The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring
England to her knees. However, this can occur only if we have
occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me.
None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no
importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great
height, even if the world does hate us now. I risk the loss of
this achievement. I have to choose between victory or
destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be
compared with the decision of Frederick the Great before the
first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one
man. Even there, the closest advisers were disposed to
capitulation. Everything depended on Frederick the Great. Even
the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great.
My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England
at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the
neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will
question that when we have won. The arguments we will choose for
the breach of neutrality shall not be as idiotic as they were in
1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France
will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I
consider it possible to end the war only by means of an attack.
The question as to whether the attack will be successful, no one
can answer. Everything depends upon favorable providence.”
Thereafter the winter of 1939 and 1940 passed quietly, the winter of
so-called “phony war.”
The General Staff and High Command group all knew what the plan
was—they had all been told. To attack ruthlessly at the first
opportunity; to smash the French and English forces; to pay no heed to
treaties with, or neutrality of, the Low Countries. “Breaking of the
neutrality of Holland and Belgium is meaningless. No one will question
that when we have won.” That is what Hitler told the Oberbefehlshaber.
The generals and admirals agreed and went forward with their plans.
Now it is not true that all the steps in this march of conquest were
conceived by Hitler and that the military leaders embarked on them with
reluctance and misgivings. To show this we need only hark back for a
moment to what Major Elwyn Jones told the Tribunal about the plans for
the invasion of Denmark and Norway.
The Tribunal will recall that Hitler’s utterances in October and
November, which I have just read, although they are full of threatening
comments about France and England and the Low Countries, contain no
suggestion of an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler’s memorandum of 9
October, from which I read Document L-52, affirmatively indicates that
Hitler saw no reason to disturb the situation to the north, because he
said that unless unforeseen factors appeared the neutrality of the
northern states could be assumed. Trade could be continued with those
countries even in a long war. But a week previously, on the 3rd of
October 1939, the Defendant Raeder had caused a questionnaire to be
circulated within the Naval Staff seeking comments on the advantages
which might be gained from a naval standpoint by securing bases in
Norway and Denmark. That document is C-122, Exhibit Number GB-82. And
another document introduced by Major Elwyn Jones, Document C-66, which
is Exhibit Number GB-81, shows that Raeder was prompted to circulate
this questionnaire by a letter from another admiral named Carls, who
pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by
Germany. Admiral Carls, Rolf Carls, later attained the rank of Admiral
of the Fleet and commanded Naval Group North and in that capacity is a
member of the group as defined in the Indictment, as well as Raeder.
The Tribunal will also recall that the Defendant Dönitz, who at that
time was flag officer of submarines, replied to the questionnaire from
Raeder on 9 October 1939. The document in question is Document C-5,
Exhibit Number GB-83. And Dönitz replied that from his standpoint
Trondheim and Narvik met the requirements for a submarine base, that
Trondheim was better, and that he proposed the establishment of a U-boat
base there. The next day Raeder visited Hitler, and this visit and
certain subsequent events are described in a document which has not
previously been introduced.
Now, Your Honors, owing to a confusion in numbering, the German document
is C-71, but the translation appears in your books in Document L-323,
and that will be Exhibit Number USA-541. The translation will be found
in L-323, the middle of the page, entitled, “Entry in the War Diary of
the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, naval war staff, on ‘Weserübung’,”
that being the code name for the operation against Norway and Denmark.
Diary entry for 10 October 1939:
“First reference of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, when
visiting the Führer, to the significance of Norway for sea and
air warfare. The Führer intends to give the matter
consideration.
“12 December 1939. Führer received Q and H”—those being
presumably Quisling and Hagelin.
“Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces to make mental preparations. The Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy is having an essay prepared which will be ready in
January.”
I may interpolate. The translation of the next sentence is somewhat in
error and should read:
“With reference to this essay Kapitän zur See Krancke is working
on ‘Weserübung’ at OKW.”
“During the time which followed H”—Hagelin—“maintained contact
with the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
His aim was to develop the Party Q”—Quisling—“with a view to
making it capable of action and to give the Supreme Command of
the Navy information on the political developments in Norway and
military questions. In general he pressed the speeding up of
preparations, but considered that it was first necessary to
expand the organization.”
I think that is all I need read of that.
Another document, which is Document C-64, Exhibit Number GB-86, already
in the record, shows that on 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed
the Norwegian project with Hitler—I am not going to read from that
document, Your Honors—at a meeting which the Defendants Keitel and Jodl
also attended. In the meantime Raeder was in touch with the Defendant
Rosenberg on the possibilities of using Quisling; and Major Elwyn Jones
very properly pointed out to the Tribunal the close link between the
service chiefs and the Nazi politicians. As a result of all this, on
Hitler’s instructions, Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940
stating that Hitler had commissioned him to undertake charge of
preparations for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code
name Weserübung.
On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive setting forth the general
plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. That is Document C-174,
Exhibit Number GB-89, which Major Elwyn Jones put in the record. The
directive was initialed by Admiral Kurt Fricke, who at that time was
head of the operations division of the naval war staff and who at the
end of 1941 became Chief of the naval war staff and in that capacity is
a member of the group as defined in the Indictment. So, as these
documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark was not
conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military leaders; on
the contrary, it was conceived in the naval part of the General Staff
and High Command group, and Hitler was persuaded to take the idea up.
Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General Staff and
High Command group as to the Nazis.
As to the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were
disturbed about treaty considerations. The Tribunal will remember that
at a conference between Hitler and the principal military leaders in May
1939, as shown in Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27, already in the
record, when the intention to attack Poland was announced, Hitler, in
discussing the possibility of war with England, said that the Dutch and
Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. “Declarations of
neutrality will be ignored.” And later, in his speech to the
Oberbefehlshaber in November 1939, Hitler said that they must first
invade the Low Countries and “no one will question that when we have
won.”
Accordingly, one can well imagine that the winter of 1939 and 1940 and
the early spring of 1940 was a period of very intensive planning in
German military circles. The major attack in the West through the Low
Countries had to be planned and the attack on Norway and Denmark had to
be planned. The Defendant Jodl’s diary for the period 1 February to 26
May 1940, Document 1809-PS, Exhibit Number GB-88, contains many entries
reflecting the course of this planning. Some of the entries have been
read into the record and others are now of interest.
The Tribunal will see from these entries which have already been read
that during February and early March there was considerable doubt in
German military circles as to whether the attack on Norway and Denmark
should precede or follow the attack on the Low Countries and that at
some points there even was doubt as to whether all these attacks were
necessary from a military standpoint. But the Tribunal will not find a
single entry which reflects any hesitancy from a moral angle, on the
part of Jodl or any of the people he mentions, to overrun these
countries.
I will make several references now to Document 1809-PS and several of
the entries in it. I do not plan to quote verbatim from any one of them.
The Court will note that on 1 February 1940 General Jeschonnek, the
Chief of the Air Staff and a member of the group as defined in the
Indictment, visited Jodl and made a suggestion that it might be wise to
attack only Holland, on the ground that Holland alone would offer a
tremendous improvement for Germany’s aerial warfare.
On 6 February Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek, Warlimont, and Colonel Von
Waldau, and what Jodl calls a “new idea” was proposed at this meeting:
That the Germans should carry out only “Action H” (Holland) and the
Weser Exercise (Norway and Denmark) and should guarantee Belgium’s
neutrality for the duration of the war.
I suppose the German Air Force may have felt that the occupation of
Holland alone would give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks
on England and that if Belgium’s neutrality were preserved the German
bases in Holland would be immune from attack by the French and British
armies in France. If, to meet this situation, the French and British
should attack through Holland and Belgium, the violation of neutrality
would be on the other foot. But whether or not this new idea made sense
from a military angle, it appears to be a most extraordinary notion from
a diplomatic angle. It was a proposal to violate without any excuse the
neutrality of three neighboring small countries and simultaneously to
guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have
attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such
circumstances, it is difficult to imagine; and in fact, the “new idea”
projected at this meeting seems a most extraordinary combination of
cynicism and naïveté.
In the meantime, as Jodl’s diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the “special
staff” for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its
instructions from Keitel. On 21 February Hitler put General Von
Falkenhorst in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl’s diary
records that “Falkenhorst accepts gladly.”
On 26 February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first to Norway
or the Low Countries, but on 3 March he decided to do Norway first and
the Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final.
Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the
adventure was certain by the 1st of May. The invasion of the Low
Countries took place 10 days later.
