthausen or not one cannot determine exactly, because
the view is too small.
COL. AMEN: Would you repeat that answer please?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Certainly. As far as can be seen from this picture, it is
not possible to say definitely if this is the Wiener-Graben quarry which
adjoined Mauthausen. It might easily be another quarry. A larger range
of vision is required. But I think that visits were often made there. I
assume that this is the Wiener-Graben quarry.
COL. AMEN: Very good. Just lay the picture aside for the time being. Did
you have occasion to observe the killing of inmates of the concentration
camp by pushing them off a cliff?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what you saw with respect to that
practice?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I remember, it was in 1941. At that time I was with a guard
company on the tower which closed off the area of the Wiener-Graben
quarry. I was able to observe in the morning about six to eight
prisoners who came with two SS men. One was Hauptscharführer
Spatzenöcker and the other, Unterscharführer Edenhofer; they moved about
and made strange gestures . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Wait, you are going too fast. You should go slower.
HÖLLRIEGEL: I saw that they were approaching the precipice near the
quarry. I saw from my watchtower that these two SS men were beating the
prisoners and I realized immediately that they intended to force them to
throw themselves over the precipice or else to push them over. I noticed
how one of the prisoners was kicked while lying on the ground, and the
gestures showed that he was supposed to throw himself down the
precipice. This the prisoner promptly did under the pressure of the
blows—presumably in despair.
COL. AMEN: How steep was the precipice?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I estimate it to be 30 to 40 meters.
COL. AMEN: Was there a term used amongst you guards for this practice of
having the prisoners fall from the top of the precipice?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, in Mauthausen Camp they were called paratroopers.
COL. AMEN: The witness is available to other counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Russian Prosecutor or the French Prosecutor or
any defense counsel have any questions?
DR. SAUTER: Witness, I am interested in the following points: You said
just now that in 1939 you were taken into the SS?
HÖLLRIEGEL: That is true; on the 6th of September . . .
DR. SAUTER: One moment; please repeat your answer.
HÖLLRIEGEL: That is right. On the 6th of September 1939 I was taken into
the SS at Ebersberg near Linz.
DR. SAUTER: Had you no connection at all with the Party before then?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes. In April 1938 I enlisted in the civilian SS, because I
was out of work during the entire previous period of the Schuschnigg
Government and without any support, and consequently I thought, I would
join the civilian SS; there I would get work in order to marry my wife.
DR. SAUTER: Then, if I understood you correctly, you were drafted into
the SS in 1939, because you had already voluntarily enlisted in the
civilian SS in the spring of 1938?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot say that exactly. Many were drafted into the Armed
Forces, into the Air Force, and into the General SS.
DR. SAUTER: Are you an Austrian?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Then at that time you lived in Austria?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, in Graz.
DR. SAUTER: Then I should be interested in a certain point in regard to
the Defendant Von Schirach. You saw the Defendant Von Schirach at
Mauthausen. How often did you see him there?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I can remember quite clearly—once.
DR. SAUTER: Once?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Was Von Schirach alone at Mauthausen, or was he together
with other people?
HÖLLRIEGEL: No. Von Schirach was accompanied by other gentlemen. There
was a group of about 10 people, and among them I recognized Von Schirach
and Gauleiter Uiberreither.
DR. SAUTER: There are supposed to have been 20 persons at least and not
10 on that occasion.
HÖLLRIEGEL: I did not know at that time that I might have to use these
figures; I did not count them.
DR. SAUTER: This point is important to me, because the Defendant
Schirach told me it was a visiting inspection, an official inspection
tour of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, as a result of a meeting of
the economic advisors of all six Gaue of the Ostmark.
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, I naturally did not know why he came to the camp, but I
remember that this group came with Von Schirach and
Schutzhaftlagerführer (Protective Custody-Camp Leader) Bachmeyer. At any
rate I could see that it looked like an inspection.
DR. SAUTER: Did you know that this inspection was announced in the camp
several days before and that certain preparations were made in the camp
because of this inspection?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember any specific preparations but I do
remember it was in the evening. I can’t tell you the exact time; it was
the time of the evening roll call. The prisoners had assembled for roll
call and all the hands on duty also had to fall in. Then this group came
in.
DR. SAUTER: Did you or your comrades not know on the day before that
this inspection would take place the very next day?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember that.
DR. SAUTER: And did it not strike you that certain definite preparations
had been made in this camp?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember noticing that any preparations had been
made.
DR. SAUTER: I have no further questions to ask this witness.
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Witness,
you described an incident which, judged by the concepts of civilized
people, cannot be termed anything but murder—that is, the hurling of
people over the side of the quarry. Did you report this incident to your
superiors?
HÖLLRIEGEL: These incidents happened frequently and one can take it that
the chances were a thousand to one that the superiors knew about them.
DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, you did not report this. Is it true that
not only the internees but also the guards were forbidden under pain of
death to report incidents of this sort to a third person?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no other question.
COL. AMEN: Would you just look at that picture again?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you look at it carefully and tell me whether that is the
quarry underneath the cliff which you have just described?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes. As far as I can tell from this picture, and I assume
with a 100 percent degree of accuracy that it is the quarry
Wiener-Graben; but one would have to see more, more background, to
decide whether it is really this quarry. One sees too little, but I
think quite certainly . . .
COL. AMEN: Do you recognize the individuals whose faces appear in the
picture?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal the ones which you do recognize?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I recognize of course Reichsführer SS Himmler first of all,
next to him the commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp Ziereis and
way to the right I recognize Kaltenbrunner.
COL. AMEN: That is all, may it please the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can go and we will adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next and final subject of the
criminal organizations is the General Staff and High Command, to be
presented by Colonel Taylor.
COLONEL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States):
Your Lordship and members of the Tribunal, the Indictment seeks a
declaration of criminality, under Articles 9 to 11 of the Charter,
against six groups or organizations; and the last one listed in the
Indictment is a group described as the General Staff and High Command of
the German Armed Forces.
At first sight these six groups and organizations seem to differ rather
widely one from another, both in their composition and in their
functions. But all of them are related, and we believe that they are
logically indicted together before the Tribunal because they are the
primary agencies and the chief tools by means of which the Nazi
conspirators sought to achieve their aims. All six of them were either
established by, controlled by, or became allied with the Nazis; and they
were essential to the success of the Nazis. They were at once the
principal and indispensable instruments: The Party, the Government, the
Police, and the Armed Forces. It is my task to present the case in chief
against the General Staff and High Command group.
Now, in one respect this group is to be sharply distinguished from the
other groups and organizations against which we have sought this
declaration. For example, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party—of the
NSDAP—is the Leadership Corps of the Party itself, the Party which was
the embodiment of Nazism and which was the instrument primarily through
which Hitlerism rode to full power and tyranny in Germany. The SA and
the SS were branches—to be sure, large branches—of the Nazi Party. The
German Police did, indeed, have certain roots and antecedents which
antedated Hitlerism; but it became 99 per cent a creature of the Nazi
Party and the SS. The Reich Cabinet was in essence merely a committee or
series of committees of Reich Ministers; and when the Nazis came to
power, quite naturally these ministerial positions were filled for the
most part by Nazis. All these groups and organizations, accordingly,
either owe their origin and development to Nazism or automatically
became Nazified when Hitler came to power.
Now, that is not true of the group with which we are now concerned. I
need not remind the Tribunal that German armed might and the German
military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades. One need not be a
graybeard to have very vivid personal recollections of the war of 1914
to 1918, of the Kaiser, and of the “scrap of paper.” For these reasons I
want to sketch very briefly, before going into the evidence, the nature
of our case against this group, which is unique in the particulars I
have mentioned.
As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles,
the size and permissible scope of activities of the German Armed Forces
were severely restricted. That these restrictions did not destroy or
even seriously undermine German militarism, the last few years have made
abundantly apparent. The full flowering of German military strength came
about through collaboration; collaboration between the Nazis on the one
hand and the career leaders of the German Armed Forces—the professional
soldiers, sailors, and airmen.
When Hitler came to power, he did not find a vacuum in the field of
military affairs. He found a small Reichswehr and a body of professional
officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German military history.
The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in
the Indictment, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men.
Now, needless to say, it is not the Prosecution’s position that it is a
crime to be a soldier or a sailor or to serve one’s country as a soldier
or sailor in time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one and
can be honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man
who commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in
uniform.
It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the Prosecution’s
position that every member of this group was a wicked man or that they
were all equally culpable. But we will show that this group not only
collaborated with Hitler and supported the essential Nazi objectives,
but we will show that they furnished the one thing which was essential
and basic to the success of the Nazi program for Germany; and that was
skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.
Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? I think Your Honors
will see, as the proof is given, that the answer is very simple. The
answer is that they agreed with the truly basic objectives of Hitlerism
and Nazism and that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a
major part in achieving these objectives. The generals, like Hitler,
wanted to aggrandize Germany at the expense of neighboring countries and
were prepared to do so by force or threat of force. Force, armed might,
was the keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would
have been possible.
As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had
two alternatives: either to collaborate with and expand the small German
Army, known as the Reichswehr, or to ignore the Reichswehr and build up
a separate army of their own. The generals feared that the Nazis might
do the latter and accordingly were the more inclined to collaborate.
