THE PRESIDENT: Just that Kaltenbrunner was there?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Just that Kaltenbrunner was there, at some time, in

the company of Ziereis and Himmler.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: With full knowledge of conditions in, and the purpose

of, concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner ordered or permitted to be

ordered in his name the commitment of persons to concentration camps.

I offer Document L-38 as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-517.

This is an affidavit of Hermann Pister, the former commandant of

Buchenwald concentration camp, which was taken on 1 August 1945 at

Freising, Germany, in the course of an official military investigation

by the United States Army, and I quote from it as follows, beginning

with the second paragraph:

“With exception of the mass delivery of prisoners from the

concentration camps of the occupied territory, all prisoners

were sent to the Concentration Camp Buchenwald by order of the

Reichssicherheitshauptamt”—Reich Security Main Office—“Berlin.

These orders for protective custody (red forms) were in most

cases signed with the name ‘Kaltenbrunner.’ The few remaining

protective custody orders were signed by ‘Förster.’”

I now offer Document 2477-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number

USA-518. This is the affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, former Chief of

Department IVA1b in the RSHA. This document reads in part as follows,

and I quote, beginning with the second paragraph:

“The right of taking into summary protective custody belongs to

the directors of the State Police Directorates or State Police

Offices; previously for a period of 21 days; later, I think, for

a period of 56 days. Custody exceeding this time had to be

sanctioned by the competent Office for Protective Custody in the

RSHA. The regulations for protective custody or the signing of

the protective custody order could only be issued through the

Director of the RSHA as Chief of the Sipo and SD. All

regulations and protective custody orders that I have seen bore

a facsimile stamp of Heydrich or Kaltenbrunner. As far as I can

remember, I have never seen a document of this kind with another

name as signature. How far and to whom the Chief of the Sipo and

SD possibly gave authority for the use of his facsimile stamp, I

do not know. Perhaps the Chief of Amt IV possessed a similar

authority. The greater part of the Protective Custody Office was

transferred to Prague. Only one staff remained in Berlin.”

I now offer Document 2745-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number

USA-519. This is an order, under date of 7 July 1943, which was found at

the former office of the section of the Gestapo which handled protective

custody matters in Prague. It was an order to the Prague office to send

a teletype message to the Gestapo office in Köslin ordering protective

custody of one Ratzke, and her commitment to the concentration camp at

Ravensbrück for refusing to work. The order carried the facsimile

signature of Kaltenbrunner and I invite the attention of the Tribunal to

the original which has that facsimile for the arrest. Orders of this

type were the basis for the orders actually sent out to the Prague

office, which carried the teletype signature of Kaltenbrunner. At the

bottom of the page the Tribunal will note the facsimile stamp of

Kaltenbrunner.

I next refer to Document L-215, which has heretofore been received as

Exhibit Number USA-243. I believe the Tribunal will recall this

document, which has heretofore been received in evidence, and which

contains 25 orders for arrest issued out of the Prague office of the

RSHA to the Einsatzkommando of Luxembourg, all of which carry the typed

signature of Kaltenbrunner. And the Court will remember—and I am

holding up the original document—that these arrest orders were the red

forms which the commandant of Buchenwald referred to in his affidavit as

being the forms which he saw coming from RSHA committing persons to

Buchenwald.

The concentration camps to which persons were committed, according to

Document L-215, by Kaltenbrunner, included Dachau, Natzweiler,

Sachsenhausen, and Buchenwald.

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of it?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: The most of these, Sir, were in 1944. I believe they

are all in 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear on the document does it?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: It does appear, Sir, on the original document, yes.

The first page of this translation is a summary of all of these. There

is only one of the dossiers which has been translated in full, and the

date on that one is 15. 2. 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I see.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Among the grounds specified on these orders carrying

the typed signature of Kaltenbrunner were, quoting:

“Strongly suspected of working to the detriment of the Reich;

spiteful statements inimical to Germany, as well as aspersions

and threats against persons active in the National Socialist

movement; strongly suspected of aiding deserters.”

I now offer Document 2239-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number

USA-520. This is a file of 42 telegrams sent by the Prague office of the

RSHA to the Gestapo office at Darmstadt, and they all carry the teletype

signature of Kaltenbrunner. These commitment orders were issued during

the period from 20 September 1944 to 2 February 1945. The concentration

camps to which Kaltenbrunner sent these people included Sachsenhausen,

Ravensbrück, Buchenwald, Bergen-Belsen, Flossenbürg, and Theresienstadt.

Nationalities included Czech, German, French, Dutch, Italian, Corsican,

Lithuanian, Greek, and Jews. Grounds included refusal to work, religious

propaganda, sex relations with PW’s, communist statements, loafing on

the job, working against the Reich, spreading of rumors detrimental to

morale, “action Gitter,” breach of work contracts, statements against

Germany, assault of foremen, defeatist statements, and theft and escape

from jail.

Not only did Kaltenbrunner commit persons to concentration camps, but he

authorized executions in concentration camps. I now offer Document L-51

as exhibit next in order, Exhibit USA-521. This is the affidavit of

Adolf Zutter, the former adjutant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp,

taken in the course of an official military investigation of the United

States Army, on 2 August 1945, at Linz, Austria. This affidavit states,

and I am quoting from Paragraph 3:

“Standartenführer Ziereis, the commander of Camp Mauthausen,

gave me a large number of execution orders after opening the

secret mail, because I was the adjutant and I had to deliver

these to Obersturmführer Schulz. These orders of execution were

written approximately in the following form. . . .”

There follows in the affidavit a description of the order for execution

issued by the RSHA to the commander of the Concentration Camp

Mauthausen. I omit quoting that description and continue at the next

paragraph:

“Orders for execution also came without the name of the court of

justice. Until the assassination of Heydrich, these orders were

signed by him or by his competent deputy. Later on the orders

were signed by Kaltenbrunner, but mostly they were signed by his

deputy, Gruppenführer Müller.

“Dr. Kaltenbrunner, who signed the above-mentioned orders, had

the rank of SS general—Obergruppenführer—and was the Chief of

the Reich Security Main Office.

“Dr. Kaltenbrunner is about 40 years old, height about 1.76 to

1.80 meters, and has deep fencing scars on his face.

“When Dr. Kaltenbrunner was only a Higher SS and Police Leader

in Vienna, he visited the camp several times; later on as the

Chief of Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) he visited the camp,

too, though this occurred much less frequently. During these

visits, the commander usually received him outside the building

of the camp headquarters and reported. Concerning the American

military mission, which landed behind the German front in the

Slovakian or Hungarian area in January 1945, I remember when

these persons were brought to Camp Mauthausen. I suppose the

number of the arrivals was about 12 to 15 men. They wore a

uniform, which was American or Canadian, brown-green color shirt

and tunic and cloth cap. Eight or 10 days after their arrival

the execution order came in by telegraph or teletype.

Standartenführer Ziereis came to me into my office and told me,

‘Now Kaltenbrunner has given the permission for the execution.’

This letter was secret and had the signature ‘signed,

Kaltenbrunner.’ Then these people were shot according to martial

law and their belongings were given to me by Oberscharführer

Niedermeyer.”

The fifth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the

Security Police and SD was the deportation of citizens of occupied

territories for forced labor and the disciplining of forced labor.

I am sure the Tribunal will recall, without referring to it, Document

3012-PS, which has heretofore been received as Exhibit Number USA-190.

That was the letter from the head of the Sonderkommando of the Sipo and

SD, which stated that the Ukraine would have to provide a million

workers for the armament industry and that force should be used where

necessary. That letter was dated 19 March 1943.

Kaltenbrunner’s responsibility for the disciplining of foreign labor is

shown by Document 1063-PS, which has heretofore been received as Exhibit

Number USA-492. No part of this letter has been read into the record.

This letter dated 26 July 1943 was addressed to Higher SS and Police

Leaders, commanders and inspectors of the Sipo and SD, and to the chiefs

of Einsatz Groups B and D.

The Tribunal will recall that Einsatz Groups A, B, C, and D, operating

in the East, carried out the extermination of Jews and Communist

leaders. This document proves Kaltenbrunner’s control over Einsatz

Groups B and D. This document is signed “Kaltenbrunner.” The first

paragraph provides as follows:

“The Reichsführer SS has given his consent that besides

concentration camps, which come under the jurisdiction of the SS

Economic and Administration Main Office, further labor

reformatory camps may be created for which the Security Police

alone is competent. These labor reformatory camps are dependent

on the authorization of the Reich Security Main Office, which

can only be granted in case of urgent need (great number of

foreign workers, and so forth).”

I now offer Document D-473 as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number

USA-522. It should be right at the beginning of the document book. This

letter signed “Kaltenbrunner” was sent by him under date of 4 December

1944 to regional offices of the Criminal Police.

The Tribunal will recall that Kaltenbrunner’s responsibility covered the

Criminal Police as well as the Gestapo. It provides in part, and I

quote, reading at the beginning of the letter:

“According to the decree of 30 June 1943, crimes committed by

Polish and Soviet-Russian civilian laborers are being prosecuted

by the Directorates of the State Police and even in those cases

where for the time being the Criminal Police had, within the

sphere of its competence, carried on the inquiries. For the

purpose of speeding up the process and in order to save

manpower, the decree of 30 June 1943 is altered, and the

Directorates of the Criminal Police are authorized as from now

on to prosecute, themselves, the crimes they are inquiring into,

within the sphere of their competence, insofar as they are cases

of minor or medium crimes.”

I begin with the second paragraph:

“The following are available to the Criminal Police as a means

of prosecution:

“Police imprisonment . . . Admission into a concentration camp

for preventive custody as being antisocial or dangerous to the

community.”