So France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side
of Germany, and the African campaign began. In October 1940 Italy
attacked Greece. The Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of
Yugoslavia became embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the
attack of the Soviet Union was being planned and Germany felt she could
not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.
Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to
Italy’s aid, and the Yugoslavian _coup d’état_ of 26 March 1941 brought
about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The documents
have already been introduced by Colonel Phillimore, and there is little
that I need to add for my present purpose. The decisions were made; the
Armed Forces drew up the necessary plans and executed the attacks. The
onslaught was particularly unmerciful and ruthless against Yugoslavia
for the special purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final
deployment instructions were issued by Brauchitsch and appear in
Document R-95, Exhibit Number GB-127, which has not been read before.
Two extracts from this are of interest. These extracts are very short:
“The political situation in the Balkans having changed by reason
of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be considered
an enemy even should it make declarations of loyalty at first.
“The Führer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to
destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible.”
And turning to Paragraph Number 5, the “Timetable for the Operations”:
“On 5 April as soon as sufficient forces of the Air Forces are
available and weather permitting, the Air Forces should attack
continuously by day and night the Yugoslav ground organization
and Belgrade.”
The German attack on the Soviet Union I have little more to say about.
The documents showing the aggressive nature of the attack have been put
in by Mr. Alderman. I suppose it is quite possible that some members of
the General Staff and High Command group opposed Barbarossa as
unnecessary and unwise from a military standpoint. The Defendant Raeder
so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January 1944, Document C-66,
Exhibit Number GB-81. C-66 is the translation and the only document I
propose to read on this subject, from which a few extracts are of
interest. The quotation starts at the very outset of the Document C-66:
“At this time the Führer had made known his ‘unalterable
decision’ to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all
remonstrances. After that further warnings, if no new situation
had arisen, were found to be, according to previous experiences,
completely useless. As Chief of naval war staff I was never
convinced of the ‘compelling necessity’ for Barbarossa.”
And passing to the third paragraph:
“The Führer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts
with Russia; doubtless his general ideological attitude played
an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he
intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would
then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf.
The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic
States in 1939-1940 probably further strengthened him in this
idea.”
And passing to the very end of the document, Paragraph 7, Page 4:
“As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion.
If thereby a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and
myself”—that, if I may interpolate, is a division of the naval
war staff having to do with operations—“it is perhaps because
the arguments the Führer used on such occasions (dinner speech
in the middle of July to the officers in command) to justify a
step he had planned usually had a greater effect on people not
belonging to the inner circle than on those who often heard this
type of reasoning.
“Many remarks and plans indicate that the Führer calculated on
the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941,
whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very
skeptical.”
That, to be sure, indicates division of opinion as to the military
chances of a rapid success, but the part last quoted indicates that
other members of the group favored Barbarossa and Raeder’s memorandum
actually says and substantiates what Blomberg’s affidavit says: That
some of the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler’s judgment,
but that the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand
against him, although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the
High Command took no stand against Hitler on Barbarossa and the events
of 1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the
Soviet war tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless
determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have all
been read and cited to the Court previously.
That concludes the evidence on the criminal activities of the group
under Counts One and Two. The documents written by the military leaders
are not the writings of men who were reluctant to plan and execute these
manifold wars.
I want to make clear again the nature of the accusations against this
group under Counts One and Two. They are not accused on the ground that
they are soldiers. They are not accused merely for doing the usual
things a soldier is expected to do, such as making military plans and
commanding troops. It is, I suppose, among the normal duties of a
diplomat to engage in negotiations and conferences, to write notes and
_aide-memoire_, to entertain at dinner parties, and cultivate good will
toward the government he represents. The Defendant Ribbentrop is not
indicted for doing these things. It is the usual function of a
politician to draft regulations and decrees, to make speeches. The
Defendants Hess and Frick are not indicted for doing those things.
It is an innocent and respectable business to be a locksmith; but it is
none the less a crime, if the locksmith turns his talents to picking the
locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And that is the nature of
the charge under Counts One and Two against the defendants and the
General Staff and High Command group. The charge is that, in performing
the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers, sailors, or whatever
they happened to be, they conspired, and did plan, prepare, initiate,
and wage illegal wars and thereby committed crimes under Article 6 (a)
of the Charter.
It is no defense for those who committed such crimes to plead that they
practice a particular profession. It is perfectly legal for military men
to prepare military plans to meet national contingencies, and such plans
may legally be drawn whether they are offensive or defensive in a
military sense. It is perfectly legal for military leaders to carry out
such plans and engage in war, if in doing so they do not plan and launch
and wage wars which are illegal because they are aggressive and in
contravention of the Charter.
I am very far from saying that there may not be individual cases,
involving some individual members of this group, where drawing the line
between legal and illegal behavior might involve some difficulties. That
is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But I do not believe
that there is any doubt or difficulty here, before this Tribunal, as to
the criminality of the General Staff and High Command group as a group
under Counts One and Two, or as to the guilt of the five defendants who
are members of the group.
In the case of the Defendants Göring, Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is
voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is more
or less constant. The same is true of Defendant Raeder, and his
individual responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway
and Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against
Dönitz is less voluminous for the reason that he was younger and not one
of the top group until later in the war.
But numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command group,
including its other leaders, are shown to have participated knowingly
and wilfully in these illegal plans and wars: Brauchitsch, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder;
Warlimont, the deputy of Jodl. In the nature of things these men knew
all that was going on and participated fully, as the documents show.
Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau, and Von
Schober, together with Göring, were immediately sent for by Hitler when
Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At a later date we have seen
Blaskowitz as an Oberbefehlshaber in the field, knowingly preparing for
the attack on Poland; Field Marshal List educating the Bulgarians for
their role during the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; Von Falkenhorst
“gladly” accepting the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and
Denmark. On the air side, Jeschonnek has been recorded proposing that
Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and Holland and simultaneously assuring
Belgium that there is nothing to fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls,
member of the group, foresees at an early date that German policy is
leading to a general European war, and at a later date the attack on
Norway and Denmark is his brainchild; Krancke, later one of the group,
is one of the chief planners of this attack; Schniewind is in the inner
circle for the attack on Poland; Fricke certifies the final orders for
Weserübung and a few months later proposes that Germany annex Belgium
and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia to
vassalage.
Most of the 19 officers I have mentioned were at that time members of
the group, as defined, and the few who were not, subsequently became
members. At the final conference for Barbarossa 17 additional members
were present and at the two meetings with Hitler, at which the
aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully disclosed, the
entire group was present.
The military defendants will perhaps argue that they are pure
technicians. This amounts to saying that military men are a race apart
from and different from the ordinary run of human beings—men above and
beyond the moral and legal requirements that apply to others, incapable
of exercising moral judgment on their own behalf.
What we are discussing here is the crime of planning and waging
aggressive war. It stands to reason that that crime is committed most
consciously and culpably by a nation’s leaders—the leaders in all the
major fields of activity which are necessary to and closely involved in
the waging of war. It is committed by propagandists and publicists. It
is committed by political leaders, by diplomats, by the chief ministers,
by the principal industrial and financial leaders. It is no less
committed by the military leaders.
In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war is
accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these types of
leaders. And if the leaders in any notably important field of activity
stand aside or resist or fail to co-operate, then the program will at
the very least be seriously obstructed. That is why the principal
leaders in all these fields of activity share responsibility for the
crime, and the military leaders no less than the others. Leadership in
the military field, as well as in other fields, calls for moral wisdom
as well as technical astuteness.
I do not think that the responsible military leaders of any nation will
be heard to say that their role is that of a mere janitor, or custodian,
or pilot of the war machine which is under their command and that they
bear no responsibility whatsoever for the use to which that machine is
put.
The prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate today,
when the military leaders control forces infinitely more powerful and
destructive than ever before. Should the military leaders be declared
exempt from the declaration in the Charter that planning and waging
aggressive war is a crime, it would be a crippling, if not a fatal blow
to the efficacy of that declaration.
Such is certainly not the view of the United States. The Prosecution
here representing the United States believes that the profession of arms
is a distinguished profession. We believe that the practice of that
profession by its leaders calls for the highest degree of integrity and
moral wisdom no less than for technical skill. We believe that, in
consulting and planning with the leaders in other fields of national
activities, the military leaders must act in accordance with
international law and the dictates of the public conscience. Otherwise
the military resources of the nation will be used, not in accordance
with the laws of modern society, but in accordance with the law of the
jungle. The military leaders share responsibility with other leaders. I
use the word “share” advisedly. Obviously the military leaders are not
the final and exclusive arbiters, and the German military leaders do not
bear exclusive responsibility for the criminal holocaust which was
committed. But the German military leaders conspired with others to
undermine and destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German
military leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and, if necessary, to
resort to war for that purpose.
