DR. NELTE: When an agreement is made between two different organizations

such as the RSHA on the one hand and, shall we say, the OKH on the

other, then the office entrusted with the execution of that which has

been agreed upon must be informed thereof in a form known as an “order”

in military parlance. Is such an order known to you as originating from

the OKW?

OHLENDORF: Please understand that no such orders from the War Office or

the OKW were received by me. I should have had only orders or wishes

expressed by the Army.

DR. NELTE: By the Army or by your superior command?

OHLENDORF: No. I am speaking now . . . If I think of the Armed Forces

. . .

DR. NELTE: Therefore, there was no connection of any kind between you,

as leader of the Einsatzgruppe, and the OKW as such?

OHLENDORF: No immediate connection. I know very well that individual

reports reached the OKW through official channels.

DR. NELTE: If you know that, can you tell me to which office? Because,

after all, OKW covered a great many.

OHLENDORF: I should assume they eventually reached Canaris.

DR. NELTE: I thank you.

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): Witness, in your

position as Chief of the SD, you will probably have some idea about the

trustworthiness of the members of the Reich Cabinet and about the

secrecy in which very important matters were kept. Please answer this

question: whether the order which has been discussed today regarding the

liquidations, in your opinion, originated in the Reich Cabinet and

whether this order, in your opinion, was made known to the individual

members of the Reich Cabinet?

OHLENDORF: I am convinced that both questions are to be answered in the

negative.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to ask the witness a few more questions on

behalf of the Defendant Speer, since counsel for the Defendant Speer is

absent and I, as a colleague, have taken over this task.

Witness, is it known to you that the Defendant Speer, contrary to

Hitler’s orders, took measures to prevent the destruction of industrial

and other installations?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: That these measures also extended beyond the interior of

Germany to the then still-occupied area of Upper Silesia, _et alia_?

OHLENDORF: I believe that the date when I learned about this was so late

that, although applicable to some small areas in the West, it no longer

applied to any area in the East.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: One more question which you might perhaps know about. Do

you know that the Defendant Speer prepared an attempt on Hitler’s life

in the middle of February of this year?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know that Speer undertook to turn Himmler over to

the Allies so that he could be called to account and possibly clear

others who were innocent?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: This question will perhaps be answered in the affirmative

by another witness.

Are you well informed regarding the events of the 20th of July?

OHLENDORF: To a considerable extent.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it known to you that the circle of plotters of 20 July

had also planned to keep the Defendant Speer as head of his Ministry?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know any details about that?

OHLENDORF: From the participants in the plot of the 20th of July I

merely learned that they had considered him, on a drafted organizational

scheme, as continuing in his post as head of the armament ministry.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you believe that this intention of the

plotters of the 20th of July was due to the fact that the Defendant

Speer, in view of his activities, was considered not only in these

circles but even elsewhere merely as an expert and not as a politician?

OHLENDORF: The question is very hard to answer. It is very difficult not

to be considered a politician if one has been so closely connected with

those authorities of the Reich who made the final political decisions

and has perhaps been an essential contributor to the suggestions and

proposals from which the decisions evolved. On the other hand, Minister

Speer was known or believed not to be purely a politician.

DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for the Gestapo): Witness, do you know that

in April 1933 the Gestapo was created in Prussia?

OHLENDORF: I do not know the month, but I do know the year.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know what was the purpose of creating this

institution?

OHLENDORF: To fight political opponents potentially dangerous to the

State.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know how this institution, which was intended

originally for Prussia only, was extended to the rest of the Reich?

OHLENDORF: Either in 1933 or in 1934 the institution of the Political

Police was created in all of the Länder. These Political Police agencies

were officially subordinated in 1934, as far as I remember, to the

Reichsführer SS as Political Police Chief of the Länder. The Prussian

Secret State Police Office represented the first central headquarters.

After the creation of the Main Office of the Security Police the command

tasks were delegated by Himmler to Heydrich who carried them out through

the Main Office of the Security Police.

DR. MERKEL: Who created and instituted the Gestapo in the individual

Länder?

OHLENDORF: I cannot give you an answer to this question.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know whether before 1933, in the area which then

constituted the Reich, there had existed a similar institution, a

political police force?

OHLENDORF: Yes, that existed, as far as I remember, at Police

headquarters in Berlin, for instance; and I believe it was Department

IA. At any rate political police organizations did exist.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about the sphere of activities of this

organization which existed before 1933?

OHLENDORF: Yes. They were the same; at any rate their activities were

fundamentally the same.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about the personnel of the Gestapo,

which on the whole, was a new institution and consequently not

constituted merely by a transfer of personnel already in existence?

OHLENDORF: When I became acquainted with the State Police it was

certainly true that the nucleus of expert personnel had been taken from

the Criminal Police and the majority of the leading men in the State

Police offices, that is, in the regional offices of the State Police,

had risen from the ranks of the civil administration, possibly also from

the Police administrations of the various Länder

(Länderpolizeiverwaltungen), and that they had, in part, even been

detailed from the civil administration. The same was also true for the

experts within Amt IV—the Gestapo.

DR. MERKEL: You say the majority of the officials were detailed?

OHLENDORF: I did not say the majority were detailed, but I said “in

part.”

DR. MERKEL: Detailed in part? Was it possible for any of these members

of the Gestapo to resist being taken over into the Gestapo if they did

not wish it, or was it not?

OHLENDORF: I would not affirm that a definite resistance was possible.

Some of them might have succeeded, by cunning, in avoiding it had they

not wanted to go. But if one was detailed to such an office from the

civil administration, then, as an official, one simply had to obey. As

an official one had to.

DR. MERKEL: The members of the Gestapo evidently consisted almost

exclusively, or exclusively, of civil service officials? Do you know

anything about that?

OHLENDORF: That probably was no longer the case during the war. But as a

rule it should be assumed that they were officials insofar as the

specialists were concerned. Some of them, of course, while in training,

were not yet officials and others again were engaged merely as employees

or, especially, as assistants.

DR. MERKEL: Can you tell me the approximate number of the members of the

Gestapo towards the end of the war?

OHLENDORF: I estimate the total organization of the Gestapo, including

the regional offices and the occupied territories, at about 30,000.

DR. MERKEL: There was therefore within the Gestapo a considerable

percentage of officials who were merely administrative officials and had

nothing to do with operational functions?

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

DR. MERKEL: And what was the percentage of these administrative

officials who performed purely administrative functions?

OHLENDORF: We must, in the first instance, take into consideration that

this number included the assistants, as well as the women; and I cannot

give you any figures off hand. But it is certain that a proportion of

one specialist to three or four persons not employed in a functional

capacity could not be considered excessive.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about who was responsible for the

direction and administration of the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: It was Obergruppenführer Pohl.

DR. MERKEL: Did or did not the Gestapo have anything to do with the

direction and with the administration of the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: According to my knowledge, not.

DR. MERKEL: Therefore, no members of the Gestapo were active or in any

way involved in the measures carried out in the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: As far as I could judge from a distance, only investigating

officials of the State Police were active in the concentration camps.

DR. MERKEL: Did the Gestapo in any way participate in the mass

executions undertaken by your Einsatzgruppe which you described this

morning?

OHLENDORF: Only to the same extent as every other person present in the

Einsatzgruppe.

DR. MERKEL: I ask the Tribunal to give me the opportunity of questioning

this witness again after the return of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner,

since I am obliged to rely exclusively on information received from

Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that the Tribunal will be prepared to allow you

to put further questions at a later stage.

DR. MERKEL: Thank you.

PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for the General Staff and the High

Command of the German Armed Forces): Witness, you mentioned the

negotiations which took place in the OKW, which later led to an

agreement between OKW and OKH on the one side, and the Reich Security

Main Office (RSHA) on the other. I am interested in this point: Can you

assert that during the negotiations for this agreement there was mention

of the extermination and the killing of Jews?

OHLENDORF: I cannot say anything concrete on this particular subject,

but I do not believe it.

DR. EXNER: You do not believe it?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. EXNER: In addition you have told us that the Commanding General of

the 11th Army knew about the liquidations, and I should like to ask you:

Do you know anything regarding the commanding generals of the other

armies?

OHLENDORF: In general they must have been informed through the speech of

the Führer before the beginning of the Russian campaign.

DR. EXNER: That is a conclusion that you have drawn?

OHLENDORF: No, it is not a conclusion that I have drawn; it is merely a

report on the contents of the speech which, according to Himmler’s

statement, Hitler had made to the commanding generals.

DR. EXNER: Now you have spoken about directives given by the Commanding

General of the 11th Army. What kind of directives were they?

OHLENDORF: I first spoke about the commanding general in the Nikolaiev

incident, that is, about the order given at that time that the

liquidations should take place 200 kilometers away from the headquarters

of the High Command of the army. The second time, I did not speak about

the commanding general of the army but about the High Command of the

army at Simferopol, because I cannot say, with any certainty, who had

requested the competent Einsatzkommando at Simferopol to speed up the

liquidations.

DR. EXNER: That is the very question I should like to put to you: With

whom in the 11th Army did you negotiate at that time?

OHLENDORF: I, personally, did not negotiate at all with anyone on this

subject, as I was not the person directly concerned with these matters;

but the High Command of the Army negotiated with the competent local

Einsatzkommando either through the responsible army office, which at all

times was in touch with the Einsatzkommandos, namely the I-C or the

I-CAO, or else through the staff of the OQ.

DR. EXNER: Who gave you orders for the advance?

