to wages, inspection, hours, and sanitation. These standards were
inserted in the contracts made for garment production, and a board was
appointed to enforce an observance of these standards. The effect of
this has been that it is now possible to say that no uniform worn by an
American soldier is the product of sweatshop toil, and that so far as
the Government is concerned in its purchases of garments it is a model
employer.
[Sidenote: The worker feels a national interest.]
This action has not delayed the accumulation of necessary supplies, and
it has added to our national self-respect. It has distributed national
interest between the soldier who wears and the worker who makes the
garment, regarding them each as assets, each as elements in our
aggregated national strength.
[Sidenote: The Ordnance Department.]
On the 1st day of July, 1916, there was a total of 96 officers in the
Ordnance Department. The commissioned strength of this department
increased substantially 2,700 per cent, and is still expanding. The
appropriations for ordnance in 1917 were $89,697,000; for 1918, in view
of the war emergency, the appropriations for that department aggregate
$3,209,000,000.
[Sidenote: Most difficult problems of the war.]
This division of the War Department has had, in some respects, the most
difficult of the problems presented by the transition from peace to war.
Like the Department of the Quartermaster General, the Ordnance
Department has had to deal with various increases of supply, increases
far exceeding the organization and available capacity of the country for
production. The products needed take longer to produce; for the most
part they involved intricate machinery, and highly refined processes of
manufacture. In addition to this the industrial agencies of the country
have been devoting a large part of their capacity to foreign production
which, in the new set of circumstances, it is unwise to interrupt.
[Sidenote: Organization of the Council of National Defense.]
[Sidenote: An advisory body.]
[Sidenote: Advisory function should not be impaired.]
[Sidenote: The council supplements the Cabinet.]
Legislation enacted on August 29, 1916, as a part of the National
Defense Act provided for the creation of a Council of National Defense.
Shortly thereafter the council was organized, its advisory commission
appointed, a director chosen, and its activities planned. It
appropriately directed its first attention to the industrial situation
of the country and, by the creation of committees representative of the
principal industries, brought together a great store of information both
as to our capacity for manufacture and as to the re-adaptations possible
in an emergency for rapid production of supplies of military value.
Under the law of its creation, the Council of National Defense is not an
executive body, its principal function being to supervise and direct
investigations and make recommendations to the President and the heads
of the executive departments with regard to a large variety of subjects.
The advisory commission is thus advisory to a body which is itself
advisory, and the subordinate bodies authorized to be created are
collectors of data upon which advice can be formulated. There was no
intention on the part of Congress to subdivide the executive function,
but rather to strengthen it by equipping it with carefully matured
recommendations based upon adequate surveys of conditions. The extent of
the council's powers has been sometimes misunderstood, with the result
that it has been deemed an inapt instrument, and from time to time
suggestions have been made looking to the donation to it of power to
execute its conclusions. Whatever determination Congress may hereafter
reach with regard to the bestowal of additional executive power and the
creation of agencies for its exercise, the advisory function of the
Council of National Defense ought not to be impaired, nor ought its
usefulness to be left unrecognized. In the first place, the council
brings together the heads of the departments ordinarily concerned in the
industrial and commercial problems which affect the national defense and
undoubtedly prevents duplications of work and overlappings of
jurisdiction. It also makes available for the special problems of
individual departments the results attained in other departments which
have been called upon to examine the same problem from other points of
view. In the second place, the council supplements the activities of the
Cabinet under the direction of the President by bringing together in a
committee, as it were, members of the Cabinet for the consideration of
problems which, when maturely studied, can be presented for the
President's judgment.
[Sidenote: The council directs the aroused spirit of the nation.]
[Sidenote: The General Munitions Board.]
[Sidenote: Field of priorities in transportation and supplies.]