As the Chief Prosecutor for the United States said in his opening
statement, the German military leaders are here before you because they,
along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war.
Your Lordship, that concludes the evidence under Counts One and Two, and
if this would be a convenient stopping point . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You have another branch of the argument?
COL. TAYLOR: Counts Three and Four, Your Honor, which will take
considerable time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]
TWENTY-EIGHTH DAY
Monday, 7 January 1946
_Morning Session_
COL. TAYLOR: May it please the Court, Sir, when the Court rose on Friday
I had completed that part of the presentation on Counts One and Two. I
now turn to that part of the Indictment which charges that the General
Staff and High Command group had a major responsibility for the War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved in the execution of the
Common Plan or Conspiracy set forth in Counts Three and Four of the
Indictment. For purpose of brevity I shall refer to these crimes simply
as War Crimes.
The presentation of the documents under this part of the case should
take all or the better part of the morning session. At the conclusion of
that, I propose to call a single witness, one witness, Erich von dem
Bach-Zelewski, whose testimony on direct examination should not exceed
25 or 30 minutes. After that, I shall take possibly 10 minutes to
conclude, and that will be the entire presentation.
On this part of the case I propose to show that members of the General
Staff and High Command group, including the defendants who are members
of the group, ordered and directed the commission of War Crimes, and
thereby participated in the commission of War Crimes in their official
capacity as members of the group. I also propose to show, in certain
instances, the actual commission of War Crimes by members of the German
Armed Forces as a result of these orders or as a result of other orders
and arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command
group which controlled the German Armed Forces. However, I do not
propose to make a full showing of War Crimes committed by the German
Armed Forces. The full presentation of the evidence under Counts Three
and Four will be made, pursuant to agreement among the Chief
Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet Delegations, and a substantial
amount of the evidence to be presented by them will be relevant to the
charges against the General Staff and High Command group.
We will at this time show the Tribunal that the General Staff and High
Command became wedded to a policy of terror. In some cases, the evidence
of this policy is in documentary form, and we will present the
activating papers which were signed by, initialed by, and circulated
among the members of the group. In other instances, where the actual
crimes were committed by others than members of the German Armed Forces,
where, for example, prisoners of war were handed over to and mistreated
by the SS or SD, we will show that in those cases members of this group
were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of War
Crimes. We will show that many crimes committed by the SS and SD were
committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff
and High Command group.
The first matter which I will take up relates to the killing, in
violation of international law and the rules of war, of Allied
commandos, paratroopers, and members of military missions, and the first
document to which I wish to refer is 498-PS, which will be Exhibit
USA-501.
This story starts with the order embodied in that document, which is an
order issued by Hitler on 18 October 1942, and which Mr. Storey has
already mentioned in the presentation of charges against the
Sicherheitsdienst. The order begins with a recital that Allied commandos
were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside the scope of the
Geneva Convention, and thereafter proceeds to specify the methods of
warfare which German troops should use against Allied commandos, and the
disposition which should be made of captured commandos.
This order is one of the two basic documents in the story. I will read
it in full:
“1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare
methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions.
Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the
so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially
recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From
captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only
to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on
the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter, as
prisoners, represent a burden in the further pursuit of their
purpose or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have
been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded
in principle.
“2. For this reason it was already announced, in an addendum to
the Armed Forces communiqué of 7 October 1942, that in the
future, Germany, in the face of the sabotage troops of the
British and their accomplices, will resort to the same
procedure, that is, that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by
the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.
“3. I therefore order:
“From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in
Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they are
to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops,
whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be
slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference
whether they are landed from ships and airplanes for their
actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these
individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give
themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In
each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW
for publication in the communiqué of the Armed Forces.
“4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents,
saboteurs, _et cetera_, fall into the hands of the Armed Forces
by some other means, through the police in occupied territories,
for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD.
Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades, for
instance, _et cetera_, is strictly prohibited, even if this is
only intended for a short time.
“5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any soldiers
who, in the course of normal hostilities, large-scale offensive
actions, landing operations, and airborne operations, are
captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this
order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after
battles at sea, or to enemy soldiers trying to save their lives
by parachute after air battles.
“6. I will hold responsible under military law, for failing to
carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either
have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this
order, or acted against this order when it was to be executed.”
It is signed Adolf Hitler, and the Tribunal will note that this order
was issued by OKW in 12 copies, and the distribution shown on the second
page included the three Supreme Commands, Army, Sea, and Air, and the
principal field commands.
Now, the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order, that is, Document
503-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-542. This was issued for the purpose
of explaining the reasons why the basic order was issued. In this
explanation, Hitler gave a rather different set of reasons for the
issuance of the order and pointed out that Allied commando operations
had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear
communications, intimidating laborers, and destroying important war
plants in occupied areas. This is the other basic document; and while I
need not read it in full, I would like to read substantial excerpts,
starting with the first paragraph at the top of the page:
“Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and
sabotage troops”—then in parentheses was a cross reference to
the order which I have just read—“a supplementary order of the
Führer is enclosed.
“This order is intended for commanders only and must not, under
any circumstances, fall into enemy hands.
“The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the
receiving bureaus.
“The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible
for the return and destruction of all distributed copies of this
order and copies made thereof.”
It is signed, “The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, by
order of Jodl.”
Thereafter follows a distribution list and then the supplementary order
itself, signed by Hitler. I will start reading the first two paragraphs
of the supplementary order which appear at the bottom of Page 1 of the
translation:
“I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the
destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare
non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it
necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and
commanders the reasons for this decree.
“As in no previous war, a method of destruction of
communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace
working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important
industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been
developed in this war.”
I propose to skip to the bottom of Page 2, the last two paragraphs on
Page 2 of the translation:
“The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary
weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is
cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single
electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of
many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the
construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the
fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the
homeland as well as to bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.
“Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the
adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at
the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can,
according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they
themselves have orders ruthlessly to remove any German soldiers
or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of
suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at
the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender
and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the
provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however,
that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva
agreements, especially since part of these elements are even
criminals liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate
themselves through these activities.
“England and America will therefore always be able to find
volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can
truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life
for them. At worst, all they have to do is successfully to
commit their attacks on people, traffic installations, or other
installations and, upon being encountered by the enemy, to
capitulate.
“If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage
through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary
that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without
exception, to the last man.
“This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is
nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that
a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to
be captured, expecting to be treated according to the rules of
the Geneva Convention. It must, under all circumstances, be
ruthlessly exterminated.
“The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces
communiqué will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage,
terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and
exterminated to the last man.
“I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies
subordinate to them, as well as individual commanders, not only
to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry
out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned
officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported
without fail or, if the circumstances require it, e.g. if danger
is imminent, to be at once made strictly accountable. The
homeland, as well as the fighting soldier at the front, has the
right to expect that behind their backs the essentials of
nourishment as well as the supply with war-important weapons and
ammunition remains secure.
“These are the reasons for the issuance of my decree.
“If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation,
initially to spare one man or two, then they are to be shot
immediately after interrogation.”
Your Lordship, the next is Document C-179, which will be Exhibit
USA-543. As this document shows, 10 days later on 28 October 1942 and
while the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy,
the naval war staff in Berlin transmitted its copy of the basic order of
18 October to the lower naval commands. The copy distributed by the Navy
and the covering memorandum from the naval war staff show clearly the
secrecy which surrounded the dissemination of this order; and I read the
first sheet of this document only, the cover sheet:
“Enclosed please find an order of the Führer regarding
annihilation of terror and sabotage units. This order must not
be distributed in writing by flotilla leaders, section
commanders, or officers of this rank. After verbal notification
to subordinate sections, the above officers must hand this order
over to the next higher section, which is responsible for its
withdrawal and destruction.”
Passing over to Page 3 of this document, at the very end we find a
similar admonition in the notice for distribution, at the very end of
the document; I read:
“These instructions are not to be distributed over and above the
battalions and the corresponding staffs of the other services.
After notification, those copies distributed over and above the
regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must
be withdrawn and destroyed.”