OHLENDORF: The orders for the advance came, as a rule, from the Chief of

Staff.

DR. EXNER: From the Chief of Staff? The Commanding General of the army

at the time referred to was Von Manstein. In this case was there ever an

order signed by Von Manstein?

OHLENDORF: I cannot remember any such order; but when the advance was

being discussed there were oral consultations with Von Manstein, the

Chief of Staff, and me.

DR. EXNER: When the advance was being discussed?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. EXNER: You said that the Army was opposed to these liquidations. Can

you state how this became evident?

OHLENDORF: Not the Army, but the leaders were inwardly opposed to the

liquidations.

DR. EXNER: Yes; but I mean, how did you recognize that fact?

OHLENDORF: In our conversations. Not only the leaders of the Army were

opposed to the liquidations but also most of those who had to carry them

out.

DR. EXNER: I thank you.

PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Were you

acquainted with the personal records on Reichsbank President Schacht

kept in your department?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. KRAUS: Do you know why, after the 20th of July 1944, the former

Reichsbank President Schacht was arrested and interned in a

concentration camp?

OHLENDORF: Probably the occasion of the 20th of July was favorable also

for the conviction at last of Reichsbank President Schacht, who was

known to be inimical to the Party, inasmuch as by means of witnesses or

other methods he could be brought to trial in connection with the events

of the 20th of July.

DR. KRAUS: Then Defendant Schacht was known to your people as being

inimical to the Party?

OHLENDORF: Yes, at least from 1937-1938 on.

DR. KRAUS: Since the year 1937 or 1938? And you also suspected him of

participating in Putsche?

OHLENDORF: Personally I did not suspect this, because I was not

concerned with these matters at all. He was mainly under suspicion

because of his well-known enmity. But, as far as I know, this suspicion

was never confirmed.

DR. KRAUS: Can you tell me, who caused Schacht to be arrested?

OHLENDORF: That I cannot say.

DR. KRAUS: Then you don’t know whether the arrest was ordered by the

Führer, by Himmler, or by some subordinate authority.

OHLENDORF: I don’t think the order could possibly have come from any

subordinate authority.

DR. KRAUS: Then you assume that it had been ordered by the Führer?

OHLENDORF: At least by Himmler.

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Witness, if I

understood you correctly, you said: At the beginning of 1933, after the

seizure of power by Hitler, the Gestapo was created in Prussia; but

before that time there had already existed in Prussia an organization

with similar tasks, for instance at the Police headquarters in Berlin

with Department IA, with the difference that this organization was

opposed to National Socialism, whereas now the contrary is true. But its

task was likewise to keep political opponents under observation and if

need be to arrest them, and thus to protect the State from these

political opponents.

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: You said further that in 1933, after the seizure of power,

a political police with identical tasks was also instituted in all the

other Länder.

OHLENDORF: Yes, in the year 1933-1934.

DR. STAHMER: This political police, which existed in the various Länder,

was then centralized in 1934 and its direction handed over to Himmler?

OHLENDORF: It was not at first centralized, but Himmler did become Chief

of Police of all the Länder.

DR. STAHMER: Now one more question. Did the Prussian Gestapo play a

leading role, as far as the other Länder were concerned, as early as

1933 or only after Himmler took over the leadership in 1934?

OHLENDORF: I do not believe that the Prussian State Police, which after

all was under the leadership of Reich Marshal Göring, became, at that

time, the competent authority for the other Länder as well.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): I am

speaking as the representative of the counsel for Defendant Grossadmiral

Raeder.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you just mentioned a speech of the

Führer before the army commanders, in which the Führer is supposed to

have given instructions to the commanders regarding the liquidation of

Jews. Which conference do you mean?

OHLENDORF: A conference which must have taken place shortly before the

Russian campaign with the commanders of the army groups and the armies

at the Führer’s quarters.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were the commanders of the various branches

of the Armed Forces absent?

OHLENDORF: I do not know that.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were you yourself present at this

conference?

OHLENDORF: No. I have recounted this conference on the basis of a

conversation I had with Himmler.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did this conversation with Himmler take

place in a large circle of people or was it a private conversation?

OHLENDORF: It was a private conversation.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did you have the impression that Himmler

stated facts, or do you consider it possible that he wished to encourage

you in your difficult task?

OHLENDORF: No. The conversation took place much, much later and did not

spring from such motives, but from resentment at the attitude of certain

generals of the Armed Forces. Himmler wanted to say that these generals

of the Armed Forces could not disassociate themselves from the events

that had taken place, as they were just as responsible as all the rest.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And when did this conversation with Himmler

take place?

OHLENDORF: In May 1945, at Flensburg.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Thank you.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, with regard to the command channels at the

disposal of the RSHA for the execution of its orders and measures and

for the transmission of these orders to tactical organizations, such as

the SD and the concentration camps, did the RSHA possess its own command

channels or did it rely on the channels of the Leadership Corps

organization, that is, were these orders forwarded via the Gauleitung

and the Kreisleitung?

OHLENDORF: I know nothing about it. I consider it entirely out of the

question.

DR. SERVATIUS: You consider it entirely out of the question that the

Gauleitung and the Kreisleitung had been informed? How was it, for

instance . . .

OHLENDORF: One moment, please. You asked me whether these orders passed

through these channels. You did not ask me whether they had been

informed.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were these offices informed of the orders?

OHLENDORF: The inspectors, the Gestapo leaders, and the SD leaders were

all considered as police or political agents (Referenten) of the

Gauleiter or the Reichsstatthalter; and these office chiefs had to

report to the Gauleiter on their respective fields of activity. To what

extent this was done, I am unable to judge. It depends on the activities

and on the degree of co-operation between the Gauleiter and these

offices, but in any case it is inconceivable that the State Police could

carry on these activities for any length of time without the knowledge

of the responsible Party organizations.

DR. SERVATIUS: Does this also hold for reports from lower to higher

units? For the activities of the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: The concentration camps were not subordinate to the State

Police. I am convinced, since these were purely affairs of the Reich,

that there was no such close connection between the Gauleiter and the

concentration camps as there was between the Gauleiter and the permanent

activities of the State Police.

DR. SERVATIUS: I also represent the Defendant Sauckel. Do you know of

the impressment of foreign workers by the SS? Foreign workers who, as a

matter of fact, came from the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: Only superficially.

HERR BABEL: Witness, this morning you mentioned the figures of 3,000 and

30,000 for the Security Service. I should now like to know for certain

how these figures are to be understood. Do the 3,000 members of the SD

whom you mentioned this morning represent the entire personnel of the SD

at that time, or did they represent only those members who were employed

in the field with the mobile units also mentioned by you this morning?

OHLENDORF: No, it represented the total personnel including employees

and women auxiliaries.

HERR BABEL: Including employees and women auxiliaries. And the 30,000

which we also discussed—were they honorary members (ehrenamtliche

Mitglieder) employed only in the interior of Germany?

OHLENDORF: Yes; as a rule, in any case.

HERR BABEL: And who, for the most part, belonged neither to the SS nor

to the Party?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

HERR BABEL: How large were the mobile units of the SD employed in these

executions?

OHLENDORF: The SD had no mobile units but rather only individual members

of the SD detailed to outside organizations. The SD, as a separate

entity, did not act independently anywhere.

HERR BABEL: In your opinion and judging by your own experience, how many

of these detailed personnel were there?

OHLENDORF: The figure was quite small.

HERR BABEL: Will you please give an approximate figure.

OHLENDORF: I place the figure at an average of about two to three SD

experts per Einsatzkommando.

HERR BABEL: I should like to know the total strength of the SS. Do you

know anything about that?

OHLENDORF: No, I have no idea at all.

HERR BABEL: No idea at all. Did any units of the Waffen-SS and other

subordinate SS groups in any way participate in the Einsatzgruppen?

OHLENDORF: As I said this morning, in each Einsatzgruppe there was, or

rather there should have been, one company of Waffen-SS.

HERR BABEL: One company. And what, at that time, was the exact strength

of one company?

OHLENDORF: I do not know about the Waffen-SS serving with the other

Einsatzgruppen, but I estimate that my particular group employed

approximately 100 men of the Waffen-SS.

HERR BABEL: Were Death’s-Head Units (Totenkopf Verbände) also employed?

OHLENDORF: No.

HERR BABEL: Was the Adolf Hitler Bodyguard (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler)

employed in any fashion?

OHLENDORF: That was purely a matter of chance. I cannot name a single

formation from which these Waffen-SS had been taken.

HERR BABEL: Another question that was touched upon this morning: When

was the SD created and what, at first, were its duties?

OHLENDORF: As far as I know, the SD was created in 1932.

HERR BABEL: And what were its duties at that time?

OHLENDORF: It constituted, so to speak, the Intelligence Corps of the

Party. They were supposed to give information about Party opponents and,

if necessary, to thwart them.

HERR BABEL: Did these duties change in the course of time, and, if so,

when?

OHLENDORF: Yes, after the seizure of power, the combatting of political

opponents was, in certain spheres, one of their principal duties and

supplying the required information on certain individuals was considered

an important factor. At that time an intelligence service, in the true

sense of the word, did not yet exist; the real evolution of the SD

machine within the field of home intelligence service only followed as

from 1936-1937. From that time on the work changed from the observation

of individuals to technical matters. With the 1939 reorganization, when

the Main Office of the SD was dissolved, the handling of political

opponents was completely eliminated from the work of the SD, which work

was thereafter limited to technical matters. Its duties now consisted in

observing the effects of the measures carried out by the leading

authorities of the Reich and the Länder and in determining how the

circles affected reacted to them; in addition, they had to find out what

the moods and attitude of the people and its various classes of society

were during the course of the war. It was, as a matter of fact, the only

authority offering criticism within the Reich and reporting facts from

an objective point of view to top levels. It should also be pointed out

that the Party did not, at any stage, legitimize this work until 1945.