Moreover, the Nazis offered the generals the chance of achieving much
that they wished to achieve by way of expanding German armies and German
frontiers; and so, as we will show, the generals climbed onto the Nazi
bandwagon. They saw it was going in their direction for the present. No
doubt they hoped later to take over the direction themselves. In fact,
as the proof will show, ultimately it was the generals who were taken
for a ride by the Nazis.
Hitler, in short, attracted the generals to him with the glitter of
conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically; and, as the
war proceeded, they became his tools. But if these military leaders
became the tools of Nazism, it is not to be supposed that they were
unwitting or that they did not participate fully in many of the crimes
which we will bring to the notice of the Tribunal. The willingness—and,
indeed, the eagerness—of the German professional officer corps to
become partners of the Nazis, will be fully developed.
Your Lordship, there will be three principal parts to this presentation.
There will be first a description of the composition and functioning of
the General Staff and High Command group as defined in the Indictment;
next, the evidence in support of the charges of criminality under Counts
One and Two of the Indictment; finally, the evidence in support of the
charges under Counts Three and Four.
The members of the Tribunal should have before them three document books
which have been given the designation “CC.” The first of these books is
a series of sworn statements or affidavits which are available to the
Tribunal in English, Russian, and French and which have been available
to the defendants in German. The second and third books are the usual
type of document books, separated merely for convenience of handling.
The second book contains documents in the C- and L-series, and the third
book, in the PS- and R-series. For the convenience of the Tribunal we
have had handed up a list of these documents in the order in which they
will be referred to.
The Tribunal should also have one other document, and that is a short
mimeographed statement entitled, “Basic Information on the Organization
of the German Armed Forces.” That has also been handed up in English,
Russian, and French and has been made available to the defendants’
Information Center in German.
So I turn first to the description of the group as defined in the
Indictment.
During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed
Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name, the German General
Staff or Great General Staff, persists in the public mind; but the
Grosse Generalstab no longer exists in fact. There has been no such
single organization, no single German General Staff, since 1918; but
there has, of course, been a group of men responsible for the policy and
the acts of the German Armed Forces, and the fact that these men have no
single collective name does not prevent us from collecting them
together. They cannot escape the consequences of their collective acts
by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a general
staff or a high command lies, not in the name you give it, but in the
functions it performs; and the men comprised within the group as we have
defined it in the Indictment do constitute a functional group, welded
together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the
principal authority and responsibility under Hitler for the plans and
operations of the German Armed Forces.
Let us examine first the general structure and organization of the
German Armed Forces and then look at the composition of the group as
specified in the Indictment. As I just mentioned, we have prepared a
very short written exposition of the organization of the German Armed
Forces, which we have handed up to the Tribunal. That document contains
a short sketch setting forth the basic history and development of the
Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces since 1933 and the structure
as it emerged after its reorganization in 1938. It also contains a
simple chart which, in a few moments, will be displayed at the front of
the courtroom. It also contains a short glossary of German military
expressions; and it contains a comparative table of ranks in the German
Army and in the SS, showing the equivalent ranks in the American Army
and the equivalent ranks for the German Navy and the British Navy. I may
say that military and naval ranks differ slightly among the principal
nations, but that by and large they follow the same general pattern and
terminology.
When the Nazis came to power in 1933, the German Armed Forces were
controlled by a Reich Defense Minister, who at that time was Field
Marshal Werner von Blomberg. Under Von Blomberg were the Chief of the
Army Staff, who at that time was Von Fritsch, and of the Naval Staff,
the Defendant Raeder. Owing to the limitations imposed on Germany by the
Treaty of Versailles, the German Air Force at that time had no official
existence whatever. The Army and Naval Staffs were renamed “High
Command”—Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der
Kriegsmarine—from which are derived the initials by which they are
generally known, OKH and OKM.
In May 1935 at the time that military conscription was introduced in
Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices; but the
structure remained basically the same. Field Marshal Von Blomberg
remained in supreme command of the Armed Forces, with the title of Reich
Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch
assumed the title Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder,
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this
same time, but it was not put under Von Blomberg. It was an independent
institution under the personal command of the Defendant Göring who had
the double title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force.
I will now ask that that chart be displayed, please.
This chart, Your Honors, has been certified and sworn to by three
principal German generals and the affidavits with reference to it will
be introduced in a few moments. It shows the organization, the top
organization, of the Armed Forces as it emerged in 1938 after the
reorganization which I will now describe.
In February 1938 Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch were both retired from
their positions and Blomberg’s ministry, the War Ministry, was wound up.
The War Ministry had contained a division or department called the
Wehrmachtsamt, meaning the Armed Forces Department; and the function of
that department had been to co-ordinate the plans and operations of the
Army and Navy. From this Armed Forces Department was formed a new
over-all Armed Forces authority known as the High Command of the German
Armed Forces—that is the box in the center, right under Hitler—known
in German as Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, and usually known by the
initials OKW.
Since the Air Force as well as the Army was subordinated to OKW,
co-ordination of all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which
was really Hitler’s personal staff for these matters. The Defendant
Keitel was appointed Chief of the OKW. The most important division of
the OKW, shown just to the right, was the Operations Staff, of which the
Defendant Jodl became the chief.
Now, this reorganization and the establishment of OKW was embodied in a
decree issued by Hitler on the 4th of February 1938. This decree
appeared in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, and I invite the Court’s attention
to it by way of judicial notice (1915-PS). Copies are available; and I
would like to read the decree, which is very short, into the transcript.
I quote:
“Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on
exercised directly by me personally.”
THE PRESIDENT: Where do we find it?
COL. TAYLOR: That is not a document, Your Honor, because it is a decree
from the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and subject to judicial notice; but copies
are available here if the Tribunal cares to look at it.
I will continue with the second paragraph of this decree:
“The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its
functions becomes the High Command of the Armed Forces and comes
directly under my command as my military staff.
“The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces
is the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department, with the
title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. His
status is equal to that of a Reich Minister.
“The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the
affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces, as my representative, exercises the
functions hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister. The High
Command of the Armed Forces is responsible in peacetime for the
unified preparation of the defense of the Reich in all areas
according to my directives.”
Dated at Berlin, 4 February 1938; signed by Hitler, by Lammers, and by
Keitel.
Underneath the OKW come the three supreme commands of the three branches
of the Armed Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force. The Air Force did not
receive the official designation OKL until 1944. The Defendant Raeder
remained after 1938 as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, but Von Fritsch,
as well as Blomberg, passed out of the picture; Von Fritsch being
replaced by Von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Göring
continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 Von
Brauchitsch was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Army—that is the
first box in the left column—by Hitler himself; and in 1943 Raeder was
replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy by the Defendant Dönitz. The
Defendant Göring continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force until
the last month of the war.
OKW, OKH, OKM, and OKL each had its own staff. These four staffs did not
have uniform designations. The three staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force are the three boxes in a horizontal line next to the bottom. The
staff of the OKW is the little box to the right at the top, bearing the
names of Jodl and Warlimont.
In the case of OKH—that is the Army—the staff was known as the
Generalstab or the General Staff. In the case of OKW, it was known as
the Führungsstab or Operations Staff, but in all cases the functions
were those of a general staff in military parlance.
It will be seen, therefore, that in this war there was no single German
General Staff; but, rather, that there were four, one for each branch of
the service and one for the OKW as the over-all inter-service Supreme
Command.
So we come to the bottom line on the chart. Down to the bottom line we
have been concerned with the central staff organization at the center of
affairs. Now we pass to the field. Under OKH, OKM, and OKL come the
various fighting formations of the Army, Air Force, and Navy,
respectively.
In the Army the largest army field formation was known to the Germans,
as indeed it is among the nations generally, as an army group, or in
German “Heeresgruppe.” Those are shown in the box in the lower left hand
corner. An army group or Heeresgruppe controls two or more armies—in
German, “Armeen.” Underneath the armies come the lower field formations,
such as corps, divisions, and regiments, which are not shown on the
chart.
In the case of the German Air Force, the largest formation was known as
an air fleet or “Luftflotte,” and the lower units under the air fleet
were called corps, “Fliegerkorps” or “Jagdkorps”; or divisions,
“Fliegerdivisionen” or “Jagddivisionen.” These lower formations again we
have not shown on the chart.
Under the OKM were the various naval group commands, which controlled
all naval operations in a given area with the exception of the high seas
fleet itself and submarines. The commanders of the fleet and the
submarines were directly under the German Admiralty.
So we may now examine the group as defined in the Indictment; the group
against which the Prosecution seeks the declaration of criminality. It
is defined in Appendix B of the Indictment. The group comprises,
firstly, German officers who held the top positions in the four supreme
commands which I have just described and, secondly, the officers who
held the top field commands.
Turning first to the officers who held the principal positions in the
supreme commands, we find that the holders of nine such positions are
included in the group. Four of these are positions of supreme authority:
The Chief of the OKW, Keitel; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von
Brauchitsch, later Hitler; Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder, and
later Dönitz; Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Göring, and later Von
Greim.