And next to the last paragraph:

“Their stay in the concentration camp is normally to be for the

duration of the war. Besides this, the Directorates of the

Criminal Police are authorized to hand over Polish and

Soviet-Russian civilian laborers in suitable cases and with the

agreement of the competent Directorates of the State Police to

the Gestapo’s penal camps for the ‘education for labor.’ Where

the possibilities of prosecuting an individual case are

insufficient because of the peculiarity of the case, the case is

to be handed over to the competent Directorate of the State

Police. Signed: Dr. Kaltenbrunner.”

In addition to sending foreign workers to Gestapo labor camps,

Kaltenbrunner punished foreign workers by committing them to

concentration camps. I offer Document 2582-PS as exhibit next in order,

Exhibit Number USA-523.

This is a series of four teletype orders committing individuals to

concentration camps. I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the

second order dated 18 June 1943 under which the Gestapo at Saarbrücken

was ordered to deliver a Pole to the Concentration Camp Natzweiler as a

skilled workman and to the third teletype dated 12 December 1944 in

which the Gestapo at Darmstadt was ordered to commit a Greek to the

Concentration Camp Buchenwald because he was drifting around without

occupation and to the fourth teletype dated 9 February 1945 in which the

Gestapo at Darmstadt in Bensheim was ordered to commit a French citizen

to Buchenwald for shirking work and insubordination. All of those orders

are signed Kaltenbrunner.

I offer Document 2580-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number

USA-524. This document contains three more of these red form orders for

protective custody, all signed Kaltenbrunner. The first one shows that a

citizen of the Netherlands was taken into protective custody for work

sabotage, and the second one shows that a French citizen was taken into

protective custody for work sabotage and insubordination, both under

date of 2 December 1944.

The sixth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the

Security Police and SD is the executing of captured commandos and

paratroopers and the protecting of civilians who lynched Allied fliers.

The Tribunal will recall, I am sure, without referring to it, the Hitler

order of 18 October 1942 which was introduced this morning, Document

498-PS, Exhibit Number USA-501, to the effect that commandos, even in

uniform, were to be exterminated to the last man and that individual

members captured by the police in occupied territory were to be handed

over to the SD.

I now offer Document 1276-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number

USA-525. This is an express top-secret letter from the Chief of the

Security Police and SD signed “Müller,” by order, to the Supreme Command

of the Armed Forces, in which the Chief of the Security Police and SD

states—and I quote from the third paragraph of the second page of the

English translation:

“I have instructed the Befehlshaber of the Security Police and

the SD in Paris to treat such parachutists in English uniform as

members of the commando operations in accordance with the

Führer’s order of 18 October 1942 and to inform the military

authorities in France that there must be corresponding treatment

at the hands of the Armed Forces.”

This letter was dated 17 June 1944. That executions were carried out by

the SD pursuant to the said Hitler order of 18 October 1942 while

Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Security Police and SD, is indicated by

Document 526-PS heretofore received as Exhibit Number USA-502. That was

the order introduced this morning; I am sure the Tribunal recalls it.

The policy of the police to protect civilians who lynched Allied fliers

was effective during the period that Kaltenbrunner served as Chief of

the Security Police and SD. I now offer Document 2990-PS as exhibit next

in order, Exhibit Number USA-526. This is an affidavit of Walter

Schellenberg, the former Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, and provides in

Paragraph 7—this is all I’m going to read from the affidavit:

“In 1944, on another occasion but also in the course of an

Amts-chef conference, I heard fragments of a conversation

between Kaltenbrunner and Müller. I remember distinctly the

following remarks of Kaltenbrunner:

“‘All offices of the SD and the Security Police are to be

informed that pogroms of the populace against English and

American terror fliers are not to be interfered with. On the

contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered.’”

The seventh crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the

Security Police and SD is the taking of civilians of occupied countries

to Germany for secret trial and punishment, and the punishment of

civilians of occupied territories by summary methods. The fact that this

crime continued after 30 January 1943 is shown by Document 835-PS, which

is offered as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-527. This is a

letter from the High Command of the Armed Forces to the German Armistice

Commission under date 2 September 1944. The document begins, and I

quote:

“Conforming to the decrees referred to, all non-German civilians

in occupied territories who have endangered the security and

readiness for action of the occupying power by acts of terror

and sabotage or in other ways are to be surrendered to the

Security Police and SD. Only those prisoners are excepted who

were legally sentenced to death or were serving a sentence of

confinement prior to the announcement of these decrees. Included

in the punishable acts which endanger the security or readiness

of action of the garrison power are those also of a political

nature.”

The eighth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the

Security Police and SD is the crime of executing and confining persons

in concentration camps for crimes allegedly committed by their

relatives. That this crime continued after 30 January 1943 is indicated

by Document L-37, heretofore received in evidence as Exhibit Number

USA-506. That was received this morning. It is the letter of the

Commander of Sipo and SD at Radom, dated 19 July 1944, in which it was

stated that the male relatives of assassins and saboteurs should be shot

and the female relatives over 16 years of age sent to concentration

camps. I refer again to Document L-215, which has heretofore been

received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-243, and specifically to the

case of Junker, who was ordered by Kaltenbrunner to be committed to

Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp by the Gestapo “because as a relative

of a deserter, he is expected to endanger the interest of the German

Reich if allowed to go free.”

The ninth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the

Security Police and SD is the clearance of Sipo and SD prisons and

concentration camps. I refer the Tribunal to Document L-53, which was

received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-291. This was the letter from

the Commander of the Sipo and SD, Radom, dated 21 July 1944, in which it

is stated that the Commander of the Sipo and SD of the General

Government had ordered all Sipo and SD prisons to be cleared and, if

necessary, the inmates to be liquidated. I now offer Document 3462-PS as

exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-528. This is the sworn

interrogation of Bertus Gerdes, the former Gaustabsamtsleiter under the

Gauleiter of Munich. This interrogation was taken in the course of an

official military investigation of the U.S. Army. In this interrogation

Gerdes was ordered to state all he knew about Kaltenbrunner. I am only

going to read a very small portion of his reply, beginning on the third

paragraph of Page 2:

“Giesler told me that Kaltenbrunner was in constant touch with

him because he was greatly worried about the attitude of the

foreign workers and especially inmates of Concentration Camps

Dachau, Mühldorf, and Landsberg, which were in the path of the

approaching Allied armies. On a Tuesday in the middle of April

1945 I received a telephone call from Gauleiter Giesler asking

me to be available for a conversation that night. In the course

of our personal conversation that night, I was told by Giesler

that he had received a directive from Obergruppenführer

Kaltenbrunner, by order of the Führer, to work out a plan

without delay for the liquidation of the concentration camp at

Dachau and the two Jewish labor camps in Landsberg and Mühldorf.

The directive proposed to liquidate the two Jewish labor camps

at Landsberg and Mühldorf by use of the German Luftwaffe, since

the construction area of these camps had previously been the

targets of repeated enemy air attacks. This action received the

code name of ‘Wolke A-1.’”

I now pass to the second paragraph on Page 3, continuing to quote from

this interrogation:

“I was certain that I would never let this directive be carried

out. As the action Wolke A-1 should have become operational

already for some time, I was literally swamped by couriers from

Kaltenbrunner and moreover I was supposed to have discussed the

details of the Mühldorf and Landsberg actions in detail with the

two Kreisleiter concerned. The couriers, who were in most cases

SS officers, usually SS Untersturmführer, gave me terse and

strict orders to read and initial. The orders threatened me with

the most terrible punishment, including execution, if I did not

comply with them. However, I could always excuse my failure to

execute the plan because of bad flying weather and lack of

gasoline and bombs. Therefore, Kaltenbrunner ordered that the

Jews in Landsberg be marched to Dachau in order to include them

in the Dachau extermination operations, and that the Mühldorf

action was to be carried out by the Gestapo.

“Kaltenbrunner also ordered an operation ‘Wolkenbrand’ for the

Concentration Camp Dachau, which provided that the inmates of

the concentration camp at Dachau were to be liquidated by poison

with the exception of Aryan nationals of the Western Powers.

“Gauleiter Giesler received this order direct from Kaltenbrunner

and discussed in my presence the procurement of the required

amounts of poison with Dr. Harrfeld, the Gau health chief. Dr.

Harrfeld promised to procure these quantities when ordered and

was advised to await my further directions. As I was determined

to prevent the execution of this plan in any event, I gave no

further instructions to Dr. Harrfeld.

“The inmates of Landsberg had hardly been delivered at Dachau

when Kaltenbrunner sent a courier declaring the Action

Wolkenbrand was operational.

“I prevented the execution of the ‘Wolke A-1’ and ‘Wolkenbrand’

by giving Giesler the reason that the front was too close and

asked him to transmit this on to Kaltenbrunner.

“Kaltenbrunner therefore issued directives in writing to Dachau

to transport all Western European prisoners by truck to

Switzerland and to march the remaining inmates into Tyrol, where

the final liquidation of these prisoners was to take place

without fail.”

THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TWENTY-SIXTH DAY

Thursday, 3 January 1946

_Morning Session_

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: If the Tribunal will recall, at the end of the last

session we had finished reading a portion of the sworn interrogation of

the Gaustabsamtsleiter under the Gauleiter of Munich and had touched on

the point where he said that Kaltenbrunner issued directives to Dachau

to transport Western European prisoners by truck to Switzerland and to

march the remaining inmates into Tyrol.

I now offer, as exhibit next in order, the first five pages of the

interrogation report of Gottlob Berger, Chief of the head office of the

SS, made under oath on 20 September 1945, in the course of these

proceedings. You will find these pages at the end of the document book

and this is offered as Exhibit Number USA-529. These pages have been

translated into German and made available to the defendants.