The only legitimation for this critical work came from Reich Marshal

Göring, and that only after the war, for he could in this way draw the

attention of the other departments, at meetings of the Reich Defense

Council, to faulty developments. This expert critical work became, in

fact, after 1939 the main function of the SD home intelligence service.

HERR BABEL: Another question. To what extent were units of the SD

employed for duty in the concentration camps?

OHLENDORF: I would ask you at all times to distinguish between the SD

home service (SD-Inland) with the head office of Amt III, and the SD

service board (SD-Ausland). I cannot give you any information about the

SD service board; but the chief, Schellenberg, is present in this

courthouse. As far as Amt III is concerned, I know of no single case in

which the SD home service had representatives or anything at all to do

with concentration camps.

HERR BABEL: Now, a question concerning you personally. From whom did you

receive your orders for the liquidation of the Jews and so forth? And in

what form?

OHLENDORF: My duty was not the task of liquidation, but I did head the

staff which directed the Einsatzkommandos in the field, and the

Einsatzkommandos themselves had already received this order in Berlin on

the instructions of Streckenbach, Himmler, and Heydrich. This order was

renewed by Himmler at Nikolaiev.

HERR BABEL: You personally were not concerned with the execution of

these orders?

OHLENDORF: I led the Einsatzgruppe, and therefore I had the task of

seeing how the Einsatzkommandos executed the orders received.

HERR BABEL: But did you have no scruples in regard to the execution of

these orders?

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

HERR BABEL: And how is it that they were carried out regardless of these

scruples?

OHLENDORF: Because to me it is inconceivable that a subordinate leader

should not carry out orders given by the leaders of the state.

HERR BABEL: This is your own opinion. But this must have been not only

your point of view but also the point of view of the majority of the

people involved. Didn’t some of the men appointed to execute these

orders ask you to be relieved of such tasks?

OHLENDORF: I cannot remember any one concrete case. I excluded some whom

I did not consider emotionally suitable for executing these tasks and I

sent some of them home.

HERR BABEL: Was the legality of the orders explained to these people

under false pretenses?

OHLENDORF: I do not understand your question; since the order was issued

by the superior authorities, the question of legality could not arise in

the minds of these individuals, for they had sworn obedience to the

people who had issued the orders.

HERR BABEL: Could any individual expect to succeed in evading the

execution of these orders?

OHLENDORF: No, the result would have been a court-martial with a

corresponding sentence.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, do you wish to re-examine?

COL. AMEN: Just a very few questions, Your Honor.

[_Turning to the witness._] What organization furnished the supplies to

the Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) furnished the

equipment.

COL. AMEN: What organization furnished weapons to the Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The weapons were also furnished through the RSHA.

COL. AMEN: What organization assigned personnel to the Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The Organization and Personnel Department of the RSHA.

COL. AMEN: And all these activities of supplies required personnel in

addition to the operating members?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: That will do; thank you.

[_The witness left the stand._]

COL. AMEN: The next witness to be called by the Prosecution is Dieter

Wisliceny. That witness will be examined by Lieutenant Colonel Smith W.

Brookhart, Jr.

[_The witness, Wisliceny, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

DIETER WISLICENY (Witness): Dieter Wisliceny.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty

and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and

add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: Please speak slowly and pause between questions and

answers.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR. (Assistant Trial Counsel for

the United States): How old are you?

WISLICENY: I am 34 years old.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Where were you born?

WISLICENY: I was born at Regulowken in East Prussia.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were you a member of the NSDAP?

WISLICENY: Yes, I was a member of the NSDAP.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Since what year?

WISLICENY: I entered the NSDAP first in 1931, was then struck off the

list and entered finally in 1933.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were you a member of the SS?

WISLICENY: Yes, I entered the SS in 1934.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were you a member of the Gestapo?

WISLICENY: In 1934 I entered the SD.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What rank did you achieve?

WISLICENY: In 1940 I was promoted to SS Hauptsturmführer.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you know Adolf Eichmann?

WISLICENY: Yes, I have known Eichmann since 1934.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Under what circumstances?

WISLICENY: We joined the SD about the same time, in 1934. Until 1937 we

were together in the same department.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How well did you know Eichmann personally?

WISLICENY: We knew each other very well. We used the intimate “du,” and

I also knew his family very well.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was his position?

WISLICENY: Eichmann was in the RSHA, a section chief in Amt IV, Gestapo.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you mean Section IV or a subsection, and, if so,

which subsection?

WISLICENY: He ran Section IVA4. This department comprised two

subsections: one for churches and another for Jewish matters.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: You have before you a diagram showing the position

of Subsection IVA4b in the RSHA.

WISLICENY: Yes.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did you prepare this diagram?

WISLICENY: Yes, I made the diagram myself.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Does it correctly portray the organizational setup

showing the section dealing with Jewish problems?

WISLICENY: Yes, this was approximately the personnel of the section at

the beginning of 1944.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Referring to this chart and the list of leading

personnel as shown in the lower section of the paper, were you

personally acquainted with each of the individuals named therein?

WISLICENY: Yes, I knew all of them personally.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the particular mission of IVA4b of the

RSHA?

WISLICENY: This Section IVA4b was concerned with the Jewish question for

the RSHA. Eichmann had special powers from Gruppenführer Müller, the

Chief of Amt IV, and from the Chief of the Security Police. He was

responsible for the so-called solution of the Jewish question in Germany

and in all countries occupied by Germany.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were there distinct periods of activity affecting

the Jews?

WISLICENY: Yes.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Will you describe to the Tribunal the approximate

periods and the different types of activity?

WISLICENY: Yes. Until 1940 the general policy within the section was to

settle the Jewish question in Germany and in areas occupied by Germany

by means of a planned emigration. The second phase, after that date, was

the concentration of all Jews, in Poland and in other territories

occupied by Germany in the East, in ghettos. This period lasted

approximately until the beginning of 1942. The third period was the

so-called “final solution” of the Jewish question, that is, the planned

extermination and destruction of the Jewish race; this period lasted

until October 1944, when Himmler gave the order to stop their

destruction.

[_A recess was taken._]

LT. COL. BROOKHART: When did you first become associated with Section

IVA4 of the RSHA?

WISLICENY: That was in 1940. I happened to meet Eichmann . . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was your position?

WISLICENY: Eichmann suggested that I go to Bratislava as adviser on the

Jewish question to the Slovakian Government.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Thereafter how long did you hold that position?

WISLICENY: I was at Bratislava until the spring of 1943; then, almost a

year in Greece and later, from March 1944 until December 1944, I was

with Eichmann in Hungary. In January 1945 I left Eichmann’s department.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In your official connection with Section IVA4, did

you learn of any order which directed the annihilation of all Jews?

WISLICENY: Yes, I learned of such an order for the first time from

Eichmann in the summer of 1942.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Will you tell the Tribunal under what circumstances

and what was the substance of the order?

WISLICENY: In the spring of 1942 about 17,000 Jews were taken from

Slovakia to Poland as workers. It was a question of an agreement with

the Slovakian Government. The Slovakian Government further asked whether

the families of these workers could not be taken to Poland as well. At

first Eichmann declined this request.

In April or at the beginning of May 1942 Eichmann told me that

henceforward whole families could also be taken to Poland. Eichmann

himself was at Bratislava in May 1942 and had discussed the matter with

competent members of the Slovakian Government. He visited Minister Mach

and the then Prime Minister, Professor Tuka. At that time he assured the

Slovakian Government that these Jews would be humanely and decently

treated in the Polish ghettos. This was the special wish of the

Slovakian Government. As a result of this assurance about 35,000 Jews

were taken from Slovakia into Poland. The Slovakian Government, however,

made efforts to see that these Jews were, in fact, humanely treated;

they particularly tried to help such Jews as had been converted to

Christianity. Prime Minister Tuka repeatedly asked me to visit him and

expressed the wish that a Slovakian delegation be allowed to enter the

areas to which the Slovakian Jews were supposed to have been sent. I

transmitted this wish to Eichmann and the Slovakian Government even sent

him a note on the matter. Eichmann at the time gave an evasive answer.

Then at the end of July or the beginning of August, I went to see him in

Berlin and implored him once more to grant the request of the Slovakian

Government. I pointed out to him that abroad there were rumors to the

effect that all Jews in Poland were being exterminated. I pointed out to

him that the Pope had intervened with the Slovakian Government on their

behalf. I advised him that such a proceeding, if really true, would

seriously injure our prestige, that is, the prestige of Germany, abroad.

For all these reasons I begged him to permit the inspection in question.

After a lengthy discussion Eichmann told me that this request to visit

the Polish ghettos could not be granted under any circumstances

whatsoever. In reply to my question “Why?” he said that most of these

Jews were no longer alive. I asked him who had given such instructions

and he referred me to an order of Himmler’s. I then begged him to show

me this order, because I could not believe that it actually existed in

writing. He . . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Where were you at that time? Where were you at the

time of this meeting with Eichmann?

WISLICENY: This meeting with Eichmann took place in Berlin,

Kurfürstenstrasse 116, in Eichmann’s office.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Proceed with the answer to the previous question.

