the Sheria-Hareira line were considerable, and careful preparations and
training were necessary. The chief difficulties were those of water and
transport, and arrangements had to be made to ensure that the troops
could be kept supplied with water while operating at considerable
distances from their original water base for a period which might amount
to a week or more; for, though it was known that an ample supply of
water existed at Beersheba, it was uncertain how quickly it could be
developed or to what extent the enemy would have damaged the wells
before we succeeded in occupying the town. Except at Beersheba, no large
supply of water would be found till Sheria and Hareira had been
captured.
[Sidenote: No good roads south of Gaza-Beersheba line.]
[Sidenote: Railway lines to be laid.]
The transport problem was no less difficult; there were no good roads
south of the line Gaza-Beersheba, and no reliance could therefore be
placed on the use of motor transport. Owing to the steep banks of many
of the wadis which intersected the area of operations, the routes
passable by wheeled transport were limited, and the going was heavy and
difficult in many places. Practically the whole of the transport
available in the force, including 30,000 pack camels, had to be allotted
to one portion of the eastern force to enable it to be kept supplied
with food, water, and ammunition at a distance of 15 to 20 miles in
advance of railhead. Arrangements were also made for railhead to be
pushed forward as rapidly as possible towards Karm, and for a line to be
laid from Gamli toward Beersheba for the transport of ammunition.
A railway line was also laid from Deir el Belah to the Wadi Ghuzze,
close behind the sector held by another portion of the eastern force.
[Sidenote: Rushing up artillery and supplies.]
Considerable strain was thrown on the military railway from Kantara to
the front during the period of preparation. In addition to the normal
requirements of the force, a number of siege and heavy batteries,
besides other artillery and units, had to be moved to the front, and
large depots of supplies, ammunition, and other stores accumulated at
the various railheads. Preparations had also to be made and the
necessary material accumulated to push forward the lines from Deir el
Belah and Shellal.
[Sidenote: The enemy determined to maintain Gaza to Beersheba line.]
During the period from July to October, 1917, the enemy's force on the
Palestine front had been increased. It was evident, from the arrival of
these reinforcements and the construction of railway extensions from El
Tine, on the Ramleh-Beersheba railway, to Deir Sineid and Belt Hanun,
north of Gaza, and from Deir Sineid to Huj, and from reports of the
transport of large supplies of ammunition and other stores to the
Palestine front, that the enemy was determined to make every effort to
maintain his position on the Gaza-Beersheba line. He had considerably
strengthened his defences on this line; and the strong localities
mentioned had, by the end of October, been joined up to form a
practically continuous line from the sea to a point south of Sheria,
except for a gap between Ali Muntar and the Sihan Group. The defensive
works round Beersheba remained a detached system, but had been improved
and extended.
[Sidenote: Date of attack on Beersheba.]
The date of the attack on Beersheba, which was to commence the
operations, was fixed as October 31, 1917. Work had been begun on the
railway from Shellal towards Karm, and on the line from Gamli to El
Buggar. The development of water at Ecani, Khalasa, and Asluj proceeded
satisfactorily. These last two places were to be the starting point for
the mounted force detailed to make a wide flanking movement and attack
Beersheba from the east and north-east.
[Sidenote: The Turks make a strong reconnaissance.]
On the morning of October 27 the Turks made a strong reconnaissance
towards Karm from the direction of Kauwukah, two regiments of cavalry
and two or three thousand infantry, with guns, being employed. They
attacked a line of outposts near El Girheir, held by some Yeomanry,
covering railway construction. One small post was rushed and cut up, but
not before inflicting heavy loss on the enemy; another post, though
surrounded, held out all day, and also caused the enemy heavy loss. The
gallant resistance made by the Yeomanry enabled the 53rd (Welsh)
Division to come up in time, and on their advance the Turks withdrew.
[Sidenote: Bombardment of Gaza defenses.]
The bombardment of the Gaza defences commenced on October 27, and on
October 30 warships of the Royal Navy, assisted by a French battleship,
began cooperating in this bombardment.
On the evening of October 30 the portion of the eastern force, which was
to make the attack on Beersheba, was concentrated in positions of
readiness for the night march to its positions of deployment.
[Sidenote: Imperial Camel Corps, Infantry and Cavalry.]