THE PRESIDENT: Does it have a number?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: It has no PS number, Sir. It is at the very end of

the document book. I wish to read only one question and answer from

these pages; and I refer to Page 3 of the exhibit, the last question and

answer on that page:

“Q: Assuming, only for the purposes of this discussion, that

these atrocities that we hear about are true, who do you think

is primarily responsible?

“A: The first one, the commandant; the second one, Glücks;

because he was practically responsible for all the interior

direction of the camps. If one wants to be exact, one would have

to find out how the information service between the camp

commandant and Glücks actually operated. I want to give you the

following example:

“During the night of the 22d and 23rd of April, I was sent to

Munich by plane. As I entered the city, I met a group of perhaps

120 men dressed in the suits of the concentration camps. These

people made a very miserable impression on me. I asked the guard

who was with them, ‘What about these men?’ He told me that these

men were marching by foot to the Alps. Firstly, I sent him back

to Dachau. Then I wrote a letter to the commandant to send no

more people by foot to any place but, whenever the Allies

advanced any further, to give over the camp completely. I did

that on my own responsibility and I told him that I came

straight from Berlin and that I can be found in my service post

in Munich. The commandant or his deputy telephoned at about 12

o’clock and told me that he had received this order from

Kaltenbrunner after he had been asked by the Gauleiter of

Munich, the Reichskommissar . . .” (Document Number USA-529)

The tenth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief of the

Security Police and SD is the persecution of the Jews. This crime, of

course, continued after 30 January 1943; and evidence has heretofore

been received that the persecutions continued until, and were

accelerated toward, the end of the war. Kaltenbrunner took a personal

interest in such matters, as is indicated by Document 2519-PS, which is

offered as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-530. This exhibit

consists of a memorandum and an affidavit; and I invite the attention of

the Tribunal to the affidavit. Quoting from the affidavit:

“I, Henri Monneray, being first duly sworn, depose and say that

since 12 September 1945 I have been and I am the member of the

French staff for the prosecution of Axis criminality and have

been pursuing my official duties in this connection in

Nuremberg, Germany, since 12 October 1945.

“In the course of my official duties, at the instruction of the

French Chief Prosecutor, I examined the personal documents of

the defendants . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all of this? What is the object

of this affidavit?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: To show that this document was derived from the

personal effects of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: From the personal possession?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: From the personal possession.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well, you can leave out the immaterial parts.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Very good, Sir. Passing to the last sentence of the

affidavit:

“Said Document 2519-PS is the document which I found in the

envelope containing Kaltenbrunner’s personal papers.”

I now read the memorandum, quoting:

“Radio message to Gruppenführer SS Major General Vegelein,

Headquarters of the Führer, through Sturmbannführer SS Major

Sansoni, Berlin.

“Please inform the Reichsführer SS and report to the Führer that

all arrangements against Jews, political, and concentration camp

internees in the Protectorate have been taken care of by me

personally today. The situation there is one of calmness, fear

of Soviet successes, and hope of an occupation by the Western

enemies. Kaltenbrunner.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is not dated?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: This is not dated.

The eleventh crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible is the

persecution of the churches. It is unnecessary to present specific

evidence that this crime continued after 30 January 1943, since this was

one of the fundamental purposes of the Security Police and SD, as has

already been shown.

These are the crimes for which the Defendant Kaltenbrunner must answer.

As to his intent, there is no need to go outside the record before this

Tribunal. On December 1, 1945, in these proceedings the Witness Lahousen

was asked on cross-examination, “Do you know Mr. Kaltenbrunner?”

After describing his meeting with Kaltenbrunner on a day in Munich when

a university student and his sister were arrested and executed for

distributing leaflets from the auditorium, Lahousen said—and I wish to

refer only to two sentences on Page 724 of the transcript (Volume III,

Page 29)—quoting:

“I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last

time that I saw Kaltenbrunner, with whose name I was familiar.

Of course Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to Canaris, who

was completely shattered because of what happened that day and

was still under the painful impression—and thank God there are

still witnesses available who can testify to this. When

discussing the matter Kaltenbrunner was very much to the point,

but at the same time he was quite cynical about it. That is the

only thing I can tell you about this matter.”

Kaltenbrunner was a life-long fanatical Nazi. He was the leader of the

SS in Austria prior to the Anschluss and played a principal role in the

betrayal of his native country to the Nazi conspirators. As higher SS

and Police Leader in Austria after the Anschluss, he supervised and had

knowledge of the activities of the Gestapo and the SD in Austria. The

Mauthausen Concentration Camp was established in his jurisdiction and he

visited it several times. On at least one occasion he observed the gas

chamber in action. With this knowledge and background he accepted, in

January 1943, appointment as Chief of the Security Police and SD, the

very agencies which sent such victims to their deaths. He held that

office to the end, rising to great prominence in the SS and the German

Police and receiving high honors from Hitler. Like other leading Nazis,

Kaltenbrunner sought power; to gain it, he made his covenant with crime.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, next will be some witnesses, and

Colonel Amen will handle the interrogation. Colonel Amen.

COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United

States): May it please the Tribunal, I wish to call as a witness for the

Prosecution, Mr. Otto Ohlendorf.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you spell it, please?

COL. AMEN: O-h-l-e-n-d-o-r-f, the first name being Otto. Your Lordship

will note that his name appears under Amt III on the chart on the wall.

THE PRESIDENT: What did you say appeared?

COL. AMEN: The name of this witness appears under Amt III of the chart,

RSHA, the large square, the third section down.

THE PRESIDENT: Amt III. Oh, yes; I see it.

[_Witness Ohlendorf took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Otto Ohlendorf, will you repeat this oath after me: “I

swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure

truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

COL. Amen: Will you try to speak slowly and pause between each question

and answer.

OTTO OHLENDORF (Witness): Yes.

COL. AMEN: Where were you born?

OHLENDORF: In Hohen-Egelsen.

COL. AMEN: How old are you?

OHLENDORF: Thirty-eight years old.

COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you become a member of the National

Socialist Party?

OHLENDORF: 1925.

COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you become a member of the SA?

OHLENDORF: For the first time in 1926.

COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you become a member of the SS?

OHLENDORF: I must correct my answer to the previous question; I thought

you were asking about my membership in the SS.

COL. AMEN: When did you become a member of the SA?

OHLENDORF: In the year 1925.

COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you join the SD?

OHLENDORF: In 1936.

COL. AMEN: What was your last position in the SD?

OHLENDORF: Chief of Amt III in the RSHA.

COL. AMEN: Turning to the chart on the wall behind you, will you tell

the Tribunal whether you can identify that chart in any way.

OHLENDORF: I have already seen this chart. I worked on it, and I can

identify it as accurate.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did you have to do with making up that

chart?

OHLENDORF: This chart was made up during my interrogation.

COL. AMEN: For the information of the Tribunal, that is Exhibit Number

USA-493, the chart of which the witness speaks.

OHLENDORF: I didn’t understand you.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal whether that chart correctly

portrays the basic organization of the RSHA, as well as the position of

Kaltenbrunner, the Gestapo, and the SD in the German Police system?

OHLENDORF: This chart represents the organization of the RSHA. It shows

the correct position of the SD departments, of the State Police, and of

the Secret Police.

COL. AMEN: Referring once more to the chart, please indicate your

position in the RSHA and state for what period you continued to serve in

that capacity.

[_The witness pointed to Amt III on the chart._]

COL. AMEN: What were the positions of Kaltenbrunner, Müller, and

Eichmann in the RSHA, and state for what periods of time each of them

continued to serve in his respective capacity?

OHLENDORF: Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD;

as such, he was also Chief of the RSHA, the internal organizational term

for the office of the chief of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD.

Kaltenbrunner occupied this position from 30 January 1943 until the end

of the war. Müller was Chief of Amt IV, the Gestapo. When the Gestapo

was established, he became Deputy Chief, and as such he logically became

Chief of Amt IV of the RSHA. He occupied this position until the end of

the war. Eichmann occupied a position in Amt IV under Müller and worked

on the Jewish problem from approximately 1940 onwards. To my knowledge,

he also occupied this position until the end of the war.

COL. AMEN: Did you tell us for what period of time you continued to

serve as Chief of Amt III?

OHLENDORF: I was part-time Chief of Amt III from 1939 to 1945.

COL. AMEN: Turning now to the designation “Mobile Units” with the Army

shown in the lower right hand corner of the chart, please explain to the

Tribunal the significance of the terms “Einsatzgruppe” and

“Einsatzkommando.”

OHLENDORF: The concept “Einsatzgruppe” was established after an

agreement between the Chiefs of the RSHA, OKW, and OKH, on the separate

use of Sipo units in the operational areas. The concept “Einsatzgruppe”

first appeared during the Polish campaign.

The agreement with the OKH and OKW, however, was arrived at only before

the beginning of the Russian campaign. This agreement specified that a

representative of the Chief of the Sipo and the SD would be assigned to

the army groups, or armies, and that this official would have at his

disposal mobile units of the Sipo and the SD in the form of an

Einsatzgruppe, subdivided into Einsatzkommandos. The Einsatzkommandos

would, on orders from the army group or army, be assigned to the

individual army units as needed.

COL. AMEN: State, if you know, whether prior to the campaign against

Soviet Russia, any agreement was entered into between the OKW, OKH, and

RSHA?

OHLENDORF: Yes, the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos, as I have just

described them, were used on the basis of a written agreement between

the OKW, OKH, and RSHA.

COL. AMEN: How do you know that there was such a written agreement?

OHLENDORF: I was repeatedly present during the negotiations which

Albrecht and Schellenberg conducted with the OKH and OKW; and I also had

a written copy of this agreement, which was the outcome of these

negotiations, in my own hands when I took over the Einsatzgruppe.

COL. AMEN: Explain to the Tribunal who Schellenberg was. What position,

if any, did he occupy?