Proceed with the discussion of the circumstances and the order.

WISLICENY: Eichmann told me he could show me this order in writing if it

would soothe my conscience. He took a small volume of documents from his

safe, turned over the pages, and showed me a letter from Himmler to the

Chief of the Security Police and the SD. The gist of the letter was

roughly as follows:

The Führer had ordered the final solution of the Jewish question; the

Chief of the Security Police and the SD and the Inspector of

Concentration Camps were entrusted with carrying out this so-called

final solution. All Jewish men and women who were able to work were to

be temporarily exempted from the so-called final solution and used for

work in the concentration camps. This letter was signed by Himmler

himself. I could not possibly be mistaken since Himmler’s signature was

well known to me. I . . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: To whom was the order addressed?

WISLICENY: To the Chief of the Security Police and SD, that is, to the

office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was there any other addressee on this order?

WISLICENY: Yes, the Inspector of Concentration Camps. The order was

addressed to both these offices.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did the order bear any classification for security

purposes?

WISLICENY: It was classified as “secret.”

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the approximate date of this order?

WISLICENY: This order was dated April 1942.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: By whom was it signed?

WISLICENY: By Himmler personally.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: And you personally examined this order in Eichmann’s

office?

WISLICENY: Yes, Eichmann handed me the document and I saw the order

myself.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was any question asked by you as to the meaning of

the words “final solution” as used in the order?

WISLICENY: Eichmann went on to explain to me what was meant by this. He

said that the planned biological annihilation of the Jewish race in the

Eastern Territories was disguised by the concept and wording “final

solution.” In later discussions on this subject the same words “final

solution” appeared over and over again.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was anything said by you to Eichmann in regard to

the power given him under this order?

WISLICENY: Eichmann told me that within the RSHA he personally was

entrusted with the execution of this order. For this purpose he had

received every authority from the Chief of the Security Police; he

himself was personally responsible for the execution of this order.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did you make any comment to Eichmann about his

authority?

WISLICENY: Yes. It was perfectly clear to me that this order spelled

death to millions of people. I said to Eichmann, “God grant that our

enemies never have the opportunity of doing the same to the German

people,” in reply to which Eichmann told me not to be sentimental; it

was an order of the Führer’s and would have to be carried out.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you know whether that order continued in force

and under the operation of Eichmann’s department?

WISLICENY: Yes.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How long?

WISLICENY: This order was in force until October 1944. At that time

Himmler gave a counter order which forbade the annihilation of the Jews.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Who was Chief of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt at

the time the order was first issued?

WISLICENY: That would be Heydrich.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did the program under this order continue with equal

force under Kaltenbrunner?

WISLICENY: Yes; there was no diminution or change of any kind.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: State, if you know, how long Kaltenbrunner knew

Eichmann.

WISLICENY: From various statements by Eichmann I gathered that

Kaltenbrunner and Eichmann had known each other for a long time. Both

came from Linz, and when Kaltenbrunner was made Chief of the Security

Police, Eichmann expressed his satisfaction. He told me at that time

that he knew Kaltenbrunner very well personally, and that Kaltenbrunner

was very well acquainted with his family in Linz.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did Eichmann ever refer to his friendship or

standing with Kaltenbrunner as being helpful to him?

WISLICENY: Yes, he repeatedly said that, if he had any serious trouble,

he could at any time go to Kaltenbrunner personally. He did not have to

do that very often, since his relations with his immediate superior,

Gruppenführer Müller, were very good.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Have you been present when Eichmann and

Kaltenbrunner met?

WISLICENY: Yes; once I saw how cordially Kaltenbrunner greeted Eichmann.

That was in February 1945 in Eichmann’s office in Berlin. Kaltenbrunner

came to lunch every day at Kurfürstenstrasse 116; there the chiefs met

for their midday meal with Kaltenbrunner; and it was on one such

occasion that I saw how cordially Kaltenbrunner greeted Eichmann and how

he inquired after the health of Eichmann’s family in Linz.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In connection with the administration of his office,

do you know to what extent Eichmann submitted matters to Heydrich and

later to Kaltenbrunner for approval?

WISLICENY: The routine channel from Eichmann to Kaltenbrunner lay

through Gruppenführer Müller. To my knowledge, reports to Kaltenbrunner

were drawn up at regular intervals by Eichmann and submitted to him. I

also know that in the summer of 1944 he made a personal report to

Kaltenbrunner.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did you have an opportunity to examine files in

Eichmann’s office?

WISLICENY: Yes; I frequently had occasion to examine the files in

Eichmann’s office. I know that he handled with special care any files

which had to do with questions concerning his own special task. He was

in every respect a confirmed bureaucrat; he immediately recorded in the

files every discussion he ever had with any of his superiors. He always

pointed out to me that the most important thing was for him to be

covered by his superiors at all times. He shunned all personal

responsibility and took good care to take shelter behind his

superiors—in this case Müller and Kaltenbrunner—when it was a question

of responsibility for his actions.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In the case of a typical report going from

Eichmann’s department through Müller, Kaltenbrunner, to Himmler—have

you seen copies of such reports in Eichmann’s file?

WISLICENY: Yes, of course there were many such copies in the files. The

regular channel was as follows: Eichmann had a draft made by a

specialist or he made it himself; this draft went to Gruppenführer

Müller, his department chief; Müller either signed this draft himself or

left the signing to Eichmann. In most cases, when reports to

Kaltenbrunner and Himmler were concerned, Müller signed them himself.

Whenever reports were signed by Müller without any alteration they were

returned to Eichmann’s office, where a first copy and one carbon copy

were prepared. The first copy then went back to Müller for his

signature, and thence it was forwarded either to Kaltenbrunner or to

Himmler. In individual cases where reports to Himmler were involved,

Kaltenbrunner signed them himself. I myself have seen carbon copies with

Kaltenbrunner’s signature.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Turning now to areas and countries in which measures

were taken affecting the Jews, will you state as to which countries you

have personal knowledge of such operations?

WISLICENY: First, I have personal knowledge of all measures taken in

Slovakia. I also know full particulars of the evacuation of Jews from

Greece and especially from Hungary. Further, I know about certain

measures taken in Bulgaria and in Croatia. I naturally heard about the

measures adopted in other countries, but was unable to gain a clear

picture of the situation from personal observation or from detailed

reports.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Considering the case of Slovakia, you have already

made reference to the 17,000 specially selected Jews who were sent from

Slovakia. Will you tell the Tribunal of the other measures that followed

concerning Jews in Slovakia?

WISLICENY: I mentioned before that these first 17,000 laborers were

followed by about 35,000 Jews, including entire families. In August or

the beginning of September 1942 an end was put to this action in

Slovakia. The reasons for this were that a large number of Jews still in

Slovakia had been granted—either by the President or by various

ministries—special permission to remain in the country. A further

reason might have been the unsatisfactory answer I gave the Slovakian

Government in reply to their request for the inspection of the Jewish

camps in Poland. This state of affairs lasted until September 1944; from

August 1942 until September 1944 no Jews were removed from Slovakia.

From 25,000 to 30,000 Jews still remained in the country.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What happened to the first group of 17,000 specially

selected workers?

WISLICENY: This group was not annihilated, but all were employed for

enforced labor in the Auschwitz and Lublin Concentration Camps.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How do you know this?

WISLICENY: I know this detail because the Commandant of Auschwitz,

Hoess, made a remark to this effect to me in Hungary in 1944. He told me

at that time that these 17,000 Jews were his best workers in Auschwitz.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the name of that Commandant?

WISLICENY: The Commandant of Auschwitz was Hoess.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What happened to the approximately 35,000 members of

the families of the Jewish workers that were also sent to Poland?

WISLICENY: They were treated according to the order which Eichmann had

shown me in August 1942. Part of them were left alive if they were able

to work; the others were killed.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How do you know this?

WISLICENY: I know that from Eichmann and, naturally, also from Hoess,

during conversations in Hungary.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What proportion of this group remained alive?

WISLICENY: Hoess at that time, in a conversation with Eichmann at which

I was present, gave the figure of the surviving Jews who had been put to

work at about 25 to 30 percent.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Referring now to the 25,000 Jews that remained in

Slovakia until September of 1944, do you know what was done with those

Jews?

WISLICENY: After the outbreak of the Slovakian insurrection in the fall

of 1944 Hauptsturmführer Brunner, one of Eichmann’s assistants, was sent

to Slovakia. Eichmann refused to grant my wish to go to Slovakia. With

the help of German police forces and also with forces of the Slovakian

Gendarmerie, Brunner assembled these Jews in several camps and

transported them to Auschwitz. According to Brunner’s statement, about

14,000 persons were involved. A small group which remained in Camp

Szered was, as far as I know, sent to Theresienstadt in the spring of

1945.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What happened to these Jews after they were deported

from Slovakia, this group of 25,000?

WISLICENY: I assume that they also met with the so-called final

solution, because Himmler’s order to suspend this action was not issued

until several weeks later.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Considering now actions in Greece about which you

have personal knowledge, will you tell the Tribunal of the actions there

in chronological sequence?