The night march to the positions of deployment was successfully carried
out, all units reaching their appointed positions up to time. The plan
was to attack the hostile works between the Khalasa road and the Wadi
Saba with two divisions, masking the works north of the Wadi Saba with
the Imperial Camel Corps and some infantry, while a portion of the 53rd
(Welsh) Division further north covered the left of the corps. The right
of the attack was covered by a cavalry regiment. Further east, mounted
troops took up a line opposite the southern defences of Beersheba.
[Sidenote: Enemy's advanced works taken.]
As a preliminary to the main attack, in order to enable field guns to be
brought within effective range for wire-cutting, the enemy's advanced
works at 1,070 were to be taken. This was successfully accomplished at
8.45 a.m., after a short preliminary bombardment, by London troops, with
small loss, 90 prisoners being taken. The cutting of the wire on the
main line then proceeded satisfactorily, though pauses had to be made to
allow the dust to clear; and the final assault was ordered for 12.15
p.m. It was successful all along the front attacked, and by about 1 p.m.
the whole of the works between the Khalasa road and the Wadi Saba were
in our hands.
Some delay occurred in ascertaining whether the enemy still occupied the
works north of the road; it was decided, as they were still held by
small parties, to attack them from the south. After a preliminary
bombardment the works were occupied with little opposition by about 7.30
p.m.
[Sidenote: British casualties light.]
The casualties were light, considering the strength of the works
attacked; a large proportion occurred during the advance towards the
positions previous to the assault, the hostile guns being very accurate
and very difficult to locate.
[Sidenote: The road toward Beersheba.]
Meanwhile, the mounted troops, after a night march, for part of the
force of 25 and for the remainder of 35 miles, arrived early in the
morning of the 31st about Khasim Zanna, in the hills some five miles
east of Beersheba. From the hills the advance into Beersheba from the
east and north-east lies over an open and almost flat plain, commanded
by the rising ground north of the town and flanked by an underfeature in
the Wadi Saba called Tel el Saba.
A force was sent north to secure Bir es Sakaty, on the Hebron road, and
protect the right flank, this force met with some opposition and was
engaged with hostile cavalry at Bir es Sakaty and to the north during
the day. Tel el Saba was found strongly held by the enemy, and was not
captured till late in the afternoon.
[Sidenote: Rapid advance of Australian Light Horse.]
Meanwhile, attempts to advance in small parties across the plain towards
the town made slow progress. In the evening, however, a mounted attack
by Australian Light Horse, who rode straight at the town from the east,
proved completely successful. They galloped over two deep trenches held
by the enemy just outside the town, and entered the town at about 7 p.
m., capturing numerous prisoners.
The Turks at Beersheba were undoubtedly taken completely by surprise, a
surprise from which the dash of London troops and Yeomanry, finely
supported by their artillery, never gave them time to recover. The
charge of the Australian Light Horse completed their defeat.
[Sidenote: Prisoners and guns taken.]
A very strong position was thus taken with slight loss, and the Turkish
detachment at Beersheba almost completely put out of action. About 2,000
prisoners and 13 guns were taken, and some 500 Turkish corpses were
buried on the battlefield. This success laid open the left flank of the
main Turkish position for a decisive blow.
[Sidenote: Complete success of Beersheba operations.]
[Sidenote: The attack on Gaza.]
The actual date of the attack at Gaza had been left open till the result
of the attack at Beersheba was known, as it was intended that the former
attack, which was designed to draw hostile reserves towards the Gaza
sector, should take place twenty-four to forty-eight hours previous to
the attack on the Sheria position. After the complete success of the
Beersheba operations, and as the early reports indicated that an ample
supply of water would be available at that place, it was hoped that it
would be possible to attack Sheria by November 3 or 4. The attack on
Gaza was accordingly ordered to take place on the morning of November 2.
Later reports showed that the water situation was less favorable than
had been hoped, but it was decided not to postpone the attack.
[Sidenote: The works on Umbrella Hill principal objectives.]
The objective of this attack were the hostile works from Umbrella Hill
(2,000 yards south-west of the town) to Sheikh Hasan, on the sea (about
2,500 yards north-west of the town). The front of the attack was about
6,000 yards, and Sheikh Hasan, the furthest objective, was over 3,000
yards from our front line. The ground over which the attack took place
consisted of sand dunes, rising in places up to 150 feet in height. This
sand is very deep and heavy going. The enemy's defences consisted of
several lines of strongly built trenches and redoubts.