OHLENDORF: Schellenberg was, at the end, Chief of Amt VI in the RSHA; at

the time when he was conducting these negotiations as the representative

of Heydrich, he belonged to the Amt I.

COL. AMEN: On approximately what date did these negotiations take place?

OHLENDORF: The negotiations lasted several weeks. The agreement must

have been reached about 1 or 2 weeks before the beginning of the Russian

campaign.

COL. AMEN: Did you yourself ever see a copy of this written agreement?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you have occasion to work with this written agreement?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: On more than one occasion?

OHLENDORF: Yes; in all questions arising out of the relationship between

the Einsatzgruppen and the Army.

COL. AMEN: Do you know where the original or any copy of that agreement

is located today?

OHLENDORF: No.

COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, please

explain to the Tribunal the entire substance of this written agreement.

OHLENDORF: First of all, the agreement stated that Einsatzgruppen and

Einsatzkommandos would be set up and used in the operational areas. This

created a precedent, because until that time the Army had, on its own

responsibility, discharged the tasks which would now fall solely to the

Sipo. The second was the regulation as to competence.

THE PRESIDENT: You’re going too fast. What is it that you say the

Einsatzkommandos did under the agreement?

OHLENDORF: I said, this was the relationship between the Army and the

Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos. The agreement specified that

the army groups or armies would be responsible for the movement and the

supply of Einsatzgruppen, but that instructions for their activities

would come from the Chief of the Sipo and SD.

COL. AMEN: Let us understand. Is it correct that an Einsatz group was to

be attached to each army group or army?

OHLENDORF: Every army group was to have an Einsatzgruppe attached to it.

The army group in its turn would then attach the Einsatzkommandos to the

armies of the army group.

COL. AMEN: And was the army command to determine the area within which

the Einsatz group was to operate?

OHLENDORF: The operational area of the Einsatzgruppe was already

determined by the fact that it was attached to a specific army group and

therefore moved with it, whereas the operational areas of the

Einsatzkommandos were then fixed by the army group or army.

COL. AMEN: Did the agreement also provide that the army command was to

direct the time during which they were to operate?

OHLENDORF: That was included under the heading “movement.”

COL. AMEN: And also to direct any additional tasks they were to perform?

OHLENDORF: Yes. Even though the Chiefs of the Sipo and SD had the right

to issue instructions to them on their work, there existed a general

agreement that the army was also entitled to issue orders to the

Einsatzgruppen, if the operational situation made it necessary.

COL. AMEN: What did this agreement provide with respect to the

attachment of the Einsatz group command to the army command?

OHLENDORF: I can’t remember whether anything specific was contained in

the agreement about that. At any rate a liaison man between the army

command and the SD was appointed.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall any other provisions of this written agreement?

OHLENDORF: I believe I can state the main contents of that agreement.

COL. AMEN: What position did you occupy with respect to this agreement?

OHLENDORF: From June 1941 to the death of Heydrich in June 1942, I led

Einsatzgruppe D, and was the representative of the Chief of the Sipo and

the SD with the 11th Army.

COL. AMEN: And when was Heydrich’s death?

OHLENDORF: Heydrich was wounded at the end of May 1942, and died on 4

June 1942.

COL. AMEN: How much advance notice, if any, did you have of the campaign

against Soviet Russia?

OHLENDORF: About 4 weeks.

COL. AMEN: How many Einsatz groups were there, and who were their

respective leaders?

OHLENDORF: There were four Einsatzgruppen, Group A, B, C, and D. Chief

of Einsatzgruppe A was Stahlecker; Chief of Einsatzgruppe B was Nebe;

Chief of Einsatzgruppe C, Dr. Rasche, and later, Dr. Thomas; Chief of

Einsatzgruppe D, I myself, and later Bierkamp.

COL. AMEN: To which army was Group D attached?

OHLENDORF: Group D was not attached to any army group, but was attached

directly to the 11th Army.

COL. AMEN: Where did Group D operate?

OHLENDORF: Group D operated in the Southern Ukraine.

COL. AMEN: Will you describe in more detail the nature and extent of the

area in which Group D originally operated, naming the cities or

territories?

OHLENDORF: The northernmost city was Cernauti; then southward through

Mohilev-Podolsk, Yampol, then eastward Zuvalje, Czervind, Melitopol,

Mariopol, Taganrog, Rostov, and the Crimea.

COL. AMEN: What was the ultimate objective of Group D?

OHLENDORF: Group D was held in reserve for the Caucasus, for an army

group which was to operate in the Caucasus.

COL. AMEN: When did Group D commence its move into Soviet Russia?

OHLENDORF: Group D left Duegen on 21 June and reached Pietra Namsk in

Romania in 3 days. There the first Einsatzkommandos were already being

demanded by the Army, and they immediately set off for the destinations

named by the Army. The entire Einsatzgruppe was put into operation at

the beginning of July.

COL. AMEN: You are referring to the 11th Army?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: In what respects, if any, were the official duties of the

Einsatz groups concerned with Jews and Communist commissars?

OHLENDORF: On the question of Jews and Communists, the Einsatzgruppen

and the commanders of the Einsatzkommandos were orally instructed before

their mission.

COL. AMEN: What were their instructions with respect to the Jews and the

Communist functionaries?

OHLENDORF: The instructions were that in the Russian operational areas

of the Einsatzgruppen the Jews, as well as the Soviet political

commissars, were to be liquidated.

COL. AMEN: And when you say “liquidated” do you mean “killed?”

OHLENDORF: Yes, I mean “killed.”

COL. AMEN: Prior to the opening of the Soviet campaign, did you attend a

conference at Pretz?

OHLENDORF: Yes, it was a conference at which the Einsatzgruppen and the

Einsatzkommandos were informed of their tasks and were given the

necessary orders.

COL. AMEN: Who was present at that conference?

OHLENDORF: The chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen and the commanders of the

Einsatzkommandos and Streckenbach of the RSHA who transmitted the orders

of Heydrich and Himmler.

COL. AMEN: What were those orders?

OHLENDORF: Those were the general orders on the normal work of the Sipo

and the SD, and in addition the liquidation order which I have already

mentioned.

COL. AMEN: And that conference took place on approximately what date?

OHLENDORF: About 3 or 4 days before the mission.

COL. AMEN: So that before you commenced to march into Soviet Russia, you

received orders at this conference to exterminate the Jews and Communist

functionaries in addition to the regular professional work of the

Security Police and SD; is that correct?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you, personally, have any conversation with Himmler

respecting any communication from Himmler to the chiefs of army groups

and armies concerning this mission?

OHLENDORF: Yes. Himmler told me that before the beginning of the Russian

campaign Hitler had spoken of this mission to a conference of the army

groups and the army chiefs—no, not the army chiefs but the commanding

generals—and had instructed the commanding generals to provide the

necessary support.

COL. AMEN: So that you can testify that the chiefs of the army groups

and the armies had been similarly informed of these orders for the

liquidation of the Jews and Soviet functionaries?

OHLENDORF: I don’t think it is quite correct to put it in that form.

They had no orders for liquidation; the order for the liquidation was

given to Himmler to carry out, but since this liquidation took place in

the operational area of the army group or the armies, they had to be

ordered to provide support. Moreover, without such instructions to the

army, the activities of the Einsatzgruppen would not have been possible.

COL. AMEN: Did you have any other conversation with Himmler concerning

this order?

OHLENDORF: Yes, in the late summer of 1941 Himmler was in Nikolaiev. He

assembled the leaders and men of the Einsatzkommandos, repeated to them

the liquidation order, and pointed out that the leaders and men who were

taking part in the liquidation bore no personal responsibility for the

execution of this order. The responsibility was his, alone, and the

Führer’s.

COL. AMEN: And you yourself heard that said?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Do you know whether this mission of the Einsatz group was

known to the army group commanders?

OHLENDORF: This order and the execution of these orders were known to

the commanding general of the army.

COL. AMEN: How do you know that?

OHLENDORF: Through conferences with the army and through instructions

which were given by the army on the execution of the order.

COL. AMEN: Was the mission of the Einsatz groups and the agreement

between OKW, OKH, and RSHA known to the other leaders in the RSHA?

OHLENDORF: At least some of them knew of it, since some of the leaders

were also active in the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos in the

course of time. Furthermore, the leaders who were dealing with the

organization and the legal aspect of the Einsatzgruppen also knew of it.

COL. AMEN: Most of the leaders came from the RSHA, did they not?

OHLENDORF: Which leaders?

COL. AMEN: Of the Einsatz groups.

OHLENDORF: No, one can’t say that. The leaders in the Einsatzgruppen and

Einsatzkommandos came from all over the Reich.

COL. AMEN: Do you know whether the mission and the agreement were also

known to Kaltenbrunner?

OHLENDORF: After his assumption of office Kaltenbrunner had to deal with

these questions and consequently must have known details of the

Einsatzgruppen which were offices of his.

COL. AMEN: Who was the commanding officer of the 11th Army?

OHLENDORF: At first, Ritter von Schober; later, Von Manstein.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal in what way or ways the commanding

officer of the 11th Army directed or supervised Einsatz Group D in

carrying out its liquidation activities?

OHLENDORF: An order from the 11th Army was sent to Nikolaiev stating

that liquidations were to take place only at a distance of not less than

200 kilometers from the headquarters of the commanding general.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall any other occasion?

OHLENDORF: In Simferopol the army command requested the Einsatzkommandos

in its area to hasten the liquidations, because famine was threatening

and there was a great housing shortage.

COL. AMEN: Do you know how many persons were liquidated by Einsatz Group

D under your direction?

OHLENDORF: In the year between June 1941 to June 1942 the

Einsatzkommandos reported 90,000 people liquidated.

COL. AMEN: Did that include men, women, and children?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: On what do you base those figures?