The next document, Your Lordship, is C-178, which becomes Exhibit
USA-544. This document is dated 11 February 1943, which was 12 days
after the Defendant Dönitz had become Commander-in-Chief of the German
Navy. On that day, this memorandum was circulated within the naval war
staff in order to clear up certain misunderstandings as to the scope of
the basic order of 18 October 1942. This document, of which I will read
the first four paragraphs, indicates why the earlier order had been
treated as such a secret matter and also directs that all naval
commanders and officers who failed to carry out the order, or to
instruct their units concerning the order, would run the risk of serious
court-martial penalties. I’ll read the first four paragraphs only:
“From the notice given by the 3rd Section of the Naval
Operations Staff on 1 February 1943 it has been discovered that
the competent departments of the General Staff of the Army, as
well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff, have a wrong
conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone
inquiry at the 3rd Section of the Operations Staff proved that
this naval authority was not correctly informed either.
“In view of this situation, reference is made to Paragraph 6 of
the Führer Order of 18 October 1942”—and then a
cross-reference—“according to which all commanders and officers
who have neglected their duty in instructing their units about
the order referring to treatment of saboteurs are threatened
with punishment by court-martial.
“The first Führer order concerning this matter of 18 October
1942 was given the protection of top secret merely because it
stated therein (1) that according to the Führer’s views, the
spreading of military sabotage organizations in the East and
West may have tremendous consequences for our whole conduct of
the war, and (2) that the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting
on military orders must be carried out even after they have
surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon.
“On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle
is not at all to be kept secret; but on the contrary, to be
currently published in the OKW reports. The purpose of these
measures to act as a deterrent will not be achieved if those
taking part in enemy commando operations would not learn that
certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the
saboteurs are to be annihilated immediately, unless their
statements are first needed for military reasons, it is
necessary that not only all members of the Armed Forces must
receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even if they
are in uniform, are to be annihilated but also all departments
of the home staff, dealing with this kind of questions, must be
informed of the course of action which has been ordered.”
I will call the Tribunal’s attention to the two reasons given in that
quotation for keeping secret from the public knowledge of the fact that
uniformed prisoners would be shot, even after they had surrendered and
asked for pardon. This shows a clear awareness that that was in direct
contravention of the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read the paragraph beginning,
“Practical difficulties . . .”?
COL. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. I’ll read that.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should.
COL. TAYLOR: “Practical difficulties may develop because of the
definition of the term ‘sabotage units.’ The annihilation and
destruction, according to Paragraph 5 of the Führer Order of 18
October 1942, do not apply to troops participating in
large-scale landing operations and large-scale airborne
operations. The criterion is to be found in that, in the latter
case, an open battle takes place, whereas, for instance, 10 or
more people who land by sea or air, or drop by parachute not to
fight an open battle but to destroy either a factory, a bridge,
or a railway installation, would fall into the category of those
who must be annihilated.”
The next document, Your Honor, is 508-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-545.
Now, the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 was actually carried out in a
number of instances, of which we have the documentary proof for several.
Document 508-PS shows that during the night of 19-20 November 1942, a
British freight glider crashed near Egersund, in Norway. The glider
carried a British commando unit of 17 men, of whom three were apparently
killed in the crash. All were in British uniform. Fourteen survivors
were executed in accordance with the Hitler Order the evening of 20
November. In proof of this I will read certain extracts from 508-PS,
beginning on Page 1 of the translation, the paragraph numbered “1)”:
“1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a
British freight glider at Egersund in the night of . . .”
It reads November 11 in the translation, but I believe in the original
it was November 20; that is a typographical error.
“a) No firing on the part of the German defense.
“b) The towing plane (Wellington) crashed after touching the
ground; 7-man crew dead. The attached freight glider also
crashed; of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage
force. Führer Order has been carried out.”
I pass to Page 3 of the translation, on which page appear two teletype
messages. I wish to read the first two paragraphs at the top of the
page:
“On 20 November 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15
kilometers northeast of Egersund. It is a British aircraft
(towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17-member
crew three are dead, six are severely, the others are slightly,
wounded.
“All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve insignia.
Furthermore, following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents,
skis, and radiosender, exact number still unknown. The glider
carried rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number
unknown. At present the prisoners are with the battalion in
Egersund.”
Passing to the second teletype message, the first paragraph:
“Beside the 17-member crew extensive sabotage material and work
equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was
absolutely proved. The 280th Infantry Division ordered the
execution of the action according to the Führer Order. The
execution was carried out toward the evening of 20 November.
Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki
uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short
interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their
names, ranks and serial numbers.”
I pass to the last paragraph of that teletype, at the foot of Page 3 of
the translation:
“In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew,
the Armed Forces Commander of Norway has issued an order to the
district commanders, according to which the interrogations by
G-2”—that was I. C. in the German—“and by BDS”—police—“are
important before the execution of the Führer Order; in case of
Paragraph Number 4 of the Führer Order, the prisoners are to be
handed over to the BDS.”
Your Lordship, the next document is 512-PS, Exhibit USA-546. This
document recites three specific instances where the Hitler Order was
carried out in Norway and especially emphasizes the desirability of
taking individual commandos prisoner for interrogation. I read from
Document 512-PS, dated 13 December 1942:
“According to the last sentence of the Führer Order of 18th
October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being
in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this
measure was proved in the cases of the Glomfjord, 2-man torpedo
Drontheim, and glider plane Stavanger, where interrogations
resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the
case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no
clues were obtained; therefore, Armed Forces Commander refers to
the above-mentioned last sentence of the Führer Order calling
for liquidation only after a short interrogation.”
One final document from the Norwegian Theater of War is relative.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, what does “RK” in the last paragraph
mean? The first words of the last paragraph?
COL. TAYLOR: Red Cross (Rotes Kreuz).
THE PRESIDENT: So they had a protest from the Red Cross?
COL. TAYLOR: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: And “BDS”?
COL. TAYLOR: That is “Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo).”
Document 526-PS which is Exhibit USA-502, dated 10 May 1943, Colonel
Storey has already brought to the Tribunal’s attention in connection
with the presentation against the Sicherheitsdienst. I will first read
the opening sentences:
“On 30 March 1943, in Toftefjord (degree of latitude 70), an
enemy cutter was sighted. Cutter was blown up by enemy.
“Crew: 2 dead and 10 taken prisoners.
“Cutter sent from Scalloway (Shetland Isles) by the Norwegian
Navy.”
Passing to the word “Purpose”:
“Purpose: Building of an organization for the sabotaging of
strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and
bridges.
“Assigner of mission in London: Norwegian Major Munthe.
“Führer Order executed by Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service).
“Wehrmacht communiqué of 6 April announces the following about
it: ‘In northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and
destroyed on approaching the coast.’”
Now, shifting to the Italian Theater of War, I call the Court’s
attention to 509-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-547. This document is
dated 7 November 1943; and is a telegram from the Supreme Commander in
Italy to OKW; and it shows that on 2 November 1943 three British
commandos, taken prisoner near Pescara in Italy, were given “special
treatment” (sonderbehandelt), which as the Court knows from previous
evidence in the case, meant death. What happened to the nine remaining
prisoners of war in the hospital, we do not know.
I have one more document from the Italian Theater, 2610-PS, Exhibit
USA-548. This specifically shows the carrying out of Hitler’s orders. It
consists of an affidavit, dated 7 November 1945, by Frederick W. Roche,
a major in the Army of the United States. Major Roche was the Judge
Advocate of an American Military Commission which tried General Anton
Dostler, formerly Commander of the 75th German Army Corps, for the
unlawful execution of 15 members of the United States Armed Forces. I
will read from this affidavit:
“Frederick W. Roche, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
“I am a major in the Army of the United States. I was the Judge
Advocate of the Military Commission which tried Anton Dostler
for ordering the execution of the group of 15 United States Army
personnel who comprised the ‘Ginny Mission.’ This Military
Commission, consisting of five officers, was appointed by
command of General McNarney, by Special Order, Number 269, dated
26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of
Operations, United States Army, APO 512.
“The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945,
and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States
_versus_ Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed 4 days,
and the findings and sentence were announced on the morning of
12 October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are
as follows:
“Charge: Violation of the law of war.
“Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then general, commanding
military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation,
to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in
the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war,
order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army
personnel consisting of two officers and 13 enlisted men who had
then recently been captured by forces under General Dostler,
which order was carried into execution on or about 26 March
1944, resulting in the death of the said 15 members of the Army
of the United States. . . .”—and a list of names follows.