As Umbrella Hill flanked the advance against the Turkish works further
west, it was decided to capture it by a preliminary operation, to take
place four hours previous to the main attack. It was accordingly
attacked, and captured at 11 p. m. on November 1 by a portion of the
52nd (Lowland) Division. This attack drew a heavy bombardment of
Umbrella Hill itself and our front lines, which lasted for two hours,
but ceased in time to allow the main attack, which was timed for 3 a.
m., to form up without interference.
It had been decided to make the attack before daylight owing to the
distance to be covered between our front trenches and the enemy's
position.
[Sidenote: Success of the attack on Umbrella Hill.]
[Sidenote: Capture of the south-western defenses.]
The attack was successful in reaching all objectives, except for a
section of trench on the left and some of the final objectives in the
centre. Four hundred and fifty prisoners were taken and many Turks
killed. The enemy also suffered heavily from the preliminary
bombardment, and subsequent reports from prisoners stated that one of
the divisions holding the Gaza sector was withdrawn after losing 33 per
cent of its effectives, one of the divisions in general reserve being
drawn into the Gaza sector to replace it. The attack thus succeeded in
its primary object, which was to prevent any units being drawn from the
Gaza defences to meet the threat to the Turkish left flank, and to draw
into Gaza as large a proportion as possible of the available Turkish
reserves. Further, the capture of Sheikh Hasan and the south-western
defences constituted a very distinct threat to the whole of the Gaza
position, which could be developed on any sign of a withdrawal on the
part of the enemy.
Our losses, though considerable, were not in any way disproportionate to
the results obtained.
[Sidenote: Water and transport difficulties.]
Meanwhile on our right flank the water and transport difficulties were
found to be greater than anticipated, and the preparations for the
second phase of the attack were somewhat delayed in consequence.
On the early morning of November 1 the 53rd (Welsh) Division, with the
Imperial Camel Corps on its right, had moved out into the hills north of
Beersheba, with the object of securing the flank of the attack on
Sheria. Mounted troops were also sent north along the Hebron Road to
secure Dhaheriyeh if possible, as it was hoped that a good supply of
water would be found in this area, and that a motor road which the Turks
were reported to have constructed from Dhaheriyeh to Sheria could be
secured for our use.
The 53rd (Welsh) Division, after a long march, took up a position from
Towal Abu Jerwal (six miles north of Beersheba) to Muweileh (four miles
north-east of Abu Irgeig). Irish troops occupied Abu Irgeig the same
day.
[Sidenote: Advance on Kohleh and Khuweilfeh.]
On November 3 we advanced north on Ain Kohleh and Tel Khuweilfeh, near
which place the mounted troops had engaged considerable enemy forces on
the previous day. This advance was strongly opposed, but was pushed on
through difficult hill country to within a short distance of Ain Kohleh
and Khuweilfeh. At these places the enemy was found holding a strong
position with considerable and increasing forces. He was obviously
determined not only to bar any further progress in this direction, but,
if possible, to drive our flankguard back on Beersheba. During the 4th
and 5th he made several determined attacks on the mounted troops. These
attacks were repulsed.
[Sidenote: Hostile cavalry between Khuweilfeh and Hebron Road.]
By the evening of November 5 the 19th Turkish Division, the remains of
the 27th and certain units of the 16th Division had been identified in
the fighting round Tel el Khuweilfeh, and it was also fairly clear that
the greater part of the hostile cavalry, supported apparently by some
infantry ("depot" troops) from Hebron, were engaged between Khuweilfeh
and the Hebron Road.
[Sidenote: Enemy tries to draw forces north of Beersheba.]
The action of the enemy in thus employing the whole of his available
reserves in an immediate counter-stroke so far to the east was
apparently a bold effort to induce me to make essential alterations in
my offensive plan, thereby gaining time and disorganizing my
arrangements. The country north of Beersheba was exceedingly rough and
hilly, and very little water was to be found there. Had the enemy
succeeded in drawing considerable forces against him in that area the
result might easily have been an indecisive fight (for the terrain was
very suitable to his methods of defence) and my own main striking force
would probably have been made too weak effectively to break the enemy's
centre in the neighborhood of Sheria Hareira. This might have resulted
in our gaining Beersheba, but failing to do more--in which case
Beersheba would only have been an incubus of a most inconvenient kind.