With the declaration of a state of war, however, the usefulness of the
Council of National Defense became instantly more obvious. The
peace-time activities and interests of our people throughout the country
surged toward Washington in an effort to assimilate themselves into the
new scheme of things which, it was recognized, would call for widespread
changes of occupation and interest. The Council of National Defense was
the only national agency at all equipped to receive and direct this
aroused spirit seeking appropriate modes of action, and it was admirably
adapted to the task because among the members of the council were those
Cabinet officers whose normal activities brought them into constant
contact with all the varied peace-time activities of the people and who
were, therefore, best qualified to judge the most useful opportunities
in the new state of things for men and interests of which they
respectively knew the normal relations. For the more specialized
problems of the national defense, notably those dealing with the
production of war materials, the council authorized the organization of
subordinate bodies of experts, and the General Munitions Board grew
naturally out of the necessities of the War and Navy Departments, which
required not only the maximum production of existing munition-making
industries in the country, but the creation of new capacity for
production and its correlation with similar needs on the part of the
foreign governments. The work done by the General Munitions Board was
highly effective, but it was soon seen that its problem carried over
into the field of transportation, that it was bound up with the question
of priorities, and that it was itself divisible into the great and
separate fields of raw material supply and the production of finished
goods. With the growth of its necessary interests and the constant
discovery of new relations it became necessary so to reorganize the
General Munitions Board as both to enlarge its view and more definitely
recognize its widespread relations.
[Sidenote: The War Industries Board.]
[Sidenote: Knowledge of war needs of the United States and Allies.]
[Sidenote: The Council of National Defense a natural center.]
Upon the advice of the Council of National Defense, the General
Munitions Board was replaced by the War Industries Board, which consists
of a chairman, a representative of the Army, a representative of the
Navy, a representative of labor and the three members of the Allied
Purchasing Commission through whom, under arrangements made with foreign
Governments by the Secretary of the Treasury, the purchasing of allied
goods in the United States is effected. This purchasing commission
consists of three chairmen--one of priorities, one of raw materials, and
one of finished products. By the presence of Army and Navy
representatives, the needs of our own Government are brought to the
common council table of the War Industries Board. The board is thus
enabled to know all the war needs of our Government and the nations
associated with us in war, to measure their effect upon the industry of
the country, to assign relative priorities in the order of
serviceableness to the common cause, and to forecast both the supply of
raw material and our capacity for completing its manufacture in such a
way as to coordinate our entire industrial capacity, both with a view to
its maximum efficiency and to its permanent effect upon the industrial
condition of the country. Under legislation enacted by Congress, the
President has committed certain definite problems to special agencies.
The food administration, the fuel administration, and the shipping
problem being each in the hands of experts specially selected under
appropriate enactments. In large part, these activities are separable
from the general questions considered by the Council of National Defense
and the War Industries Board, but there are necessary relations between
them which it has been found quite simple to arrange by conference and
consultation, and the Council of National Defense, with the Secretary of
the Treasury added as an important councilor, has seemed the natural
center around which to group these agencies so far as any common
activity among them is desirable.
[Sidenote: The War Department indebted to the council.]
[Sidenote: Unremunerated service of able citizens.]
[Sidenote: Business confidence in the Government.]
In the meantime the Advisory Commission of the Council of National
Defense and the council itself have continued to perform the original
advisory functions committed to them by the National Defense Act. The
War Department is glad to acknowledge its debt to the council and the
commission. I refrain from specific enumeration of the services which
the department has received through these agencies only because their
number is infinite and their value obvious. The various supply
committees created by the Supply Commission, the scientific resources
placed at the disposal of the department, the organization of the
medical profession, the cooperation of the transportation interests of
the country, the splendid harmony which has been established in the
field of labor, are all fruits of the actions of these bodies and
notably of the Advisory Commission. It has been especially in connection
with the activities of the council and the commission that we have been
helped by the unremunerated service of citizens who bore no official
relation to the Government but had expert knowledge of and experience
with the industries of the country which it was necessary rapidly to
summon into new uses. Through their influence, the trade rivalries and
commercial competitions, stimulating and helpful in times of peace,
have been subordinated to the paramount purpose of national service and
the common good. They have not only created helpful relations for the
present emergency but have established a new confidence in the
Government on the part of business and perhaps have led to clearer
judgments on the part of the Government in its dealings with the great
organizations, both of labor and of capital, which form the industrial
and commercial fabric of our society. The large temporary gain thus
manifest is supplemented by permanent good; and in the reorganizations
which take place when the war is over there will doubtless be a more
conscious national purpose in business and a more conscious helpfulness
toward business on the part of the Government.
[Sidenote: General Pershing goes to France.]
[Sidenote: The Navy transports troops without any loss.]
[Sidenote: Terminal facilities organized.]
[Sidenote: Cooperation of the Shipping Board.]
[Sidenote: Reserve equipment and food.]
As a result of the exchanges of views which took place between the
military missions to the United States and our own Government, it was
determined to begin at once the dispatch of an expeditionary force of
the American Army to France. This has been done. General John J.