“I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all the
testimony and I am familiar with the records in this case. The
facts developed in this proceeding are as follows:
“On the night of 22 March 1944 two officers and 13 enlisted men
of the 2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of
the United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats
and landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All 15
men were members of the Army of the United States and were in
the military service of the United States. When they landed on
the Italian coast, they were all properly dressed in the field
uniform of the United States Army and they carried no civilian
clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad tunnel on the
main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being
used by the German forces to supply their fighting forces on the
Cassino and Anzio beachhead fronts. The entire group was
captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a patrol consisting
of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of the German Army.
All 15 men were placed under interrogation in La Spezia and they
were held in custody until the morning of 26 March 1944, when
they were all executed by a firing squad. These men were never
tried nor were they brought before any court or given any
hearing; they were shot by order of Anton Dostler, then general
commanding the 75th German Army Corps.
“Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified, by way
of defense, that he ordered the 15 American soldiers to be shot
pursuant to the Hitler Order of 18 October 1942 on commando
operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and
not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been
interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject
to court-martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler
Order.
“The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in
the case of the United States against Anton Dostler, as these
findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial
and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy, on 12
October 1945:
“Findings: General Dostler, as President of this Commission it
is my duty to inform you that the Commission, in closed session
and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Commission concurring in each finding of guilty,
finds you of the specification and of the charge: Guilty.
“Sentence: And again in closed session and upon secret written
ballot, at least two-thirds of all the members of the Commission
concurring, sentences you: To be shot to death by musketry.”
Now the order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as we know,
until the end of the war. I wish to offer 506-PS, which will be Exhibit
USA-549. This document is dated 22 June 1944. It is initialed by
Warlimont, and in it the OKW made it where the commando operation was
undertaken by only one person. I will read the single paragraph of the
order:
“The Operations Staff agrees with the view taken in the letter
of the army group judge to the Supreme Commander Southwest of 20
May 1944. The Führer Order is to be applied even if the enemy
employs only one person for a task. Therefore, it does not make
any difference if several persons or a single person take part
in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of
participants in a commando operation is that such operations do
not correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of
warfare.”
The Allied landing in Normandy early in June 1944, in the course of
which large-scale airborne operations took place, raised among the
Germans the question as to how far the Hitler Order would be applied in
Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. I direct the Court’s
attention to Document 531-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-550. The
memorandum is dated 23 June 1944 and is signed by Warlimont. Warlimont’s
memorandum starts by quoting a teletype received from the Supreme
Command in the West, inquiring what should be done about applying the
Hitler Order to airborne troops and commandos.
I would like to read a small part of the teletype, beginning at the
beginning:
“Supreme Command West; teletype message Number 1750/44; top
secret; 23 June 1944.
“The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried
out according to the order referred to.”
If I may interpolate here, the order referred to is shown in the
cross-reference to the Führer Order of 18 October 1942.
“With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has
arisen. The order referred to directs, in Paragraph 5, that
enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or
surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (such as
large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be
treated according to Paragraphs 3 and 4. It must be established
in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept
‘within the limits of normal combat operations, _et cetera_’ is
to be extended.”
Then I pass down to Subparagraph D and read the first sentence of that
subparagraph.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you ought to read the latter part of “C.”
COL. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I think it is all summarized in the one
sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: The last sentence is the one that I mean.
COL. TAYLOR: “Considerable reprisals against our own prisoners
must be expected if its contents become known.”
Then, continuing with “D”:
“The application of Number 5 for all enemy soldiers in uniform
penetrating from the outside into the occupied western
territories is held by the Supreme Command West to be the most
correct and clearest solution.”
Accordingly, as it is there shown, the Supreme Command in the West
directed that Paragraph 5, which is the paragraph under which the orders
for execution are not to be applied, should be utilized in the West.
At the foot of the page is the position taken by the Armed Forces
Operational Staff, the recommendation they were making:
“1. The Commando Order remains basically in effect, even after
the enemy landing in the West.
“2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect that
the order is not valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform who
are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the
beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our
troops committed in the immediate combat area means the
divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to
and including corps headquarters.
“3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases, enemy personnel who have
fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD,
upon whom it is incumbent to determine whether the Commando
Order is to be applied or not.
“4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units
committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner
with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando
undertakings of 18 October 1942, along with the above
explanation.”
The final document on this episode, or inquiry, is 551-PS, which becomes
Exhibit USA-551, and this is the actual order of 25 June 1944,
constituting OKW’s reply to the inquiry from the Supreme Command West,
signed by Keitel, initialed by Warlimont and Jodl. I will read beginning
with:
“Subject: Treatment of commando participants.
“1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the
order of the Führer on the annihilation of terror and sabotage
units of 18 October 1942 remains fully in force.
“Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the
bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in
the most forward lines, as well as of the reserves up to the
corps commands, according to Number 5 of the basic order of 18
October 1942, remain exempted.
“2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the
immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all
parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they
are to be turned over to the SD.
“3. All troops committed outside the combat area of Normandy are
to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and
sabotage units briefly and succinctly, according to the
directives issued for it.
“4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily how
many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies
especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The
number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces communiqué
to exercise a frightening effect, as had already been done
toward previous commando undertakings in the same manner.”
Your Lordship, there is just one further development in connection with
this order, this basic order, and that was that in July 1944. The
question was then raised within the German High Command as to whether
the order should be applied to members of foreign military missions with
special regard to the British, American, and Soviet military missions
which were co-operating with Allied Forces in Southeastern Europe,
notably in Yugoslavia. A long document signed by Warlimont, which is
1279-PS, and becomes Exhibit USA-552, embodies the discussions which
were had at OKW. I think I need not read from this document, and merely
wish to point out that the Armed Forces operational staff recommended
that the order should be applied to these military missions and drew up
a draft to this effect. I would, however, like to read 537-PS, which is
Exhibit USA-553. This is the order which actually resulted from these
discussions. It is dated 30 July 1944. I will read that in full:
“Subject: Treatment of members of foreign ‘Military Missions’
captured together with partisans.
“In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest,
members of foreign so-called ‘Military Missions’ (Anglo-American
as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the
struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as
specified in the special orders regarding the treatment of
captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as
prisoners of war but in conformity with the Führer’s order
concerning the annihilation of terror and sabotage troops of 18
October 1942.
“This order shall not be transmitted to units subordinate to the
corps commands and the equivalent staffs of the other branches
of the Armed Forces, and is to be destroyed after being made
known.
“The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Keitel.”
Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of an Allied military
mission to Slovakia were executed in January 1945, as is shown by
Document L-51, which is already in the record as Exhibit USA-521, and
which has been read in full by Lieutenant Harris. I will not read it
again.
This concludes the presentation of documents with respect to the order
of the 18th of October 1942 and its subsequent enforcement and
application. I can pass from here to another subject.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes now.
[_A recess was taken._]
COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, the order I have just been discussing
operated chiefly in the Western Theater of War. This was natural, since
Germany occupied almost the entire western coast of Europe from 1940
until the last year of the war, and during that period land fighting in
Western Europe was largely limited to commando operations.
I want to pass now to the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale
land fighting in Poland and the Soviet Union, from 1941 on. Here the
German forces were fighting among a hostile population and had to face
extensive partisan activities behind their lines. I propose to show here
that the activities of the German Armed Forces against partisans and
against other elements of the population became a vehicle for carrying
out Nazi political and racial policies and a vehicle for the massacre of
Jews and numerous segments of the Slav population which were regarded by
the Nazis as undesirable. I will show that it was the policy of the
German Armed Forces to behave with the utmost severity to the civilian
population of the occupied territories; and that its military
operations, particularly against partisans, were so conducted as to
advance the Nazi policies to which I have referred.
I will show that the Armed Forces supported, assisted, and acted in
co-operation with the SS groups to which reference has been made in the
presentation by Major Farr and Colonel Storey.
I do not plan to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes on
the Eastern Front. That will be done by the Soviet Delegation. Nor do I
plan to retrace the ground covered by Colonel Storey and Major Farr
during their presentation of the evidence against the SS, SD, and
Gestapo, except to the extent necessary to clarify the relations between
these organizations and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their
close collaboration in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.