Four other positions are those of the chiefs of the staffs to those four
commanders-in-chief: The Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW, Jodl;
the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Halder, and later others;
the Chief of-the General Staff of the Air Force, Jeschonnek, and later
others; the Chief of the Naval War Staff.
The ninth position is that of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of
OKW. Throughout most of the war that was General Warlimont, whose name
is shown under Jodl’s on the chart. The particular responsibility of
Jodi’s deputy was planning—strategic planning—and for that reason his
office has been included in the group as defined in the Indictment.
The group named in the Indictment includes all individuals who held any
of those nine staff positions between February 1938 and the end of the
war in May 1945. February 1938 was selected as the opening date because
it was in that month that the top organization of the German Armed
Forces was reorganized and assumed substantially the form in which you
see it there and in which it persisted up until the end of the war.
Twenty-two different individuals occupied those nine positions during
that period, and of those 22, 18 are still living.
Turning next to the officers who held the principal field commands, the
Indictment includes, as members of the group, all commanders-in-chief in
the field who had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in the Army, Navy, or
Air Force. The term “Oberbefehlshaber” rather defies literal translation
into English. Literally, the components of the word mean
“over-command-holder;” and we can perhaps best translate it as
“commander-in-chief.”
In the case of the Army, commanders of the army groups and armies always
had the status and title of Oberbefehlshaber. In the Air Force the
commanders-in-chief of air fleets always had the status of
Oberbefehlshaber, although they were not formally so designated until
1944. In the Navy officers holding the senior regional commands and,
therefore, in control of all naval operations in a given sector had the
status of Oberbefehlshaber.
Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in
the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in question. All but
approximately a dozen of them are still alive. The entire General Staff
and High Command group, as defined in the Indictment, comprises about
130 officers, of whom 114 are believed to be still living. These
figures, of course, are the cumulative total of all officers who at any
time belonged to the group during the 7 years and 3 months from February
1938 to May 1945.
The number of active members of the group at any moment is, of course,
much smaller. It was about 20 at the outbreak of the war and it rose to
about 50 in 1944 and 1945. That is to say, that at any one moment of
time in 1944 the group—the active group—would have consisted of the
nine individuals occupying the nine staff positions and about 41 Naval,
Air Force, or Army commanders-in-chief.
The structure and the functioning of the German General Staff and High
Command group has been described in a series of affidavits by some of
the principal German field marshals and generals. These affidavits are
included in Volume I of Document Book CC. I want to state briefly how
these statements were obtained.
In the first place two American officers who were selected for their
ability and experience in interviewing high-ranking German prisoners of
war were briefed by an intelligence officer and by the Trial counsel on
the particular problems presented by this part of the case, the
organizational side of the German Armed Forces. These officers were
already well versed in military intelligence and were fluent in German.
It was emphasized that the function of these interrogating officers was
merely to inquire into and establish the facts with respect to the
organization of the Armed Forces, to establish facts on which the
Prosecution wanted to be accurately informed.
The German generals to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the
special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of
the positions which they had held in the past. After each interview the
interrogator prepared a report, and from this report such facts as
appeared relevant to the issues before the Tribunal were extracted and a
statement embodying them was prepared. This statement was then presented
to the German officer at a later interview in the form of a draft, and
the German officer was asked whether it truly reproduced what he had
said and was invited to alter it in any way he saw fit. The object was
to procure the most accurate testimony on organizational matters that we
could.
I will take up these affidavits one by one, and I think the members of
the Tribunal will see that they fully support the Prosecution’s
description of the group and conclusively establish that this group of
officers was, in fact, the group which had the major responsibility for
planning and for directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.
The Soviet and French Judges have copies in French and Russian, and the
Defense has copies in German.
The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder, who held the rank
of “Generaloberst” or colonel general—the equivalent of a four-star
general in the American Army. His affidavit will be Exhibit Number
USA-531 (Document 3702-PS). Halder was Chief of the General Staff of
OKH. That would be the box second from the bottom on the left-hand side.
He was Chief of the General Staff of the OKH from September 1938 to
September 1942. He is, accordingly, a member of the group and well
qualified by his position to testify as to the organization. His
statement is short, and I will read it in full:
“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in
Germany was vested in the head of the State, who prior to the 2d
of August 1934, was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg and thereafter,
until 1945, was Adolf Hitler.
“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the
three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of
the State), that is to say, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force.
In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a
relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers
exercised such supervision on the basis of their official
instructions and by virtue of their training, their positions,
and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations, of the
German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group,
according to the instructions of the OKW, in the name of their
respective commanding officers and were presented to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time the
head of the State).
“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility
of preparing for military operations within their competent
fields, and they actually did prepare for any such operations as
were to be undertaken by troops in the field.
“Prior to any operation, the respective members of this group
were assembled occasionally and given appropriate directions by
the head of the State. Examples of such meetings are the speech
by Hitler to the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 prior to
the Polish campaign and the conference at the Reich Chancellery
on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.
“The composition of this group and the relationship of its
members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. This
was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German
Armed Forces. Signed: Halder.”
The chart to which reference is made is the chart which is at the front
of the room and which was attached to the affidavit. The two meetings
referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavit are covered by
documents which will be introduced subsequently.
I next offer a substantially identical statement by Von Brauchitsch,
which will be Exhibit Number USA-532 (Document 3703-PS). Von Brauchitsch
held the rank of field marshal and was Commander-in-Chief of the Army
from 1938 to 1941—therefore also a member of the group. I need not read
his statement, since it is practically the same as that given by Halder;
but I will ask that it be set forth in full in the transcript at this
point. The only difference between the two statements is in the last
sentence of each. Halder states that the group described in the
Indictment “was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the
German Armed Forces,” whereas Von Brauchitsch puts it a little
differently, saying, “In the hands of those who filled the positions
shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.”
Otherwise, the two statements are identical.
[_The document referred to above is as follows_:]
“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in
Germany was vested in the head of State who prior to 2 August
1934 was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945
was Adolf Hitler.
“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the
three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of State),
that is to say, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In
practice supervision within this field was exercised by a
relatively small group of high ranking officers. These officers
exercised such supervision on the basis of their official
instructions and by virtue of their training, their positions,
and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the
German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group
according to the instructions of the OKW and were presented to
the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time head
of State).
“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility
of preparing for military operations within their competent
fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as
might possibly be undertaken by troops in the field.
“Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled
occasionally and given appropriate directions by the head of
State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the
commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish
campaign and the conference at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June
1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.
“The composition of this group and the relationship of its
members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. In
the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart
lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.”—Signed— “Von
Brauchitsch.”
Now, the Tribunal will see from these affidavits that the chart which is
on display at the front of the Court and which is contained in the short
expository statement has been laid before Von Brauchitsch and Halder and
that these two officers have vouched for it under oath as an accurate
picture of the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The
statements by Von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the
Prosecution’s statement that the holders of the positions shown on this
chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the
planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters.
I would now like to offer another affidavit by Halder which sets forth
some of the matters of detail to which I adverted in describing the
group. It is quite short. Affidavit Number 6, which becomes Exhibit
USA-533 (Document 3704-PS)—and I shall read it in full into the
transcript:
“The most important department in the OKW was the Operations
Staff, in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army
and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel
there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in
status with Jodl but, in the planning and conduct of military
affairs, they and their departments were less important and less
influential than Jodl and Jodl’s staff.
“The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of
these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was
chief. It was called the National Defense Section, and it was
primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions.
From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same
duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.
“There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as
the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.
“Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out
by the group of high ranking officers described in my statement
of 7 November (in the Army, the General Staff of the Army; and
in the Air Force, the General Staff of the Air Force).
“Operational matters of the Navy were, even in World War I, not
worked out by the Great General Staff but by the Naval Staff.
Signed: Halder.”
The Tribunal will note that this affidavit is primarily concerned with
the functions of the General Staffs of the four commands of OKW, OKL,
OKH, and OKM and fully supports the inclusion in the group of the Chiefs
of Staff of the four services, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as
Deputy Chief of the OKW staff because of his strategic planning
responsibilities.
I have just one other very short affidavit covering a matter of detail.
The Tribunal will remember that the highest fighting formation in the
German Air Force was known as an air fleet or Luftflotte and that all
commanders-in-chief of air fleets are included in this group. That is
the box in the lower-right-hand corner. The commanders of air fleets
always had the status of Oberbefehlshaber, but they were not formally so
designated until 1944. These facts are set forth in an affidavit by the
son of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. His son had the rank of Oberst, or
colonel, in the German Air Force and was personal aide to the Defendant
Göring as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. His affidavit is Number 9
and becomes Exhibit Number USA-534 (Document 3705-PS). It reads as
follows:
“Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the Oberbefehlshaber
of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority
and, accordingly, exercised no territorial jurisdiction.
“They were the highest troop commanders of the Air Force units
subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
“Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation Befehlshaber
and from then on that of Oberbefehlshaber. This change of
designation carried with it no change in the functions and
responsibilities that they previously had.”
Your Honor, that concludes the description of the composition of the
group and the personnel of it. The staff of the Tribunal have referred
to me two inquiries which have been addressed to the Tribunal by counsel
for the group and it seemed to me it might be appropriate if I disposed
of those inquiries now as to the composition of the group. The letters
were turned over to me 2 days ago.