Pershing was selected as commander in chief and with his staff departed
for France, to be followed shortly by the full division, consisting
entirely of Regular Army troops. Immediately thereafter there was formed
the so-called Rainbow Division, made up of National Guard units of many
States scattered widely throughout the country. The purpose of its
organization was to distribute the honor of early participation in the
war over a wide area and thus to satisfy in some part the eagerness of
these State forces to be permitted to serve in Europe. The Marines, with
their fine traditions and honorable history, were likewise recognized,
and regiments of Marines were added to the first forces dispatched. It
would, of course, be unwise to attempt any enumeration of the forces at
this time overseas, but the Army and the country would not have me do
less than express their admiration and appreciation of the splendid
cooperation of the Navy, by means of which these expeditionary forces
have been safely transported and have been enabled to traverse without
loss the so-called danger zone infested by the stealthy and destructive
submarine navy of the enemy. The organization and dispatch of the
expeditionary force required the preparation of an elaborate transport
system, involving not only the procurement of ships and their refitting
for service as troop and cargo transports, but also extensive
organizations of terminal facilities both in this country and France;
and in order to surround the expeditionary force with every safeguard, a
large surplus of supplies of every kind were immediately placed at their
disposal in France. This placed an added burden upon the supply
divisions of the department and explains in part some of the shortages,
notably those of clothing, which have temporarily embarrassed
mobilization of troops at home, embarrassments now happily passed. In
the organization of this transport the constant and helpful cooperation
of the Shipping Board, the railroads, and those in control of
warehousing, wharfing, lighterage, and other terminal facilities has
been invaluable. Our activities in this regard have resulted in the
transporting of an army to France fully equipped, with adequate reserves
of equipment and subsistence, and with those large quantities of
transportation appliances, motor vehicles, railroad construction
supplies, and animals, all of which are necessary for the maintenance
and effective operations of the force.
[Sidenote: Technical troops cooperate with British and French.]
The act authorizing the temporary increase of the military establishment
empowered the department to create special organizations of technical
troops. Under this provision railroad and stevedore regiments have been
formed and special organizations of repair men and mechanics, some of
which have proceeded to France and rendered service back of the British
and French line in anticipation of and training for their later service
with the American Army. No complete descriptions of these activities can
be permitted at this time, but the purpose of the department has been to
provide from the first for the maintenance of our own military
operations without adding to the burdens already borne by the British
and French, and to render, incidentally, such assistance to the British
and French Armies as could be rendered by technical troops in training
in the theater of operations. By this means the United States has
already rendered service of great value to the common cause, these
technical troops having actually carried on operations for which they
are designed in effective cooperation with the British and French Armies
behind hotly contested battle fronts.
[Sidenote: The Red Cross organizes base hospital units.]
[Sidenote: Doctors and nurses aid British and French armies.]
[Sidenote: The medical profession rallies around the service.]
[Sidenote: Convalescent and reconstruction hospitals.]
[Sidenote: Physical fitness necessary for military service.]
Working in close association with the medical committee of the Council
of National Defense and the Red Cross and in constant and helpful
contact with the medical activities of the British, French, and other
belligerents, the Surgeon General has built up the personnel of his
department and taken over from the Red Cross completely organized
base-hospital units and ambulance units, supplemented them by fresh
organizations, procured great quantities of medical supplies and
prepared on a generous scale to meet any demands of our Army in action.
Incidentally and in the course of this preparation, great numbers of
base hospital organizations, ambulance units, and additional doctors and
nurses have been placed at the disposal of the British and French
armies, and are now in the field of actual war, ministering to the
needs of our Allies. Indeed, the honor of first participation by
Americans in this war belongs to the Medical Department. In addition to
all this preparation and activity, the Surgeon General's department has
been charged with the responsibility for the study of defense against
gas attack and the preparation of such gas masks and other appliances as
can be devised to minimize its effects. The medical profession of the
country has rallied around this service. The special laboratories of the
great medical institutions have devoted themselves to the study of
problems of military medicine. New, effective, and expeditious surgical
and medical procedures have been devised and the latest defensive and
curative discoveries of medical science have been made available for the
protection and restoration of our soldiers. Far-reaching activities have
been conducted by the Medical Department here in America, involving the
supervision of plans for great base hospitals in the camps and
cantonments, the planning of convalescent and reconstruction hospitals
for invalided soldiers and anticipatory organization wherever possible
to supply relief to distress and sickness as it may arise. Moreover, the
task of the Medical Department in connection with the new Army has been
exacting. Rigid examinations have been conducted, in the first instance
by the physicians connected with the exemption boards, but later at the
camps, in order to eliminate from the ranks men whose physical condition
did not justify their retention in the military service. Many of the
rejections by the Medical Department have caused grief to high-spirited
young men not conscious of physical weakness or defect, and perhaps
having no weakness or defect which embarrassed their usefulness in
civilian occupation; but both the strength of the Army and justice to
the men involved require that the test of fitness for military service
should be the sole guide, and the judgments of the most expert
physicians have been relied upon to give us an army composed of men of
the highest possible physical efficiency.