However, the enemy's action was not allowed to make any essential
modification to the original plan, which it had been decided to carry
out at dawn on November 6.
[Sidenote: Effort to reach Sheria.]
By the evening of November 5, all preparations had been made to attack
in the Kauwukah and Rushdi systems and to make every effort to reach
Sheria before nightfall.
The mounted troops were to be prepared in the event of a success by the
main force to collect, as they were somewhat widely scattered owing to
water difficulties, and push north in pursuit of the enemy. Tel el
Khuweilfeh was to be attacked at dawn on the 6th, and the troops were to
endeavor to reach line Tel el Khuweilfeh-Rijm el Dhib.
[Sidenote: The plan of attack.]
At dawn on the 6th the attacking force had taken up positions of
readiness to the S.E. of the Kauwukah system of trenches. The attack was
to be commenced by an assault on the group of works forming the extreme
left of the enemy's defensive system, followed by an advance due west up
the railway, capturing the line of detached works which lay east of the
railway. During this attack London and Irish troops were to advance
towards the Kauwukah system, bringing forward their guns to within
wire-cutting range. They were to assault the southeastern face of the
Kauwukah system as soon as the bombardment had proved effective, and
thence take the remainder of the system in enfilade.
[Sidenote: All objectives of the attack captured.]
The attack progressed rapidly, the Yeomanry storming the works on the
enemy's extreme left with great dash; and soon after noon the London and
Irish troops commenced their attack. It was completely successful in
capturing all its objectives, and the whole of the Rushdi system in
addition. Sheria Station was also captured before dark. The Yeomanry
reached the line of the Wadi Sheria to Wadi Union; and the troops on the
left were close to Hareira Redoubt, which was still occupied by the
enemy. This attack was a fine performance, the troops advancing 8 or 9
miles during the day and capturing a series of very strong works
covering a front of about 7 miles, the greater part of which had been
had and strengthened by the enemy for over six months. Some 600
prisoners were taken and some guns and machine-guns captured. Our
casualties were comparatively slight. The greatest opposition was
encountered by the Yeomanry in the early morning, the works covering the
left of the enemy's line being strong and stubbornly defended.
[Sidenote: Mounted troops are ordered to take up the pursuit.]
During the afternoon, as soon as it was seen that the attack had
succeeded, mounted troops were ordered to take up the pursuit and to
occupy Huj and Jemmamah.
The 53rd (Welsh) Division had again had very severe fighting on the 6th.
Their attack at dawn on Tel el Khuweilfeh was successful, and, though
they were driven off a hill by a counterattack, they retook it and
captured another hill, which much improved their position. The Turkish
losses in this area were very heavy indeed, and the stubborn fighting
of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, Imperial Camel Corps, and part of the
mounted troops during November 2 to 6 drew in and exhausted the Turkish
reserves and paved the way for the success of the attack on Sheria. The
53rd (Welsh) Division took several hundred prisoners and some guns
during this fighting.
[Sidenote: Bombardment of Gaza continues.]
The bombardment of Gaza had meanwhile continued, and another attack was
ordered to take place on the night of the 6th-7th.
The objectives were, on the right, Outpost Hill and Middlesex Hill (to
be attacked at 11.30 p. m. on the 6th), and on the left the line Belah
Trench-Turtle Hill (to be attacked at dawn on the 7th).
[Sidenote: Airmen observe enemy movements.]
During the 6th a certain amount of movement on the roads north of Gaza
was observed by our airmen and fired on by our heavy artillery, but
nothing indicating a general retirement from Gaza.
The attack on Outpost Hill and Middlesex Hill met with little
opposition, and as soon, after they had been taken, as patrols could be
pushed forward, the enemy was found to be gone. East Anglian troops on
the left also found at dawn that the enemy had retired during the night,
and early in the morning the main force occupied the northern and
eastern defences of Gaza. Rearguards were still occupying Beit Hanun and
the Atawineh and Tank systems, from whence Turkish artillery continued
to fire on Gaza and Ali Muntar till dusk.
[Sidenote: The Turks evacuate Gaza.]
[Sidenote: Turkish rearguard makes counterattacks.]