The first is from Hofrat Düllmann, and he has asked whether the group,
as defined in the Indictment, is contingent upon rank, whether it
includes officers holding a definite rank such as field marshal or
“Generaloberst.”
The answer to that is clearly “no.” As has been pointed out, the
criterion of membership in the group is whether one held one of the
positions on the chart up there; and one would be in the group if one
held one of the positions, no matter what one’s rank. Rank is no
criterion. In point of fact, I suppose everybody in the group held at
least the rank of general in the German Army, which is the equivalent of
lieutenant general in ours.
He has also asked whether the group includes officers of the so-called
General Staff Corps. The answer to that is “no.” There was in the German
Army a war academy, and graduates of the war academy were in the branch
of service described as the General Staff Corps. They signed themselves,
for example, “Colonel in Generalstab.” They functioned largely as
adjutants and assistants to the chief staff officers. I suppose there
were some thousands of them—two or three thousand, but they are not
included in the group. Many of them were officers of junior rank. They
are not named in the Indictment, and there is no reason and no respect
in which they are comprehended within the group as defined.
The other letter of inquiry is from Dr. Exner, who states that he is in
doubt as to the meaning of Oberbefehlshaber and goes on to state that he
believes that Oberbefehlshaber includes commanders-in-chief in theaters
of war, the commanders-in-chief of army groups, and the
commanders-in-chief of armies. That is quite right. Those are the
positions as shown on the chart.
Let us now spend a few minutes examining the way this group worked. In
many respects, of course, the German military leaders functioned in the
same general manner as obtained in the military establishments of other
large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and
their assistants in collaboration with the field generals or admirals
who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a
particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest
level; and the making of such a decision would involve political and
diplomatic questions, as well as purely military considerations. When,
for example, the decision was made to attack Poland, the top staff
officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military
plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the
commanders of the army groups and armies who would be in charge of the
actual campaign; and then there would follow consultation between the
top field commanders and the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, in order
to revise and perfect and refine the plans.
The manner in which this group worked, involving as it did the
interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers
at OKW and OKH, on the one hand, and the principal field commanders on
the other hand, is graphically described in two statements by Field
Marshal Von Brauchitsch. That is Affidavit Number 4, which will be
Exhibit Number USA-535 (Document 3706-PS). I invite the Tribunal’s
attention to these and will read them into the transcript. The statement
of 7 November 1945:
“In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military
preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was
immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan.
This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him, as
amended by a change which he desired. After the operational and
deployment orders had been given to the two commanders of the
army groups and the five commanders of the armies, conferences
took place with them about details, in order to hear their
desires and recommendations. After the outbreak of the war I
continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch
with the commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies by
personal visits to their headquarters, as well as by telephone,
teletype, or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their
advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military
operations. In fact, it was the accepted policy and common
practice for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his
subordinate commanders-in-chief and maintain a constant exchange
of ideas with them.
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff
communicated with army groups and through them, as well as
directly, with the armies; through army groups on strategic and
tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and
administration of conquered territory occupied by the armies. An
army group had no territorial executive power. It had a
relatively small staff, which was concerned only with military
operations. In all territorial matters it was the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and not of the army group, who
exercised executive power. Signed: Von Brauchitsch.”
There follows:
“Supplement to the statement of 7 November 1945:
“When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of
his political objectives through military pressure or through
the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an
appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.
Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the
OKH. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally
by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a
written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed
Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the
operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies
involved.
“Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed
by the OKH with the commanders-in-chief of the army groups and
armies and with the chiefs of staff of these commanders. During
the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas
with the army groups by means of telephone, radio, and courier.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every opportunity to
maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of
army groups, armies, and lower echelons by means of personal
visits to them.
“In the war against Russia the commanders of army groups and
armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for
report. Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to
army groups, and for all matters concerning supply and
territorial executive power from the OKH directly to the armies.
Signed: Von Brauchitsch.”
The Oberbefehlshaber in the field, therefore—and in the case of the
Army that means the commanders-in-chief of army groups and
armies—participated in planning and directing the execution of the
plans, as those affidavits show. The Oberbefehlshaber were also the
repositories of general executive powers in the areas in which their
army groups and armies were operating. In this connection I invite the
Court’s attention to Document 447-PS, which is already in evidence as
Exhibit Number USA-135, this being a directive of 13 March 1941 signed
by Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. This
directive sets out various regulations for the operations against the
Soviet Union which were actually begun a few months later on 22 June.
The documents, Your Honor, are in numerical order in Document Books II
and III. Document Book II contains C and L; Document Book III contains
PS; and this, being 447-PS, will be in Document Book III in numerical
order within the PS’s. And within that Document, under Paragraph I, the
paragraph entitled “Area of Operations and Executive Power”
(“Vollziehende Gewalt”), the Tribunal will find Subparagraph 1, in which
the following appears—that is Page 1 of the translation, Paragraph 2:
“It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the
Government General an area of operations. However, in accordance
with the unpublished Führer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army shall be authorized to take
all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and
for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his
authority to the commanders-in-chief”—that, in the original
German, is Oberbefehlshaber—“of the army groups and armies.
Orders of that kind have priority over all other obligations and
over orders issued by civilian agencies.”
Your Honors will see that this executive power, with priority over
civilian agencies, was vested in the Commander-in-Chief of the Army with
authority to transfer it to commanders-in-chief of army groups or
armies—to the members of the group as defined in the Indictment.
Further on in the document, under Subparagraph 2(a), the document
states—that is the fourth paragraph, on Page 1 of the document:
“The area of operations of the Army created through the advance
of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the
neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as
possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right to
exercise the executive power”—vollziehende Gewalt—“in this
area, and may transfer his authority to the
commanders-in-chief”—Oberbefehlshaber—“of the army groups and
armies.”
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.
[_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in closed session to
consider matters of procedure, and there will therefore be no public
session tomorrow.
COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, I have just one more document dealing with
this subject of the structure of the group before passing on to the
substantive charges of criminality.
This document is C-78, which is already in evidence as Exhibit Number
USA-139. That will be found in Volume II of the document book. This
document is the official command invitation to participate in the
consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941, 8 days prior to
the attack on the Soviet Union. This is one of the meetings that was
referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits by Halder and Von
Brauchitsch, which were read into the record this morning. It is signed
by Colonel Schmundt, the chief Wehrmacht adjutant to Hitler, and is
dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941. It begins:
“In re: Conference Barbarossa”—that being the code for the
attack on the Soviet Union—“the Führer and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces has ordered reports on Barbarossa by the
commanders of army groups and armies and naval and air
commanders of equal rank.”
That is, as the Tribunal will see once again, the very group specified
in the bottom line of the chart on the wall, army groups, armies, naval,
and air commanders of similar rank.
This document likewise includes a list of the participants in this
conference, and I would just like in closing on this subject to run
through that list to point out who the participants in this conference
were and how closely they parallel the structure of the group as we find
it in the Indictment. The Tribunal will see that the list of
participants begins at the foot of Page 1 of the translation:
General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, who was the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and a member of the group; General Halder, who was Chief of the
Army Staff and a member of the group; then three subordinates, who were
not members of the group: Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt.
Navy: Captain Wagner, who was Chief of the Operations Staff, Operations
Division of the naval war staff, not a member of the group. On the air
side: General Milch, State Secretary and General Inspector of the Air
Force, again not a member of the group; Jeschonnek, Chief of the General
Staff of the Air Force and a member of the group; and two of his
assistants.
Passing over the page to the OKW, High Command of the Armed Forces, we
find Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group, were present,
with an assistant from the General Staff.
Then four officers from the office of the adjutant, who were not members
of the group.
Then we pass to the officers from the field commands: General Von
Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway, member of the group; General
Stumpff, Air Fleet 5, member of the group; Rundstedt, Reichenau,
Stülpnagel, Schober, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the
group.
Air Force: General Löhr, Air Fleet 4, member of the group. General Fromm
and General Udet were not members. One was director of the home forces,
commander of the home forces, and the other the Director General of
Equipment and Supply, G.A.F.
The Navy: Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the naval war
staff, and a member of the group; and a personal assistant who was not a
member; Carls, Naval Group North, a member of the group, likewise
Schmundt.
Then from the Army: Leeb, Busch, Küchler, all members of the group as
Oberbefehlshaber; Keller, a member of the group; Bock, Kluge, Strauss,
Guderian, Hoth, Kesselring, all members of the group.
And it will accordingly be seen that except for a few assisting officers
of relatively junior rank, all the participants in these consultations
were members of the group as defined in the Indictment and that in fact
the participants included almost all the members of the group who were
concerned in the impending operation against the Soviet Union.
I have now concluded the first part of the presentation, to wit, the
description of the General Staff and High Command group and its
composition and structure and general manner of functioning. I turn now
to the charges levelled against this group in the Indictment.
Appendix B charges that this group had a major responsibility for the
planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of the illegal wars set
forth in Counts One and Two and for the War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity detailed in Counts Three and Four.