* * * * *
The capture of Jerusalem by the British under Allenby on December 8th,
1917, sent a thrill throughout the civilized world. The deliverance of
the Holy City from the Turks marked another great epoch in its history,
which includes possession by Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans,
Arabs, and Turks. The entrance of the British troops into Jerusalem is
described in the following narrative.
THE CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM
GENERAL E. H. H. ALLENBY
[Sidenote: General Allenby's instructions.]
When I took over the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force at the
end of June, 1917, I had received instructions to report on the
conditions in which offensive operations against the Turkish Army on the
Palestine front might be undertaken in the autumn or winter of 1917.
After visiting the front and consulting with the Commander of the
Eastern Force, I submitted my appreciation and proposals in a telegram
dispatched in the second week of July.
[Sidenote: Situation on the Palestine front.]
The main features of the situation on the Palestine front were then as
follows:
The Turkish Army in Southern Palestine held a strong position extending
from the sea at Gaza, roughly along the main Gaza-Beersheba Road to
Beersheba. Gaza had been made into a strong modern fortress, heavily
entrenched and wired, offering every facility for protracted defence.
The remainder of the enemy's line consisted of a series of strong
localities, viz.: the Sihan group of works, the Atawineh group, the Baha
group, the Abu Hareira-Arab el Teeaha trench system, and, finally, the
works covering Beersheba. These groups of works were generally from
1,500 to 2,000 yards apart, except that the distance from the Hareira
group to Beersheba was about 4 1/2 miles.
[Sidenote: Turks have good communications.]
The enemy's force was on a wide front, the distance from Gaza to
Beersheba being about 30 miles; but his lateral communications were
good, and any threatened point of the line could be very quickly
reinforced.
My force was extended on a front of 22 miles, from the sea, opposite
Gaza, to Gamli.
[Sidenote: Lack of water on the British front.]
Owing to lack of water I was unable, without preparations which would
require some considerable time, to approach within striking distance of
the enemy, except in the small sector near the sea coast opposite Gaza.
My proposals received the approval of the War Cabinet, and preparations
were undertaken to enable the plan I had formed to be put into
execution.
[Sidenote: To strike on Turk's left flank.]
I had decided to strike the main blow against the left flank of the main
Turkish position, Hareira and Sheria. The capture of Beersheba was a
necessary preliminary to this operation, in order to secure the water
supplies at that place and to give room for the deployment of the
attacking force on the high ground to the north and north-west of
Beersheba, from which direction I intended to attack the Hareira-Sheria
line.
[Sidenote: Necessary to take Beersheba.]
This front of attack was chosen for the following reasons. The enemy's
works in this sector were less formidable than elsewhere, and they were
easier of approach than other parts of the enemy's defences. When
Beersheba was in our hands we should have an open flank against which to
operate, and I could make full use of our superiority in mounted troops,
and a success here offered prospects of pursuing our advantage and
forcing the enemy to abandon the rest of his fortified positions, which
no other line of attack would afford.
[Sidenote: Attacked Gaza to deceive enemy.]
[Sidenote: Assurance of naval cooperation at Gaza.]
It was important, in order to keep the enemy in doubt up to the last
moment as to the real point of attack, that an attack should also be
made on the enemy's right at Gaza in conjunction with the main
operations. One of my Commanders was therefore ordered to prepare a
scheme for operations against Gaza on as large a scale as the force at
his disposal would permit. I also asked the Senior Naval Officer of
Egypt, Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., to afford me naval
cooperation by bombarding the Gaza defences and the enemy's railway
stations and depots north of Gaza. Rear-Admiral Jackson afforded me
cordial assistance, and during the period of preparation Naval Officers
worked in the closest cooperation with my staff at General Headquarters
and the staff of the G.O.C. troops operating in that region.
[Sidenote: Difficulties regarding water and transport.]