The first document to which I will make reference is Document C-50,
which will be Exhibit USA-554; and it will show that these policies of
severity were determined upon and made official even before the invasion
of the Soviet Union took place. This document consists of an order by
Hitler dated 13 May 1941 and two covering transmittal sheets of
subsequent date. I ask the Tribunal to note on Page 4 of the translation
that the order is signed by Keitel, the Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces, and also to note the distribution, which appears at
the foot of the second sheet, showing the distribution to the principal
staff sections. The order itself begins on the third page, and that is
where I propose to read. The document is entitled, “Order concerning the
exercise of martial jurisdiction and procedure in the area ‘Barbarossa’
and special military measures”:
“The application of martial law aims, in the first place, at
maintaining discipline.
“The fact that the operational areas in the East are so
far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the
peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial
with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve
while hostilities are in progress and until some degree of
pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless
jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main
task.
“This is possible only if the troops themselves take ruthless
action against any threat from the enemy population.
“For these reasons I herewith issue the following order
effective for the area ‘Barbarossa’ (area of operations, Army
rear area, and area of political administration):
“I. Treatment of offenses committed by enemy civilians.
“1. Until further notice the military courts and the
courts-martial will not be competent for crimes committed by
enemy civilians.
“2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military,
whether they are fighting or in flight.
“3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed
Forces, its members, and employees, are to be suppressed at once
by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the
assailants are destroyed.
“4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first
possible, persons suspected of criminal action will be brought
at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they
are to be shot.
“On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a
battalion commander, collective drastic measures will be taken
without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious
attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not
permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.
“5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in
order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of
civil courts.
“6. The commanders of the army groups may, by agreement with the
competent naval and air force commanders, reintroduce military
jurisdiction for civilians in areas which are sufficiently
pacified.
“For the area of the political administration this order will be
given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
“II. Treatment of offenses committed against inhabitants by
members of the Armed Forces and its employees.
“1. With regard to offenses committed against enemy civilians by
members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not
obligatory, even where the deed is at the same time a military
crime or offense.
“2. When judging such offenses, it must be borne in mind,
whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in
1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people, and the
fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of
innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by
Bolshevistic influence and that no German has forgotten this
fact.
“3. Therefore, the judicial authority will decide in such cases
whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal
proceedings are necessary. In the case of offenses against
inhabitants it will order a court-martial only if maintenance of
discipline or security of the forces call for such a measure.
This applies, for instance, to serious offenses originating in
lack of self-control in sexual matters or in a criminal
disposition and to those which indicate that the troops are
threatening to get out of hand. Offenses which have resulted in
senseless destruction of billets or stores or other captured
material, to the disadvantage of our forces, should as a rule be
judged no less severely.
“The order to institute proceedings requires in every single
case the signature of the judicial authority.
“4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of
statements made by enemy civilians.
“III. Responsibility of military commanders of the troops.
Within their sphere of competence military commanders are
personally responsible for seeing that:
“1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command
is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on
principles set out under I, above.
“2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these
instructions and of verbal information in which the political
intentions of the High Command were explained to the
commanders-in-chief.
“3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in
accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.
“IV. Security. Once the camouflage is lifted, this decree will
be treated as ‘most secret.’”
Your Lordship, the next document will be C-148, Exhibit USA-555. Less
than 3 months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the instructions
which I have just read were amplified and made even more drastic.
Document C-148 is an order dated 16 September 1941, signed by Keitel,
widely distributed, as is shown on the second sheet where the
distribution is listed. This order is of general application in all
theaters of war, but from its contents it is clearly of primary
importance for the Eastern Front. I read, beginning at the start of the
order:
“Subject: Communist insurrection in occupied territories.
“1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia,
Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in
the area occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is
growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual
members of the Armed Forces into open rebellion and widespread
guerilla warfare.
“It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed
by Moscow, which is also responsible for the apparently trivial
isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise
quiet.
“In view of the many political and economic crises in the
occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated that
nationalist and other circles will make full use of this
opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying
forces by associating themselves with the Communist
insurrection.
“This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort,
which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the
occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of
forces to the main centers of disturbance.
“2. The measures taken up to now to deal with this general
Communist insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The
Führer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with
the most drastic means, in order to crush the movement in the
shortest possible time. Only this course, which has always been
followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of
influence of great peoples, can restore order.
“3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the
following general directions:
“a. It should be inferred in every case of resistance to the
German occupying forces, no matter what the individual
circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.
“b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud the most
drastic measures should be taken immediately and on the first
indication, so that the authority of the occupying forces may be
maintained and further spreading prevented. In this connection
it should be remembered that a human life in the countries
concerned frequently counts for nothing, and a deterrent effect
can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for
50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as
suitable atonement for one German soldier’s death. The way in
which sentence is carried out should still further increase the
deterrent effect.
“The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively
lenient penalties and of being content, for purposes of
deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures does not
accord with these principles and shall not be followed.”
Unless the Court desires the next paragraph read, I will pass to Page 2,
at the very end of the document, Paragraph Number 4:
“The commanding officers in the occupied territories shall see
to it that these principles are made known without delay to all
military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist
measures of insurrection”—Signed—“Keitel.”
Your Lordship, the next document will have the Exhibit Number USA-556,
and it has been given the number D-411. It also has the designation
UK-81. It is the last document in Document Book 2. This is a set of
documents which includes a directive, dated 10 October 1941, by Field
Marshal Von Reichenau, who was the Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber)
of the German 6th Army then operating on the Eastern Front. Reichenau,
who died in 1942, was therefore a member of the group as defined in the
Indictment; and here is what he had to say. I begin reading at Page 5 of
the translation:
“Subject: Conduct of troops in Eastern Territories.
“Regarding the conduct of troops towards the Bolshevistic
system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most
essential aim of war against the Jewish-Bolshevistic system is a
complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination
of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this
connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the
one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the Eastern
Territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of
the art of war, but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology
and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon
German and racially related nations.
“Therefore, the soldier must have full understanding for the
necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The
Army has to aim at another purpose, that is the annihilation of
revolts in the hinterland, which as experience proves, have
always been caused by Jews.
“The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not
being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and
unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war; and
guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes
and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers and
sent to prisoner-of-war camps. In fact, captured Russian
officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly
about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens.
Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete
thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to
clarify the meaning of the present struggle.
“The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not
working for the Armed Forces from army kitchens is an equally
misunderstood humanitarian act, as is the giving of cigarettes
and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great
sacrifices and things which are being brought by the command to
the front under great difficulties should not be given to the
enemy by the soldier, not even if they originate from booty. It
is an important part of our supply.
“When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire.
The troops should be interested in extinguishing fires only as
far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets.
Otherwise, the disappearance of symbols of the former
Bolshevistic rule, even in the form of buildings, is part of the
struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic
considerations are of any importance in the Eastern Territories.
“The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of
raw materials and plants essential for war economy. The complete
disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting
troops is imperative, considering the long and vulnerable lines
of communication. Where possible, captured weapons and
ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be
impossible because of the situation, the weapons and ammunition
will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using
firearms in the rear of the Army, drastic measures are to be
taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male
population who were in a position to hinder or report the
attacks. The indifference of numerous allegedly anti-Soviet
elements, which originates from a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude, must
give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not,
no one can complain about being judged and treated as a member
of the Soviet system.
“The fear of the German counter measures must be stronger than
the threats of the wandering Bolshevistic remnants. Being far
from all political considerations of the future, the soldier has
to fulfill two tasks:
“1. Complete annihilation of the false Bolshevistic doctrine of
the Soviet State and its armed forces.
“2. The pitiless extermination of alien treachery and cruelty
and thus the protection of the lives of German military
personnel in Russia.
“This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate
the German people once and forever from the Asiatic-Jewish
danger. Signed: Von Reichenau, Oberbefehlshaber.”
The Tribunal will note the sheet immediately preceding Reichenau’s
order. That is Sheet Number 4 of the translation, which is a memorandum
dated 28 October 1941. It shows that Reichenau’s order met with Hitler’s
approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the
Commander-in-Chief of the German Army.
The Tribunal will also note from the first sheet, the very top sheet in
the several ensuing, that Reichenau’s order was thereafter circulated
down to divisional level, and was received by the 12th German Infantry
Division on 27 November 1941.
These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German
military leaders, it is no wonder that the Wehrmacht joined in the
monstrous behavior and activities of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front.
Colonel Storey described to the Tribunal the formation of units known as
Einsatzgruppen by the Sipo and SD, which were sent out to operate in and
behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in order to combat
partisans and to cleanse and pacify the civilian population. Major Farr
and Colonel Storey both presented to the Tribunal a large amount of
evidence showing the manner in which these units operated.