As soon as it was seen that the Turks had evacuated Gaza a part of the
force pushed along the coast to the mouth of the Wadi Hesi, so as to
turn the Wadi Hesi line and prevent the enemy making any stand there.
Cavalry had already pushed on round the north of Gaza, and became
engaged with an enemy rearguard at Beit Hanun, which maintained its
position till nightfall. The force advancing along the coast reached the
Wadi Hesi by evening, and succeeded in establishing itself on the north
bank in the face of considerable opposition, a Turkish rearguard making
several determined counterattacks.
On our extreme right the situation remained practically unchanged during
the 7th; the enemy made no further attempt to counterattack, but
maintained his positions opposite our right flank guard.
[Sidenote: London troops take Tel el Sheria.]
In the centre the Hareira Tepe Redoubt was captured at dawn; some
prisoners and guns were taken. The London troops, after a severe
engagement at Tel el Sheria, which they captured by a bayonet charge at
4 a. m. on the 7th subsequently repulsing several counterattacks, pushed
forward their line about a mile to the north of Tel el Sheria; the
mounted troops on the right moved towards Jemmamah and Huj, but met with
considerable opposition from hostile rearguards.
[Sidenote: Charge of the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry.]
[Sidenote: Reports of the Royal Flying Corps.]
During the 8th the advance was continued, and interest was chiefly
centred in an attempt to cut off, if possible, the Turkish rearguard
which had held the Tank and Atawineh systems. The enemy had, however,
retreated during the night 7th-8th, and though considerable captures of
prisoners, guns, ammunition, and other stores were made during the day,
chiefly in the vicinity of Huj, no large formed body of the enemy was
cut off. The Turkish rearguards fought stubbornly and offered
considerable opposition. Near Huj a fine charge by some squadrons of the
Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry captured 12 guns, and broke the
resistance of a hostile rearguard. It soon became obvious from the
reports of the Royal Flying Corps, who throughout the 7th and 8th
attacked the retreating columns with bombs and machine-gun fire, and
from other evidence, that the enemy was retiring in considerable
disorganization, and could offer no very serious resistance if pressed
with determination.
Instructions were accordingly issued on the morning of the 9th to the
mounted troops, directing them on the line El Tine-Beit Duras, with
orders to press the enemy relentlessly. They were to be supported by a
portion of the force, which was ordered to push forward to Julis and
Mejdel.
[Sidenote: Enemy pursued toward Hebron by the Yeomanry.]
The enemy opposite our right flank guard had commenced to retreat
towards Hebron on the morning of the 8th. He was pursued for a short
distance by the Yeomanry, and some prisoners and camels were captured,
but the Yeomanry were then recalled to rejoin the main body of the
mounted troops for the more important task of the pursuit of the enemy's
main body.
[Sidenote: The problem of water and forage.]
By the 9th, therefore, operations had reached the stage of a direct
pursuit by as many troops as could be supplied so far in front of
railhead. The problem, in fact, became one of supply rather than
man[oe]uvre. The question of water and forage was a very difficult one.
Even where water was found in sufficient quantities, it was usually in
wells and not on the surface, and consequently if the machinery for
working the wells was damaged, or a sufficient supply of troughs was not
available, the process of watering a large quantity of animals was slow
and difficult.
[Sidenote: Enemy organizes a counterattack.]
[Sidenote: Enemy's losses heavy.]
On the evening of November 9 there were indications that the enemy was
organizing a counterattack towards Arak el Menshiye by all available
units of the force which had retired towards Hebron, with the object of
taking pressure off the main force, which was retiring along the coastal
plain. It was obvious that the Hebron force, which was believed to be
short of transport and ammunition, to have lost heavily and to be in a
generally disorganized state, could make no effective diversion, and
that this threat could practically be disregarded. Other information
showed the seriousness of the enemy's losses and the disorganization of
his forces.
[Sidenote: Imperial Camel Corps ordered to Tel de Nejile.]
Orders were accordingly issued to press the pursuit and to reach the
Junction Station as early as possible, thus cutting off the Jerusalem
Army, while the Imperial Camel Corps was ordered to move to the
neighborhood of Tel de Nejile, where it would be on the flank of any
counter-stroke from the hills.
[Sidenote: The Turkish Army makes a stand.]