OHLENDORF: On reports sent by the Einsatzkommandos to the

Einsatzgruppen.

COL. AMEN: Were those reports submitted to you?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And you saw them and read them?

OHLENDORF: I beg your pardon?

COL. AMEN: And you saw and read those reports, personally?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And it is on those reports that you base the figures you have

given the Tribunal?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Do you know how those figures compare with the number of

persons liquidated by other Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The figures which I saw of other Einsatzgruppen are

considerably larger.

COL. AMEN: That was due to what factor?

OHLENDORF: I believe that to a large extent the figures submitted by the

other Einsatzgruppen were exaggerated.

COL. AMEN: Did you see reports of liquidations from the other Einsatz

groups from time to time?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And those reports showed liquidations exceeding those of

Group D; is that correct?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you personally supervise mass executions of these

individuals?

OHLENDORF: I was present at two mass executions for purposes of

inspection.

COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal in detail how an individual

mass execution was carried out?

OHLENDORF: A local Einsatzkommando attempted to collect all the Jews in

its area by registering them. This registration was performed by the

Jews themselves.

COL. AMEN: On what pretext, if any, were they rounded up?

OHLENDORF: On the pretext that they were to be resettled.

COL. AMEN: Will you continue?

OHLENDORF: After the registration the Jews were collected at one place;

and from there they were later transported to the place of execution,

which was, as a rule an antitank ditch or a natural excavation. The

executions were carried out in a military manner, by firing squads under

command.

COL. AMEN: In what way were they transported to the place of execution?

OHLENDORF: They were transported to the place of execution in trucks,

always only as many as could be executed immediately. In this way it was

attempted to keep the span of time from the moment in which the victims

knew what was about to happen to them until the time of their actual

execution as short as possible.

COL. AMEN: Was that your idea?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And after they were shot what was done with the bodies?

OHLENDORF: The bodies were buried in the antitank ditch or excavation.

COL. AMEN: What determination, if any, was made as to whether the

persons were actually dead?

OHLENDORF: The unit leaders or the firing-squad commanders had orders to

see to this and, if need be, finish them off themselves.

COL. AMEN: And who would do that?

OHLENDORF: Either the unit leader himself or somebody designated by him.

COL. AMEN: In what positions were the victims shot?

OHLENDORF: Standing or kneeling.

COL. AMEN: What was done with the personal property and clothing of the

persons executed?

OHLENDORF: All valuables were confiscated at the time of the

registration or the rounding up and handed over to the Finance Ministry,

either through the RSHA or directly. At first the clothing was given to

the population, but in the winter of 1941-42 it was collected and

disposed of by the NSV.

COL. AMEN: All their personal property was registered at the time?

OHLENDORF: No, not all of it, only valuables were registered.

COL. AMEN: What happened to the garments which the victims were wearing

when they went to the place of execution?

OHLENDORF: They were obliged to take off their outer garments

immediately before the execution.

COL. AMEN: All of them?

OHLENDORF: The outer garments, yes.

COL. AMEN: How about the rest of the garments they were wearing?

OHLENDORF: The other garments remained on the bodies.

COL. AMEN: Was that true of not only your group but of the other Einsatz

groups?

OHLENDORF: That was the order in my Einsatzgruppe. I don’t know how it

was done in other Einsatzgruppen.

COL. AMEN: In what way did they handle it?

OHLENDORF: Some of the unit leaders did not carry out the liquidation in

the military manner, but killed the victims singly by shooting them in

the back of the neck.

COL. AMEN: And you objected to that procedure?

OHLENDORF: I was against that procedure, yes.

COL. AMEN: For what reason?

OHLENDORF: Because both for the victims and for those who carried out

the executions, it was, psychologically, an immense burden to bear.

COL. AMEN: Now, what was done with the property collected by the

Einsatzkommandos from these victims?

OHLENDORF: All valuables were sent to Berlin, to the RSHA or to the

Reich Ministry of Finance. The articles which could be used in the

operational area, were disposed of there.

COL. AMEN: For example, what happened to gold and silver taken from the

victims?

OHLENDORF: That was, as I have just said, turned over to Berlin, to the

Reich Ministry of Finance.

COL. AMEN: How do you know that?

OHLENDORF: I can remember that it was actually handled in that way from

Simferopol.

COL. AMEN: How about watches, for example, taken from the victims?

OHLENDORF: At the request of the Army, watches were made available to

the forces at the front.

COL. AMEN: Were all victims, including the men, women, and children,

executed in the same manner?

OHLENDORF: Until the spring of 1942, yes. Then an order came from

Himmler that in the future women and children were to be killed only in

gas vans.

COL. AMEN: How had the women and children been killed previously?

OHLENDORF: In the same way as the men—by shooting.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was done about burying the victims after

they had been executed?

OHLENDORF: The Kommandos filled the graves to efface the signs of the

execution, and then labor units of the population leveled them.

COL. AMEN: Referring to the gas vans which you said you received in the

spring of 1942, what order did you receive with respect to the use of

these vans?

OHLENDORF: These gas vans were in future to be used for the killing of

women and children.

COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the construction of these

vans and their appearance?

OHLENDORF: The actual purpose of these vans could not be seen from the

outside. They looked like closed trucks, and were so constructed that at

the start of the motor, gas was conducted into the van causing death in

10 to 15 minutes.

COL. AMEN: Explain in detail just how one of these vans was used for an

execution.

OHLENDORF: The vans were loaded with the victims and driven to the place

of burial, which was usually the same as that used for the mass

executions. The time needed for transportation was sufficient to insure

the death of the victims.

COL. AMEN: How were the victims induced to enter the vans?

OHLENDORF: They were told that they were to be transported to another

locality.

COL. AMEN: How was the gas turned on?

OHLENDORF: I am not familiar with the technical details.

COL. AMEN: How long did it take to kill the victims ordinarily?

OHLENDORF: About 10 to 15 minutes; the victims were not conscious of

what was happening to them.

COL. AMEN: How many persons could be killed simultaneously in one such

van?

OHLENDORF: About 15 to 25 persons. The vans varied in size.

COL. AMEN: Did you receive reports from those persons operating these

vans from time to time?

OHLENDORF: I didn’t understand the question.

COL. AMEN: Did you receive reports from those who were working on the

vans?

OHLENDORF: I received the report that the Einsatzkommandos did not

willingly use the vans.

COL. AMEN: Why not?

OHLENDORF: Because the burial of the victims was a great ordeal for the

members of the Einsatzkommandos.

COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell the Tribunal who furnished these vans to

the Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The gas vans did not belong to the motor pool of the

Einsatzgruppen but were assigned to the Einsatzgruppe as a special unit,

headed by the man who had constructed the vans. The vans were assigned

to the Einsatzgruppen by the RSHA.

COL. AMEN: Were the vans supplied to all of the different Einsatz

groups?

OHLENDORF: I am not certain of that. I know only in the case of

Einsatzgruppe D, and indirectly that Einsatzgruppe C also made use of

these vans.

COL. AMEN: Are you familiar with the letter from Becker to Rauff with

respect to these gas vans?

OHLENDORF: I saw this letter during my interrogation.

COL. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal, I am referring to Exhibit 501-PS,

Exhibit USA-288, being a letter already in evidence, a letter from

Becker to Rauff.

[_Turning to the witness._] Will you tell the Tribunal who Becker was?

OHLENDORF: According to my recollection, Becker was the constructor of

the vans. It was he who was in charge of the vans of Einsatzgruppe D.

COL. AMEN: Who was Rauff?

OHLENDORF: Rauff was group leader in Amt II of the RSHA. Among other

things, he was at that time in charge of transportation.

COL. AMEN: Can you identify that letter in any way?

OHLENDORF: The contents roughly correspond to my experiences and are

therefore probably correct.

[_Document 501-PS was handed to the witness._]

COL. AMEN: Will you look at the letter before you and tell us whether

you can identify it in any way?

OHLENDORF: The external appearance of the letter as well as the initial

“R” (Rauff) on it, and the reference to Zwabel or Fabel who took care of

transportation under Rauff, seems to testify to the letter’s

authenticity. The contents roughly correspond to the experiences which I

had at that time.

COL. AMEN: So that you believe it to be an authentic document?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you now lay it aside on the table there?

Referring to your previous testimony, will you explain to the Tribunal

why you believe that the type of execution ordered by you, namely,

military, was preferable to the shooting-in-the-neck procedure adopted

by the other Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: On the one hand, the aim was that the individual leaders and

men should be able to carry out the executions in a military manner

acting on orders and should not have to make a decision of their own; it

was, to all intents and purposes, an order which they were to carry out.

On the other hand, it was known to me that through the emotional

excitement of the executions ill-treatment could not be avoided, since

the victims discovered too soon that they were to be executed and could

not therefore endure prolonged nervous strain. And it seemed intolerable

to me that individual leaders and men should in consequence be forced to

kill a large number of people on their own decision.

COL. AMEN: In what manner did you determine which were the Jews to be

executed?

OHLENDORF: That was not part of my task; but the identification of the

Jews was carried out by the Jews themselves, since the registration was

handled by a Jewish Council of Elders.

COL. AMEN: Did the amount of Jewish blood have anything to do with it?

OHLENDORF: I can’t remember the details, but I believe that half-Jews

were also considered as Jews.

COL. AMEN: What organizations furnished most of the officer personnel of

the Einsatz groups and Einsatzkommandos?

OHLENDORF: I did not understand the question.

COL. AMEN: What organizations furnished most of the officer personnel of

the Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: The officer personnel was furnished by the State Police, the

Kripo, and, to a lesser extent, by the SD.

COL. AMEN: Kripo?

OHLENDORF: Yes, the State Police, the Criminal Police and, to a lesser

extent, the SD.

COL. AMEN: Were there any other sources of personnel?