I want to refer back briefly to a few of these documents in order to
trace the participation of the Armed Forces in those circumstances.
Colonel Storey read at length from 3012-PS, which is Exhibit USA-190,
dated 19 March 1943. It is a directive from the commanding officer of
one of these groups. This directive praised and justified such
activities as the shooting of Hungarian Jews, shooting of children, and
the total burning of villages and directed that in order not to obstruct
the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry, “as a
rule no more children will be shot.”
Major Farr read from R-102, which is Exhibit USA-470, a report covering
the work of the Einsatzgruppen in the German occupied territories of the
Soviet Union during the month of October 1941. This report states
cynically on Page 7:
“Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on
the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not
been recorded on account of the lack of adequate instructions.”
It shows as clearly as the human eye can see that pacification and
anti-partisan activities became mere code words for the extermination of
Jews just as much as Weserübung was the code word for the invasion of
Norway and Denmark.
We have seen from the documents quoted a few moments ago that the German
Army received some similar policies and directives. It only remains to
show that in the field the Army and the SS worked hand in glove.
The Tribunal will recall the document quoted by Major Walsh, 1061-PS,
already in evidence as Exhibit USA-275. It describes the destruction of
the Warsaw ghetto; and at this time I merely want to call attention to
one paragraph appearing at Page 6 of the translation, the third
paragraph from the bottom of the page, where the author of the document
stresses the close co-operation between the SS and the Army. I read that
one paragraph and quote:
“The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the
Waffen-SS, Police, and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their
duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as
models and examples of soldiers. Their combat duty often lasted
from early morning until late at night. At night search patrols
with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the
Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and
killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their
stores from abandoned dug-outs and for contacting neighboring
groups or exchanging news with them.”
To the same general effect is R-135, Exhibit USA-289, which is a report
dated 5 June 1943 by the German General Commissioner for Minsk. Major
Farr read from this report, describing an anti-partisan operation in
which 4,500 enemies were killed: 5,000 suspected partisans and 59
Germans. The co-operation by the German Army is shown in the following
excerpt, and I will begin reading at the bottom of Page 3 of the
translation:
“The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy
destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492
rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows
that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from the
country. The battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation
for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000 people
suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and
children.
“By order of the chief of anti-partisan units, SS
Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach, units of the Wehrmannschaften
have also participated in the operation. SA Standartenführer
Kunze was in command of the Wehrmannschaften, among whom there
were also 90 members from my office and from the District
Commissariat of Minsk. Our men returned from the operation
yesterday without losses.”
I need not read the rest of that. The next paragraph shows again the
participation of the Armed Forces personnel.
The SS Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach, referred to in this quotation,
will be a witness later in the day, and in this connection I want to
call the Court’s attention to 1919-PS, Exhibit USA-170, which is
Himmler’s speech on October 4, 1943 to a gathering of SS generals at
Posen. In this speech Himmler mentioned the appointment of Von dem Bach
to be chief of all anti-partisan units, and I would like to read one
paragraph from Page 3 of the document merely for purpose of
identification of the witness:
“Chief of the anti-partisan combat units:
“In the meantime I have also set up the department of the Chief
of the anti-partisan combat units. Our comrade SS
Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan
combat units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsführer SS
to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am
convinced that we are best in a position to take action in this
struggle, which is decidedly a political one. Except where the
units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this
purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have
been very successful.”
There is one further document which has already been introduced from
which I wish to read new material. That is L-180, which is already in
evidence as Exhibit USA-276. It is the report of Einsatzgruppe A,
covering the period up to 15 October 1941. I think the excerpts which I
will read will make clear beyond doubt the participation of the German
military leaders and Armed Forces in the activities of these
Einsatzgruppen. I read first from Page 2 of the translation, the top of
the page:
“Einsatz Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action,
proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June
1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group
North, consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer Group
4, had started the advance the day before. Our task was to
establish hurriedly personal contact with the commanders of the
armies and with the commander of the army rear area. It must be
stressed from the beginning that co-operation with the Armed
Forces was generally good; in some cases, for instance with
Panzer Group 4 under Colonel General Höppner, it was very close
and almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some
authorities in the first days were cleared up mainly through
personal discussions.”
This ends that particular extract. I read next a series of extracts, of
which the first is at the bottom of Page 2:
“Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start
pogroms against Jews during the first hours after the entry,
though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following
out orders the Security Police was determined to solve the
Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But
it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an
immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the
extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German
circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native
population itself took the first action by way of natural
reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades
and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the
preceding period.”
Next I pass to Page 4 of the translation, about half way down the page,
the middle of the first complete paragraph:
“After the failure of purely military activities, such as the
placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied
territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to
look out for new methods. The Einsatz group undertook the search
for new methods as an essential task. Soon, therefore, the Armed
Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their
methods of combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the
numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans.”
I pass next to Page 6 under “Instigation of self-cleansing actions”:
“Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had
suffered very heavily under the government of bolshevism and
Jewry while they were incorporated in the U.S.S.R., it was to be
expected that after the liberation from that foreign government,
they (that is, the population themselves) would render harmless
most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red
Army. It had to be the duty of the Security Police to set in
motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into
the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the
cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less
important, in view of the future, to establish the unshakeable
and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took
the most severe measures against the bolshevist and Jewish enemy
quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities
could not be found out.
“In Lithuania this was achieved for the first time by partisan
activities in Kovno. To our surprise it was not easy, at first,
to set in motion an extensive pogrom against the Jews. Klimatis,
the leader of the partisan unit mentioned above, who was used
for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on
the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment
acting in Kovno and in such a way that no German order or German
instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first
pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June, the Lithuanian partisans
did away with more than 1,500 Jews, setting fire to several
synagogues or destroying them by other means and burning down a
Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During
the following nights 2,300 Jews were eliminated in a similar
way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions followed the
example of Kovno, though smaller and extending to the Communists
who had been left behind.
“These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army
authorities, who had been informed, showed understanding for
this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the
first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for
carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the
self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.”
I pass to Page 10 of the translation, toward the bottom under “Other
jobs of the Security Police”:
“Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums
necessitated operations of the Security Police.”
Passing to the next paragraph:
“In some cases authorities of the Armed Forces asked us to clean
out, in a similar way, other institutions which were wanted as
billets. However, as interests of the Security Police did not
require any intervention, it was left to the authorities of the
Armed Forces to take the necessary action with their own
forces.”
I pass on to Page 17 of the translation, the paragraph at the top of the
page: “But it was decided . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read Paragraph 5 (1) on Page 10?
COL. TAYLOR: 5 (1) on Page 10? I read the first passage, Your Honor. If
you would like it in full . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you might go to the end of it.
COL. TAYLOR: “Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the
lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police.
Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of
their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel
had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and
became a danger to the general security; therefore, in Aglona
(Lithuania) 544 lunatics, in Mariampol (Lithuania) 109 lunatics,
and in Mogutowo, near Luga, 95 lunatics were liquidated.”
Passing back to Page 17, the first paragraph on that page:
“When it was decided to extend the German operations to
Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Einsatz Group A
to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941, to parts of
Einsatzkommandos 2 and 3 and to the staff of the group to
advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and
to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around
Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of
Einsatz Group A, which were intended to be used for Leningrad,
was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer
Group 4.”
The final quotation from this document is Page 18, last paragraph:
“Einsatzkommandos of Einsatz Group A of the Security Police
participated from the beginning in the fight against the
nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the
Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were
collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a
thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength,
equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on.”
Now, in the light of these documents, I would like to turn to some of
the remaining affidavits which are before the Tribunal in Document Book
I. These affidavits have been furnished by responsible officials in both
the Wehrmacht and the SS and fill in much of the background for the
documents.
Affidavit Number 12 is an affidavit by Schellenberg, which in view of
the fact that its contents have been covered in Schellenberg’s and
Ohlendorf’s testimony, I do not propose to read. It covers much of the
same ground, and I see no reason to take the time of the Tribunal by
reading it. I should like to have it considered, subject to the usual
rule that Schellenberg can be questioned on any of these matters by the
Defense. The affidavit itself is available in French and Russian as well
as in English and in German for the Defense, so I will pass over that
one.