In presenting the evidence in support of these charges we must keep in
mind that under the Charter the group may be declared criminal in
connection with any acts of which an individual defendant who was a
member of the group may be convicted.
The General Staff and High Command group is well represented among the
individual defendants in this case. Five of the individual defendants,
or one-quarter of the individuals here, are members of the group.
Taking them in the order in which they are listed, the first is the
Defendant Göring. Göring is a defendant in this case in numerous
capacities. He is a member of the General Staff and High Command group
by reason of having been Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force from the
time when the Air Force first came into the open and was officially
established until about 1 month prior to the end of war. During the last
month of the war he was replaced in this capacity by Von Greim, who
committed suicide shortly after his capture at the end of the war.
Göring is charged with crimes under all Counts of the Indictment.
The next listed defendant who is a member of the group is Keitel. He and
the remaining three defendants are, all four of them, in this case
primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all four of them
are professional soldiers or sailors.
Keitel was made chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, or
OKW, when the OKW was first set up in 1938 and he remained in that
capacity throughout the period in question. He held the rank of Field
Marshal throughout most of this period, and in addition to being the
Chief of the OKW, he was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and of
the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich. Keitel is charged
with crimes under all four Counts.
The Defendant Jodl was a career soldier. He was an Oberstleutnant, or
lieutenant colonel, when the Nazis came to power and ultimately attained
the rank of Generaloberst or colonel general. He became the Chief of the
Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht and continued in that capacity
throughout the war. He also is charged with crimes under all four
counts.
The other two defendants who are members of this group are on the
nautical side. The Defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior member of
the entire group, having been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy as
early as 1928. He attained the highest rank in the German Navy,
Grossadmiral. He retired from the Supreme Command of the Navy in 1943,
in January, and was replaced by Dönitz. Raeder is charged under Counts
One, Two, and Three of the Indictment.
The last of the five defendants, Dönitz, was a relatively junior officer
when the Nazis came to power. During the early years of the Nazi regime,
he specialized in submarine activities and was in command of the U-boat
arm when the war broke out. He rose steadily in the Navy and was chosen
to succeed Raeder when the latter retired in 1943. He then became
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and attained the rank of Grossadmiral.
When the German Armed Forces collapsed near the end of the war, Dönitz
succeeded Hitler as head of the German Government. He is charged under
Counts One, Two, and Three of the Indictment.
Four of these five defendants are reasonably typical of the group as a
whole. We must except the Defendant Göring who is primarily a Nazi Party
politician nourishing a hobby for aviation as a result of his career in
1914-18. But the other four made soldiering or sailoring their life
work. They collaborated with and joined in the most important adventures
of the Nazis, but they were not among the early Party members. They
differ in no essential respects from the other 125 members of the group.
They are, no doubt, abler men in certain respects. They rose to the
highest position in the German Armed Forces, and all but Jodl attained
highest rank.
But they will serve as excellent case studies and as representatives of
the group, and we can examine their ideas as they have expressed them in
these documents and their actions, with fair assurance that these ideas
and actions are characteristic of the other group members.
I turn first to the criminal activities of the General Staff and High
Command group under Counts One and Two of the Indictment, their
activities in planning and conspiring to wage illegal wars. Here my task
is largely one of recapitulation. The general body of proof relating to
aggressive war has already been laid before the Tribunal by my
colleague, Mr. Alderman, and the distinguished members of the British
Delegation.
Many of the documents to which they drew the Tribunal’s attention showed
that the defendants here who were members of the General Staff and High
Command group participated knowingly and wilfully in crimes under Counts
One and Two. I propose to avoid referring again to that evidence so far
as I possibly can, but I must refer to one or two of them again to focus
the Tribunal’s attention on the part which the General Staff and High
Command group played in aggressive War Crimes.
Now it is, of course, the normal function of a military staff to prepare
military plans. In peacetime, military staffs customarily concern
themselves with the preparation of plans for attack or defense based on
hypothetical contingencies. There is nothing criminal about carrying on
these exercises or preparing these plans. That is not what the
defendants and this group are charged with.
We will show that the group agreed with the Nazi objective of
aggrandizing Germany by threat of force or force itself, and that they
joined knowingly and enthusiastically in developing German armed might
for this purpose. They were advised in advance of the Nazi plans to
launch aggressive wars. They laid the military plans and directed the
initiation and carrying on of the wars. These things we believe to be
criminal under Article 6 of the Charter.
Aggressive war cannot be prepared or waged without intense activity on
the part of all branches of the armed forces, and particularly by the
high-ranking officers who control these forces. To the extent,
therefore, that German preparation for and the waging of aggressive war
are historical facts of common knowledge, or are already proved, it
necessarily follows that the General Staff and High Command group, and
the German Armed Forces, participated therein.
This is so notwithstanding the effort on the part of certain German
military leaders to insist that until the troops marched they lived in
an ivory tower unwilling to see the direction to which their work led.
The documents to which I will refer fully refute this, and moreover some
of these men now fully admit they participated gladly with the Nazis,
because the Nazi aims coincided closely with their own.
I think that the documents which Mr. Alderman read into the transcript
already adequately reflect the purposes and objectives of the German
General Staff and High Command group during the period prior to the
absorption of Austria. During this period occurred, as is charged in the
Indictment, firstly, secret rearmament, including the training of
military personnel, the production of war munitions, and building of an
air force; secondly, the Göring announcement on 10 March 1935 that
Germany was building a military air force; thirdly, the law for
compulsory military service of 16 March 1935, fixing the peacetime
strength of the German Army at 500,000; and finally, and fourthly, the
reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and the refortification of
that area.
Those particular facts do not require judicial proof. They are
historical facts, and likewise the fact that it would have been
impossible for the Nazis to achieve these things without co-operation by
the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things.
Mr. Alderman described to the Tribunal and read from numerous documents
which illustrate these events. He included numerous documents concerning
the secret expansion of the German Navy in violation of treaty
limitations, under the guidance of the Defendant Raeder.
He also read the secret Reich Defense Law, Document 2261-PS, already in
the record as Exhibit Number USA-24, which was adopted on the same day
that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provisions of the
Versailles Treaty. He read Von Blomberg’s plan, dated 2 May 1935, for
the reoccupation of the Rhineland—that is Document C-159, Exhibit
Number USA-54—and Blomberg’s orders under which the reoccupation was
actually carried out.
All these events, by obvious inference, required the closest
collaboration between the military leaders and the Nazis. I need not
labor that point further.
But it is worth while, I think, to re-examine one or two of the
documents which show the state of mind and the objectives of the German
military leaders during this early period. One document read from by Mr.
Alderman which reflects the viewpoint of the German Navy on the
opportunities which Nazism accorded for rearmament so that Germany could
achieve its objectives by force or threat of force is a memorandum
published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937, entitled _The
Fight of the Navy against Versailles_. That is Document C-156, Exhibit
Number USA-41. The Tribunal will recall that this memorandum, this
official publication of the German Navy, stated that only with the
assistance of Hitler had it been possible to create the conditions for
rearmament. The Defendant Jodl has stated this, better than I could
possibly put it, in his speech to the Gauleiter on 7 November 1943. That
is in Document L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34, from which Mr. Alderman
read at length.
Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the policies and
objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war. I
invite the Court’s attention to Document C-23, which is already in the
record as Exhibit Number USA-49. This consists of some notes made by
Admiral Carls of the German Navy in September 1938. These notes were
written by Admiral Carls by way of comment on a “Draft Study of Naval
Warfare against England” and they read in part as follows—that will be
found, Your Lordship, on Page 3 of the translation of Document C-23:
“There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.
“1. If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to
acquire a position as a world power guaranteed by its own
strength, she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but
also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.
“2. Both requirements can be fulfilled only in opposition to
Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world
powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful
means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore
forces upon us the necessity of making corresponding
preparations for war.
“3. War against England means at the same time war against the
Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, and a
large number of countries overseas; in fact, against one-half to
one-third of the whole world.
“It can be justified and have a chance of success only if it is
prepared economically as well as politically and militarily, and
waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the
ocean.”
Let us turn to the Air Force, having seen what the viewpoint of the Navy
was. Parts of the German Air Staff during this pre-war period were
developing even more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement
of the Reich. Document L-43, Exhibit Number GB-29, is a study prepared
by the chief of a branch of the General Staff of the Air Force called
the Organization Staff. The study in question is a recommendation for
the organization of the German Air Force in future years up to 1950. The
recommendation is based on certain assumptions, and one assumption was
that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany would be as shown on the map which
was attached as an enclosure to this study. There is only one copy of
the map available, Your Honor.
The Court will note on this map that Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included
within the borders of the Reich. The Court will also note, at Page 2 of
the Document itself—that is L-43—that the author envisaged the future
peacetime organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven group
commands, four of which lie within the borders of Germany proper at
Berlin, Braunschweig, Munich, and Königsberg, but the three others are
proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw.
Before turning to particular acts of aggression by the German Armed
Forces, I want to stress once more the basic agreement and harmony
between the Nazis and the German military leaders. Without this
agreement on objectives there might never have been a war. In this
connection I want to direct the Tribunal’s attention to an affidavit
Number 3 in Document Book I, which will be Document 3704-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-536, by Von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshal, Reich War
Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Forces until February
1938.