OHLENDORF: Yes, most of the men employed were furnished by the Waffen-SS

and the Ordnungspolizei. The State Police and the Kripo furnished most

of the experts, and the troops were furnished by the Waffen-SS and the

Ordnungspolizei.

COL. AMEN: How about the Waffen-SS?

OHLENDORF: The Waffen-SS and the Ordnungspolizei were each supposed to

supply the Einsatzgruppen with one company.

COL. AMEN: How about the Order Police?

OHLENDORF: The Ordnungspolizei also furnished the Einsatzgruppen with

one company.

COL. AMEN: What was the size of Einsatz Group D and its operating area

as compared with the other Einsatz groups?

OHLENDORF: I estimate that Einsatzgruppe D was one-half or two-thirds as

large as the other Einsatzgruppen. That changed in the course of time,

since some of the Einsatzgruppen were greatly enlarged.

COL. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal, I have other questions relating

to organizational matters which I think would clarify some of the

evidence which has already been in part received by the Tribunal; but I

don’t want to take the time of the Tribunal unless they feel that they

want any more such testimony. I thought perhaps if any members of the

Tribunal had questions they would ask this witness directly, because he

is the best informed on these organizational matters of anyone who will

be presented in Court.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not think that it is

necessary to go further into the organizational questions at this stage,

but it is a matter which must be really decided by you because you know

what the nature of the evidence which you are considering is.

So far as the Tribunal is concerned, they are satisfied at the present

stage to leave the matter where it is. But there is one aspect of the

witness’ evidence which the Tribunal would like you to investigate, and

that is whether the practices of which he has been speaking continued

after 1942, and for how long.

COL. AMEN: [_To the witness._] Can you state whether the liquidation

practices which you have described continued after 1942 and, if so, for

how long a period of time thereafter?

OHLENDORF: I don’t think that the basic order was ever revoked. But I

cannot remember the details—at least not with regard to Russia—which

would enable me to make concrete statements on this subject. The retreat

began very shortly thereafter, so that the operational region of the

Einsatzgruppen became ever smaller. I do know, however, that other

Einsatzgruppen with similar orders had been envisaged for other areas.

COL. AMEN: Your personal knowledge extends up to what date?

OHLENDORF: I know that the liquidation of Jews was prohibited about six

months before the end of the war. I also saw a document terminating the

liquidation of Soviet commissars, but I cannot recall a specific date.

COL. AMEN: Do you know whether in fact it was so terminated?

OHLENDORF: Yes, I believe so.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know the number of men in your

Einsatz group.

OHLENDORF: There were about 500 men in my Einsatzgruppe, excluding those

who were added to the group as assistants from the country itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Including them, did you say?

OHLENDORF: Excluding those who were added to the group from the country

itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know how many there would be in other groups?

OHLENDORF: I estimate that at the beginning there were seven to eight

hundred men; but, as I said, this number changed rapidly in the course

of time, since the Einsatzgruppen themselves acquired new people or

succeeded in getting additional personnel from the RSHA.

THE PRESIDENT: The numbers increased, did they?

OHLENDORF: Yes, the numbers increased.

COL. AMEN: Now, here are perhaps just a half dozen of these questions I

would like to ask, because I do think they might clear up, in the minds

of the Tribunal, some of the evidence which has gone before. I shall be

very brief, if that is satisfactory to the Tribunal.

[_Turning to the witness._] Will you explain the significance of the

different widths of the blue lines on the chart?

OHLENDORF: The thick blue line between the position of Himmler as

Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police and the RSHA is designed

to show the identity of the offices of the chiefs of the

Sicherheitspolizei and the SD in their tasks. The RSHA treated both

ministerial questions of leadership and individual executive questions,

that is to say, matters of the Sipo and the SD. From the legal

administrative point of view, however, the organizational scheme shows

an illegal state of affairs in that the RSHA as such never actually had

official validity. The formal, legal position was different from that

shown on this chart. Party and State offices with different authority

were amalgamated. Under this designation RSHA, no directives or laws or

orders could be issued on a legal basis, because the State Police, in

its ministerial capacity, was still subordinate to the Ministry of the

Interior, whereas the SD, despite this set-up, was an organ of the

Party.

Therefore if I wanted to reproduce this administrative scheme

accurately, I should, for example, have to put in place of Amt IV, the

Amt “Political Police”, a part of the former Hauptamt

Sicherheitspolizei. This Amt “Political Police” existed formally to the

very end and had sprung from the Police Department of the Ministry of

the Interior. Also, the Secret State Police Amt, the Central Office of

the Prussian Secret State Police, the head office of all the political

police offices of the different Länder, continued to exist formally.

Thus, ministerial questions continued to be dealt with under the heading

of the Minister of the Interior. So far as it was necessary to emphasize

the formal competence of the Ministry of the Interior, this was

indicated in the heading “Reich Minister of the Interior” with the

filing notice “Pol,” the former designation of the Police Department of

the Ministry of the Interior, together with the appropriate filing

notice of the competent department of the former Hauptamt

Sicherheitspolizei; for example, filing notice “Pol-S” meant

Sicherheitspolizei; “V” meant Amt Verwaltung und Recht (Administration

and Law).

The RSHA was therefore nothing more than a camouflage designation which

did not correctly represent the actual state of affairs but gave the

Chief of the Sipo and the SD, as a collective designation for the Chief

of the Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei and the Chief of the SD Hauptamt (an

office which existed until 1939), the opportunity of using one or the

other letterhead at any time.

At the same time it gave him the opportunity of an internal amalgamation

of all forces and the opportunity of a division of the spheres of work

on a practical, effective basis. But the State offices in this Amt did

remain in a way dependent on the Ministry of the Interior, and similarly

the departments of the SD remained departments of the Party.

The SD Hauptamt, or the RSHA, had formally only the significance of an

SS Main Office, in which the SS members of the Sipo and the SD belonged

to the SS. But the SS, that is to say, Himmler, as Reichsführer SS, gave

these State offices no official authority to issue orders.

THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that I follow altogether what you have been

saying; but is what you have been saying the reason why you are shown on

the chart as concerned with Amt III, which refers, apparently, only to

inside Germany, while, according to your evidence, you were the head of

Einsatz Group D, which was operating outside Germany?

OHLENDORF: The fact that I led an Einsatzgruppe had nothing to do with

my position as Chief of Amt III. I led the Einsatzgruppe as an

individual and not as Chief of Amt III; and in my capacity as leader of

an Einsatzgruppe, I entered into a completely new function and assumed

an office completely separate from my previous one.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. And did it involve that you left Germany and went

into the area invaded in the Soviet Union?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you now explain the significance of the dotted blue

lines, as compared with the solid blue lines on the right-hand side of

the chart?

OHLENDORF: The solid lines indicate a direct official channel for

orders, whereas the dotted lines signify that there was, as a rule, no

direct channel.

COL. AMEN: Was the term “SD” ever used to include both the Sipo and the

SD?

OHLENDORF: In the course of years the term “SD” was used more and more

incorrectly. It came to be established as an abbreviation for Sipo and

SD, without actually being suitable for that. “SD” was originally simply

a designation for the fact that someone belonged to the SS through the

SD Main Office. When the SD Main Office was dissolved and was taken over

into the RSHA, the question arose whether the designation SD, which was

also worn as insignia on the sleeve of the particular SS man, should be

replaced by another insignia or a new abbreviation, e.g., RSHA. That was

not done because the camouflage of the RSHA would thereby have been

endangered. But when, for example, I read in a Führer order that in

France people were to be turned over to the SD, that was a case in point

of the false use of the designation SD, because there were no such

offices in France and the SD, insofar as it functioned in departments,

e.g., Amt III, had no executive power but was purely an intelligence

organ.

COL. AMEN: Briefly, what was the relationship between the SS and the

Gestapo?

OHLENDORF: The relationship between the SS and Gestapo was this: The

Reichsführer SS, as such, took over the tasks of the Police and

attempted to link the State Police and the SS more closely, that is to

say, on the one hand to employ only members of the State Police who were

eligible for the SS and, on the other hand, to use the institutions of

the SS, e.g., education and training of the younger generation by the

Waffen-SS, in order in this way to supply recruits for the State Police.

This amalgamation was later extended by Himmler in an attempt to bring

about the same relationship between the SS and the Ministry of the

Interior, i.e., the whole internal administration.

COL. AMEN: About how many full-time agents and honorary auxiliary

personnel did the SD employ?

OHLENDORF: Yes, well, in this connection, too, one cannot use the term

SD; one must distinguish here between Amt III and Amt VI. Amt III, as

the interior intelligence service, had about 3,000 salaried members,

including men and women. On the other hand, the interior intelligence

service worked essentially with honorary members, that is, with men and

women who put their professional experiences and the experiences in

their surroundings at the disposal of the interior intelligence service.

I would judge their number to be roughly 30,000.

COL. AMEN: Will you briefly give the Tribunal a general example of how a

typical transaction was handled through the channels indicated on the

chart?

OHLENDORF: First, a general example, invented to make things clear.

Himmler heard that more and more saboteurs were being dropped from

planes into Germany and were endangering transportation and factory

sites. He informed Kaltenbrunner in the latter’s capacity as Chief of

the Sipo and instructed him to draw the attention of his organs to this

state of affairs and to take measures ensuring that these saboteurs

would be seized as soon and as completely as possible.

Kaltenbrunner instructed the chief of Amt IV, that is, the State Police,

to prepare an order to this effect for the regional offices. This order

was drawn up by the competent authorities in Amt IV and was either

transmitted by Müller directly to the State Police offices in the Reich

or—and this is more probable on account of the importance of the

question and the necessity to bring the order at the same time to the

attention of the other offices of the Sicherheitspolizei—or he gave it

to Kaltenbrunner, who signed it and sent it to the regional offices in

the Reich.