WISLICENY: In January 1943 Eichmann ordered me to come to Berlin and

told me that I was to proceed to Salonika to solve the Jewish problem

there in co-operation with the German Military Administration in

Macedonia. Eichmann’s permanent representative, Sturmbannführer Rolf

Günther, had previously been to Salonika. My departure had been

scheduled for February 1942. At the end of January 1942 I was told by

Eichmann that Hauptsturmführer Brunner had been nominated by him for the

technical execution of all operations in Greece and that he was to

accompany me to Salonika. Brunner was not subordinate to me; he worked

independently. In February 1942 we went to Salonika and there contacted

the Military Administration. As first action . . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Whom in the Military Administration did you deal

with?

WISLICENY: War Administration Counsellor (Kriegsverwaltungsrat) Dr.

Merten, Chief of the Military Administration with the Commander of the

Armed Forces in the Salonika-Aegean Theater.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: I believe you used 1942 once or more in reference;

did you at all times refer to 1943 in dealing with Greece?

WISLICENY: That is an error. These events occurred in 1943.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What arrangements were made through Dr. Merten and

what actions were taken?

WISLICENY: In Salonika the Jews were first of all concentrated in

certain quarters of the city. There were in Salonika about 50,000 Jews

of Spanish descent. At the beginning of March, after this concentration

had taken place, a teletype message from Eichmann to Brunner ordered the

immediate evacuation of all Jews from Salonika and Macedonia to

Auschwitz. Armed with this order, Brunner and I went to the Military

Administration; no objections were raised by the Military

Administration, and measures were prepared and executed. Brunner

directed the entire action in Salonika in person. The trains necessary

for the evacuation were requisitioned from the Transport Command of the

Armed Forces. All Brunner had to do was to indicate the number of

railway cars needed and the exact time at which they were required.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were any of the Jewish workers retained at the

request of Dr. Merten or the Military Administration?

WISLICENY: The Military Administration had made a demand for about 3,000

Jews for construction work on the railroad, which number was duly

delivered. Once the work was ended, these Jews were returned to Brunner

and were, like all the others, dispatched to Auschwitz. The work in

question came under the program of the Todt Organization.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the number of Jewish workers retained for

the Organization Todt?

WISLICENY: Three to four thousand.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was there any illness among the Jews that were

concentrated for transport?

WISLICENY: In the camp proper, that is, the concentration camp, there

were no special cases of illness; but in certain quarters of the city

inhabited by the Jews typhus was prevalent and other contagious

diseases, especially tuberculosis of the lungs.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What, if any, communication did you have with

Eichmann concerning this typhus?

WISLICENY: On receipt of the teletype concerning the evacuation from

Salonika, I got in touch with Eichmann on the telephone and informed him

of the prevalence of typhus. He ignored my objections and gave orders

for the evacuation to proceed immediately.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Altogether, how many Jews were collected and

deported from Greece?

WISLICENY: There were over 50,000 Jews. I believe that about 54,000 were

evacuated from Salonika and Macedonia.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What is the basis for your figure?

WISLICENY: I myself read a comprehensive report from Brunner to Eichmann

on completion of the evacuation. Brunner left Salonika at the end of May

1943. I personally was not in Salonika from the beginning of April until

the end of May, so that the action was carried out by Brunner alone.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How many transports were used for shipping Jews from

Salonika?

WISLICENY: From 20 to 25 transport trains.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: And how many were shipped in each train?

WISLICENY: There were at least 2,000, and in many cases 2,500.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What kind of railway equipment was used for these

shipments?

WISLICENY: Closed freight cars were used. The evacuees were given

sufficient food to last them for about 10 days, consisting mostly of

bread, olives, and other dry food. They were also given water and

various other sanitary facilities.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Who furnished this railway transportation?

WISLICENY: Transport was supplied by the Transport Command of the Armed

Forces, that is, the cars and locomotives. The food was furnished by the

Military Administration.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What did the Subsection IVA4 have to do with

obtaining this transportation, and who in that subsection dealt with

transportation?

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, you need not go into this in such

great detail.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: If Your Honor pleases, this particular question, I

believe, will have a bearing on the implications involving the military;

I can cut down on the other details.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you spent some considerable time in describing how

many of them were concentrated. Whether it was 60,000 or how many were

kept for the Todt Organization—all those details are really

unnecessary.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Very well, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: I mean, you must use your own discretion about how you

cut down. I don’t know what details or what facts you are going to

prove.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: If Your Honor pleases, this witness, as he has

testified, is competent to cover practically all details in these Balkan

countries. It is not our wish to add cumulative evidence, but his

testimony does furnish a complete story from the Head Office of the

Reichssicherheitshauptamt through the field operations to the final

solution.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is he going to prove about these 50,000 Jews?

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Their ultimate disposition at Auschwitz, as far as

he knows.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can go on to what ultimately happened to them

then.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Yes, Sir.

[_Turning to the witness._] What was the destination of these transports

of Jews from Greece?

WISLICENY: In every case Auschwitz.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: And what was the ultimate disposition of the Jews

sent to Auschwitz from Greece?

WISLICENY: They were without exception destined for the so-called final

solution.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: During the collection period were these Jews called

upon to furnish their own subsistence?

WISLICENY: I did not quite understand the question.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, does it matter, if they were “brought

to the final solution” which I suppose means death?

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Your Honor, this witness will testify that

280,000,000 drachmas were deposited in the Greek National Bank for the

subsistence of these people and that this amount was later appropriated

by the German Military Administration. That is all I have hoped to prove

by this question.

[_Turning to the witness._] Is that a correct statement of your

testimony?

WISLICENY: Yes. The cash which the Jews possessed was taken away and put

into a common account at the Bank of Greece. After the Jews had been

evacuated from Salonika this account was taken over by the German

Military Administration. About 280,000,000 drachmas were involved.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: When you say the Jews taken to Auschwitz were

submitted to the final solution; what do you mean by that?

WISLICENY: By that I mean what Eichmann had explained to me under the

term “final solution,” that is, they were annihilated biologically. As

far as I could gather from my conversations with him, this annihilation

took place in the gas chambers and the bodies were subsequently

destroyed in the crematories.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: If Your Honor pleases, this witness is able to

testify as to actions in Hungary, involving approximately 500,000 Jews.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, then. You must use your own discretion. I can’t

present your case for you.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: I have no desire to submit cumulative evidence.

[_Turning to the witness._] Turning to actions in Hungary, will you

briefly outline the actions taken there and your participation?

WISLICENY: After the entry of the German troops into Hungary Eichmann

went there personally with a large command. By an order signed by the

head of the Security Police, I was assigned to Eichmann’s command.

Eichmann began his activities in Hungary at the end of March 1944. He

contacted members of the then Hungarian Government, especially State

Secretaries Endre and Von Baky. The first measure adopted by Eichmann in

co-operation with these Hungarian Government officials was the

concentration of the Hungarian Jews in special places and special

localities. These measures were carried out according to zones,

beginning in Ruthenia and Transylvania. The action was initiated in

mid-April 1944.

In Ruthenia over 200,000 Jews were affected by these measures.

Consequently, impossible food and housing conditions developed in the

small towns and rural communities where the Jews were assembled. On the

strength of this situation Eichmann suggested to the Hungarians that

these Jews be transported to Auschwitz and other camps. He insisted,

however, that a request to this effect be submitted to him either by the

Hungarian Government or by a member thereof. This request was submitted

by State Secretary Von Baky. The evacuation was carried out by the

Hungarian Police.

Eichmann appointed me liaison officer to Lieutenant Colonel Ferency,

entrusted by the Hungarian Minister of the Interior with this operation.

The evacuation of Jews from Hungary began in May 1944 and was also

carried out zone by zone, first starting in Ruthenia, then in

Transylvania, northern Hungary, southern, and western Hungary. Budapest

was to be cleared of Jews by the end of June. This evacuation, however,

was never carried out, as the regent, Horthy, would not permit it. This

operation affected some 450,000 Jews. A second operation was then . . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Before you go into that, please, will you tell the

Tribunal what, if anything, was done about organizing an Einsatz group

to act in Hungary on the Jewish question?

WISLICENY: At the beginning of March 1944 a so-called Einsatzgruppe,

consisting of Security Police and SD, was formed at Mauthausen near

Linz. Eichmann himself headed a so-called “Sonder-Einsatz-Kommando” to

which he detailed everybody who had held any position in his department.

This Special-Action Commando was likewise assembled at Mauthausen. All

questions of personnel devolved on the then Standartenführer, Dr.

Geschke, leader of the Einsatzgruppe. In technical matters Eichmann was

subordinate only to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the meaning of the designation

“Special-Action Commando Eichmann” in relation to the movement into

Hungary?

WISLICENY: Eichmann’s activities in Hungary comprised all matters

connected with the Jewish problem.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Under whose direct supervision was Special-Action

Commando Eichmann organized?

WISLICENY: I have already said that in all matters of personnel and

economy Eichmann was subordinate to Standartenführer, Dr. Geschke,

leader of the Einsatzgruppe. In technical matters he could give no

orders to Eichmann. Eichmann likewise reported direct to Berlin on all

the special operations undertaken by him.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: To whom?

WISLICENY: Either to Gruppenführer Müller, or, in more important cases,

to the Chief of the Security Police and SD, that is, to Kaltenbrunner.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: During the period in which Hungarian Jews were being

collected, what, if any, contact was made by the Joint Distribution

Committee for Jewish Affairs with Eichmann’s representative?