I will read the affidavit into the transcript:
“From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three essential
territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were
the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr, and Memel.
“I, myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers,
believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was
the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled
some day, if necessary by force of arms. About 90 percent of the
German people were of the same mind as the officers on the
Polish question. A war to wipe out the outrage perpetrated by
the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to
separated East Prussia, surrounded by Poland and Lithuania, was
regarded as a sacred duty, though a sad necessity. This was one
of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament
which began about 10 years before Hitler came to power and was
accentuated under Nazi rule.
“Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to
Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler, since he produced
the results which they desired. After this time some generals
began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of
his judgment. However, they failed as a group to take any
definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do
so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their
positions.
“Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, in January 1938, Hitler asked me to
recommend a successor. I suggested Göring, who was the ranking
officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and
diligence. I was not replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces by any officer, but Hitler personally took over my
function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a _chef
de bureau_. As far as I know, he was never named Commander of
the Armed Forces but was always merely a ‘chief of staff’ under
Hitler and in effect conducted the administrative functions of
the Ministry of War.
“At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler and therefore was
qualified to bring about a good understanding between Hitler and
the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself desired and had
furthered as Reichswehrminister and Reichskriegsminister. To do
the opposite would have led to a civil war, for at that time the
mass of the German people supported Hitler. Many are no longer
willing to admit this. But it is the truth.
“As far as I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler’s
measures. He became a willing tool in Hitler’s hands for every
one of his decisions.
“He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him.”
The statement by Von Blomberg which I have just read is paralleled
closely in some respects by an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz.
That is Affidavit Number 5 in Volume I of the document book Exhibit
Number USA-537. Blaskowitz commanded an army in the campaign against
Poland and the campaign against France. He subsequently took command of
Army Group G in southern France and at the end of the war he was in
command of Army Group H, which had retreated beyond the Rhine. The first
three paragraphs of his affidavit are substantially identical with the
first three paragraphs of Von Blomberg’s; and since they are available
in all languages, for expedition I will start reading with Paragraph 4,
where the affidavit is on a different subject:
“After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish
question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through
diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and
England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter
of fact, we felt that if political negotiations came to nothing
the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not
only with Poland herself but also with the Western Powers.
“When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to
prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war
came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion
was only strengthened by the Führer’s speech on 22 August 1939
at the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality.
Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members
of my staff who were engaged in preparations participated in
various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army
group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical,
strategical, and general nature were discussed as had to do with
my future position as Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Army during
the planned Polish campaign.
“During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno
operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army; and he, as well as the Führer,
visited my headquarters. In fact, it was common practice for
commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked
from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their
recommendations by telephone, teletype, or wireless, as well as
by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually
became advisers to the OKH in their own field, so that the
positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which
was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the
German Armed Forces.”
The Tribunal will note that the latter part of this affidavit, like
those of Halder and Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the
structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group
as described by the Prosecution. The Tribunal will also note that the
Von Blomberg affidavit and the first part of the Blaskowitz affidavit
make it clear beyond question that the military leaders of Germany knew
of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the expansion of the
Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties. The objectives which
they had in mind are obvious, and in these documents and affidavits we
see the Nazis and the generals in agreement upon the basic objective of
aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force and collaborating to
build up the armed might of Germany, in order to make possible the
subsequent acts of aggression. We turn now to an examination of those
particular acts of aggression which have already been described to the
Tribunal in general, with the particular purpose of noting participation
in these criminal acts by the General Staff and High Command group.
I may say, Your Lordship, that in going over this material, in order to
save time I propose to read from a very few documents. There are large
numbers of documents. Accordingly, when I cite them I think there is
probably no need for the Tribunal to try to find them in the documents
before it. Most of them are documents already in evidence and I propose
to cite them for purposes of recapitulation, without reading very much.
The Tribunal will recall that Mr. Alderman read into the transcript
portions of a document, 386-PS, Exhibit Number USA-25, consisting of
notes by Colonel Hossbach on a conference which was held in the German
Chancellery in Berlin on the 5th of November 1937. Hitler presided at
this conference, which was a small and highly secret one; and the only
other participants were the four principal military leaders and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Defendant Neurath. The four chief
leaders of the Armed Forces—Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister of
War, and the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the Armed
Forces: Von Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Göring for
the Air Force—were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of
Germany’s diplomatic and military policy and stated that the conquest of
Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary “for the
improvement of our military and political position” and “in order to
remove any threat from the flanks.”
The military and political advantages which were envisaged included the
acquisition of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the
release of troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new
divisions from the population of the conquered territories. Blomberg and
Von Fritsch joined in the discussion and Von Fritsch stated that he was
making a study to investigate “the possibilities of carrying out
operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration for the
conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications.”
The following spring, in March 1938, the German plans with respect to
Austria came to fruition. Mr. Alderman has already read into the record
portions of the diary kept by the Defendant Jodl. The portion here in
question, Document 1780-PS, Exhibit Number USA-72, of this diary shows
the participation of the German military leaders in the absorption of
Austria. As is shown by Jodl’s diary entry for 11 February 1938, the
Defendant Keitel and two other important generals were present at the
Obersalzberg meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler, and the purpose is
shown clearly by the entry which recites that:
“. . . in the evening and on 12 February General Keitel with
General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg,
Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under
heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours
Schuschnigg signs protocol.”
The General Von Reichenau referred to there was at that time the head
commander of Wehrkreis 7, one of the military districts into which
Germany was divided. He subsequently commanded the 10th Army in Poland
and the 6th Army in France and was a member of the group as defined in
the Indictment. Sperrle, who was in Spain during the civil war and then
commanded Luftflotte 3, the 3rd German Air Fleet, practically throughout
the war, was also a member of the group. Two days later Keitel and other
military leaders were preparing proposals to be submitted to Hitler
which would give the Austrian Government the impression that Germany
would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg agreement was ratified in
Vienna.
These proposals are embodied in a document dated February 14, 1938,
1775-PS, Exhibit Number USA-73, and signed by Keitel. Portions of
Keitel’s proposals to the Führer are as follows:
“1) Take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe.
No troop movements or redeployments.
“2) Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the
conclusion of military preparations against Austria: a) through
V-men”—that means agents—“in Austria, b) through our customs
personnel at the frontier, c) through travelling agents.”
Going down the document to 4), Keitel proposed:
“4) Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in
Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.
“5) Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of
the mountain troops near the frontier.
“6) Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14 in
the Service Command Headquarters VII in order to carry out
measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.”
As Jodl’s diary shows under the entry for 14 February, these deceptive
maneuvers were very effective and created in Austria the impression that
these threats of force might be expected to create. About a month later
armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg’s decision to hold a
plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in accordance with
the pre-existing plans for the invasion of Austria, these plans being
known as “Case Otto,” in order to absorb Austria and stop the
plebiscite. Jodl’s diary under the entry for 10 March 1938 tells us as
follows on Page 2:
“By surprise and without consulting his ministers Schuschnigg
ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring a
strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or
preparation.
“Führer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March
9 to 10, he calls for Göring. General Von Reichenau is called
back from Cairo Olympic Committee, General Von Schober is
ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is
with Gauleiter Bürckel in the Palatinate.”
The General Von Schober referred to succeeded General Von Reichenau as
Commander of Wehrkreis 7 and later was Commander of the 11th Army in
Russia and was a member of the group as defined in the Indictment.
The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of aggression
in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance.
This is the case simply because the invasion was precipitated by an
outside event, that being Schuschnigg’s order for the plebiscite. But,
although for this reason the element of deliberately timed planning was
lacking, the foregoing documents make clear the participation of the
military leaders at all stages.
At the small policy meeting of November 1937, when Hitler’s general
program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the only others
present were the four principal military leaders and the Foreign
Secretary.
In February Keitel, Reichenau, and Sperrle were all present to help
subject Schuschnigg to the heaviest military pressure. Keitel and others
immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of military
threat and deception to frighten the Austrian Government into acceptance
of the Schuschnigg protocol. When the actual invasion took place, it
was, of course, directed by the military leaders and executed by the
Armed Forces, and we are indebted to the Defendant Jodl for a clear
statement of why the German military leaders were only too delighted to
join with the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence.
In his lecture in November 1943 to the Gauleiter, which appears in
Document L-172, which is Exhibit Number USA-34, Jodl explained—this is
Page 5, Paragraph 3 of the translation:
“The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only
fulfillment of an old national aim, but also had the effect both
of re-inforcing our fighting strength and of materially
improving our strategic position. Whereas until then the
territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way
right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and
air base for the Allies, in particular Russia) Czechoslovakia
herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position
had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a
victim to any vigorous attack before effective aid from the West
could be expected to arrive.”
The foregoing extract from Jodl’s speech makes a good transition to the
case of Czechoslovakia—“Case Green,” or “Fall Grün.” I propose to treat
this very briefly. Mr. Alderman has covered the general story of German
aggression against Czechoslovakia very fully and the documents he read
from are full of evidence showing the knowing participation in this
venture by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the group.