An order of this sort laid down, for example, that the State Police

offices were to report the measures they were taking as well as their

results. These reports went back through the same channels from the

regional offices to the competent authorities in Amt IV, from there to

the Chief of Amt IV, from there to the Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei,

Kaltenbrunner, and then to the Chief of the German Police Himmler.

COL. AMEN: And, finally will you give a specific example of a typical

transaction handled through the channels indicated on the chart?

OHLENDORF: I take the example of the arrest of the leaders of the

leftist parties after the events of the 20th of July: This order was

also transmitted from Himmler to Kaltenbrunner; Kaltenbrunner passed it

on to Amt IV and an appropriate draft for a decree was formulated by Amt

IV, signed by Kaltenbrunner, and sent to the regional offices. The

reports were returned from the subordinate offices back to the higher

offices along the same channels.

COL. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal. The witness is now available to

other counsel. I understand that Colonel Pokrovsky has some questions

that he wishes to ask on behalf of the Soviets.

COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): The

testimony of the witness is important for the clarification of questions

in a report on which the Soviet Delegation is at present working.

Therefore, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to put a

number of questions to the witness.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you said that you were present

twice at the mass executions. On whose orders were you an inspector at

the executions?

OHLENDORF: I was present at the executions on my own initiative.

COL. POKROVSKY: But you said that you attended as inspector.

OHLENDORF: I said that I attended for inspection purposes.

COL. POKROVSKY: On your initiative?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did one of your chiefs always attend the executions for

purposes of inspection?

OHLENDORF: Whenever possible I sent a member of the staff of the

Einsatzgruppe to witness the executions, but this was not always

feasible since the Einsatzgruppen had to operate over great distances.

COL. POKROVSKY: Why was some person sent for purposes of inspection?

OHLENDORF: Would you please repeat the question?

COL. POKROVSKY: For what purpose was an inspector sent?

OHLENDORF: To determine whether or not my instructions regarding the

manner of the execution were actually being carried out.

COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that the inspector was to make

certain that the execution had actually been carried out?

OHLENDORF: No, it would not be correct to say that. He was to ascertain

whether the conditions which I had set for the execution were actually

being carried out.

COL. POKROVSKY: What manner of conditions had you in mind?

OHLENDORF: 1. Exclusion of the public; 2. Military execution by a

firing-squad; 3. Arrival of the transports and carrying out of the

liquidation in a smooth manner to avoid unnecessary excitement; 4.

Supervision of the property to prevent looting. There may have been

other details which I no longer remember. At any rate, all

ill-treatment, whether physical or mental, was to be prevented through

these measures.

COL. POKROVSKY: You wished to make sure that what you considered to be

an equitable distribution of this property was effected, or did you

aspire to complete acquisition of the valuables?

OHLENDORF: Yes.[1]

COL. POKROVSKY: You spoke of ill-treatment. What did you mean by

ill-treatment at the executions?

OHLENDORF: If, for instance, the manner in which the executions were

carried out caused excitement and disobedience among the victims, so

that the Kommandos were forced to restore order by means of violence.

COL. POKROVSKY: What do you mean by “restore order by means of

violence”? What do you mean by suppression of the excitement amongst the

victims by means of violence?

OHLENDORF: If, as I have already said, in order to carry out the

liquidation in an orderly fashion it was necessary, for example, to

resort to beating.

COL. POKROVSKY: Was it absolutely necessary to beat the victims?

OHLENDORF: I myself never witnessed it, but I heard of it.

COL. POKROVSKY: From whom?

OHLENDORF: In conversations with members of other Kommandos.

COL. POKROVSKY: You said that cars, autocars, were used for the

executions?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know where, and with whose assistance, the

inventor, Becker, was able to put his invention into practice?

OHLENDORF: I remember only that it was done through Amt II of the RSHA;

but I can no longer say that with certainty.

COL. POKROVSKY: How many were executed in these cars?

OHLENDORF: I did not understand the question.

COL. POKROVSKY: How many persons were executed by means of these cars?

OHLENDORF: I cannot give precise figures, but the number was

comparatively very small—perhaps a few hundred.

COL. POKROVSKY: You said that mostly women and children were executed in

these vans. For what reason?

OHLENDORF: That was a special order from Himmler to the effect that

women and children were not to be exposed to the mental strain of the

executions; and thus the men of the Kommandos, mostly married men,

should not be compelled to aim at women and children.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did anybody observe the behavior of the persons executed

in these vans?

OHLENDORF: Yes, the doctor.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did you know that Becker had reported that death in

these vans was particularly agonizing?

OHLENDORF: No. I learned of Becker’s reports for the first time from the

letter to Rauff, which was shown to me here. On the contrary, I know

from the doctor’s reports that the victims were not conscious of their

impending death.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did any military units—I mean, Army units—take part in

these mass executions?

OHLENDORF: As a rule, no.

COL. POKROVSKY: And as an exception?

OHLENDORF: I think I remember that in Nikolaiev and in Simferopol a

spectator from the Army High Command was present for a short time.

COL. POKROVSKY: For what purpose?

OHLENDORF: I don’t know, probably to obtain information personally.

COL. POKROVSKY: Were military units assigned to carry out the executions

in these towns?

OHLENDORF: Officially, the Army did not assign any units for this

purpose; the Army as such was actually opposed to the liquidation.

COL. POKROVSKY: But in practice?

OHLENDORF: Individual units occasionally volunteered. However, at the

moment I know of no such case among the Army itself, but only among the

units attached to the Army (Heeresgefolge).

COL. POKROVSKY: You were the man by whose orders people were sent to

their death. Were Jews only handed over for the execution by the

Einsatzgruppe or were Communists—“Communist officials” you call them in

your instructions—handed over for execution along with the Jews?

OHLENDORF: Yes, activists and political commissars. Mere membership in

the Communist Party was not sufficient to persecute or kill a man.

COL. POKROVSKY: Were any special investigations made concerning the part

played by persons in the Communist Party?

OHLENDORF: No, I said on the contrary that mere membership of the

Communist Party was not, in itself, a determining factor in persecuting

or executing a man; he had to have a special political function.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did you have any discussions on the murder vans sent

from Berlin and on their use?

OHLENDORF: I did not understand the question.

COL. POKROVSKY: Had you occasion to discuss, with your chiefs and your

colleagues, the fact that motor vans had been sent to your own

particular Einsatzgruppe from Berlin for carrying out the executions? Do

you remember any such discussions?

OHLENDORF: I do not remember any specific discussion.

COL. POKROVSKY: Had you any information concerning the fact that members

of the execution squad in charge of the executions were unwilling to use

the vans?

OHLENDORF: I knew that the Einsatzkommandos were using these vans.

COL. POKROVSKY: No, I had something else in mind. I wanted to know

whether you received reports that members of the execution squads were

unwilling to use the vans and preferred other means of execution?

OHLENDORF: That they would rather kill by means of the gas vans than by

shooting?

COL. POKROVSKY: On the contrary, that they preferred execution by

shooting to killing by means of the gas vans.

OHLENDORF: Yes, I have already said that the gas van . . .

COL. POKROVSKY: And why did they prefer execution by shooting to killing

in the gas vans?

OHLENDORF: Because, as I have already said, in the opinion of the leader

of the Einsatzkommandos, the unloading of the corpses was an unnecessary

mental strain.

COL. POKROVSKY: What do you mean by “an unnecessary mental strain”?

OHLENDORF: As far as I can remember the conditions at that time—the

picture presented by the corpses and probably because certain functions

of the body had taken place leaving the corpses lying in filth.

COL. POKROVSKY: You mean to say that the sufferings endured prior to

death were clearly visible on the victims? Did I understand you

correctly?

OHLENDORF: I don’t understand the question; do you mean during the

killing in the van?

COL. POKROVSKY: Yes.

OHLENDORF: I can only repeat what the doctor told me, that the victims

were not conscious of their death in the van.

COL. POKROVSKY: In that case your reply to my previous question, that

the unloading of the bodies made a very terrible impression on the

members of the execution squad, becomes entirely incomprehensible.

OHLENDORF: And, as I said, the terrible impression created by the

position of corpses themselves, and by the state of the vans which had

probably been dirtied and so on.

COL. POKROVSKY: I have no further questions to put to this witness at

the present stage of the Trial.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecutor for the French Republic desire to put

any questions to the witness?

M. FRANÇOIS DE MENTHON (Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): No.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the counsel for Kaltenbrunner desire to

cross-examine now or at a later date?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Perhaps I could ask a few questions now and request that

I be allowed to make my cross-examination later, after consultation with

Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN [_Turning to the witness._]: How long have you known

Kaltenbrunner?

OHLENDORF: May I be allowed to sit? May I sit down?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

OHLENDORF: I saw Kaltenbrunner for the first time during the journey

from Berlin to Himmler’s headquarters at the time when Kaltenbrunner was

to be appointed Chief of the Sipo and SD. Before that, I only knew of

his existence.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You did not know him?

OHLENDORF: I only knew of his existence.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you come into personal contact with Kaltenbrunner in

private or official discussions after his appointment as Chief of the

RSHA?

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his views on the Jewish question, for

example?

OHLENDORF: No, I don’t know his particular views on this question.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his attitude in the church question?

OHLENDORF: In the question of the church—he repudiated the anti-church

course followed in Germany. We agreed that an understanding had to be

reached with the church.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his attitude on the liquidation of civilian

prisoners, parachutists, and so on?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know that Kaltenbrunner made special efforts to

use the SD, in order to supply the criticism lacking at the Führerstab?

OHLENDORF: Yes, that was the task of the SD even before Kaltenbrunner,

and he also gave his material support to this task.

THE PRESIDENT: A little bit more slowly.