I turn to Affidavit Number 13, which will be Exhibit USA-558, Document
Number 3711-PS. Schellenberg’s affidavit will be Exhibit USA-557,
Document Number 3710-PS; Number 13 is 558. This is an affidavit by
Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army, who worked in the
War History Section of the OKW from 1941 to 1945. It sheds considerable
light on the relations between the Wehrmacht and the SS at the top with
respect to anti-partisan warfare. I will read the affidavit:
“I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the
OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.
“Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I
remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the
Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in
the Führer’s headquarters with Major General Walter Scherff, the
Führer’s appointee for the compilation of the history of the
war.
“Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of
Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to
handle this matter.
“In the years 1942 and 1943, however, counter-partisan warfare
developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW
had to give it special attention. In the Army Operations Section
of the Operations Staff of the OKW, a specific officer was
assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his
special task. It proved necessary to conduct extensive
operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht troops in
Russian, as well as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations
for a long while threatened to cut off the lines of
communication and transport routes that were necessary to
support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report
concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia
revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000
attacks occurred each month during that period causing among
other things the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.
“It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted
with cruelty on both sides. It was well known that reprisals
were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants
were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is
beyond question that these facts must have been known to the
leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the
Army’s General Staff. It was further well known that Hitler
believed that the only successful method of conducting
counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as
deterrents.
“I remember that, at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS
Gruppenführer Fegelein reported to Colonel General Guderian and
Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS Brigade Kaminski,
which fought on the German side.”
Now, the foregoing documents and the testimony of Ohlendorf and
Schellenberg relate to the arrangements which were made between the OKW,
OKH, and Himmler’s headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare.
They show conclusively that these arrangements were made jointly and
that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of,
but was an active participant in, these plans.
Turning now to the field, I would like to read three statements by
General Hans Röttiger, which will be Affidavits Numbers 15 and 16:
Exhibit USA-559, Document Number 3713-PS; and USA-560, Document Number
3714-PS. General Röttiger attained the rank of general of panzer troops,
the equivalent of a lieutenant general in the American Army, and was
Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group Center on
the Eastern Front, during the period of which he speaks.
The first statement is as follows:
“As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943,
to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had
occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan
warfare. For the execution of these operations the troops
received orders from the highest authority, as for example even
the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were
carried out by troops of the army group and of the army, as, for
example, security battalions.
“At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued
through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In
accordance with orders Jews, political commissars, and agents
were delivered up to the SD.
“The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very
high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which
have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order
from the highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the
anti-partisan war can only have been intended to make possible a
ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by
using for this purpose the military struggle of the Army against
the partisans.”
The second statement:
“Supplementary to my first declaration of 8 December 1945, I
declare:
“As I stated orally on 28 November 1945, my then commander of
the 4th Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war
against the partisans more severely than was required at the
time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the
annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a
surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily
had an interest in taking prisoners, since very many of them
could very well be used as members of native volunteer units
against the partisans.
“Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans, there
was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the
population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them
to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the
women, too, were continually urged to get their men back from
the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the
partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring
of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of
partisans. Only on its boundaries, and then only from time to
time, were partisans in evidence when they crossed into the area
of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on
this account, on the orders of Army Group Center, to give up
security forces to the neighboring army to the south.”
The third statement by Röttiger, Number 16:
“During my period of service, from May 1942 to June 1943, as
Chief of Staff of the 4th Army of the Army Group Center, SD
units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose
of counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was
clear later on that these SD units were causing great
disturbances among the local civilian population, with the
result that my commanding officer therefore asked the commander
of the Army Group, Field Marshal Von Kluge, to order the SD
units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place
immediately. The reason for this, first and foremost, was that
the excesses of the SD units, by way of execution of Jews and
other persons, assumed such proportions as to threaten the
security of the army in its combat areas because of the
infuriated civilian populace. Although in general the special
tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried
out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we
opposed these methods as far as possible because of the danger
which existed for our troops, as I have mentioned above.”
I would like now to offer one final document, the last document,
1786-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-561. This is an extract from the war
diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, dated
14 March 1943. I propose to read the last two paragraphs, which deal
with the problem of shipping of suspected partisans to concentration
camps in Germany.
The Tribunal will see, from the extracts which I will read, that the
Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of
treatment for suspected partisans without at the same time obstructing
the procurement of labor from the occupied territories.
I will read the last two paragraphs:
“The Quartermaster General, together with the Economic Staff
East, has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to
prison camps or to reformatory labor camps in their own area and
that deportation to Germany should take place only when the
deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.
“In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, this proposal
does not take sufficient account of the severity required and
leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the
‘peaceful population’ which has been called upon to work. He
recommends, therefore, transportation to concentration camps in
Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsführer
SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the
Armed Forces in the case of an extension to the province of the
latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore orders
that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed
should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police
Leader, and orders that the difference between ‘punitive labor’
and ‘being set to labor in Germany’ be made clear to the
population.”
Finally, I would like to offer a group of four affidavits which show
that the anti-partisan activities on the Eastern Front were under the
command of and supported by the Wehrmacht, and that the nature of these
activities was fully known to the Wehrmacht.
The first of these is Affidavit Number 17, Exhibit USA-562, Document
Number 3715-PS by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadeführer and major
general of the Police, and was a member of Himmler’s personal command
staff from 1943 to 1945:
“I, Ernst Rode, was formerly Chief of the Command Staff of the
Reichsführer SS, having taken over this position in the spring
of 1943 as successor to former SS Obergruppenführer Kurt
Knoblauch. My last rank was Major General of Police and of the
Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish the forces necessary for
anti-partisan warfare to the Higher SS and Police Leaders and to
guarantee the support of Army Forces. This took place through
personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations
Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General
Von Buttlar, Colonel General Guderian, Colonel General Zeitzler,
General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg
and later, Colonel Von Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also
was under the sole command of the respective army group
commander in operational areas—for instance, in Army Group
Center under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch—and since
police troops for the most part could not be spared from the
Reich Commissariats, the direction of this warfare lay
practically always entirely in the hands of the Army. In the
same way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH. SS
and Police troops transferred to operational areas from the
Reichskommissariate to support the army groups were likewise
under the latter’s command. Such transfers were frequent and
therefore resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the
Reichskommissariate. According to a specific agreement between
Himmler and the OKW and OKH, the direction of individual
operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who commanded
the largest troop contingent. It was therefore possible that an
Army general could have SS and Police under him; and, on the
other hand, that army troops could be placed under a general of
the SS and Police. Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas
could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the
OKH to order it, until 1944, mostly through the intervention of
Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary
Ganzenmüller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the
army groups concerned for compliance.
“The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically
diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had
already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for
its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops
through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops
as well as to those of the SS and Police. There was absolutely
no difference in the manner in which these two components
carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as
embittered against the enemy as were those of the SS and Police.
“As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried
out by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping
with Hitler’s desires or intentions. As proof of this, the order
of the OKW and OKH can be adduced which directed that all
captured partisans, for instance, such as Jews, agents, and
political commissars, should without delay be handed over by the
troops to the SD for special treatment. This order also
contained the provision that in anti-partisan warfare no
prisoners except the above-named be taken. That anti-partisan
warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to every
extreme, I know as the result of discussions with army troop
leaders, for instance with General Herzog, Commander of the 38th
Army Corps, and with his Chief of Staff, Colonel Pamberg, in the
General Staff, both of whom support my opinion. Today it is
clear to me that anti-partisan warfare gradually became an
excuse for the systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.”
Your Lordship, I am told that I misread and said “Hitler” instead of
“Himmler”.
I next wish to offer another and shorter statement by Rode, which shows
that the SD Einsatzgruppen were under Wehrmacht command. This is Number
18, Exhibit USA-563; Document Number 3716-PS:
“As far as I know, the SD Einsatz groups with the individual
army groups were completely subordinate to them, that is to say
tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders were
therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and operational
methods of these units. They approved of these missions and
operational methods because, apparently, they never opposed
them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews, agents, and
commissars, who were handed over to the SD, underwent the same
cruel death as victims of so-called purifications, is a proof
that the executions had their approval. This also corresponded
with what the highest political and military authorities wanted.
Frequent mentions of these methods were naturally made in my
presence at the OKW and OKH; and they were condemned by most SS
and Police officers, just as they were condemned by most army
officers. On such occasions I always pointed out that it would
have been quite within the scope of the authority of the
commanders of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the
firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all
field marshals would have resulted in a change of these missions
and methods. If they should ever assert that they would then
have been succeeded by even more ruthless commanders, this, in
my opinion, would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.”
I would like next to read the final affidavit, Number 24, in Document