Once again the Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and the
four principal military leaders, Document 386-PS, Exhibit Number USA-25,
may be called to mind. Austria and Czechoslovakia were then listed as
the most proximate victims of German aggression. After the absorption of
Austria, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the
Armed Forces lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia.
From this point on nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt
file, Document 388-PS, Exhibit Number USA-26, and Jodl’s diary, both of
which have been read from extensively. These two sources of information
go far, I think, to demolish what is urged in defense of the military
defendants and the General Staff and High Command group. They seek to
create the impression that the German generals were pure military
technicians, that they were not interested in or not informed about
political and diplomatic considerations—that they prepared plans for
military attack or defense on a purely hypothetical basis. They say all
this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not estimate
Hitler’s aggressive intentions, that they carried out politically
conceived orders like military automatons, with no idea whether the wars
they launched were aggressive or not.
When these arguments are made, Your Honor, may I respectfully suggest:
Read the Schmundt file and read General Jodl’s diary. They make it
abundantly clear that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between
the Nazis and the generals, that the military leaders were fully posted
on the aggressive intentions and fully informed on the political and
diplomatic developments, that, indeed, German generals had a strange
habit of turning up at diplomatic foregatherings; and indeed, if the
documents did not show these things, a moment’s thought must show them
to be true.
A highly successful program of conquest depends on armed might. It
cannot be executed by an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military
leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a
business to be left to soldiers alone; and this is no doubt true, but it
is equally true that an aggressive diplomacy is far too dangerous a
business to be conducted without military advice and support, and no
doubt some of the German generals had qualms about Hitler’s timing and
the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather
interestingly reflected in an entry from Jodl’s diary which has not yet
been read.
That is Document 1780-PS again—the entry for 10 August 1938. It appears
on Page 4 of the translation of 1780-PS:
“10 August 1938. The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air
Forces groups, Lieutenant Colonel Jeschonnek, and I are ordered
to the Berghof. After dinner the Führer makes a speech lasting
for almost 3 hours, in which he develops his political thoughts.
The subsequent attempts to draw the Führer’s attention to the
defects of our preparations, which are undertaken by a few
generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies
especially to the remarks of General Von Wietersheim, in which,
to top it off, he claims to quote from General Adams that the
Western fortifications can be held for only 3 weeks. The Führer
becomes very indignant and flares up, bursting into the remarks
that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for
anything. ‘I assure you, General, the position will be held not
only for 3 weeks, but for 3 years.’
“The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately
enough is held widely within the Army General Staff, is based on
various reasons. First of all, it”—the General Staff—“is
prejudiced by old memories and feels responsible also for
political decisions instead of obeying and executing its
military mission. That is certainly done with traditional
devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking, because in the
end they do not believe in the genius of the Führer. One does
perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows
downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense
political damage, for the opposition between the generals’
opinion and that of the Führer is common talk, but may also
constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no
doubt that this, as well as the morale of the people, will
encourage the Führer enormously when the right moment comes.”
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off now for 10 minutes?
[_A recess was taken._]
COL. TAYLOR: The extract from the Jodl diary from which I have just read
may indeed show that some of the German generals at that time were
cautious with respect to Germany’s ability to take on Poland and the
Western Powers simultaneously; but, nonetheless, the entry shows no lack
of sympathy with the Nazi aims for conquest. And there is no evidence in
Jodl’s diary or elsewhere that any substantial number of German generals
lacked sympathy with Hitler’s objectives. Furthermore, the top military
leaders always joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable
success in these years from 1938 to 1942.
So, if we are told that German military leaders did not know that German
policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive or based on force or threat
of force, let us remember that on 30 May 1938 Hitler signed a most
secret directive to Keitel—already in the transcript, Document 388-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-26—in which he stated clearly his unalterable
decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.
The Defendant Jodl was in no doubt what that directive meant. He noted
in his diary, the same day, that the Führer had stated his final
decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and had initiated military
preparation all along the line.
And the succeeding evidence, both in the Schmundt file and in the Jodl
diary, shows how these military preparations went forward. Numerous
examples of discussions, plans, and preparations during the last few
weeks before the Munich Pact, including discussions with Hungary and the
Hungarian General Staff, in which General Halder participated, are
contained in the Jodl diary and the later items in the Schmundt file.
The day the Munich Pact was signed, the 29th of September, Jodl noted in
his diary—Document 1780-PS—the entry for 29 September:
“The Munich Pact is signed, Czechoslovakia as a power is out.
Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2d and 7th
of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will
be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Führer and
his determination not to shun even a world war have again won
the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the
incredulous, the weak, and the doubtful people have been
converted and will remain that way.”
Plans for the liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia were made
soon after Munich. Ultimately the absorption of the remainder was
accomplished by diplomatic bullying, in which the Defendant Keitel
participated, for the usual purpose of demonstrating that German armed
might was ready to enforce the threats—as shown by two documents
already in, and which I need not read: Document 2802-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-117; and 2798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-118.
And once again the Defendant Jodl, in his 1943 lecture, Document L-172,
Exhibit Number USA-34, tells us clearly and in one sentence why the
objective of eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of
the German military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazi:
“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of
1938 and the spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia
rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that
it then became possible to consider the Polish problem on the
basis of more or less favorable strategic premises.”
And this serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg and Blaskowitz,
from which I have already read. The whole group of German staff and
front officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor “would
have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms,” they told
us. “Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired,” they
have told us.
I turn now to Poland. The German attack on Poland is a particularly
interesting one from the standpoint of the General Staff and High
Command. The documents which show the aggressive nature of the attack
have already been introduced by Colonel Griffith-Jones of the British
Delegation. I propose to approach it from a slightly different angle,
inasmuch as these documents serve as an excellent case study of the
functioning of the General Staff and High Command group as defined in
the Indictment.
This attack was carefully timed and planned, and in the documents one
can observe the staff work step by step. Colonel Griffith-Jones read
from a series of directives from Hitler and Keitel, embodied in Document
C-120, Exhibit Number GB-1, involving “Fall Weiss”, which was the code
word for the plan of attack on Poland. That is a whole series of
documents, and the series starts—C-120—with a reissuance of a document
called, “Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed
Forces.”
We have encountered this periodically reissued directive previously.
That was a sort of form for standing instructions to the Armed Forces
laying out what their tasks during the coming period would be.
In essence these directives are: Firstly, statements of what the Armed
Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and
diplomatic policies and developments and; secondly, indications of what
should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military
tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in
fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and they strongly
demonstrate the mutual interdependence of aggressive diplomacy and
military planning.
Note the limited distribution of these documents, early in April 1939,
in which the preparation of the plans for the Polish war is ordered.
Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: One goes to Brauchitsch at
OKH; one to Raeder at OKM; one to Göring at OKL; and two to Warlimont in
the planning branch of OKW.
Hitler lays down that the plans must be capable of execution by 1
September 1939; and, as we all remember, that target date was adhered
to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly brought out
by a part of one of these documents which has not previously been read;
that is Document C-120, Subdivision D, and it is to be found at Page 4.
The sub-heading is “Political Requirements and Aims”:
“German relations with Poland continue to be based on the
principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however,
change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same
principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards
Germany, a final settlement might become necessary,
notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.
“The aim, then, will be to destroy Polish military strength and
create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements
of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed
a part of the Reich territory at the outbreak of the conflict,
at the latest.
“The political leadership considers it its task in this case to
isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to
Poland only.
“The development of increasing internal crises in France and the
resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in
the not too distant future.
“Intervention by Russia, so far as she would be able to do this,
cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this
would imply Poland’s destruction by Bolshevism.
“The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by
German military exigencies.
“On the German side Hungary cannot be considered a certain ally.
Italy’s attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis.”
Sub-heading 2, “Military Conclusions”:
“The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed
Forces will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the
Western Democracies. Fall Weiss constitutes only a precautionary
complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in
any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military
settlement with the Western opponents.
“The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even
after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the
war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.
“The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be
taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea
coast, as well as the air over them.”
Let no one suggest that these are hypothetical plans or that the General
Staff and High Command group did not know what was in prospect. The
plans show on their face that they are no war game. But, to clinch this
point, let us refer briefly to Mr. Alderman’s so-called “pin-up”
document on Poland, Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. These are
Schmundt’s notes on the conference in Hitler’s study at the Reich
Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939, when Hitler announced—and I quote
just one sentence:
“There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are
left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity.”
Note who was present besides Hitler and a few military aides: The
Defendant Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; the Defendant
Raeder, Navy; the Defendant Keitel, OKW; Von Brauchitsch,
Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Colonel General Milch, who was State
Secretary of the Air Ministry and Inspector General of the Luftwaffe;
General Bodenschatz, Göring’s personal assistant; Rear Admiral
Schniewind, Chief of the naval war staff; Colonel Jeschonnek, Chief of
the Air Staff; Colonel Warlimont, Planning Staff. All of them, except
Milch, Bodenschatz, and the adjutants, are members of the group.
So far these documents have shown us the initial and general planning of
the attack on Poland. These general plans, however, had to be checked,
corrected, and perfected by the field commanders who were to carry out
the attack.