OHLENDORF: It was the task of the SD even before Kaltenbrunner came, and

he approved and materially supported this tendency.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know, either directly or indirectly, that

Kaltenbrunner had no authority to give executive orders, for example,

that he had no authority to send people to concentration camps or

release them from concentration camps, that all these things were

handled exclusively by Himmler and Müller?

OHLENDORF: I think this question is too general to be answered in a

concrete way, it must be divided up.

If you ask whether Kaltenbrunner could order executive actions, I must

answer in the affirmative. If you then name Himmler and Müller to the

exclusion of Kaltenbrunner, I must point out that in the organization of

the RSHA Müller was Kaltenbrunner’s subordinate; and consequently orders

from Himmler to Müller were also orders to Kaltenbrunner, and Müller was

obliged to inform Kaltenbrunner of them.

On the other hand, it is certain that, particularly in regard to the

concentration camps, the final decision on dispatch to them or release

from them was really made by Himmler. I can say with absolute

certainty—in this connection the expression “to the last washerwoman”

was often used—that Himmler reserved the final decision for himself.

Whether Kaltenbrunner had any authority at all in this regard, I cannot

say definitely.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you personally see the original orders and original

signatures of Kaltenbrunner ordering the liquidation of sabotage troops

and so on?

OHLENDORF: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know, either directly or indirectly, that after

Heydrich’s death a change, which to be sure was not a formal change,

took place and that another and milder course was followed by

Kaltenbrunner?

OHLENDORF: I couldn’t answer that question with concrete proof.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then I will leave that question, and come to another. Did

Kaltenbrunner know that you were an Einsatz leader in the East?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Who gave you this order?

OHLENDORF: Heydrich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Heydrich gave it to you? Then it was before this time?

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions at the moment.

THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I. T. Nikitchenko, Member for the U.S.S.R.):

Witness Ohlendorf, can you answer up to what date the Einsatzgruppe

under your command was operating?

OHLENDORF: The staff of the Einsatzgruppe went as far as the Caucasus

and then returned. As far as I can remember, a combat command

(Kampfkommando) was formed out of it under the name “Bierkamp,” and that

was used in fighting the partisans. Then, I think, the Einsatzgruppe was

entirely disbanded, Bierkamp went into the Government General and took a

large number of his men with him.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What did the group do after Bierkamp

left?

OHLENDORF: I think I can say that the Einsatzgruppe ceased to exist

after the retreat from the Caucasus. It took over tasks similar to those

of the Wehrmacht under the immediate command of the Commander of the

Sicherheitspolizei in the Ukraine and particularly under the command of

the Higher SS and Police Leaders in the Ukraine.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In other words, it merely carried out

its activities in different surroundings under different leadership, and

that was all the difference. Such functions as were performed by the

Einsatzgruppe in the past continued to be carried out in new

surroundings.

OHLENDORF: No, it actually became a combat unit.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What does that mean? Against whom were

the military actions directed?

OHLENDORF: Within the scope of operations directed against the partisan

movement.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Can you say more particularly what this

group was actually doing?

OHLENDORF: After the retreat?

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): When you say that the function of this

group changed when it conducted operations against the partisans.

OHLENDORF: I have no concrete experiences myself. It was probably used

for reconnaissance against the partisans and also in combat.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But did it carry out any executions?

OHLENDORF: I can no longer say that definitely for this period, for the

unit now entered territories in which that sort of activity was out of

the question.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In your testimony you said that the

Einsatz group had the object of annihilating the Jews and the

commissars, is that correct?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in what category did you consider

the children? For what reason were the children massacred?

OHLENDORF: The order was that the Jewish population should be totally

exterminated.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Including the children?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Were all the Jewish children murdered?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But the children of those whom you

considered as belonging to the category of commissars, were they also

killed?

OHLENDORF: I am not aware that inquiries were ever made after the

families of Soviet commissars.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did you send anywhere reports on the

executions which the group carried out?

OHLENDORF: Reports on the executions were regularly submitted to the

RSHA.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): No, did you personally send any reports

on the annihilation of thousands of people which you effected? Did you

personally submit any report?

OHLENDORF: The reports came from the Einsatzkommandos who carried out

the actions, to the Einsatzgruppe and the Einsatzgruppe informed the

RSHA.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Whom?

OHLENDORF: The reports went to the Chief of the Sipo personally.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Personally?

OHLENDORF: Yes, personally.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What was the name of this police

officer? Can you give his name?

OHLENDORF: At that time, Heydrich.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): After Heydrich?

OHLENDORF: I was no longer there then, but that was the standing order.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am asking you whether you continued

to submit reports after Heydrich’s death or not?

OHLENDORF: After Heydrich’s death I was no longer in the Einsatz, but

the reports were, of course, continued.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Do you know whether the reports

continued to be submitted after Heydrich’s death or not?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes?

OHLENDORF: No, the reports. . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Was the order concerning the

annihilation of the Soviet people in conformity with the policy of the

German Government or the Nazi Party or was it against it? Do you

understand the question?

OHLENDORF: Yes. One must distinguish here: The order for the liquidation

came from the Führer of the Reich, and it was to be carried out by the

Reichsführer SS Himmler.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But was it in conformity with the

policy conducted by the Nazi Party and the German Government, or was it

in contradiction to it?

OHLENDORF: A policy amounts to a practice so that in this respect it was

a policy laid down by the Führer. If you were to ask whether this

activity was in conformity with the idea of National Socialism, then I

should say “no.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am talking about the practice.

THE PRESIDENT: I understood you to say that objects of value were taken

from the Jewish victims by the Jewish Council of Elders.

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Did the Jewish Council of Elders settle who were to be

killed?

OHLENDORF: The Jewish Council of Elders determined who was a Jew, and

then registered the Jews individually.

THE PRESIDENT: And when they registered them did they take their

valuables from them?

OHLENDORF: That was done in various ways. As far as I remember, the

Council of Elders was given the order to collect valuables at the same

time.

THE PRESIDENT: So that the Jewish Council of Elders would not know

whether or not they were to be killed?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 5 minutes past 2.

[_A recess was taken until 1405._]

-----

[1] Only the first half of the preceding question, originally spoken in

Russian, was transmitted to the witness in German by the interpreter.

The answer of the witness, therefore, refers only to this first half of

the question.

_Afternoon Session_

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When you spoke of the written agreement

between the leaders of the Einsatz groups and the Army, do you know

whether or not the functions and purposes of the Einsatz groups were

described in the agreement? Did the agreement say what the groups were

going to do?

OHLENDORF: I no longer remember that. In any case the task of

liquidation was not mentioned.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you understand the question?

OHLENDORF: Yes. I cannot quite remember whether there was a general

clause in the agreement about the tasks and activities of the Security

Police in the operational area, but I am certain that it contained

nothing regarding the task of liquidation.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You stated that there had been a general

order for the liquidation of all Jews. Was that order in writing?

OHLENDORF: No.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know who gave the order?

OHLENDORF: Is this question with regard to the activities of the

Einsatzgruppen?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.

OHLENDORF: Regarding the Einsatzgruppen, the order came first via

Himmler, Heydrich, and Streckenbach to the Einsatzgruppen and then was

repeated a second time by Himmler personally.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did a similar order go to the Army?

OHLENDORF: I know of no such order to the Army in this form.

THE PRESIDENT: Now do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to

cross-examine this witness?

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Witness, you said that

several weeks before the opening of the Russian campaign, there were

conferences regarding the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen and the

Einsatzkommandos. Were you personally present at these conferences?

OHLENDORF: May I briefly correct this by saying that the main subject

was not the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen but the set-up within the

operational area . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. Will you repeat that, please?

OHLENDORF: May I make a correction by saying that, according to my

recollection, the main subject was not the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen

but the establishment of these mobile organizational units for

activities within the operational area of the Army.

DR. NELTE: In other words, this concerned tasks within the sphere of the

Army?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: You testified that the written agreement was concluded

between the RSHA on the one hand and the OKW and OKH on the other. Are

you familiar with the difference in authority between the OKW and the

OKH?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Who was present from the OKW at these conferences?

OHLENDORF: I cannot mention any one name because I personally was not

present at these conferences, but these conferences were conducted by

Heydrich on the one hand and by his deputy, Schellenberg, on the other.

DR. NELTE: Schellenberg also spoke on this question in an affidavit

presented here, but he mentioned Quartermaster General Wagner as the

official with whom he had to deal. Can you remember now whether this was

also the case at the conferences to which you are referring?

OHLENDORF: At any rate the name of Quartermaster General Wagner is one

of the few names mentioned which I remember in connection with these

conferences.

DR. NELTE: Is it known to you that Quartermaster General Wagner had

nothing to do with the OKW as an institution?

OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: I take it that you cannot therefore name any personality who

might be regarded as representative of the OKW?

OHLENDORF: No, I cannot. I merely said that I remembered—that is, I

still have in my mind’s eye—the letterhead OKW-OKH. I took this double

heading to mean that essential negotiations with Canaris were probably

being carried out, that arrangements with Canaris were therefore

included in this agreement, and that this accounted for the letterhead

OKH plus OKW, which, to me as well, had appeared unusual, since the OKH,

_per se_, was naturally in charge of all movement and supply.

DR. NELTE: A joint letterhead OKW-OKH, as such, did not, of course,

exist. In your case then it could have been only a typewritten copy?

OHLENDORF: I can still visualize a mimeographed sheet.

DR. NELTE: Do you know which signatures were on this document which you

visualize?

OHLENDORF: I cannot remember, I am sorry.

DR. NELTE: One of the judges already put the question that orders would

naturally result from an agreement of this kind. Is the name of the OKW,

or the signature perhaps, included in any one such order?

OHLENDORF: Now I do not understand what kind of orders you mean.