WISLICENY: The Joint Distribution Committee made efforts to contact

Eichmann and to try to ward off the fate of the Hungarian Jews. I myself

established this contact with Eichmann, since I wanted to discover some

means of protecting the half million Jews in Hungary from the measures

already in force. The Joint Distribution Committee made certain offers

to Eichmann and in return requested that the Jews should remain in

Hungary. These offers were mainly of a financial nature. Eichmann felt

himself, much against his will, obliged to forward these proposals to

Himmler. Himmler thereupon entrusted a certain Standartenführer Becher

with further negotiations. Standartenführer Becher then continued the

negotiations with Dr. Kastner, delegate of the J.D.C. But Eichmann, from

the very first, endeavored to wreck the negotiations. Before any

concrete results were obtained he attempted to present us with a _fait

accompli_; in other words, he tried to transport as many Jews as

possible to Auschwitz.

THE PRESIDENT: Need we go into all these conferences? Can’t you take us

on to the conclusion of the matter?

LT. COL. BROOKHART: The witness is inclined to be lengthy in his

answers. That has been true in his pre-trial examination. I will try

. . .

THE PRESIDENT: You are examining him.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Yes, Sir.

Was there any money involved in the meeting between Dr. Kastner and

Eichmann?

WISLICENY: Yes.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How much?

WISLICENY: In the first conversation Dr. Kastner gave Eichmann about 3

million pengoes. What the sums mentioned in further conversations

amounted to, I do not know exactly.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: To whom did Dr. Kastner give this money and what

became of it?

WISLICENY: It was given to Eichmann, who then turned it over to his

financial agent; the sum was in turn handed to the commander of the

Security Police and the SD in Hungary.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: These actions that you have described, involving

approximately 450,000 Jews being moved from Hungary—were there any

official communications sent to Berlin concerning these movements?

WISLICENY: Yes, as each transport left, Berlin was informed by teletype.

From time to time Eichmann also dispatched a comprehensive report to the

RSHA and to the Chief of the Security Police.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Now with reference to the Jews that remained in

Budapest, what, if any, action was taken against them?

WISLICENY: After Szalasi had taken over the Government of Hungary . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, we have not yet heard, have we, what

happened to these Jews from Hungary? If we have, I have missed it.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: I will ask that question now, Sir.

[_Turning to the witness._] What became of the Jews to whom you have

already referred—approximately 450,000?

WISLICENY: They were, without exception, taken to Auschwitz and brought

to the final solution.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you mean they were killed?

WISLICENY: Yes, with the exception of perhaps 25 to 30 percent who were

used for labor purposes. I here refer to a previously mentioned

conversation on this matter between Hoess and Eichmann in Budapest.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Turning now to the Jews remaining in Budapest, what

happened to them?

WISLICENY: In October-November 1944 about 30,000 of these Jews, perhaps

a few thousand more, were removed from Budapest and sent to Germany.

They were to be used to work on the construction of the so-called

Southeast Wall, a fortification near Vienna. They were mostly women.

They had to walk from Budapest to the German border—almost 200

kilometers. They were assembled in marching formations and followed a

route specially designated for them. Their shelter and nutrition on this

march was extremely bad. Most of them fell ill and lost strength. I had

been ordered by Eichmann to take over these groups at the German border

and direct them further to the Lower Danube Gauleitung for labor

purposes. In many cases I refused to take over these so-called workers,

because they were completely exhausted and emaciated by disease.

Eichmann, however, forced me to take them over and in this case even

threatened to turn me over to Himmler to be put into a concentration

camp if I caused him further political difficulties. For this same

reason I was later removed from Eichmann’s department.

A large proportion of these people then died in the so-called Lower

Danube work camps from exhaustion and epidemics. A small percentage,

perhaps 12,000, was taken to Vienna and the surrounding area, and a

group of about 3,000 was taken to Bergen-Belsen, and from there to

Switzerland. Those were Jews who had been released from Germany as a

result of the negotiations with the J.D.C.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Summarizing for the countries of Greece, Hungary,

and Slovakia—approximately how many Jews were affected by measures of

the Secret Police and SD in those countries about which you have

personal knowledge?

WISLICENY: In Slovakia there were about 66,000, in Greece about 64,000,

and in Hungary more than half a million.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In the countries Croatia and Bulgaria, about which

you have some knowledge, how many Jews were thus affected?

WISLICENY: In Bulgaria, to my understanding about 8,000; in Croatia I

know of only 3,000 Jews who were brought to Auschwitz from Agram in the

summer of 1942.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were meetings held of the specialists on the Jewish

problem from Amt IVA, whose names appear on this sheet to which we made

reference earlier?

WISLICENY: Yes. Eichmann was accustomed to calling a large annual

meeting of all his experts in Berlin. This meeting was usually in

November. At these meetings all the men who were working for him in

foreign countries had to report on their activities. In 1944, so far as

I know, such a meeting did not take place, because in November 1944

Eichmann was still in Hungary.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In connection with the Jews about whom you have

personal knowledge, how many were subjected to the final solution, that

is, to being killed?

WISLICENY: The exact number is extremely hard for me to determine. I

have only one basis for a possible estimate, that is a conversation

between Eichmann and Hoess in Vienna, in which he said that only a very

few of those sent from Greece to Auschwitz had been fit for work. Of the

Slovakian and Hungarian Jews about 20 to 30 percent had been able to

work. It is therefore very hard for me to give a reliable total.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In your meetings with the other specialists on the

Jewish problem and Eichmann did you gain any knowledge or information as

to the total number of Jews killed under this program?

WISLICENY: Eichmann personally always talked about at least 4 million

Jews. Sometimes he even mentioned 5 million. According to my own

estimate I should say that at least 4 million must have been destined

for the so-called final solution. How many of those actually survived, I

am not in a position to say.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: When did you last see Eichmann?

WISLICENY: I last saw Eichmann towards the end of February 1945 in

Berlin. At that time he said that if the war were lost he would commit

suicide.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did he say anything at that time as to the number of

Jews that had been killed?

WISLICENY: Yes, he expressed this in a particularly cynical manner. He

said he would leap laughing into the grave because the feeling that he

had 5 million people on his conscience would be for him a source of

extraordinary satisfaction.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: The witness is available for other counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecuting counsel wish to examine

the witness?

MR. G.D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I

have no desire to ask any questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Soviet prosecutor wish to ask any questions?

COL. POKROVSKY: At this stage the Soviet Union does not wish to ask any

questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French prosecutor?

[_There was no response._]

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you mentioned the impressment of the Jews for

labor and named two cases, one of Jews from Slovakia who were brought to

Auschwitz and put to work if they were fit for it; then later you spoke

of those Jews who were brought from Hungary to the Southeast Wall. Do

you know whether the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor

Sauckel had any connection with these actions, whether this happened on

his orders, and whether he otherwise had anything to do with these

matters?

WISLICENY: As far as the Jews from Slovakia were concerned, the

Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor had nothing to do

with these matters. It was a purely internal affair for the Inspector of

Concentration Camps who employed these Jews for his own purposes.

Concerning the impressment of Jews for the construction of the Southeast

Wall, I cannot definitely answer this question. I do not know to what

extent the construction of the Southeast Wall was directed by the

Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. The Jews who came

up from Hungary for this construction work were turned over to the Lower

Danube Gauleitung.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to ask the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other?

HERR BABEL: Witness, you mentioned measures taken by the Security Police

and the SD; and you spoke about these organizations several times in

your testimony. Is this merely an official designation or are we to

conclude from your statement that the Security Service (the SD) as such,

participated in some way?

WISLICENY: The actions mentioned were executed by Amt IV, that is, the

Gestapo. If I mentioned the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, I

did so because it was the correct designation of this office and not

because I wished to mention the SD as such.

HERR BABEL: Did the SD then participate, in any way, in the measures

against the Jews mentioned by you: 1) to what extent, and 2) in what

manner?

WISLICENY: The SD as an organization was not involved. Some of the

leaders, including me, who worked with Eichmann, came from the SD; but

they had been detailed to Amt IV—to the Gestapo.

HERR BABEL: Did former members of the SS and SD who later became active

in the Gestapo still remain members of their original organization, or

were they now members of the Gestapo?

WISLICENY: No, they still remained with the SD.

HERR BABEL: And were they acting as members of the SD or were they

carrying out orders of the Gestapo?

WISLICENY: We belonged to the Gestapo for the duration of our

assignment. We merely remained on the SD payroll and were taken care of

as members of their personnel. Orders were received exclusively from the

Gestapo—from Amt IV.

HERR BABEL: In this connection I should like to ask one more question.

Could an outsider ever know his way about in this maze of offices?

WISLICENY: No; that was practically impossible.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other of the defendants’ counsel who wishes

to cross-examine this witness? Colonel Amen, do you wish, or Colonel

Brookhart, does he wish to re-examine the witness?

COL. AMEN: No further questions, Your Lordship.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That will do.

[_The witness left the stand._]

COL. AMEN: It will take about 10 minutes, Sir, to get the next witness

up. I had not anticipated we would finish quite so quickly. Do you still

want me to get him up this afternoon?

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any other witnesses on these subjects?

COL. AMEN: Not on this subject, Sir. I have two very brief witnesses:

one on the written agreement, concerning which testimony was given this

morning, between the OKW and OKH and the RSHA—a witness who can answer

the questions which the members of the Tribunal asked this morning, very

briefly; and one other witness who is on a totally different subject.

THE PRESIDENT: On what subject is the other witness?

COL. AMEN: Well, he is on the subject of identifying two of the

defendants at one of the concentration camps. I don’t like to mention

these names to the Defense unless you wish me to.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you will call those two witnesses

tomorrow?

COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship. I don’t think either of them will take

more than 20 minutes apiece.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you will go on with the evidence against

the High Command?

COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY

Friday, 4 January 1946

_Morning Session_

COL. AMEN: I would like to call as a witness for the Prosecution Walter

Schellenberg.

[_The witness, Schellenberg, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Is your name Walter Schellenberg?

WALTER SCHELLENBERG (Witness): My name is Walter Schellenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty

and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and

add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

COL. AMEN: Speak slowly and pause between the questions and the answers.

Where were you born?

SCHELLENBERG: In Saarbrücken.

COL. AMEN: How old are you?

SCHELLENBERG: Thirty-five years.

COL. AMEN: You were a member of the NSDAP?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And of the SS?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes; the SS also.

COL. AMEN: And of the Waffen-SS?

SCHELLENBERG: And the Waffen-SS.

COL. AMEN: And the SD?

SCHELLENBERG: And the SD.

COL. AMEN: What was the highest office you held?

SCHELLENBERG: The highest rank I held was that of SS Brigadeführer in

the SS, and of major general in the Waffen-SS.

COL. AMEN: You were Chief of Amt VI?

SCHELLENBERG: I was Chief of Amt VI and Military.

COL. AMEN: During what period of time?

SCHELLENBERG: I was made Deputy Chief of Amt VI in July 1941, and the

final confirmation of my appointment as Chief was in June of 1942.

COL. AMEN: State briefly the functions of Amt VI of the RSHA.

SCHELLENBERG: Amt VI was the political secret service of the Reich and

worked principally in foreign countries.

COL. AMEN: Do you know of an agreement between OKW, OKH, and the RSHA

concerning the use of Einsatz groups and Einsatzkommandos in the Russian

campaign?

SCHELLENBERG: At the end of May 1941 conferences took place between the

then head of the Security Police and the Quartermaster General, General

Wagner.

COL. AMEN: And who?

SCHELLENBERG: The Quartermaster General of the Army, General Wagner.

COL. AMEN: Did you personally attend those conferences?

SCHELLENBERG: I kept the minutes of the final conferences.

COL. AMEN: Have you given us the names of all persons present during

those negotiations?

SCHELLENBERG: The negotiations took place principally between

Obergruppenführer Heydrich, who was then the Chief of the Security

Police and the SD, and the Quartermaster General of the Army.

COL. AMEN: Was anyone else present during any of the negotiations?

SCHELLENBERG: Not during the negotiations themselves, but at a later

meeting other persons took part.

COL. AMEN: And did those negotiations result in the signing of an

agreement?

SCHELLENBERG: A written agreement was concluded.

COL. AMEN: Were you there when the written agreement was signed?

SCHELLENBERG: I kept the minutes and I saw both gentlemen sign.

COL. AMEN: By whom was this agreement signed?

SCHELLENBERG: It was signed by the then Chief of the Security Police, SS

Obergruppenführer Heydrich, and the Quartermaster General of the Army,

General Wagner.

COL. AMEN: Do you know where the original agreement, or any copy

thereof, is located today?

SCHELLENBERG: No, that I cannot say. I know nothing about that.

COL. AMEN: But you are familiar with the contents of that written

agreement?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes; for the most part I recall that.

COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, please tell

the Tribunal exactly what was contained in that written agreement.

SCHELLENBERG: The first part of this agreement began with the quotation

of a basic decree by the Führer. It read in the introductory clause

somewhat as follows:

For the safety of the fighting troops in the Russian campaign that is

now expected to start, all means are to be used to keep the rear safe

and protected. On the basis of this consideration every means is to be

used to break any resistance. In order to support the fighting units of

the Army, the Security Police and the Security Service are also to be

called in for this task.

If I remember correctly, as a special example of something to be

protected, the safeguarding of the so-called great routes of supply,

also called “Rollbahnen,” was mentioned.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall anything else contained in that agreement?

SCHELLENBERG: In the second part of this agreement the organization of

the army groups was mentioned.

COL. AMEN: And what was said about that?

SCHELLENBERG: And the corresponding organization of the Einsatz groups

and the Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and the SD. Four

different sectors were mentioned.

I remember the following: First, the front area; second, the operational

zone—it was also divided into an army group area and a rear army group

area; third, the rear army area; and fourth, the area where the civil

administration (Reichskommissariat) was to be set up.

In these different areas, the division of subordination and command was

clearly defined. In the front areas or fighting areas, the

Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and the SD were tactically and

operationally under the command of the Army; that is, they were

completely under the command of the Army.

In the operational zones only operational subordination should apply and

this same rule should apply in the rear army area. In the zone intended

for the civil administration (Reichskommissariat) the same conditions of

subordination and command were to apply as in Reich territory.

In a third part it was explained what was meant by tactical and

operational, or rather only the concept “operational” was explained in

detail. By “operational” was meant the subordination to the branches of

the Army in respect to discipline and supplies. Special mention was made

of the fact that the operational subordination also included all

supplies—especially supplies of gasoline, food, and the making

available of technical routes for the transmission of intelligence.

COL. AMEN: Have you now told us everything which you recall about that

agreement?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes; I cannot remember anything else contained in the

agreement.

COL. AMEN: If Your Honor pleases, that is all.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the English Prosecution have any questions to ask?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):

No.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Russian Prosecution have any questions to ask?

COL. POKROVSKY: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecution have any questions to ask?

[_There was no response._]

THE PRESIDENT: Do the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that Dr. Kaltenbrunner was your superior?

SCHELLENBERG: Dr. Kaltenbrunner was my immediate superior.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Until what time?

SCHELLENBERG: From the 30th of January of 1943 until the end.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his attitude towards the main themes of

National Socialism, for instance, the treatment of the Jews or the

treatment of the Church?

SCHELLENBERG: I personally did not have a chance to converse with him on

these problems. What I know about him is the result of my own few

personal observations.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you see original orders from Kaltenbrunner dealing

with the execution of saboteurs, the confinement of people in

concentration camps, and the like?

SCHELLENBERG: No. I heard him give only oral orders in respect to

this—commands which he gave to the Chief of the State Police, the Chief

of Amt IV of the RSHA.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner ever indicate to you that he had agreed

with Himmler that everything concerning concentration camps and the

entire executive power was to be taken away from him and that only the

SD, as an intelligence service, was to be entrusted to him and that he

wanted to expand this intelligence service in order to supply the

criticism that was otherwise lacking?

SCHELLENBERG: I never heard of any such agreement, and what I found out

later to be the facts is to the contrary.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, since you have given a negative answer, I must ask

you the following question, in order to make this one point clear: Which

facts do you mean?

SCHELLENBERG: I mean, for instance, the fact that after the Reichsführer

SS very reluctantly agreed, through my persuasion, not to evacuate the

concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner—by getting into direct contact with

Hitler—circumvented this order of Himmler’s and broke his word in

respect to international promises.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Were there any international decisions in respect to

this—decisions which referred to existing laws or decisions which

referred to international agreements?

SCHELLENBERG: I would like to explain that, if through the intermediary

of internationally known persons, the then Reichsführer SS promised the

official Allied authorities not to evacuate the concentration camps,

owing to the general distress, this promise was binding according to

human rights.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What do you mean by evacuate?

SCHELLENBERG: Arbitrarily to evacuate the camps before the approaching

enemy troops and to scatter them to other parts of Germany still

unoccupied by the enemy troops.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was your opinion?

SCHELLENBERG: That no further evacuation should take place, because

human rights simply did not allow it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: That the camps should therefore be surrendered to the

approaching enemy?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that your activity, too, could bring

suffering to many people, to people who were _per se_ innocent?

SCHELLENBERG: I did not understand the question. Will you please repeat

it?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever think that your activity, too, and the

activity of your fellow-workers was a cause for the great suffering of

many people—let us say Jews—even though these people were innocent?

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot imagine that the activity of my office could

cause any such thing. I was merely in an information service.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then your information service had no connection at all

with such crimes.

SCHELLENBERG: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then Kaltenbrunner, too, would not be guilty in regard to

this point?

SCHELLENBERG: Certainly; because he was, at the same time, the Chief of

Amt IV of the State Police.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I asked “in regard to this point,” and by that I meant

your sector.

SCHELLENBERG: I only represented the Sector Amt VI and Amt Military.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But Kaltenbrunner, at the same time, was Chief of Amt VI?

SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the RSHA. Eight

departments, as you probably know, were under him. I was at the head of

one or two of them, namely, Amt VI and Amt Military. These two offices

had nothing to do with the executive power of the State Police.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then, if your department . . .

THE PRESIDENT: What I understood you to say was that you were only in a

branch which was an information center; is that right?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And that Kaltenbrunner was your immediate chief; is that

right?

SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the RSHA.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he was the Chief not only of your branch but of the

whole organization.

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I should like to question this witness later on, after I

have talked with Kaltenbrunner.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the summer of 1943 were you in Ankara? And did you, on

this occasion pay a visit to the German Embassy?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you during this visit criticize German foreign policy

in various respects, and did you mention that it was absolutely

advisable to establish better relations with the Holy See? Did Herr Von

Papen then answer, “That would be possible only if, in accordance with

the demands that I have made repeatedly, the Church policy is revised

completely and the persecution of the Church ceases”?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, the gist of the conversation is correct; and I spoke

with the then Ambassador Von Papen to this effect.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): You said a little

while ago that, with respect to authority, the same regulations applied

in the area of the civil administration as in the Reich.

SCHELLENBERG: I said they were to apply.

DR. THOMA: Please answer my question again.

SCHELLENBERG: I will repeat: I described the agreement which contained

the provision that in the areas intended for civil administration

(Reichskommissariat) the same relations between the Army and the

Security Police and the SD, in regard to subordination and command, were

applicable as in the Reich.

DR. THOMA: Do you know how that was done in practice?

SCHELLENBERG: No, later on I did not concern myself with these questions

any more.

DR. THOMA: Thank you.

HERR BABEL: You were a member of the SS and of the SD, and in leading

positions . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state, for the purposes of the record, which

organization you appear on behalf of?

HERR BABEL: I represent the organization of the SS and SD.

[_Turning to the witness._] In the RSHA there were departments of the

Security Police and the SD. How were these two departments interrelated,

and what was the purpose of the SD?

SCHELLENBERG: That is a question that I cannot answer with one sentence.

HERR BABEL: I can withdraw the question for the moment and ask a

concrete one: Was the SD used with the “Einsatzgruppen” in the East? To

what extent? And for what tasks?

SCHELLENBERG: I believe that most of this work in the East was

undertaken by the Security Police, that is, by the Secret State Police

and the Criminal Police and that only supplementary contingents were

formed from the personnel of the SD.

HERR BABEL: How large were these contingents? How large was the SD?

SCHELLENBERG: I believe that I can estimate the figures: Excluding

female employees, the State Police—perhaps 40,000 to 45,000; the

Criminal Police—15,000 to 20,000; the SD of the interior, that is, Amt

III with its organizational subsidiaries—2,000 to 2,500; and the SD

outside Germany, that is my Amt VI—about 400.

HERR BABEL: And how was the SD used in the East with the Einsatz groups.

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot give you the particulars, as that was a concern

of the personnel administration and it depended entirely upon the

instructions of the then Chief of the Security Police.

HERR BABEL: Did the figures you mentioned include only the male members

of the SD, or were the female employees also included?

SCHELLENBERG: Only male members. I excluded the female employees.

HERR BABEL: Yesterday a witness gave us approximately the same figure of

3,000, but he included the female employees in this figure.

SCHELLENBERG: I mentioned a figure of 2,000 to 2,500 for the SD in the

interior.

HERR BABEL: What was the organizational structure of the Waffen-SS?

SCHELLENBERG: As for the organizational structure of the Waffen-SS, I

cannot give you a detailed reply that is reliable as I did not deal with

this question.

HERR BABEL: You were a member of the Waffen-SS and of the SD?

SCHELLENBERG: I was merely appointed a member of the Waffen-SS in

January 1945, so to speak by higher orders, because I had many military

units under my command and I had to be given a military rank through the

Amt Military.

HERR BABEL: Do you know whether that also happened to a large extent in

other cases?

SCHELLENBERG: That question is beyond me.

HERR BABEL: Thank you.

COL. AMEN: Do you know of any particular case in which Kaltenbrunner had

ordered the evacuation of any one concentration camp, contrary to

Himmler’s wishes?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal about that?

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot give you the exact date, but I believe it was in

the beginning of April 1945. The son of the former Swiss President,

Muesi, who had taken his father to Switzerland, returned by car to the

Buchenwald Concentration Camp, in order to fetch a Jewish family which I

myself had set free. He found the camp in process of being evacuated

under the most deplorable conditions. When he had, 3 days previously,

driven his father to Switzerland, he was given definite assurance before

he left that the camps would not be evacuated. Since this assurance was

also intended for General Eisenhower, he was doubly disappointed at this

breach of promise. Muesi, Jr., called on me personally at my office. He

was deeply offended and reproached me bitterly. I could not understand

what had happened; and I at once contacted Himmler’s secretary,

protesting against this sort of procedure. Shortly after, it was

admitted that the facts as depicted by Muesi, Jr., were true, although

it was still incomprehensible, because Himmler had not given these

orders. I was assured that everything would be done to put an immediate

halt to the evacuations. This was confirmed on the telephone personally

by Himmler a few hours later. I believe it was on the same day, after a

meeting of office chiefs, that I informed Kaltenbrunner of the situation

and expressed my profound concern at this new breach of international

assurances. As I paused in the conversation, the Chief of the State

Police, Gruppenführer Müller, interrupted and explained that he had

started the evacuation of the more important internees from the

individual camps 3 days ago on Kaltenbrunner’s orders. Kaltenbrunner

replied with these words:

“Yes, that is correct. It was an order of the Führer which was

also recently confirmed by the Führer in person. All the

important internees are to be evacuated at his order to the

south of the Reich.”

He then turned to me mockingly and, speaking in dialect, said:

“Tell your old gentleman (i.e. Muesi, Sr.) that there are still

enough left in the camps. With that you too can be satisfied.”

I think this was on 10 April 1945.

COL. AMEN: That is all, may it please the Tribunal.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Can you say now what the functions of

the RSHA were?

SCHELLENBERG: That I cannot answer in one sentence. I believe . . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Be brief, be brief! What were the aims?

SCHELLENBERG: The RSHA was a comprehensive grouping of the Security

Police, that is, the State Police . . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): We know about this organization on the

basis of the documents which are at the disposal of the Court, but what

were its functions?

SCHELLENBERG: I just wanted to explain its functions. Its functions

consisted of security, that is, State Police activity, of Criminal

Police activity, and of intelligence activity at home and abroad.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Would it be correct to formulate the

functions as follows: To suppress those whom the Nazi Party considered

its enemies?

SCHELLENBERG: No, I think this statement is too one-sided.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But all these functions were included?

SCHELLENBERG: They were, perhaps, a certain part of the activities of

the State Police.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Had this part of the functions, then,

been changed after Kaltenbrunner took office?

SCHELLENBERG: No, there was no change.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Had those functions, to which you

referred just now, been changed since the time that Kaltenbrunner took

office as Chief of the Security Police?

SCHELLENBERG: The functions, as I formulated them, did not change after

Kaltenbrunner assumed office.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I have one more question: What were the

aims and purposes of the Einsatz groups which were to have been created

on the basis of the agreement between the SD and the High Command?

SCHELLENBERG: As I mentioned before, in the first part of the agreement

made at that time it was laid down that the rear must be protected and

all means used to repress any resistance.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): To repress or to crush resistance?

SCHELLENBERG: The words were, “All resistance is to be crushed with

every means.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): By what means was the resistance to be

suppressed?

SCHELLENBERG: The agreement did not mention or discuss this in any way.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But you know what means were used for

that suppression, do you not?

SCHELLENBERG: Later I heard that because of the bitterness of the

struggle, harsh means were chosen, but I know this only by hearsay.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What does it mean more exactly?

SCHELLENBERG: That in partisan fighting and in encounters with the

civilian population many shootings took place.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Including children?

SCHELLENBERG: I didn’t hear about that.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You didn’t hear about it?

[_There was no response._]

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): That is all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Since Your Lordship was good enough to ask me

whether I wanted to put any questions, I have had some further

information and I should be very grateful if the Tribunal would be good

enough to allow me to ask one or two questions.

[_Turning to the witness._] Would you direct your mind to a conversation

between the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, Gruppenführer Nebe, and

Gruppenführer Müller, in the spring of 1944, in Berlin at Wilhelmstrasse

102.

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With what was that conversation concerned?

SCHELLENBERG: This conversation, as far as I could gather—for I took no

part in it—concerned the subsequent covering for the shooting of about

50 English or American prisoners of war. The gist of the conversation

was, as far as I remember, that there had evidently been an inquiry from

the International Red Cross as to the whereabouts of 50 English and

American prisoners of war. This request for information by the

International Red Cross appears to have been passed on to the Chief of

the Security Police and the SD by way of the Foreign Office. From the

conversation I could . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was it already in the form of a protest against

the shooting of prisoners of war?

SCHELLENBERG: I believe it was lodged in the form of a protest, since

from fragments of this conversation I gathered that there was a

discussion as to how the shooting of these prisoners of war, which had

already taken place, could be covered up or disguised.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did Kaltenbrunner discuss this with Müller and

Nebe?

SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner discussed this matter with Müller and Nebe,

but I heard merely fragments of the conversation. I heard, incidentally,

that they meant to discuss the details in the course of the afternoon.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you hear any suggestion put forward as to

what explanations should be given to cover the shooting of these

prisoners?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, Kaltenbrunner himself offered these suggestions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What were the suggestions?

SCHELLENBERG: That the majority should be treated as individual cases,

as “having perished in air raids”; some, I believe, because they

“offered resistance,” that is, “physical resistance,” while others were

“pursued when escaping.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean—shot while trying to escape?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, shot in flight.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And these were the excuses which Kaltenbrunner

suggested?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, these were the excuses that Kaltenbrunner suggested.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to try and remember as well as

you can about these prisoners. Does any number remain in your mind? Can

you remember any number of prisoners that they were discussing or how

these explanations arose? About how many?

SCHELLENBERG: I remember only that the number “50” was mentioned over

and over again, but what the actual details were I cannot say because I

just caught fragments of the conversation. I could not follow the whole

conversation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the number “50” remains in your mind?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, I heard “50.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you remember anything of the place or the

camp in which these people had been, who were said to have been shot?

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot tell you under oath. There is a possibility that

I might add something I heard afterwards. I believe it was Breslau, but

I cannot say it exactly, as a fact.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And can you remember anything of what service

the people belonged to? Were they Air Force or Army? Have you any

recollection on that point?