I offer Document C-142, which will be Exhibit Number USA-538. This
document was issued in the middle of June 1939, and in this document Von
Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, passed on the general
outlines of the plan for the attack on Poland to the field
commanders-in-chief—to the Oberbefehlshaber of army groups and
armies—so that the field commanders could work out the actual
preparation and deployment of troops in accordance with the plans. This
is from Page 1 of the translation, and I quote:
“The object of the operation is to destroy the Polish Armed
Forces. High policy demands that the war should be begun by
heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. The
intention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is to prevent a
regular mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army by a
surprise invasion of Polish territory and to destroy . . . the
mass of the Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of
the Vistula-Narev Line.”
I skip to the next paragraph:
“The army group commands and the army commands will make their
preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy. There will
be alterations necessary if surprise should have to be
abandoned. These will have to be developed simply and quickly on
the same basis; they are to be prepared mentally to such an
extent that in case of an order from the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army they can be carried out quickly.”
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that document?
COL. TAYLOR: The date of that document is the middle of June 1939; I
believe it is the 15th or 14th of June 1939. The date is on the
original.
The next document is 2327-PS, which will be Exhibit Number USA-539. It
is signed by Blaskowitz. It is dated 14 June 1939, and it shows us an
Oberbefehlshaber at work in the field planning an attack. Blaskowitz at
that time was Commander of the 3rd Army Group and he became
Commander-in-Chief of the German 8th Army during the Polish campaign. I
read some extracts from this document found on Page 1 of the
translation:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has ordered the working out
of a plan of deployment against Poland which takes into account
the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war
by surprise and for quick success.
“The order of deployment by the High Command of the Army, known
as Fall Weiss, authorizes the 3rd Army Group (in Fall Weiss 8th
Army headquarters) to give necessary directions and orders to
all commands subordinated to it for Fall Weiss.”
I skip to Paragraph 7 on Page 1:
“The whole correspondence on Fall Weiss has to be conducted
under the classification ‘top secret.’ This is to be disregarded
only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the chief
of the responsible command, is harmless in every way—even in
connection with other documents.
“For the middle of July a conference is planned where details of
the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered
later on. Special requests are to be communicated to 3rd Army
Group before 10 July.”
That is signed, “The Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army Group, F.
Blaskowitz.”
I skip to Page 2 to read one further extract under the title at the top
of Page 2 of the translation, “Aims of Operation Fall Weiss”:
“The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish
mobilization, is to be opened by surprise with forces which are
for the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in the
neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the
Polish frontier guards and surprise, both of which can be
expected with certainty, are to be maintained by quickly
bringing up other parts of the Army as well as by counteracting
the marching up of the Polish Army.
“Accordingly, all units have to keep the initiative against the
foe by quick action and ruthless attacks.”
Finally, a week before the actual attack on Poland, and when all the
military plans are laid, we find the group as defined in the Indictment
all in one place, in fact, all in one room. On August 23 the
Oberbefehlshaber assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler’s explanation
of the timing of the attack and for political and diplomatic orientation
from the head of the State. This speech has already been read from at
length. It is found in Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29; and I
pass over it, except to note and emphasize that it is addressed to the
very group defined in the Indictment as the General Staff and High
Command group. It is, incidentally, the second of the two examples
referred to in the affidavits by Halder and Brauchitsch, Numbers 1 and
2, which I read previously.
We have now come to the point where Germany actually launched the war.
Within a few weeks, and before any important action on the Western
Front, Poland was overrun and conquered; German losses were
insignificant.
The three principal territorial questions mentioned in the Blomberg and
Blaskowitz affidavits were all solved. The Rhineland had been reoccupied
and fortified; Memel was annexed; the Polish Corridor had been annexed.
And a good deal more, too: Austria, a part of the Reich; Czechoslovakia
occupied; all of western Poland in German hands. Germany was superior in
arms and in experience to her Western enemies, France and England.
Then came the 3 black years of the war, 1939, 1940, and 1941, when
German armed might swung like a great scythe from north to south to
east: Norway and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Italy became an
ally of Germany; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia and Greece; Romania,
Hungary, and Bulgaria became allies; the western part of the Soviet
Union overrun.
I would like to deal as a whole with this period from the fall of Poland
in October 1939 to the attack against the Soviet Union in June of 1941.
In this period occurred the aggressive wars in violation of treaties, as
charged in the Indictment, against Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece.
I cannot improve on or add much to the presentation of these matters by
the British Delegation. From the standpoint of proving Crimes against
Peace, our case is complete. But I would like to review this period
briefly from the military standpoint and view it as the German military
leaders viewed it. And of one thing we may be sure: neither the Nazis
nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a series of
violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms of a war, a
war of conquest, a war for the conquest of Europe. Neutrality, treaties,
non-aggression pacts—these were not the major considerations. They were
annoying obstacles, and devices had to be formed and excuses
manufactured to fit the circumstances.
Von Blomberg has told us in his affidavit, which I have read, that after
1939 some generals began to condemn Hitler’s methods and lost confidence
in his judgment. Which particular Hitler methods some of the generals
condemned is not stated, but I think the Tribunal will not hear any
substantial evidence that many of the generals condemned the march of
conquest during the years 1939 to 1941. In fact the evidence is rather
that most of the generals were having the time of their lives during
those years.
Six weeks after the outbreak of war and upon the successful termination
of the Polish campaign, 9 October 1939, there was issued a memorandum
and directive for the conduct of the war in the West. This is Document
Number L-52, and becomes Exhibit Number USA-540. It is not signed. It
was distributed only to the four service chiefs, Keitel, Brauchitsch,
Göring, and Raeder. From the wording there is every indication that it
was issued by Hitler. I will read the pertinent extracts, starting with
Page 2 of the document, about two-thirds of the way down in the first
paragraph, starting with the words, “The aim of the Anglo-French conduct
of war”:
“The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or
disintegrate the 80-million-state”—meaning Germany—“again so
that in this manner the European equilibrium, in other words,
the balance of power which serves their ends, may be restored.
This battle, therefore, will have to be fought out by the German
people one way or another. Nevertheless, the very great
successes of the first month of the war could serve, in the
event of an immediate signing of peace, to strengthen the Reich
psychologically and materially to such an extent that from the
German viewpoint there would be no objection to ending the war
immediately, insofar as the present achievement with arms is not
jeopardized by the peace treaty.
“It is not the object of this memorandum to study the
possibilities in this direction, or even to take them into
consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively
to the other case: the necessity to continue the fight, the
object of which, as already stressed, consists, insofar as the
enemy is concerned, in the dissolution or destruction of the
German Reich. In opposition to this the German war aim is the
final military dispatch of the West, that is, destruction of the
power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to
oppose the state consolidation and further development of the
German people in Europe. As far as the outside world is
concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo
various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological
point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and
remains the destruction of our Western enemies.”
I now pass to Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 2, and the subheading
“Reasons”:
“The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first
of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without
any hope of realization; that is to say, Germany is able to
enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a
few covering troops in the East. The remaining European states
are neutral either because they fear for their own fates or lack
interest in the conflict as such or are interested in a certain
outcome of the war, which prevents them from taking part at all,
or at any rate too soon. The following is to be, firmly borne in
mind. . . .”
At this point I interpolate that here follows a succession of references
to countries, and I pass to Belgium and Holland at the foot of Page 3:
“Belgium and Holland: Both countries are interested in
preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding
prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of
their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the
securing of their interior economy, even of their very life,
depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore in
their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions both
countries are dependent upon the West in the highest degree. If
England and France promise themselves a successful result at the
price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position
to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without
covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality,
they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality.
Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch
neutrality, time is not a factor which might promise a favorable
development for Germany.”
The final paragraph to be read is as follows:
“The Nordic States: Provided no completely unforeseen factors
appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed.
The continuation of German trade with these countries appears
possible even in a war of long duration.”
Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, our group as defined in the
Indictment—the Oberbefehlshaber—again assembled, as found in Document
Number 789-PS, already in the record as Exhibit Number USA-23, and heard
from Hitler much of what he had said previously to the four service
chiefs. This speech, part of which is already in the record, contains
other portions, not previously read, which are now of interest; and the
first extract which I would like to read is on Page 2 of the
translation, about half-way down in Paragraph 1, starting with the
words, “For the first time in history we have to fight only on one front
. . .” I quote:
“For the first time in history we have to fight only on one
front; the other front is at present free. But no one can know
how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time
whether I should strike first in the East and then in the West.
In principle I did not organize the Armed Forces in order not to
strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Sooner or later
I wanted to solve the problem. Inevitably it was decided that
the East was to be annihilated first. If the Polish war was won
so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our Armed Forces.
The most glorious experience in our history. Unexpectedly small
expenditures of men and material. Now the Eastern front is held
by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed
previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The
opponent in the West lies behind his fortifications. There is no
possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question
is: How long can we endure this situation?”
Passing to Page 3 of that document, line 3:
“Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is
favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so any more.”
The final passage on Page 4 of the translation, in the long paragraph
about half-way down, beginning, “England cannot live without its
imports. We can feed . . .”: